PREVOST Et Al (2014) USA National Security Latin America Ungoverned Spaces Failed States PDF

US National Security Concerns in
Latin America and the Caribbean

This page intentionally left blank
US National Security Concerns in
Latin America and the Caribbean
The Concept of Ungoverned
Spaces and Failed States
Edited by
Gary Prevost, Harry E. Vanden,
Carlos Oliva Campos, and
Luis Fernando Ayerbe
us national security concerns in latin america and the caribbean
Copyright © Gary Prevost, Harry E. Vanden, Carlos Oliva Campos,
and Luis Fernando Ayerbe, 2014.
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2014 978-1-137-37951-1
All rights reserved.

First published in 2014 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN®
in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC,
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.
Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world,
this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited,
registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills,
Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.
Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies
and has companies and representatives throughout the world.
Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States,
the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.
ISBN 978–1–349–47886–6 ISBN 978–1–137–37952–8 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9781137379528
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available from the
Library of Congress.
A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.
Design by Newgen Knowledge Works (P) Ltd., Chennai, India.
First edition: March 2014
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Contents
List of Illustrations vii
1 Introduction 1
Gary Prevost and Harry E. Vanden
2 From the US Department of State, USAID, and
Washington-Based Think Tanks: The Search for
Ungoverned Spaces in South America 9
Luiza R. Mateo and Aline P. dos Santos
3 The United States and the Security Agenda in the Caribbean
Basin after 9/11 41
Carlos Oliva Campos
4 The Militarization of Mexico-US Relations: Ungovernable
Areas and a Failed State? 61
Jaime A. Preciado Coronado and Angel L. Florido Alejo
5 Maras, Contragoverned Spaces, and Sovereignty 81
Harry E. Vanden
6 Central America: Ungoverned Spaces and the National Security
Policy of the United States 93
Ignacio Medina Núñez
7 Security Issues on the Mexico-Guatemala Border and Their
Relationship to the New National Security Policy of the
United States 113
Daniel Villafuerte Solís
8 Old Wine in New Wineskins: Incorporating the “Ungoverned
Spaces” Concept into Plan Colombia 143
John C. Dugas
vi l Contents
9 US Response to the Haitian Earthquake in the Context of the

Concepts of Failed State and Ungoverned Spaces 179
Gary Prevost
10 Conclusion 187
Gary Prevost, Carlos Oliva Campos, Luis Fernando Ayerbe, and
Harry E. Vanden
Bibliography 189
About the Authors 203
Index 207
Illustrations
Maps
4.1 Index of failed states, 2011 70
4.2 Drug trafficking routes in Mexico 72
4.3 Mexican drug cartels and their area of influence 73
4.4 Casualties associated to delinquency due to presumed rivalry,
2007–2010 73
Tables
2.1 Subcategories of ungoverned areas 12
2.2 The fragility framework 30
2.3 USAID programs to South America (2010/2011) 33
5.1 US ICE removals: El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras 86
6.1 Central America: Population 95
6.2 HDI 2010–2011 in Central America and Mexico 96
6.3 Central America: Average income per capita in 2009 97
6.4 Fund for Peace failed state index 100
6.5 Military and police assistance from the United States to
Central America 2008–2013 107
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Gary Prevost and Harry E. Vanden
T
he concepts of “ungoverned spaces” and “failed states” where the
limited presence of the state is seen as a challenge to global secu-
rity have generated a rich intellectual debate in recent years. In
this edited volume, scholars from Latin America and the United States
will analyze how the US foreign-policy making circles have applied
the concepts to the creation of new US security initiatives in the Latin
American region during the post September 11, 2001 era. The concept
of failed states is not a new one, having entered US political thinking
in the early 1990s, but the September 11, 2001 events focused attention
on the failure of the Afghan state to prevent the operation of Al-Qaeda
on its territory. The situation in Afghanistan, and subsequent growing
concern about states perceived to be similar, only intensified concern
about the role of failed states in harboring or aiding armed groups with
the intent to harm the interests of the United States. This outlook was
codified in the US National Security Strategy of 2002, which declared,
“America is now threatened less by conquering states than by failing
ones.”
While the failed state concept has remained central to US war mak-
ing strategy in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, the center of US atten-
tion in the last decade, it has been broadened to include the entire world
including Latin America. The list of countries judged to be in dan-
ger has grown to encompass states as diverse as Colombia, East Timor,
Indonesia, North Korea, Cote d’Ivoire, Haiti, Iraq, Somalia, and
Sudan. The extension to Latin America has been significant because
G. Prevost et al. (eds.), US National Security Concerns in Latin

America and the Caribbean
© Gary Prevost, Harry E. Vanden, Carlos Oliva Campos, and Luis
Fernando Ayerbe 2014
2 l Gary Prevost and Harry E. Vanden
it has meant that during the past 12 years US policy in the Western
Hemisphere has shifted away from the primarily economic emphasis
of the 1990s, the era of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)
project, back to a security focus reminiscent of the Cold War era. The
last decade has witnessed a significant increase in US military presence
in the region highlighted by the relaunching of the Caribbean-based
Fourth Fleet, the militarization of drug fighting efforts in Mexico,
and the establishment of several new military bases in Colombia, the
staunchest US ally in the region. While not based solely on the failed
state or “contested spaces” rhetoric, the shift has in part utilized that
rhetoric to justify the renewed military focus in spite of any concrete
evidence that terror plots aimed at the US homeland have been created
in Latin America. It is the author’s perspective that the renewed US
security focus in Latin America has little to do with real fears of terror
attacks emanating from the region and more to do with defending long-
standing political and economic interests in the region in the face of
progressive political movements in the region that have come to power
in recent years with an agenda of challenging traditional US hegemony
in the region.
Beginning in 1998 with the election of populist Hugo Chavez to
the presidency of Venezuela, there has been a clear Leftward trend
in Latin American politics that continues all the way to the present.
Most scholars analyze the trend as occurring in response to the failure
of neoliberal economic policies, known as the Washington Consensus,
that were pursued by Latin American governments in the 1980s and
1990s acting in close concert with the governments in Washington
and the international financial institutions such as the World Bank
and International Monetary Fund. Because the incoming Left govern-
ments in a range of countries including Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia,
Uruguay, Paraguay, and Ecuador saw the United States as at least part
of their problems, the leaders pursued policies that in one manner
or another sought greater independence from the United States. This
newly independent stance was most immediately recognized when
between 2003 and 2005 Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela blocked the
completion of the FTA A project that had been the centerpiece of the
US policy in the region since its launch in 1994 by the US president
William Clinton. The defeat of the FTA A has been followed by a series
of initiatives aimed at Latin American political and economic integra-
tion independent of the United States that has included the Bolivarian
Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, the Union of South American
Nations, and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean
Introduction l 3
States. While all of these projects and several others of a narrower

scope are still at an early stage of development, the newly independent
stance of many key Latin American countries over the last decade has
presented a challenge to US policy makers unaccustomed to such posi-
tions from its neighbors to the south and primarily preoccupied with
challenges to US security in the Middle East and Asia. The result has
been a Latin American policy pursued by the administrations of both
George W. Bush and Barack Obama that treats the region, not as a
priority but still highly important to US national interests. It is in that
context that analyzing US policy in the region, over the past decade,
often country by country, through the lenses of the concepts of failed
states and ungoverned spaces yields some valuable insights into how
Washington has promoted its twenty-first-century security proposals
in the face of a significant amount of Latin American s kepticism—in
some countries like Brazil and Argentina but with greater acceptance
among traditional US allies in Mexico, Central America, and the
Caribbean.
The changing nature of US-Mexican relations is captured in all of
its complexity by Mexican researchers Jaime Preciado Coronado and
Angel Florido Alejo in their chapter “The Militarization of Mexico-US
Relations: Ungovernable Areas and a Failed State?” These authors detail
how, in the post September 11, 2001 era, during the Mexican presiden-
cies of Vicente Fox and, more so, Felipe Calderon, US-Mexican rela-
tions in the security field have undergone a qualitative shift that now
includes much greater day-to-day collaboration between police and
military officials of the two countries than existed at any time in the
past. Preciado and Florido demonstrate how this new relationship, long
desired by the United States, has come to be justified, using at least in
part the rhetoric of ungoverned spaces and the possibility of a failed
Mexican state—all done in the framework of increased drug violence in
Mexico over the past decade.
The United States had long sought closer police and military ties
to Mexico similar to those it enjoyed with most other Latin American
countries but traditional Mexican nationalism going back to the
n ineteenth-century Mexican-American War and the decades-long
nationalist stance of the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party
(PRI) had stunted those US hopes. The arrival at power, in 2000,
of the National Action Party (PAN), along with closer ties to the
United States opened the possibility for security relations on a differ-
ent level. Such a change occurred with the launching of the Alliance
for Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP)
bringing together police and military officials of Mexico, Canada,

and the United States for the first time in a more systematic way.
The SPP gave rise to the Mérida Initiative in 2006 and the North
American Leaders Summit starting with the Obama administration
in 2009. The Mérida Initiative was supported by the US Congress
with over US$1.2 billion over four years for the Mexican fight against
drugs. It is in this funding and its justification that the intersection
occurs between the rhetoric of ungoverned spaces and justification for
unprecedented security cooperation.
Mexico had long been a transshipment point for drugs manufactured
in the Andean region bound for US markets. However, after 2000 as
the result of some US success in closing Caribbean drug routes to the
US mainland, drug-shipment activity increased in Mexico. With the
greater activity came the inevitable increase in drug cartels and with
that the levels of violence between them as they vied for control over a
multibillion dollar business. Of course, this trend represented a serious
challenge for the Mexican law enforcement that did not have a great
reputation for either honesty or competence during the long years of
PRI power. As the drug-related deaths grew rapidly after 2000, PAN
and US officials seized on the idea of confronting the drug challenge
by militarizing the issue in the framework of the SPP and the Mérida
Initiative arguing that the Mexican police were increasingly ineffective.
Significant sections of the major Mexican cities like Cuidad Juarez were
becoming ungoverned spaces where the drug cartels were the defacto
rulers and could only be removed from such a position by the direct
intervention of the Mexican army funded in part by the US govern-
ment in its long-standing “war on drugs” and justified in the wider
framework of threats to US security of drugs and other illicit activities
flowing from such ungoverned spaces. By implication such ungoverned
spaces, especially those close to the US border, could even foster armed
attacks against the United States, Al-Qaeda style. While the latter was
never actually a serious claim, it smoothed the way for the spending of
US tax dollars on expensive new security projects in Mexico at a time of
cutbacks in other US government spending.
Preciado and Florido detail how the militarization of drug fighting
under President Felipe Calderon primarily served to increase the level
of violence without stemming the influence of the cartels or the flow of
drugs into the United States. Roughly 65,000 people died in the drug
wars during 2006–2012 Calderon’s presidential term. Calderson’s PAN
was politically repudiated by the Mexican people in the 2012 election
when their candidate finished a distant third even though the overall
Introduction l 5
Mexican economy remained reasonably healthy. Most analysts saw the

election as a referendum on the drug fighting policy of the PAN and the
electorate chose Enrique Pena Nieto, the candidate of the PRI, endors-
ing his pledge for a new drug fighting policy. However, Nieto actually
made no pledge to reverse the militarization of Mexican drug policy
and in meeting with the US president Obama in December 2012, before
taking office, made clear that the cooperative efforts of the SPP and
North American Summits would continue as they were developed dur-
ing the years of PAN power. It is clear that there would be no return to
the historic nationalist stances of the PRI. Pena Nieto clearly accepts
the resetting of US-Mexican security relations as a major achievement
for Washington, given the strategic importance of its southern neigh-
bor. This shift might have been achieved independent of the events of
September 11, 2001, and the rhetoric of ungoverned spaces but both
things facilitated this important development.
The shift in US policy toward Mexico is probably the most signifi-
cant development of the past decade in terms of US security plans in
the Western Hemisphere but our other authors demonstrate the ungov-
erned spaces rhetoric has yielded other significant developments includ-
ing new agreements and actual military bases from Central America to
the Caribbean to South America.
The US-renewed focus on security in the past decade was by no
means limited to a resetting of relations with Mexico. In the fiscal year
2012 according to the “Just the Facts” database maintained by several
Washington-based NGOs, US military and police aid to Latin America
and Caribbean totaled nearly US$1 billion. For the previous five years,
the police and military aid totaled more than US$7.5 billion. In 2010
alone, US arms sales to the region were another US$1.7 billion. These
figures do not include the costs of the deployment of thousands of
US troops to bases in the region and the ships deployed including the
Caribbean Fourth Fleet. The US approach is a Western Hemisphere–
wide strategy neither limited to any one country or part of the region,
nor limited to the use of the ungoverned spaces, failed state framework.
According to Achin Vanik, in the post–Cold War era, the United States
has used six markers to justify US strategic initiatives, “humanitarian
intervention,” “weapons of mass destruction,” “global war on terror,”
“regime change in the name of democracy,” “failed states,” and “war on
narcotics.” While not all of these markers have been front and center in
justifying US policy in Latin America, most have figured prominently.
For example, US policy in Colombia going back to the late 1980s has
been justified using three of the markers. Initially, the war on drugs
followed in the post September 11, 2001 era by the added rhetoric of
failed states and the “war on terror.” In his chapter on Colombia, long
time Colombia expert John Dugas from Kalamazoo College analyzes
how the United States has shifted its rhetoric on Colombia over time
while maintaining its basic strategy of supporting the Colombian gov-
ernment in its 50-year war against revolutionary guerillas, primarily
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). As Dugas also
details, the Colombian government has remained the United States’
most important strategic partner in South America throughout the last
decade as other neighbors like Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia distanced
themselves from US security initiatives. The largest blow to US plans
in the Andean region came when the Ecuadorian government of Rafael
Correa refused to renew the US base at Manta that had been established
at the beginning of the new century with a previous US administration.
The loss of the Ecuador base prompted the United States to lean even
more on Colombia for additional bases there, a request that so far has
not been met by the Colombians.
In addition to the Mexico and the Andean regions, a major focus of
US security policy in recent years has been in Central America and the
Caribbean Basin. New initiatives have been pursued on both a bilateral
and regional basis. In the last three years, two important regional agree-
ments have been sponsored by the United States, the Central American
Security Initiative (CASI) and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative
(CBSI). Each agreement is modeled after the Mérida Initiative with
Mexico and provides more than US$1 billion in new funding for coop-
eration in the legal, policy, and military fields between the US govern-
ments and the governments of the Central American and Caribbean
area. These regional agreements compliment bilateral initiatives made
by the United States to several governments in the region, most nota-
bly Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Haiti, and Costa Rica. As sev-
eral of the authors in our volume describe, the rhetoric of ungoverned
spaces and failed states figure prominently in the justification for these
initiatives together with the war on drugs. As Harry Vanden discusses
in his chapter on drug gangs in El Salvador and Guatemala, US author-
ities, with rhetoric similar to that of Mexico argue that the power and
scope of these gangs, most originating from the United States, have
resulted in spaces in San Salvador and Guatemala City controlled not
by the local authorities but by the drug gangs. Most importantly, this
analysis allows the US government to propose to the local governments
of Guatemala and El Salvador increased police and military aid (rather
than economic aid to attack the roots of the problem) falling under
Introduction l 7
the rubric of the CASI. However, it is interesting how the different

governments based on political ideology have responded to the United
States. The conservative Guatemalan government elected in 2011 has
eagerly embraced the US plans while the progressive Salvadoran gov-
ernment of Mauricio Funes was skeptical of the militarized approach
and recently arranged a truce with the drug gangs as an alternative,
nonmilitary solution to regaining control over San Salvador’s most vio-
lent neighborhoods.
In their articles on Costa Rica/Nicaragua and Guatemala/Mexico,
respectively, Ignacio Medina and Daniel Villafuerte discuss how the
fluid character of those two border areas have drawn the attention of
US policy makers within the rubric of ungoverned spaces with result-
ing security initiatives toward the countries involved. In the case of the
Mexican/Guatemala border, it is acknowledged that the remote char-
acter of that region historically to the capitals of both countries has
meant that it is a good area for the passage of both people and goods,
including drugs. As a result, new efforts to create a police and military
presence along that border have moved forward under both the Mérida
Initiative and CASI. These are impoverished regions of both countries
and in the Mexican case, the scene of the two-decade old Zapatista
uprising. Rather than focus on social and economic programs to address
the underlying problems of the border region, the implemented actions
are purely militaristic and unlikely to stem the drug trafficking in the
absence of more serious efforts to control the demand in the United
States.
The final chapter on the region is Gary Prevost’s analysis of the US
government’s response to the Haiti earthquake understood in the con-
text of viewing Haiti as a failed state. Professor Prevost points out that
Haiti, with its high levels of poverty, underdevelopment, and lack of
successful governance, has long been near the top of the US govern-
ment’s list of potential failed states. The United States’ concern for a
failed state scenario is based primarily on a fear that such a situation
would create an unacceptable flow of refugees toward the United States.
As a result, when the devastating earthquake struck Haiti in January
2010, the United States response was quick and decisive sending thou-
sands of US troops to the island ostensibly to provide “humanitarian
assistance,” but in reality to secure the island’s surviving resources for
its economic elites and to make sure that there was no exodus of refu-
gees toward the United States. As the chapter demonstrates, the US
military presence actually hindered the relief effort in the early days and
made little contribution to Haiti’s long-term recovery. The chapter also
demonstrates how the United States using the failed state framework,
justified control over long-term recovery efforts and even the supervi-
sion of the immediate postearthquake election where the US authori-
ties blocked the participations of progressive candidate Jean Bertrande
Aristide on the grounds that his return to power could result in Haiti
retreating to the failed state status.
CHAPTER 2
From the US Department of State,

USAID, and Washington-Based Think
Tanks: The Search for Ungoverned
Spaces in South America
Luiza R. Mateo and Aline P. dos Santos
Introduction
The theme of “ungoverned areas” is connected to that of the so-called
new threats, which, as defined by the late 1980s, cover such diverse sub-
jects as terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal migration, organized crime,
and handling of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or of nuclear
arsenals. Similarly, this approach touches upon discussions on failed
states, weak states, and effective governance. The purpose of this chap-
ter is to understand the nature of the “zones of low governability” once
they have taken on relevance in discussions of international security and
have had particular impact on the foreign policy of the United States.
Recognition of the fact that the lack of governance in remote, border
regions, or even in urban complexes out of the reach of state authority,
facilitated pernicious threat exploration and threatened international
stability has become especially acute for American perceptions after
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Thus, the time frame of
the analysis in this chapter has been delimited to George W. Bush’s
two terms (2001–2008) and to part of Barack Obama’s administration
(2009–early 2013), privileging the approaches of four players in US for-
eign policy: the president and his advisers; the US Department of State

10 l Luiza R. Mateo and Aline P. dos Santos
(USDS); the US Agency for International Development (USAID); and

centers for strategic thinking (think tanks), especially the Brookings
Institution, aligned with the Democratic Party’s positions, the Heritage
Foundation, and the Hudson Institute, closer to the positions of the
Republican Party, the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS) and the R AND Corporation, that have a more independent per-
spective in terms of parties, focused on the interests of the US state.
From this analytical framework, we will try to list common defini-
tions for the term “ungoverned areas,” instrumentalized both by the US
bureaucracy and by think tanks. Through National Security Strategy
(NSS) and the position of the USDS, we attempt to understand how
threats arising from the lack of state governance are transposed to realms
of national security, foreign aid, and diplomatic action. Henceforth,
we focus on the hemispheric and South American contexts, mapping
the perceptions as transcribed in US reports that point to exploitable
locations as terrorist sanctuaries and programs for development in the
region.
From Practice to Theory: Defining Ungoverned Areas

After the demise of the Cold War, many of the new challenges to
the United States ensued from the decay or complete absence of state
authority in troubled contexts, combining humanitarian crisis, piracy
and trafficking of weapons, drugs and people, refugee flows, or civil
strife. Hence, conflicts unfolding in the international realm extrapolate
the traditional mold of interstate confrontation and begin to involve
internal security problems as well.
The conceptual construction of ungoverned areas is closely linked to
perceptions of threat in the US agenda. The first qualification for states
unfit to perform their functions came into use during Ronald Reagan’s
administration (1981–1989), in which the term “Rogue States” was used
to indicate countries unwilling to follow the norms of the international
community, especially in relation to the possession of nuclear weapons,
and/or that often supported terrorists and criminal networks. In short,
this specification was attributed to nations whose political regimes
expressed animosity toward the United States (Nasser, 2009).
Rogue States became an issue once again in Bill Clinton’s (1993–
2000) NSS, and were situated along with threats such as ethnic and
religious conflicts, proliferation of WMD, large-scale environmental
degradation, and the triad of terrorism, transnational crime, and drug
trafficking (Shimabukuro, 2009: 36–37). However, the term “Rogue
From the US Department of State l 11
States” contributed little in understanding the growing challenges to

international security, less tied to the indiscipline of some states than
to the inability of others to maintain effective control over significant
portions of their territory.
In the US view, this gap left by the state was amenable to exploitation
by illegal domestic or transnational groups that could establish dan-
gerous parallel powers. Such a demand prompted the incorporation of
new classifications to the study of international politics, with emphasis
on failed, fragile, and weak states, and, more recently, to ungoverned
areas. The theoretical categorizations have a very practical purpose: to
identify the sources of threats and to assist in combating them, and
consequently, shaping US foreign policy.
Thus, the idea of failed states first appeared in a US document
in 1998, during the Clinton administration, but it was not until
September 11, 2001, that the issue again emerged, when the planes
hijacked by Al-Qaeda crashed against great symbols of American power
in Washington and New York. At this point, it became evident just
what the global impact of a terrorist network coordinated from a sanc-
tuary in Afghanistan could be. As a result, the US NSS of 2002 stated
that “weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our
national interests as strong states” (NSS, 2002: 4).
The failed states terminology gained ground in the analytical and
political lexicon after a ranking prepared in the United States by the
Fund for Peace and published by Foreign Policy. Since 2005, the Failed
States Index annually ranks the extreme cases presenting a framework
of demographic pressures, massive movement of refugees, alarming eco-
nomic crisis, criminalization and delegitimization of the state, deterio-
ration of public services, or systematic violation of human rights.1
Comparatively, the definition of failed states is narrower than that of
ungoverned areas, since it does not include, for example, the vacuums
of authority in consolidated states or in cyber spaces. The concept of
ungoverned areas, in turn, provides tools for analyzing new dynamics
such as transnational actors, the use of new media (e.g., radical Islam
propaganda), the exploitation of virtual holes (e.g., money launder-
ing), the boundaries blurred by deterritorialized identities (e.g., eth-
nic groups in Africa and Arab tribes), civil conflicts and refugee flows,
and dangers coming from suburban areas (e.g., the banlieues in Paris or
the favelas in Rio de Janeiro, or the poor neighborhoods in northern
Central America).
For Menkhaus (2007), an ungoverned area is a category located
somewhere on a continuum between completely collapsed states with
predatory government presence, partially collapsed states in which state

authority exists but cannot project over the entire territory, and failed
states characterized by boundaries out of the control of the state and
the presence of parallel powers. Within the conceptual framework,
the “ungoverned territories” find shelter close to topics such as safe
havens for illicit actors, counterterrorism, drug trafficking, and money
laundering.
The term “ungoverned areas” denotes, therefore, places where there
is weakened governmental power or the intermittent exercise of its sov-
ereignty, coupled with the inability to influence the local population.
This includes states that, despite their economic strength and political
legitimacy, do not exercise authority over all their territorial extension,
because of either lack of political will, or incapacity or inefficiency in
the bureaucratic structure and functioning and logistics (Gates, 2010;
Lamb, 2008; Menkhaus, 2007; Rabasa et al., 2007). This definition
also admits variations, as systematized in table 2.1.
Table 2.1 Subcategories of ungoverned areas
Governance Threat Description
Ungoverned areas Potential safe haven Weak or failed states that performs none
(comprehensive) of their governance functions effectively in
a given area, freeing illicit actors to pursue
threatening activities
Undergoverned Potential safe haven States that perform only some of their
areas (partial) governance functions effectively, either in
a particular area or throughout its territory
(e.g., groups that exploit the gaps in law
enforcement)
Misgoverned (or Potential haven States, or some significant faction of
ill-governed) areas sponsored by the state states, that exercise limited governance,
freeing illicit actors to pursue threatening
activities (e.g., material support to drug
cartels, genocidal militias, or terrorists)
Contested areas Conflict zones and States that do not perform some or all
situations of of their governance functions in a given
competition for area, that come to be controlled by parallel
governance authorities providing basic social services
Exploitable areas Potential haven, States that perform all or most governance
functional or virtual functions effectively, but illicit actors are
able to exploit social networks and legal
and social norms.
Source: LAMB, 2008: 19–20.

According to some critics, ungoverned and undergoverned areas

are not a new phenomenon, and even the use of the term would be
misleading, because it presents a state-centric and universalist concep-
tion, developed by governments and international organizations in the
post–Cold War world: “In reality, many of the so-called ungoverned
spaces are simply ‘differently’ governed” (Clunan and Trinkunas, 2008:
5, emphasis in the original). That is, the question of ungoverned areas
would solely reflect the corrosion of the Western project of inserting
a specific model of political-territorial organization through instru-
ments such as the liberal universalist ideology, the incorporation into
the global economy, and diplomatic and military support to the elites in
power. In this scheme, “good governance” and “effective sovereignty”
are seen as the only remedy for deviations to the constitutional state
and for local malaise such as underdevelopment, corruption, diffusion
of illegal activities, or social insurgency.
We might still argue that, for decades, ungoverned areas constituted
a solution, rather than a problem for the world powers. Examples range
from the cases of El Salvador and Honduras in the 1980s to those of Saudi
Arabia and Iraq-Yemen, in which impasse in the demarcation of borders
and subtraction of the regional authority was part of a diplomatic move.
One could still list cases of tax havens and money-laundering networks
that are virtual zones of weak governance promoted by the very states
and recognized leaders (Clunan and Trinkunas, 2008: 10–11).
Moreover, part of these territories is characterized by the actions
of humanitarian relief agencies or the spread of peace operations and
humanitarian interventions, which exemplify the increase of inter-
ference by great powers, international organizations like the United
Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
or even of transnational civil society (through NGOs) in unstable or
conflict zones (Menkhaus, 2007).
Another terminological dispute concerning “ungoverned spaces” is
due to the conclusion that, in most cases, there is no power vacuum,
but the predominance of some “alternative governance” to state power.
Hybrid local arrangements that combine traditional authorities such
as tribal or ethnic-religious units that employ customary law, the pres-
ence of paramilitary, warlords, private security forces, transnational
entrepreneurs, or groups that carry out surveillance from outside the
borders.
Although vulnerable and generally averse to democracy, these hybrid
systems provide some security, predictability, and compliance with the
law, occupying those functions that are not exercised by the central
authority, such as social services and humanitarian aid in conflict areas.

Thus, in situations where the state is negligent or represents a threat,
parallel authorities are tolerated or even supported by local people. The
general scenario fostering crime, corruption, and sectarian leadership is
one of insecurity, poverty, disease, and hopelessness (Olson, 2010).
For the United States, ungoverned areas become a problem only
when they back the erosion of the international order, exposing high
human costs of armed conflicts (e.g., Congo, Cambodia, Sierra Leone,
Liberia, Lebanon), as well as the destabilization of entire regions due to
refugee flows, the association of civil groups with criminal networks,
black market of weapons, or even the relativization of the liberal norms
of governance, such as human rights. According to Lamb (2008), the
threat posed by these territories is that of turning into potential safe
havens for crime and terror, which can be described as a place or situ-
ation that enables illicit actors to operate with impunity or to evade
detection or capture, including ungoverned, under-governed, misgov-
erned, or contested physical areas (remote, urban, maritime) or exploit-
able non-physical areas (virtual) where illicit actors can organize, plan,
raise funds, communicate, recruit, train and operate in relative security
(Lamb, 2008: 6).
Thus, the perception prevails that regions with governance issues 2
may attract terrorists, insurgents, and criminal groups due to the pres-
ence of porous borders, reduced surveillance (due to corruption and
intimidation of officers), crisis of political legitimacy, and vulnerable
populations that, fearful for their survival and deprived of basic social
goods, end up joining parallel authorities that can meet their needs.
Illicit actors3 take advantage of “blind spots” left by governmental
capacity and political will, pockets of discontent—exploring the many
social ills or even ethnic-religious and ideological affinities to operate
without detection or to recruit these vulnerable populations.
In this way, current governance gaps are not present only in remote
areas or geographic havens (e.g., mountains or jungles), but also in
urban, sea, or even virtual areas (e.g., communication networks or
financial transactions). In such environments, the lack of surveillance,
of ability to exercise control, or even of recognition of the state author-
ity leave people at the mercy of criminal networks that can thus orga-
nize and plan their activities, raise funds, recruit, train, and ultimately
operationalize their strategy without a regulator to prevent them.
For Lamb (2008: 20), then, the most important evaluation is not
about the degree of governance of an area, but about “who is, and who is
not, governing an area and what are the consequences of the particular
way they govern.” The understanding of the subject is split, therefore,

between the sources of ungovernability and the factors that lead to
exploitation of the territory by terrorists or insurgents. Explicitly, it is
from the combination of these two elements that parts of US current
policies are drawn.
To further identify the vacuum of governance, we can observe indi-
cators pointing to the incipient state penetration: lack of institutions
and physical infrastructure, prevalence of corruption and informal
economy, as well as social and cultural resistance to the United States.
Other elements that draw attention are the loss of the monopoly of
force, low border control, external interference, high crime rates, and
broad public access to small arms (Rabasa et al., 2007).
Thus, one sees the emergent need on the part of US foreign policy
to clarify what are the threats and who is the enemy—nonstate actors,
armed with weapons and capable of using illegal and violent means to
achieve political gains that, ultimately, will conflict with US interests.
From this perspective, the security scenario in Latin America is dichot-
omous: despite the lack of formal wars, it faces increasing problems con-
cerning the fragility of the rule of law in border and particular urban
areas, drug trafficking, and the high degree of social violence.
Therefore, fighting the causes of the “lack of governance” is a complex
and multifaceted issue, involving, as we shall see, foreign aid, coopera-
tion with local governments, and the strengthening of civil society. The
challenge to contemporary American politics rests in the elaboration of
a plan combining aspects of security, development, and governance.
The Ungoverned Areas in the US Grand Security Strategy

The NSS is a document prepared periodically by the US executive to
enunciate the main national security concerns and how the government
intends to deal with them. The document adopts a general approach
and its implementation depends on other guidelines to action in the
Strategic Plan or the National Defense Strategy (NDS).
It was in the 2002 NSS, developed during the George W. Bush
administration, that the areas with deficits in governance appear, for
the very first time, as a threat to the international order, mainly as a
possible haven for terrorists and illicit actors. The 2002 strategy clearly
pointed to the threat coming from weak states—the context of poverty,
weak institutions, and corruption leaves us vulnerable to the actions of
terrorists and drug cartels. “America is now threatened less by conquer-
ing states than by failing ones” (NSS, 2002: 7). The United States and
the international community would have the duty to free these people
from uncertainty and poverty, working through foreign aid and bilat-
eral and multilateral pressure so that governments act on behalf of their
citizens, encouraging economic freedom and fighting diseases (such as
AIDS).
There is a further concern expressed by the American government
with Rogue States 4 and their terrorist “clients” yearning access to WMD.
In the 2002 NSS, there is a clear emphasis on the African continent and
its fragile states5 and on the need for border control and resolution of
ethnic and religious strife to avoid further civil wars. According to the
document, governance could be enhanced by state reforms and empow-
erment of subnational governments, consolidating democracy and sov-
ereignty on the continent.
The absence of governance is also alluded to in the treatment of
Afghanistan, for which the promotion of humanitarian, political, eco-
nomic, and security assistance is vital in order to stop it from being a
safe haven for Al-Qaeda. Complimentarily, NDS indicates the necessity
to limit the strategic options of the enemy “preventing the exploita-
tion by terrorists organizations of large, ungoverned spaces and border
areas” (NDS, 2005: 13). In line with the 2002 NSS, this report from the
Defense Department proposes to engage in intelligence partnerships
and operations of stabilization postconflict, in order to assist states in
the resumption of control over nongoverned territories.
While the 2002 NSS document was more concerned with defining
terrorism and US action, the 2006 one focused on the importance of the
political regime. Thus, the promotion of democracy has been repeatedly
stated as a pillar of American security in the attempt to “help to create
a world of democratic, well governed states that can meet the needs of
their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international
system” (NSS, 2006: 6).
Besides mentioning the term “ungoverned area” four times, the doc-
ument placed effective sovereignty (border protection, law enforcement,
and combating corruption) as critical to building effective democracy.
The issues of failed states and low governability appear again associated
with the provision of safe havens for terrorist activity. 6 Thus, inhibit-
ing the access of these groups to operational havens is a central strategy
in the fight against Al-Qaeda, which according with the Department
of Defense, was already present in 80 countries: “They exploit poorly
governed areas of the world, taking sanctuary where states lack capac-
ity or the will to police themselves” (QDR, 2006: 21). The American
defense policy should therefore help to “shrink the ungoverned areas of

the world and thereby deny terrorists sanctuary” (NDS, 2008: 9–10).
The 2006 NSS defined the major challenges of the twenty-first cen-
tury as being posed by pandemics (e.g., AIDS and avian flu), environ-
mental degradation, and illegal trade of drugs, weapons, and people.
Misgoverned states would be unable to cope with these challenges, of
which organized crime is the most severe, for it reveals a vicious circle—
the lack of governance attracts illicit actors that, in turn, undermine the
social order by strengthening violence and corruption. This becomes
explicit in the following statement:
Weak and impoverished states and ungoverned areas are not only a threat
to their people and a burden on regional economies, but are also sus-
ceptible to exploitation by terrorists, tyrants, and international crimi-
nals. We will work to bolster threatened states, provide relief from crises,
and build capacity in developing states to increase their progress. (NSS,
2006: 33)
In 2010, President Barack Obama published his first NSS that, in the
introduction, classifies failed states as a source of global instability
and threat. When referring to the fight against Al-Qaeda, the docu-
ment insists on its neutralization through the promotion of opportu-
nity and hope in vulnerable countries, preventing the emergence of
potential safe havens7 for recruiting, training, and operationalizing
terrorist cells. Counterterrorism was linked to the ability to overcome
the political, economic, and social deficits, providing basic needs in
states “at risk” with weak government performance: “Where govern-
ments are incapable of meeting theirs citizens’ basic needs and fulfill-
ing their responsibilities to provide security within their borders, the
consequences are often global and may directly threaten the American
people” (NSS, 2010: 26).
In addition, the National Military Strategy (NMS) of 2011 reveals the
threats coming from the international routes for piracy and illicit traf-
ficking, which could serve as havens for “violent extremism.” Countries
like Somalia and Yemen are especially worrisome because “states with
weak, failing and corrupt governments will increasingly be used as a
safe haven for an expanding array of non-state actors that breed conflict
and endanger stability, particularly in Africa and broader Middle East”
(NMS, 2011: 4).
There is an emphasis on the importance of strengthening states’
capacities in matters of security, social welfare, and postenvironmental
disaster or postconflict recovery: “Good governance is the only path to

long term peace and security” (NSS, 2010: 26). The proper functioning
of the international system would depend, therefore, on the recovery
of weak states and their institutions, political leaders, and civil soci-
ety. American security itself would depend on the assistance to new
and fragile democracies in the distribution of social goods to their citi-
zens. The 2010 document repeatedly affirms the relationship between
democracy, human rights, prosperity, and security, calling the United
States to work together with peoples, communities, and local govern-
ments, promoting dignity by meeting their basic needs, such as access
to food, drinking water, and medicines.
When listing the international challenges of the twenty-first cen-
tury, the document emphasizes, along with environmental issues and
pandemics, the threat stemming from illicit trade. Trafficking net-
works and international crime are seen as capable of destabilizing entire
nations, as they weaken institutions and encourage corruption, often
associating with terror (using criminal networks for funding and logis-
tical support).
One can deduce from US NSSs of the last decade (2002, 2006, and
2010), that issues of governance and state strengthening assumed a
prominent position in the US grand strategy. Despite the clear link
between (in)effective performance of states, geographic governance
gaps, and threats posed by the organized crime and terror, the term
“ungoverned areas” appears intermittently in the documents, sharing
room with the ideas of state weakness, states at risk or failed states, and
safe havens for global terrorism.
What can be seen in the Americas, in general, is the destabiliz-
ing potential of the association between low governance with corrup-
tion, parallel authorities (such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia [FARC, in Spanish] and paramilitary groups in Colombia),
organized crime, and possibly terrorism. 8 In the following section,
together with the general guidelines set forth by the USDS and USAID
assistance programs, we will emphasize the US agenda for Latin America
in addressing the challenges described above and maintaining the area
as a safe zone with broad political and economic cooperation.
State Weakness and Terrorism: The Approach of the USDS

Focusing on the connection between the ungoverned areas and global
terrorism systematically presented by the US security and defense strat-
egies early in this century, we will analyze the documents produced
by the USDS on the subject. Therefore, it will be possible to identify

the interpretive nuances of the USDS, as well as the chronology of the
incorporation of factors relating to state weakness as presumed pro-
pellers of terrorist activities in South America. Furthermore, we may
examine how the documentation provides points of contact with ideas
presented by think tanks, which will be analyzed next.
The activities documented in the USDS to assess terrorism around
the world dates back to 1995. Initially, the aim of the Patterns of Global
Terrorism9 report was to compile existing attacks and the presence of
terrorist cells in each country. It also aimed to classify the degree of
state support and internal efficiency in combating terrorism, id est,
assessing the willingness and ability of governments to contain group
formation and the operationalization of attacks. In a broader context,
these reports subsidize the budgetary approval of foreign affairs projects.
We note that the report issued immediately after the terrorist attacks
of September 2001 ascribes a high degree of reliability in the Western
Hemisphere, with the exception of Cuba. Such optimism is motivated
by the regional consensus on the condemnation of the attacks and the
perception that terrorism was a threat to all democratic nations in the
region. Still, the United States considers that instances of systematic
abductions should be the object of attention in the regional security
agenda and defines the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AVC)
as a terrorist paramilitary group.
With this addition, Colombia becomes the only country in the region
with three international terrorist organizations, since the FARC and
the National Liberation Army (ELN) were already included since 1997.
There follows the expression of concerns with the resumption of terror-
ist activities by the Peruvian group Sendero Luminoso, as well as with
the possibility of illicit activities in the Triple Frontier, funding terrorist
groups (USDS, 2002: 43–50).
The Latin American view on threats and ways to combat terrorism
spread through the Organization of American States (OAS) and, in
2002, resulted in the ratification of the Inter-American Convention on
Terrorism, which promotes the understanding that terrorism is a crime
that challenges democratic values, international peace, and security,
and stipulates the need for hemispheric alignment to combat it through
the adoption of the following measures:
●● Intensive supervision of financial activities

