Talal Asad On Torture

On Torture, or Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment
Author(s): TALAL ASAD

Source: Social Research, Vol. 63, No. 4 (WINTER 1996), pp. 1081-1109
Published by: The New School
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40971325 .
Accessed: 22/07/2013 05:20
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
The New School is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Social Research.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 130.126.32.13 on Mon, 22 Jul 2013 05:20:47 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
On Torture,
or Cruel,
Inhuman,and
Degrading /
Treatment*/ BY TALAL ASAD
In thispaper I discussthemodernconceptionof "cruelty," in

particular as represented in Article 5 of the Universal
Declarationof Human Rights:"No one shall be subjectedto
tortureor to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatmentor
punishment."In this statementthe adjectives qualifying
"treatment or punishment" seemto indicateformsof behavior
thatif not quite equivalentto "torture,"at least have a close
withit.
affinity
Moral and legaljudgmentsthatderivefromthisrule have
an interesting historyin the West,to whichI shall advertin
whatfollows.I wantto advance the thesisthatthe universal
rules enshrinedin the Declarationcover a wide range of
different
qualitatively kindsofbehavior.Moreprecisely, I shall
try to make four that
points: first, the modern historyof
* An earlyversionof thispaperwasreadfirstin Bellagioat a conference on "Social

Suffering"in July1994; I thankthe organizersArthurKleinman,Veena Das, and
MaragaretLock fortheirhelpfulresponses.Laterversionswereread at seminarsin
The NewSchoolforSocialResearch,The University of Californiaat SantaCruz,The
JohnsHopkinsUniversity, New York University, and The University of Sussex at
Brighton.I am grateful to each of theseaudiencesfortheircriticismsand comments.
In particular,I have benefitted fromcriticalsuggestionsmade by the following:
Jonathan Boyarin,JeffGoldfarb, VickiHattam,KiraKosnick, JimMiller,KeithNield,
DavidSchneider, DavidScott,Don Scott,and BrianStreet.
SOCIAL RESEARCH, Vol. 63, No. 4 (Winter1996)

1082 SOCIAL RESEARCH
"torture"is not only a record of the progressiveprohibitionof

cruel, inhuman and degrading practices. It is also part of a
more complex storyof the modern secular concept of what it
means to be trulyhuman. The second point is this: the phrase
"torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment"serves
today as a cross-culturalcriterionfor making moral and legal
judgments about pain and suffering.Yet it is given much of
its operative sense historicallyand culturally.My thirdpoint is
linked to the first two. It is that the new ways of
conceptualizingsuffering (which include "mental torture"and
"degrading treatment")and sufferer (a term that now refers
also to non-humansand even to the natural environment)are
increasinglyuniversal in scope but particular in prescriptive
content. The final point is that the modern dedication to
eliminating pain and suffering often conflicts with other
commitmentsand values: the right of individuals to choose
and the duty of the state to maintainits interests.
Together, these four points aim at underscoring the
unstable character of a central categorydeployed in modern,
Westernsociety.The instabilityrelates,in brief,to the factthat
the ideas of torture, cruelty, inhumanity, and degrading
treatmentare intended to measure what are oftenincommen-
surable standardsof behavior. In addition, theyare applied in
particularcases in a contradictoryfashion.
I do not argue that there can be no such thingas cruelty.I
am merely skeptical about theuniversalist discoursesthat have
been generated around it. But myskepticismis intellectual,not
moral. This paper is not concerned withattackingthe reforms
thattake theirinspirationfromthe United Nations condemna-
tionof "tortureor cruel,inhuman and degrading treatment."I
am interestedprimarilyin the way Western discourses about
crueltyhang together,and the waysthatthe idea of torturecan
overlap with and substitutefor ideas of cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment-as well as of the inflictingof pain and
sufferingon others. In myview,such inquiriesare necessaryif
we seek to clarifyour transculturaljudgments.

ON TORTURE 1083
Two Historiesof Torture
I beginwitha discussionof twobookswhichtogethershow

verydifferent waysof writinghistoriesof cruelty.The first,
by G.R. Scott, representsphysicalcrueltyas a featureof
barbaricsocieties-that is, societiesthat have not yet been
humanized.The other book is by D. Rejali. It makes a
distinctionbetween two kinds of physical cruelty,one
appropriate to pre-modern and the other to modern
societies,and describes that differencein the context of
contemporary Iran.
Scott was a Fellow of several Britishlearned societies,
includingamong them the Royal AnthropologicalInstitute.
His History ofTorture (1940) is perhapsthe firstmodernstory
of its kind. It deals at lengthwith "Savage and Primitive
Races," ancient and early modern European peoples, and
Asian "civilizations" (China,Japan, and India). On the one
hand, it tellsa of
story punishments now largelydiscontinued
or suppressed; on the other, it speaks of motives for
inflictingsufferingthat are deep-rooted and pervasive.
His indebtednessto Krafft-Ebing's ideas is evident not
only in explicit form in his chapters on "Sadism" and
"Masochism,"but also in the generalevolutionary schemehe
employsaccording to which the primitiveurge to inflict
pain
remainsa latentpossibility(sometimesrealized) in civilized
society.
Scottis somewhatunusualforhistimein wantingto include
the mistreatment of animalsin his accountof torture,and in
describing theirplightas a consequenceof thenon-recognition
ofrights, forlikeothermodernshe sees theextensionofrights
tobe crucialfortheelimination ofcruelty.But in thecourseof
arguing this thesis he hits on a profoundand disturbing
ambiguity.It is not entirelyclear whetherhe thinksthat
humancrueltyis merelyan instanceof bestial cruelty-thatis,a
workingout of the supposedlyuniversalinstinctof stronger
animals to hunt or attackthe weaker. Or whetherhuman

crueltyis unique -not a characteristicof animal behavior at

all- and that everydayhuman ruthlessnesstoward animals is
essential for justifyingthe persecution of vulnerable people
(defeated enemies, uninitiated children, and so on) on the
ground that they are notfully human. In either case, Scott
disturbsliberal ideas of what it is to be trulyhuman: humans
are essentiallyno differentfrom other animals, or they are
differentby virtueof theirunique capacityfor cruelty.
It is worth noting that the instances of physical pain Scott
describes as "torture" belong sometimes to the involuntary
submission to punishmentand sometimes to the practices of
personal discipline (for example, rituals of endurance,
asceticism).He makes no distinctionbetween the two: pain is
regarded as an isolable experience to be condemned for what
it is.
In the encounter between "Savage Races" and modern
Euro-Americans,Scott has no doubt that "torture" is some-
thing the former do to the latter- perhaps because it is
synonymous with "barbarity." At any rate, the sufferings
inflicted on Native Americans by white settlers and the
expanding United States have no place in his history of
torture.
This is not to say that Scott asserts torture to be entirely
absent in the modern state.On the contrary,he is quite explicit
about its use by the police to secure confession ("the third
degree"). His positionis thatthe storyof modernityis in part a
story of the progressive elimination of all morally shocking
social behavior- including what is now described in interna-
tional law as "cruel, inhuman and degrading treatmentor
punishment."Scottdoes not claim thatthatintentionhas been
fullyrealized, only that progress has been made. In this story
of progress, he tells us, the state's definitionand defense of
rightsis the most effectiveprotectionagainst cruelty.
In his importantbook, the Iranian political scientistDarius
Rejali makes the interestingargument that far from being a
barbaric survivalin the modern state as Scott's storysuggests,

