TAPUZ VS.

DEL ROSARIO

Before us for the determination of sufficiency of form and substance (pursuant to Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; Sections 1 and 5 of
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;1 and Sections 1 and 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data2) is the petition for certiorari and for the issuance of the writs of
amparo and habeas data filed by the above-named petitioners against the Honorable Judge Elmo del Rosario [in his capacity as presiding judge of RTC Br. 5,
Kalibo], Sheriff Nelson de la Cruz [in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC], the Philippine National Police stationed in Boracay Island, represented by the PNP Station
Commander, the Honorable Court of Appeals in Cebu, 18th Division, and the spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson, respondents.

The petition and its annexes disclose the following material antecedents:

The private respondents spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson (the "private respondents"), filed with the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Buruanga-Malay, Aklan (the "MCTC") a complaint3 dated 24 April 2006 for forcible entry and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction against the petitioners Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, Aurora Tapuz-Madriaga, Liberty M. Asuncion, Ladylyn Bamos Madriaga, Everly Tapuz
Madriaga, Excel Tapuz, Ivan Tapuz and Marian Timbas (the "petitioners") and other John Does numbering about 120. The private respondents alleged in their
complaint that: (1) they are the registered owners under TCT No. 35813 of a 1.0093-hectare parcel of land located at Sitio Pinaungon, Balabag, Boracay, Malay,
Aklan (the "disputed land"); (2) they were the disputed land's prior possessors when the petitioners - armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms and
together with unidentified persons numbering 120 - entered the disputed land by force and intimidation, without the private respondents' permission and against
the objections of the private respondents' security men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.

In their Answer4 dated 14 May 2006, the petitioners denied the material allegations of the complaint. They essentially claimed that: (1) they are the actual and prior
possessors of the disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private respondents are the intruders; and (3) the private respondents' certificate of title to the disputed
property is spurious. They asked for the dismissal of the complaint and interposed a counterclaim for damages.

The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered on 2 January 2007 a decision5 in the private respondents' favor. It found prior possession - the key issue in forcible
entry cases - in the private respondents' favor, thus:

"The key that could unravel the answer to this question lies in the Amended Commissioner's Report and Sketch found on pages 245 to 248 of the
records and the evidence the parties have submitted. It is shown in the Amended Commissioner's Report and Sketch that the land in question is
enclosed by a concrete and cyclone wire perimeter fence in pink and green highlighter as shown in the Sketch Plan (p. 248). Said perimeter fence was
constructed by the plaintiffs 14 years ago. The foregoing findings of the Commissioner in his report and sketch collaborated the claim of the plaintiffs that
after they acquired the land in question on May 27, 1993 through a Deed of Sale (Annex 'A', Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, p. 276, rec.), they caused the
construction of the perimeter fence sometime in 1993 (Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, pp. 271-275, rec.).

From the foregoing established facts, it could be safely inferred that the plaintiffs were in actual physical possession of the whole lot in question since
1993 when it was interrupted by the defendants (sic) when on January 4, 2005 claiming to (sic) the Heirs of Antonio Tapuz entered a portion of the land
in question with view of inhabiting the same and building structures therein prompting plaintiff Gregorio Sanson to confront them before BSPU, Police
Chief Inspector Jack L. Wanky and Barangay Captain Glenn Sacapaño. As a result of their confrontation, the parties signed an Agreement (Annex 'D',
Complaint p. 20) wherein they agreed to vacate the disputed portion of the land in question and agreed not to build any structures thereon.

The foregoing is the prevailing situation of the parties after the incident of January 4, 2005 when the plaintiff posted security guards, however, sometime
on or about 6:30 A.M. of April 19, 2006, the defendants some with bolos and one carrying a sack suspected to contain firearms with other John Does
numbering about 120 persons by force and intimidation forcibly entered the premises along the road and built a nipa and bamboo structure (Annex 'E',
Complaint, p. 11) inside the lot in question which incident was promptly reported to the proper authorities as shown by plaintiffs' Certification (Annex 'F',
Complaint, p. 12) of the entry in the police blotter and on same date April 19, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Office of the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of Barangay Balabag, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan but no settlement was reached as shown in their Certificate to File Action (Annex
'G', Complaint, p. 13); hence the present action.

Defendants' (sic) contend in their answer that 'prior to January 4, 2005, they were already occupants of the property, being indigenous settlers of the
same, under claim of ownership by open continuous, adverse possession to the exclusion of other (sic)'. (Paragraph 4, Answer, p. 25).

The contention is untenable. As adverted earlier, the land in question is enclosed by a perimeter fence constructed by the plaintiffs sometime in 1993 as
noted by the Commissioner in his Report and reflected in his Sketch, thus, it is safe to conclude that the plaintiffs where (sic) in actual physical
possession of the land in question from 1993 up to April 19, 2006 when they were ousted therefrom by the defendants by means of force. Applying by
analogy the ruling of the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Molina, et al. vs. De Bacud, 19 SCRA 956, if the land were in the possession of
plaintiffs from 1993 to April 19, 2006, defendants' claims to an older possession must be rejected as untenable because possession as a fact cannot be
recognized at the same time in two different personalities.

Defendants likewise contend that it was the plaintiffs who forcibly entered the land in question on April 18, 2006 at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon as
shown in their Certification (Annex 'D', Defendants' Position Paper, p. 135, rec.).

The contention is untenable for being inconsistent with their allegations made to the commissioner who constituted (sic) the land in question that they
built structures on the land in question only on April 19, 2006 (Par. D.4, Commissioner's Amended Report, pp. 246 to 247), after there (sic) entry thereto
on even date.

Likewise, said contention is contradicted by the categorical statements of defendants' witnesses, Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin
Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, in their Joint Affidavit (pp. 143- '144, rec.) [sic] categorically stated 'that on or about April 19, 2006, a group of armed
men entered the property of our said neighbors and built plastic roofed tents. These armed men threatened to drive our said neighbors away from their
homes but they refused to leave and resisted the intruding armed men'.

From the foregoing, it could be safely inferred that no incident of forcible entry happened on April 18, 2006 but it was only on April 19, 2006 when the
defendants overpowered by their numbers the security guards posted by the plaintiffs prior to the controversy.

Likewise, defendants (sic) alleged burnt and other structures depicted in their pictures attached as annexes to their position paper were not noted and
reflected in the amended report and sketch submitted by the Commissioner, hence, it could be safely inferred that these structures are built and (sic)
 situated outside the premises of the land in question, accordingly, they are irrelevant to the instant case and cannot be considered as evidence of their
actual possession of the land in question prior to April 19, 20066."