●● Cooperation on border control in order to inhibit the irregular
flows of goods and people
●● Cooperation and exchange of information between national and

international intelligence
●● Technical and security training cooperation
●● Clearance for transfer of suspects in custody, with the impossibil-
ity of treating them as refugees
Although the agreements are related to the internal functions of states

and are treated under the aegis of cooperation, there is an explicit clause
that denies the possibility of violating state sovereignty, as expressed
in the phrase that “nothing in this Convention entitles a state party to
undertake in the territory of another state party the exercise of jurisdic-
tion or performance of functions that are exclusively reserved to the
authorities of that other state party by its domestic Law” (OAS, 2002:
Article XIX).
For the United States, the convention is a tool to obtain regional
commitment to the interests of eradicating and countering terrorism,
even through adjustments in countries’ domestic legislation. In other
words, this offers further evidence that the region poses lower risk than
other parts of the globe on this issue. So much so that the 2002 Patterns
of Global Terrorism report states, “When compared to other regions of
the world, the Western Hemisphere generally does not attract attention
as a ‘hot zone’ in the war on terror” (2003: 65).
The prevailing interpretation is that, as far as the region can discour-
age illicit financing of terrorist groups, the chances of establishing safe
havens in the region are minimized. Furthermore, this same document
mentions for the first time the lack of cooperation from Venezuela,
which despite maintaining a converging discourse in relation to US
proposals embraced few concrete measures of cooperation and internal
adjustments (USDS, 2003: 74).
In addition to reaffirming the points mentioned in previous years,
the 2003 Patterns of Global Terrorism explores two approaches to ter-
rorism, international and domestic, the latter being characteristic of
countries where governance deficit enables the emergence of heav-
ily armed parastatal powers supported by illegal activities. The Latin
American region is perceived as being most affected by domestic terror-
ism, Colombia constituting the main example. As a result, US concerns
in the region refer to the possibility that structural deficiencies and the
rise of illegality will lead to an increase of safe havens, of fundraising
for terrorist activities, and of falsification of documents, factors that
ultimately make the region productive of and a safe route for the flow
of illegal immigrants and narcotics to the United States.
In order to minimize these impacts, the United States should help

the countries of the region to improve their capacity to counter ter-
rorism in all its facets. As an example, the 2003 document alludes to
the establishment of the 3+1 Forum, comprising Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, and the United States, in order to boost joint efforts in the
military, political, and intelligence sectors to increase the security of the
Triple Frontier (USDS, 2004: 72–84).
In 2004, the Patterns of Global Terrorism report was replaced by the
“Country Reports on Terrorism,” which maintains the initial goals of
demonstrating the involvement of each country with such crimes, as well
as presenting the classification of countries considered to be sponsors of
terrorism and terrorist-like organizations.10 In its first issue, the report
notes that the development of terrorism in the Western Hemisphere
occurs through the formation of groups that advocate political change
internally, or criminal organizations that intimidate government and
society with attacks so as to reinforce the impunity of illegal activities.
It states,
Terrorists in the region are becoming increasingly active in illicit trans-

national activities, including the drug trade, arms trafficking, money
laundering, contraband smuggling, and document and currency fraud.
The Western Hemisphere’s lightly-defended “soft” targets—its tourism
industry, large American expatriate communities, thriving aviation sec-
tor, and busy ports—as well as systemic disparities between countries
in border security, legal and financial regulatory regimes, and the dif-
ficulty of maintaining an effective government presence in remote areas
represent targets and opportunities for domestic and foreign terrorists to
exploit. (USDS, 2005: 76)
The terms used refer to an incipient but nonetheless clear definition

of an “undergoverned area” and, through such a justification, Sandero
Luminoso is raised to the condition of a Foreign Terrorist Organization
(FTO), and the relationship between drug trafficking and terrorism is
repeatedly stated (USDS, 2005: 83). One can further notice a distanc-
ing from the idea that Latin America is not the main stage for counter-
terrorism, and an attempt to highlight the fact that the region became a
battleground for international terrorism that operates with impunity in
the region in order to obtain resources to support its causes.
In the 2005 Country Reports on Terrorism, an entire chapter is
devoted to discuss the category of safe haven that is thus defined and
extended to states or large geographic complexes, regionally referring
to Venezuela, the Colombian border, and the Triple Frontier (USDS,

2006). The document also gains a subdivision to illustrate how the
American bureaucracy is acting in different regions. What is surprising
is the fact that its biggest accomplishments in the Western Hemisphere
are related to the control and seizure of illegal passports, that is, the
possibility of limiting migration to the United States becomes a mile-
stone in the fight against terrorism. Also at the regional level, Colombia
is moved from the category of narco-trafficking to that of narco-ter-
rorism, once the same groups linked to drug trafficking are treated as
responsible for the attacks carried out during that period.
There is a further indication that terrorism is perpetuated in the
region due to the production of narcotics, political radicalism, and, more
recently, by providing adequate structure for the presence of Islamic ter-
rorist groups. The relationship between terrorism and government inef-
ficiency becomes more explicit to the point at which the indicators of
the lack of governance appear in the following terms:
The threat of terrorist attack remained low for most countries. Overall,
governments took modest steps to improve their counterterrorism (CT)
capabilities and tighten border security, but corruption, weak govern-
ment institutions, ineffective or lacking interagency cooperation, weak
or non-existent legislation, and reluctance to allocate sufficient resources
limited the progress of many. (USDS, 2006: 155)
In the years 2006 and 2007, several counterterrorist initiatives were

reported, ranging from the coordination of international aid agencies
to the establishment of partnerships with the private sector. The United
States, thus, reshaped its strategy in that, while maintaining the inter-
governmental leaning, it started to act closer to the internal agents. At
the same time, Bolivia and Venezuela started to be discredited, seen as
uncooperative nations, with a high degree of political instability, a weak
judicial structure, and rising coca cultivation. Moreover, the United
States regarded with suspicion the commercial approach of these coun-
tries with Iran, as well as their ideological proximity to the Colombian
guerrillas, making room for statements concerning the increased threat
that such places could be used by terrorist cells (USDS, 2008).
As for the eve as well as the beginning of Obama’s administration,
we could say that, in general terms, the 2008 and 2009 reports indicate
little connection of the Western Hemisphere with transnational terror-
ist activities, the most worrying fact being members of Hezbollah and
Hamas raising funds through illegal activities on the Triple Frontier,
even though there is no confirmation of an operational presence of the

groups in the region. Furthermore, it is worth noting that none of the
South American states are classified as a sponsor of terrorism despite
Venezuela being considered a safe haven (USDS, 2010: 163–165).
Of the 44 terrorist organizations mapped by the Office of the
Coordinator for Counterterrorism of the USDS, only 5 are in the region:
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement and Sendero Luminoso, both in
Peru; and the FARC, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, and
the ELN, in Colombia (USDS, 2010: 235–287). Argentina and Brazil
are seen as extremely cooperative with the counterterrorist efforts and
free of movements capable of posing a threat to American interests.
Countries like Chile, Peru, and Paraguay are a concern to the State
Department, since their efforts have not been able to contain disputes
in indigenous lands or to create and effectively apply laws capable of
reducing corruption and crime. Bolivia, in turn, appears as a minimally
cooperating state with US actions, followed by Venezuela, which ranks
among the uncooperative (USDS, 2010: 165–190).
Hence, in what concerns terrorism, we observe a growing belief in
the involvement with terrorism in Latin America as a whole, and South
America in particular. Notoriously, this evolution occurs in convergence
with the solidification of the theme on the US foreign policy agenda,
and despite the lack of assertiveness in the language used for descrip-
tions, there is room for understanding a rise of severity in the region,
especially if linked to Islamic extremists who are the country’s main
target to eradicate terrorism. Moreover, there is the incorporation of a
number of issues such as immigration, democracy, and production of
drugs under the umbrella of terrorism, id est, different American issues
are justified in the same way, as if they gave rise to the same threat.
The Think Tanks’ View within the Framework of

South American Security
While the USDS provides an instrumental assessment of the ungoverned
areas, centers of strategic thinking are in charge of developing more
detailed studies, which ultimately seek to influence the decision making
process, and the direction of US government resources. One can note a
convergence between the surveyed think tanks and USDS on the identi-
fication of the diffuse nature of threats, as well as in the prioritization of
regions such as Africa and the Middle East, with South America posing
a concern with regard to the production of narcotics (cocaine), the levels
of violence, and the weakness of democratic institutions.
In this line, research by the CSIS focus on the failed states, privileg-
ing Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan. In South America, only Colombia receives
special attention, inside a historical framework and the evaluation of
the results of Plan Colombia (DeShazo, Forman, & McLean, 2009).
The R AND Corporation goes further by conceptually defining
the term “ungoverned areas,” creating a methodology of analysis and
including the Colombia-Venezuela border in its case studies. According
to the think tank, the border is used as a haven for the Colombian
guerrillas and as a route for the traffic of drugs and weapons. Also,
another concern for analysts is underdevelopment and ethnic diversity
in the region, where around 80 distinct indigenous groups live (Rabasa
et al., 2007: 243–276). Besides the Colombian border, another concern
of the US government in South America is the undercontrolled move-
ment of people and illicit goods in the Triple Frontier between Brazil
(Iguazu Falls), Argentina (Puerto Iguazu), and Paraguay (Ciudad Del
Este). Official documents released by Wikileaks indicate, in a diplo-
matic dialogue between Brasilia and Washington (2008), that in the
Triple Frontier there is “weak border control, smuggling, drug traffick-
ing, easy access to weapons and false documents, circulation of counter-
feit products and flows of money without any control” (Folha, 2010).
The Brookings Institution and the Hudson Institute have focused
on the urban sprawl and its implications for public safety, environ-
mental degradation, and the spread of diseases. Brainard (2008), of
the Brooking Institution, identifies the expansion of international
assistance as essential to the continuance of South American develop-
ment, and even claims that this is a way to spread American values
and strengthen democracy. Concurrently, researchers at the Hudson
Institute (Daremblum, 2009) indicate the following as regional risk fac-
tors: Venezuela under the leadership of Hugo Chávez, and the political
situation in the favelas of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, and
Caracas. On this lack of governance, Cirino states,
A careful look at Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires or Caracas—just

to mention four examples—show us that slowly, almost imperceptibly,
“society” in these countries accepts forms of “small anarchies” and toler-
ances that make coexistence increasingly difficult. The limits between
legality and the illegal gradually blur, and exculpatory rhetoric is avail-
able for almost all criminal activity, even the most aberrant. (2007: 1)
To complete the range of regional threats, the Heritage Foundation

focuses on the Andean region, identifying political instability and
economic difficulties with the perpetuation of poverty in these coun-

tries (Eiras et al., 2002). In addition, there are the problems of coca
cultivation and maintenance of drug trafficking in Bolivia, Colombia,
and Peru. Thus, Heritage analysts suggest that US foreign policy should
encourage the privatization of state enterprises, liberalization of mar-
kets, control of inflation, and strong judiciary with applicable legisla-
tions. At the bilateral level, they support the maintenance of aid to
Colombia in the fight against guerrillas, and suggest aid to Ecuador,
Peru, and Bolivia as a way to eliminate corruption and preserve demo-
cratic institutions.
In the study conducted by Johnson (2005), Colombian reluctance to
impose state authority over rural communities and border areas led to
the expansion of the FARC. The alert thus extends to other undergov-
erned regions on the continent, as the Brazilian favelas and the Triple
Frontier (which already present increasing numbers of illicit actors).
For Walser (2008), the Colombian problem of drug trafficking is
spreading throughout the South American region, in countries such
as Ecuador and Venezuela. The analyst proposes, for example, that
the Brazilian group First Capital Command (PCC, in Portuguese)
should be considered as terrorist and that Chávez and Morales anti-
American speeches should be neutralized. This agenda should be
implemented mainly through diplomacy, but also through sanctions
imposed on individuals suspected of involvement with terrorism in
the region (e.g., the withdrawal of US visa), budgetary increase for
regional security, and pressure over members of the OAS to recog-
nize the great threat posed by the FARC, and cooperate in the fight
against it.
Overall, we could observe that think tanks reiterate the concerns of
the USDS, deepening the case studies and pointing out the geographi-
cal locations with the most alarming cases, indicating means of action
that go beyond military action. As we will see, through the American
foreign assistance agenda to the region, governance vacuums are more
amenable to investment in development than in defense.
Ungoverned Areas in the USDS and USAID

The main thematic and programmatic lines to be followed by the USDS
and the USAID are condensed in the “Strategic Plan,” a document that
is periodically released in order to update the direction of foreign policy
in relation to the objectives defined in the NSS. Currently, the strate-
gic guidelines of the Transformational Diplomacy (2007–2012) are in
force, their purpose lying in the relationship between freedom, security,

and prosperity.
Its transformational character is due to the spillover effect that the
promotion of democracy and socioeconomic progress would bring to
the institutions, productive structures, and human capacity. The role
of US foreign assistance is to catalyze local leadership and enhance the
national development projects. According to Condoleezza Rice, secre-
tary of state during George W. Bush’s second term, “in today’s world,
it’s impossible to draw clear lines between our security interests, ours
development efforts, and our democratic ideals” (USDS, 2007: 6).
As stated in the document, there are seven goals to be pursued by US
foreign policy (USDS, 2007: 9–38):
●● Achieving peace and security

●● Governing justly and democratically
●● Investing in people
●● Promoting economic growth and prosperity
●● Providing humanitarian assistance
●● Promoting international understanding
●● Strengthening consular and management capabilities
We also observed that the goals of international peace and security

are connected to the eradication of terrorist actions and transnational
crime, as well as the control of conventional arms and WMD, the artic-
ulation of mechanisms for promoting security cooperation, and the
minimization of conflicts. Thus, the themes presented by the Strategic
Plan relate to the stabilization of the ungoverned areas. According to
Miko (2004), the eradication of terrorism involves the use of military
forces and sanctions, as well as of diplomatic tools, economic assistance,
and other social programs to strengthen governance and state presence.
Even if it does not make the term “ungoverned areas” explicit, the plan
addresses this issue by stating that “the most intractable safe havens
exist astride international borders and in regions where ineffective gov-
ernance allows their presence; we must develop the means to deny these
havens to terrorists” (USDS, 2007: 12).
American perception points to the restatement of old ties of integra-
tion of the Americas, regional stability and the convergence of inter-
ests in expanding markets, consolidating democracy, and generating
improvements in the social field. The common agenda is developed
through bilateral and multilateral dialogues, in international organiza-
tions such as the OAS, or in permanent forums such as the Summit of
the Americas. The priorities for the continent are the consolidation of
democracy (free elections, strengthened institutions, and reduction of
corruption), increased prosperity, and access to opportunity (education,
health, and environment). The protection of national states would be
linked to the fight against terrorism, organized crime, and the traffic of
persons and illicit goods.
With regard to transnational crime, the United States firmly stands
for the continuance of its war on the production, transport, and sale of
narcotics. There is a perception that, in the fight against drug traffick-
ing, the Americas occupy a prominent place (USDS, 2007: 15). The
Andean region produces much of the cocaine sold in the world, while
Central America, the Caribbean, and Mexico are routes for its redistri-
bution, which finds its largest destination in the US domestic market.
Narcotics trafficking also works as a catalyst of insecurity because it
degrades the consumer, fosters crime, illegal arms trading, and money
laundering networks. Narco-dollars corrupt the police, political, and
judicial systems of Latin America, resulting in a growing spiral in the
crisis of legitimacy and governance.
Parts of these problems are identified in the Strategic Plan as obsta-
cles to the attainment of American political and security goals at the
beginning of the third millennium (USDS, 2007: 17):
●● Political, social, or economic instability

●● Endemic or institutionalized corruption
●● Violent anti-American demonstrations
●● Latent ethnic or religious tensions within or between nations
●● Inadequate or nonexistent control of borders
●● Inadequate or nonexistent institutions for law enforcement
We could note here the convergence of the points mentioned by the

Strategic Plan and the indicators of ungovernability proposed by Rabasa
et al. (2007), highlighted above. Also with regard to the Western
Hemisphere, the perception that threats do not come exclusively from
political enemies, but especially from social, economic, and governmen-
tal vulnerabilities is dominant in the document. In this way, USAID
programs gain prominence.
Since not all areas affected by low economic development and inef-
fective government action pose the same risk to the United States, the
budget to prevent and treat such problems is addressed in accordance
to the relevance that the action will have on efforts to combat transna-
tional crime and terrorism. Specifically, the budget estimated by the US
executive for foreign policy activities in 201111 totaled US$52.8 billion

to be distributed to projects by the USDS (US$16.4 billion) and USAID
(US$36.4 billion).
In the budget proposal, the United States establishes core issues such
as human rights, rule of law, climate change, economic growth, democ-
racy, combating poverty, hunger, and disease. The intention was, there-
fore, to create a positive cycle of self-feeding that would culminate in
the independence of countries, because, as stated by the Congressional
Budget Justification (CBJ, 2010a: 11), “rather than delivering services
ourselves, we will help countries build their own capacity to deliver ser-
vices through strong, transparent, accountable institutions.”
USDS operations for the prevention of conflicts (64% of budget allo-
cation) and the confrontation of terrorism (12%) stand out among the
priorities. The Western Hemisphere received US$365.3 million,12 which
allowed the maintenance of diplomatic posts13 and the strengthening
of inter-American integration through bilateral relations, structures of
multilateral cooperation, cultural ties, and advances in market liber-
alization (increase in business transactions). Five priorities were stated
for the Americas in 2011: security for citizens, social equity, energy
security, climate change, and support for American values (CBJ, 2010a:
249–252).
External Aid and Good Governance: USAID in Action

USAID is under the umbrella of the USDS and meets the priorities
of the Strategic Plan and the budget approved by the US Congress,
constituting an important pillar of US foreign policy. The objectives of
foreign assistance are, on the one hand, to reverse underdevelopment by
improving the condition of human life according to the moral impera-
tives of US politics; on the other hand, foreign assistance is seen as a
tool of national defense, repairing the global systemic cracks through
programs to improve governance and the rule of law, control hunger
and disease, and expand free trade and liberal democratic values.
Following the imperative that “when development and governance
fail in a country, the consequences engulf entire regions and leap around
the world” (USAID, 2002), assistance for development becomes the
institutional mantra repeated by US foreign policy to deal with unstable
regions and prevent states from collapsing. For Lew,
the combined impact of investments . . . to improve people’s lives and

make them less vulnerable to the ravages of poverty and the threat of
instability that extreme poverty breeds. Improving the most basic human
conditions not only ref lects our values, it enhances our security. Left
unmet these conditions lead too often to conf lict, instability, and failed
states. (2010: 3)
The goals set for Latin America and the Caribbean constitute four main
aspects: to support the goals of the Summit of the Americas,14 to pro-
mote social and economic opportunities, to ensure the safety of citizens,
and to consolidate effective governance (USAID, 2011a). As is the case
with the USDS, USAID has no program with nominal reference to
the ungoverned areas. Indirectly, however, there are many themes cov-
ering issues of governance: democratization of the political processes,
rule of law, fighting corruption, and socioeconomic inclusion. Having
in mind the previous discussion on how factors of social vulnerability
and an authority vacuum may be exploited by illicit actors, threaten-
ing American security, it seems clear that the contribution that would
accrue from improvement in the political, legal, economic, and social
fields would protect people against exploitation from criminals and
terrorists.
In this sense, USAID seeks to deepen the ties between state and civil
society. According to Gleason et al. (2011), this process results in obtain-
ing governmental legitimacy, which is the main component for effective
state building (the capacity to perform political, economic, security,
and welfare functions). The former international assistance director,
Henrietta Fore, points out that the ultimate goal of foreign assistance
is that the favored nations can sustain the projects and advance autono-
mously (USDS, 2007: 6).
In 2005, USAID launched a document titled “Fragile States Strategy,”
which provides valuable parallels with the debate about ungoverned
areas. State fragility is recognized in cases of failed, failing, or recover-
ing states. Vulnerable states are those unable or unwilling to adequately
provide security and basic services to significant portions of their pop-
ulation, or those where governmental legitimacy is in question. This
includes states that have failed or are recovering from crisis (USAID,
2005a: 9).
According to the World Bank, fragile states grow at a rate that is
only one-third of the global average, have one-third of the per capita
income, 50 percent more debt/GDP, and are twice as poor in relation to
the average countries (Wyler, 2008: 13). The expected time for fragile
states to outgrow this limbo is 56 years, underscoring the importance of
programs that can boost their development.
Table 2.2 The fragility framework
Effectiveness Legitimacy
Security Military and police services Military and police services that are
that secure borders and limit provided reasonably, equitably, and
crime without major violation of human rights
Political Political institutions and Political processes, norms, and leaders that
processes that adequately ensure are acceptable to the citizenry
response to citizen needs
Economic Economic and financial Economic institutions, financial services,
institutions and infrastructure and income-generating opportunities
that support economic growth that are widely accessible and reasonably
(including jobs), adapt to transparent, particularly related to access
economic change, and manage to and governance of natural resources
natural resources
Social Provision of basic services Tolerance of diverse customs, cultures, and
that generally meet demand, beliefs
including that of vulnerable
and minority groups
Source: USAID, 2005a: 12.
Researches show that the instability connected to fragile states is a

product of ineffective and/or illegitimate governance (USAID, 2005a:
10–11). Following table 2.2, we define effectiveness as governmental
capacity to maintain order and provide public goods and services and
legitimacy as the perception that the government is reasonably just and
acts on behalf of the nation. These two indicators, stability and gover-
nance, are therefore conditioned by security, political, economic, and
social perceptions.
USAID has always worked with the theme of fragile states, but
this agenda gained effective relevance in the 1990s. In 2003, with the
exception of Iraq, one-fifth of the agency’s resources were directed to
vulnerable countries or to those in crisis. In that context, fragile coun-
tries receiving US assistance were Afghanistan, Iraq, Peru, El Salvador,
Indonesia, Sierra Leone, Macedonia, Serbia, and Montenegro. Over
time, USAID was modernized in order to improve the ability to detect
and promptly respond to states coming into the cycle of failure. An
example is the creation of the Office of Transition Initiatives and the
Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation.
In this way, it would be possible to anticipate the erosion of legiti-
macy and effectiveness through the detection of symptoms such as
institutional decay, disputed elections, poor income distribution, lack

of infrastructure (transport and telecommunications), environmental
degradation, limited access to resources, or ideological/extremist educa-
tion. USAID action should prioritize the stabilization of fragile states,
reducing the impacts of armed conflict, ensuring security and basic ser-
vices, in order to encourage further reforms in the social, political, and
economic fields, thus recovering the states’ institutional capacity.
This reality is no less important when we turn to Latin America,
which, constituting the United States’ first sphere of influence, is
seen as a strategic priority in the maintenance of international order.
Eliminating corruption and increasing government transparency,
increasing popular participation, modernizing the justice system,
promoting trade, and job creation are important goals of the USAID
agenda for the area. Some of the more recent programs for the region are
the Pathways to Prosperity in the Americas Initiative, the Microfinance
Growth Fund for the Western Hemisphere, the Inter-American Social
Protection Network, and the Energy and Climate Partnership of the
Americas (CBJ, 2010b).
Besides humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations and vic-
tims of environmental disasters—such as the earthquakes in Haiti and
Chile (2010) or the floods in Guatemala and El Salvador (2005)—the
role of USAID in the region focuses on the development issue. Efforts
to promote democracy/governance and the rule of law are present in
almost all regional programs. As we have seen, development serves as a
shield for fragile areas, raising the quality of socio-political-economic
relations, avoiding association of the local populations with crime, and
especially preventing severe crises.
Good governance alleviates poverty and promotes economic growth
through increased investment, which, in turn, drives trade, well-being,
and political stability. Within the logic of USAID, opening markets
for US products and services, and maintaining safe environments for
investment from the North are important steps for sustaining order and
regional stability. The other development areas would be affected by the
positive spillover effect:
USAID recognizes that quality governance positively inf luences the

sustainability of development, and this is a vital priority to eradicate
poverty, encourage economic development, promote sustainable infra-
structure development, foster public sector legitimacy, eradicate disease
and bring about an end to global terrorism. (USAID, 2004: 2)
Through local leadership, it is possible to reach the sources of underde-

velopment and provide basic services with greater efficiency and lower
costs. By circumventing state bureaucratic obstacles, the programs get
more adapted to local realities and are more exposed to the direct super-
vision of the communities. The goal is to increase the level of trans-
parency and popular participation in the projects, thus increasing the
confidence, the capacity to set priorities, and build consensus on con-
troversial issues.
Another priority in the maintenance of hemispheric order is the so-
called rule of law. Inefficient and corrupt justice systems can disrupt
the democratic game, the maintenance of security and social order,
as well as reduce trade flows and repel financial investments in Latin
America. Cooperation to improve legal systems in Latin America and
the Caribbean began in the 1980s, encouraging legal reform, techni-
cal assistance, donation of equipment, and staff training in order to
broaden access to justice. USAID also invests in the training of lawyers
in programs such as the Justice Studies Center of the Americas, a part-
nership with the Summit of the Americas.
Some noteworthy examples are the training of judges in Guatemala,
Bolivia, and Honduras, the creation of houses of justice (casas de jus-
ticia, in Spanish)—14 in Guatemala and over 40 in Colombia—and
significant adhesion of Latin American countries to the oral system of
legal argument—which happened mainly in 1992, with the entrance
of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Peru,
Ecuador, Colombia, Chile, Venezuela, and so on (USAID, 2005b: 4–8).
Since the 1990s, USAID runs programs to combat corruption (also
along with the police) in all Latin American and Caribbean countries
(except Cuba).
Turning the analysis toward the South American region, we iden-
tified countries currently receiving support from USAID (2011a) as
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, and Peru, whose
programs are summarized in table 2.3.
Comparing the programs listed in table 2.3, we can see a conver-
gence on issues such as health, environment, democratic strengthen-
ing, and economic growth. The activities undertaken by USAID in
South America range from fighting tuberculosis and AIDS, to pro-
moting vaccination campaigns, water supply, and sanitation. We also
emphasize the financing of infrastructure in those countries, through
the construction of bridges and highways. Projects for the substitution
of production predominate largely in the Andean region, with the aim
of reducing coca cultivation. In these cases, USAID assistance ranges
Table 2.3 USAID programs to South America (2010/2011)
Country Programs Geographic distribution of the Investments % share of programs

programs (US$ millions)
Bolivia Integral development Covering all 9 Bolivian states 52.158 About 30% share for each
Health program
Sustainable growth and environment
Brazil Environment 10 in the Northern region 22.589 Environment: 59%
Health 7 in the Northeast region Health: 26%
Energy 9 in the Southeast region
Employment 4 in the Central-West region
3 in the Southern region
Colombia a Environment 227.236
Democracy and human rights
Vulnerable populations
Security and productivity
Ecuador Alternative development Mainly in the Northern and 26.000 b
Democracy Southern borders
Economic growth
Environment
People with disability
Human trafficking
Guyana Democracy 24.000c
Economic growth
Health
Threshold program
continued
Table 2.3 Continued
Country Programs Geographic distribution of the Investments % share of programs
programs (US$ millions)
Paraguay Democracy Concentrated in the Southern 18.000b

Environment region
Health
Economic growth
Threshold program
Northern Border Initiative
Peru Democracy 7 states assisted by the integrated 87.603 Sustainable development: 36%
Economic growth development proposal Environment, democracy and
Health 3 states assisted by the border health: 14%
Environment program
Education
Sustainable development
Notes:
a
It is among the 20 countries that most received funds in 2010.
b
Approximate value based on 2009.
c
Approximate value based on 2008.
Source: USAID, 2011b.
from the provision of training on the cultivation of other products

(e.g., corn) to the mediation between small farmers and buyers in the
international market.
Another initiative, known as the Threshold Program, includes the
strengthening of governmental audits, combating corruption, and pro-
tection of rights (e.g., intellectual property). In addition to resources
from USAID, the program relies on funding from the Millennium
Challenge Corporation (MCC)—responsible for monitoring indicators
on governance, economic openness, and investment in the population.
It is, therefore, a tool capable of influencing governments of developing
countries and educating people about the advantages of establishing a
democratic regime according to US standards.
In short, USAID agenda for the region focuses on the strengthening
of democratic regimes and opening of markets to leverage economic
development. To this end, the agency invests in multilateral opera-
tions, such as those carried out with the OAS to combat poverty, social
inequality, and political marginalization. We stress, however, the limi-
tations of time and coverage surrounding the programs undertaken
by USAID that, once subject to annual budgetary approval by the US
Congress, can have their beneficiary communities suddenly deprived of
foreign assistance.
Final Remarks
The incorporation of the term “ungoverned area” by the American
political arenas is relatively new and has been linked to correlates such
as good governance and state fragility or failure. This approach points
to a series of threats to international stability that bring to the US for-
eign policy agenda the challenge of expanding its room for maneuver in
the domestic affairs of other states. For US foreign policy, the goal is to
promote the model of democratic states, with market economies and the
capacity to meet the basic needs of their populations in order to obtain
stability in the international system.
From this, debates emerge concerning which treatment should be
given to remote, border, or urban complex areas that are not controlled
by a state authority in accordance with American standards. Such inter-
ests permeated the administrations of both George W. Bush and Barack
Obama, which characterizes them as permanent issues in the US agenda.
It is precisely to support such interests that new classifications are incor-
porated in the characterization of global threats. According to Lamb
(2008: 3), safe haven and ungoverned area are “terms of convenience,”
just as terrorist group, spoiler to peace, and illicit actors, id est, they are
political expressions, created out of the need to circumscribe and name
the enemies, guiding US foreign policy.
In this view, the idea of ungoverned areas appears in the NSSs, in
reports about terrorism, in the Strategic Plan and in the documents
delineating US foreign assistance. Equipped with this interpretation,
the US government opens the way to act precisely on the sources of
systemic instability, especially by illicit actors connected to crime and
terror. It is worth noting, also, the role of the centers of US strategic
thinking in the consolidation of the term “ungoverned area.” Despite
different approaches to the issue of governance, specifically in South
America, the think tanks listed here reinforce the perception embodied
in American foreign policy, that the diffuse threats of the twenty-first
century are connected to the difficulty in exercising state authority in
fragile states and territories.
In this sense, we could observe in the geographical scope of South
America how foreign assistance contributes to the consolidation of
national security objectives—through programs of assistance to vulner-
able populations and the strengthening of governmental capacities. The
activities of the USDS and the USAID in South America are directed at
reducing the risk of state failure and lack of territorial control. We thus
observed the focus of USAID programs in overcoming the institutional
deficit, both in terms of democratic consolidation (e.g., to fight corrup-
tion and reform the judicial system) and in what concerns the lack of
infrastructure tied to socioeconomic problems.
As direct consequences, we point out growing US influence in the
internal affairs of South American, Central American, and Caribbean
countries, and the use of international assistance as a diplomatic tool
capable of meeting part of its strategic objectives related to “effective”
sovereignty. Although diffuse, the implementation of strategic objectives
and projects of foreign assistance to ungoverned areas end up becom-
ing important, for they involve a demand that interconnects economic,
political, and social questions. Thus, their operationalization depends
on US cooperation with individuals, civil society, and governments in
both bilateral and multilateral spheres.
Notes
1. For more detailed information, articles by international analysts, case studies,
and an interactive map, see, www.foreignpolicy.com/failedstates.
2. We adopt here the definition given by Lamb (2008: 7), according to which
governance means “the delivery of security, judicial, legal, regulatory, intel-
ligence, economic, administrative, social, and political goods and public ser-
vices, and the institutions through which they are delivered.”
3. Still according to Lamb (2008: 7), illicit actors would be nonstate groups or
individuals who use or incite armed violence for political or private gains, so as
to threaten the United States and its allies.
4. The main Rogue States according to the document would be Iran, Iraq, and
North Korea.
5. The 2002 NSS points to the fragility of the sub-Saharan region and to countries
with great regional impact such as South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia.
6. In a critical assessment, Nasser states that the territorialization of global ter-
rorism observed a practical criterion: “In this way, it has effected a strategy
that placed the phenomenon of transnational terrorism within the borders of
the state, making it possible for a military action in the conventional molds”
(2009: 115–116). A clear result of this policy was the deployment of US troops
to Iraq and Afghanistan under the slogan of “War on Terror.”
7. The document admits that Al-Qaeda acts in safe havens in Somalia, Yemen,
and the African regions of Maghreb e Sahel.
8. In the last Quadrennial Defense Review, the Western Hemisphere appears,
along with Asia and Africa, as a sanctuary for crime due to the presence of
nonstate actors engaged with drug trafficking and terrorism. The report
points out the “increasing challenges and threats emanating from the ter-
ritories of weak and failing states” (QDR, 2010: 12).
9. As a rule, these reports are published at the beginning of the year follow-
ing the one under examination, so when we refer to the 2001 Patterns of
Global Terrorism, we deal with a work published by the USDS in 2002.
10. We emphasize that none of the documents of this subdivision of the USDS
presents the methodology used to justify their conclusions.
11. The 2011 budget had a 2.8 percent increase (US$4.9 billion) compared to the
fiscal year 2010, of which US$3.6 billion are committed to the frontline states:
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. The International Affairs Budget comprises
only 1.4 percent of the total US budget, representing only one-sixth (1.7%) of
the amount destined to national security, or 7.4 percent of the defense budget,
which in 2011 was estimated at US$708 billion (Clinton, 2010: 2).
12. Compared to the 2010 budget justification, there was a budgetary increase of
US$9.2 million required for the 2011 fiscal year.
13. There are 31 diplomatic posts (9 in the United States and 22 abroad). Among
the Latin American countries, those that demand higher cost of diplomatic
operation are Colombia, Haiti, Mexico, Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela (CBJ,
2010a: 261–262).
14. The Summit of the Americas was established in 1994, and it provided for the
meeting of the American states (except Cuba) in order to promote democracy,
free trade, and sustainable development.
Works Cited
Brainard, Lael (2008). U.S. foreign assistance: Reinventing aid for the 21st
century. Retrieved February 18, 2011, from http://www.brookings.edu
/testimony/2008/0123_foreign_assistance_reform_brainard.aspx.
Cirino, Julio A. (2007). Urban areas out of control: Looking at Buenos Aires and
Rio de Janeiro. Retrieved April 15, 2011, from http://www.hudson.org/files
/documents/julio cirino_urban_areas.pdf.
Clinton, Hillary R. (2010). Foreign policy priorities: The FY2011 international
affairs budget. Retrieved February 18, 2011, from http://www.state.gov/secre-
tary/rm/2010/02/137256.htm.
Clunan, Anne L., & Trinkunas, Harold (2008). Ungoverned spaces alternatives to
state authority in an era of softened sovereignty. International Studies Association
48th Annual Meeting, San Francisco.
Daremblum, Jaime (2009). Populism, Islamism and “indigenismo” vs. democracy
in Latin America. Retrieved February 12, 2011, from http://www.hudson.org
/files/documents/PopulismIndigenismo_Transcript.pdf.
Deshazo, Peter, Forman, Johanna Mendelson, & McLean, Phillip (2009).
Countering threats to security and stability in a failing state: Lessons from
Colombia. Retrieved March 8, 2011, from http://csis.org/publication/countering-
threats-security-and-stability-failing-state.
Eiras, Ana, et al. (2002). Time to change U.S. strategy for the Andean region.
Retrieved February 15, 2011, from http://www.heritage.org/Research/
Reports/2002/02/Time-to-Change-US-Strategy-for-the-Andean-Region.
Folha (2010, November 29). Leia íntegra dos arquivos do Wikileaks obtidos
pela Folha. Retrieved March 16, 2011, from http://www1.folha.uol.com.br
/poder/837579-leia-integra-dos-arquivos-do-wikileaks-obtidos-pela-folha.shtml.
Gates, Robert M. (2010). Helping others defend themselves. Foreign Affairs, 89, 3.
Gleason, Megan et al. (2011). State building in situations of fragility and con-
flict: Relevance for US policies and programs. Retrieved January 25, 2011,
from http://csis.org/files/publication/110218_Statebuilding_in_Situations
_Fragility_Conflict.pdf.
Johnson, Stephen (2005). Latin America’s security puzzle. Retrieved February
15, 2011, from http://www.heritage.org/Research/Testimony/Latin-Americas-
Security-Puzzle.
Lamb, Robert D. (2008). Ungoverned Areas and the Threats from Safe Havens.
Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Lew, Jacob J. (2010). President’s proposal for the FY 2011 State Department bud-
get. Retrieved November 19, 2011, from http://blogs.state.gov/index.php/site
/entry/state_usaid_budget.
Menkhaus, Ken (2007). Terrorist activities in ungoverned spaces: Evidence
and observations from the horn of Africa. Southern Africa and International
Terrorism workshop. Retrieved September 9, 2010, from http://www.
thebrenthurstfoundation.org/Files/terror_talks/Terrorist%20Activities%20
in%20Ungoverned%20Spaces.pdf.
Miko, Francis T. (2004). Removing Terrorist Sanctuaries: The 9/11 Commission,