ON TORTURE 1085
tortureis in fact integralto it (Rejali, 1994). Althoughhe

classifiestortureintotwotypes,modernand pre-modern, he
shareswithScottthe viewthatthe term"torture"has a fixed
referent. More precisely,bothof themassumethatto speakof
tortureis to referto a practicein whichthe agentforcibly
painon anotherregardlessoftheplacethatthepractice
inflicts
occupieswithina largermoraleconomy.
Rejali offersa sophisticatedaccountof the role of political
punishments in Iran both beforeand afterthe inceptionof
modernization in thatcountry.Moderntorture, he tellsus, is a
formof physicalsufferingthat is an inseparablepart of a
disciplinarysociety.In Iran, the practiceof tortureis as
essentialto the IslamicRepublictodayas it was to the Pahlevi
regime it replaced. Both in their own way are modern
disciplinarysocieties.
Rejalibelieves thathisbookrefuteswhatFoucaulthad to say
about torturein Discipline and Punish(1979).1 He maintains
thattorturedoes notgiveplace to disciplinein modernsociety,
as Foucaultclaimed,butpersistsin a majorway.This belief,in
myview,arisesfroma misreadingof Foucault,whosecentral
concern was not with "torture"but with "power": and
consequently witha contrastbetweensovereignpower(which
needs to exhibititselfpublicly)and disciplinarypower(which
worksthroughthenormalization of everydaybehavior).
Public rituals of tortureare no longer deemed to be
necessaryto the maintenanceof sovereignpower (whether
theywerein factfunctionally necessaryto themaintenanceof
"socialorder"is, of course,anotherquestion).But Foucault's
thesisaboutdisciplinary poweris notsubvertedbyevidenceof
torture
surreptitious in the modern state. On the contrary,
preciselybecause torturecarriedout in secretis said to be
connectedwiththeextraction of information,itis an aspectof
policing.(The actualmotivesof torturers, whetherin modern
or in premodernstates,are usually mixed and variable.)
Policingas a governmental activitydirectedat defendinga
fundamental"interestof society"concernsthe ordinaryand

extraordinarysecurityof the state and its citizens. It is an

institutionin which knowledge and power depend upon each
other: much of it- and this point is curiously neglected by
Rejali- circulatingin secret.
Modern tortureas part of policing is typicallysecret partly
because inflictingphysical pain on a prisoner to extract
information,or for any purpose whatever,is "uncivilized"and
thereforeillegal. It is also secretbecause policingagents do not
wish to advertise everything they learn from tortured
prisoners. After all, the effectivenessof certain kinds of
disciplinaryknowledge depends upon its secrecy. The secret
characterof knowledgeacquired in policing,therefore,relates
at once to the uncertaintyof outside criticsas to whether,and
if so how often, something illegal has been done by a
bureaucratic power to obtain it ("torture is intolerable in a
civilized society"), and also to how, when, and where
law-enforcingpower chooses to act once it possesses thatsecret
information("everysocietymust protectitselfagainst criminal
conspiracies").
Rejali's definitionof torture as "sanguinary violence con-
doned by public authorities" slips uneasily between the
legitimateand public practice of classical tortureon the one
hand, and, on the other hand, the secretbecause "uncivilized"
character of policing torturein modernizing states like Iran.
His fullerargumentdoes not address this difference.Modern
torture,he insistsat length,is integralto what Foucault called
disciplinary society. It is, if not itself quite identical with
discipline,then veryclose to it.
There are valuable insightsin Rejali's book relating to the
brutalizing aspect of the process of modernization. Here I
mention only two objections that might be made to his
argument. The first is that his main example (twentieth-
centuryIran) relates to what many readers will identifyas a
"modernizing"rather than a "fullymodern" society.Whether
all the transformations in Iran in the period covered by Rejali's
book truly represent modernization in the sense of moral

ON TORTURE 1087
improvement is- thesereaderswillsay- an open question,but

shockingevidenceof blatanttorturein thatcountrydoes not
provethattortureis integralto modernity. I believethatRejali
is right,but his argumentat this point would have been
strongerif he had referredto a modern society,like Nazi
Germany,ratherthan a societymerelyon the way to being
modernized.2 For althoughNazi Germanywas notoriously an
i/liberal
state,it was certainlyno less modern than any other.
The otherobjectionis this:Rejalidoes notexplainwhy,unlike
discipline,modern stateuse of torturerequiresthe rhetoricof
denial.In pre-modern societiesofthekindFoucaultcalledClas-
torture
sical, was carriedoutunapologetically and in public.Why
does "torture"nowtypically generatea discourseofsecrecy-and-
exposure? The brief answer to thisquestion,surely,is thatthere
is now a new sensibility regardingphysicalpain. Althoughit
occursfrequently enoughin our time,the modernconscience
regardstheinflicting ofpainwithout "goodreason"(toperform
a medicaloperation,say)as reprehensible and, therefore,as an
objectof moralcondemnation.It is thisattitudeto pain that
helpsdefinethemodernnotionof cruelty.
The modern conscienceis also a secular conscience,a
categorythatsubsumeswhatwe nowknowas modernreligion.
Christianity,whichwas traditionally rootedin the doctrineof
Christ'spassion,consequentlyfindsit difficult to make good
sense of suffering today.Modern theologianshave begun to
concede that pain is essentiallyand entirelynegative."The
secularistchallenge,"writesa modernCatholictheologian,
eventhoughseparating manyaspectsoflifefromthereligious
field,bringswithita moresound,interpretive the
equilibrium;
natural even
phenomena, though sometimesdifficult
to under-
stand,havetheircauseandrootsinprocesses thatcanandmust
be recognized.It is a man'sjob, therefore,
to enterintothis
cognitiveanalysisof the of
meaning suffering, in orderto be
and conquerit. ... Throughhisworks,even
able to affront
beforehiswords, JesusofNazareth thegoodness
proclaimed of
lifeand of health,as theimageof salvation.For Himpainis
negativeness(Autiero, 1987,p. 124).3

The writerin this passage is clearly thinkingof disease, but

since pain can also be a consequence of human intention,it
followsthatsuch pain should be eliminatedfromthe world of
human interaction-even from religious disciplines and from
the enactmentof martyrdom,where it once had an effective
and honored place. The secular Christian must now abjure
passion and choose action. Pain is not merelynegativeness.It
is, literally,a scandal.
Torture
Abolishing
Why has the inflictionof physical pain now become

scandalous?A well-known partof the answeris thisprogres-
siviststory:two centuriesago criticsof torturelike Beccaria
and Voltaire recognized how inhuman it was and how
unreliableas a wayof ascertaining the truthin a trial.Thus,
they saw and articulatedwhat others before them had
(unaccountably)failed to see. Their powerfulcase against
judicial tortureshockedEnlightenment rulersintoabolishing
it. The themeof itsintolerablecrueltyemergedmoreclearly
becausethepain inflicted injudicialtorturewas declaredto be
gratuitous.Paininflicted on prisonersto makethemconfesswas
immoral, it was argued, particularly because it was grossly
inefficientin identifyingtheir guilt or innocence.4(The
Enlightenment reformers did not necessarilycondemnphysi-
cal punishmentas such, because it involved considerations
otherthansimpleinstrumental ones,especiallyideas ofjustice.
Eventually, however,theevolutionof modernideas ofjustice
wereto contribute to growinghostility to painfulpunishment.)
But whywas this gratuitouspain not condemnedby critics
earlier?What had preventedpeople fromseeing the truth
untilthe Enlightenment?
In his brilliantstudy,Torture and theLaw of Proof,John
Langbein provided partialexplanation.He demonstrates
has a
thattorturewas proscribedwhen the Roman canon law of