The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to the Regional Trial Court ("RTC," Branch 6 of Kalibo, Aklan) then presided over by Judge Niovady M. Marin ("Judge
Marin").

On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents' motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction through an Order dated 26 February
2007, with the issuance conditioned on the private respondents' posting of a bond. The writ 7 - authorizing the immediate implementation of the MCTC decision -
was actually issued by respondent Judge Elmo F. del Rosario (the "respondent Judge") on 12 March 2007 after the private respondents had complied with the
imposed condition. The petitioners moved to reconsider the issuance of the writ; the private respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for demolition.

The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and to Defer Enforcement of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in an Order
dated 17 May 20078.

Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition. 9 The respondent Judge nevertheless issued via a Special Order10 a writ of demolition to be
implemented fifteen (15) days after the Sheriff's written notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow the private respondents to effectively
take actual possession of the land.

The petitioners thereafter filed on 2 August 2007 with the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, a Petition for Review11(under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)
of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and Order of Demolition of the RTC of Kalibo, Br. 6 in Civil Case No. 7990.

Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff Nelson R. dela Cruz issued the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition on 19 March 2008. 12

It was against this factual backdrop that the petitioners filed the present petition last 29 April 2008. The petition contains and prays for three remedies, namely: a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; the issuance of a writ of habeas data under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data; and finally, the
issuance of the writ of amparo under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

To support the petition and the remedies prayed for, the petitioners present factual positions diametrically opposed to the MCTC's findings and legal reasons. Most
importantly, the petitioners maintain their claims of prior possession of the disputed land and of intrusion into this land by the private respondents. The material
factual allegations of the petition - bases as well of the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo - read:

"29. On April 29, 2006 at about 9:20 a.m. armed men sporting 12 gauge shot guns intruded into the property of the defendants [the land in
dispute]. They were not in uniform. They fired their shotguns at the defendants. Later the following day at 2:00 a.m. two houses of the defendants were
burned to ashes.

30. These armed men [without uniforms] removed the barbed wire fence put up by defendants to protect their property from intruders. Two of the armed
men trained their shotguns at the defendants who resisted their intrusion. One of them who was identified as SAMUEL LONGNO y GEGANSO, 19 years
old, single, and a resident of Binun-an, Batad, Iloilo, fired twice.

31. The armed men torched two houses of the defendants reducing them to ashes. [...]

32. These acts of TERRORISM and (heinous crime) of ARSON were reported by one of the HEIRS OF ANTONIO TAPUZ [...]. The terrorists
trained their shotguns and fired at minors namely IVAN GAJISAN and MICHAEL MAGBANUA, who resisted their intrusion. Their act is a
blatant violation of the law penalizing Acts of Violence against women and children, which is aggravated by the use of high-powered
weapons.

[…]

34. That the threats to the life and security of the poor indigent and unlettered petitioners continue because the private respondents Sansons have under
their employ armed men and they are influential with the police authorities owing to their financial and political clout.

35. The actual prior occupancy, as well as the ownership of the lot in dispute by defendants and the atrocities of the terrorists [introduced into the
property in dispute by the plaintiffs] are attested by witnesses who are persons not related to the defendants are therefore disinterested witnesses in the
case namely: Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Penarada. Likewise, the affidavit of Nemia T. Carmen is
submitted to prove that the plaintiffs resorted to atrocious acts through hired men in their bid to unjustly evict the defendants.13"

The petitioners posit as well that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint for forcible entry that the private respondents filed below. Citing Section 33
of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,14 they maintain that the forcible entry case in fact involves issues of title to or
possession of real property or an interest therein, with the assessed value of the property involved exceeding P20,000.00; thus, the case should be originally
cognizable by the RTC. Accordingly, the petitioners reason out that the RTC - to where the MCTC decision was appealed - equally has no jurisdiction to rule on
the case on appeal and could not have validly issued the assailed orders.

OUR RULING

We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data fatally defective, both in substance and in form. The petition for the issuance
of the writ of amparo, on the other hand, is fatally defective with respect to content and substance.

The Petition for Certiorari

We conclude, based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition, that the petition for certiorari to nullify the assailed RTC orders has been filed out
of time. It is not lost on us that the petitioners have a pending petition with the Court of Appeals (the "CA petition") for the review of the same RTC orders now
assailed in the present petition, although the petitioners never disclosed in the body of the present petition the exact status of their pending CA petition. The CA
petition, however, was filed with the Court of Appeals on 2 August 2007, which indicates to us that the assailed orders (or at the very least, the latest of the
interrelated assailed orders) were received on 1 August 2007 at the latest. The present petition, on the other hand, was filed on April 29, 2008 or more than eight
months from the time the CA petition was filed. Thus, the present petition is separated in point of time from the assumed receipt of the assailed RTC orders by at
least eight (8) months, i.e., beyond the reglementary period of sixty (60) days15 from receipt of the assailed order or orders or from notice of the denial of a
seasonably filed motion for reconsideration.

We note in this regard that the petitioners' counsel stated in his attached "Certificate of Compliance with Circular #1-88 of the Supreme Court"16 ("Certificate of
Compliance") that "in the meantime the RTC and the Sheriff issued a NOTICE TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION not served to counsel but to the petitioners
who sent photo copy of the same NOTICE to their counsel on April 18, 2008 by LBC." To guard against any insidious argument that the present petition is timely
filed because of this Notice to Vacate, we feel it best to declare now that the counting of the 60-day reglementary period under Rule 65 cannot start from the April
18, 2008 date cited by the petitioners' counsel. The Notice to Vacate and for Demolition is not an order that exists independently from the RTC orders assailed in
this petition and in the previously filed CA petition. It is merely a notice, made in compliance with one of the assailed orders, and is thus an administrative
enforcement medium that has no life of its own separately from the assailed order on which it is based. It cannot therefore be the appropriate subject of an
independent petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in the context of this case. The April 18, 2008 date cannot likewise be the material date for Rule 65 purposes as
the above-mentioned Notice to Vacate is not even directly assailed in this petition, as the petition's Prayer patently shows. 17

Based on the same material antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have been guilty of willful and deliberate misrepresentation before this Court and, at the
very least, of forum shopping.