Recommendations and U.S. Policy. Washington, DC: Congressional Research
Service. Retrieved May 24, 2011, from http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror
/RL32518.pdf.
Nasser, R. M. (2009). Os Estados Falidos: novas ameaças e novas oportunidades.
In Nasser, Reginaldo M. Os conflitos internacionais em múltiplas dimensões. São
Paulo: Editora UNESP.
Olson, Dean (2010). Ungoverned areas pose transnational threats. Retrieved June
17, 2011, from http://www.eurasiareview.com.
Rabasa, Angel, et al. (2007). Ungoverned Territories: Uunderstanding and Reducing
Terrorism Risks. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
Shimabukuro, A. (2009). Concepções estratégicas dos Estados Unidos sobre a
segurança internacional dos governos de Bill Clinton, George W. Bush e Barack
Obama. In Ayerbe, Luis Fernando (org.) De Clinton a Obama: políticas dos
Estados Unidos para a América Latina. São Paulo: Editora UNESP.
Walser, Ray (2008). Terrorism, insurgency, and drugs still threaten America’s
southern flank. Retrieved February 15, 2011, from http://www.heritage.org
/Research/Reports/2008/06/Terrorism-Insurgency-and-Drugs-Still-Threaten-
Americas-Southern-Flank.
Wyler, Liana Sun (2008). Weak and Failing States. Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service.
Documents
CBJ (2010a). Congressional Budget Justification FY 2011 (v.1). Washington, DC:
Office of Management and Budget.
CBJ (2010b). Congressional Budget Justification FY 2011 (v.2). Washington, DC:
Office of Management and Budget.
NDS (2005, 2008). National Defense Strategy of USA. Retrieved March 19, 2012,
from http://www.defense.gov.
NMS (2011). National Military Strategy of USA. Retrieved March 19, 2012, from
http://www.defense.gov.
NSS (2010). The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2010.
Washington, DC: The White House.
OAS (2002). Inter-American convention against terrorism. Retrieved November
24, 2011, from http://www.oas.org/xxxiiga/english/docs_en/docs_items
/AGres1840_02.htm.
QDR (2006, 2010). Quadrennial defense review report. Retrieved March 19, 2012,
from http://www.defense.gov/qdr/.
USAID (2011a). USAID priorities in Latin America and Caribbean. Retrieved
May 10, 2011, from http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_america_caribbean/.
USAID (2011b). USAID regions and countries. Retrieved May 24, 2011, from
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/.
USAID (2005a). Fragile States Strategy. Washington, DC: US Agency for
International Development.
USAID (2005b). USAID Promotes the Rule of Law in Latin America and the
Caribbean. Washington, DC: US Agency for International Development.
USAID (2004). Good Governance in Latin American and the Caribbean. Washington,
DC: US Agency for International Development.
USAID (2002). Foreign Aid in the National Interest. Washington, DC: US Agency
for International Development.
USDS (2004–2009). Country reports on terrorism. Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism. Retrieved May 24, 2011, from http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls
/crt.
USDS (2001–2003). Patterns of global terrorism. Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism. Retrieved May 24, 2011, from http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls
/crt.
USDS; USAID (2010). A citizen’s guide to foreign affairs: Diplomacy and develop-
ment in action. Retrieved May 24, 2011, from http://www.state.gov/documents
/organization/141872.pdf.
USDS; USAID (2007). Strategic plan: Transformational diplomacy. Retrieved May
24, 2011, from http://www.usaid.gov/policy/coordination/stratplan_fy07–12.
pdf.
CHAPTER 3
The United States and the

Security Agenda in the
Caribbean Basin after 9/11
Carlos Oliva Campos
Introduction
In the history of US relations with Latin America and the Caribbean,
the issue of national security has always been a key one on bilateral
agendas. Inter-American history also reflects how the Caribbean Basin,1
under different denominations as “Southern border,” “Southern stra-
tegic perimeter,” among others, has been trapped under higher levels
of subordination in terms of security perceptions and policies of the
United States, as compared with South America.
In geopolitical terms, the United States has paid particular attention
to the Caribbean Basin since the early nineteenth century, as one of
the scenarios where the need for a naval power to control the destiny of
events in the area was based (Rodríguez Beruff, 2000: 28). The twenti-
eth century would seal this “special relationship” with the construction
of the waterway of the Panama Canal and the definition of the strategic
communication routes with Europe during the two world wars.
Moreover, the most serious threat to US national security before
September 11, 2001, was also within the Caribbean Basin, with the
start of the strategic alliance between Cuba and the Soviet Union from
the early sixties of last century. We all remember as peak time the “mis-
sile crisis” of October 1962, which put humanity on the brink of a

42 l Carlos Oliva Campos
nuclear conflict, and ended when Soviets and Americans negotiated the
withdrawal of the nuclear missiles installed on the island without the
presence of the Cuban authorities.
After the collapse of the USSR and the overcoming of the theaters
of war in Central America, there was speculation about the loss of the
strategic importance of the Caribbean Basin and rejection of the opera-
tional validity of the interoceanic and Atlantic routes, determining geo-
political factors for the area (Griffith, 1997: 76). The dramatic events of
September 11, 2001, discarded any remaining doubts and marked the
definite approach to the Caribbean Basin as part of the return to the old
doctrines on US national security (Rosas, 2006: 47). Following the ideas
expressed by this author, that return implied
●● return to the “state-centered” concept, in which the state defines

and centralizes the policies related to the protection of the borders,
the population and institutions;
●● establishing a clear distinction between internal and external secu-
rity, as the two dimensions of the national security doctrine;
●● contrary to the perceptions of the Cold War, threats come from
outside and not from internal strife;
●● the reaction is assumed in terms of centralization of state decision
making;
●● there is only one option, the development of offensive military
capabilities necessary to face and neutralize the enemy.
In the US perspective, the following general inventory of the security

agenda of the Caribbean Basin in the post–Cold War showed a diverse
and complex set of issues, an indicator of the profound weaknesses of
the countries of the region:
●● Drug trafficking
●● Arms trafficking, without ruling out those of mass destruction or
at least the components to build them
●● Organized crime
●● Money laundering
●● Human trafficking
●● Illegal immigration
●● Transport of nuclear waste
●● International networks of robbery, kidnapping, and smuggling of
vehicles
●● Natural disasters
The United States and the Security Agenda l 43
●● Political corruption
●● Insurgent terrorism in Colombia
●● Continuity of the conflict with the socialist government of Cuba,
included as terrorist country in the Black List of the Department
of State
●● Haiti, a failed state
●● Venezuela, an example of “radical populism” in the area
●● Rise of drug trafficking networks in Mexico
●● Prison for terrorists, real and assumed, at the Guantanamo Naval
Base, Cuba
However, within such a broad agenda, the presence of the so-called

transnational actors (Cerny, 2005: 11) became a priority, an expression
of a general review of security strategies after 9/11.
Transnational Actors in the Caribbean Basin

Undoubtedly, one of the major issues reshaped in the post–Cold War
era was that of governance. During the Cold War, its hallmark was
the strong interconnection with the global conflict between the United
States and the USSR. The issue, therefore, was treated and monitored
through the prism of confrontation between the East and the West. The
rating of the communist regimes as undemocratic, embellished with
names such as Stalinist, Castroist, and totalitarian, and opposite to the
democracy and governance of the “free world,” could conceal “authori-
tarian” experiences, provided they were backed by the supreme order of
the fight against communism (Kirkpatrick, 1979).
In the post–Cold War era, as a consequence of major changes, the
issue of governance regained importance, and it has become a convenient
gauge to measure the proper functioning of governments. However, the
exercise of governance also changed with the post–Cold War. A reading
of what is happening today tells us that there are at least three levels of
governance with specific traits. The first is the institutional level itself,
marked by a paradox: governments inherited the neoliberal economic
model, which, by definition, needs to reduce state management to a
minimum in favor of free markets. The second concentrates on the real
economic and, therefore, political power, with the large multinational
corporations as the leading actors on top of governments. The third
covers a diversity of not only emerging social, political, and economic
actors, but also criminals who, from their particular areas of activity,
have established their own standards of governance.
Despite the differing paths between such dissimilar actors, some of

them take a risk and, indeed, suffer the cost of being criminalized.
This fact conceals ethnic, racial, and ideological issues, as has happened
with Latin American indigenous movements, particularly the successful
experience of Evo Morales in Bolivia, turning a social movement into
government (Andersen, 2007: 159–170).
As transnational actors in the area affecting US national security,
there are the large drug trafficking networks that operate primarily
from Colombia and Peru, without ruling out drug trafficking opera-
tions from Ecuador and Bolivia. The main destination for such opera-
tions is the US market, but they also move drugs to markets created in
other countries of the Western Hemisphere and Europe. During the
last decade, besides the initial prominent role of the Colombian cartels,
struck by successive blows of US drug enforcement agencies, there are
the Mexican drug trafficking networks, acting not only as key interme-
diaries for the US market, but also as drug dealers in an increasingly
wider domestic market.
At the start of President Felipe Calderon’s offensive against drug
trafficking networks, the country was divided among six major cartels:
the Zetas, the Gulf, the Sinaloa, that of Juarez, the Tijuana, and the
so-called Familia Michoacana. Over the years, both alliances and wars
have sprung up between them. The alliance between the Sinaloa and
the Gulf cartels caused the Zetas to break up with the latter, assuming
an independent stance since March 2010 and operating throughout the
country.
Moreover, the Gulf cartel allied with the Familia Michoacana “to
create operational and military arms in their territories such as La
Resistencia, the New Generation Guadalajara Cartel, Los Pelones and
Los Antrax, the latter two considered the shock troops running the kill-
ings and the settling of scores of gunmen from rival organizations” (Gil
Olmos, 2011: 12).
At present, international networks of all kinds are studied and
monitored due to their position as important players, leaders in some
cases, at the international level. For some authors (Raab and Brinton
Milward, 2003: 417), a network is a social structure governed by
interdependence. It is a new expression of governance. It is a systemic
player, defined by its particular features. In this sense, a network of
drug traffickers, while a criminal network, operates under strict codes
of conduct. It operates with large financial resources; it maintains
international contacts with arms and technology dealers; it engages
in alternative economic projects of various magnitudes to maintain
a balance between losses caused by the war on drugs and to ensure

“clean” businesses; it penetrates all possible official agencies; and it has
more or less sophisticated and generally efficient intelligence services,
mostly supported on the violence-money mix. Its transnational nature
can be understood from its own operating capacity and that its profit
criteria go beyond national boundaries, meeting the high demand of
the largest markets in the world.
The drug problem becomes further complicated due to the increased
levels of drug consumption in the countries of the area. Caribbean
Basin has gone from being a transit area of drugs to the US market, to
a gradually increasing drug market itself. The strengthening of local
drug markets deepens crime levels, while favoring the development of
small local drug entities, interconnected with transnational networks
operating in the area.
The second major transnational actor identified within the Caribbean
Basin, is located in the Northern Triangle—Guatemala, Honduras, and
El Salvador, due to the massive presence of gangs known as maras, so-
called because of the most famous one, Mara Salvatrucha (MS 13). This
phenomenon originated on the streets of Los Angeles, California, where
gangs of Mexicans, Chicanos, and Central Americans grew stronger
and became a real social problem for US authorities. The reaction was
to carry out mass deportations to their countries of origin, with uncon-
firmed figures of around 90,000 deported.
The “Mara Salvatrucha” (MS 13) derives its name from the
marabunda, an insect that lives in El Salvador, together with the street
slang “trucha,” meaning “sharp,” “stinger.” The number 13 refers to the
street where they used to live in Los Angeles. Other well-known ones
are the Mara 18, from 18th Street in Los Angeles, the Mao Mao, Crazy
Harrisons Salvatrucho, and Crazy Normans, whose names denote their
American origin.
According to British anthropologist Dennis Rodgers, for whom
Central American youth population outnumbers the armed forces in
the region, Central American gangs
are much more defined collective organizations with an institutional

continuity independent of its membership. Conventions and rules are
fixed, which may include initiation rituals, a hierarchy and codes that
can make the gang a primary source of identity for its members. These
codes may also require specific behavior patterns: peculiar costumes,
tattoos, drawings or graffiti indicating the areas under their control,
hand signs and slang, and obviously, regular participation in illegal and
violent activities. These gangs are very often, though not always, associ-
ated with a specific territory and their relations with the community
can be both threatening and protective, easily shifting from one role to
another. (Rodgers, 2007)
Due to their control over certain territories, these gangs are involved
in all types of crimes, so they mix with drug and arms dealers, human
traffickers, government corruption, international gangs of car thefts,
and kidnappings, as well as with an uncontrolled illegal migration, very
vulnerable to this huge criminal universe.
The issue of the maras reflects opposing opinions. While it is true
that Central American gangs have taken over important territorial
areas within those nations, José Luis Rocha, making a critical analy-
sis of the issue, says that the links of gangs and organized crime net-
works have been overstated, and that associating their origins solely to
deportations from the United States has also criminalized migration
(Rocha, 2006: 2).
Moreover, the maras have not only been criminalized, but have also
raised speculation about understanding them as a new type of insur-
gency in Central America. Post 9/11, with the comprehensive global
review of all probable threats that hung over the United States, the
concerns about the maras became stronger. The New York Times and
some specialized publications such as Strategic Studies Institute and
Foreign Affairs, published articles whose common denominator was
how maras had become a threat to US national security. Terms such as
“new Central American insurgency” and “threat to Central America”
were used (Bruneau, 2005). Such epithets were officially coined in April
2005, with a public statement by Anne Aguilera, anti-narcotics affairs
officer of the Department of State (Rodgers, 2007).
The issue of the maras has many edges for analysis. While, on the
one hand, the United States returned these gang members to their
countries of origin, on the other, it should be asked whether they were
already gang members when they entered US territory, or whether their
intention was to accompany or help their families start a new life, which
they never could. Therefore, another perspective of analysis would start
by wondering what options they had in the United States so as not to
become criminals, thus opening another hypothesis: rather than deport-
ing, the United States “exported” the problem to Central America, to
countries where governance has not been actually achieved, due to the
effects of the wars in the eighties and the prevailing critical socioeco-
nomic situation.
The maras are like a guerrilla force to demobilize that did not achieve
their political objectives. They are without any idea on how to reinte-
grate socially; a process of reduction of the armed forces that included
purging of troops accused of war crimes, many of them without crimi-
nal charges and selling their military skills to the most diverse causes;
the harmful force with which the gang members of Los Angeles were
deported, and their logical rejection to any establishment; a labor mar-
ket extremely depressed, like the economies of their countries where the
easiest way was to get involved in drugs, arms, people, and stolen cars
trafficking; in short, societies where there were more job offers on the
side of drug trafficking and organized crime, and where security was
more appreciated within a gang than believing in authorities disavowed
by the prevailing high levels of corruption.
The neoliberal governments were responsible for worsening this tragic
situation, fulfilling one of the main requirements of the Washington
Consensus, the drastic reduction of state management to further hand-
cuffing any governance. The diagnosis can be seen in this comment by
Craig Deare:
An unintended consequence of establishing market economies has been

the thinning of the state. This has resulted, in some cases, in a lack of
state presence in many parts of the region, which has contributed to
the emergence of “ungoverned spaces” and the absence of an “effective
sovereignty”. In turn, this has left room for other non-state actors—
insurgents, drug traffickers and the maras, among others—to fill those
gaps. All this has generated an increasingly shared perception that there
is more uncertainty, thus raising important questions about militariza-
tion. (Deare, 2008: 26)
These are weak states, vulnerable to the action of different criminal

groups, unable to offer proposals to a young population greater in num-
ber than the existing armed forces, which, in turn, cannot control all
their territory, an expression of the limitation of exercising their sover-
eignty. The response to this diagnosis was to apply the least suitable of
the recipes—the use of armed forces to deal with those internal chal-
lenges. This decision, also applied in Mexico, has broken a basic balance,
the division of responsibilities between internal security and external
security. Internal security, public safety, is no longer the responsibility
of specialized police forces, but directly handled by the armed forces.
Among the many dangers involved in this decision, is the use of
national scenario as a conventional theater of military operations. Such
a decision returns the military commanders to starring roles, who will

inevitably rise as an alternative power to governments, reviving old
ghosts of the past.
Finally, it should be borne in mind that this decision was in line with
the strategic objectives of the Southern Command.
Dealing with the “New” Transnational Actors

Despite the detailed research the entire Western Hemisphere was sub-
jected to in search of terrorist cells after 9/11, the existence of real ter-
rorist threats to America could not be proven. Special attention was
given to citizens of Lebanese origin living in the complex environ-
ment of the triple border area—Argentina/Brazil/Paraguay—who send
funds to Hamas and Hezbollah, but not for operations in the Western
Hemisphere. Regarding the Caribbean Basin, the focus of interest was
the group Jamat-al-Muslimeen of Trinidad and Tobago, considered
with tendencies toward violence (Latin America Newsletter, 2003: 23),
but not involved with Islamic terrorist organizations linked to 9/11 and
the fight against the United States.
Therefore, the opportunity was taken to label the Colombian insur-
gents as terrorists, knowing they could not be proven to be a threat to
US national security, as opposed to trafficking networks.
Cuba, meanwhile, was doubly engaged on the one hand, by the use
of Guantanamo Naval Base located in its territory as a prison for cap-
tured terrorists and suspects, while on the other, by ratifying the inclu-
sion of the island in the list of terrorist countries, published annually
by the Department of State. The latter is connected with the fact that
Venezuela, the example of “radical populism” in the area (Leogrande,
2005: 26–27), together with Cuba maintains strong ties with Iran, the
first in the current list of terrorist countries and main enemy of the
United States in the Middle East.
In this context, academic endeavors, independent or linked to the
US government, have been made in looking for answers to understand
how transnational actors operate and, consequently, develop appropri-
ate strategies to face them and defeat them. A number of public inqui-
ries have been made, seeking to know the characteristics of their home
bases; their masking, protection, and operational tactics; the financial
and technical means at their disposal; internal and external partners. In
short, collecting all the information necessary to design successful strat-
egies of confrontation against enemies that have radically transformed
the global scenario in which the United States defends its national secu-
rity today.
The bibliography consulted is mainly focused in countries and regions
outside the Western Hemisphere, such as Afghanistan and Somalia or
the Middle East, but the definition of the threats can be applied to the
transnational actors in the Caribbean Basin due to their similarities.
Thus, for example, it recognizes the existence of “ungoverned spaces”
in Mexico controlled by the drug cartels in the north, south, and parts
of the Gulf States; in territories within Guatemala, El Salvador, and
Honduras under the control of gangs; and in Colombia, the areas in the
hands of the guerrilla groups and drug traffickers.
Well qualified by Anne Clunan, the concept of “ungoverned space”
is false and misleading, due to the multiple interpretations that it entails
(Clunan, 2010: 17). In this sense, following the reasoning of this author,
it should encompass all those social, political, and economic spheres
in which the state does not exercise “effective sovereignty,” does not
maintain any control, does it poorly, or is in dispute with another state
or actors.
But the area of the Caribbean Basin presents other issues in which
the sovereignty of the states shows different degrees: limited, null, or
in dispute. The problem is concerned with borders, with numerous
cases in litigation. According to Manuel Orozco, “the current bound-
ary disputes or in process can be explained by a range of issues usually
associated with undetermined boundaries, transboundary movements,
political opportunism, or unfinished agreements that lead to changes in
the position of a border” (Orozco, 2001).
Among the many borderline cases to mention, the Mexican southern
border with Guatemala and Belize stands out, noted for its extreme
“porosity,” a term that became fashionable since 9/11 referring to the
vulnerability of Canada’s and Mexico’s borders with the United States
(Jiménez and MacDonald, 2006: 550). Mexico’s southern border with
Guatemala and Belize offers multiple access points for drug trafficking,
being an area where criminal groups, arms, people, and car traffickers
operate, among other illegal activities.
Another case in point is the Nicaragua–Costa Rica border, on the San
Juan River, an area that has led to a long bilateral conflict. Although
international arbitration recently ruled in favor of Nicaragua, recogniz-
ing its right to dredge the river, military tensions are latent due to bilat-
eral tensions raised by border development projects, confusing armed
incidents and the uncontrollable crossing of drug traffickers.
A particular Caribbean case to mention is the Haitian-Dominican

border, marked by a tragic story whose most critical moment was the
killings of Haitian farm workers ordered by the Dominican dictator
Rafael Leonidas Trujillo in 1937. According to Haroldo Dilla,
the bi-national relationship shows positive signs (e.g. the intensification

of trade) and thus overcoming old traumas. In other instances, it pres-
ents highly difficult situations related to issues such as the respect for
human rights, the use of shared natural resources and criminal traffic
(people, arms and drugs). Both governments have serious responsibilities
in mishandling certain situations, either by the application of negative
policies or a total lack of them. (Dilla, 2008)
In connection with the above, it is necessary to remember that the very

geographical environment of many countries in the Caribbean Basin,
with their vast jungle areas, mountains and plateaus, and numerous
land and sea accidents, reveals a scenario favorable to the existence of
another identified classification, the so-called safe havens, id est, shel-
ters that provide excellent conditions for protection against military
operations launched by the governments of their countries and for car-
rying out transnational activities.
A closer approximation to the problem can lead to mention the
Colombian regions controlled by the guerrillas and drug traffickers—
including coca plantations relocated after years of direct and indirect
confrontations with American specialized agencies; the Darien jungle,
which covers both territories of Panama and Colombia; the area of
Limón, Costa Rica; some segments of San Juan River; the Guatemalan
Petén jungle; and some areas along the border of Belize and Guatemala
with Mexico, where another known criminal gang, the Zetas, operates.
But if these concepts sound controversial, the declaration of a
state as “failed” leads to an extreme situation, virtually invalidating
the governance of a nation (Rotberg, 2002a, 2002b). A critical view
from the south is offered by the Venezuelan researcher Jorge Arturo
Reyes:
As fragile or failed states there have been listed those states that: cause
waves of immigration; incur in or permit the violation of human rights;
cause humanitarian disasters; protect or are unable to control state,
semi-private and non-state violence, drug trafficking and terrorism; vio-
late or are not strict in the exercise of enforcing the law and the “rule of
law”; are unable to cope with epidemics and pandemics; have difficulty
in controlling their territories and providing security to its citizens; are
unable to keep the domestic legal order; lose the monopoly of legitimate
violence; are unable to provide public services; prevent social cohesion;
lack institutional strength in the administration of justice; lack institu-
tional legitimacy in any of its public powers; have collapsed as a result of
internal wars, genocide and natural disasters; are likely to secession; lack
democratic legitimacy and accountability; and are economically, politi-
cally and socially weak to overcome poverty and social exclusion. (Reyes,
2008: 48)
In the Western Hemisphere, Haiti has been taken as a “test case” coun-
try by the international community. Unfortunately, the treatment of
the problem has also stemmed from military approaches, a fact reflected
in the US interventions in 1994, 2004, and most recently in 2010, fol-
lowing a devastating earthquake that killed about 300,000 people.
September 11, 2001, the Southern Command,

and the Caribbean Basin
For both US history and the history of international relations,
September 11, 2001, marked a before and an after 9/11 era. For many
in America, it meant the end of the transition period opened with the
post–Cold War. Condoleezza Rice ref lected this in the national secu-
rity report prepared by the Department of State the year after the ter-
rorist attacks:
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the World Trade Center
were the parentheses for enclosing a long transition period. During that
period, we, who are dedicated to foreign policy as a way of life, seek a
theory or a general conceptual framework that would describe the new
threats and the appropriate response that should be given. There were
those who asserted that nations and their military forces were no lon-
ger relevant, that only the global markets linked by new technologies
accounted for. Others foresaw a future dominated by ethnic conf licts.
And some even thought that in the future, the power of the U.S. armed
forces would primarily be used in the control of civil conf licts and
humanitarian assistance. (Rice, 2002)
As part of the new global security strategy, the Western Hemisphere

seemed to be defined in five key areas:
●● The US borders with Canada and Mexico

●● The Caribbean Basin as the southern border
●● Colombia, a Western Hemispheric priority in the fight against

drug trafficking and “terrorist insurgency,” and southern border
of the strategic perimeter of the Caribbean Basin
●● The Amazon
●● The Triple Border (Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay)
The Northern Command, based in Colorado Springs, was established to

address the threats to the security of US borders, focused on two imme-
diate neighbors, Canada and Mexico (US Northern Command). The
Southern Command, moved from Panama to Florida in 1997, remained
in charge of addressing the problems in the region.
The assessment of the security agenda of the Caribbean Basin opened
a new chapter for the United States, resizing it after the loss of atten-
tion following the collapse of the USSR and the end of Cuba’s strate-
gic alliance with that country. The process of strategic repositioning of
the Caribbean Basin must be seen in two stages. The first, consider-
ing as most significant the Gulf War (1991) and the gradual process
of strengthening the leading role of the Southern Command in the
Western Hemispheric security strategy of the United States.
It was precisely the issue of fighting drug trafficking, which facili-
tated a greater role for the Southern Command, even before 9/11.
The year after participating in the military intervention in Panama in
December 1989, it received more air support for the operation Coronet
Nighthawk to identify and intercept aircrafts that could transport
drugs. Currently, the contingent operates from the Hato Viejo base
in Curacao, supported by an extensive system of radars distributed
throughout the Caribbean.
According to Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, the Southern Command,
through its commanders, monopolized the issue of the fight against
drug trafficking as a niche that would ensure the necessary funds in the
new post–Cold War scenario. Tokatlián says,
Since the nineties, the Southern Command plays a prominent role in the
counternarcotic strategy towards Latin America. Successive commanders
ensured the role of the Southern Command in the strategy: a bigger bud-
get, more bases and radars, and fewer restrictions from the Department
of State. In turn, together with the Southern Command headquarters
in Miami, other military posts offered their services, thus constituting
valuable assets for its external projection: The Southern Army (Fort Sam
Houston, Texas), the Twelfth Air Force (Davis-Monthan Air Force Base,
Arizona), the Southern Naval Force Command (Mayport Naval Base,
Florida), the Southern Marine Forces (Miami, Florida), the Southern

Special Operations Command (Homestead, Florida), the Bravo Joint
Task Force (Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras), the Guantanamo Joint Task
Force (Guantanamo, Cuba), and the Southern Interagency Joint Task
Force (Key West, Florida). (Tokatlián, 2010)
The second stage opened with the events of 9/11, which led to the
recovery of the strategic dimension the basin had never lost. On a
regional-global perspective, the Caribbean Basin was reinstated in the
geostrategic maps of air and sea routes connecting the United States
with Europe, the Atlantic route, beside the role played by the inter-
oceanic corridor of Panama, all serving major military operations to
come. Moreover, the military bases in the area (Honduras, El Salvador,
Panama, Colombia), the refueling points, and monitoring radars in
Aruba, Curacao, Trinidad and Tobago, and US Virgin Islands, were
basic supports for the military forces to be deployed in these routes.
By then, the Southern Command had already accumulated enough
experience in fighting drug trafficking by the interception of ships and
aircrafts, aimed at penetrating the US territory from Colombia, Peru,
and Bolivia through the Caribbean Sea, or across Central America and
Mexico.
Between 2001 and 2005, while the first years of the antiterrorist
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the most significant security issues in the
Caribbean Basin were Haiti and Colombia. Haiti, after the breakup of
the country’s precarious democracy in 2004 and the establishment, by
mandate of the Security Council of the United Nations, of an interna-
tional military contingent, eventually came under the denomination
of United Nations Mission for Stabilization in Haiti (MINUSTAH).
Interesting about this endeavor is that besides the United States, France,
and other foreign military forces, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay
have been actively involved, thus establishing a strong Latin American
presence in the responsibility for finding solutions to the crisis of gov-
ernance affecting this country.
The Colombian case has been a strategic objective of the United
States in the region since President Ronald Reagan decreed the fight
against drug trafficking in the eighties. With the controversial Plan
Colombia 2 adopted only a year before the 9/11 attacks, the country
became a strategic priority in the Western Hemisphere, not only by
increasing the amounts of military assistance granted by Washington,
but also by the expansion of direct US presence as part of the escalating
war on drugs. Although during the period 2001–2005, both countries
made progress in the destruction of poppy and heroin, they did not
achieve the expected results in the eradication of coca and marijuana,
which were relocated by growers to more intricate areas.
In the same period, progress in the war on drugs went from the
release of funds and sending of advisers, to authorizing covert opera-
tions to catch drug lords and extradite them to the United States for
trial. Moreover, while making the inventory of threats to US national
security in the region, particular attention was also paid to the politi-
cal changes that were occurring. Remember how the then chief of
Southern Command, General James T. Hill, mentioned the “radical
populism,” focusing on the process in Venezuela led by Hugo Chavez
(US SOUTHCOM, 2004).
The fact that Latin America and the Caribbean were not a priority
of US foreign policy after 9/11 attacks should not lead to the error of
thinking of a lack of policies regarding them. Latin America and the
Caribbean have a permanent place in the global matrix of US foreign
policy. It would therefore be more appropriate to say that after 9/11
attacks, US relations with the Western Hemisphere were based on a
set of specialized policies implemented by different government agen-
cies, and on the face-to-face treatment developed by experts within the
Department of State. In this context, the strengthening of military and
security views facilitated the Southern Command to assume the leading
role pursued.
Moreover, the emerging new political reality in Latin America con-
tributed to resizing of the Southern Command. The progressive elec-
toral victory of political projects, either interparty agreements or by
force of popular action, marked a shift to the Left wing in the region,
and opened a new spectrum of threats to meet and face from the pre-
dominantly military approaches post–9/11 attacks (Oliva Campos,
2009: 65–92).
The year 2006 opened a third stage in the relations between the
Southern Command and the countries of the Western Hemisphere. The
distinctive feature, which exacerbated the already complex scenario of
the Caribbean Basin, was the overflow of violence in Mexico. It all sug-
gests that the conflict broke out when the different drug cartels began
to fight each other for controlling larger internal spaces. The spiral of
violence has led to the death of tens of thousands of people—it comes
up to 50,000—the vast majority not linked to drug trafficking. The
conflict faced the cartels with state governments and their police forces,
with the federal government and, finally, due to its incompetence, with
the armed forces.
At the same time, with the evident failure of the project Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA), due to the strong opposition from key
countries in the region such as Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela, the US
strategy was restated from its original multilateral approach to finding
bilateral free trade agreements with selected countries.
Under this new scenario, the United States chose to clearly define
and protect its security perimeter at the southern border by signing
the Central American Free Trade Agreement plus Dominican Republic
(CAFTA), and launching the Mérida Initiative, the first of other proj-
ects to come.3
In this context, the report made by the Southern Command for the
year 2007, led by Admiral Stavridis, was of great significance. When
analyzing the document, it is interesting to notice the interpretation
offered by the Southern Command in respect to the management of
US relations with the region by combining the use of hard power with
soft power,4 and the call to address the security problems with a multi-
dimensional approach (US SOUTHCOM, 2007). The new role did not
go unnoticed to analysts. According to Craig Deare,
Eager to be more effective in its missions and more efficient with its
limited resources, the Southern Command is leading the task of inte-
grating the actions of several U.S. agencies, including the Departments
of State, Justice, Energy and National Security as well as the CIA, FBI,
DEA and USAID. At first glance, this seems quite reasonable, given that
many challenges in the region are multidimensional and transnational
and their solution requires an institutional effort. The problem is not
what is being done, but the entity that is leading the “battle.” (Deare,
2008: 30–31)
In 2008, the accumulation of events in the region marked the develop-

ment of a new stage. A specialized yearbook monitoring the Western
Hemispheric security issues describes what happened in that year:
The war threat between Ecuador and Colombia, the strengthening of

Brazil’s leadership, the regional role of the government of Venezuela, the
creation of the South American Defense Council, the Haiti crisis and the
resulting presence of nine Latin American countries in MINUSTAH,
and the new dimension of the drug war in Mexico and at a lower level in
Central America. (Manaut, Celi, and Diamint, 2009: 1)
The context was appropriate for the Southern Command to make a

series of strategic and operational redefinitions, with the revitalization
of the Fourth Fleet, based in Mayport, Florida, as the event with more
media coverage. In fact, there was also an increase in various military
exercises coordinated with different countries of the region (Ceceña
et al., 2010: 89–99) with lesser media coverage, although it was known
they were essential for implementing future military operations. The
domestic complement of such operations comes through military advi-
sory and the inclusion of the armed forces of the region in different
training programs (Lindsay-Poland, 2011).
The implementation of the new operational philosophy was expe-
dited in January 2010. The strong earthquake in Haiti allowed the
Southern Command to carry out a military operation in accordance
with the plans designed for the area. The unfortunate event led to
strong criticism from countries like Cuba and Venezuela, whose
emphasis was on humanitarian aid, particularly the Cuban medical
brigades. However, the United States hold their own actions by justi-
fying the military presence to stabilize the internal situation and pro-
moting the selective medical aid they offered, as stated in the report
offered by General Douglas Fraser, head of Southern Command (US
SOUTHCOM, 2010).
From another perspective, the Unified Response operation repre-
sented a disproportionate deployment of troops in a country in which
MINUSTAH was already established. In any case, support should have
been with police contingents, an essential aid to cope with the resulting
chaotic social situation. In practice, US troops set out to control com-
munications and infrastructure that were still operational, specifically,
the international airport area. This was meant to control all interna-
tional aid coming into the country. The operation officially continued
until June that year.
The departure of US troops coincided with the release of the Security
Initiative for the Caribbean by the US government, with a proposed
initial contribution of US$124 million for the defense expenses of the
island community (Joint Statement of Secretary Clinton, 2010).
Finally, in accordance with the future developments that may result,
attention must be paid to a long paragraph on Iran’s relations in the
Western Hemisphere, as part of the annual report presented by General
Fraser, head of Southern Command, in March 2011. The text concludes
with the following definition:
Together with our interagency partners, the U.S. Southern Command

will monitor the activities of Iran in the region in accordance with law and
policy to ensure that U.S. law and international sanctions be respected,
and that our existing partnerships remain strong and functioning well.
(US SOUTHCOM, 2011)
Without speculation, the following latest developments mark an accel-

erated deterioration in the US-Iran relations, and reaffirm this issue on
its agenda with the countries of the Caribbean Basin:
●● The deepening of the crisis with the government of Iran for

continuing its nuclear program, leading to the adoption of eco-
nomic sanctions against that country by the United States and the
European Union.
●● The Iranian reaction, including military maneuvers and the state-
ment of blocking off the strategic Strait of Hormuz to maritime
transportation, in case they were not allowed to sell their oil.
●● The presence of powerful US warships and those of its North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies.
●● The recent visit of the president of Iran to Venezuela, Nicaragua,
Cuba, and Ecuador.
Summarizing
The Caribbean Basin has an undeniable strategic importance to the
United States, reshaped from war to post–Cold War. This dimension
became more relevant in the international arena after the attacks of
September 11, 2001. Due to the presence of important transnational
actors established within the current global security agenda, such
as networks of drug traffickers and the gangs of Central American
Northern Triangle, in addition to other factors mentioned, the
Caribbean Basin has a high Western Hemispheric priority level for
the United States.
The trend toward conf lict scenarios is evident not only for the coun-
tries of the Caribbean Basin, but also for the rest of Latin America,
because after the alleged absence of a US Western Hemispheric strategy
and the unresolved definition of the expected new relationship with the
region, there are hidden policies that favor military options—Southern
Command—supported by a return of the armed forces to leading roles.
Such policies have in practice been supported by the Department of
State bodies, such as the US Agency for International Development
(USAID) and certain agencies within the “intelligence community”
that face the real and perceived threats to US national security in the
region.
Notes
1. The Caribbean Basin comprises all island territories in the Caribbean Sea,
the Caribbean side of Mexico, Central American countries up to Panama,
and Colombia and Venezuela.
2. Plan Colombia was signed in 2000 by President William Clinton and his
Colombian counterpart, Andres Pastrana. The stated aim of the agreement
was to achieve peace in Columbia through a combination of socioeconomic
development and a crackdown on the production and trafficking of drugs.
In reality, the emphasis from the US side has been the militarization of the
US-Colombian relationship.
3. Also known as Plan Mérida or Plan Mexico, it is an international treaty
on security, signed by the United States and Mexico. Its main objective is
the fight against drug trafficking and organized crime. The main reason
for this initiative lies on the fact that the Mexican territory has become
a corridor for drugs into the United States, acknowledged by President
Felipe Calderón. Due to its relevance, it comprises the departments of State,
Justice and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI), and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), as
well as the main governmental bodies of Mexico. The aid offered by the
United States amounts to US$1.6 billion, although by the end of 2009, the
United States had only expended US$65 million to the Central American
countries plus Dominican Republic and Haiti.
4. For Nye, soft power is based on the capacity of the United States to inf lu-
ence other states by way of its democratic and cultural values and its ideol-
ogy. See, Nye, Joseph, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of the American
Power, 1990; and Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 2004.
Works Cited
Andersen, Martin Edwin (2007). Failing states, ungoverned spaces and the indig-
enous challenge in Latin America. In Angel Rabasa, Steven Boraz, Peter Chalk,
Kim Cragim, Theodore W. Karazik, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Kevin A. O´Brien,
and John E. Peters (eds.), Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing
Terrorism Risks. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. MG-561AF (available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monography/MG561/).
Bruneau, Thomas C. (2005, May). The maras and national security in Central
América. Strategic Insights, 4(5), 1–12.
Ceceña, Ana Esther, Barrios, David, Yedra, Rodrigo, & Inclán, Daniel (2010).
El Gran Caribe. Umbral de la geopolítica mundial. Serie: Geopolítica de la
Dominación y la Emancipación, Observatorio Latinoamericano de Geopolítica
/FEDAEPS, Ecuador, agosto de 2010.
Cerny, Philip G. (2005, Winter). Terrorism and the new security dilemma. Naval
War College Review, 58(1), 11–33.
Clunan, Anne L. (2010). Ungoverned spaces? The need for reevaluation. In Anne
L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas (eds.), Ungoverned Spaces. Alternative to
State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty. Stanford Security Studies.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Condoleezza Rice (2002, December). “Un equilibrio de fuerzas que favorezca a la
libertad.” Estrategia De Seguridad Nacional De Estados Unidos: Una Nueva Era,
Agenda De La Política Exterior De Los Estados Unidos De América, Departamento
de Estado de Estados Unidos, Programas de Información Internacional, Periódico
electrónico del Departamento de Estado de Estados Unidos, 7(4), 1.
Deare, Craig E. (2008). La militarización en América Latina y el papel de Estados
Unidos. Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica, 8(3), 22–34.
Dilla Alfonso, Haroldo (2008, Año). La frontera dominico-haitiana: los espacios
para el entendimiento. Prevención y resolución de conflictos. Revista Futuro,
6(21).
Gil Olmos, José (2011, December). Criminalizar a víctimas, una estrategia de
guerra. Revista Proceso, 1831.
Griffith, I. L. (1997). Geopolítica en el Caribe: dinámicas nuevas, el viejo dilema
de siempre. In A. Serbín, Comp., América Latina y el Caribe anglófono: ¿Hacia
una nueva relación?, Ed. Grupo Editor Latinoamericano. Nuevo Hacer: Instituto
del Servicio Exterior de la Nación.
Jiménez, Gabriela Christina, & MacDonald, Laura (2006). Hacia las ´fronteras int
eligentes´norteamericanas:¿convergencia o divergencia en las políticas de control
de fronteras? Foro Internacional 185, 46(3), 549–579.
Joint Statement of Secretary Clinton and CARICOM Ministers on the
Commitment of Bridgetown (2010, June 10). Partnership for Prosperity and
Security. Media Note. Office of the Spokesman. Washington, DC.
Kirkpatrick, Jeanne, J. (1979, November). Dictatorships and double stan-
dards. Commentary Magazine, http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article
/dictatorships-double-standards/.
Latin America Newsletter, Special reports—Latin America and “the US war on ter-
ror” (mayo 2003), Londres.
LeoGrande, William M. (2005/2006, Winter). From the red menace to radical
populism. U.S. insecurity in Latin America. World Policy Journal, 22(4), 25–35.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40209992.
Lindsay-Poland, John, (2011, May–June). Mexico’s drug crisis: Alternative perspec-
tives. NACLA Report on the Americas.
Manaut, Raúl Benítez, Celi, Pablo, & Diamint, Rut (2009). Los desafíos de la
seguridad y la defensa en Latinoamérica. Entre las nuevas amenazas, la nueva
geopolítica y los viejos conflictos. In Anuario 2009. Seguridad regional en
América Latina y El Caribe, Op. Cit. p. 1.
Oliva Camposw, Carlos (2009). Estados Unidos y América Latina a principios del
siglo XXI, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad nacional de Costa Rica.
Orozco, Manuel (2001). Conflictos fronterizos en América Central: tendencias
pasadas y sucesos actuales. Pensamiento Propio, Revista bilingue de Ciencias
Sociales. No. 14. Julio-Diciembre 2001. Año 6. p. 105–144. Ediciones CRIES,

Managua, Nicaragua.
Raab, Jörg, & Brinton Milward, H. (2003, October). Dark networks as problems.
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 13(4), 413–439.
Reyes, Jorge Arturo (2008). Estados fallidos. Politica Exterior Y Soberania, 3(8),
enero-marzo. Caracas: Instituto Pedro Gual.
Rocha, José Luis (agosto 2006). Mareros y pandilleros: ¿Nuevos insurgentes,
criminales? Revista Envío, no. 293. http://www.revistapueblos.org/IMG/pdf/
mareros_y_pandilleros.pdf.
Rodgers, Dennis (diciembre de 2007). Pandillas, maras: protagonistas y chivos expi-
atorios. Revista Envío digital, no. 309. http://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/3697.
Rodríguez Beruff, Jorge (2000). Cultura y geopolítica: un acercamiento a la visión
de Alfred Thayer Mahan sobre el Caribe. In Antonio Gastambide-Géigel, Juan
González, & Mario S. Cancel (eds.), Cien años de sociedad. San Juan: Ediciones
Callejón.
Rosas, María Cristina (2006). La tentación autoritaria: La lucha contra el ter-
rorismo a cinco años del 11 de septiembre de 2001. In María Cristina Rosas
(Coordinadora), Terrorismo, democracia y seguridad. 11 de septiembre después.
México DF: UNAM/ANU.
Rotberg, Robert I. (2002a). The new nature of nation-state failure. Washington
Quarterly, 25, 85–96.
Rotberg, Robert I. (2002b). Failed states in a world of terror. Foreign Affairs, 81,
1–13.
ToKatlián, Juan Gabriel (2010). La “guerra antidrogas” y el Comando Sur: una
combinación delicada. publicado originalmente en la Revista Foreign Affairs
Latinoamérica, 10(1), enero-marzo 2010, versión http://clubpoliticoargen-
tino.org/categoria-opinion/97-la-qguerra-antidrogasq-y-el-comando-sur-una-
combinación-delicada.html.
US SOUTHCOM (2011, March 30). Posture Statement of General Douglas M.
Fraser, United States Southern Command, before the Senate Armed Services
Committee.
Fraser, United States Air Force Commander, United States Southern Command,
before the 111th Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee.
US SOUTHCOM (2007, March). Parnership for the Americas.
US SOUTHCOM (2004, March 24). Posture Statement of General James T. Hill:
FY 2005 Budget, Defense Programs. House Armed Services Committee.
CHAPTER 4
The Militarization of Mexico-US

Relations: Ungovernable Areas and
a Failed State?
Jaime A. Preciado Coronado and
Angel L. Florido Alejo
Introduction
The militarization of relations between Mexico and the United States
has advanced the aspirations of both countries to control violence and
armed conflict, particularly in relation to drug trafficking, under
agreements involving the armed forces, police strategies, and a shared
national security doctrine. Strategies for counterterrorism and combat-
ing organized crime converge in a way that favors military action over
political remedies, and the counterterrorism doctrine inherent to the
US security strategy is intensifying the militarization of domestic poli-
cies in Mexico.
The “war” against organized crime declared by President Felipe
Calderón at the beginning of his term, which accumulated a death toll
of more than 65,000 victims between 2006 and the first quarter of
2012, has been inspired by security and defense agendas established
unilaterally by the United States. These agendas subordinate develop-
ment issues to US plans for inter-American geopolitical dominance and
violate the sovereign rights of Mexico, as they seek to promote a rela-
tionship between security, defense, and development, which depends on
the implementation of a police state.