ON TORTURE 1089
proof-whichrequiredeitherconfessionor the testimony of

two eyewitnesses to convict-declinedin forcein the seven-
teenthcentury.Increasingresortto circumstantial evidence
securedconvictions moreeasilyand speedily.The abolitionof
judicial torturewas, thus,in effectthe moralcondemnation
and legal proscriptionof an extremelycumbersomeand
lengthyprocedurethatwas now comingto be regarded as
moreor lessredundant.Langbeinimpliesthatthemoraltruth
aboutjudicialtorturewas linkedto thepriorconstruction of a
newconceptof legal truth(Langbein,1977).
When torture was the object of vigorouspolemic in the
eighteenthcentury, JeremyBenthamcame to the conclusion
thatthe pain of tortureis sometimeseasiertojustifythanthe
sufferinginflictedin thenameof punishment. In thecourseof
he maintained,for example,thatCourtsof
thisjustification
Law resortingto imprisonment in cases of contemptmight
findthe applicationof physicalpain, or even the threatof
applyingit,wouldsecureobediencein a way"lesspenal" than
prison:
A manmayhavebeenlingering in prisonfora monthor two

beforehe wouldmakeanswerto a questionwhichat theworst
withone strokeof therack,and therefore almostalwayswith
onlyknowing thathe mightbe made to sufferthe rack,he
wouldhaveanswered ina moment; justas a manwilllingeron a
Monthwiththe Toothach[sic]whichhe mighthave saved
fromat theexpenseofa momentary
himself pang.5
It is not Bentham'sapparentrefusalto distinguishbetween

voluntaryand involuntary subjectionto pain thatshould be
notedhere. It is the idea thatsubjectiveexperiencesof pain
can be objectivelycompared. This idea is crucial for the
modern understandingof "cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment" in a cross-cultural
context,althoughliberalstoday
wouldstrongly rejectBentham's viewregardingtheoccasional
preferabilityof tortureto imprisonment. For it is precisely
some notionof comparability in sufferingthatmakesof long

years in prison (including solitaryconfinement)a "humane"

punishmentand of floggingan "inhumane" one, even though
theexperience of imprisonmentand of floggingare qualitatively
quite different.
In an interestingpassage in Disciplineand Punish Foucault
notes that in the nineteenth century imprisonment was
compared favorablyto other formsof legal punishmentmainly
because it was regarded as the most egalitarian (Foucault,
1979, p. 232). This was a consequence of the philosophical
doctrine that freedomwas the natural human condition.Penal
reformers reasoned that since the desire for liberty was
implantedequally in everyindividual,deprivingindividualsof
theirlibertymustbe a way of strikingat them equally- thatis,
regardless of their social status or physical constitution.For
just as fines were easier for the rich to pay, so physical pain
could be borne better by the more sturdy. No form of
punishmentaccorded so preciselywith our essentialhumanity,
therefore,as imprisonmentdid. That legal incarcerationwas
considered to be equitable contributed to the sense that
physicalpunishmentwas gratuitous.For this reason, although
modern liberalsmustregard Bentham wrongin the conclusion
he reached about torture,theymustconsider him rightto have
endorsed a quantitativecomparison of verydisparate kinds of
suffering.It is not difficultto see how the utilitariancalculus of
pleasure and pain has come to be central to cross-cultural
judgment in modern thoughtand practice. For by a reductive
operation,the idea of a calculus has facilitatedthe comparative
judgment of what would otherwiseremain incommensurable
qualities.6
HumanizingtheWorld
The historicalprocess of constructinga humane society,it is

said, has aimed at eliminatingcruelties.Thus, it has oftenbeen
observed that European rule in colonial countries, although

ON TORTURE 1091
not itselfdemocratic,broughtabout moralimprovements in

behavior-thatis, the abandonmentof practicesthatoffend
againstthehuman.
Majorinstruments in thistransformation
weremodernlegal,
administrative, and educational practices. And a central
categorydeployed in them was the modern categoryof
customary law.JamesRead writes:
Of all therestrictions
upontheapplication of customary laws
during thecolonialperiod,the test
of 'to
repugnancy justiceor
was
morality' potentially the most sweeping:forcustomary laws
couldhardly be repugnant to thetraditional
senseofjusticeor
morality of thecommunity whichstillacceptedthem,and it is
therefore clearthatthejusticeor morality
ofthecolonialpower
wastoprovidethestandard tobe applied.
Read pointsout that the phrase "repugnantto justice and

morality" does nothavea preciselegalmeaning,and thatearly
legislationin the coloniessometimesemployedotherexpres-
sions,suchas "notopposed to naturalmorality and humanity,"
to performthesame revolutionary work(Read, 1972,p. 175).
But moraland social progressin thosecountrieshas been
uneven.AlthoughEuropeanstriedto suppresscruelpractices
and formsof suffering thatwerepreviously takenforgranted
in thenon-Europeanworldbymakingthepractitioners legally
the
culpable, suppression was notalwayscompletely successful.
Today thestruggleto eliminatesocialsuffering is takenup by
theUnitedNations.Or so thestorygoes.
I wantto propose,however,thatin theirattemptto outlaw
customsthe European rulersconsideredcruel it was not the
concern with indigenous sufferingthat dominated their
thinking,but the desire to impose what they considered
civilizedstandardsof justice and humanityon a subject
population-thatis, thedesireto createnew humansubjects.7
The anguishof subjectscompelledunder threatof punish-
mentto abandontraditional practices-nowlegallybrandedas
to
"repugnant justice and morality,"or as "opposed to natural

moralityand humanity,"or even sometimesas "backward and

childish"- could not, therefore, play a decisive part in the
discourse of colonial reformers. On the contrary,as Lord
Cromer put it withreferenceto the miserycreated among the
Egyptian peasantry by legal reforms under British rule:
"Civilisationmust, unfortunately,have its victims"(1913, p.
44). In the process of learning to be "fullyhuman," only some
kinds of sufferingwere seen as an affrontto humanity,and
their eliminationsought. This was distinguishedfrom suffer-
ing that was necessaryto the process of realizing one's
humanity- that is, pain that was adequate to its end, not
wastefulpain.
Inhumansuffering, typicallyassociatedwithbarbaricbehavior,
was a morallyinsufferablecondition for which someone was
thereforeresponsible; those requiringit (themselvesinhuman
enough to cause it to be inflicted)mustbe made to desistand, if
necessary,punished. That, at any rate, is the discourse of pro-
gressivereform.Whatindividualcolonialadministrators actually
felt,thought,or did is another (though not entirelyunrelated)
matter.Most experienced administratorswere prepared locally
to toleratevarious "uncivilized"practicesfor reasons of expedi-
ency,but all were no doubt aware of the dominantprogressivist
discourserooted in "civilized"societies.8
In a recent unpublished paper by Nicholas Dirks there is a
nice example of just this discourse in late nineteenth-century
British India. His account of the inquiry conducted by the
colonial authoritiesinto the ritual of hookswinging9contains
thissoberjudgment by the presidingBritishofficial:
It is, in myopinion,unnecessary at the end of the nineteenth

centuryand, havingregardto the levelto whichcivilisation in
India has attained,to consider the motivesby which the
performers themselvesare actuatedwhentakingpartin hook
swinging,walkingthroughfire,and other barbarities.From
theirown moralstandpoint, theirmotivesmaybe good or they
may bad; theymayindulgein self-torture
be of
in satisfaction
pious vows made
fervently in all and
sincerity for the most