By the petitioners' own admissions, they filed a petition with the Court of Appeals (docketed as CA - G.R. SP No. 02859) for the review of the orders now also
assailed in this petition, but brought the present recourse to us, allegedly because "the CA did not act on the petition up to this date and for the petitioner (sic) to
seek relief in the CA would be a waste of time and would render the case moot and academic since the CA refused to resolve pending urgent motions and the
Sheriff is determined to enforce a writ of demolition despite the defect of LACK OF JURISDICTION."18

Interestingly, the petitioners' counsel - while making this claim in the body of the petition - at the same time represented in his Certificate of Compliance19 that:

"x x x

(e) the petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals to question the WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION copy of the petition is attached (sic);

(f) the CA initially issued a resolution denying the PETITION because it held that the ORDER TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION OF THE
HOMES OF PETITIONERS is not capable of being the subject of a PETITION FOR RELIEF, copy of the resolution of the CA is attached hereto;
(underscoring supplied)

(g) Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on August 7, 2007 but up to this date the same had not been resolved copy of the MR is attached (sic).

x x x"

The difference between the above representations on what transpired at the appellate court level is replete with significance regarding the petitioners' intentions.
We discern -- from the petitioners' act of misrepresenting in the body of their petition that "the CA did not act on the petition up to this date" while stating the real
Court of Appeals action in the Certification of Compliance -- the intent to hide the real state of the remedies the petitioners sought below in order to mislead us into
action on the RTC orders without frontally considering the action that the Court of Appeals had already undertaken.

At the very least, the petitioners are obviously seeking to obtain from us, via the present petition, the same relief that it could not wait for from the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 02859. The petitioners' act of seeking against the same parties the nullification of the same RTC orders before the appellate court and before
us at the same time, although made through different mediums that are both improperly used, constitutes willful and deliberate forum shopping that can sufficiently
serve as basis for the summary dismissal of the petition under the combined application of the fourth and penultimate paragraphs of Section 3, Rule 46; Section 5,
Rule 7; Section 1, Rule 65; and Rule 56, all of the Revised Rules of Court. That a wrong remedy may have been used with the Court of Appeals and possibly with
us will not save the petitioner from a forum-shopping violation where there is identity of parties, involving the same assailed interlocutory orders, with the recourses
existing side by side at the same time.

To restate the prevailing rules, "forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings involving the same parties for the same cause of action,
either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping may be resorted to by
any party against whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek a favorable opinion in another, other than by appeal or
a special civil action for certiorari. Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the administration of justice and congest court dockets.
Willful and deliberate violation of the rule against it is a ground for summary dismissal of the case; it may also constitute direct contempt."20

Additionally, the required verification and certification of non-forum shopping is defective as one (1) of the seven (7) petitioners - Ivan Tapuz - did not sign, in
violation of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7; Section 3, Rule 46; Section 1, Rule 65; all in relation with Rule 56 of the Revised Rules of Court. Of those who signed, only
five (5) exhibited their postal identification cards with the Notary Public.

In any event, we find the present petition for certiorari, on its face and on the basis of the supporting attachments, to be devoid of merit. The MCTC correctly
assumed jurisdiction over the private respondents' complaint, which specifically alleged a cause for forcible entry and not - as petitioners may have misread or
misappreciated - a case involving title to or possession of realty or an interest therein. Under Section 33, par. 2 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended
by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, exclusive jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases lies with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. These first-level courts have had jurisdiction over these cases - called accion interdictal - even before the R.A. 7691
amendment, based on the issue of pure physical possession (as opposed to the right of possession). This jurisdiction is regardless of the assessed value of the
property involved; the law established no distinctions based on the assessed value of the property forced into or unlawfully detained. Separately from accion
interdictalare accion publiciana for the recovery of the right of possession as a plenary action, and accion reivindicacion for the recovery of
ownership.21 Apparently, these latter actions are the ones the petitioners refer to when they cite Section 33, par. 3, in relation with Section 19, par. 2 of The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, in which jurisdiction may either be with the first-level courts or the regional trial
courts, depending on the assessed value of the realty subject of the litigation. As the complaint at the MCTC was patently for forcible entry, that court committed
no jurisdictional error correctible by certiorari under the present petition.
In sum, the petition for certiorari should be dismissed for the cited formal deficiencies, for violation of the non-forum shopping rule, for having been
filed out of time, and for substantive deficiencies.

The Writ of Amparo

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or
threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on
amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo - in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable
certainty that its issuance demands - requires that every petition for the issuance of the Pwrit must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:

"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;

(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the
respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;

(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the
respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;

(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or
individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;

(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person
responsible for the threat, act or omission; and

(f) The relief prayed for.

The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs."22

The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail
the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed.

The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is anchored on the factual allegations heretofore quoted, 23that are essentially repeated in paragraph 54 of
the petition. These allegations are supported by the following documents:

"(a) Joint Affidavit dated 23 May 2006 of Rowena B. Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, supporting the
factual positions of the petitioners, id., petitioners' prior possession, private respondents' intrusion and the illegal acts committed by the private
respondents and their security guards on 19 April 2006;

(b) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Nemia Carmen y Tapuz, alleging the illegal acts (firing of guns, etc.) committed by a security guard against minors -
descendants of Antonio Tapuz;

(c) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Melanie Tapuz y Samindao, essentially corroborating Nemia's affidavit;

(d) Certification dated 23 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Jackson Jauod regarding the incident of petitioners' intrusion into the disputed land;

(e) Certification dated 27 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Allan R. Otis, narrating the altercation between the Tapuz family and the security guards of
the private respondents, including the gun-poking and shooting incident involving one of the security guards;

(f) Certification issued by Police Officer Christopher R. Mendoza, narrating that a house owned by Josiel Tapuz, Jr., rented by a certain Jorge
Buenavente, was accidentally burned by a fire."

On the whole, what is clear from these statements - both sworn and unsworn - is the overriding involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to
questions of physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned
except to the extent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the threats and
harassments implied from the presence of "armed men bare to the waist" and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting
affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or is continuing.

A closer look at the statements shows that at least two of them - the statements of Nemia Carreon y Tapuz and Melanie Tapuz are practically identical
and unsworn. The Certification by Police Officer Jackson Jauod, on the other hand, simply narrates what had been reported by one Danny Tapuz y Masangkay,
and even mentions that the burning of two residential houses was "accidental."

As against these allegations are the cited MCTC factual findings in its decision in the forcible entry case which rejected all the petitioners' factual claims. These
findings are significantly complete and detailed, as they were made under a full-blown judicial process, i.e., after examination and evaluation of the contending
parties' positions, evidence and arguments and based on the report of a court-appointed commissioner.