62 l Jaime A. Preciado Coronado and Angel L. Florido Alejo
The impact of this militarization on Mexico is patently evident. The

United States approves of and promotes the involvement of the Mexican
military in domestic security through the Mérida Initiative, which is the
continuation of a security-based integration process advanced under the
administration of President George W. Bush as part of the Security and
Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP). The administration of
Barack Obama promotes and justifies militarization through discus-
sions at the North American Leaders’ Summit. This process has led to
trilateral meetings between the defense ministers of Mexico, the United
States, and Canada (US Department of Defense 2012). Meanwhile, the
militarization of the security agenda balkanizes Mexico under the de
facto power of organized crime, hence increasing the number of ungov-
ernable areas and giving rise to a situation that some characterize as that
of a failed state.
The recent presidential elections (July 1, 2012) confirmed the power
that organized crime exerts in Mexican regions and on the central gov-
ernment. And while on this occasion no systemic threat to the entire
electoral process was present, as was the case in the state of Michoacán,
irregularities were noted in certain regions where cartels compete for
control. There were also suspicions of money laundering of campaign
funds used by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the pre-
sumptive winners of the presidential election.
To address the issue of organized crime’s inexorable power, the PRI
based its campaign on claims of superior ability to deal with drug traf-
fickers and thus prevent the institutional collapse associated with the
failed state scenario. This in spite of the fact that 21 of the 31 federal
states where the PRI is the ruling party are also those that suffer from
the country’s highest rates of violence.
Although the presidential election results have been strongly called
into question by the Progressive Movement, which brings together
Leftist parties that supported the candidacy of Andrés Manuel López
Obrador, the sitting federal government prematurely recognized the PRI
as victorious, and most governments that had relations with Mexico fol-
lowed suit. Such was the case of President Obama, who assured the PRI
that they could count on a business-as-usual approach to the bilateral
Mexico-US militarization of the war on drugs.
Given the dismal failure of Mexico’s strategy to combat organized
crime, a failure for which the US security doctrine is also responsible,
this chapter considers the consequences of the militarization process on
the spiral of violence and the weakening of the Mexican state as well as
the relevance of the term “failed state” as it is used to discredit Mexico’s
Militarization of Mexico-US Relations l 63
government and state-society relations. It is a concept that does not

explain the fragmentation of public power and social disintegration as
sources of ungovernability, but rather needs to be addressed within the
geopolitical context of relations between Mexico and the United States
and within the paradigm of a police state.
The Effects of Militarization: The Police State

In the most general and neutral sense, militarization means strengthen-
ing the armed forces—that is to say, merely bolstering military infra-
structure in terms of staff, armaments, or equipment. From a broader
conceptual perspective, militarization entails the use of the armed forces
for nontraditional or unconventional purposes. It also involves using
the army and its infrastructure to combat internal and nonmilitary
threats or to conduct missions that would normally be performed by
the police—such as fighting organized crime—in cases where national
security is considered to be under threat. It is a doctrine in which sev-
eral spheres relevant to the field of security overlap: domestic, public,
state, and government.
Although militarization is evident given the existence of a de facto,
if not a de jure military government, the extent of the role of the armed
forces in development-related areas is less clear. We are talking about
military personnel leaving their barracks to engage in a range of sup-
port services for the civilian population in times of peace and with
firmly established civilian governments in power. Héctor Aguilar
Camín (2012) argues that the transformation of Latin American mili-
tary branches into police forces has come about as a result of a vacuum
created by government forces unable to deal with adversaries who are
superior to them in terms of tactical strength and readiness for armed
conflict. “The trend seems clear. During the nineteenth century, Latin
American armies were extensions of the power of regional warlords.
They became professionalized in the twentieth century and were instru-
ments of power during the darkest decades of the Cold War. They are
now beginning what seems to be a long cycle of a new specialty—
fighting organized crime.”
Operations that in some Latin American countries used to be per-
formed by specialized security forces within law enforcement agencies,
are now carried out by armies, because governments consider the for-
mer incapable of containing the level of violence they are up against.
They have also reached this conclusion because of changes in security
paradigms throughout the world that consider the military immune to
the structural factors that contribute to violence and drug trafficking.

Furthermore, this paradigm shift entails a higher degree of complexity
among institutions involved in public and national security. The coor-
dination and centralization of power within these institutions strength-
ens and increases the power of the armed forces by including police
functions within a security doctrine that mistakes national security for
public safety.
Most significantly, the militarization of our societies leads to what
Robinson and Melissa Salazar (2011) call a police state, an adaptation
of a low intensity conflict (LIC) strategy implemented as part of the
US policy of intervention in Latin America in the 1980s. “Low inten-
sity conflict, which was used in 1980 and 1994, transformed into a
new operational and logistic scheme designed to exercise social con-
trol without engaging in overtly military actions, unless the situation
and the degree of conflict posed a high level of risk. Intelligence and
media manipulation are prioritized under the banners of ‘terrorism’ and
‘security.’”
The power brokers who sustain the police state look beyond mili-
tarization in the sense that they focus on more than the dispute over
the legitimate monopoly of violence against organized crime. Control
of antisystemic social conflicts is also at the center of the debate.
Hence, the attitudes and feelings associated with terrorism and fear are
expressed through militarization, which becomes a kind of life preserver
against such threats. This scenario is problematic because the police
state paradigm, under the same threatening and disturbing logic, com-
bines approaches to deal with organized crime and antisystemic move-
ments with those used to maintain peace and tranquility.
In keeping with the ideas of Manuel Castells (2009) on communica-
tion and power, Robinson and Melissa Salazar (2011) identify functions
that both legitimize the new strategy and encourage the acceptance
of and even a dependence on militarized police action. Sophisticated
mechanisms in the electronic media and the Internet manipulate minds
and result in an internalization of these values and an uncritical accep-
tance of militarization as an ostensible solution to the devastating effects
of terror and fear.
Moreover, the impact of militarization on Latin America and particu-
larly on Mexico, because of its proximity to the United States, is closely
related to the geopolitical aspects of inter-American relations. Following
the 9/11 attacks, American security priorities became focused on the
fight against terrorism and organized crime, and also on a restructuring
of worldwide hegemony that would favor its interests. Such tendencies
have continued under the Obama administration and incorporated new

components such as the adoption of schemes that emphasize political
diplomacy, increased military deployments in the Asia-Pacific region,
the containment of China’s military power, and linking the country’s
military defense with its domestic agenda.
In this regard, the creation of smart-soft power seeks a comprehensive
projection of American global power, namely, as a police state capable of
containing terrorism, providing security from fear, and supporting law
enforcement in the fight against organized crime. What is new about
the Obama era is that foreign policy and domestic policy in these areas
are intentionally brought closer. This approach yields a militarization
strategy much more focused on restructuring US global hegemony and
exerting tighter control over its inter-American geopolitical area of
influence starting with Mexico, as the greatest threats to domestic secu-
rity are perceived as coming from the United States’ southern border.
In January 2012, President Obama presented his new defense plan.
William Hartung (2012) sees the plan as a roadmap to continue US
global hegemony. Notwithstanding Republican criticism of reductions
in the Pentagon budget expressed during the 2012 primary elections,
the plan has positive elements such as the “pledge to avoid fighting
large-scale wars like those in Iraq and Afghanistan; to increase reliance
on diplomacy and development assistance; and to make the health of
the United States economy the administration’s number one national
security priority” (ibid.). However, with regard to the defense budget,
“the encouraging parts of the Obama approach are counter-balanced by
an expansion of US military commitments that are more appropriate
for a policy of global hegemony than they are for a policy of genuine
defense” (ibid.).
The role of Latin America in the Obama plan is illustrative of the
impact of militarization on the police state, as it calls for expanded
provisioning of weapons and military aid and the strengthening of
militarized antidrug initiatives such as Plan Colombia, the Andean
Initiative, and their northernmost equivalents, the Mesoamerica Project
and the Mérida Initiative. Hartung (2012) states, “According to the
‘Just the Facts’ data base maintained by the Center for International
Policy, the Latin America Working Group, and the Washington Office
on Latin America, US military and police aid to Latin America and
the Caribbean will total nearly US$1 billion for fiscal year 2012. Total
military and police aid to the region since 2007 exceeds US$7.5 bil-
lion. In 2010 alone, US arms sales to the region totaled another US$1.7
billion. Add to this the deployments of US troops to the region under
the umbrella of counter-drug and humanitarian activities, and the US

military presence in Latin America is substantial.”
The new Pentagon Defense Policy is another aspect of American mil-
itary and political strategy that will have an impact on Latin America.
It contains two clear strategic constants: “The conception of perpetual
war as the main variable, and as a variable directly linked to it, the war
for resources” (Barrios, 2012). In Mexico, the impact of these two con-
stants further strengthens the new paradigm of the police state. There
are several aspects of inter-American relations and Mexican-American
bilateral relations that validate this approach, in which market reforms
intersect with the state’s acquiescence to the police and military impera-
tives that underpin the complex national-international-global frame-
work. Among them are the following:
●● The promotion of a (neo)Pan-American integration model based

on three pillars. The first military pillar, through the strengthen-
ing of the US Southern Command, expanded US military presence
through nine military bases in Colombia, military coordination
agreements with Panama, Costa Rica, and Honduras, and the
maintenance of a sort of military protectorate, the redeployment
of the Fourth Fleet of the US Navy in the South Atlantic, as well
as the subordination of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance (TIAR) to the imperatives of Pan-American power
brokers. A second pillar is represented by the extension of the
securitarian police model through military assistance and the
coordination of the largest countries, mainly Canada, the United
States, and Mexico. The third pillar, consisting of trade diplomacy
under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), offers
a false model of stability and a hidden agenda of domination that
obscures contentious bilateral issues in the areas of labor migra-
tion, oil, energy, and raw materials, affecting the intensity of the
crisis. These three pillars are adorned with a “democratic” model
expressed in the Inter-American Democratic Charter.
●● A set of geostrategic plans in which Mexico becomes a geopolitical
pivot and support mechanism: the Mesoamerican Project, formerly
the Puebla-Panama-Colombia Plan, and the Andean Initiative, which
together with the Plan Colombia and the Mérida Initiative, constitute
a unified strategy to establish a police state to fight organized crime.
●● Alliances between the United States and Mexico at the Summit of
the Americas, the organization that coordinates (neo)Pan-American
integration, led to the establishment of a starting point for linking
police and military arrangements with development issues: the

Alliance for SPP, which was active between 2005 and 2009. This
organization gave rise to the Mérida Initiative, whose military-
police functions were taken over by the North American Leaders’
Summit starting with the Obama administration. This initia-
tive, which was passed with reservations by the US House of
Representatives, allocated US$1.2 billion to the Mexican govern-
ment over nearly four years for its fight against drug trafficking.
●● Although indirectly related to security issues, we should also
include Mexico-US intercongressional meetings, bilateral border
programs, and both formal and informal meetings between federal
executive officials of both countries, which often include officials
from the Canadian government.
This framework of a securitarian model within the police state is the

result of two trends. The first is global and international in scope and
concerns attempts to reshape US world hegemony in terms of inter-
American relations and particularly with respect to the role of bilat-
eral relations between Mexico and the United States. The second is the
weakening of the democratic state by means of intervention on the part
of dominant states that consider themselves superior to failed states,
who they criticize for having subpar democracies. The term “failed
state” is used to justify interventionist policies, while countries consid-
ered as failed states try to avoid this classification.
From Failed State to Police State

In his analysis, Cisneros (2011) provides a starting point: “Today our
society [Mexican] is subjected to the whims and vagaries of organized
crime that exploit the weaknesses of the state and conspire with pov-
erty, inequality and corruption in a demonstration of power against the
state.” While organized crime is a factor in the weakening of the state, it
is not the only player conspiring against the state’s authority. There are
multiple threats to public authority and its ability to regulate the eco-
nomic and political spheres. Some of them are global and international,
while the most serious ones are domestic in nature.
On the international political front, the use of the failed state con-
cept is associated with the power that dominant countries have to evalu-
ate the performance of governments of peripheral and semiperipheral
countries. The term originated in the US magazine Foreign Policy,
which in 2005 began to classify the world’s countries according to
their propensity to “fail” or become failed states. The concept became

accepted among American analysts and foreign policy strategists’ intent
on demonstrating that the weakness of the national states of certain
countries could not be addressed internally but could only be remedied
through interventionist policies of varying intensities.
According to Vanaik (2010), “since the end of the Cold War six
ideological banners (or flags) have emerged to serve the interests of
American imperial behavior: ‘humanitarian’ intervention, ‘weapons of
mass destruction’, the ‘global war on terror’, ‘regime change in the name
of democracy’, ‘failed states’ and ‘war on narcotics’. The establishment
of a global hegemony requires not only the capacity to employ incon-
testable force, but the ability to forge the consensus on which this hege-
mony will be exercised.”
The failed state appeared as a menacing factor in the National
Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002, when the White House asserted,
“America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by
failing ones” (Sogge, 2010). According to this author, the US National
Intelligence Council “saw an approaching ‘perfect storm’ of conflict in
certain regions, made possible by ‘the continued prevalence of troubled
and institutionally weak states’ that yield ‘expanses of territory and
populations devoid of effective governmental control.’” The European
Security Strategy of 2003 considered failed states to be among the five
“key threats” to European security.
Sogge (2010) believes that the failed state concept weakens the state
as a public institution. “Under a variety of terms—weak states, fragile
states, states in crisis, countries at risk of instability and low-income
countries under pressure—the idea of state failure has become the sub-
ject of much attention.” This kind of attention undermines the sov-
ereignty and autonomy of these actors and makes them the objects of
American military strategy and hegemonic aspirations. This political
scientist also points out the ambiguous nature of the failed state concept:
“Much of this talk is patently reactionary, but it is drawing attention
to real and fundamental problems in non-Western places: polarized and
feeble economies, precarious lives, social injustice, deficits in democ-
racy, crippled public services, corrupted justice systems, criminal vio-
lence and war” (ibid.).
Miguel Pickard (2008) addresses the ambiguity of the failed state
label as applied to Mexico:
●● The country may become ungovernable and experience a “col-

lapse” in a relatively short period.
●● Concern about the well-being of the state originated not so much

from Mexico but from the United States. It was former US drug
czar Barry McCaffrey who ignited the debate in 2008.
●● Some analysts say that “failed” or “unsuccessful” states have a sig-
nificant impact on American international and domestic security.
●● Being classified as a failed state would have serious repercussions
for Mexico. Indeed, since this debate began in 2008, Mexico’s rela-
tions with the United States have undergone significant changes.
These changes have been on the whole more favorable to the United
States than to Mexico.
●● Since the governments of Mexico, Canada, and the United States
agreed to promote the SPP in 2005, there has been a greater
degree of homologation of the military and security forces of
the three countries, in line with US standards. This model has
been promoted by the North American Leaders’ Summit, which
has replaced the SPP, and the Summit of the Americas, where the
model is promoted without using the term “police state.”
Sogge (2010) illustrates the limits and implications of the debate sur-
rounding the failed state, because “at stake is the possible erosion of
gains made in international politics: respect for self-determination,
sovereign autonomy and collective self-esteem. But today’s talk about
‘failing states’ puts those achievements in question. It recasts sovereign
countries as frontier territories that must be policed.” This is a very dis-
turbing risk, which exacerbates the militarization of Mexican-American
bilateral relations.
Ungovernable Areas, Elections, Democracy, and Failed States

The concept of a failed state, with all the ideological baggage that it
invites, does address some points that have to do with how governments
perform in areas that fall under their domestic authority.
The Fund for Peace has developed a Failed States Index based on
12 indicators associated with 4 social, 3 economic, and 7 political and
military aspects. Among social aspects are demographic factors, the
internal displacement of people and massive movement of refugees,
vengeance seeking by groups, and the brain drain. Economic aspects
include unequal development, poverty, and slow growth. Political fac-
tors include the legitimacy of the state, the deterioration of public ser-
vices, human rights violations, regulatory issues, the security apparatus,
the increase in social fragmentation, and the emergence of nationalist
70 ● Jaime A. Preciado Coronado and Angel L. Florido Alejo
Symbology
Alert
Warning
Moderated
Sustainable
Map 4.1 Index of failed states, 2011.

Source: Our own elaboration based on data from the Fund for Peace. https://www.fundforpeace.org/
global/?g=fsi-grid2011. Made with Philcarto.
groups. Finally, one can assess the degree of involvement of social play-
ers (Fund for Peace, 2011).
According to these criteria, Mexico is ranked ninety-fourth out of
177 countries (see map 4.1 where the scale descends from ungovernabil-
ity to governability) and is classified in the “warning” category since, in
the view of specialists; its risk level has increased in recent years. In the
region of North America and the Caribbean, Mexico lies almost in the
middle between Canada (168 of 177) and Haiti (5 of 177), a country
considered unstable.
Data from the Fund for Peace, shows high-risk ratings, in an increas-
ing scale where 10 is the maximum value, are associated with Mexico’s
uneven economic development (7.7) and the security apparatus (7.9).
For Leobardo S á nchez (2011), “the major risks [for Mexico] are the weak
justice system and an inefficient police-military force. These risks have
been magnified by the strategy implemented to combat criminal gangs

who produce, distribute and sell illegal drugs.” This certainly has called
into question the role of the state from the perspective of two essential
characteristics that must be taken into account in regard to governance.
According to Leyton (2011), one of these characteristics is related to
sovereignty, in the sense that the state holds a legitimate monopoly on
violence and the capacity to use it under current laws. The other char-
acteristic entails “societal acceptance of the legitimacy of a particular
government and even a given political system.”
The absence of these factors creates a scenario of ungovernability
with lawless areas of varying sizes. It does not indicate a total or partial
absence of law but rather a situation where the law of the central govern-
ment is either not enforced or is enforced in a piecemeal fashion.
In some sense, we are witnessing a configuration of new uncontrolled
areas that are characteristic of this geopolitical order, and that Mexico is
no exception to. In the words of Nogué Font and Vicente Rufi (2001),
they are “characterized by a chaotic coexistence of completely controlled
areas and planned territories together with newly uncharted territories
that run on their own internal logic, regardless of the system to which
they theoretically belong.”
We cannot help but marvel at a context that defines Mexico, owing
to the political and social problems we face, as a network of newly
uncharted areas. Even more extreme is the notion that they somehow
foster a critical scenario of governance that is very worrisome to the
United States.
In his analysis of the critical scenario that Mexico is facing, Pickard
(2008) points out two main risks to Mexico-US relations:
●● First, violence could “spillover” the border and “invade” the

United States, which could intensify the interventionist aspects of
the Mérida Initiative.
●● Second, unbridled violence could destabilize the Mexican govern-
ment and jeopardize the viability of its institutions, particularly
those with security functions, which would also pose a risk to US
national security.
The origins of such attitudes can be understood upon examining the

territorial aspects of phenomena related to violence, especially those
associated with fighting among organized crime groups for control of
the drug trade. This involves control of routes for cocaine, marijuana,
methamphetamine, and ephedrine traffic (see map 4.2). The control of
72 ● Jaime A. Preciado Coronado and Angel L. Florido Alejo
Map 4.2 Drug trafficking routes in Mexico.

Source: Our own elaboration based on Stratford, 2010.
territory, particularly areas near the US border, is strategic to the opera-

tions of these groups (see map 4.3).
Efforts to control routes and territories have led to an escalation of
violence between these criminal groups that, according to data from the
Mexican presidency, resulted in 15,273 murders in 2010 alone. Between
2007 and 2010 there were 34,550 violent deaths allegedly resulting
from clashes between rival groups (see map 4.4).
Violence has been concentrated in the north of the country, espe-
cially in the states of Chihuahua and Baja California, but with escala-
tions in Sonora, Durango, Coahuila, Nuevo Le ón, and Tamaulipas. A
battle for Pacific routes is being fought along a corridor including states
such as Sinaloa, Jalisco, Michoac á n, and Guerrero.
Víctor Ronquillo, writing in the newspaper Milenio (2010), estimated
that approximately 200 municipalities in Mexico were under the control
of drug traffickers. He also asserted that “for the machinery of organized
crime to function it must be lubricated with corruption. Resources spent
on the police mafias involved in the drug business amount to 277 mil-
lion pesos ($20 million), according to estimates by the Ministry of Public
Security made based on the salary shortfall in corporations.”
Map 4.3 Mexican drug cartels and their area of influence.
Source: Our own elaboration based on BBC News 2011.
Casualties
1727–10134
659–1727
200–659
130–200
13–130
Map 4.4 Casualties associated to delinquency due to presumed rivalry, 2007–2010.

Source: Our own elaboration based on data from the Mexican presidency, 2010. http://www.presidencia.
gob.mx/base-de-datos-de-fallecimientos. Made with Philcarto.
Such factors create the aforementioned conditions of risk that allow

Mexico to be militarized in a way that makes us dependent on the secu-
rity policies of the United States, thus hastening the implementation
of the police state. The federal government has firmly committed itself
to militarization. According to Abelardo Rodríguez (2008), Calderón
did not thoroughly assess risks (or commission)—a “comprehensive
assessment of the government and state of affairs he inherited from the
previous administration in order to redesign a master plan to combat
threats to national security such as drug trafficking, national disasters,
transnational terrorism and poverty.”
This lack of vision and thoroughness was not conducive to the exis-
tence of a democratic doctrine for security issues. It was, in contrast,
conducive to adherence to the security policy of the United States and
to risking this security by allowing the state to carry out legitimatized
violence vis-à-vis the armed forces.
María José Rodríguez (2011) reminds us, “The militarization of the
country has deep roots that extend far beyond the war on drugs. This
is the part that the media focus on, but beyond this the process of
militarization is the result of two trends that converge and feed into
each other: The hemispheric defense plan, which falls in line with the
geoeconomic and geopolitical interests of the United States, and the
neoliberal orthodoxy that prevails in that country.”
This project is another sign that the process of militarization is geared
toward the protection of those who benefit from the resulting concentration
of economic wealth and that it criminalizes social protest through the trans-
formation of legal and institutional frameworks. In that sense, it becomes
evident how legal reforms in the area of security have begun to blur the line
between public safety and societal security (Rodríguez, 2011).
Furthermore, military spending has increased under the Calderón
administration. The amount spent in 2011 was Mex$64.3 billion (US$4.7
billion), a 44 percent increase over the amount recorded at the beginning
of his term and significantly higher than the marginal increases made in
the areas of education and health (González Amador, 2011).
Domestically, risks associated with a weak state result from the way
certain global factors are managed at the local level:
●● Failed economic policies associated with neoliberalism and par-

ticularly with NAFTA.
●● Failed antidrug trafficking policies geared toward militarization,
persecution, direct action, and imprisonment, with no emphasis
on crime prevention or strengthening the rule of law.
●● The US government taking advantage of the perceived weak hand

of the Calderón administration stemming from the disputed results
of the 2006 election. While several decades ago the United States
had considered a plan to overcome the steadfast resistance of the
Mexican military to join forces with their US counterparts, today
bilateral “understandings” exist about the creation and consolida-
tion of a police state in both countries.
●● The July 1, 2012, elections revealed that factitious powers arise
from three poles of influence: organized crime, the Catholic hier-
archy, and the corporate media structure. Players that wield power
on both local and global levels and that directly influenced the
election results.
●● While the US government maintained a low profile during Mexico’s
election process, the premature recognition of the PRI’s presiden-
tial candidate by the Obama administration prior to the finaliza-
tion of the annulment motion filed by the Progressive Movement
strengthened the alleged legitimacy of the PRI candidate.
Conclusions: From Lost Wars to Failed Democracies

During this time of war in Mexico, the strategy of the Calderón admin-
istration precluded any deceleration or annulment of the declaration
of war made by the president at the beginning of his term and threat-
ens elections and the very idea of democracy. Even though this regime
had the majority of the internationally recognized indicators of failed
states, the analysis of elections in times of war by Hernández (2010)
of a number of entities marked by violence and insecurity caused by
organized crime and the erroneous strategies used to fight it shows that
these institutional failures fracture local governments and the party sys-
tem that supports them. This poses a threat to all electoral processes,
which sustain the fragile achievements of political alternation and the
democratization of the Mexican political system. Bad omens for local
elections in the 2012 election year were significant indicators pointing
to uncertainty and insecurity surrounding the presidential elections.
In “Apuntes sobre las guerras,” the start of a letter exchange between
Subcomandante Marcos and Luis Villoro on ethics and politics (March
12, 2011), Marcos wrote, “This war (which the government lost from
the very beginning by undertaking it not as a solution to a problem
of insecurity but as a solution to questioned legitimacy) is destroying
the last bastion of what is left of a nation: its social fabric.” The worst
part is that it is not so much about a failed state as it is about a failed
democracy. This war is the continuation of politics by other means,

as noted by Baron Von Clausewitz, who sought to dignify interstate
conflicts that lead to the kind of armed conflict typical of conventional
wars. This is a war carried out for political purposes, technically flawed
because the Mexican army and police are not fighting against normal
military forces that can be destroyed by conventional troops and means
of warfare.
Following in the footsteps of global conflicts, localized “issue” wars
are, in fact, the extension of business by any means necessary, where pos-
sible “collateral damage” or the suppression of a “ridiculous minority”
(as Felipe Calderón labeled the narco elite class) are inconsequential.
The main implications are related to the global power of multinationals
and our position with respect to US power. The above-cited letter from
Marcos also asks the following question: “Is the US winning this ‘local’
war? The answer is ‘yes.’ Leaving aside financial earnings and monetary
investment in arms, ammunition and equipment (bearing in mind that
the US is the leading supplier of these items to the two warring sides—
the authorities and the ‘criminals’—the ‘war against organized crime’
is big business for the American military-industrial establishment). It is
producing a destruction/depopulation and geopolitical reconstruction/
reorganization that works to their advantage.”
This war is also a dispute between complex American geopolitical
interests such as those mentioned above and the US alliance with the
Mexican government through the Mérida Initiative for control of geo-
graphical bases of support that organized crime is taking away from the
Mexican state. The cartels have their own strategies for winning social
support and have had some success in legitimizing them. They use the
same language of violence: individual, symbolic, and “structural.”
Local elections not only pointed to the complexity of the situation
for the 2012 presidential elections, but also warned of the importance of
not subjecting elections to the strategies of the police state. Drug cartels
vie for power in virtually all regions of Mexico (see map 4.3) and cur-
rently control about 200 of Mexico’s 2,340 municipalities. According to
the Federal Electoral Institute, risks related to unstable migratory pop-
ulations and other security concerns are present in 9,000 of the more
than 134,000 electoral precincts in Mexico.
Complaints have been lodged regarding the high probability that
money laundering played a role in the elections. López Obrador
expressed this suspicion in point five his list of ten basic reasons the
2012 presidential election results should be nullified: “The distribution
of thousands of Banco Monex electronic wallets with money from illicit

activities.” Such funds are alleged to have contributed to the massive
purchase of votes for the PRI candidate.1
Although presumed winner Enrique Peña Nieto proposed a reex-
amination of the current war on drug trafficking, he is not expected
to rescind its militarization, meaning that a comprehensive and effec-
tive strategy to finalize the conflict is not likely to be implemented.
Moreover, the relations he expects to have with the United States would
entail a continuance of the police state and other contentious aspects of
the bilateral agenda such as advocating an immigration initiative that
improves the legal status of Mexicans in the United States and criticism
of discriminatory legislation in some US states, particularly Arizona.
In regard to NAFTA, Peña Nieto aims to provide continuity through
privatization measures mainly in the energy sector.
Poet Javier Sicilia, following the death of his son at the hands of drug
traffickers, founded the organization Caravan for Peace with Justice
and Dignity. This bold initiative organized a march covering 20 US
cities to advocate a halt to the sales of American weapons to organized
crime, an end to the militarization of the conflict by Mexico and the
United States, respect for the human rights of everyone affected by the
war (among them migrants killed in both countries), and the defense of
victims’ families. 2
Organized crime is the main threat to the Mexican state, but the
militarization jointly promoted by the governments of Mexico and the
United States does not offer a genuine solution. The implementation of
the police state has no effect on the structural causes of underdevelop-
ment. It only brings death and destruction that perversely nurtures the
arms industry, degrades judicial and security institutions, and corrupts
democracy. More than a failure of state, this has been a failure of policy:
the American policy with its inter-American geopolitical strategy, and
the Mexican policy of bowing to the militarization of politics.
Notes
1. This content was originally published by SINEMBARGO.MX at the fol-
lowing Web address: http://www.sinembargo.mx/07–08–2012/325318.
2. Caravan for Peace with Justice and Dignity can be accessed at the follow-
ing Web address: http://www.caravanforpeace.org/caravan/?p=2726&utm_
source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Cara
vanForPeace2012+%28Caravan+For+Peace+2012%29.
Works Cited
Aguilar Camín, Héctor (2012, March 22). América Latina: ejércitos policías.
Milenio (Mexico). Retrieved on March 24, 2012, from https://www.milenio
.com/cdb/doc/impreso/9133490/node.
Barrios, Miguel Ángel (2012). La nueva política de defensa de los EE.UU y la
UNASUR. Retrieved on March 27, 2012, from the ALAI website, http://alainet.
org/rss.phtml.
Castells, Manuel (2009). Comunicación y poder. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
Cisneros, José Luis (2011). El discurso político para justificar la llamada guerra
contra el crimen organizado. In José Luis Cisneros, Everardo Carballo, and Juan
Manuel (eds.), Violencia, crimen organizado y Estado mexicano. Mexico City:
UAM-Xochimilco. pp. 19–50.
The Fund for Peace (2011). The failed states index, 2011. Retrieved on March 24,
2012, from http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi.
González Amador, Roberto (2011, April 15). Con Calderón aumenta el gasto mili-
tar; se estancan salud y educación. La Jornada (Mexico). Retrieved on March 24,
2012, from http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2011/04/15/politica/002n1pol.
Hartung, William D. (2012). The Obama defense plan: Roadmap for continu-
ing global hegemony. Posted on January 16, 2012, on the Americas Program
of the Center for International Policy website: http://www.cipamericas.org
/archives/6170. [Consulted by the authors of this article in Spanish on the same
website under the title, El Plan de Defensa de Obama, Mapa Estratégico para
Conservar la Hegemonía Global. Retrieved from http://www.cipamericas.org/es
/archives/6229.]
Hernández Norzagaray, Ernesto (ed.) (2010). Elecciones en tiempos de guerra. Baja
California, Chihuahua, Durango, Nuevo León, Sinaloa, Tamaulipas, Veracruz.
Culiacán: Autonomous University of Sinaloa.
Leyton Salas, Cristian (2011). Estados débiles, espacios sin ley e ingobernabili-
dad. Retrieved on March 24, 2012, from http://www.orpas.cl/wp-content
/uploads/2011/10/Estado-D%C3%A9biles2.pdf.
Nogué Font, Joan, & Vicente Rufí, Joan (2001). Geopolítica, identidad y global-
ización. Barcelona: Ariel Geografía. pp. 112–113.
Pickard, Miguel (2008). Justificando la militarización de México. Retrieved
on January 25, 2012, from http://barbarosdelnorte.blogspot.com/2011/08/
justificando-la-militarizacion-de.html.
Rodríguez Rejas, María José, (2011). A outra cara da militarizaçao no México.
Retrieved on March 5, 2012, from http://passapalavra.info/?p=36309#more-
36309.
Rodríguez Sumano, Abelardo (2008). La urgente Seguridad democrática. La rel-
ación de México con Estados Unidos. Mexico City: Taurus. pp. 28–29.
Ronquillo, Víctor (2010). 200 municipios controlados por el narco. Milenio
Semanal (Mexico). Retrieved on March 24, 2012, from http://www.msemanal
.com/node/2889.
Salazar Pérez, Robinson, & Salazar Echegaray, Melissa (2011). Militarización,

seguridad y lucha contra el crimen organizado en América Latina. In José Luis
Cisneros and Juan Manuel Everardo Carballo (eds.), Violencia, crimen organizado
y Estado mexicano. Mexico City: UAM-Xochimilco. pp. 205–232.
Sánchez Juárez, Leobardo (2011). México:¿Estado Fallido? Retrieved on April 10,
2012, from http://www.elcato.org/mexico-estado-fallido.
Sogge, David (2010). Hay algo ahí fuera: debilidad estatal como pretexto impe-
rial. In Achin Vanaik (ed.), Casus Belli: cómo los Estados Unidos venden la
guerra. pp. 198–222. (Originally published in English as a book chapter titled,
“Something Out There: State Weakness as Imperial Pretext,” in Achin Vaniak
[ed.] [2007], Selling US Wars. Northampton: Olive Branch Press [Interlink
Publishers]. pp. 241–268.)
US Department of Defense (2012). Inaugural Meeting of North American Defense
Ministers Joint Statement. Retrieved from http://www.defense.gov/releases
/release.aspx?releaseid=15141.
Vanaik, Achin (2010). Terrorismo político y el proyecto imperial estadounidense.
In Achin Vanaik (ed.), Casus Belli: cómo los Estados Unidos venden la guerra.
pp. 100–122. (Originally published in English as a book chapter entitled,
“Political Terrorism & the US Imperial Project,” in Achin Vaniak [ed.] [2007],
Selling US Wars. Northampton: Olive Branch Press [Interlink Publishers].
pp. 119–146.)
CHAPTER 5
Maras, Contragoverned Spaces,

and Sovereignty
Harry E. Vanden
Introduction
Today there are more than 100,000 mareros or pandilleros (members of
juvenile gangs) in the Northern Triangle of Central America (Guatemala,
Honduras, and El Salvador) and according to several estimates they are
responsible for up to 70 percent of the homicides in these small nations
(see, e.g., Tobar, 2007). At the beginning of 2012, the homicide rates in
El Salvador and Guatemala were on par with or greater than those dur-
ing the civil wars that were suffered by these countries in the seventies,
eighties, and early nineties. In El Salvador, the annual homicide rate was
63 deaths for every 100,000 persons, which is five times greater than
what the World Health Organization considers to be an epidemic. The
mara members also involve themselves in many other types of crimes.
They rape young girls that refuse to be their girlfriends or whose fami-
lies resist their control in the neighborhoods or that go to the police to
give testimony regarding their crimes, they kill other young people who
refuse to join their maras or who resist their control, and they carry
out brutal war against the rival maras, often mutilating or decapitating
their victims. In recent years, their involvement in kidnappings and
drug trafficking business has been growing and increasingly, they are
working with cartels that are using Central America to transfer drugs
headed for the United States. They are confronting the government in
certain territories in Central America and defying governmental power