ON TORTURE 1093
disinterestedreasons;or theymayindulgein itfromthelowest

motives ofpersonal aggrandizement, whether forthealmsthey
might receive or forthe personaldistinctionand localeclatthat
itmaybringthem;butthequestion iswhether publicopinionin
thiscountry isnotopposedtotheexternal actsoftheperformers,
as beingin factrepugnant to the dictatesof humanity and
demoralizing to themselvesand to all who may witness their
performances. I amoftheopinionthatthevoiceof Indiamost
entitledtobe listened towithrespect,thatis tosay,notonlythe
voiceof the advancedschoolthathas receivedsomeof the
advantages ofwestern educationand hasbeenpermeated with
non-Oriental ideas,butalsothevoiceofthosewhoseviewsoflife
andpropriety ofconduct havebeenmainly derivedfromAsiatic
would
philosophy, gladlyproclaim that thetimehadarrived for
theGovernment of itspeopleto effectively
in theinterests put
downall degrading of self-torture
exhibitions (Dirks,unpub-
lished,pp. 9-10).
The factthattheperformers themselves declaredthattheyfelt
no pain was irrelevant.So, too, was the plea thatthiswas a
religiousrite.Such claimsto difference werenotacceptable.It
was the offencegiven by the performanceto a particular
conceptof being human thatreduced qualitatively different
kindsof behaviorto a singlestandard.
Confirmation was obtainedby listening
of its offensiveness
to somecolonizedvoicesonly.The latterincludedIndianswho
were directlywesternized.But, more significantly, confirma-
tionwas providedalso by thosewho accepteda westernized
exegesisof theirAsiaticphilosophy.10 Fromthe pointof view
of moral progress,the voices of those who took up a
reactionary positioncould notbe attendedto.
Clearly, the cause of moralprogresstherewas suffering
in
and suffering. Whatis interesting,I think,is not merelythat
someformsof suffering wereto be takenmoreseriouslythan
others,butthat"inhuman"suffering as opposedto "necessary"
or "inevitable"sufferingwas regarded as being essentially
gratuitousand thereforelegallypunishable.Pain endured in
themovementtowardbecoming"fullyhuman,"however,was
necessaryin the sensethatthereweresocialor moralreasons
whyit had to be suffered.This view is of a piece withthe

post-Enlightenmentconcern to construct through judicial

punishmentthe most efficientmeans of reformingoffenders
and of guarding society'sinterests.11
As the idea of progressbecame increasinglydominantin the
affairs of Europe and the world, the need for measuring
sufferingwas felt and responded to with greater sophistica-
tion.
"
"Torture,ActingWithDeliberateCruelty
Representing
Pain is not always regarded as insufferable in modern

Euro-Americansocieties. In warfare,sport, and psychological
experimentation-as well as in the domain of sexual plea-
sure-inflictingphysicalsufferingis activelypracticedand also
legally condoned. This makes for contradictionswhich are
exploited in public debate. When transitivepain is described as
"cruel and inhuman," it is often referred to as torture.And
tortureitselfis condemned by public opinion and prohibited
by internationallaw.
It is hardly surprising, therefore,that the many liberal-
democratic governments12that have employed torture have
attemptedto do so in secret. And sometimesthey have been
concerned to redefine legally the categoryof pain-producing
treatmentin an attemptto avoid the label "torture."Thus,
Tortureis forbiddenby Israelilaw. Israeliauthorities say that

tortureis notauthorizedor condonedin theoccupiedterritories
but acknowledgethat abuses occur and state that they are
investigated.In 1987 the Landau JudicialCommissionspecifi-
callycondemned'torture'but allowed for 'moderatephysical
and psychologicalpressure'to be used to secureconfessionsand
to obtaininformation; a classifiedannex to the reportdefining
permissiblepressure has never been made public (U.S.
Departmentof State,Country Reportson HumanRights for1993,
p. 1204).
Needless to say,other governmentsin the region (forexample,
Egypt, Turkey, and Iran) have also condoned

ON TORTURE 1095
torture,and unlikeliberal-democraticgovernments, theyhave

used it freelyagainsttheirown citizens.But the remarkable
featureof this case is the scrupulousconcernof a liberal-
democraticstatewithcalibratingthe amountof pain thatis
legallyallowable.There is evidentlya concernthattoomuch
pain should not be applied. It is assumed that "moderate
physicaland psychological pressure"is at once necessaryand
sufficientto secureconfession.Beyondthatquantity, pressure
is held to be excessive(gratuitous)and thereforepresumably
becomes"torture."13 Otherstatesin theMiddleEastare rarely
so punctilious-or so modernin theirreasoning.
The use of tortureby liberal-democratic statesrelatesto
theirattemptto controlpopulationsthatare not citizens.In
such cases, torture cannot be attributedto "primitive
urges"- as Scottsuggested;nor to governmental techniques
for discipliningcitizens,as Rejali has argued. It is to be
understoodas a practicallogicintegralto the maintenanceof
thenationstate'ssovereignty. Like warfare.
The categoryof tortureis no longerlimitedto applications
of physicalpain: it now includes psychologicalcoercionin
which disorientation, isolation,and brainwashingare em-
ployed. Indeed, "torture"in our day functionsnot only to
denotebehavioractuallyprohibitedbylaw,butalso desiredto
be so prohibitedin accordance with changingconceptsof
"inhumane"treatment (forexample,the publicexecutionor
flogging of criminals,and child abuse, as well as animal
experiments, factory
farming, and foxhunting).
This wider categoryof torture"or cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment"could in theorybe applied to the
anguish and mental sufferingexperienced by people in
societiesobliged to give up theirbeliefsand "become fully
human"(in thesenseunderstoodby Euro-Americans).But by
a curiousparadox it is a versionof relativismthatprevents
suchan applicationof thecategory.For theanguishis itselfthe
consequenceof a passionateinvestment in theTruthof beliefs
thatguidebehavior.The modernskeptical posture,in contrast,

regardssuch passionate convictionto be "uncivilized"as well as

a perpetual source of danger to others and of pain to oneself.
Beliefs should eitherhave no directconnectionto the way one
lives,or be held so lightlythat theycan be easily changed.
One mightbe inclined to thinkthat at least in humanizing
societies more sorts of inflictedpain come to be considered
morallyunacceptable withthe passage of time. In some cases,
however,pain-producingbehavior that was once shocking no
longer shocks. Or if it does, then not in the way it did in the
past. Puttinglarge numbers of people in prison for more and
more kinds of offenceis one example. Inflictingnew formsof
sufferingin battleis another.
Some writerson pain have claimed that war is "the most
obvious analogue to torture"(Scarry, 1985, p. 61). However
thatmay be, it is significantthatthe general concept of "cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment" is not
applied to the normal conduct of war- although modern,
technologicalwarfareinvolvesformsof suffering,in numbers
and in kind, that are without precedent. The Geneva
Convention,it is true, seeks to regulate conduct in war.14But,
paradoxically,this has the effectof legalizing most of the new
kinds of sufferingendured in modern war by combatantsand
non-combatantsalike.
The military historian John Keegan wrote of the new
practicesof "deliberate cruelty"nearly two decades ago when
he described some of the weaponry employed in twentieth-
centurywarfare:
Weapons have never been kind to human flesh, but the

directingprinciplebehindtheirdesignhas usuallynotbeen that
of maximizing thepain and damagetheycan cause. Beforethe
inventionof explosives,the limitsof muscle power in itself
constrainedtheirhurtfulness;butevenforsometimethereafter
moralinhibitions,fuelledbya senseof theunfairness of adding
mechanicaland chemicalincrements to man'spowerto hurthis
brother,servedto restrain ofdesign.Some
deliberatebarbarities
of theseinhibitions-againsttheuse of poisongas and explosive
bullets-were codifiedand given internationalforce by the