We preliminarily examine these conflicting factual positions under the backdrop of a dispute (with incidents giving rise to allegations of violence or threat thereof)
that was brought to and ruled upon by the MCTC; subsequently brought to the RTC on an appeal that is still pending; still much later brought to the appellate
court without conclusive results; and then brought to us on interlocutory incidents involving a plea for the issuance of the writ of amparo that, if decided as the
petitioners advocate, may render the pending RTC appeal moot.
Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts that would justify the issuance of a writ of
amparo. Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing threat to the persons of the petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be
purely property-related and focused on the disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, the
remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.

Nor do we believe it appropriate at this time to disturb the MCTC findings, as our action may carry the unintended effect, not only of reversing the MCTC ruling
independently of the appeal to the RTC that is now in place, but also of nullifying the ongoing appeal process. Such effect, though unintended, will obviously wreak
havoc on the orderly administration of justice, an overriding goal that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo does not intend to weaken or negate.

Separately from these considerations, we cannot fail but consider too at this point the indicators, clear and patent to us, that the petitioners' present
recourse via the remedy of the writ of amparo is a mere subterfuge to negate the assailed orders that the petitioners sought and failed to nullify before the
appellate court because of the use of an improper remedial measure. We discern this from the petitioners' misrepresentations pointed out above; from their
obvious act of forum shopping; and from the recourse itself to the extraordinary remedies of the writs of certiorari and amparo based on grounds that are far from
forthright and sufficiently compelling. To be sure, when recourses in the ordinary course of law fail because of deficient legal representation or the use of improper
remedial measures, neither the writ of certiorari nor that of amparo - extraordinary though they may be - will suffice to serve as a curative substitute. The writ of
amparo, particularly, should not issue when applied for as a substitute for the appeal or certiorari process, or when it will inordinately interfere with these processes
- the situation obtaining in the present case.

While we say all these, we note too that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for rules on the institution of separate actions,24 for the effect of earlier-filed
criminal actions,25 and for the consolidation of petitions for the issuance of a writ of amparo with a subsequently filed criminal and civil action. 26 These rules were
adopted to promote an orderly procedure for dealing with petitions for the issuance of the writ of amparo when the parties resort to other parallel recourses.

Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no
point in separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security -
the personalconcern that the writ is intended to protect - is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar,
however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions
on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case.

The Writ of Habeas Data

Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:

"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;

(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;

(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;

(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or
information, if known;

(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or files kept by the
respondent.

In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of; and

(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable."

Support for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges that:

"1. [ … ] Similarly, a petition for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is prayed for so that the PNP may release the report on the burning of the homes of the
petitioners and the acts of violence employed against them by the private respondents, furnishing the Court and the petitioners with copy of the same;

[…]

66. Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA commanding the Philippine National Police [PNP] to produce the police report pertaining to the
burning of the houses of the petitioners in the land in dispute and likewise the investigation report if an investigation was conducted by the PNP."

These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no
concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not alleged,
much less demonstrated, any need for information under the control of police authorities other than those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The
necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been shown. In sum,
the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the "fishing expedition" that this Court - in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data -
had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data
is fully in order.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the present petition OUTRIGHT for deficiencies of form and substance patent from its body and
attachments.

SO ORDERED.
CARAM VS. SEGUI

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, and Section 191 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo2 seeking to set aside the August 17, 20103 and September 6, 20104Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 106 of Quezon City, in Sp. Proc.
Case No. Q-10-67604. The RTC had dismissed petitioner’s petition for the issuance ofa writ of amparo which petitioner filed in order for her to regain parental
authority and custody of Julian Yusay Caram (Baby Julian), her biological child, from the respondent officers of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD). The factual antecedents as gleaned from the records follow:

Petitioner Ma. Christina Yusay Caram(Christina) had an amorous relationship with Marcelino Gicano Constantino III (Marcelino) and eventually became pregnant
with the latter’s child without the benefit of marriage. After getting pregnant, Christina mislead Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion when in fact she
proceeded to complete the term of her pregnancy. During this time, she intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for Children (Sun and
Moon) in Parañaque City to avoid placing her family ina potentially embarrassing situation for having a second illegitimate son.5

On July 26, 2009, Christina gavebirth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial MedicalCenter, Marikina City. 6Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital and
medical expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment 7 to the DSWD.

On November 26, 2009, Marcelino suffered a heart attack and died8 without knowing about the birth of his son. Thereafter, during the wake, Christina disclosed to
Marcelino’s family that she and the deceased had a son that she gave up for adoption due to financial distress and initial embarrassment. Marcelino’s family was
taken aback by the revelation and sympathized with Christina. After the emotional revelation, they vowed to help her recover and raise the baby.9 On November
27, 2009, the DSWD, through Secretary Esperanza I. Cabral issued a certificate10declaring Baby Julian as "Legally Available for Adoption." A local matching
conference was held on January 27, 2010 and on February 5, 2010, Baby Julian was "matched" with the spouses Vergel and Filomina Medina (Medina Spouses)
of the Kaisahang Bahay Foundation. Supervised trial custody then commenced. 11

On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption, wrote a letter to the DSWDasking for the suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption
proceedings. She alsosaid she wanted her family back together. 12

On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Marijoy D. Segui, sent a Memorandum 13 to DSWD Assistant Secretary Vilma B. Cabrera informing her that
the certificate declaring Baby Julian legally available for adoption had attained finality on November 13, 2009, or three months after Christina signed the Deed of
Voluntary Commitment which terminated her parental authority and effectively made Baby Julian a ward of the State. The said Memorandum was noted by
respondent Atty. Sally D. Escutin, Director IV of the Legal Service, DSWD.

On July 12, 2010, Noel Gicano Constantino, Marcelino’s brother, sent a letter to Atty. Escutin informing her that a DNA testing was scheduled on July 16, 2010 at
the DNA Analysis Laboratory at the University of the Philippines. 14

On July 16, 2010, Assistant Secretary Cabrera sent a letter15 to Noel Constantino stating that it would not allow Baby Julian to undergo DNA testing. Assistant
Secretary Cabrera informed Noel Constantino that the procedures followed relative to the certification on the availability of the child for adoption and the child’s
subsequent placement to prospective adoptive parents were proper, and that the DSWD was no longer in the position to stop the adoption process. Assistant
Secretary Cabrera further stated that should Christina wish to reacquire her parental authority over Baby Julian or halt the adoption process, she may bring the
matter to the regular courts as the reglementary period for her to regain her parental rights had already lapsed under Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9523. 16

On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition17 for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC of Quezon City seeking to obtain custody of Baby Julian from Atty.
Segui, Atty. Escutin, Assistant Secretary Cabrera and Acting Secretary Celia C. Yangco, all of the DSWD.