82 l Harry E. Vanden
and sovereignty. Such actions suggest that the nature of the govern-
ment and even the system of international relations is changing. This
reality is well explained by the concept of ungoverned or contragov-
erned spaces, as developed in works such as Clunan and Trinkunas,
Ungoverned Spaces, Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened
Sovereignty (2010). It is further argued that, as highlighted by a US
Defense Department report, threats arise in “ungoverned, under-gov-
erned, misgoverned, or contested physical areas (remote, urban, mari-
time) where illicit actors can organize, plan, raise funds, communicate,
train, and operate in relative security” (Lamb, 2008, as cited in Clunan
and Trinkunas, 2010: 5). This is precisely what the maras are doing in
selected areas of the Northern Triangle of Central America (Guatemala,
Honduras, and El Salvador), and some areas inside Nicaragua, and it is
perceived as a security concern by US policy makers.
In a special edition of Small Wars and Insurgencies, edited by Robert
J. Bunker, the same author, in his article “Grand Strategic Overview:
Epochal Change and New Realities for the United States,” observes
that the international system is changing and that several authors note
“transition and change from what we considered the modern state sys-
tem (its origins roughly correlating with the Treaty of Westphalia in
1648) to some form of post-Westphalian (e.g. post nation-state) system
that is still in its early formative stage. With this transition comes the
loss of political authority, monopoly on war making, and the sovereign
lands and rights enjoyed for so many centuries by modern states. This
level of change is grand strategic and epochal in scale and ultimately
witnesses the transition from one dominant political form to another.”
And that “all sorts of power voids are produced by the changing patterns
of human existence and interaction. As these vacuums, gaps, and niches
widen, they are exploited by competing non-state entities—both subna-
tional and supranational—that gain economic, military, political, and
religious standing and, eventually, power” (Bunker, 2011: 728). And
he concludes, “If left unchecked, belligerent and politicized non-state
entities have the potential to continue to evolve into new and undesir-
able state forms organized into criminal-enclaves, cities, statelets, and
potentially even much larger networks of criminal states” (ibid.). This is
precisely what the United States wants to avoid.
And, it is in this context, that the Central American maras are operat-
ing. As a base for their operations, the maras occupy areas in all of the
large cities of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras and they are occupy-
ing more neighborhoods in Managua and some other cities in Nicaragua.
Maras, Contragoverned Spaces l 83
In these areas, the national governments are not able to exercise their
full sovereignty and often times they don’t want—or are afraid—to
confront the maras in these territories. In these areas, it is the maras
and not the government that exercise power. They are who, as Max
Weber and Vladimir Lenin said, have a monopoly on the use of vio-
lence, which suggests that they, not the national or municipal gov-
ernments, are dominant in these territories. Using their capacity for
violence and their associated capacity for coercion, they decide who
has to pay the taxes (“renta” as they say) that they impose and how
much they are going to be. Businesses have to pay, families have to
pay, people have to pay, taxies have to pay, and the busses that operate
within the neighborhood—or pass through the neighborhood—have
to pay. It might be US$5–US$10 a week, or US$50 or more per month
for a business or a family that has the economic means. And to con-
tinue and grow their power, they recruit—with force—many young
men, and sometimes women, to be new members of the mara; these are
their soldiers.
Nation-State as a Concept
In Montevideo, Uruguay, on December 26, 1933, in the Seventh
International Conference of American States, the famous Convention
on the Rights and Duties of States was signed, better known as The
Montevideo Convention of 1933. The convention establishes the defini-
tion of state, as well as its rights and obligations. The most well-known
conceptualization is that of Article 1, which establishes four character-
istic criteria of a state. These have become the standard components of
statehood in public international law. The state as a subject of interna-
tional law must satisfy the following requirements:
1. Permanent population
2. Defined territory
3. Government
4. Capacity to enter into relations with other states1
And in international relations theory, as in public international law, it is

assumed that such government can govern the population and territory
within its borders. It is on this basis that the document insists that the
recognition of statehood should be based on its declaration of being a
state that satisfies these criteria.
The Loss of Sovereignty in the Twenty-First Century

Although this principle of state was formulated in the thirties, there was
a lot of territory in the continent where the presence of the state govern-
ment was minimal. Nonetheless, this reality was changing. Therefore,
in the new century, one characteristic of the national governments in the
Americas is that they are consolidating their power in the national ter-
ritory and as a consequence they are expected to reach a level of control
of the national territory that they have never had before. This phenom-
enon is very noticeable in Latin America. There are less and less remote
areas within the national territory where the presence of the government
is not seen or felt. For example, at present they are building a Trans-
Andean highway, which is going to facilitate the government’s ability to
exercise its power in the Andean region. A Trans-Amazonian highway,
that was built several years ago, opened large Amazonian regions to
the colonization, and there are not many regions of the current Latin
American countries that cannot be reached in a short time in a plane or
helicopter. In this way, the nations have consolidated their power and
are presumed to have the organizational capabilities to govern all parts
of the national territory, which is consistent with the concept of the
historic nation-state.
From the Catholic monarchs in Spain in the fifteenth century and
Louise XIV of seventeenth century in France, the nation-state was aris-
ing as the principal political organizational form in the world. This
process continued until different states established claims to virtually
all of the global territory and went about trying to control it. Nowadays,
the world is divided among different nation-states that are in control of
their people and their territories, and represent them in international
relations. And within the territory of these states, these national enti-
ties exercise sovereignty within their borders. Since Jean Bodin (1530–
1596) formulated the concept of sovereignty in his The Six Books of
the Commonwealth (Les Six livres de la République, 1576), saying that
“[a Republic is a] lawful government of many households and which
belongs to them jointly with sovereign power,” and that “sovereignty
is the absolute and perpetual Power of a Republic.” In other words, the
sovereignty of a nation is absolute, and the monarch may fully exercise
their power within the territory and in regard to their national citi-
zens. And due to the modernization of the Latin American state and
the growth of its administrative power within the countries of the con-
tinent, up until recently the tendency was that the government could
exercise ever-greater legitimate power in their country, even in areas
where the government did not reach before. By the 1990s and in the
early 2000s, the states have definitely overcome what was the ultimate
challenge to their power, the confrontation and territorial control of the
guerilla groups (except in parts of Colombia), in order to establish their
definitive control. But while they did this, there were other groups aris-
ing that were going to confront their governments in the heart of their
power—the capitals and the big cities of their own nations, especially
in the Northern Triangle of Central America.
The new challenges to the power of the state and national sover-
eignty consist of other groups: the gangs or, as they are called in the
Central America, the maras. These groups were formed in the seventies
and the eighties when thousands of people escaped from the violent
civil wars in Central America, leaving societies with prevalent violation
of human rights and a culture of violence. Many of them came to the
United States where they lived in poor neighborhoods of Los Angeles
and other cities. There the young Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and some
Hondurans met American gangs, such as the Crisps and the Bloods, and
other gangs that dominated many of those neighborhoods. As a form
of defense, some of them formed into their own gangs such as the Mara
Salvatrucha (MS or MS 13), or took over what used to be a Mexican
gang, such as the Eighteenth Street Gang or M18. There they learned
the tactics and practices of the American youth gangs, and learned the
culture of violence that was predominant in the neighborhoods where
those gangs operated. And it was there where they learned the concept
of “turf,” their area, their own territory. Each gang has their own blocks,
their area. This was their turf, their area, their operational base, where
they were sovereign in regard to other gangs and neighborhood groups.
And they fought to the death in order to protect it and not allow the
other gang members (i.e., the members of rival gangs), or other people
of the neighborhood, to challenge their power or control.
When their criminal actions in their gangs were documented in
their criminal records, the immigration authorities became aware of
their existence as noncitizens (residents or undocumented arrivals)
who, because of US immigration law could be deported for crimi-
nal convictions. And the gang members’ criminal acts, after they
were judged guilty, were registered in their criminal records. Once
the crimes were registered, it caused the initiation of a deportation
process. And in this manner, thousands of young Salvadoreños,
Hondureños, and Guatemaltecos were deported from the United States
due to their crimes or, alternatively even if they were picked up by the
local authorities for minor infractions such as driving without a valid
Table 5.1 US ICE removals: El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras
Citizenship FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013

(through
Jan. 19)
El Salvador 20,975 21,157 20,830 18,870 19,694 5,858

Guatemala 28,899 30,411 31,347 33,324 40,498 12,010
Honduras 29,768 27,679 25,635 23,822 32,464 8,734
driver’s license and found to be undocumented, deportation proceed-

ings were also initiated against them. In this way, thousands of young
people were deported back to El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala.
For instance, in 2008, 20,975 people were sent back to El Salvador
by the US government, the numbers of Guatemalans and Hondurans
deported was even greater: 28,899 for Guatemala and 29,768 for
Honduras (Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE] response to
author questionnaire). The exact age breakdown was not provided by
ICE (Department of Homeland Security), but initial research strongly
suggests that most of the deportees were under 30 years. As an indica-
tion of the numbers of removals, we include recent data from the US
government (table 5.1).
When the younger deportees—especially those with some gang
c ontact—returned to Central America, they were looking for security
and trusted groups and little by little, they began forming into new
gangs in their home countries. Forming themselves into youth gangs,
which came to be called Maras, these new gang members incorporated
the violence of the American gangs and the extreme violence that the
military forces of El Salvador and Guatemala and security forces in
Honduras used for years in order to liquidate guerilla members and/
or to repress the masses, as well as the violence brought by the gueril-
las to resist and free their countries from the control of the national
oligarchies.
Many of these young people left their families in the United States,
and lived with family members that they barely knew, in very poor
economic conditions and without the love and support of their nuclear
families. Some of them lived on the streets and others were looking
for security and support where they could. To those youths, the maras
that have been forming, offered them a type of substitute family. They
gathered in neighborhoods using the streets and squares as points of
reference and areas that they were able to occupy. Some of them lived
with their families; other lived in abandoned houses or simply on the

street. Little by little, they also developed a neighborhood identity and
affiliation and different gangs began to take over the neighborhoods
where they lived and operated. They funded themselves by shaking
down (extorting) children on their way to school, teenagers and adults
they found on the streets, “la renta” or monthly payment they were
extorting from businesses that operated in the neighborhood, or from
the people in the same neighborhood, or the payment or tax “la renta”
they charged the buses, taxis, or delivery trucks that passed through the
neighborhoods they controlled. In the beginning, they concentrated in
the poor neighborhoods (“colonias”) in San Salvador, Santa Ana, San
Pedro Sula, Tegucigalpa, or Guatemala City, but in recent years they
have spread to almost all of the national territories, especially to poor
urban or semi-urban areas where the governments have less interest
or capacity. Their numbers have increased in recent years. Five years
ago there were estimated to be around 50,000 of them in El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras. Now it is estimated that there are 100,000
or more in these 3 countries. Frequently, they outnumber the police in
the area and are often better armed, using not only homemade pistols
and shotguns, but also submachine guns—AK-47s and M-16s—and
even grenades. There are now reports that some gangs also have rocket
propelled grenades.
How the Maras Operate

In the neighborhoods they control, they are always on the lookout for
new members, girls to hit on, and people or groups that they can extort
or confront if they feel challenged. When they see a young person, they
initiate contact. After some initial contact, they begin to threaten those
they have selected until they integrate into the mara; otherwise they
suffer threats, extortions, beatings, killings, rape in the case of women
(or women that they want to make their girlfriends), or they are forced
to flee from the neighborhoods under that mara’s control. In regard
to the person that may not want to submit to their requests, the mara
members believe that such a person can serve as an example of resistance
to others in the neighborhood, that they are mocking them, or that they
can give testimony against them to the police. According to the psycho-
logical orientation that most of the young mareros have, the mara has
to overcome such resistance by any means necessary, this includes threat
and intimidation, violence, rape of women, or murder. Members of the
mara are capable of pursuing such an unfortunate person to another
neighborhood, city, region of the country, or to another country. (See,

e.g., the movie Sin Nombre.) If the objects of the gang’s attention agree
to incorporate themselves into the gang, they have to suffer an initia-
tion ceremony that consists of a hard beating by the entire group that
lasts 13 seconds for the MS 13 gang and 18 seconds for the M18 gang.
In some cases, the young women can opt for “the train”—having sex
with all of the boys in the group, one after another.
These maras are not like cartels; they are not even like the gangs of
the favelas in Rio de Janeiro or other cities in Brazil. They are juvenile
gangs and the members are young, some only 9 years old when they join
and the most common age varies between 12 and 19 years, while some
are between 20 and 22 and there are a few that are some years older.
When they are older than this, the majority of them are dead, incarcer-
ated, or in some cases they are “calmed,” that is, they are sympathetic
to, but do not participate in any of the mara activities anymore and have
a job and/or a family. The general rule is that one cannot quit the mara
when they are younger, and an attempt to do so will cause the local
group, “la clica [the click],” to put a green light on the person, meaning
that any member of the mara can and should kill him. The dominant
mentality of the maras is that of an insecure juvenile machismo. They
abuse women and are very violent and irrational, although each click
has its own set of rules and discipline.
The maras are divided into local “clicks,” (one click in each neighbor-
hood) directed by a “home boy”; they have their rules, and use corporal
and sometimes mortal discipline to maintain their control. They have
their own organization with work divisions: robberies, extortion, recruit-
ment, and even assassinations. They put the green light on anyone who
leaves the mara without permission and anyone can kill him/her. Until
recently, they have tattooed themselves, even in their faces with 13 or
18, or MS 13 or M18, and they use hand signs to communicate among
one another. Some girls are admitted but as a general rule, they consist
of only young males, and to be admitted one has to submit to the above
mentioned brutal beating of 13 seconds for the M 13 or 18 seconds for
the M 18. They communicate among themselves and with other clicks
with their mobile phones and the few that are imprisoned (that have to
be segregated per their affiliation so that they do not kill members of
the rival mara) use the experience to perfect their criminal abilities and
to make contact with members of other clicks. The leaders that remain
in prison for more time frequently send orders to their associates on the
outside with illegal mobile phones or secret messages. Many of the extor-
tion threats people receive in these countries originate from imprisoned
mareros. In the US journal Military Review, the authors conclude, “The

maras present a serious threat to the democracies, economies, and secu-
rity of Latin America. They overwhelm the governments, police and the
legal systems with their sheer audacity, violence and numbers” (Boraz
and Bruneau, 2006: 37–38). According to Anne Aguilera, the director
of the Office for Central America, of the International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), Department of State, “We consider
that the maras are the greatest problem for national security at this time
in Central America and part of Mexico” (La Prensa Grafica, El Salvador,
April 8, 2005, quoted in Boraz and Bruneau, 2006). The Department
of State and the US Southern Command include presentations and dis-
cussions that deal with the subject of the maras in their security con-
ferences. The Central American security forces who receive training at
the US State Department’s International Law Enforcement Academy
(ILEA) in San Salvador, are given many hours of specific instruction
on the nature of the mara threat and how to deal with it (author inter-
view with ILEA director Michael Perkins). With the rise in activities
on behalf of the narco-traffic cartels in Central America, there is more
interest in the subject as the maras begin to interact more intensively
with the cartels, agreeing to help provide security for some operations,
engage in assassinations on behalf of the cartels, or market some of their
product in the areas they control.
The Central American governments have fought to control the
growth, power, and violence of the maras, implementing “heavy-hand”
(mano dura) and “super heavy-hand,” policies, coordinating at regional
levels and working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
which established a special school to combat the maras in El Salvador.
But, “in Central America, governments have experimented with get-
tough laws, only to see crime worsen every year.” And “El Salvador’s
murder rate has risen steadily since the implementation of Mano Dura
in 2003” (Lakshmanan, 2006). But these efforts have not been very
effective and in the last few years the maras have adapted, changing
their gangster clothing for that of a “preppy” style, getting rid of the
tattoos, establishing better lines of communication among themselves,
and improving their communication with the cartels. In these three
countries, there was a consensus that the problem was out of control,
and they were already mobilizing the military forces to work with the
police because it had become more and more obvious that the police
could not control them with their own forces.
In his key article on the governmentality, contragovernmentality, and
territoriality, “Governmentality and contragovernmentality: Rethinking
sovereignty and territoriality after the Cold War,” Timothy Luke observes
that such processes confront the traditional state sovereignty that the
governments expect to exercise. “During the past three decades . . . many
contragovernmentalities have attacked the national-statal order, con-
testing the triangular bloc of state power, national populations, and
disciplinary discourses policing the behaviors of civil individuals/civic
collectives inside nationalized territorial containments” (Luke, 1996:
491). He adds, “These agencies have been proliferating more rapidly
since 1989.” Also, “the dissolution of territoriality and degradation of
sovereignty are not confined to Africa or the former Soviet Union” (ibid.,
493). Other areas that he mentions include not only Mexico and Brazil,
but also Guatemala. And among the examples of this nongovernmental-
ity he mentions criminal organizations and gangs: “Asian crime gangs,
Jamaican posses, Haitian toughs, Colombian drug lords and Nigerian
syndicates are all exercising extraordinary levels of quasi-legitimate
coercive and commercial power in hundreds of housing projects, poor
neighborhoods and city halls [even] all over the United States” (Luke,
1996: 493–494).
Max J. Manwaring, in his publication, “A contemporary challenge
to state sovereignty: Gangs and other illicit criminal organizations,”
observes, “A government’s failure to extend a legitimate sovereign pres-
ence throughout its national territory leaves a vacuum in which gangs,
drug cartels, leftists insurgents, the political and narco-right, and the
government itself may all compete for power. In that regard, ample evi-
dence clearly demonstrates that Central American, Mexican, Caribbean
and South American governments’ authority and presence have dimin-
ished over large portions of those regions” (Manwaring, 2007: 9). And
he goes on to note that these territories are governed by gangs and other
actors who operate “where there is an absence or only a partial pres-
ence of state institutions” (ibid.). It should also be noted that the US
Department of Justice recently classified the MS 13 as a transnational
criminal organization (TCO).
And in order to emphasize the challenge to the sovereignty and tra-
ditional government, John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker in the sum-
mary of their article, “Rethinking Insurgency: Criminality, Spirituality,
and Societal Warfare in the Americas” (Sullivan and Bunker, 2011),
observe,
Driven by globalization, Internet communications technology (ICT), and

new economic forms the nature of states may be changing. Transnational
criminal organizations (TCOs)—including what are commonly known
as cartels—are early adopters to the new political/economic landscape.

In addition to seeking to rule the illicit economy, criminal actors (net-
worked cartels and gangs) are challenging states through high-order vio-
lence. (Sullivan and Bunker, 2011: 742)
In 2013, the mara problem continues to increase, the civil population is

traumatized, and several experts such as Manwaring already believe that
the maras are operating as de facto governments in the territories they
control (see Manwaring, 2007: 9). This is an example of the argument
by Luke. “As contragovernmentality displaces governmentality other
forces control such areas . . . There local gangs, regional crime bosses or
transnational drug lords [fill] government voids with contragovernmen-
tal goods and services . . . State sovereignty might try to police all these
manifold sovereign spaces, but it is an on-going battle at best, rather
than a foregone conclusion” (Luke, 1996: 504). Without the necessary
economic and social changes, it is unlikely that the maras are going to
disappear, and their work with the cartels is institutionalizing them
into transnational criminal networks that are becoming stronger every
day. They have carved out areas—their turf—where it is they and not
the government that exercises control most of the time in those areas.
Indeed, they can challenge the government’s control in many ways in
these areas and the population is more subject to their control than that
of the government. In the last year, the maras have increased their coop-
eration with the Mexican and Colombian drug cartels that are increas-
ingly operating in Central America. The two main mara groups (MS 13
and M18) have negotiated a truce in El Salvador and have even met with
the secretary general of the Organization of American States (OAS).
In the eyes of US policy makers, the spaces they control are unsecure
areas that can lend themselves to activities by cartels or even terrorists
that could threaten the security of the United States. As such, they pose
a threat to US national security and must be closely monitored, if not
brought under governmental control.
Note
1. See the Montevideo Convention on the Right and Duties of States, 1933,
which states, inter alia, in Article 1, that the state as a person of inter-
national law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent
population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter
into relations with the other states.
Works Cited
Works cited are drawn from Ilene Frank and Harry E. Vanden, MARAS: Gangs
in Central America. A Bibliography. September 4, 2007, last update August 15,
2011. http://www.box.net/shared/m267o3f1is.
Bodin, Jean (1583). Les six livres de la République. Paris.
Boraz, S. C., & Bruneau, T. C. (2006, November–December). Are the maras over-
whelming governments in Central America? Military Review, 86(6), 36–40.
Available at http://www.ccmr.org/public/library_file_proxy.cfm/lid/5553.
Bunker, Robert J. (2011). Grand strategic overview: Epochal change and new reali-
ties for the United States. Special Issue of Small Wars and Insurgencies, Criminal
Insurgency in Mexico and the Americas 22(5), 728–741.
Clunan, Anne L., & Trinkunas, Harold A. (2010). Ungoverned Spaces, Alternatives
to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty. Stanford, CA: Stanford
Security Studies.
Lamb, Robert D. (2008). Ungoverned Areas and the Threats from Safe Havens.
Final report of the Ungoverned Areas Project. Washington, DC: Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense.
Lakshmanan, Indira A. R. (2006, April 17). Gangs roil Central America. The
Boston Globe, National Edition.
Luke, Timothy W. (1996). Governmentality and contragovernmentality:
Rethinking sovereignty and territoriality after the Cold War. Political Geography,
15(6/7), 491–507.
Manwaring, M. G. (2007). A Contemporary challenge to state sovereignty: Gangs
and other illicit transnational criminal organizations in Central America,
El Salvador, Mexico, Jamaica, and Brazil. U. S. Army War College, Strategic
Studies Institute. Available at http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/
[Also available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA475687&L
ocation=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf; ISBN 1–58487–334–5].
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 1933.
Sullivan, John P., & Bunker, Robert J. (2011). Rethinking insurgencies: Criminality,
spirituality, and society welfare in the Americas. Numero especial de Small Wars
and Insurgencies, Criminal Insurgency in Mexico and the Americas, 22(5),
742–763.
CHAPTER 6
Central America: Ungoverned

Spaces and the National Security
Policy of the United States
Ignacio Medina Núñez
Introduction
The primary purpose of this chapter will be to provide a comprehensive
analysis of the Central American region with particular attention to
how it is seen in the twenty-first century by the United States through
its contemporary focus on how ungoverned spaces and failed states rep-
resent a threat to the region’s stability and by implication to the national
security of the United States in the wake of the events of September 11,
2001. This chapter will offer a brief historic context of the rise of the
Central America nations in order to present the current situation in the
twenty-first century in which some territorial and maritime spaces exist
as ungoverned and where some governments almost become failed states.
In this general panorama of Central America, we see that the traditional
influence of the United States comes into play to safeguard its economic
interests and to maintain docile national governments subordinate to its
politics of imperial control. We will pay special attention to the case of
Honduras where the coup d’état in June 2009 broke the constitutional
order to favor a new government submissive to Washington.

94 l Ignacio Medina Núñez
The Origin of Central America

The Central American region is located to the southernmost part of
Mexico, where the actual territories of Guatemala and Belize begin. At
the moment of independence from Spain, what was then known as the
Captaincy General of Guatemala,1 in 1821 became part of the first inde-
pendent United Mexican States during the government of Agustin de
Iturbide. Today, this territory that comprises the geographic waist of the
continent, from Guatemala to Panama, is known as Central America.
However, Panama originally belonged politically to South America
as part of Colombia. Today’s countries of Guatemala, Honduras, El
Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica were part of Mexico for just one
year when Agustin de Iturbide declared himself emperor, but gained
independence from Mexico in 1823 with the name of United Provinces
of Central America to later become in 1824 the Federal Republic of
Central America after Iturbide was executed in Mexico and the country
proclaimed itself as a republic.
The Central American nations are a creation of the second and third
decades of the nineteenth century, more than three centuries after the
development of the European states. Just as with the rest of the ancient
New Spain, after its indigenous identity was lost and its population
assimilated as part of the Spanish colonies in America, the concept of
nation was born. At the moment of independence, the conceptualiza-
tion of united provinces as a Central American Federation existed. The
Central American Federation existed until 1840 but after its demise, the
geographical area was later divided to create five independent republics:
Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. Even
today, a Central American identity exists along with the national identi-
ties of these five countries.
Having emerged relatively late as nation-states, the inhabitants of
today’s Central America still argue over their territorial and maritime
boundaries and about sovereignty, while simultaneously struggling for
the best development models as they endeavor to consolidate their dem-
ocratic institutions. The resulting border confrontations and conflicts
among the Central American states have existed since their birth as
nations at the beginning of the nineteenth century.
Sociopolitical Situation at the Beginning of the

Twenty-First Century
In general terms, the contemporary state of the region is not a prom-
ising one in a context in which there have been three important
Central America l 95
transitions: from civil wars in some countries (Nicaragua, El Salvador,

and Guatemala) to diverse peace processes; from dominant militarism
where governments such as that of Guatemala and El Salvador were
rated as serious violators of human rights in the 1980s and 1990s toward
a new stage of civil governments voted in through open elections; and
from a situation of closed economies toward a new stage of free markets
where programs of severe economic adjustment have prevailed.
The two first transitions, although very limited, have been positive
in improving human rights, but the third one involving the insertion
of liberalized markets in an economy poses many questions about the
development model of the region, especially when poverty and violence
continue and have escalated in many cases, causing greater instability.
“The international situation that the Isthmus is facing is characterized
by a corrosive geopolitics of security linked to drug trafficking, the
growing vulnerability of the regions insertion in the international econ-
omy and the high international prices of fuel and food. None of these
elements have been manifested with such clarity until recent times”
(Estado de la Región, 2008: 47).
As a comparative point of view, the Human Development Index
(HDI) can be used through the income, education, and health indica-
tors to measure the prevailing situation in each country. This way, utiliz-
ing the same indicators for all countries, we can see how inside of Latin
America there are outstanding countries such as Chile, Uruguay, and
Argentina, while the worse indicators are found in Haiti, Guatemala,
Nicaragua, Honduras, and Bolivia. For the Central American area, the
indicators continue to show that Costa Rica and Panama experience
good life quality that is superior to that of its neighbors (see tables 6.1
and 6.2).
Table 6.1 Central America: Population
Country Population
Guatemala 14,533,035
Honduras 7,601,144
El Salvador 7,185,817
Nicaragua 5,870,577
Costa Rica 4,587,661
Panamá 3,534,410
Source: Centro Centroamericano de Población de la

Universidad de Costa Rica (CCP, 2010).
Table 6.2 HDI 2010–2011 in Central America and Mexico
Country World rank People in poverty

(% in 2008 and 2011)
Costa Rica 62 (2010) / 69 (2011) 23.9 (2008) / 21.7 (2011)

Panama 54 (2010) / 58 (2011) 36.8 (2008) / 32.7 (2011)
El Salvador 90 (2010) / 105 (2011) 30.7 (2008) / 37.8 (2011)
Nicaragua 115 (2010) / 129 (2011) 45.8 (2008) / 46.2 (2011)
Honduras 106 (2010) / 121 (2011) 50.7 (2008) / 60.0 (2011)
Guatemala 116 (2010) / 131 (2011) 51.0 (2008) / 51.0 (2011)
Mexico 56 (2010) / 57 (2011) 47.0 (2008) / 47.4 (2011)
Source: UNDP, 2010: 163–166; and UNDP, 2011: 145–148, 161–162.
“Guatemala and Nicaragua are the countries with the lowest Human
Development Index (HDI: Position 131 and 129, respectively), while
Panama and Costa Rica are located in higher positions (58 and 69
respectively)” (CA, 2011: 8). These HDI indicators are in a direct rela-
tion with the poverty situation of the region, which should be noted
when considering each particular country “in terms of poverty, Central
America is one of the regions where the poor in Latin American are
located. It is true that in Latin America the percentage of people in pov-
erty rises to 33.1 percent, but in Central America this percentage rises
to 50.8 percent. The greater percentage of people in poverty is located
in the countries of the CA4, with Honduras at the top (68.9 percent),
followed by Nicaragua (61.9 percent), Guatemala (54.8 percent) and El
Salvador (47.9 percent). Costa Rica and Panama are below the Central
American medium (18.9 percent and 25.8 percent respectively)” (CA,
2011: 5). The facts presented by in Central America in Figures (CA,
2011) are even more alarming in relation to poverty than the United
Nations Development Program (UNDP) in table 6.2 (2010 and 2011).
Panama and especially Costa Rica stand out because of a constant
migration from Nicaragua. The rest of Central America experiences
emigration as poverty, violence, and other factors push people toward
the north (Mexico and the United States) as they look for better oppor-
tunities in more developed countries. The unique solution proposed by
North America has been the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)
that has targeted the region through the bilateral treaties with the
United States known as the Central America Free Trade Agreement
(CAFTA). It is about a model of globalization that has swept up over
40 million people in the geographical waist of the America that has
Table 6.3 Central America: Average income per capita in 2009
Country Average income per capita in 2009 (US$)
Costa Rica 6398.00

El Salvador 3424.30
Guatemala 2684.30
Honduras 1916.00
Nicaragua 1069.60
Panama 6971.70
Central America 3199.20
Latin America 6975.60
Source: ECLAC, Anuario estadístico 2010. Tomado de CA, 2012: 8.
achieved economic growth, but has not surmounted the region’s prob-
lematic great inequality in the distribution of wealth. Another interest-
ing comparative example is the average income per capita in relation
to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP); it offers a great contrast among
the different countries, pointing again at Costa Rica and Panama as
those with greater income while Honduras and Nicaragua have the
lowest; the average annual income per capita in Central America is
US$3,199.20, which is considerably lower that the Latin American aver-
age of US$6,975.60 (see table 6.3).
Finally, we cannot avoid highlighting the deteriorating general secu-
rity and the fact that the Central American region is experiencing a
spiral of violence. As Ruben Aguilar observes, “The most violent region
of the world is Latin America, in particular Central America. In the for-
mer, the median crime rate for every 100,000 inhabitants is 25 and 44
in the latter. In 2006 it was nine in Mexico and in 2011 it reached 18.
The World Health Organization establishes that a rate of ten murders
for every 100,000 inhabitants is considered an epidemic, one of 20 as
a serious situation and above 30 as an extreme. That is the condition of
Central America. Violence is nothing new to the region; it has always
been present, but its growth has been exponential these recent years. In
Honduras there are 82.1 homicides for every 100,000 inhabitants; in El
Salvador 66; in Belize 41.7, and 21.6 in Guatemala. The exceptions are
Nicaragua, with just 13.2 and Costa Rica with 11.3 rates that are even
below Mexico, according to the UN” (Aguilar, 2012; emphasis origi-
nal). In this aspect, the most extreme area of Central America is located
in Honduras and El Salvador; however, the case of Nicaragua draws
one’s attention because while having a low socioeconomic condition and

a very low HDI (rank 129 in 2011), its public policies on security have
worked well producing a crime index similar to that of Costa Rica (rank
69 on the HDI of 2011).
Several political changes have taken place since the 1980s civil wars in
Central America and the creation of peace agreements; in the last decade
of the twentieth century and at the beginnings of the twenty-first cen-
tury, the political outlook of the national governments expressed itself
in the form of a predominance of oligarchic governments (Nicaragua
1990–2006; El Salvador since Napoleon Duarte in the decade of the
1980s through National Republican Alliance (ARENA) rule ending in
2009; Honduras and Costa Rica were known for their traditional bipar-
tisan between liberals and conservatives; Guatemala with its militarism
until 2007 despite its civil governments). In the first years of the twen-
ty-first century, Manuel Rojas Bolaños (2006), political sociologist of
the University of Costa Rica, predicted the reaffirmation of the Right
as the general political tendency of Central American governments.
Fortunately, this last prediction has not occurred and up to a cer-
tain point, we can talk about great political transformations and certain
reactivations of social and progressive movements that have been able to
express themselves in the midst of governmental 2 power positions even
inside the democratic electoral frame in Latin America. For the Central
American case, we have the following facts: in Guatemala, as a candi-
date during the presidential 2007 elections, the extreme Right General
Otto Pérez Molina wanted to impose an iron fist on the country but he
lost the presidential elections, and Alvaro Colom, a social democratic,
won the presidency; although later on, in 2011, Otto Pérez became
president (defeated in the 2007 but victorious in 2011). In Honduras,
the conservative National Party (PNH, Partido Nacional de Honduras)
lost at the end of 2005 and the Liberal Party (PLH, Partido Liberal
de Honduras) won the presidency with Zelaya and then the govern-
ment joined the Bolivarian Ailliance for the Peoples of Our America
(ALBA) until the coup d’état that overthrew the constitutional presi-
dent Manuel Zelaya in June 2009. In Nicaragua, in 2006, Eduardo
Montealegre, the businessman of the Right, lost, while Daniel Ortega
of the FSLN (Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional) came back to
the presidency after several failed attempts; Ortega also was reelected
as president in 2011. In Costa Rica, the traditional bipartisan was
defeated: the Party of National Liberation (PLN, Partido de Liberacion
Nacional) won by a close margin of votes over a growing force that
called self Left; in El Salvador, the Farabundo Martí for National
Liberation Front (FMLN) was for some years the second political force
in the country until it finally won the 2009 presidential elections with
its candidate Mauricio Funes.
Nonetheless, we should highlight the particular case of Panama: the
traditional Right openly subordinated to the United States after the
invasion of December 20, 1989, governed the country until 2004, when
a Centrist tendency with Martin Torrijos (son of the General Omar
Torrijos, who was able to obtain an important signature on the Torrijos-
Carter treaty over the sovereignty transfer of the canal from the North
Americans to the Panamanians) won the presidential elections; but there
was a new change in the 2009 elections when the business-backed Right
put the new president Ricardo Martinelli in power. He reaffirmed his
association with the neoliberal model and the alliance with the United
States.
Having established the social, political, and economic framework
for the Central American region in the first decade of the twenty-first
century, we can now turn to an analysis of how the region is viewed
in the national security analysis of the United States with particular
emphasis on how it falls within the framework of “ungoverned spaces
and failed states.” As outlined in the introduction to this volume, the
idea of “ungoverned spaces” and “failed states” have been in the broad
lexicon of international relations terminology for many years, but only
in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, did they become cen-
tral to the foreign policy thinking of US authorities. It is important to
place these two concepts in a wider framework of US foreign policy
perspectives.
According to Vanaik (2010), in order to promote the world hege-
mony of the United States, six ideological indicators can be used that
can justify its imperial intervention: “The global war against terrorism,
the weapons of mass destruction in the wrong hands, failed states, the
need for compulsory external humanitarian intervention, the need to
change a government in the name of democracy, and the war against
drugs” (Vanaik, 2010: 10; emphasis original). In fact, in relation to the
topic of the failed states, wanting to indicate also the failure of diverse
national states, since the 2005 an index has been carried out by Fund
for Peace and Foreign Policy, where, year by year, nations around the
planet are ranked from the perspective of the failed state, utilizing the
following 12 indicators as variables:
Social indicators: (1) demographic pressures; (2) refugees and displaced

persons; (3) demonstrations and wrongs; (4) migrations maintained;
Economic indicators: (5) development with equity; (6) poverty and

opportunities;
Political indicators: (7) legitimacy of the state; (8) deterioration of pub-
lic services; (9) violation of human rights; (10) illegal apparatuses;
(11) division of the elites; and (12) threats to sovereignty.
Although the original aim was the justification of external intervention,

the concept has been serving also to analyze the solidity of a state inside
the nations that could contribute to a comparative vision: “The main
emphasis when the index makes the evaluation of each country is the
step that has been made historically in the search for the construction of
a capable state in order to comply with the laws in a uniform way. When
this objective is not achieved, then one sees high rates of criminality,
extreme corruption, an extensive informal market, an impenetrable
bureaucracy, a judicial inefficiency, the military interference in politics,
and those situations in which the society is obliged to rectify in its own
independent way the pending tasks that the state has not been able to
carry out with success” (Fund for Peace, 2012).
There is an index where all the states can be classified in 4 different
levels, according to scores from 0 to 120, where the behavior of the 12
variables indicated is analyzed: failed states, states on alert, moderated
states, and sustainable states. For the case of Central America, we can
see the rankings in table 6.4.
Certainly, the Central American states are not found in the category of
failed states (as are, e.g., Haiti and some African countries) but certainly
they enter the next level in states on alert, particularly if we look at the
cases of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. As in the case
of the HDI, the situation of Costa Rica and Panama is different, occupy-
ing a superior rank in this scoring as they did in human development.
Table 6.4 Fund for Peace failed state index
Country Ordinal ranking Points
Guatemala 70 79.4
El Salvador 93 74.4
Honduras 75 78.5
Nicaragua 69 79.6
Costa Rica 139 49.7
Panama 132 56.1
Source: The Fund for Peace, 2012.