ON TORTURE 1097
HagueConvention of 1899;15buttheriseof 'thing-killing' as

to
opposed man-killing weapons-heavyartillery is an exam-
ple-whichby theirside-effects inflicted
grosssuffering and
disfigurement, invalidated As a resultrestraints
theserestraints.
werecastto thewinds,and it is nowa desiredeffect of many
man-killing weapons thatthey wounds
inflict as terrible and
as The
terrifyingpossible. claymore mine, forinstance, is filled
withmetalcubes. . . , the clusterbombwithjagged metal
fragments, in bothcasesbecausethatshapeof projectile tears
and fracturesmoreextensively thana smooth-bodied one.The
HEAT and HESH roundsfiredbyanti-tank gunsaredesigned
to filltheinteriorof armoredvehicleswithshowers of metal
splintersor streams of moltenmetal,so disabling thetankby
disablingitscrew.Andnapalm, disliked
forethicalreasonseven
bymanytough minded soldiers,containsan ingredient which
increasesthe adhesionof the burningpetrolto humanskin
surfaces.Militarysurgeons,so successful
overthepastcentury in
resuscitating wounded soldiers and repairing wounds of
growingseverity, have thus now to meet a challengeof
wounding agentsdeliberately conceivedto defeattheirskills
(Keegan,1978,pp. 329-30).
One mightadd to thisthatthe manufacture, possession,and

deployment of weapons of mass destruction (chemical,
nuclear, and biological) must be counted as instancesof
declared governmentalreadiness to engage in "cruel,
inhumanand degradingtreatment"againstcivilianpopula-
tionseven when theyare not actuallyused. In brief,cruel
moderntechnologiesof destructionare integralto modern
warfare,and modernwarfareis an activityessentialto the
and powerof the modernstate,on whichthewelfare
security
and identityof itscitizensdepends. In war,the modernstate
demandsfromits citizensnot only thattheykill and maim
others,but also that theythemselvessuffercruel pain and
death.16
So how can the calculatedcrueltiesof modern battle be
reconciled with the modern sensibilityregarding pain?
Preciselyby treatingpain as a quantifiable
essence.
As in state
an
torture, attempt can be made to measure the physical
sufferinginflictedin modern warfare in accordance with the

proportionalityof means to ends. The human destruction

inflictedshould not outweigh the strategicadvantage gained.
But given the aim of ultimatevictory,the notion of "military
necessity"can be extended indefinitely.Any measure that is
intended as a contributionto that aim, no matterhow much
sufferingit creates, may be justified in terms of "military
necessity."The standard of acceptabilityin such cases is set by
public opinion, and that standard varies as the lattermoves in
response to contingentcircumstances(for example, who the
enemy is, how the war is going).
I want to stressthat I am making no moraljudgment here.
My concern is to identifythe paradoxes of modern thought
and practice that relate to the deliberate inflictionof pain
between states as well as within them. If I focus on
state-condonedcrueltythis is not because I assume that the
state is its only source today,but because our moral discourse
about cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatmentor punish-
ment is closely linked to legal concepts and politicalinterven-
tions.
In the instancesdiscussed so far,I have tried to suggestthat
the instability of the concept of physicalsufferingis at once the
source of ideological contradictionsand of strategiesavailable
for evading them. I now shiftmy attentionto the domain of
interpersonal relations that the modern state defines as
"private." Here we meet with a contradictionthat has deeper
roots, and one which cannot be resolved simply by, say,
redefiningthe concept of tortureor by prohibitingcalculated
crueltyin militarycombat.
SubjectingOneselfTo "Crueland DegradingTreatment"
While the categoryof "torture"has in recenttimesbeen

expanded to include cases of induced sufferingthat are
primarilyor entirelypsychological,it has also been narrowed
to exclude some cases of the calculatedinflictionof physical

ON TORTURE 1099
pain. This sometimesleads to contradictions. But there is

another kind of contradictionwhich is characteristicof
modernsociallife.
Moderns are aware of situationsin which the sharp
separationbetweenthe negativeexperienceof pain and the
positiveexperienceof pleasureare inseparable.Sadomasoch-
ism is disturbing to manypeople preciselybecause here they
are confronted withsuffering thatis no longersimplypainful.
It is at once pain and the oppositeof pain. Two centuriesof
powerfulcriticismdirected at the Utilitarian'scalculus of
pleasureversuspain has notdestroyedthecommonsenseview
thatthesetwoexperiencesshouldbe mutuallyexclusive.Yet,
in the eroticization the twoare intimately
of suffering linked,
and it is activelysoughtbysome.
Here is an extractfroma sadomasochist Handbookpublished
recently:
Because I consideranyattemptto defineSM in a singleconcise
phraseto be the ultimateexercisein futility-or masochism-I
shall foregothe temptation to add yetanotherversionto the
great discarded stack of unsuccessful,inadequate verbal
garbage.Insteadlet me suggesta shortlistof characteristics I
findto be presentin mostsceneswhichI wouldclassify as SM:
(1) A dominant-submissive relationship.
(2) A givingand receivingof pain thatis pleasurableto both
parties.
(3) Fantasyand/orrole playingon the part of one or both
partners.
(4) A conscious humblingof one partnerby the other
(humiliation).
(5) Some formof fetishinvolvement.
(6) The actingout of one or more ritualizedinteractions
etc.) (Townsend,1989,p. 15).
(bondage,flagellation,
Noticethatthistextspeaks not about expressions
of pain, still
less about conventionalplay-acting,but about pain experi-
encedand inflicted, in whichbothpartners,theactiveand the
passive, are jointly agents. So why is sadomasochismnot
rejectedby all modernswho condemn pain as a negative
experience?

One answer, according to some interpreters,is that not

everyone "confuses the distinctionbetween unbridled sadism
and the social subculture of consensual fetishism.To argue
thatin consensual SM the 'dominant' has power, and the slave
has not, is to read theater for reality"(McClintock, 1993, p.
87).
However, the point of my question is not to dismiss the
distinctionbetween "unbridled sadism" and the "subcultureof
consensual fetishism." It is to ask what happens when
individual self-fashioningembraces every difference- includ-
ing the differencebetween "pain" and "pleasure"- withinan
aestheticwhole. We are sometimestold that the hybridization
of categories, including those that organize our sensual
experience, is a mode by which stable authority may be
subvertedin the name of liberty.But it is possible also thatthe
eroticizationof pain is merely one of the ways in which the
modern self attemptsto secure its elusive foundation.
Recently, an article in a London newspaper gave the
followingaccount of a local performanceby an American artist
at the Instituteof ContemporaryArts:
Withhis faceset in a maskof concentration, Ron Atheyallows

his head to be piercedwitha six-inchneedlejust above the
eyebrow.You watch,transfixed, as the needle snakes along
beneaththeskinlikewaterpulsingthroughan emptyhosepipe.
A dropletof bloodwellsup at thepointwheresteelmeetsscalp.
This is the firstspike of Athey 's crown of thorns-a body
piercer'stribute to the power of Christianiconography,an
withthe needle,and a gay man'sdefiance
ex-junkie'sflirtation
of infectionwithHIV.
By the time the macabre 'sketch' is finished,Athey is
encrustedwithneedles,garlandedwithwireand oozingblood,
in whatappearsto be a parodyof thecrucifixion. Ah, butis ita
parody, defined in the as
dictionary 'an so poor as to
imitation
seema deliberatemockeryof theoriginal?'Or is it- as Athey's
supporterswould claim- an explorationof the nature of
martyrdom, as manifestto a worldwidegay community in the
era of Aids?(Armistead,1994,p. 26).
What is remarkableabout these opening paragraphs is that