In her petition, Christina accused respondents of "blackmailing" her into surrendering custody of her childto the DSWD utilizing what she claims to be an invalid
certificate of availability for adoption which respondents allegedly used as basis to misrepresent that all legal requisites for adoption of the minor child had been
complied with.

Christina argued that by making these misrepresentations, the respondents had acted beyond the scope of their legal authority thereby causing the enforced
disappearance of the said child and depriving her of her custodial rights and parental authority over him.

On the basis of the said petition,the RTC, Branch 106 of Quezon City, through its Presiding Judge, the Honorable Angelene Mary W. Quimpo-Sale, issued a Writ
of Amparo18 on July 28, 2010 commanding the four respondents to produce the body of Baby Julian at a hearing scheduled on August 4, 2010. Respondents were
alsorequired to file their verified written return to the writ pursuant to Section 9 19 of the Amparo Rule, within five working days from the service of the writ.

The respondents complied with the writ and filed their Return20 on August 2, 2010 praying that the petition be denied for being the improper remedy to avail of in a
case relating toa biological parent’s custodial rights over her child.

On August 4, 2010, respondents appeared before the RTC but respondents did not bring the child, stating that threats of kidnapping were made on the child and
his caregivers. To give respondents another chance, the RTC reset the hearing to August 5, 2010.

At the August 5, 2010 hearing, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance as representative of the State and prayed that its lawyers be given
time to file their memorandum or position paper in this case. In turn, the RTC acknowledged the appearance of the OSG and allowed its representatives to actively
participate in the arguments raised during the said hearing. Relative to the matter of the parties submitting additional pleadings, Judge Sale narrowed the issues to
be discussed by providing for the following guidelines, thus:

To abbreviate the proceedings, in view of all the manifestations and counter-manifestations made by the counsels, the court enjoined the parties to file their
respective position papers on the following issues:

1. Whether or not this court has jurisdiction over the instant case;

2. Whether or not this petition isthe proper remedy based on the facts of the case and prayer in the petition; and
3. Whether or not the prayer in the petition should be granted and custody of the child be given to his biological mother.

The parties were given five (5) days from today to file their respective position papers based on these three main issues. They may include other related issues
they deem essential for the resolution of this case. Set this case for further hearing, if necessary, on August 18, 2010 at 9:00 a.m. 21

In the same order, Judge Sale alsoacknowledged that the child subject of the case was brought before the court and the petitioner was allowed to see him and
take photographs of him.

On August 17, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition for issuance of a writ of amparo without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate action in court. The RTC held
that Christina availed of the wrong remedy to regain custody of her child Baby Julian. 22 The RTC further stated that Christina should have filed a civil case for
custody of her child as laid down in the Family Code and the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. If there is
extreme urgency to secure custody of a minor who has been illegallydetained by another, a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus may be availed of,
either as a principal or ancillary remedy, pursuant to the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus inRelation to Custody of Minors.23

On August 20, 2010, Christina filed a motion for reconsideration24 arguing that since the RTC assumed jurisdiction of the petition for the issuance of a writ of
amparo, the latter is duty-bound to dispose the case on the merits.25 The RTC, however, deniedChristina’s motion for reconsideration on September 6, 2010
maintaining that the latter availed of the wrong remedy and that the Supreme Court intended the writ of amparo to address the problem of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances.26

On September 28, 2010, Christina directly elevated the case before this Court, via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, in relation to Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. In her petition, Christina prayed that the Court (1) set aside the August 17,
2010 and September 6, 2010 Orders of the RTC, (2) declare R.A. No. 9523 unconstitutional for being contrary to A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC,27 which was promulgated
by the Supreme Court, and for violating the doctrine of separation of powers, (3) declare the "enforced separation" between her and Baby Julian as violative of her
rights to life, liberty and security, and (4) grant her the privilege of availing the benefits of a writ of amparo so she could be reunited with her son.28

The only relevant issue presented before the Court worthy of attention is whether a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental
authority and custody of a minor child. This Court will not belabor to discuss Christina’s argumentsrelating to the supposedunconstitutionality or R.A. No. 9523 as
Congress has the plenary power to repeal, alter and modify existing laws 29 and A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC functions only as a means to enforce the provisions of all
adoption and adoption-related statutes before the courts.

Now, in her petition, Christina argues that the life, liberty and security of Baby Julian is being violated or threatened by the respondent DSWD officers’ enforcement
of an illegal Deed of Voluntary Commitment between her and Sun and Moon. She claims thatshe had been "blackmailed" through the said Deed by the DSWD
officers and Sun and Moon’s representatives into surrendering her child thereby causing the "forced separation" of the said infant from his mother. Furthermore,
she also reiterates that the respondent DSWD officers acted beyond the scope of their authority when they deprived her of Baby Julian’s custody.30

The Court rejects petitioner’s contentions and denies the petition.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides as follows:

SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparois a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful actor omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al., 31 this Court held:

[T]he AmparoRule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is
confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groupsor private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose
the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.

This pronouncement on the coverage of the writ was further cemented in the latter case of Lozada, Jr. v. Macapagal-Arroyo32 where this Court explicitly declared
that as it stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof. As to what constitutes
"enforced disappearance," the Court in Navia v. Pardico33 enumerated the elementsconstituting "enforced disappearances" as the term is statutorily defined in
Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 985134 to wit:

(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State ora political organization;

(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject
of the amparopetition; and,

(d) that the intention for such refusal isto remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.1âwphi1

In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD officers caused her "enforced separation" from Baby Julian and that their action amounted to an
"enforced disappearance" within the context of the Amparo rule. Contrary to her position, however, the respondent DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian's
whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD's May 28, 2010 Memorandum 35 explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina
Spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition for review on certiorari that the respondent DSWD officers
presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing held in the afternoon of August 5, 2010.36 There is therefore, no "enforced disappearance" as used in the
context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.
Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the
necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the
child and contesting custody over him.37 Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental
rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.

To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature,
regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee or a private individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and
guarantee the right to life, liberty and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 17, 2010 and September 6, 2010 Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 106, Quezon City in Sp. Proc.
Case No. Q-10-67604 are AFFIRMED without prejudice to petitioner's right to avail of proper legal remedies afforded to her by law and related rules.

No costs. SO ORDERED.