Main Frontier Conflicts and Ungoverned Spaces

According to researcher David Sogge (2010), the concept of failed state
utilized specifically by the National Counsel of American Intelligence
leads also to a vision of conflict in regions of the world where the United
States feel obliged to intervene; in practice, the term implies a justifica-
tion for the intervention.
The concept can apply to a whole nation by the “constant preponder-
ance of States bothered by multiple problems and institutionally weak”
but it can also be utilized in order to visualize ungoverned spaces that
are “important extensions of territory and lacking of effective control
by the government” (Sogge, 2010). We can use this definition in order
to analyze certain territorial and maritime spaces in Central American
area, most of them in border zones, where the state institutions that are
not solid enough to take full control of the territory and population and
that give many opportunities for action by local organizations or the
intervention of external forces.
Since its origin, “Central America presents a series of disputes about
the definition of the borders, about territorial occupations, that have
been patrolled in different ways according negotiation of treaties, until
there is violent confrontation. Historically most of the disputes have
been resolved by means of a neutral referee or by a bilateral negotiation.
Nowadays, nevertheless, almost all the border conflicts in the region are
a continuation of incomplete arrangements or of pending disputes that
coincide with the intent of some groups who try to revive old conflicts
for their political advantage” (Orozco, 2001: 131).
Among the different territorial and maritime disputes found in
Central American history, one can distinguish those that pose a high
degree of confrontation because of the lack of definition of border and
maritime boundary between two or more nations or the lack of capacity
of national institutions in order to have an effective control of a terri-
tory already established.
Specially, we can talk about several cases as areas in dispute as
follows:
●● The maritime situation in the Gulf of Fonseca results from the

confluence of Honduran, Salvadoran, and Nicaraguan interests.
●● The lack of definition in the maritime line that separates Nicaragua
and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea where there are disputes not
only for the extraction of fish but also for plans to extract primary
resources from the ocean bed.
●● The dispute over the maritime boundary between Honduras and

Colombia due to the Archipelago of San Andres (Colombia took it
over since the nineteenth century); Nicaragua not only recognized
Colombian sovereignty over the Archipelago in 1928 (Esquerra-
Barcena treaty) but also claims its rights on various keys and spe-
cially its right to the maritime waters.
●● The specific case of the border between Nicaragua and Costa Rica,
where migration is widespread and especially where there are con-
flicts in two spots: a portion of the Calero Island and the environ-
mental consequences of the Crucitas mining project.
Another problem that we will not explain here, but which also should
be noted, is the case of Guatemala-Mexico border, where there is a con-
tinuous migration of Central Americans seeking Mexican territory as
a gateway to reach the United States. This border is the focus of the
chapter by Daniel Villafuerte.
Specially, the cases located in the Caribbean Sea (Honduras-
Nicaragua, Colombia-Honduras-Nicaragua, and Nicaragua–Costa
Rica) are maritime and geographical spaces conducive to drug traffick-
ing not only because of the lack of capacity of national institutions for
their defense but especially because of the lack of exact delimitation of
a maritime boundary. In contrast, in the Pacific Ocean in the Gulf of
Fonseca, there are international institutions that have helped with the
recognition of national sovereignty on several islands there,3 admitting
also the recognition of common rights on the gulf belonging to the
three neighboring countries (El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua),4
in a situation where war and military conflicts between insurgents and
government seem left behind.
Focusing on the three cases in the Caribbean, their status as naviga-
tion space for the distribution of drugs was intensified in the late 1980s
when “Colombia became the center of the finished product and export
base for supplying over 70 percent of the cocaine entering the United
States” (Garcia Hoyos, 2007: 122). The estimates for the overall numbers
follow: “The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
estimates 1,100 tons of annual production of cocaine. All is produced
in Peru, Colombia and Bolivia. From that total, about 170 tons of pure
cocaine is seized in the producing countries. That going to foreign mar-
kets is some 930 tons” (Aguilar, 2012). From this, annually about 500
tons are allocated to the United States, the main consumer. “Since 2006,
according to the DEA [Drug Enforcement Agency], 90 percent of the
cocaine entering the United States does by way of Mexico—50 percent
by land from Central America, 30 percent by sea and 10 percent by
air. The predominance of this corridor began in 2000. The Colombian
cartels preferred the Caribbean, used since the late 1970s . . . In 2003,
the proportion was 77 percent through Central America-Mexico and
22 percent through the Caribbean” (Aguilar, 2011). The numbers of the
US International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) for 2012 are
worse: “The United States estimates that approximately 95 percent of
the cocaine leaving South America for the United States moves through
the Mexico and Central America corridor” (INCSR, 2012).
The same is confirmed by the United Nations: according to the
UNODC (2012), the majority of Colombian cocaine is transported
into the United States using land and sea areas of Central America and
Mexico. But the US report is more specific and directly points to the
importance of one country: “Honduras remained a primary transship-
ment point for cocaine destined for the United States in 2011 . . . the
United States estimated that 79 percent of all cocaine smuggling flights
departing South America first land in Honduras” (INCSR, 2012).
Maybe some ideas about the ineffectiveness of some states’ control
over their own territory may apply particularly to Honduras, where
not only the democratic order has been broken with the coup d´état in
June 2009 but mainly because the government is unable to have insti-
tutions capable of guaranteeing a minimum stability, particularly in
some territories that seem ungoverned: “Criminal organizations oper-
ating in Honduras are ruthless, well-armed, well-funded, and logisti-
cally adept.” Conversely, the Honduran government “lacked expertise,
resources, and a complete legal framework to effectively counter the
threat” (INCSR, 2012).
In the case of the Republic of Nicaragua, we also found an important
drug transshipment point for South American cocaine flowing to North
America, and a country that also lacked resources and a lack of control
over state institutions, especially in the East Coast autonomous regions.
The drug, weapons, and money trafficking organizations have come to
establish clandestine laboratories, warehouses, and safe houses, getting
support in many instances from local population groups that offer logis-
tical support, with increasing use of women and children for transpor-
tation. The Nicaraguan police do their work with limited resources, “in
2011, Nicaragua’s civilian and military law enforcement units disrupted
18 DTO [Drug Trafficking Organizations] operations throughout the
country, including operations in the strategically important autono-
mous regions of the Caribbean coast. Security forces dismantled DTO
logistical structures; seized drugs, currency and small arms; destroyed
clandestine airstrips; and confiscated vehicles, aircraft, vessels and

livestock. Nicaragua protected its territory as best it could with lim-
ited resources and while able to deter some DTOs from Nicaraguan
littoral waters, many continue to use these maritime routes” (INCSR,
2012). The same US report specifically recognizes the frontier between
Nicaragua and Costa Rica as a porous border because there is a lack of
control by both governments, a situation that was aggravated by the
conflict over Calero Island since October 2010.
Along with the description of the aggravated border issue at the end
of 2010 (which did experience a brief pause during 2011 when both gov-
ernments accepted a shared analysis and resolution of the problem based
on decisions by the International Court of Justice), it is necessary to rec-
ognize the entire territory of the mouth of San Juan River as a transter-
ritorial border space. Due to the distance from their respective central
governments that do not have enough institutional capacity to reach all
corners of their territory, and due to the lack of permanent population
willing to settle there, the territory has turned into a base of continued
drugs and arms trafficking operations. That territory is also attached to
other transborder issues of a maritime character because there is a dis-
pute in the Caribbean over the sea limits among Nicaragua, Colombia,
and Honduras that make the vigilance of drug trafficking impossible.
In fact, the unwillingness of the government of Daniel Ortega to with-
draw the army from the region was due to the possibility of abandoning
the entire region to the hands of the drug lords, who, according to many
sources, have a strong basis:
Drug trafficking is very active in Central America, especially now with

the fight between the Mexican State and the drug cartels. According to
the United States, the isthmus that goes from Colombia to Mexico is a
great territory dominated by the drug lords and the organized crime. The
Nicaraguan agenda of the White House has been focusing in the last
years on the fight against drug trafficking, while it has been very careful
with the political issue. Costa Rica has transformed itself from a country
of drug trafficking transit to an important drug trafficking base of oper-
ations with increasing infiltration by the Mexican cartels, as was noted
by Phillip Springer, the DEA spokesman in San José. The drug lords
involved themselves in the conf lict with the government of Managua
stated that the military personnel deployed in the area under dispute had
been conducting antinarcotics operations. It talked about an operation
against a gang of drug lords operating in Honduras, Costa Rica and
Colombia, known as Los Tarzanes, from which nothing has been heard
ever after. At a given time, Costa Rica rejected these arguments and
increased its number of police officers, based on Nicaragua’s increas-

ing military presence. When the Costa Rican government asked its
congress, in mid-December, to authorize American speed boats to enter
Costa Rican waters with the intend of fighting the drug lords, red lights
went on in Managua because they were associated such authorization
as an alliance in the border conf lict, and as the beginning possible U.S.
military assistance due to the lack of Costa Rican capacity. Costa Rica
denied the accusation saying that it was just a drug trafficking problem.
After the OAS resolution of, Ortega argued that the drug lords in charge
of the external affairs of Costa Rica resisting the presence of troops in
Portillos Island, and that the border conf lict is a zone of a continuous
international drug trafficking activity as an attempt is made at establish-
ing a route between Colombia and the US, passing through Panama and
Costa Rica. (Malamud and Encina, 2011: 6)
In this border conflict, it remains quite clear because of the role played
by the United States that there is no place for a neutral referee especially
because there are different political tendencies in confrontation by two
different kinds of governments: “One simple issue stands out: the two
countries’ alliances. Costa Rica’s government is aligned with U.S. impe-
rialism. Nicaragua is a member of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples
of Our America or ALBA, which includes Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia,
Ecuador, Nicaragua, Dominica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and
Antigua and Barbuda. The U.S. State Department considers ALBA hos-
tile to U.S. interests” (Joubert-Ceci, 2010).
Another particular element of permanent conflict that we must add
in the case of the Nicaragua–Costa Rica border is the problem of migra-
tion of varying intensity, which is comparable to other more troubled
cases in the world such as the Mexico-US border or that of Germany-
Turkey or that of the Mediterranean sea between Africa and the south
of Europe. This conflict represents two different realities for the same
neighborhood. In economic development, we have seen the distance
between Nicaragua and Costa Rica in the 2011 HDI caused a massive
symbolic attraction from one side with better standard of living (Costa
Rica) relating to the inhabitants of the Nicaraguan side, which is a more
unstable and poorer country. Since the year 2000, the census of Costa
Rica found 226,374 Nicaraguan origin people inside the national terri-
tory (Castro V., 2002). This is a number that has been rising, reaching
nearly half a million people years later (although some extreme analysts
imagine 800,000 and even 1 million Nicaraguans in Costa Rica): in
spite of any exaggerations, “the analysts and members of the commu-
nity Academic that investigate the migration reckon that in the peak
of the year in which there are more Nicaraguan people in Costa Rica
(January–May), there should be 400–450 thousand” (Envío, 2006).
Military Assistance
The military assistance to the Central American region can be a good
indicator of the course of North American politics, which now utilizes
two key arguments: first, to maintain the economic covenants of CAFTA
promoting free trade that allows the continuing extraction of natural
resources from the region and selling US manufactured products and,
second, putting great importance in the international arena on the fight
against drug trafficking that, being a real problem, has been handled
with a US strategy that does not diminish US domestic consumption.
Instead, it tries to stop the supply by means of unusual violence through
giving equipment, training, and North American weapons, with most
of the deaths occurring outside of the United States. In the Central
American area, particularly on the Caribbean Coast, the ungoverned
spaces become a good place for the illegal commerce of drugs going to
the United States and Europe. For this reason, there is a special focus
on North American politics:
In the context of new political forces in all Latin America, with the
growth of the drug trafficking, the organized crime and violence, espe-
cially in the three Central American countries (Honduras, El Salvador,
and Guatemala) and Mexico, the North American government is rede-
fining its security politics in Central America. There is not a completely
new politics, but a continuation and redefinition of politics already
in practice, such as (i) Plan Colombia; and (ii) The Mérida Initiative,
both centered on regional security, the battle against terrorism and the
strengthening of the military and security forces. At present, since the
North American administration has spoken about the Central America
Plan when William Brownfield, Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, visited the region
in February 16 2012. This Plan would follow on the heals of the Central
America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI).5 (CESPAD, 2012: 9)
The total of North American aid in recent years to Central American

governments shows sufficient data for an analysis of the great impor-
tance that the United States is giving to the region and especially to
Honduras after the 2009 coup d’état (see table 6.5).
From these figures, the CESPAD analysts note the following tenden-
cies: “Reading this data, we conclude the following: i) The decreasing
Table 6.5 Military and police assistance from the United States to Central America 2008–
2013 (US$ millions)
Countries 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Honduras 12.8 7.8 6.7 9.5 8.0 10.0

Guatemala 6.2 5.2 17.9 21.8 15.8 13.0
El Salvador 10.3 8.4 7.0 8.5 5.4 6.0
Nicaragua 4.8 7.0 3.1 4.4 5.3 5.2
Costa Rica 2.8 1.7 2.5 3.5 3.9 4.9
Source: http://justf.org/All_Grants_Country.
importance of the Guatemala government as a recipient of police and

military aid; ii) The participation of the government of Costa Rica is
growing; iii) The reduction of such aid to government of El Salvador;
iv) The relatively stable participation of the Nicaragua government; and
v) The rebound and then increase of Honduran military and police
assistance after the coup d’etat. Keeping in mind the previous data and
measuring the frequency of the visits of senior U.S. officials in recent
months to the country, we can conclude that, Honduras, as it was in
the eighties, is becoming a key piece in the north-American strategy
in the region” (CESPAD, 2012: 10). It is also strange to note that in
spite of presently counting President Porfirio Lobo a privileged associ-
ate of the North Americans through military and police assistance, the
INCSR (2012) itself considers, as already mentioned, that 79 percent
of the secret contraband flights coming from South America land in
Honduras as a transit point. Further, while the criminal bands are well
equipped and financed, the Honduras government lacks resources and
experience to such a degree that they have little or no effectiveness,
especially in the marine and terrestrial ungoverned spaces.
The context of the drug trafficking has caused the North American
government to consider the battle against drugs—along with the fight
against terrorism—a foreign policy priority. Nevertheless, besides
violently proceeding to control demand and consumption in its own
national territory, the United States elected to try to stop the supply.
This is done through not only direct operations but also more indi-
rectly by supporting governments—like that of Mexico lead by Felipe
Calderon—despite the social costs generated by the violence. The main
allies of the United States for Central America in this strategy are found
in the governments of Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama.
In reality, the North American foreign policy against terrorism and
drugs is a way to intervene everywhere to safeguard its own interests

through an imperialist foreign policy.
For the case of Central America, the governments of Nicaragua and
El Salvador—led at present by Leftists—are making big efforts in the
battle against drugs, even though they are not supported with as many
US resources as the current Rightist rulers in Honduras (Porfirio Lobo)
and Costa Rica (Oscar Arias and Laura Chinchilla), who much more
aptly subordinate their national politics to the alliances with the United
States.
Conclusions
Through contemporary history, we see that Central America, after
almost two centuries of independence, has yet to define with preci-
sion its borders and, besides, various countries—very near to the status
of failed states—are shown to have weak state institutions and diverse
maritime and territorial spaces that are ungoverned. If there are states
without solid institutions and they do not come to control the total-
ity of their territory, the border conflicts, then, are such that they can
cause open disputes or political-military clashes related to the possible
appropriation of natural resources. Such spaces also can be contested for
their strategic value in international drug trafficking, especially if they
are on the Central American route used to transport illegal substances
to the United States. The presence of the neighboring states is respected
not as a possible contribution or the basis for integration action but as
a potential danger that fans the nationalism of the government and
of the nation’s inhabitants. The reality is that such real factors move
the nations away from the integration processes. The US government
plans its intervention perfectly in all this context of national confron-
tation with its own economic interests, which protect such a capitalist
framework through very uneven commercial exchange that continues to
prompt discord among Latin American nations as Rightist tendencies
are supported with enormous resources as they battle against Leftist
governments.
There have been border conflicts that have ended in war as occurred
between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969; there were also military
clashes during the first phase of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua
(1979–1990), when the Nicaraguan counterrevolution supported by the
United States operated from Honduran territory and Costa Rica. There
has also been police involvement in the maritime dispute in the Gulf of
Fonseca. Nevertheless, even without an open war, the diplomatic ten-

sion is still high, especially between Nicaragua and Honduras over their
maritime border (also involving Colombia from time to time); among
Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras over establishing the limit of
the maritime limits in the Gulf of Fonseca; and between Nicaragua
and Costa Rica over the navigation and dredging in the San Juan River
and its mouth to the Caribbean and over the territorial portion on the
north of Calero Island. The clash over these conflicts does not favor
regional development especially when Costa Rican officials have come
to call neighboring Nicaragua a hostile nation, and they have accused
the Nicaraguan migrants of being the cause of the delinquency and
social problems inside of Costa Rica.
Nevertheless, in specific moments, the national disputes over border
spaces as taken on by the national governments create popular feeling
that support governmental leaders facing their neighbors. There is also
a lack of understanding caused by ideological differences in politics
in regard to different development projects, in addition to the explicit
alliance of the United States with the Costa Rican government and its
distancing from the Sandinist Nicaragua government.
In spite of all, there is stronger collaboration among Guatemala,
El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, which is quite different from
more economically developed Costa Rica and Panama. The concept
of Central America commonalities exists, but the national narratives
of each country have created identities that are prone to territorial
conf licts and differences by the political tendencies in each govern-
ment. Unfortunately, the current different political tendencies in the
area (on the Right: Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama,
and on the Left: El Salvador and Nicaragua) represent a big opportu-
nity for North American intervention in favor of the first and against
the second, thus pulverizing the efforts at regional integration and
continuing to guarantee an unjust international order that contin-
ues giving enormous profits to North America, in order to counteract
the depressive circumstances of a deep economic crisis (Petras et al.,
2004). On the other hand, the failed fight against drug trafficking
also represents another big opportunity for North American inter-
vention that, inside illegal drug activity trafficking especially in the
ungoverned spaces in the region, decides about the unilateral way of
giving military and police assistance to each government, wanting
to put conditions on the international aid favoring its own imperial
interests.
Notes
1. During mala, the Spanish Colony, this Captaincy General, was also called
the Kingdom of Guatemala, and was divided into five provinces in 1821:
Ciudad Real de Chiapas, Guatemala, San Salvador, Comayagua, and
Nicaragua–Costa Rica. With the exception of Chiapas, which became on
September 14, 1821, the nineteenth state of the Mexican Union through a
popular plebiscite, the rest of the provinces became the Federal Republic of
Central America in 1824.
2. It is about a tendency in Latin America, especially after the results of the
presidential electoral processes of 2005–2008, in which under the same elec-
toral democratic norms we find the rise of Leftist governments. An outlook
of this regional tendency is found in the book of Ignacio Medina Núñez
(2009) Presidential Elections in Latin America: The Ascent of an Heterogeneous
Left, published by elaleph, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
3. Nowadays, there is recognition of state sovereignty over most of the islands
in the gulf, but there are some unresolved issues such as the Conejo Island.
4. This was a decision from the International Court of Justice in The Hague in
1992, which was accepted by the three countries: a shared sovereignty over
the waters of the Gulf of Fonseca.
5. The same source says that CARSI project is more ambitious than pure drug
control: the target being “i) Create safe streets for the citizens of the region,
ii) disrupt the movement of criminals and contraband within and between
the Central American countries, iii) support the development of strong gov-
ernment, capable and responsible in Central America; iv) Re-establish effec-
tive state presence and security in communities at risk, and, v) Promoting
higher levels of security coordination and cooperation and the rule of law
among the countries of the region.” As clearly pointed by Robinson Salazar
in various studies, these measures in the real life have led to broader actions:
the assassination of Leftist leaders or leaders of social movements that chal-
lenge state policies, and advising local security forces in the counterinsur-
gency strengthening governments related to the designs of the empire.
Works Cited
Aguilar Valenzuela, Rubén (2012, March 6). Violencia en Centroamérica. En
Animal Político: http://bit.ly/w9swy1.
Aguilar Valenzuela, Rubén (2011, December 13). La ruta de la cocaína a Estados
Unidos. En Animal Político. http://bit.ly/sMB9gX.
CA (2011). Centroamérica en cifras. Datos de seguridad alimentaria nutricio-
nal y agricultura familiar. Diciembre de 2011. Ediciones de la FAO (PESA
Centroamérica), Iniciativa América Latina y Caribe sin hambre, AECID, Unión
Europea, PRESANCA II, PRESISAN, SICA.
Castro Valverde, Carlos (2002). Migración nicaragüense en Costa Rica: población,

empleo y necesidades básicas insatisfechas. Informe final de investigación.
Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales. Sede académica Costa Rica. 5
diciembre de 2002.
CCP (2010). Centro Centroamericano de Población. Universidad de Costa Rica.
http://ccp.ucr.ac.cr/.
CESPAD (2012). Informe de Análisis Político prospectivo. Honduras ¿Ruptura o per-
sistencia del bipartidismo tradicional? Escenarios probables 2013–2014. Edición
del Centro de Estudios para la Democracia (CESPAD). Autor: Gustavo Irías.
Mayo 2012. Tegucigalpa: Financiado por OXFAM Internacional.
ECLAC, Anuario estadístico 2010. Publicacion de las Naciones Unidas, Nuena York.
Envío (2006). Los imprescindibles migrantes nicas y la impresentable ley que
los afectará. Revista Envío. Número 289. Abril 2006. UCA: Universidad
Centroamericana, en Managua, Nicaragua http://www.envio.org.ni.
Estado de la Región (2008). Desarrollo Humano Sostenible 2008. Un informe desde
Centroamérica para Centroamérica. Programa Estado de la Nación, en Costa
Rica. http://www.estadonacion.or.cr/estadoregion2008/index.htm.
The Fund for Peace (2012). The failed states index, 2012. consultado el September
20, 2012, http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi.
García Hoyos, Juan Carlos (2007). De la coca a la cocaina. Una historia por contar.
Bogotá: Editorial Universidad del Rosario.
INCSR (2012, March 7). International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.
Washington, DC: Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs.
Joubert-Ceci, Berta (2010, December 5). U.S. role in Costa Rica-Nicaragua border
dispute. Workers world. http://www.workers.org.
Malamud, Carlos, & Encina, Carlota García (2011). El conflicto fronterizo entre
Costa Rica y Nicaragua: ¿medio ambiente, soberanía, narcotráfico o mero
instrumento electoral? Real Instituto Elcano. No. 22. February 7, 2011.
Medina Núñez, Ignacio (2009). Elecciones presidenciales en América Latina. El
surgimiento de una izquierda heterogénea. Ediciones elaleph. Buenos Aires,
Argentina.
Managua, Nicaragua.
Petras James, Vasapolio, & Veltmeyer, Casadio (2004). Imperio con imperialismo. La
dinámica globalizadora del capitalismo neoliberal. Editorial de Ciencias Sociales,
Cuba.
Sogge, David (2010). Hay algo ahí fuera: debilidad estatal como pretexto impe-
rial. In Achin Vanaik (ed.), Casus Belli: cómo los Estados Unidos venden la guerra,
editado por el Transnational Institute, eBooks, con el permiso de Interlink
Publishing Group, Massachusetts, Estados Unidos. pp. 198–222.
UNODC (2012). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC): http:
//www.unodc.org/.
Vanaik, Achin (ed.) (2010). Casus Belli: cómo los Estados Unidos venden la guerra.
Edición del Transnational Institute, eBooks, con el permiso de Interlink
Publishing Group, Massachusetts, Estados Unidos. Ver el capítulo escrito
por Achin: “Terrorismo político y el proyecto imperial estadounidense.”
pp. 100–122.
CHAPTER 7
Security Issues on the Mexico-

Guatemala Border and Their
Relationship to the New National
Security Policy of the United States
Daniel Villafuerte Solís
Introduction
Since the beginning of President Barack Obama’s administration in
2009, a series of summits and agreements have been organized owing
to the concern over violence and security in Central America, particu-
larly in Guatemala. The year 2011 was especially significant regarding
Central American security issues. In April 2011, the creation of two
military bases in Chiapas, a Mexican state bordering Guatemala, was
announced. In May, the Organization of American States (OAS) secre-
tary general issued an alert on the seriousness of criminality prevailing
in Central America and its possibilities to worsen if criminal organi-
zations continued to establish their operations in this region, where
countries are weaker and smaller compared to Mexico and Colombia.
On June 22 and 23, the Central American Security Conference was
held in Guatemala; 110 representatives attended the conference, among
them Spain, the United States, Canada, the OAS, the World Bank, and
the Inter-American Bank figured prominently. These events were not
only significant but also emblematic of a larger picture of wider security
issues.

114 l Daniel Villafuerte Solís
This article will discuss the strategic significance that the Central
American region has for US homeland security. In a more specific way,
it is the border between Guatemala and Mexico that will be examined.
This border has been declared as an ungovernable area by the US gov-
ernment. It is a region where criminal organizations have been operating
for many years, and it is these operations that are ultimately perceived
as threatening US homeland security. The Mexico-Guatemala border
has witnessed important population displacements due to different
events; one of these was the civil war that occurred in the early 1980s
when people crossed into Mexico to escape repression at the hands
of the Guatemala government. After the peace agreements that were
signed in 1996, a different transnational migratory wave took place in
the area of persons seeking better economic prospects in the United
States. This phenomenon was considered threatening for US home-
land security by the American government. Also, during the past years,
the growth of drug trafficking and weapon smuggling have become
part of this phenomenon, a situation that has created great concerns
in the Mexican and US governments. Right after the September 11,
2001, attacks, Washington, DC, decided to restructure its homeland
security system and the Mexican and Central American governments
were forced to reinforce surveillance all along their borders. The south
border of Mexico and the northern Guatemalan counterpart became an
important issue in the agenda of the American government. However,
this fact contrasts significantly with the weaknesses shown by local
institutions that have been invaded by such criminal organizations and
therefore limits the ability of both Mexico and Guatemala to meet the
expectations of its neighbors to the north.
The Geographic and Demographic Area of the

Northern Border of Guatemala
The border between Guatemala and Mexico spans 963 kilometers, of
which 665 kilometers are shared with the State of Chiapas and the rest
with the State of Tabasco. The Guatemalan border departments are
San Marcos, Huehuetenango, Alta Verapaz, and Petén; together they
comprise an approximate extension of 64,109 square kilometers, which
is approximately 58.9 percent of the country’s area; the department of
Petén is 35,854 square kilometers, which makes it the biggest one and it
represents 32.9 percent of the bordering departments.
According to the Instituto Nacional de Estadística de Guatemala
[National Statistics Institute of Guatemala], 32.9 percent of the country’s
Security Issues l 115
population lives in the border departments; this represents in absolute

figures 4,724,156 inhabitants. The demographic density varies in every
department, but two extreme figures can be found: San Marcos, with
267.7 inhabitants per square kilometer and Petén, with 17.1 inhabit-
ants per square kilometer; the national average is 131.9 inhabitants per
square kilometer.
The departments that have the busiest border interaction are
Huehuetenango and San Marcos. Both have had strong interactions
with the Soconusco region for many decades (an important region in
the State of Chiapas). This has happened because there is an agricul-
tural labor market that needs a large number of workers, especially
for the coffee and sugarcane crops. This has expanded over some new
working areas during the last years, including the commerce and con-
struction industries. During the January–November 2011 period, the
National Migration Institute gave 29,101 visas for border workers from
Guatemala; of which, 17,889 were issued in Talisman—a border point
on the Mexican side opposite El Carmen that belongs to the depart-
ment of San Marcos. Another example can be found in the informa-
tion resulting from a survey carried out during 2007 that examines the
migratory flows between Mexico and Guatemala. It states that out of
450,427 migrants, 434,076 of them came from the department of San
Marcos and 51,031 from Huehuetenango (INM-CONAPO-COLEF-
SER-STPS, 2009).
Petén is geographically the northernmost department of Guatemala
and for decades, it had remained quite isolated; as a result, the border
interactions with Mexico were not relevant. Yet, the construction of
the freeway that connects the Mexican municipality of Tenosique—in
the State of Tabasco—with the administrative center of Petén favored a
significant increase in the border crossings.1 During the second part of
the first decade of 2000, the migratory flows coming from Guatemala,
El Salvador, and Honduras increased in a very significant way due to
the reinforcement of the traditional crossings in the State of Chiapas
and also because of the contingency created by Hurricane Stan that
destroyed an important part of the railroads that were used as a means
of transportation by irregular transit migrants coming from Central
America and from some countries in South America.
During the recent years, Petén has become a very important border
area for National Security. Halfway through 2006, the presence in the
area of drug trafficking groups in the department of Petén became a
common thing. An Associated Press (AP) press release, published by
the Chiapas newspaper Cuarto Poder, indicated the presence of drug
dealers in the Biosfera Maya Reserve, located in Petén. The press release
mentioned the actions performed by the Guatemalan army in this area;
for example, the destruction of an illegal landing strip that was used
by drug dealers to land light aircraft loaded with cocaine coming from
South America. The infantry captain in charge of the patrol declared to
the news agency that they had been in the jungle for 28 days when they
were able to spot the mentioned landing strip. The colonel in charge
of the “Fuerza de Tarea Interinstitucional del Norte” stated, “This is a
small blow to drug trafficking in terms of money, especially when we
are referring to guys that can afford to set fire to their aircraft right
after downloading their drug cargos . . . what really matters is that we
are destroying their landing strips” (Cuarto Poder, June 4, 2006). This
area was described as ungovernable by the then chief of the US South
Command, General Bantz Craddock.
Fundamentals of the Guatemala-Mexico Border

A few years after the beginning of the twenty-first century, what
was known about the southern Mexican border was rather limited.
Monteforte (1997) underscored this by saying,
One of the most dangerous and f lagrant setbacks in Guatemalan policy

is the unknown aspects of what is really going on in the border area with
Mexico. The few specialized studies written on the subject just pile up
without being translated, becoming mere treaties and bilateral agree-
ments that lack of any follow up; or at the most, they simply deal with
current topics with diplomatic rhetoric. Yet, it is undeniable that these
works were made with good intentions.
Five years after Monteforte’s work was published, a book edited by

Jacob Dardon was released, sponsored by the Latin American School of
Social Sciences, located in Guatemala. This book makes a study of the
Mexico-Guatemala border, focusing on the Guatemalan municipalities
of the border zone shared with Mexico. Several other topics are also
discussed in this book, including the handling of natural resources,
population, poverty, investment, trade, and migration. It is, as a whole,
a fundamental book for understanding the dynamics of the northern
Guatemalan border and it can be used to make a geopolitical analysis.
César Ordóñez’s book, The Economic Integration Tendencies in
Guatemala and the Southeast of Mexico, was published in 2006. It ana-
lyzes the border cooperation experiences in Latin America based on a
macroanalysis and it discusses the possibilities for cooperation between
Guatemala and Mexico. This work makes a big contribution by giving

interesting ideas for reflection. These ideas mainly express the poten-
tiality, but at the same time, the obstacles that are contained in the
concept “border effect.”
How much progress has been made in learning about the bor-
der between Guatemala and Mexico? The honest answer is a limited
amount. This is a serious situation due to the fact that the area has
become very important in terms of geopolitics. Whatever is know is
definitely partial and fragmented when it comes to some very specific
topics. There is a remarkable lack of an articulated understanding of
border dynamics. At the most, what is best known is what happens in
some very specific places that are characterized by the busy transit of
people and goods, such as La Mesilla in Huehuetenango department
Tecún-Umán and El Carmen, both located in the department of San
Marcos, all in Guatemala. Besides these locations, the information
is almost nonexistent. The department of Petén is part of the Mayan
World project, because of the significance of its archaeological site Tikal
and its tropical forest. Despite the latter, very little is known about the
border dynamics of Petén, although during the recent years the media
has promoted it because of the notoriety it has acquired due to the
transnational migratory phenomenon and because of the violence that
has broken out in the area, particularly during 2011.
The little existing information on this border area made Vautravers
(2005) carry out research on the border dynamics that prevailed
between the state of Tabasco, Mexico, and the department of Petén,
a Guatemalan province. It focused on four municipalities: Balancán
and Tenosique in Tabasco, Mexico, and La Libertad and San Andrés in
Petén, Guatemala. The research results describe essential indicators on
population, education, health, housing, infrastructure, and economy.
The author presents a historical summary of the information on the
border and at the end, makes an analysis of the agreements between
Mexico and Guatemala—emphasizing the Mayan World project and the
Puebla-Panama plan, which has been renamed as Proyecto Mesoamérica
[Mesoamerica Project] and its effects on the border dynamics.
Despite the considerable gaps in the knowledge of the border reality of
Guatemala and Mexico, the US Agency for International Development
(USAID), which was created in 1961, has worked in practically all its
departments. USAID’s commitment to working in the region is stated
as follows:
Guatemala is the largest country in Central America in terms of econ-

omy and population and it plays an essential role in trade and regional
integration. It is the third country with the biggest inequality in the world
in terms of income distribution and therefore it is a land of contrasts; it
has big natural and cultural resources and approximately 58 percent of
its population lives in poverty. 2
Behind the presence of this US government agency, there are, certainly,

very important economic and geopolitical interests. The agency itself
expressed the latter declaring, “Currently, as President Bush’s National
Security Strategy states it, the work performed in this developing area
by the USAID goes hand in hand with that of the Department of
Defense, as one of the three key pillars of the foreign policy structure
of the nation.”3 In a recent report, the American embassy in Guatemala
declares,
The United States and the Guatemalan government have very close bilat-
eral affairs and they have collaborated in many areas to strengthen the
governmental institutions of Guatemala, in order to develop a technical
capacity. However, in 2010, the security situation continues to worsen.
The permanent incursion of Mexican cartels in the border regions,
including the Zetas, led to a series of violent confrontations among rival
organizations. Guatemala is also being hounded by a group of transna-
tional delinquency, including human and weapons trafficking and an
increase in juvenile gangs.4
This declaration provides the justification for renewed contemporary

interest in the border region placed within the overarching framework
of “ungoverned spaces” and “failed states.”
The Geopolitical Dimension and the

Economic Interests of the Border Area
As we have seen, the presence of the United States in Guatemala, through
the presence of its agencies, has increased over a long time; however, in
recent years it has become more evident. In 1988, still during the civil
war, Alvaro Arzú’s administration established what was called the Plan
Maya Jaguar [Jaguar Mayan Plan]. Although, the decree that establishes
the terms of such plan was never published in the official journal, it is
known that it was created to fight drug trafficking. It is a plan that
authorizes the presence of US military forces in the Guatemalan oceans,
as well as in its air space and on land.
Although it has been claimed that the Plan Maya Jaguar was cre-
ated because of the presence of drug trafficking organizations, there
are several more reasons that justify its implementation. One of these
is the complex sociopolitical aspect that had turned this large area into
an “ungovernable” region, mainly because of the presence of different
groups: human traffickers, illegal occupants, archaeological looters,
illegal loggers, and more recently, drug traffickers. Several threats have
been identified in the Mayan Biosphere5 by the Guatemalan govern-
ment, among which the following stand out: (1) fires; (2) oil exploration
and exploitation; (3) agriculture; (4) raising livestock; (5) incompatible
infrastructure; (6) irregular (unplanned) human settlements; and (7)
ungovernability. The National Council for Protected Areas (CONAP)
is an organization in charge of the management of the national reserve,
but unfortunately it only has 30 percent of the necessary personnel to
operate and this situation prevents it from stemming the advancement
of deforestation, invasions, and organized crime (refer to Peace Brigades
International, 2007: 6).
On the other hand, in June 2004, President Alfonso Portillo’s admin-
istration signed an agreement with Washington, DC, allowing the US
Navy to send marines to Guatemala. Likewise, in June and July 2004,
the Guatemalan government signed several agreements with the US
government within the framework of the cooperation program called
New Horizons 2004 that solidified security cooperation between the
two governments (Bauer, 2004).
As we shall see further on, the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, created renewed interest on the part of the US government with
respect to Latin American borders, particularly the border between
Guatemala and Mexico. This happened because the situation of the
northern Guatemalan border is very complex (every border depart-
ment has some specific problems, although they all share some common
issues). As an example of this, we can mention that there is not a solid
presence of the Guatemalan government in the region. For instance,
one of the most complex situations takes place in the department of
Petén, with several problems occurring simultaneously. It is a very big
territory and its total area is approximately 36,000 square kilometers. It
not only has the country’s lowest population density but also has plenti-
ful natural resources—tropical rainforest, oil, biodiversity, and water.
During the civil war, it witnessed a series of battles between the guer-
rilla and the forces of the Guatemalan army.6 In addition, this depart-
ment has been a region where a displaced population, victims of the
civil war, has lived for several years. Another aspect is what can be
called “the agricultural colonization” of its fertile lands, and last but
not least, is the fact that several transnational companies7 are operating
in this department. In recent years, more particularly since 2000, two

phenomena have occurred in this department: illegal drug trafficking
and transnational migration, both have been considered as a threat for
US homeland security.
There is also a very serious agricultural problem in Petén, which
became notorious right after the peace agreements were signed by the
end of 1996. This was experienced by the returning population. The
invasion of pieces of land has been acknowledged by authorities, as well
as the irregular status of several agricultural properties. In 2006, ten
estates were discovered in the National Property located in the central
area of the Laguna de Tigre and Sierra del Lacandón national forests.
The total area of these estates adds up to 16,371 hectares, which accord-
ing to local authorities, could be used to perform drug trading activi-
ties; at Laguna del Tigre alone, 67 illegal airplane runways were found
(refer to Brigadas Internacionales de Paz, 2007).
In September 2005, the Guatemalan press announced a drug seizure
of 430 kilograms of cocaine that took place in Vértice, Petén, and which
belonged to the Gulf Cartel. The presence of the criminal organiza-
tion called Los Mendoza was also announced and it was stated that
it had been operating in the region since 1988. It is believed that this
organization controls one-third of the total territory of Petén and has
approximately five hundred armed men at its service. The drug bust,
valued at US$43 million, was part of the Plan Maya Jaguar (Lara and
Escobar, 2007).
San Marcos, another border department between Mexico and
Guatemala, also has a series of problems; apparently, the most repre-
sentative one is the transiting migration of Guatemalans and Central
Americans bound for Mexico and the United States. This is the part of
the border where the most crossings take place and where a big trade
exchange occurs. A mining concession located in this department has
also created a series of big problems. Locals are not happy with the
operations of this transnational company and they have even organized
a social movement against the mining industry. The Marlin mine,
according to official figures, produces 250,000 ounces of gold a year
and 3.5 million ounces of silver. This mining concession, located in
the municipalities of San Miguel Istahuacán and Sipacapa, 8 was estab-
lished in 2003 and exploitation began in 2005; it belongs to Montana
Exploradora, a subsidiary of the multinational Canadian God Corp.
The social movement has challenged the potential environmental
degradation that such operations can do to the region. On May 20,
2010, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR),
an autonomous organ of the OAS, asked the Guatemalan president,

Alvaro Colom, to temporarily order the suspension of operations in the
Marlin mine due to official reports concerning pollution, which were
filed by 18 neighboring communities. Almost a month later, on June
23, 2010, the Guatemalan government announced its decision to follow
the ruling made by the IACHR. Nevertheless, the ruling for suspend-
ing operations was not followed and one year later, the Ministerio de
Energía y Minas [The Energy and Mining Ministry], issued the official
resolution No. 0104, that established that “there is no reason to suspend
operations of Marlin I.” 9
On April 7, 2011, a group of 15 American congressmen sent a letter
to President Alvaro Colom; here is an excerpt of the text:
We urge you to immediately suspend operations at the Marlin mine and

address the ongoing human rights, health and environmental concerns
of the indigenous communities. As you are aware, eighteen Mayan com-
munities indigenous to the western highlands region have filed petitions
citing serious human rights, health, and environmental concerns relat-
ing to the Marlin mine. Local indigenous communities allege that it has
contaminated local water resources used for consumption and irrigation,
and that toxic pollutants from the mine have caused serious health prob-
lems among community members.10
As is obvious, there are several economic interests at stake, mainly because

the estimated annual income of the mine is around US$125 million.
The Guatemalan government has played an important role in allow-
ing several mining companies to continue to work in the Guatemalan
countryside and this is particularly true in the case of the Marlin mine.
The social movement opposing the mine has been criminalized and
this situation has fostered a repression campaign against the population
from the following communities: Livingston, San Juan, Sacatepéquez,
and Nueva Linda, among others. This repression occurs in the con-
text of a 1997 mining law passed during Alvaro Arzu’s administration.
This law favors the mining companies and limits the benefits that the
country could obtain from such activities. It is a law that contradicts
the Constitution of Guatemala and the terms of the agreement No.
169 with the International Labor Organization (ILO), ratified by the
Guatemalan government in 1996. Article 15 from the mining law states,
“the exploration licenses will be granted for up to 100 square kilometers
and the exploitation licenses will be given up to 20 square kilometers.
However, the Ministry will be able to grant exploration or exploitation
licenses for greater areas, whenever the importance of the project so

requires it. The latter has to be demonstrated with a technical-economic
study signed by a professional in such matters” (Guatemalan Mining
Law, Decree 48–97). Article 28 refers to the way in which the license
should be granted: “The Ministry shall grant the license of exploita-
tion, extension or cession of the license issuing for the corresponding
administrative resolution. Such license shall be granted for a period of
25 years, which shall be extended at the request of the interested parts,
up to one similar period. The period of the license shall be extended
with no further procedures, whenever the request may be filed before
it expires.”
In December 2008, the Commission on Energy and Mines of the
Guatemalan congress passed a bill on a new mining law that would
replace the 1997 law. However, the organizations that oppose the min-
ing industry rejected it as inadequate in July 2009 because according
to their assessment, it does not include the socioenvironmental impacts
and rejects the discussions that had been taking place in civil society.
The bill does not establish the obligation to consult indigenous com-
munities concerning the activities of the companies in the lands where
they are. The social and environmentalist sectors consider that the bill
gives unreasonable fiscal benefits to the mining companies and it estab-
lishes that the state should receive between 1 and 7 percent of the total
royalties, when they should be at least 10 percent of the value of the
extracted resources.
On December 4 and 5, 2009, a three-nation summit, among
Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala took place using the follow-
ing slogan: “Mining: a threat to life.” The Guatemalan committee was
made up of a group of antimining leaders that demanded the follow-
ing actions: (1) to abolish the current mining law, as long as a national
table of dialogue was not implemented; (2) to solve the murders of the
opposition leaders in the mining industry, by involving investigations
that should be done along with the International Commission against
Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), since they are considered high impact
crimes; (3) to stop issuing licenses, both for exploration and mining
exploitation in border areas with El Salvador and Honduras; (4) to
stop the harassment and forced purchase of pieces of land for metallic
and nonmetallic mining exploitation purposes in national and private
areas; (5) to avoid passing bills to reform the Guatemalan constitu-
tion, which is promoted by the oligarchic group Pro Reforma; and (6) to
impose regulations that demand environmental impact studies that can
consider the right of the lands of the communities and the communal
referendum.
New Intervention Initiatives