ON TORTURE 1101
the writerof this account finds herselfhaving to put the

familiartheatrical word"sketch"in quotationmarks-but not
so the equallyfamiliartheologicalexpressionmartyrdom. The
readeris givento understandthatthisis a realtributeto the
power of Christianiconography,a real explorationof the
natureof (Christian)martyrdom, but thatit only"appears"to
be a formof theater,an "imitation."17
I stressthat I am not here challengingthis claim, but
underliningthe writer'srecognitionthatin the discourseof
modern self-fashioning, the tension holding "real" and
"theatrical"apart can collapse. It is especiallyin a modern
culture,where the split between the real and its mere
representation has become institutionalized, that it becomes
necessary to assertfrom time to time that a givenperformance
is merelytheatrical,or thatanotherperformanceis notreally
theater.My point here, however,is that it is the difference
between"the real" and "the mimetic"-like the difference
between"pain" and "pleasure"-thatis availableto modern
self-fashioning.And that,consequently, the tensionbetween
"real" and "pretend"bondage is itselfaestheticized, and the
cleardistinction betweenconsentand coercionproblematized.
Of course,SM as definedin the text I quoted earlier is
different fromthisperformance at theI.C.A. For one thing,in
the latter there is a separationbetween performersand
observers.No experienceof givingand receivingpain binds
thetwotogetherin mutualpleasure.We findonlya one-sided
representation(presentation?)of an evocative image of
suffering, whichis precededby a painfulconstruction of that
image on the stage. Furthermore, its intention is not the
of
production privatepleasure. We cannot know whether the
variousmembersof Athey'saudiencerespondprimarily to the
icon of Christ'slast passionor to the painfulconstruction of
that icon on the stage- or to both. Nor can we tell what
difference it would make to thosewho would like to ban this
performance iftheywereto be toldthatAtheysuffersfroma
malfunctioning of the nervoussystemso thathe actuallyfeels

no pain. Or- more tellingly-that like a religious virtuoso he

has learnt to experience it positively.
Think of the Shi'a Muslim flagellants mourning the
martyrdomof the Prophet's grandson Hussain annually every
Muharram. That instance of self-inflicted pain is at once real
and dramatic (not "theatrical"). It has even less to do with
"pleasure" than does Athey'sperformance.It differsfromthe
latter in being a collective rite of religious sufferingand
redemption. It is not a secular act that borrows a religious
metaphorto make a politicalstatementabout prejudice. Nor is
it premised on the rightto self-fashioningand the autonomy
of individual choice. Yet both strike against the modern
sensibilitythatrecoilsfroma willing,positiveengagementwith
suffering.Because for ascetics,as for sadomasochists,pain is
not merelya means which can be measured and pronounced
excessiveor gratuitousin relationto an end. Pain is not action,
but passion.
These briefreferencesto pain willinglyendured in modern
society help us to raise some questions at the trans-cultural
level.
The interestingthing about the criteriaenumerated in the
SM text I quoted above is that theycome up against Article5
of the UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights:"No one shall be
subjected to tortureor to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatmentor punishment." This rule is not qualifiedby the
phrase"unless the concerned
parties are consentingadults."In
the same way and for the same reason that one may not
consentto sell oneselfintoslavery,even fora limitedperiod.
Not even if the partiesconcernedfind the relationshipof
bondageerotic.
So, too, the liberalizedChurch stronglydisapprovesof
monksbeing whipped at the commandof theirabbot for
penalizablefaults-evenwhenthepenancehas a ritualclosure
and a dramaticcharacter,and even if the monkshave taken
monasticvowsof obediencevoluntarily. This followsfromthe
modern rejection of physical pain in general and of

ON TORTURE 1103
"gratuitous" suffering in particular.But it is more preciseto

put it this way: the modern is notsimplyto pain,it is
hostility
to pain thatdoes not accord witha particularconceptionof
beinghuman- andthatistherefore inexcess."Excess"is a concept
of measure.An essentialaspectof themodernattitudeto pain
restson a calculusthatdefinesappropriateactions.
Needlessto say,nothingI have said so faris an argument
against SM. I am not denouncing a "dangerous" sexual
practice.18 Nor am I concernedto celebrateits"emancipatory"
social potential.19 These antagonistic positionsseem to me to
assumethat"sadomasochism" has an essence.They are mirror
images of each other. But the essenceof whatlegal and moral
discourseconstructs, polices,and contestsas "SM" is not the
object of my analysis.As in the field of "abnormal and
unnatural"sexualpracticesgenerally, statepoweris,of course,
directly and vitallyinvolved- helpingto defineand regulate
normality. Myconcernhere,however,is withthe structure of
public debate over the valorizationof painfulexperience ain
culturethatregardsit negatively. In thatdebate,argumentis
sharpenedbecause, on the one hand, modernsdisapproveof
physicalpain as "degrading."On the other hand, theyare
committedto every individual'srightto pursue unlimited
physicalpleasure"in private"-so longas thatconformsto the
legalprincipleof consenting adultsand does notlead to death
or serious injury.Thus, one way that modernsattemptto
resolvethiscontradiction is by definingcrueltyin relationto
the principleof individualautonomywhichis the necessary
basis of free choice. However, if the concept of "cruel,
inhumanand degradingtreatment"cannot be consistently
deployed withoutreferenceto the principleof individual
freedom,it becomesrelativized.
This becomesclearerin thetrans-cultural domain.For here
itis notsimplya matterof eliminating particularcruelties,but
of imposingan entiremoderndiscourseof "being human,"
central to which are its ideas about individualismand
detachmentfrompassionatebelief.Thus, whileat home the

principle of consenting adults within the bounds of the law

worksby invokingthe idea of free choice based on individual
autonomy,the presence of consentingadults abroad may often
be taken to indicate mere "false consciousness"- a fanatical
commitment to outmoded beliefs- which invites forcible
correction.
Yet, only the suspicious individual- suspicious of othersand
of herself- can be trulyautonomous, trulyfree of fanatical
convictions.But continuous suspicion introduces instabilityat
another level: that of the subject.
ConcludingComment
I have tried to problematize the basic idea underlyingthe

United Nations declaration that,"No one shall be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment."I have suggestedthatthe idea is unstable,mainly
because the aspirationsand practicesto whichit is attached are
themselvescontradictory,ambiguous, or changing. Of course,
the fact that an idea is unstable may not be, in itself,reason
enough for abandoning it. But neither the attempt by Pensarlo
Euro-Americansto impose theirstandards by force on others para una
nor the willinginvocationof these standardsby weaker peoples
in the third world makes them stable or universal. It merely
posible
globalizes them.
conclusión
We need ethnographies of pain and cruelty which can
provide us with a better understanding of how relevant
practices are actually conducted in differenttraditions.Such
ethnographies will certainly show us that cruelty can be
experienced and addressed in waysother than as a violationof
rights- for example, as a failure of specific virtues or as an
expression of particularvices. They will also show us that if
crueltyis increasinglyrepresented in the language of rights
(and especiallyof human rights),then this is because perpetual
legal strugglehas now become the dominant mode of moral