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES vs. ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE

The individual's desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society is an equally powerful desire. Thus each individual is
continually engaged in a personal adjustment process in which he balances the desire for privacy with the desire for disclosure and
communication of himself to others, in light of the environmental conditions and social norms set by the society in which he lives.

- Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)

The Case

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 19 of A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC,1 otherwise
known as the "Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data." Petitioners herein assail the July 27, 2012 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in
Cebu City (RTC) in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB, which dismissed their habeas data petition.

The Facts

Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were, during the period material, graduating high school students
at St. Theresa's College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to
attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were
then uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her Facebook3 profile.

Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher at STC’s high school department, learned from her students that
some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her
students if they knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes Taboada (Chloe), among
others.

Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal Facebook accounts and showed her photos of the identified
students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the
streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of their black brassieres. What is more, Escudero’s students claimed
that there were times when access to or the availability of the identified students’ photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook friends,4but
were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.5

Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her student’s Facebook page, showed the photosto Kristine Rose Tigol
(Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action. Thereafter, following an investigation, STC found the identified students to have
deported themselves in a manner proscribed by the school’s Student Handbook, to wit:

1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;

2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;

3. Smoking and drinking alcoholicbeverages in public places;

4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;

5. Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity; contains sexually suggestive messages, language or symbols; and
6. Posing and uploading pictures on the Internet that entail ample body exposure.

On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures in question, reported, as required, to the office of Sr. Celeste
Ma. Purisima Pe (Sr. Purisima), STC’s high school principal and ICM6 Directress. They claimed that during the meeting, they were castigated
and verbally abused by the STC officials present in the conference, including Assistant Principal Mussolini S. Yap (Yap), Roswinda Jumiller, and
Tigol. What is more, Sr. Purisima informed their parents the following day that, as part of their penalty, they are barred from joining the
commencement exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012.
A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages before
the RTC of Cebu City against STC, et al., docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-38594.7In it, Tan prayed that defendants therein be enjoined from
implementing the sanction that precluded Angela from joining the commencement exercises.

On March 25, 2012,petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother of Julia, joined the fray as an intervenor. On March 28, 2012,
defendants inCivil Case No. CEB-38594 filed their memorandum, containing printed copies of the photographs in issue as annexes. That same
day, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) allowing the students to attend the graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a motion
for reconsideration.

Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned students from participating in the graduation rites, arguing that, on
the date of the commencement exercises, its adverted motion for reconsideration on the issuance ofthe TRO remained unresolved.

Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB8 on the
basis of the following considerations:

1. The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were taken for posterity before they changed into their swimsuits on the
occasion of a birthday beach party;

2. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at "Friends Only." They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of
privacy which must be respected.

3. Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or ought to have known of laws that safeguard the right to privacy.
Corollarily, respondents knew or ought to have known that the girls, whose privacy has been invaded, are the victims in this case, and
not the offenders. Worse, after viewing the photos, the minors were called "immoral" and were punished outright;

4. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their consent. Escudero, however,
violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook
accounts of petitioners’ children were intruded upon;

5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and digital images happened at STC’s
Computer Laboratory; and

6. All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly broadcasted by respondents through their memorandum submitted to
the RTC in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594. To petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing constitutes an invasion of their
children’s privacy and, thus, prayed that: (a) a writ of habeas databe issued; (b) respondents be ordered to surrender and deposit with
the court all soft and printed copies of the subjectdata before or at the preliminary hearing; and (c) after trial, judgment be rendered
declaring all information, data, and digital images accessed, saved or stored, reproduced, spread and used, to have been illegally
obtained inviolation of the children’s right to privacy.

Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC, through an Order dated July 5, 2012, issued the writ of habeas data. Through the
same Order, herein respondents were directed to file their verified written return, together with the supporting affidavits, within five (5) working
days from service of the writ.

In time, respondents complied with the RTC’s directive and filed their verified written return, laying down the following grounds for the denial of
the petition, viz: (a) petitioners are not the proper parties to file the petition; (b) petitioners are engaging in forum shopping; (c) the instant case is
not one where a writ of habeas data may issue;and (d) there can be no violation of their right to privacy as there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy on Facebook.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for habeas data. The dispositive portion of the Decision pertinently states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.9

To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the minors’ right to privacy, one of the
preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data. Moreover, the court a quoheld that the photos, having been uploaded on Facebook
without restrictions as to who may view them, lost their privacy in some way. Besides, the RTC noted, STC gathered the photographs through
legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the implementation of the school’s policies and rules on discipline.

Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court pursuant to Section 19 of the Rule on Habeas Data. 10
 The Issues

The main issue to be threshed out inthis case is whether or not a writ of habeas datashould be issued given the factual milieu. Crucial in
resolving the controversy, however, is the pivotal point of whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy
in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case.

Our Ruling

We find no merit in the petition.

Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of Habeas Data

The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data
or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. 11 It is an independent and summary remedy
designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s
right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances
in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. 12

In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to informational privacy, among others. A comparative law
scholar has, in fact, defined habeas dataas "a procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age."13 The
writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a person.Availment of the writ requires
the existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. 14 Thus, the existence
of a person’s right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to
privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be extended. 15

Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational privacy, a habeas datapetition will not prosper. Viewed from the
perspective of the case at bar,this requisite begs this question: given the nature of an online social network (OSN)––(1) that it facilitates and
promotes real-time interaction among millions, if not billions, of users, sans the spatial barriers, 16 bridging the gap created by physical space; and
(2) that any information uploaded in OSNs leavesan indelible trace in the provider’s databases, which are outside the control of the end-users––
is there a right to informational privacy in OSN activities of its users? Before addressing this point, We must first resolve the procedural issues in
this case.

a. The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances

Contrary to respondents’ submission, the Writ of Habeas Datawas not enacted solely for the purpose of complementing the Writ of Amparoin
cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, the petition may be filed by:

(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children and parents; or

(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degreeof consanguinity or affinity, in
default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph. (emphasis supplied)

Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, the
above underscored portion of Section 2, reflecting a variance of habeas data situations, would not have been made.

Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age." 17 As such, it is erroneous to limit its
applicability to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances only. In fact, the annotations to the Rule preparedby the Committee on the
Revision of the Rules of Court, after explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data complements the Writ of Amparo, pointed out that:

The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s right to privacy, more specifically the right to
informational privacy. The remedies against the violation of such right can include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the
database or information or files in possession or in control of respondents.18 (emphasis Ours) Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Datamay also be availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

b. Meaning of "engaged" in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information

Respondents’ contention that the habeas data writ may not issue against STC, it not being an entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is,
nonetheless, erroneous.
To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity
engaged in the businessof gathering, storing, and collecting of data. As provided under Section 1 of the Rule:

Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated
or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis Ours)

The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea that habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or
omissions of public officials and of private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and
his or her correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data.

To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To "engage" means "to do or take part in something."19 It does not
necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting
or storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as
when one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial and
such will not prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity.

To agree with respondents’ above argument, would mean unduly limiting the reach of the writ to a very small group, i.e., private persons and
entities whose business is data gathering and storage, and in the process decreasing the effectiveness of the writ asan instrument designed to
protect a right which is easily violated in view of rapid advancements in the information and communications technology––a right which a great
majority of the users of technology themselves are not capable of protecting.

Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now proceed to the core of the controversy.

The right to informational privacy on Facebook

a. The Right to Informational Privacy

The concept of privacyhas, through time, greatly evolved, with technological advancements having an influential part therein. This evolution was
briefly recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno’s speech, The Common Right to Privacy,20 where he explained the three strands of
the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational privacy; 21(2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy. 22 Of the three, what is relevant
to the case at bar is the right to informational privacy––usually defined as the right of individuals to control information about themselves. 23

With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data sharing nowadays, not to mention each system’s inherent
vulnerability to attacks and intrusions, there is more reason that every individual’s right to control said flow of information should be protected
and that each individual should have at least a reasonable expectation of privacy in cyberspace. Several commentators regarding privacy and
social networking sites, however, all agree that given the millions of OSN users, "[i]n this [Social Networking] environment, privacy is no longer
grounded in reasonable expectations, but rather in some theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking." 24

It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to provide for judicial remedies that would allow a summary hearing of the unlawful
use of data or information and to remedy possible violations of the right to privacy. 25 In the same vein, the South African High Court, in its
Decision in the landmark case, H v. W,26promulgated on January30, 2013, recognized that "[t]he law has to take into account the changing
realities not only technologically but also socially or else it will lose credibility in the eyes of the people. x x x It is imperative that the courts
respond appropriately to changing times, acting cautiously and with wisdom." Consistent with this, the Court, by developing what may be viewed
as the Philippine model of the writ of habeas data, in effect, recognized that, generally speaking, having an expectation of informational privacy
is not necessarily incompatible with engaging in cyberspace activities, including those that occur in OSNs.

The question now though is up to whatextent is the right to privacy protected in OSNs? Bear in mind that informational privacy involves personal
information. At the same time, the very purpose of OSNs is socializing––sharing a myriad of information,27 some of which would have otherwise
remained personal.

b. Facebook’s Privacy Tools: a response to the clamor for privacy in OSN activities

Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact and to stay connected to other members of the same or different
social media platform through the sharing of statuses, photos, videos, among others, depending on the services provided by the site. It is akin to
having a room filled with millions of personal bulletin boards or "walls," the contents of which are under the control of each and every user. In his
or her bulletin board, a user/owner can post anything––from text, to pictures, to music and videos––access to which would depend on whether
he or she allows one, some or all of the other users to see his or her posts. Since gaining popularity, the OSN phenomenon has paved the way
to the creation of various social networking sites, includingthe one involved in the case at bar, www.facebook.com (Facebook), which, according
to its developers, people use "to stay connected with friends and family, to discover what’s going on in the world, and to share and express what
matters to them."28

Facebook connections are established through the process of "friending" another user. By sending a "friend request," the user invites another to
connect their accounts so that they can view any and all "Public" and "Friends Only" posts of the other.Once the request is accepted, the link is
established and both users are permitted to view the other user’s "Public" or "Friends Only" posts, among others. "Friending," therefore, allows
the user to form or maintain one-to-one relationships with other users, whereby the user gives his or her "Facebook friend" access to his or her
profile and shares certain information to the latter.29
To address concerns about privacy,30 but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate
the accessibility of a user’s profile31 as well as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W,32 the South Gauteng High Court recognized this
ability of the users to "customize their privacy settings," but did so with this caveat: "Facebook states in its policies that, although it makes every
effort to protect a user’s information, these privacy settings are not foolproof." 33

For instance, a Facebook user canregulate the visibility and accessibility of digital images(photos), posted on his or her personal bulletin or
"wall," except for the user’sprofile picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy setting:

(a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;

(b) Friends of Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;

(b) Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;

(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook user; and

(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user.

The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up barriers to broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific
profile content, statuses, and photos, among others, from another user’s point of view. In other words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to
make the availability of their Facebook activities reflect their choice as to "when and to what extent to disclose facts about [themselves] – and to
put others in the position of receiving such confidences." 34 Ideally, the selected setting will be based on one’s desire to interact with others,
coupled with the opposing need to withhold certain information as well as to regulate the spreading of his or her personal information. Needless
to say, as the privacy setting becomes more limiting, fewer Facebook users can view that user’s particular post.

STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy

Without these privacy settings, respondents’ contention that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in Facebook would, in context, be
correct. However, such is not the case. It is through the availability of said privacy tools that many OSN users are said to have a subjective
expectation that only those to whomthey grant access to their profile will view the information they post or upload thereto. 35

This, however, does not mean thatany Facebook user automatically has a protected expectation of privacy inall of his or her Facebook activities.

Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this case the children of
petitioners,manifest the intention to keepcertain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its
visibility.36 And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these
privacy tools is the manifestation,in cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to informational privacy. 37

Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny access to his or her post orprofile detail should not be
denied the informational privacy right which necessarily accompanies said choice.38Otherwise, using these privacy tools would be a feckless
exercise, such that if, for instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal information to his or her Facebook page and sets its privacy level at
"Only Me" or a custom list so that only the user or a chosen few can view it, said photo would still be deemed public by the courts as if the user
never chose to limit the photo’s visibility and accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of their function but it
would also disregard the very intention of the user to keep said photo or information within the confines of his or her private space.

We must now determine the extent that the images in question were visible to other Facebook users and whether the disclosure was confidential
in nature. In other words, did the minors limit the disclosure of the photos such that the images were kept within their zones of privacy? This
determination is necessary in resolving the issue of whether the minors carved out a zone of privacy when the photos were uploaded to
Facebook so that the images will be protected against unauthorized access and disclosure.

Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their children’s privacy right being violated, insist that Escudero intruded upon their children’s
Facebook accounts, downloaded copies ofthe pictures and showed said photos to Tigol. To them, this was a breach of the minors’ privacy since
their Facebook accounts, allegedly, were under "very private" or "Only Friends" setting safeguarded with a password. 39 Ultimately, they posit that
their children’s disclosure was only limited since their profiles were not open to public viewing. Therefore, according to them, people who are not
their Facebook friends, including respondents, are barred from accessing said post without their knowledge and consent. Aspetitioner’s children
testified, it was Angelawho uploaded the subjectphotos which were only viewable by the five of them, 40 although who these five are do not
appear on the records.

Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit41 that "my students showed me some pictures of girls cladin brassieres. This student [sic] of
mine informed me that these are senior high school [students] of STC, who are their friends in [F]acebook. x x x They then said [that] there are
still many other photos posted on the Facebook accounts of these girls. At the computer lab, these students then logged into their Facebook
account [sic], and accessed from there the various photographs x x x. They even told me that there had been times when these photos were
‘public’ i.e., not confined to their friends in Facebook."

In this regard, We cannot give muchweight to the minors’ testimonies for one key reason: failure to question the students’ act of showing the
photos to Tigol disproves their allegation that the photos were viewable only by the five of them. Without any evidence to corroborate their
statement that the images were visible only to the five of them, and without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the other students were able
to view the photos, their statements are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.42

It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her students, who are the minors’ Facebook "friends,"
showed her the photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be able to viewthe allegedly private
posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students,43 and that it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable
either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.

Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is"Public," it can be surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to
everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If suchwere the case, they
cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy. The ensuing pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez44 is most
instructive:

[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly
under circumstances suchas here, where the Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices that would have controlled access to the
Web page or the photograph itself.45

Also, United States v. Maxwell46 held that "[t]he more open the method of transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably expect.
Messages sent to the public at large inthe chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of
privacy."

That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not necessarily bolster the petitioners’ contention. In this regard, the cyber community is
agreed that the digital images under this setting still remain to be outside the confines of the zones of privacy in view of the following:

(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the tools to interact and share in any conceivable
way;"47

(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total strangers;48

(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and

(4) A user’s Facebook friend can "share"49 the former’s post, or "tag"50 others who are not Facebook friends with the former, despite its
being visible only tohis or her own Facebook friends.

It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to "Friends" is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by
another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or
her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the
post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the
post, the privacy setting of which was set at "Friends."

To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B are not Facebook friends. If C, A’s Facebook friend, tags B in A’s
post, which is set at "Friends," the initial audience of 100 (A’s own Facebook friends) is dramatically increased to 300 (A’s 100 friends plus B’s
200 friends or the public, depending upon B’s privacy setting). As a result, the audience who can view the post is effectively expanded––and to a
very large extent.

This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of Facebook’s proclivity towards user interaction and socialization rather than
seclusion or privacy, as it encourages broadcasting of individual user posts. In fact, it has been said that OSNs have facilitated their users’ self-
tribute, thereby resulting into the "democratization of fame." 51Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or even a post, with visibility set at "Friends
Only" cannot easily, more so automatically, be said to be "very private," contrary to petitioners’ argument.

As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’ Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be
taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were
mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them
by persons who had legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however,
neither the minors nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy against the students who showed the images to Escudero.

Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents reproduced and broadcasted the photographs. In fact, what petitioners
attributed to respondents as an act of offensive disclosure was no more than the actuality that respondents appended said photographs in their
memorandum submitted to the trial court in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594.52 These are not tantamount to a violation of the minor’s
informational privacy rights, contrary to petitioners’ assertion.

In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more precise, the photos of minor students scantily clad, are personal in
nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of the minors enrolled in a conservative institution. However, the records are
bereft of any evidence, other than bare assertions that they utilized Facebook’s privacy settings to make the photos visible only to them or to a
select few. Without proof that they placed the photographs subject of this case within the ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot
now insist that they have an expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question.
Had it been proved that the access tothe pictures posted were limited to the original uploader, through the "Me Only" privacy setting, or that the
user’s contact list has been screened to limit access to a select few, through the "Custom" setting, the result may have been different, for in such
instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s friends en
masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.

On Cyber Responsibility

It has been said that "the best filter is the one between your children’s ears."53 This means that self-regulation on the part of OSN users and
internet consumers ingeneral is the best means of avoiding privacy rights violations.54 As a cyberspace communitymember, one has to be
proactive in protecting his or her own privacy.55 It is in this regard that many OSN users, especially minors, fail.Responsible social networking or
observance of the "netiquettes"56 on the part of teenagers has been the concern of many due to the widespreadnotion that teenagers can
sometimes go too far since they generally lack the people skills or general wisdom to conduct themselves sensibly in a public forum. 57

Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons on good cyber citizenship in its curriculum to educate its students on proper
online conduct may be mosttimely. Too, it is not only STC but a number of schools and organizations have already deemed it important to
include digital literacy and good cyber citizenshipin their respective programs and curricula in view of the risks that the children are exposed to
every time they participate in online activities. 58 Furthermore, considering the complexity of the cyber world and its pervasiveness,as well as the
dangers that these children are wittingly or unwittingly exposed to in view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the participation of the
parents in disciplining and educating their children about being a good digital citizen is encouraged by these institutions and organizations. In
fact, it is believed that "to limit such risks, there’s no substitute for parental involvement and supervision." 59

As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its students to beresponsible in their dealings and activities in
cyberspace, particularly in OSNs, whenit enforced the disciplinary actions specified in the Student Handbook, absenta showing that, in the
process, it violated the students’ rights.

OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to whenever they engage incyberspace activities.1âwphi1 Accordingly,
they should be cautious enough to control their privacy and to exercise sound discretion regarding how much information about themselves they
are willing to give up. Internet consumers ought to be aware that, by entering or uploading any kind of data or information online, they are
automatically and inevitably making it permanently available online, the perpetuation of which is outside the ambit of their control. Furthermore,
and more importantly, information, otherwise private, voluntarily surrendered by them can be opened, read, or copied by third parties who may or
may not be allowed access to such.

It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings and activities and must not be negligent in protecting
their rights. Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding relief from the courts, as here, requires that claimants themselves take utmost care in
safeguarding a right which they allege to have been violated. These are indispensable. We cannot afford protection to persons if they
themselves did nothing to place the matter within the confines of their private zone. OSN users must be mindful enough to learn the use of
privacy tools, to use them if they desire to keep the information private, and to keep track of changes in the available privacy settings, such as
those of Facebook, especially because Facebook is notorious for changing these settings and the site's layout often.

In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors' privacy rights, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
case disposition of the court a quo.

In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other assigned errors.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated July 27, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in
Cebu City in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB is hereby AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.