ON TORTURE 1105
uncertain,and rapidly
engagementin an interconnected,
changingworld.
Notes
1So, too,
Page DuBois (1991, pp. 153-57).
2 Z. Bauman
(1989) has exploredthe structures
and processesof
themodernstatethatmade possiblethedistinctive modesof cruelty
underNazism.
3 thereis a curiousparadox in invokinga metaphor
Incidentally,
of militaryviolence ("to affrontand conquer") to describe the
compassionatework of healing. But such paradoxes abound in
Christianhistory,of course.
Thus, Beccaria denounces"the barbarousand useless tortures
multiplied with prodigaland useless severityfor crimesthat are
eitherunprovenor chimerical"(1986, p. 4). And Voltaire,with
sarcasm,remarksthat,"On a ditsouvent
characteristic que la question
[thatis, torture]etaitun moyende sauvertincoupablerobuste,
etde perdre
un innocenttropfaible"(1818, Vol. 26, p. 314).
5 See thetwo firstpublishedas "Benthamon Torture"
fragments
in Bentham,1973,p. 45.
b In her
important work,ClassicalProbability
in theEnlightenment
(1988), Lorraine Daston has described how, over two centuries,
Enlightenment mathematicians struggledto produce a model that
would provide a moral calculus for "the reasonable man" in
conditionsof uncertainty.Althoughmodernprobability theoryhas
becomeentirely divorcedfromthismoralprojectsinceabout 1840,
the idea of a calculuscontinuesto be powerfulin liberalwelfare
discourse.
' Lord for Finance during the British
Milner,Under-Secretary
Occupation of Egypt which began in 1882, described Britain's
imperial taskin thatcountry follows:
as
This then,and no lessthanthis,was meantby'restoring order.'

It meant reformingthe Egyptianadministration root and
branch.Nay,itmeantmore.For whatwas thegood of recasting
the system,if it were leftto be workedby officialsof the old
type,animatedbytheold spirit?'Men, notmeasures,'is a good
watch-word anywhere, but to no countryis it moreprofoundly
applicable than to Egypt. Our task, therefore,included

somethingmore than new principlesand new methods.It

involvednewmen.It involved'the educationof the
ultimately
people know,and thereforeto expect,orderlyand honest
to
government- the educationof a body of rulers capable of
supplyingit' (1899, p. 23).
Here Milnerenunciatesthe government's need to createsubjects
(in both senses)as well as rulersinformedby new standardsof
humanbehaviorand politicaljustice.That thiswouldinvolvethe
application of some force and sufferingwas a secondary
consideration.I stress that my point is not that colonial
administrators likeMilnerlacked"humanitarian" motives,butthat
theywereguidedbya particularconceptof "humanness."
8 I am
gratefulto Jon Wilsonforinforming me that,"The word
expediencyis one thatwe find again and again in ImperialIndia's
officialdocuments,from the 1820's to the Royal Commission on
Agricultureof1928" Resort to expediency,as to indicated
"interest," a
distrustof passionatebelief.See Hirschman,1977.
9 involvesa ceremonyin whichthecelebrantswings
Hookswinging
froma cross-beam builtforthepurposeon a cart,suspendedbytwo
steelhooksthrustintothesmallof hisback.See Kosambe,1967.
10In relationto themorecelebratedBritish ofsati(the
prohibition
self-immolation of Hindu widowson the funeralpyre of their
husband)in 1829,Lata Mani notesthat,
Ratherthan arguingfor the outlawingof sati as a cruel and

barbarousact, as one mightexpect of a true 'moderniser,'
in favourofabolitionwereat painsto illustrate
officials thatsuch
a movewas entirely consonantwiththe principleof upgrading
indigenous tradition.Their strategywas to point to the
questionablescriptural sanctionforsatiand to the factthat,for
one reasonor another,theybelieveditscontemporary practice
transgressed itsoriginaland therefore'true'scripturalmeaning
(Mani, 1985,Vol. 1, p. 107).
Thus, itwasa modernized"Hinduism"thatwas made to yieldthe
judgmentthatsatiwas a crueland barbarousact.
1xReformative to offenders as being
theorypresentedpunishment
theorycastitas an impartial
whileutilitarian
'in theirbestinterests'
act of social necessity.In rejectingretributivetheory,the
reformers sought,in effect,to taketheangerout of punishment.
As itwaslegitimized to theprisoner,punishment was no longerto

ON TORTURE 1107
be, in Bentham'swords,'an act of wrathor vengeance',butan act

ofcalculation,disciplinedbyconsiderationsof thesocialgood and
theoffenders' needs (Ignatieff,
1989,p. 75).
12For
example,Francein Algeria,the UnitedStatesin Vietnam,
Israel in Gaza and the West Bank, Britainin Aden, Cyprus,and
NorthernIreland.
13This is
preciselyBentham'sargumentabout the rationality of
torturein comparisonwithpunishment:
The purposeto whichTortureis appliedis suchthatwhenever

thatpurpose is actuallyattainedit may plainlybe seen to be
attained;and as soon as ever it is seen to be attainedit may
immediately be made to cease. Withpunishment itis necessarily
otherwise. Of punishment, in orderto makesureof applyingas
muchas is necessaryyoumustcommonly runa risqueof apply-
ingconsiderably more: of Torture there need neverbe a grain
moreappliedthanwhatis necessary(Bentham,1973,p. 45).
14It should not be thatmedievalwarfarealso had its
forgotten
rules(see, forexample,Contamine,1984). In one sense,the moral
regulation ofconductin warfarewasevenstricter in theearlymiddle
ages: killingand maiming, even in was
battle, regardedas a sin for
whichthechurchdemandedpenance(see Russell,1975).
la Of the or "dum-dum"bullet,inventedin British
mushrooming
India in 1897,Daniel Headrickobserves:"This particularinvention
was so vicious,for it tore greatholes in the flesh,thatEuropeans
thoughtit too cruel to inflictupon one another,and used it only
againstAsiansand Africans"(Headrick,1979,p. 256).
lhThe
paradoxhereis thatthemoderncitizenis a freeindividual
and yethe is obligedto foregothe mostimportantchoice a free
humanbeingcan make- thataffecting hislifeor death.The modern
statecan send itscitizensto theirunwilling deathsin warand forbid
themfromwillingto end theirown livesin peace.
17Cf. McClintock
(1993, p. 106): "SM is the most liturgicalof
forms, sharing with Christianitya theatricaliconographyof
punishmentand expiation:washingrituals,bondage, flagellation,
body-piercing, and symbolictorture."But whyonlysymbolic}
18See, for
example, Linden et al., 1982. See also the legal
in
judgments the Spanner case in England,now being appealed
against in the EuropeanCourt.
19The radical social criticismallegedly expressed by SM is
eloquentlyargued for in McClintock'sarticle,but the liberatory

implicationsof SM are explicitly

retractedat the end. (See also the
cleverbook by AngelaCarter[1979].) Whilesuch writings typically
provideradicalpoliticaldecodingsof SM narratives, theyalso seem
tobe sayingthatas a modeofobtainingorgasm,SM is theproductof
sociallydistortedand sexuallyrepressiverelations.
References
Autiero,A., "The Interpretation of Pain: The Point of View of

CatholicTheology,"inJ. Brihaye,F. Loew,and H.W. Pia, eds.,
Pain (Vienna:Springer- Verlag,1987).
Armistead,Claire,"PiercingThoughts,"GuardianWeekly (July17,
1994).
Bauman, Z., Modernity and the Holocaust(Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press,1989).
Beccaria, On Crimesand Punishments, D. Young, ed. and trans.
(Indianapolis,IN: Hackett,1986).
Bentham,J., Bentham and Legal Theory,M.H. James,ed. (Belfast:
NorthernIrelandLegal Quarterly,1973).
Carter,Angela,TheSadeianWoman(London: Virago,1979).
Contamine,P., Warin theMiddleAges(Oxford:Blackwell,1984).
in theEnlightenment
Daston,Lorraine,ClassicalProbability (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton UniversityPress,1988).
Dirks,N., "The PolicingofTradition:Colonialismand Anthropology
in SouthernIndia,"unpublishedmanuscript.
DuBois,Page, Torture and Truth(New York: Routledge,1991).
Foucault,M.,DisciplineandPunish(New York:VintageBooks,1979).
Headnck, D., The Tools ot Imperialism:Technologyand the
Expansionof European Colonial Empiresin the Nineteenth
Century ,"JournalofModernHistory, 51 (1979).
Hirschman,A.O., The Passionsand the Interests (Princeton,NJ:
PrincetonUniversity Press,1977).
Ignatieff,M., A JustMeasureof Pain (Harmondsworth:rengum
Books,1989).
Keegan,J., The Face of Battle(Harmondsworth:Penguin Books,
1978).
Kosambe, D.D., Living prehistoryin India, Scientific American,
216:2 (1967).
and theLaw ofProof: Europeand Englandin the
Langbein,J.H., Torture
AncienRegime of ChicagoPress,1977).
(Chicago:University

ON TORTURE 1109
Linden,R.R. et al., eds., AgainstSadomasochism: A RadicalFeminist

(San Francisco,
Analysis CA: Frog in the Well,1982).
Lord Cromer,"The Governmentof Subject Races," Politicaland
Essays,1908-1913 (London: Macmillan,1913).
Literary
Lord Milner,Englandin Egypt(London: EdwardArnold,1899).
Mani,L., "The Productionof an OfficialDiscourseon Satiin Early
Nineteenth-Century Bengal,"in F. Barkeret al., eds.,Europeand
ItsOthers(Colchester:University of Essex,1985).
McClintock, A., "Maid to Order: CommercialFetishism and Gender
Power,"SocialText,37 (Winter1993).
Read,James,"Customary Law underColonialRule, in H.F. Morris
andJ.S.Read,eds.,Indirect RuleandtheSearch forJustice(Oxford:
ClarendonPress,1972).
Rejali,D.M., Tortureand Modernity: and Statein Modern
Self,Society,
Iran(Boulder,CO: WestviewPress,1994).
Russell,F.H., TheJustWarin theMiddleAges(Cambridge:Cambridge
University Press,1975).
Scarry,Elaine, TheBodyin Pain (Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press,
1985).
Scott,G.R., TheHistory of Torture Throughout theAges(London: T.
WernerLaurie,1940).
Townsend,Larry,TheLeathermans Handbook II (New York: Carlyle
Communications, Ltd., 1989).
Voltaire,Oevrescompletes New Edition(Paris,1818).
de Voltaire,


Talal Asad On Torture

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Originalbeschreibung:

Originaltitel

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Talal Asad On Torture

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

On Torture, or Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment

Author(s): TALAL ASAD

This content downloaded from 130.126.32.13 on Mon, 22 Jul 2013 05:20:47 AM

In thispaper I discussthemodernconceptionof "cruelty," in

* An earlyversionof thispaperwasreadfirstin Bellagioat a conference on "Social

SOCIAL RESEARCH, Vol. 63, No. 4 (Winter1996)

This content downloaded from 130.126.32.13 on Mon, 22 Jul 2013 05:20:47 AM

"torture"is not only a record of the progressiveprohibitionof

This content downloaded from 130.126.32.13 on Mon, 22 Jul 2013 05:20:47 AM

Two Historiesof Torture

I beginwitha discussionof twobookswhichtogethershow

This content downloaded from 130.126.32.13 on Mon, 22 Jul 2013 05:20:47 AM

crueltyis unique -not a characteristicof animal behavior at

This content downloaded from 130.126.32.13 on Mon, 22 Jul 2013 05:20:47 AM

tortureis in fact integralto it (Rejali, 1994). Althoughhe

This content downloaded from 130.126.32.13 on Mon, 22 Jul 2013 05:20:47 AM

extraordinarysecurityof the state and its citizens. It is an

This content downloaded from 130.126.32.13 on Mon, 22 Jul 2013 05:20:47 AM

improvement is- thesereaderswillsay- an open question,but

This content downloaded from 130.126.32.13 on Mon, 22 Jul 2013 05:20:47 AM

The writerin this passage is clearly thinkingof disease, but

Why has the inflictionof physical pain now become

This content downloaded from 130.126.32.13 on Mon, 22 Jul 2013 05:20:47 AM

proof-whichrequiredeitherconfessionor the testimony of

A manmayhavebeenlingering in prisonfora monthor two

It is not Bentham'sapparentrefusalto distinguishbetween

This content downloaded from 130.126.32.13 on Mon, 22 Jul 2013 05:20:47 AM

years in prison (including solitaryconfinement)a "humane"

The historicalprocess of constructinga humane society,it is

This content downloaded from 130.126.32.13 on Mon, 22 Jul 2013 05:20:47 AM

not itselfdemocratic,broughtabout moralimprovements in

Read pointsout that the phrase "repugnantto justice and

This content downloaded from 130.126.32.13 on Mon, 22 Jul 2013 05:20:47 AM

moralityand humanity,"or even sometimesas "backward and

It is, in myopinion,unnecessary at the end of the nineteenth

This content downloaded from 130.126.32.13 on Mon, 22 Jul 2013 05:20:47 AM

disinterestedreasons;or theymayindulgein itfromthelowest

This content downloaded from 130.126.32.13 on Mon, 22 Jul 2013 05:20:47 AM

post-Enlightenmentconcern to construct through judicial

Pain is not always regarded as insufferable in modern

Tortureis forbiddenby Israelilaw. Israeliauthorities say that

This content downloaded from 130.126.32.13 on Mon, 22 Jul 2013 05:20:47 AM

torture,and unlikeliberal-democraticgovernments, theyhave

This content downloaded from 130.126.32.13 on Mon, 22 Jul 2013 05:20:47 AM

regardssuch passionate convictionto be "uncivilized"as well as

Weapons have never been kind to human flesh, but the

This content downloaded from 130.126.32.13 on Mon, 22 Jul 2013 05:20:47 AM

HagueConvention of 1899;15buttheriseof 'thing-killing' as

One mightadd to thisthatthe manufacture, possession,and

This content downloaded from 130.126.32.13 on Mon, 22 Jul 2013 05:20:47 AM

proportionalityof means to ends. The human destruction

SubjectingOneselfTo "Crueland DegradingTreatment"

While the categoryof "torture"has in recenttimesbeen

This content downloaded from 130.126.32.13 on Mon, 22 Jul 2013 05:20:47 AM

pain. This sometimesleads to contradictions. But there is

This content downloaded from 130.126.32.13 on Mon, 22 Jul 2013 05:20:47 AM

One answer, according to some interpreters,is that not

Withhis faceset in a maskof concentration, Ron Atheyallows

What is remarkableabout these opening paragraphs is that

This content downloaded from 130.126.32.13 on Mon, 22 Jul 2013 05:20:47 AM

the writerof this account finds herselfhaving to put the

This content downloaded from 130.126.32.13 on Mon, 22 Jul 2013 05:20:47 AM