The September 11 attacks marked a new era in international affairs
in the eyes of the policymakers in Washington, DC. From that per-
spective, the redefinition of the security concept and the priority it
acquires in the international agenda creates an arena where every single
topic, including the economic and commercial ones, have to be gov-
erned by security agreements. Thus, in accordance with the security
policy defined by Washington, DC, in 2003, the OAS redefined the
concept of hemispheric security, which is expressed in the Declaration
on Security in the Americas:
Our new concept of security in the Hemisphere is multidimensional in

scope, it includes traditional and new threats, concerns, and other chal-
lenges to the security of the states of the Hemisphere, it incorporates the
priorities of each state, it contributes to the consolidation of peace, com-
prehensive development and social justice and it is based on democratic
values, respect for and promotion and defense of human rights, solidar-
ity, cooperation, and respect for national sovereignty. (OAS, 2003: 2)
However, what mostly concerns the US government is that Latin

America falls in line with its vision by acknowledging that the security
of the hemispheric states is being affected, to different extents, by tra-
ditional threats and by some new ones, in addition to other concerns
and some challenges that are different in nature. Such new threats are
expressed in the OAS document as follows:
1) Terrorism, transnational organized delinquency, the world drug prob-

lem, corruption, money laundry, the illegal traffic of weapons and the
connections among them; 2) Attacks to cyber-security; 3) The eventual
access to, possession and use of mass destruction weapons and its col-
lateral implications. (OAS, 2003: 4)
When it comes to the Central American region, for example, the imple-
mentation of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR)
was justified post September 11, 2001, as a security issue when in real-
ity it was an economic treaty long advocated by the United States
(Villafuerte, 2006). Its successful passage was a crucial political victory
for the Bush administration following the defeat of its broader proposal
for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).
The weight of commerce with the small Central American economies
in the American market represents a very poor percentage; that is why
it does not match the excessive interest of the American government in
approving a commercial agreement with the region. Nevertheless, the
US government promoted the idea that the Central American countries
would have big opportunities to become part of the world’s biggest mar-
ket; and by the way, these nations were already taking advantage of the
existing Caribbean Basin Initiative.
In May 2005, a particularly important meeting was held in
Washington, DC, headed by Donald Rumsfeld, the American secre-
tary of defense, and the following presidents: Henrique Bolaños from
Nicaragua; Ricardo Maduro from Honduras; Abel Pacheco from Costa
Rica; Oscar Beger from Guatemala; Antonio Saca from El Salvador; and
Leonel Fernández from the Dominican Republic. During the breakfast
meeting with the Central American and Dominican presidents, the US
defense secretary focused on the high levels of violence, drug trafficking
and extreme poverty that threaten the stability of the isthmus. Also dur-
ing the meeting, Rumsfeld mentioned that Guatemala was a key area of
transit to the North American drug market. The meeting was held as
part of a campaign to promote the Free Trade Treaty between the region
and the United States, in which the secretary of defense urged those
countries that had not ratified the treaty to do so as soon as possible
(Prensa Libre, May 12, 2005).
Another example of the significance of the security issue in the
agenda of the US government is the expansion of North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) into the Alliance for Security and Prosperity
Partnership of North America (ASPAN), which was signed in March
2005 by the presidents of Mexico and the United States and the prime
minister of Canada.11 Some years before, in 2002, the US government
had approved the program called Intelligent Borders, which implied
a series of commitments with Mexico regarding border security that
includes the border between Mexico and Guatemala.
The objectives of the ASPAN are to promote the prosperity of each of
the countries, regarding economy, trade, society, and safety. The joint
statement of the presidents says,
Our partnership will reach these objectives by making a three-party

effort in order to increase the security, the prosperity and the quality of
life for our peoples. This task will be carried out using the principle that
our security and our prosperity are mutually dependent and complemen-
tary, and it will ref lect our conviction in freedom, the economic oppor-
tunities and the values, thorough democratic institutions. Likewise, the
Alliance will contribute to consolidate our efforts, the North America
framework, so that we can face the economy and security challenges, and
promote the great potential of our peoples by considering the existing
regional disparities and increasing opportunities for everyone.12
The alliance seems to be covered with valid development purposes, both

economic and social, when it comes to decreasing the regional asym-
metries, as well as improving the quality of life of the population; how-
ever, beyond these stated intentions, the real concern is the security of
the United States. The following points are included in the agenda in
regard to this issue:
1) To implement common strategies for border security and bio-

protection; 2) to improve the protection of important infrastructure
and to implement a common reaction model before emergencies; 3) to
improvements in the air and sea security, to face extra-regional threats
and to improve the alliances regarding information and intelligence;
4) to implement a speeding up border strategy, in order to increase the
established capacity to improve the legal traffic of people and goods in
our borders.13
In the beginning of the twenty-first century, the border between Mexico

and Guatemala acquires big notoriety because of the presence of drug
trafficking and the growth of Central American migratory flows tran-
siting through Mexico. In this new framework, the operation of the
Closing of the Southern Border was implemented by the beginning
of 2000; a response of the US and Mexican governments to stop the
traffic of drugs at the southern border of Mexico. This operation took
place in the states of Chiapas and Tabasco that have a territorial area
of 30,783 square kilometers and a 300-kilometer coastline (Ramírez,
2000). A similar operation was carried out in the Yucatan Peninsula
that comprises the states of Campeche, Yucatan, and Quintana Roo;
this operation began in 1998 and covers a territorial area of 132,426
square kilometers and a coastline of 1,740 kilometers. In the context of
such an operation, on February 10, 1998, there was a meeting in Ciudad
Hidalgo—one of the border municipalities in Chiapas with the busiest
social and trade activities. The meeting was attended by the director of
the Office of National Drug Control Policy, Barry McCaffrey, along
with the American ambassador in Mexico, Jefrey Davidow, as well as
the Mexican attorney general, Jorge Madrazo Cuéllar and the district
attorney, Mariano Herrán Salvati.
The attorney general’s office of Mexico, the secretariat of the Interior
of Mexico, the Mexican Army and the Mexican Navy, the Fiscal and
Federal Police, the secretary of the Treasury, and the secretary of
Communication and Transportation, were all part of the Closing of
the Southern Border operation. The purpose of this operation was to
stop the trafficking of drugs and chemical precursors in Mexican terri-
tory bound for the United States. A few days before the September 11
attacks, the failure of the operation was recognized by the government
and to replace it, the operation called Plan South was put into effect,
later to be incorporated into ASPAN.
From the late 1980s, the drug trafficking issue was an important part
of the security agenda of the US administration but its approach began
to shift after September 11, 2001, from a primary focus on the Andean
region to a strategy that increasingly focused on both the Andean region
and Central America. It used to be said that Guatemala and Belize were
no longer “bridge” countries through which drugs were transported, but
that they had become warehouses where Colombian cocaine was being
stored. A report issued by the Narcotics Affairs Section of the American
embassy in Guatemala in 2002, described that country as follows:
Guatemala is the most eligible country in Central America to store and

to consolidate the shipping of cocaine bound for the U.S. The figures
given by the USG indicate that up to 400 metric tons of cocaine are
transported through Central America bound for Mexico and the U.S.,
from which almost half of it is transported through Guatemala. The
Guatemalan police agencies confiscated 2.4 metric tons of cocaine
in 2002. This showed a significant drop, compared to the 4.1 metric
tons confiscated the previous year; this amount was already lower than
those registered in the previous years. The Guatemalan Anti-Narcotics
Institution (DOAN) stole more than half of the cocaine that had been
seized, according to official records, and it was also involved in a series
of scandals before it was closed. The drug dealers continue to pay the
freight services using drugs, thus promoting the local consumption and
crime in the area. (NAS, 2002)
As can be seen, by 2002, there was enough evidence of the failure of

the strategy to fight drug trafficking in Guatemala. The institutions
in charge of controlling drugs, like the DOAN and the antinarcot-
ics police, were implicated in drug trafficking. The latter revelation
made the Guatemalan authorities dissolve the DOAN, and then, in
October 2002, the Analysis and Anti-Narcotics Investigation Service

(SAIA) started operations; eventually it would become a full govern-
ment ministry:
The corruption, the changes of police personnel, the poor leadership and
the lack of resources continue to haunt the police. Since the new admin-
istration inauguration, by the beginning of 2000, four different State
Secretaries have been appointed, seven National Civil Police Directors
(PNC) and eleven directors of the DOAN and SAIA. (NAS, 2002)
Despite the problems that have been referred to, the US government
had the intention to continue actions to fight drug trafficking:
Despite the adversities, the U.S. strategy in Guatemala continues to

focus on the strengthening of police forces and the judicial sector
of Guatemala, through training, technical assistance and the deliv-
ery of equipment and infrastructure, especially for the units directly
involved in fighting drug trafficking and other international crimes
that may directly affect the United States. There is an especial empha-
sis in the administrative capacities, leadership, human rights, investi-
gation techniques and case management. The United States strategy is
also aimed to reduce the level of corruption in Guatemala, by imple-
menting training programs, education and public awareness. More
specifically, the efforts of the United States will be focused on the
investigation, interdiction, corruption, money laundry, development
of special task groups and sea agreements. The U.S. government in
Guatemala will continue to firmly help the Guatemalan government
to improve the already successful Anti-Narcotics Regional Training
Center. (NAS, 2002)
In June 2002, the México-Guatemala High-Level Border Security

Group (GANSEF) was created. Eventually it turned into the Mexico-
Guatemala High Level Security Group (GANSEG). This initiative was
created right after the September 11 attacks. An official report issued by
the Guatemalan government is extremely clear regarding the initiative:
In order to obtain specific measures to coordinate the banking coopera-

tion regarding surveillance and control, the governments of Guatemala
and Mexico formally implemented the High-Level Border Security
Group (GANSEF), that is coordinated by the Guatemala Secretariat of
the Interior and the Mexican Secretariat of the Interior. The actions of
such group include migration issues, human rights and border affairs;
international terrorism; organized crime and judicial cooperation; and
public security. (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores [The Ministry of

Foreign Affairs], 2004)
The GANSEG activities are in an ongoing process, on June 13, 2011,

the X Technical Meeting took place in Guatemala; during this encoun-
ter, the advances on security issues, migration, and drug trafficking
were analyzed: “Every country undertook to frontally fight the security
problems prevailing at the border, basing their action on the mutual
support of the state institutions; the participants prepared the Strategic
Risk Agenda, applicable for both countries” (Secretariat of the Interior,
2011: 25).
New Conflict Scenarios at the Border

The presence of organized crime groups in the Mexico-Guatemala bor-
der has been recorded since 2005. This fact coincides with the militari-
zation that was imposed by former president Felipe Calderón in several
states of the Mexican Republic. The Mexican and Guatemalan govern-
ments are both of the same opinion that the actions taken against drug
trafficking, particularly within the Mérida framework, have created the
effect called “cucaracha” [cockroach]; however, the presence of drug
trafficking in the border space has been going on for many years.
The slaughter of 16 people occurred on November 30, 2008, in
the municipality of Santa Ana Huisa, Guatemala—a place located
30 kilometers away from the Mexican border—in the Department of
Huehuetenango, although locals affirm that 55 people were killed. After
these events, a bilateral operation between Mexico and Guatemala took
place, and President Alvaro Colom mentioned whether the Gulf cartel
wanted to “seize” the Guatemalan territories because of the pressure
the Mexican government exerted on drug traffickers with its antidrug
trafficking operations (El Periódico, December 3, 2008). Regarding
the latter, PNC captured four Mexicans and two Guatemalans in the
village La Mesilla, Huehuetenango, on December 3, 2008. They were
accused of having participated in the killing. The journal, Prensa Libre,
highlighted the following: “The southern Mexican border has been an
area that requires more security for many years, due to the number of
immigrants and criminals that get there from Central America; but,
since last Monday, because of the attack that took place between drug
traffickers, the Guatemalan government ordered reinforced security in
that area. However, this tendency seems to have changed, and now, it
is the Guatemalan army that has sent reinforcements to this region;
these actions have taken place because of the arrival of Mexican drug
traffickers and to avoid the escape of those responsible for the killing
in the Village Agua Zarca, Santa Ana Huista, and Huehuetenango.”
Subsequently, the journal states, “The Mexican authorities sealed the
municipalities of Frontera Comalapa, La Trinitaria, Las Margaritas,
Motozintla and Maravilla Tenejapa, Mexico, near Agua Zarca” (Prensa
Libre, December 3, 2008; emphasis original). These events, known as
the “narco apuesta,” the narco bet, happened because two Mexican
and Guatemalan criminal groups made a million dollar wager over a
horse race; although the popular versions indicate that the Zetas set
up the other criminal group, qualified opinions consider that this was
a tactic used by this criminal group to gather all people they intend to
victimize.
Another outstanding event took place on December 8, 2010, when
four people were murdered, among which was a woman, presumably a
Mexican citizen. The events happened in the municipality of Nentón,
Department of Huehuetenango. The journal Prensa Libre (December 9,
2000) announced “an armed commando blocked their way and shot
them using AK-47 and M-16 assault rifles, the passengers died inside
the motor vehicle that was destroyed by fire. Witnesses declared that
200 shells were left in the scene.” The attack took place a few kilometers
away from Agua Zarca, where the 2008 killings happened.
Violence in Guatemala has reached historical levels; some say that
the current events are more violent that those during the civil war. This
situation made President Alvaro Colom declare a state of siege in the
Department of Alta Verapaz on December 19, 2010, and eventually
the same happened on May 16, 2011, in Petén (Acuerdo Gubernativo
[Government Agreement] 4—2011); the same could also happen in the
Department of San Marcos.
As a matter of fact, on December 19, 2010, the state of siege was
declared in the border Department of Alta Verapaz. This measure
was issued under the government agreement No. 23—2010 and it was
ratified through the agreement No. 56—2010 by the Congress of the
Republic on January 5, 2011. The action was taken due to the vio-
lence created by organized crime. The journal Prensa Libre refers to
it as follows: “According to investigations, criminal cells of the Zetas
[Drug Cartel], mostly formed by Mexican hit men and Guatemalan
e x-military men have taken over control in the Department of Alta
Verapaz for more than a year and the inhabitants have had an uneasy
life ever since” (Prensa Libre, April 19, 2010). Subsequently, on January
18, 2011, President Colom announced the extension of the state of siege
for 30 more days, stating that “the perception of tranquility in the area
has improved, though some processes need to be consolidated. The state
of siege is just part of a much bigger plan” (Prensa Libre, January 19,
2011).
Some months later, under the Government Decree 7—2011, pub-
lished in the official journal on August 18, 2011, the state of alarm14 is
issued in Petén for 30 days, starting on August 16. The justification is
that “there exists a number of serious situations in Petén that endanger
the constitutional order, the governability and the security of the State,
affecting and risking human life and the comprehensive development
of people” (Government of Guatemala, 2011). This measure was put
into effect after the killing of 27 people, what occurred on May 14,
2011, in the country estate called Los Cocos, La Libertad, located in
the north of Petén. Twenty-six of these people were beheaded—among
which there were three minors and two women. This event has been
considered as one of the most terrible massacres since the civil war
ended in 1996.
It is said that the state of alarm was issued by virtue of the persis-
tence of a number of serious events in Petén, and which endangered
the constitutional order, the governability and the security of the state,
affecting and risking human life and the comprehensive development of
people. However, the main reason for this measure was the presence of
drug trafficking, particularly the presence of the group called the Zetas.
On this matter, Cabrera stated,
A curious fact, not very common though, is the decision made by the
Zetas to establish themselves in Poptún,15 a town in the middle of the
jungle, where the Kaibil School is also located, as well as the army train-
ing center where Guatemalan policemen and military men are trained
by American officials. Consequently, the region could easily become the
new scenario of the war between the government and the criminal orga-
nization. The kaibiles are military men trained to kill and survive the
most adverse conditions and they also know the Guatemalan territory.
(Cabrera, 2011)
Security Plan for Central America

These events ultimately defined the necessity of drawing up a security
plan for Central America, with the direct involvement of the United
States government. The justification can be found in a document issued
by the World Bank that analyzes the violence in Central America and
that exposes some figures:
The hope Central American countries have for a new start after the civil
wars has been overshadowed by a different plague: a stream of crime and
violence that first took over El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala and
that currently threatens Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama. In order to
understand the significance of this new criminal wave, we have to con-
sider the following: both Spain and Central America have an approxi-
mate population of 40 million people; however, Spain registered 336
murders (that is, less than one per day) in 2006, when Central America
registered 14,257 (that is, almost 44 per day).
El Salvador has the highest murder rate in Latin America (58 per 100,000
inhabitants), and two other Central American countries Guatemala and
Honduras, with murder rates of 45 and 43 per 100,000 inhabitants, respec-
tively, are among the first five in the region. The rate of murders in Central
America is generally 35.4 per 100,000 inhabitants, compared to approxi-
mately 20 per 100,000 in all Latin America. (World Bank, 2011: 1)
The successive meetings held by the Mexican and Guatemala govern-

ments represent some of the contextual elements that shape the formu-
lation of a security plan for Central America. For instance, the yearly
activities report given by the Secretariat of the Interior, headed by José
Francisco Blake Mora, and which covers the period from September
2009 to August 2010, emphasized,
Within the framework of the Central America and Mexico Security

Strategy, which is part of the Dialog: System of Central American
Integration (SICA), in 2010 the CISEN took part in two meetings
between secretaries, during which the base document for the Security
Agreement of Central America was discussed (March 5, 2010). Likewise,
the CISEN analyzed the proposals of collaboration between Mexico and
SICA on democratic legal matters, including the trafficking of people,
weapons and drugs, as well as the criminal activities of the maras (May,
2010). (Secretariat of the Interior, 2010: 24)
As part of the concern regarding the migratory phenomenon, the National

Institute of Migration implemented the Comprehensive Program for the
Southern Border of Mexico in its migratory responsibility. Its general
objective is to impose a comprehensive migratory policy in the southern
border, in order to turn it into an area of harmonic coexistence for the
regional development, by the supplying of legal documents, and the
control and surveillance of different migratory flows, safeguarding the
defense of the dignity and the rights of migrants, and contributing to
border security (Secretariat of the Interior, 2010: 116).
Within this global framework, on April 12, 2011, the US deputy

assistant secretary of defense for counter-narcotics and global threats,
William Wechsler, announced the beginning of a security program in
the border region of Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize. This program is
within the framework of antidrugs cooperation plans and includes the
allocation of US$51 million to the Mexican government, which will
be controlled by Northern Command and includes the training of
security forces, equipment, and information exchange (CNN México,
2011a). One day before, on April 11, the Mexican ambassador to the
United States, Arturo Sarukhán declared, “We have observed that in
several ways, Central America has become a victim of the success of
Mexico and the United States. There is a displacement factor.” This
idea had been expressed by the US assistant secretary of state for the
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
William Brownfield, who said the following during his appearance in
court: “Given the increasing pressure of Plan Colombia and the Merida
Initiative, the drug cartels are seizing Central America thoroughly”
(CNN México, 2011b).
Likewise, it would be appropriate to mention the third meeting of
the Mérida Initiative High-Level Consultive Group, which took place
in Washington, DC, on April 19, 2011, the previous gathering was
held in Mexico City on March 20, 2010. During the third meeting,
the joint strategies to confront organized crime and drug trafficking
were discussed and the main topic of the discussion was border security,
and undoubtedly, the south border of Mexico was very relevant. Thus,
regarding border matters, the joint press release indicated,
To expand the prevention protocols of border violence that set up a

framework that reduces and responds to violent incidents in the region,
through a multilateral assessment of risks, the improvement of commu-
nication, the coordination of law enforcement and the creation of a group
that prevents border violence. (Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, 2011)
During this meeting, the achievements accomplished by the Mérida

Initiative were listed:
1) Training in Mexican soil of 8,500 federal policemen, 2,600 district

attorneys and law enforcement officials and 1,800 correction department
employees; 2) Opening of the Implementation Office, with Mexican and
American personnel to follow up the activities and projects of the Merida
Initiative; 3) Transference of 11 helicopters to the Mexican security
forces to increase their mobility in the operations against drug traffick-
ing. (Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, 2011)
Finally, the press release acknowledged that the contributions the Plan
Merida had made “more than 400 million dollars in equipment, train-
ing and programs to strengthen capacities have been given; and the
government of the United States has promised to allocate $500 million
more before the end of 2011” (Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, 2011). This
meeting was attended by the representatives of both security branches;
the following were on the Mexican side: Patricia Espinosa, minister
of foreign affairs; Francisco Blake Mora, secretary of state; Guillermo
Galván, secretary of national defense; Francisco Saynez, secretary of
the navy; Genaro García Luna, secretary of public security. On the
American side, the following incumbents attended the meeting: Hillary
Clinton, secretary of state; Janet Napolitano, secretary of homeland
security; Robert Gates, secretary of defense; Mike Mullen, chairman of
the joint chiefs of staff; John O. Brennan; chairman of the Intelligence
and National Security Alliance; and Eric Holder, US attorney general.
The attendance of the security cabinet of the most powerful country in
the world at this meeting showed the concern and interest the American
government has on these top priority topics; and it also expressed and
influenced the decision of the policies and actions applicable in Mexico
and Central America.
In this context, the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has visited
Guatemala at least twice since she became the secretary of state. The
later visit took place in order to prepare for the International Conference
in Support of the Central America Security Strategy that took place
in Guatemala in June 2011. This conference that ended on June 23,
achieved the allocation of US$2 billion in international cooperation.
This accomplishment was celebrated in official speeches, although
it only represents 33 percent of the millions projected by the Sistema
de Integración Centroamericana (SICA) [Central America Integration
System].16
Some opinions simply consider the accomplishments as a politically cor-
rect effort to overcome strategic failures of historical and structural nature,
regarding the irrefutable levels of impunity in Central America, which in the
case of Guatemala reached 99.75 percent in 2010, the highest percentage on
the region. But the biggest in-depth critic of the achievements accomplished
in the Lecture states,
It is necessary to analyze in detail the fact that the financial and techni-
cal assistance of our “friends” from the international community should
be interpreted as an evolved kind of State neo-interventionism through
the soft power and the fifth power, the oriented democratization and the
financial neocolonialism- dependency on multilateral credit organisms,
thus creating a configuration of asymmetric inter-state affairs. (Prensa

Libre, June 26, 2011)
And, in comparison to the US$4 billion invested by Central America in

2010 in security issues, only US$2 billion were offered by the 110 del-
egations that attended the summit, many of these delegations belonged
to developed countries. The offer was as follows: US$430 million
were gathered in donations, the United States gave US$320 million,
Spain US$54 million, and Australia US$24 million, while Canada
only offered US$5 million. The World Bank gave loans that added
up US$1.2 billion and US$500 million came from the Inter-American
Development Bank. In short, 80 percent of what was obtained repre-
sents nothing but loans, whose interest rates and periods need to be
considered.
Final Reflections/New Guatemalan Presidency

We begin these reflections with a relevant event in the political life
of Guatemala. We are talking about the presidential succession that is
rather an important occasion, because General Otto Pérez who took
office in 2012, a prominent military man who participated in the civil
war. He worked as the director of espionage services for the military
government 25 years ago. It is said that Pérez was a very influential
person in the military circles and now his collaborators think that he
supports the conditions imposed by the US Congress to restore military
assistance to his country; these guidelines had been eliminated in 1987,
during the civil war.
Otto Pérez took office using a speech that showed his intentions to
be firm when fighting crime. During his political campaign, he offered
effective measures to end this desperate situation. During the cere-
mony in which he was sworn into office, Pérez offered “a deep change,
a structural one and not only ‘cosmetic’ in nature.” According to his
understanding, he finds Guatemala on the brink of economical and
moral breakdown, with the biggest indebtedness in its history and with
a destroyed infrastructure. He also admitted that several of the factors
that motivated the armed conflict are still at work. His policy guide-
lines are directed to prioritize ensuring security as well as fighting hun-
ger and strengthening the economy.
One week before the presidential succession, Otto Pérez spoke
about his priorities for the country and went over his analysis of the
country “today, we experience an atmosphere of insecurity, violence

and crime”; and he added, “We propose a change to achieve rural
development, in which poverty and malnutrition can improve . . . We
want to finish our administration with a rate of 20 or 22 murders
per 100,000 inhabitants; half of the figures that currently exist”
(Ismatul and Barrios, 2012). Even so, the pledge is not outstanding,
because we have to take into account the consideration that accord-
ing to the World Bank, those are figures would be comparable to
those in 2006.
On the eve of the end of President Alvaro Colom’s term of office’s
conclusion, Calros Menocal, minister of the interior, gave a report on
the accomplishments fulfilled during the four-year administration. He
emphasized the fact that at the beginning of Colom’s administration 46
murders per 100,000 inhabitants occurred and that by 2010 they had
decreased to 41.5 murders. He also stated that the arriving administra-
tion would inherit a country with 38 murders per 100,000 inhabitants.17
In an interview, Menocal answered the question asked by the journal
Prensa Libre: Did the states of siege that the government imposed work
somehow? The minister answered,
They did work to recover territory and the intelligence machinery work
was reinforced. The State of Siege in Cobán, Alta Verapaz, for instance,
allowed the capture of members of the Zetas cartel and prevented his
members to walk freely in the streets. By then, their presence had been
spotted in Petén, Alta Verapaz and Baja Verapaz, Jalapa, Jutiapa, Zacapa,
Quetzaltenango, and Huehuetenango.18 It cannot be said that the struc-
ture has been dismantled, but several blows to their livers, their heads
and their financial parts were given. Still, they are a latent threat. The
Zetas represent the last link in the food chain of organized crime, they
are carrion eaters. They’re a supermarket making business out of kidnap-
ping, extortion, hired killing, robbery, bribery and terrifying the popula-
tion. (Prensa Libre, January 6, 2012)
These data give us an idea of the situation Guatemala has regarding

security issues in its border area with Mexico. The scenario for the next
years is not encouraging, resources are insufficient to foster a substan-
tial change in security and poverty matters; international support, as we
have seen, is minimal and some other factors add up to this precarious
situation: the tax collection rate represents 11.2 percent of the GDP, the
lowest in the continent and yet a public debt of Q92 million existed
by 2011.
Notes
1. Regarding this subject, Campuzano said, “El Ceibo is the door between the
state of Tabasco and the department of Petén. There is a path between that
formal crossing point and the village El Naranjo, in the department of Petén;
it is 23 kilometers, with no pavement. Surfacing this path would give impor-
tant results. The new road would allow a more efficient administration in the
border area. With a resulting reduction in criminal activities” (Campuzano,
2004: 185).
2. Retrieved November 30, 2011, from http://www.usaid.gov/gt/espanol/history
.htm.
3. Retrieved November 30, 2011, from http://www.usaid.gov/gt/espanol/
overview.htm.
4. See, International Narcotics Control Startegy Plan, 2011—Guatemala section:
Drugs and chemicals, March 3, 2011, American embassy. Retrieved November
30, 2011, from http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2011/vol1/156360.
htm#guatemala.
5. It is estimated that 2.1 million hectares, which represent a little more than
60 percent of the territory of the department of Petén are protected areas;
there are some important archaeological sites in this location, among which
Tikal, Yaxhá, Ceibal, and the Zotz are found. Petén has had a fast popula-
tion growth, in 1960, the population was estimated as 20,000 inhabitants
and in 2006 there was an estimated population of 600,000 inhabitants (Peace
Brigades International, 2007: 4).
6. An important event in the history of Petén is the massacre called “Dos Erres”
[“Two R’s”]. On December 5, 1982, a military squad of the special forces
of the Guatemalan army arrived in the small village called Dos Erres, La
Libertad, in the northern department of Petén. Three days later, the squad left
leaving behind 250 men, women, boys and girls that had been massacred. (See,
Amnesty International, at http://www.amnesty.org/en/node/8570.)
7. The supplement of the third report on Verification of the Peace Agreements
issued by the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGA),
that covers the period from January to July, 1998, states, “The regional office
of Petén located in Santa Elena and the sub-regional office in Poptún are in
charge of the whole department that has 12 municipalities. It has an exten-
sion of 36,000 km 2 and an approximate population of 500,000 inhabitants.
Petén is the largest department of Guatemala and it represents the third
part of Guatemala’s geographical area. It has a diverse population, mostly
formed by Ladino people in the urban areas; whereas Mayan ethnic groups
live in the country side. Petén witnessed the armed conflict and its territory
took in important groups of displaced people coming from other depart-
ments; nowadays, it has some rootless population, displaced people from
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), as well as ex-members
of the Comités Voluntarios de Defensa Civil [Volunteer Committees of Civil
Defense], as well as other sectors affected by the conflict, one way or another”
(MINIGUA, 1998).
8. There is an approximate population of 29,000 in Istahuacán—information
from 2002—and it has an extension of 184 square kilometers; there are 14,000
inhabitants in Sipacapa and its extension is 152 square kilometers. This is a rela-
tively high population density, especially if we consider that around 90 percent
of the inhabitants live in rural areas. We refer to “survival peasants,” whose
land ownership is less than one hectare; they produce corn, beans, wheat,
barley, coffee, apples, avocados, and peach and in the surroundings there are
pines, holm oaks, oak trees, and cypresses among others (see, COPAE, 2010).
9. See website No a la Mina [Say no to the mine]: http://www.noalamina.
org/mineria-latinoamerica/mineria-guatemala/mem-desiste-de-suspender-
operaciones-en-mina-marlin.
10. For further information see, http://goldcorpoutofguatemala.com.
11. La Alianza para la Seguridad y la Prosperidad de América del Norte [The
Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America] was founded in Waco,
Texas, on March 2, 2005, by Vicente Fox Quesada, president of Mexico; Paul
Martin, prime minister of Canada; and George W. Bush, president of the
United States.
12. ASPAN, 2005, Joint Declaration, from Trejo, 2006: 11.
13. ASPAN, 2005, Security Agenda, from Trejo, 2006: 11.
14. The state of alarm is a flexible form of the state of siege; it guarantees the
necessary constitutional rights to develop an election, which occurs in country
under normal conditions. And it guarantees that the completion of activities
and political rallies that may be part of the election process won’t be affected.
The regulations limit the freedom of action, legal detentions, questionings to
people under arrest and prisoners, freedom of transit, and right of assembly,
as well as the right of carrying weapons. In November 2011, through decree
13–2011 the extension of the state of alarm was declared for 30 days.
15. It is the second most populated municipality of the department of Petén;
it is located 100 kilometers from the municipality of Flores—the adminis-
trative center. Since 1989, it has housed the special operations force of the
Guatemalan army, known as the kaibiles.
16. It is important to highlight that it refers to offers. Six months after the con-
ference, the resources were not available. In the resolutions of the XXXVIII
Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Central American Integration
System that took place in San Salvador on December 16, 2011, section 13 of
the action plan indicates, “To instruct the Central American Commission on
Security along with SG-SICA to finish the negotiations with the group of fel-
low friends and International Organisms as soon as possible; those negotiations
related to the first eight projects identified by the Security Commission during
its summit on November 10, 2011 and to proceed to their implementations.”
The document can be checked at http://www.sica.int/busqueda/Reuniones.as
px?IDItem=64887&IDCat=21&IdEnt=1&Idm=1&IdmStyle=1. However, the
United States had achieved a fundamental accomplishment: to be admitted

as region observer of SICA (it can be read in the joint declaration in the cited
document, section 20).
17. Retrieved January 5, 2012, from http://www.guatemala.gob.gt/noticia4.php?c
odigo=14101&titulo2=Guatemala.
18. Petén, Alta Verapaz, and Huehuetenango share their border with Mexico,
Jutiapa is bordered by El Salvador and Zacapa by Honduras.
Works Cited
Bauer, Alfonzo (2004). El Plan Maya Jaguar. In Albedrío, Revista Electrónica de
Discusión y Propuesta Social, año 1 [Discussion and Social Proposal Electronic
Magazine], year 1, Guatemala, at http://www.albedrio.org/htm/articulos/a/abp-
001.htm.
Brigadas Internacionales de Paz [Peace Brigades International] (2007, April). Boletín
Especial: El Petén [Special Bulletin, El Petén], proyecto Guatemala [Guatemala
Project], Guatemala.
Cabrera, Fernando (2011). El gran desafío de Guatemala [Guatemala’s Great
Challenge], Radio Nedeland Latinoamérica [Nedeland Radio, Latin America],
at http://www.rnw.nl/espanol/article/el-gran-desaf%C3%ADo-de-guatemala.
Campuzano, Juan José (2004). México y Guatemala: de la vecindad a la asociación,
en: Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior [Mexico and Guatemala: from vecin-
ity to partnership], No. 72, Instituto Matías Romero de Estudios Diplomáticos,
México.
CNN México [CNN Mexico] (2011a). EU desarrolla un plan para mejorar la segu-
ridad en la frontera sur de México [The U.S. Develops a Plan to Improve Security
in the South Border of Mexico], Retrieved December 26, 2011, from http:
//mexico.cnn.com/mundo/2011/04/12/eu-desarrolla-un-plan-para-mejorar-la-
seguridad-en-frontera-sur-de-mexico.
CNN México [CNN Mexico] (2011b). Narco se desplaza a Centroamérica por
éxito en lucha antinarco [Drug Trafficking Goes to Central America Due to
Success of Anti-Drug Fight], Retrieved December 26, 2011, from http://mexico
.cnn.com/nacional/2011/04/11/narco-se-desplaza-a-centroamerica-por-exito-
en-lucha-antinarco-sarukhan.
COPAE (Comisión pastoral Paz y Ecología) [Pastoral Comission: Peace and
Ecology] (2010). It can be consulted in PDF format, at http://goldcorpoutof-
guatemala.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/tercer20informe20anual20del20moni-
toreo.pdf.
Dardón, Jacobo (2002). Caracterización de la Frontera de Guatemala/México,
FLACSO-Guatemala-Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, Guatemala.
El Periódico (2008, December 3). Fuerza binacional tras vinculados con balac-
era en Huehuetenango [Bilateral Force after Those Linked to Shooting in
Huehetenango]. Guatemala.
Government of Guatemala (2011). Publican Oficialmente Estado de Alarma en

Petén. Retrieved January 5, 2012, from the State of Siege officialy published at
http://www.guatemala.gob.gt/noticia4.php?codigo=13820&titulo2=Peten.
INM-CONAPO-COLEF-SER-STPS (2009). Encuesta sobre Migración en la
Frontera Guatemala-México [Survey on Migration in the Guatemala-Mexico
Border], 2007, historic issue 2004–2007, México.
Ismatul, Óscar, & Barrios, Antonio (2012, January 9). Pérez prioriza tres acciones
[Pérez prioritizes three actions]. Prensa Libre, Guatemala.
Lara, Julio, & Escobar, Roberto (2007, September 30). Identifican a grupo
de narcotraficantes [Group of Drug Traffickers is Identified]. Prensa Libre,
Guatemala.
MINIGUA (1998). Suplemento del Tercer Informe de Verificación de los Acuerdos
de Paz [Supplement on the Third Report of Verification of the Peace Agreements].
PDF document. Retrieved December 20, 2011, from http://www.acnur.org/t3
/fileadmin/scripts/doc.php?file=pais/docs/398.
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] (2004). Informe
de Guatemala al Comité Interamericano contra el Terrorismo [Guatemalan
Report to the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism], at the OEA, Fourth
Period of Ordinary Sessions, from January 28 to 30, Montevideo, Uruguay.
Monteforte, Mario (1997). La frontera Móvil [The Moving Border], Universidad
Autónoma de México—Ministerio de Cultura y Deportes de Guatemala
[Ministry of Culture and Sports of Guatemala], Guatemala.
NAS (Sección de Asuntos Narcóticos [Narcotics Affairs Section]) (2002).
Guatemalan embassy in the United States, Retrieved December 5, 2011, from
http://www.nasgt.com.gt/incsrgtesp.htm.
OAS (Organization of American States) (2003, October 28). Conferencia Especial
sobre Seguridad [Special Conference on Security]. Declaración sobre seguridad
en las Américas [Declaration on Security in the Americas], OEA/Ser. XXXVIII/
CES/dec.1/03, Mexico City, it can be consulted at http://www.oas.org/es/ssm/
CE00339S03.pdf.
Ordóñez, César E. (2006). Tendencias de la integración económica en Guatemala
y el Sureste Mexicano [Economical Integration Trends in Guatemala and the
Southeast of Mexico], Universidad de San Carlos-Asociación para el Avance de
las Ciencias Sociales en Guatemala, Guatemala.
Prensa Libre (2012, January 6). Carlos Menocal: el narcotráfico es una amenaza
latente [Drug Trafficking Is a Latent Threat]. Guatemala. Retrieved January
6, 2012, from http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/narcotrafico-amenaza-
latente_0_622737766.html?print=1.
Prensa Libre (2011, June 26). Conferencia de seguridad: otra utopía en Centroamérica
[Security Conference: Another Utopia in Central America]. Guatemala.
Retrieved June 10, 2012, from http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/Titulo-
articulo-edicion-impresa_0_506349371.html.
Prensa Libre (2011, January 19). Gobierno extiende estado de Sitio en Alta Verapaz
[The Government Extends the State of Siege in Alta Verapaz]. Guatemala.
Retrieved November 15, 2011, from http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias

/Gobierno-extiende-Sitio-Alta-Verapaz_0_411558877.html.
Prensa Libre (2010, April 19). El gobierno decreta estado de Sitio en Alta Verapaz
para actuar contra el narcotráfico [The Government Declares the State of Siege
to Act against Drug Trafficking]. Guatemala. Retrieved January 05, 2012, from
http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/justicia/coba-sitio-estado_0_392960746.
html.
Prensa Libre (2008, December 3). Control militar en la zona fronteriza [Militar
Control in the Border Area]. Guatemala. Retrieved January 6, 2012, from
http://especiales.prensalibre.com/PDFs/Ediciones/2008/diciembre/03/PDFs
/PLMT03122008.PDF.
Prensa Libre (2005, May 12). EE.UU: Terrorismo y crimen amenaza a Centroamérica
[USA: Terrorism and crime threat to Central America]. Guatemala. Retrieved
May 25, 2007, from http://www.ieepp.org/boletin/mirador/noticias_archivo_g
t.php?subaction=showfull&id=1116604951&archive=1125343203&star
t_from=&ucat=1&er_query.
Prensa Libre (2000, December 9). Acribillan a cuatro mexicanos [Riddled four
Mexican]. Guatemala. Retrieved January 10, 2011, from http://www.prensali-
bre.com/noticias/Acribillan-mexicanos_0_386961329.html.
Ramírez, Ignacio (2000, May 30). Frontera Sur. Narcotráfico. Chiapas, donde
“llueve” droga [South Border, Drug Trafficking. Chiapas, Where it Rains
Drugs]. El Universal, México.
Secretaría de Gobernación [Secretariat of the Interior] (2011). Quinto Informe de
Labores [Fifth Report of Activities], México, PDF document, it can be consulted
at http://www.gobernacion.gob.mx/work/models/SEGOB/Resource/620/1
/images/Quinto_Informe_de_Labores_SEGOB_2011.pdf.
Secretaría de Gobernación [Secretariat of the Interior] (2010). Cuarto Informe
de Labores [Fourth Report of Activities], México; Quinto Informe de Labores
[Fifth Report of Activities], México, http://www.gobernacion.gob.mx/work
/models/SEGOB/Resource/620/1/images/Quinto_Informe_de_Labores
_SEGOB_2010.pdf.
Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores [Secretariat of Foreign Affairs] (2011). Third
Meeting of the High-Level Border Security Group of the Merida Initiative, Joint
release retrieved January 5, 2012, from http://www.sre.gob.mx/csocial_viejo
/contenido/comunicados/2011/abr/cp_133.html.
Trejo, Elma del Carmen (2006). Alianza para la Seguridad y Prosperidad de América
del Norte (ASPAN) [The Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America],
Analysis Research and Analysis Service, Foreign Policy Sub direction, Cámara
de Diputados LIX Legislatura, México [Chamber of Deputies of Mexico LIX
Legislature].
Vautravers, Guadalupe (2005). Estudio comparativo de la frontera Tabasco,
México-El Petén, Guatemala [Comparative Study on the Tabasco, Mexico-El
Petén, Guatemala Border], Universidad Juárez Autónoma de Tabasco, México.
Villafuerte, Daniel (2006). Integraciones en el norte y sur de México: del NAFTA

al CAFTA [Integrations in the North and South of Mexico: from NAFTA to
CAFTA]. In Daniel Villafuerte and Xochitl Leyva (Coordinators), Geoeconomía
y geopolítica en el área del Plan Puebla-Panamá [Geoeconomics and Geopolitics
in the Area of the Puebla-Panama Plan], Cámara de Diputados, LIX Legislatura
[Chamber of Deputies of Mexico LIX Legislature]. México: CIESAS-Miguel
Ángel Porrúa Editor. pp. 85–116.
World Bank (2011). Crimen y violencia en Centroamérica. Un desafío para el desar-
rollo [Crime and Violence in Central America. A Challenge for Development].
Sustainable Development Department and Poverty Reduction and Economical
Management Unit. Latin America and the Caribbean Region. Washington,
DC.
CHAPTER 8
Old Wine in New

Wineskins: Incorporating the
“Ungoverned Spaces”
Concept into Plan Colombia
John C. Dugas
Introduction
On November 19, 2002, US defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld met
with other hemispheric defense ministers in Santiago, Chile. Referring
to the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Rumsfeld noted, “When
terrorists are driven out of countries—as they were in Afghanistan—
they often find havens in the world’s many ungoverned regions.” He
went on to argue, “In this hemisphere, narco-terrorists, hostage takers,
and arms smugglers operate in ungoverned areas, using them as bases
from which to destabilize democratic governments” (Rumsfeld, 2002).
This concept of “ungoverned spaces” became a key part of the rhetorical
framework utilized by the Bush administration to advance its post–9/11
foreign policy goals throughout the world. In Latin America, as other
chapters in this volume detail, the concept was employed to justify
policy initiatives in Mexico, Central America, and Haiti. This chap-
ter examines the incorporation of the concept into US foreign policy
toward Colombia, focusing specifically on the preexisting policy initia-
tive known as “Plan Colombia.”
The chapter begins with a discussion of the concept of ungoverned
spaces, underscoring key elements of the concept and its development

144 l John C. Dugas
in the post–9/11 period. Despite the novelty of the term itself, I argue
that the concept addresses concerns that have long been central to US
foreign policy. The chapter next explores the nature of Plan Colombia,
a foreign policy initiative begun during the final years of the Clinton
administration, with specific focus on the origin, development, and
competing claims made about the impacts of this policy initiative. The
chapter then examines how the ungoverned spaces concept was incorpo-
rated into the rhetoric used to legitimate the preexisting policy, with an
emphasis given to the congressional hearings on Plan Colombia and its
embrace by the US military establishment. The broad argument is that
that the ungoverned spaces concept served primarily as a framing device
used to justify continued support for Plan Colombia. The concluding
reflections note the seeming irony that the concept underscores what
many of the harshest critics of US foreign policy in Colombia have long
maintained—the need to address the absence of effective state institu-
tions throughout Colombian territory. This observation suggests that
the concept might be more flexible than some critics suggest.
The Concept of Ungoverned Spaces

Overview of the Contemporary Concept of Ungoverned Spaces
The relatively recent employment of the concept of ungoverned spaces
(also referred to variously as “ungoverned territories,” “ungoverned
areas,” and “unpoliced areas”) is underscored by a 2007 Rand vol-
ume funded by the US Air Force. In the Preface, the authors note that
while “there is a literature about failed states and civil conflict . . . to
our knowledge, there has been no concerted effort to define and ana-
lyze ungoverned territories as a category of security challenges” (Rabasa
et al., 2007: iii). The absence of a scholarly literature on ungoverned
spaces reflects the fact that the term did not become widely used until
the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Nonetheless, 9/11 had the galvanizing effect
of focusing attention on regions that might serve as safe havens for ter-
rorist organizations (ibid.). Thus, the 9/11 Commission warned that
to find sanctuary, terrorist organizations have f led to some of the least

governed, most lawless places in the world . . . areas that combine rug-
ged terrain, weak governance, room to hide or receive supplies, and low
population density with a town or city near enough to allow necessary
interaction with the outside world. Large areas scattered around the
world meet these criteria. (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
upon the United States, 2004: 366)
Old Wine in New Wineskins l 145
Defined succinctly, ungoverned spaces refer to “territories . . . outside

the control of the government that holds nominal sovereignty over the
territory in question” (Rabasa and Peters, 2007a: 3). Nonetheless, this
seemingly straightforward definition belies the fact that there has been
significant debate over the precise meaning of the term. In its most
narrow construction, the term refers specifically to a situation in which
“a weak, failed, or collapsed state performs none of its governance func-
tions effectively in a given area, freeing illicit actors to pursue threaten-
ing activities” (Lamb, 2008: 19). Despite the clarity of this definition,
there is broad recognition that there are relatively few regions of the
world that are completely lacking in at least some presence of the central
government. Hence, some analysts have sought to specify variables that
would help to indicate the relative level of central governance, or lack
thereof, in a given territory. For example, Rabasa and Peters suggest that
four variables are useful in determining the extent to which territories
are ungoverned: the extent of state penetration of society; the degree
of state monopoly on the use of force; the level of state control over
borders; and the vulnerability of a territory to external intervention by
other states (Rabasa and Peters, 2007b: 3).
More generally, US government analysts have adopted the position
that ungoverned spaces encompass an array of situations, including
“undergoverned areas” (territories that the state controls only partially
or tenuously), “misgoverned areas” (regions characterized by negli-
gence, corruption, or intimidation of state officials), and “contested
areas” (zones where governance is disputed between state officials and
illicit nonstate actors such as terrorists, insurgents, or drug traffickers)
(Lamb, 2008: 17–20). In addition, a single country could simultane-
ously have several of these types of ungoverned spaces, some of which
might overlap (ibid., 17). Furthermore, although it is common to envi-
sion ungoverned spaces as remote territories characterized by rugged
geography and low population density, analysts have pointed out that
urban zones, particularly slums or shantytowns, and maritime zones,
including coastlines, islands, and rivers, can also constitute ungoverned
spaces that can be used as safe havens by illicit actors (ibid., 25). Not
least, some scholars have suggested that cyberspace constitutes a type of
virtual ungoverned area in which the Internet, mobile phone systems,
and satellite networks can be utilized for nefarious purposes (ibid.,
25–26; Williams, 2010: 50).
As noted by the 9/11 Commission, the principal danger that analysts
have associated with ungoverned spaces is that they can serve as sanctu-
aries or “safe havens” for illicit actors such as terrorists, insurgents, and
146 l John C. Dugas
drug traffickers, that is, they constitute “a place or situation that enables
illicit actors to operate while avoiding detection or capture . . . where
illicit actors can organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit,
train, and operate in relative security” (Lamb, 2008: 15). Indeed, Robert
Lamb makes central to his definition of “ungoverned areas” the notion
that they are “potential safe havens” (ibid., 13). Lamb goes on to sug-
gest that there are a number of characteristics that would make a safe
haven particularly concerning to US government officials, including
whether it contains illicit actors with transnational links who are capa-
ble of organizing and launching attacks against US interests from the
area; whether it contains vital natural resources (such as oil); whether it
is proximate to the US homeland; and whether there is strong domestic
or international pressure to act (Lamb, 2008: 33–35). Anne Clunan and
Harold Trinkunas note that ungoverned spaces have the potential to
undermine human security (concerned with the physical well-being and
the economic, social, and political rights of the inhabitants of the zone),
national security (concerned with the physical survival, territorial integ-
rity, and continuation of the existing political and economic system of
the state), and international security (concerned with the outbreak of
intrastate or interstate wars that might spread geographically and the
harboring of nonstate actors that might attack other states) (Clunan
and Trinkunas, 2010b: 282–283). Not least, Vanda Felbab-Brown notes
that ungoverned spaces characterized by illicit economic activities (such
as drug trafficking) can pose particular threats to the home state by cre-
ating international political costs for the state, threatening the judicial
system of the country, facilitating disruptive economic effects, creating
environmental threats, and exacerbating security threats to the country
(Felbab-Brown, 2010: 182–183).
Given the perceived dangers of ungoverned spaces, it is not surpris-
ing that US government analysts have sought to clarify the conditions
that facilitate the conversion of such spaces into safe havens for threat-
ening nonstate actors. Thus, in addition to attractive geographic condi-
tions, Lamb suggests that illicit actors will be attracted to ungoverned
spaces that exhibit certain political, civil, and resource characteristics.
Politically, illicit actors will be attracted to areas in which the state
exhibits inadequate political will to confront them, has inadequate
governance capacity to counter them, and/or that contains conflicts or
crises that might provide them with operational benefits (Lamb, 2008:
26–30). Likewise, such actors will be attracted to zones in which the
central government lacks legitimacy in the eyes of the local population,
particularly if the local population has significant political or social
grievances with the state, or if it shares an ethnic, linguistic, cultural,

ideological, or religious identity with the illicit actors (ibid., 30–32).
Not least, illicit actors will be attracted to ungoverned spaces that pro-
vide them with resources for their continued operation, including access
to potential personnel, sources of funding, communications infrastruc-
ture, transportation infrastructure, and the ability to procure and hide
weapons (Lamb, 2008: 32–33; cf. Rabasa and Peters, 2007c).
In response to the perceived threat posed by ungoverned spaces, the
US government has typically sought to intervene to promote “effec-
tive sovereignty” and “good governance” in ungoverned spaces through
state-to-state, top-down programs aimed at building state institu-
tions and capacities (Clunan and Trinkunas, 2010a: 21; Clunan and
Trinkunas, 2010b: 288). In addition, some US government analysts
have suggested working directly with local governments or with other
countries or nongovernmental organizations that may be better posi-
tioned to address local conditions that facilitate the creation of safe
havens (Lamb, 2008: 36). Other analysts have suggested the need to
temper expectations with regard to what the US government can do
about ungoverned spaces. Hence, Anne Clunan argues, “Ungoverned
spaces . . . are here to stay whether we like them or not, and states should
focus on how best to manage, exploit, and coexist with them to pro-
vide human and national security to their populations” (Clunan, 2010:
12). Moreover, Clunan and Trinkunas underscore another problem—
namely, that since the end of the Cold War, “the enthusiasm for solving
difficult ungoverned or dangerous spaces wanes relatively quickly, and
‘donor fatigue,’ characterized by declining economic assistance to trou-
bled states or reluctance to provide troop contingents for peacekeeping
or coalition operations, has become the norm” (Clunan and Trinkunas,
2010b: 288). These authors suggest far more modest aspirations with
regard to ungoverned spaces, including accommodating alternatives to
central government authority that do not pose a threat to US secu-
rity, a willingness to countenance shared authority in some regions, and
working with networks of nongovernmental organizations, interna-
tional agencies, and states to create bottom-up approaches to ameliorate
threats or contain dangerous illicit actors in ungoverned spaces (Clunan
and Trinkunas, 2010b: 289–290).
Finally, it needs to be acknowledged that some analysts associated
with the US government have been critical of the concept of ungoverned
spaces as well as its policy results. Empirically, critics have suggested
that the term itself is a misnomer—rather than ungoverned spaces,
which are quite rare, scholars and policy makers should be talking about
148 l John C. Dugas
“alternative authority and governance structures” (Clunan, 2010: 6;

Clunan and Trinkunas, 2010a: 17). For these critics, the fact that the
concept has become widely used is merely a reflection of the “reluctance
of policy practitioners and scholars to fully grapple with the world of
the twenty-first century” (Clunan, 2010: 6). More to the point, the
concept reflects an unquestioned acceptance of a traditional notion of
state sovereignty, rooted in a perspective that takes the Western welfare
state of the twentieth century as the norm, which these critics view as
increasingly questionable (Clunan and Trinkunas, 2010a: 18–19). Not
only is governance often provided by illict actors other than the cen-
tral government (e.g., relatively autonomous local, provincial, or tribal
authorities) or illicit actors (e.g., insurgents, terrorists, traffickers), but
in some locales these various actors are all incorporated into the politi-
cal process, becoming part of the political system (Arias, 2010: 116). A
distinct, but related, critique is that the concept of ungoverned spaces
privileges a “state-centric conception of national security” to the detri-
ment of other concepts of security such as “human security” (Clunan
and Trinkunas, 2010a: 276). This approach makes it difficult to recog-
nize or acknowledge that alternative forms of governance may actually
promote human security (ibid.). Some critics have also argued that ana-
lysts focused on ungoverned spaces bemoan the loss of state authority,
but often fail to recognize that one of the principal culprits of such
loss is globalization, particularly the neoliberal economic globalization
promoted by advanced industrialized countries themselves (Clunan and
Trinkunas, 2010a: 22–25). Not least, a few analysts have acknowledged
normative concerns about the types of policy that the concept encour-
ages, including that the concept of ungoverned spaces is “merely the
latest window dressing for neoimperialism” (Clunan, 2010: 5), that it
encourages policy “driven more by fear of the unknown and the ‘other’
than by hard facts on the ground” (Clunan and Trinkunas, 2010b: 275),
and that an uninformed approach to ungoverned spaces can lead to
“unwarranted paranoia and a misallocation of state resources by policy
makers, or at worst, a proliferation of poorly targeted interventions that
precipitate blowback by the actors and inhabitants of ungoverned spaces
that might have never been a threat in the first place” (Clunan and
Trinkunas, 2010b: 289).
Precedents to the Concept of Ungoverned Spaces

As noted previously, the specific concept of ungoverned spaces is rela-
tively new, coming to prominence only after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the underlying concerns have long

been a part of US foreign policy preoccupations. For example, US pol-
icy makers have long been concerned with instability in other countries
and its potential impact on US economic and political interests. With
regard to the Western Hemisphere, this concern dates back to at least
1904, when President Theodore Roosevelt established his infamous
Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, proclaiming that “chronic
wrongdoing” or “an impotence which results in a general loosening of
the ties of civilized society” might require the United States to exercise
“an international police power” in the hemisphere (Roosevelt, 1904).
This concern with hemispheric instability and its perceived negative
impacts on US interests led to repeated US interventions in the region
between 1904 and the onset of the Good Neighbor Policy in the early
1930s. With the advent of the Cold War in the mid-1940s, US con-
cern with hemispheric instability focused increasingly on the putative
threats posed by communist subversion, leading to a range of poli-
cies aimed at both overthrowing Leftist governments (e.g., Guatemala
under Arbenz, Cuba under Castro, Chile under Allende, and Nicaragua
under the Sandinistas), and squelching Leftist guerrilla movements.
Such concerns continued into the twenty-first century, bolstered by
new sources of instability in the form of international drug trafficking
and global terrorism. US preoccupation with the latter threats is well
documented in the State Department’s annual International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report (first issued in 1984) and Country Reports on
Terrorism (first released under a different name in 1976).
In a similar fashion, the concern with the existence of safe havens
or “sanctuaries” did not originate with the ungoverned spaces concept.
Indeed, US government documents dating back to the 1970s reveal a
concern with the existence of sanctuaries for threatening actors, par-
ticularly terrorists. For example, the 1977 Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) report International Terrorism in 1977 (forerunner to today’s
State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism) lauds “the denial of
safe haven to hijackers by a growing number of states” (CIA, 1978: i).
The preoccupation with denying sanctuary to illicit nonstate actors
who constitute a threat to US interests continued without pause—as
revealed most clearly in the annual CIA and State Department reports
on terrorist threats—from the 1970s up to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and
the subsequent introduction of the concept of ungoverned spaces.
Moreover, while the term “ungoverned spaces” only came into its
own after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, it was preceded in US government
documents by the analogous term of “failed states,” which underscored
150 l John C. Dugas
many of the same concerns. For example, the 1997 National Military
Strategy argues, “Failed and failing states, and conflict that is not
directed against the United States, can also threaten our interests and
the safety of our citizens” (Shalikashvili, 1997: 9). The following year,
the 1998 National Security Strategy (NSS) not only utilizes the failed
state concept but also describes it in a way strikingly similar to the
subsequent ungoverned spaces concept: namely, as states “unable to pro-
vide basic governance, services and opportunities for their populations,
potentially generating internal conflict, humanitarian crises or regional
instability” (Clinton, 1998: 7). Due to the possibility of “mass migra-
tion, civil unrest, famine, mass killings, environmental disasters and
aggression against neighboring states or ethnic groups,” failed states are
perceived as a threat to “U.S. interests and citizens” (ibid.).
Not least, a central concern of the ungoverned spaces concept—
strengthening the capacity of the state in order to establish the effective
exercise of sovereignty by the central government—was also foreshad-
owed in US government documents by discussions of the need for rule
of law, institution building, and good governance. The importance of
establishing the rule of law was mentioned as early as the 1988 annual
Patterns of Global Terrorism Report (US Department of State, 1989:
iv, 24). Likewise, by 1990, the NSS explicitly discussed the need to
strengthen the institutional capabilities of countries in order to confront
drug trafficking: “Our policy is to strengthen the political will and insti-
tutional capability of host-country military, judicial, and law enforce-
ment agencies” (Bush, 1990: 28). This same document also addresses
more directly the notion of institution building: “We seek to . . . pro-
mote the growth of free, democratic political institutions, as . . . an
aid in combating threats to democratic institutions from aggression,
coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism, and illicit drug traffick-
ing” (ibid., 2–3). By 1994, the imperative of promoting good gover-
nance was also addressed in Clinton’s NSS. Specifically, in responding
to the needs of newly democratic states, the strategy announced, “We
must help these nations strengthen the pillars of civil society, improve
their market institutions, and fight corruption and political discontent
through practices of good governance” (Clinton, 1994: 20).
In sum, well before the concept of ungoverned spaces became com-
mon currency, US government officials were already addressing most of
the policy concerns that undergirded it. What the ungoverned spaces
concept did was to provide policy makers with a useful framing device
to bring together many of the existing concerns into a more cohesive
narrative. This is perhaps best illustrated by George W. Bush’s 2006
NSS. Notably, this was the first NSS document to incorporate explicitly
the concept of ungoverned spaces. While the concept is never defined,

the document warns that “we must prevent terrorists from exploiting
ungoverned areas” (NSS, 2006: 12), cautions that “weak and impover-
ished states and ungoverned areas are not only a threat to their people
and a burden on regional economies, but are also susceptible to exploi-
tation by terrorists, tyrants, and international criminals” (ibid., 33),
and claims that “the United States recognizes that our security depends
upon . . . strengthen[ing] fragile and failing states and bring[ing] ungov-
erned areas under the control of effective democracies” (ibid., 37). The
term “safe haven” is used throughout the document (ibid., 8, 9, 12, 13,
15), and the concern is clear: it is comprised of a weak state or “ungov-
erned area” that a terrorist organization might utilize to pursue their
ends undisturbed. Likewise, the 2006 NSS, like its predecessors, makes
reference to strategies that might be utilized to confront the dangers
posed by ungoverned spaces—good governance (ibid., 4, 15, 16, 26, 27,
30, 31, 32, 37, 47), “rule of law” (16 distinct references), and “institu-
tion building” (e.g., ibid., 3, 13, 16). The basic concern is clearly to
establish the stable and effective presence of sovereign governmental
authority: “Peace and stability . . . often depends on the early establish-
ment of strong local institutions such as effective police forces and a
functioning justice and penal system. This governance capacity is criti-
cal to establishing the rule of law and a free market economy, which
provide long-term stability and prosperity” (ibid., 16).
In short, in contradistinction to the biblical warning against the
danger of putting new wine into old wineskins, the case of ungoverned
spaces appears to be the opposite—old wine poured into new wineskins.
That is, the concerns being dealt with by US foreign policy makers
when they attend to ungoverned spaces are not new, but are merely
being addressed using new terminology. The value added does not lie in
the novelty of the concept itself, but in its role as a framing device that
helps to articulate a more cohesive narrative tying together what some-
times appeared previously to be disparate policy concerns. This conclu-
sion is perhaps better appreciated when seen in the light of a concrete
case such as US foreign policy toward Colombia.
Ungoverned Spaces in the Context of Plan Colombia

The Origin, Goals, and Development of Plan Colombia
By the late 1990s, Colombia was a country mired in an exceptionally
complex civil conflict fueled to a significant degree by a burgeoning
drug trade. The conflict was characterized by two well organized Leftist
152 l John C. Dugas
guerrilla movements (the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

[FARC] and the National Liberation Army [ELN]), a growing and
extremely vicious Right-wing paramilitary movement (spearheaded by
the AUC [Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, United Self Defense Forces
of Colombia]), and state security forces that frequently violated human
rights. Not least, all of the major actors in the armed conflict were
benefiting directly or indirectly from the enormous profits generated
by drug trafficking. In the midst of this difficult situation, the United
States was providing the Colombian government with an array of coun-
ternarcotics and economic development assistance. This aid escalated
significantly with the advent of Plan Colombia in 1999.
It should be noted that the United States had also provided
Colombia with military aid on a continual basis since the early 1960s.
Nonetheless, the overall levels of this assistance were relatively mod-
est until the US-declared war on drugs intensified in the mid-1980s.
In 1986, President Ronald Reagan issued National Security Decision
Directive 221, which determined that “global narcotics traffick-
ing . . . threatens the national security of the United States” (Reagan,
1986: 1). The directive then declared that it was to be the policy of
the United States “to halt the production and flow of illicit narcotics,
reduce the ability of insurgents and terrorist groups to use drug traffick-
ing to support their activities, and strengthen the ability of individual
governments to confront and defeat this threat” (ibid., 2). Massive US
security assistance to Colombia began in earnest in late 1989 after the
assassination of Liberal presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galán, which
was immediately attributed to the Medellín drug cartel. Colombian
president Virgilio Barco responded to this killing by declaring war
on the cartel, and was promptly supported by the George H. W. Bush
administration, which announced a five-year US$2.2 billion Andean
Initiative (Crandall, 2008: 30). Beginning with the Andean Initiative
and continuing through Plan Colombia, the bulk of the counternarcot-
ics aid that the United States has sent to Colombia has been military
in nature.
US security assistance to Colombia was controversial throughout
the 1990s, primarily because the Colombian state security forces had
a well-documented record of violating human rights and international
humanitarian law. Because of this, after 1992 most US counternarcotics
assistance was channeled to the Colombian national police, which had
a less problematic human rights record than the military. Nonetheless,
the Colombian armed forces continued to receive various forms of secu-
rity assistance, including US military training and support in building
US military bases. In 1994, concerned about this human rights record,

the US Congress mandated that military aid be limited to state secu-
rity forces engaged “primarily” in counternarcotics operations (Human
Rights Watch, 1996: 4). This mandate was strengthened in 1996 by
the so-called Leahy Amendment, which prohibited US counternarcot-
ics assistance from going to specific military units if the “secretary of
state has credible evidence to believe that such unit has committed gross
violations of human rights” (ibid., 89).
By 1999, however, the United States had grown increasingly concerned
about the intensification of the armed conflict in Colombia, marked by
an explosive growth in coca cultivation (in areas largely controlled by
the Leftist guerrillas), stalled peace talks with the FARC guerrillas, and
an increasing number of guerrilla attacks and kidnappings (Crandall,
2008: 122). Fearing that Colombia had become a “crisis case” that posed
a serious risk to US national security and pressured by congressional
Republicans to advance a tougher counternarcotics policy, the Clinton
administration outflanked its congressional critics by proposing a mas-
sive increase in security assistance to Colombia (ibid., 122–123). The
new Clinton policy coincided with a multifaceted proposal advocated
by Colombian president Andrés Pastrana consisting of a US$7.5 bil-
lion plan that would simultaneously reinvigorate the stalled peace talks,
jump-start the moribund Colombian economy, eradicate drug crops,
and provide aid for judicial institutions, human rights, education and
health programs, and alternative development (US Congress Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, 1999: 58). Labeled “Plan Colombia,”
Pastrana’s idea was quickly commandeered by Washington policy mak-
ers, who transformed the original far-reaching and comprehensive plan
into a more narrowly focused and highly militarized counternarcotics
strategy (Crandall, 2008: 124–125).
On July 13, 2000, President Clinton signed into law the first install-
ment of aid under the auspices of Plan Colombia. The package totaled
US$860.3 million, of which US$519.2 million was dedicated to mili-
tary aid and US$123.1 million to police assistance (Crandall, 2008:
128). Altogether, security assistance comprised 75 percent of the total
aid package to Colombia. A mere US$3 million was set aside to sup-
port the ongoing peace process with the FARC guerrillas (ibid.). It is
worth underscoring that the security aid contained in Plan Colombia
was given primarily to the Colombian armed forces rather than to the
national police, which had previously taken the lead in counternarcot-
ics strategy. Most of this was to create a new counternarcotics brigade
within the Colombian military, to be supported by the provision of
154 l John C. Dugas
42 Huey and 18 Blackhawk helicopters (ibid., 127). Underlying this

decision was a strategy known as the “Push into Southern Colombia,”
in which the newly created counternarcotics brigade would move into
areas of coca production such as Putumayo and Caquetá that were
dominated by the FARC guerrillas (Tate, 2000: 16–19). According to
the Clinton administration, the brigade’s mission was to “establish the
security conditions” needed to carry out counternarcotics operations
such as aerial fumigation (Isacson, 2002: 32). In short, despite a con-
certed effort by the Clinton administration to portray the program as
an antidrug initiative (Crandall, 2008: 123–124), critics were essen-
tially correct in contending that under the guise of counternarcotics
strategy, the United States was preparing the Colombian armed forces
to engage in counterinsurgency operations.
The 2000 aid package set the tone for the remainder of the decade
and beyond. Under the auspices of Plan Colombia, the United States
provided US$6.3 billion in military and police aid between 2000 and
2012, constituting 74.1 percent of all aid given to Colombia during this
period (Just the Facts, 2013).1 Plan Colombia did include financing
for alternative economic development programs, judicial reform, and a
range of human rights initiatives, including a nationwide early warning
system to alert authorities to potential human rights violations and a
protection program for threatened individuals. Nonetheless, as noted
below, the negative effects of US military aid appeared to overwhelm
the positive impacts of alternative development and human rights pro-
grams. Given the abusive nature of the Colombian armed forces and
their direct and indirect ties to Right-wing paramilitary groups, US
assistance for human rights and alternative development ultimately
worked at cross-purposes with, and was undermined by, the larger strat-
egy of Plan Colombia that prioritized massive security assistance for
counternarcotics and counterinsurgency purposes (Dugas, 2005).
Despite the fact that the basic contours of Plan Colombia (i.e., mas-
sive security aid accompanied by relatively meager economic and social
assistance) were set in 2000 and have prevailed ever since, the imple-
mentation of the policy was influenced by three subsequent develop-
ments. First, in February 2002, the troubled peace talks with the FARC
guerrillas definitively broke down, and President Pastrana ordered the
military to retake the so-called demilitarized zone that had been ceded
to the FARC for the duration of the negotiations. With the FARC no
longer portrayed as legitimate political actor, pressures began to increase
in Colombia and the United States to intensify the counterinsurgency
campaign against the guerrillas.
Second, the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States had a sig-
nificant impact on the way the Bush administration perceived the
Colombian conf lict. The distinction between counternarcotics and
counterinsurgency policy began to blur as high-ranking officials began
to interpret the conf lict primarily through the lens of “counterterror-
ism” (Mason, 2010: 344). As the “war on drugs” expanded into the
“war on terror,” drug traffickers, guerrillas, and paramilitaries were all
tagged with the label “narco-terrorist,” a transformation facilitated by
the State Department’s prior designation of all three major nonstate
belligerents (FARC, ELN, and AUC) as “foreign terrorist organiza-
tions.” This change in outlook also facilitated the elimination of the
preexisting prohibition against using security aid for purposes other
than counternarcotics. Specifically, on August 2, 2002, President Bush
signed legislation that allowed all past and present security aid to sup-
port a “unified campaign” against drug trafficking and Colombian
“terrorist organizations” (2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act, Secs.
305 and 601). Soon US Special Forces were on the ground training
Colombian soldiers to defend the Caño Limón-Coveñas oil pipeline
(partially owned by US multinational Occidental Petroleum) against
guerrilla attacks and creating a Colombian Special Forces commando
battalion dedicated to killing or capturing top guerrilla and paramili-
tary leaders (Isacson, 2004: 247). Ultimately, Plan Colombia financed
“the delivery of about 90 helicopters, the spraying of 3.2 million acres
of Colombian territory with herbicides, and the training of over 70,000
Colombian military and police personnel” (Haugaard, Isacson, and
Johnson, 2011: 7).
Third, the inauguration of hardliner Álvaro Uribe as president of
Colombia on August 7, 2002, marked a major intensification of the
internal armed conflict in Colombia. Uribe, whose father had been
killed by FARC insurgents, embraced the “narco-terrorist” character-
ization of the guerrillas wholeheartedly and portrayed his administra-
tion as the closest Latin American ally of the United States in its war on
terror. With firm backing from the Bush administration, and bolstered
by Plan Colombia financing, Uribe tripled the military budget, nearly
doubled the size of the security forces, and launched a nationwide anti-
guerrilla offensive, while simultaneously negotiating the demobiliza-
tion of the bulk of the pro-government paramilitary forces (Haugaard,
Isacson, and Johnson, 2011: 6–7; Isacson, 2010).
The overall record of Plan Colombia is decidedly mixed. Its staunch-
est defenders, led by US and Colombian government officials, cite dra-
matic and undeniable declines in levels of homicides, massacres, and
156 l John C. Dugas
kidnappings over the decade following the adoption of Plan Colombia.

For example, homicides dropped by 40.5 percent from a peak of 27,829
in 2002 to 16,554 in 2011 (Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y
Ciencias Forenses, 2011: 20; 2012: 70). Likewise, the number of mas-
sacres fell from 115 cases with 680 victims in 2002 to 37 massacres with
171 fatalities in 2011 (Dirección de Investigación Criminal e Interpol,
2004: 58; 2012: 96). Even more striking is the decline in the num-
ber of kidnappings by 90.3 percent from a peak of 3,241 in 2001 to
313 in 2010 (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2013). 2 US and
Colombian officials also laud the deterioration in the strength of the
FARC guerillas from over 20,000 fighters in 514 municipalities in 2002
to an estimated 8,000–10,000 fighters with a presence in 206 munici-
palities in 2010 (International Crisis Group, 2010: 2).
Despite these security improvements, critics have charged that these
gains came at an extremely high price. For example, after the collapse of
peace negotiations with the FARC in 2002, direct combat took the lives
of some 21,000 soldiers, police, guerrillas, and paramilitaries by 2010
(Isacson, 2010). Moreover, human rights groups estimate that conflict-
related violence killed an additional 14,000 civilian noncombatants
during this same period (ibid.). This continued violence produced at
least three million internally displaced persons (IDPs) between 2000
and 2010, giving Colombia the second-largest population of IDPs in
the world after Sudan (ibid.; Haugaard, Isacson, and Johnson, 2011: 8).
Of particular concern to many observers was the flawed process of
demobilization that led to the disbanding of the largest paramilitary
organization, the AUC. Not only did this process result in almost com-
plete impunity for paramilitary leaders who were responsible for many
of the most atrocious massacres in recent Colombian history, but also
several thousand former AUC fighters and new paramilitaries subse-
quently took up arms again, engaging in the same practices of intimi-
dation, violence, drug trafficking, and large-scale theft of agricultural
land that characterized the former AUC forces (Haugaard, Isacson, and
Johnson, 2011: 9). Moreover, even as paramilitary violence declined
initially with the demobilization of the AUC, extrajudicial killings
committed by the Colombia’s US-financed military rose dramatically.
Particularly notable was the nearly one thousand cases of “false posi-
tives,” a Colombian term referring to instances in which civilians are
detained by soldiers, murdered, and then dressed in guerrilla clothing
and claimed by the military to be killed in combat (Isacson, 2010).
Also notable is that extrajudicial killings increased significantly (by
an average of 56%) in areas where Colombian army units received the
largest increases of US military aid under Plan Colombia (Lindsay-

Poland, 2012: 8). Even the vaunted aerial fumigation campaign had
limited effects. Although there is evidence that coca cultivation has
declined in Colombia in recent years, “the most important reductions
have occurred since about 2007 . . . after the fumigation campaign—the
centerpiece of Plan Colombia at its outset—began to be scaled back in
favor of efforts to increase the government’s on-the-ground presence
in coca-growing zones” (Haugaard, Isacson, and Johnson, 2011: 7). In
short, the successes achieved by Plan Colombia were accompanied by
significant collateral damage.
The Incorporation of Ungoverned Spaces into Plan Colombia

Plan Colombia began to be discussed seriously by US officials in 1999
and its initial financing was signed into law by President Clinton in July
2000, well over a year before the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Furthermore, as
noted in the previous section, the basic framework of Plan Colombia—
substantial security aid accompanied by a relatively small amount of
social and economic assistance—never changed after its initial estab-
lishment. Nonetheless, its implementation was clearly affected by the
termination of peace talks with the FARC guerrillas, the election of
Álvaro Uribe as president, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which led key
US policy makers to increasingly view the Colombian conflict through
the lens of the war on terror. It was in this latter context that the concept
of ungoverned spaces began to be utilized to interpret the Colombian
conflict. Hence, the concept played no role in the origin or early devel-
opment of Plan Colombia. Its utility came significantly later, primarily
as a tool for framing and defending the policy as a necessary component
of US national security.
Early discussions of Plan Colombia in Congress contained no men-
tion whatsoever of ungoverned spaces. Indeed, a careful review of eight
key House and Senate committee hearings in 1999 and 2000 in the
lead-up to and immediate aftermath of the creation of Plan Colombia
reveal that in nearly one thousand pages of discussion and testimony
by legislators, administration officials, and outside specialists, the term
“ungoverned spaces” does not appear a single time (see Appendix). This
is not to say that ideas related to this concept were not present. As noted
earlier, the underlying concerns associated with ungoverned spaces have
long been part of US foreign policy preoccupations. Hence, the hear-
ings clearly evinced a concern with the lack of stability in Colombia, the
existence of safe havens/sanctuaries, a concern that the country could
158 l John C. Dugas
become a failed state, and the need to establish the rule of law, good
governance, and stable institutions.
Fears of instability in Colombia were evident throughout the hear-
ings. Senator Arlen Spector put the matter concisely: “I am concerned
about the stability of Colombia” (US Congress Senate Committee on
Appropriations, 2000: 8). Senator Mike DeWine cautioned further that
“instability in the country threatens to destabilize the entire region”
(US Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1999: 9). Jess
T. Ford, an official from the Government Accounting Office, argued
that “Colombia faces continuing challenges associated with its political
and economic instability fostered by its longstanding insurgency and
the need for the police and the military to comply with human rights
standards” (US Congress House Committee on Government Reform,
2000b: 19–20). This instability, in turn, was perceived as related to safe
havens that existed in both Colombia and neighboring countries for
violent actors. Thus, General Barry McCaffrey, director of the Office
of National Drug Control Policy, lamented that “Colombian guerril-
las and paramilitary units have found sanctuary in Panama’s Darien
Province and cross the Colombian-Panamanian border nearly at will”
(US Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1999: 23). Of
even greater concern to some Republican lawmakers was the demili-
tarized zone that had been ceded to the FARC guerrillas during the
ongoing peace negotiations. As Senator Mitch McConnell argued, “We
cannot argue that a push into Southern Colombia will reduce drug pro-
duction, as long as there is a policy of allowing the FARC and traffickers
safe haven in a demilitarized zone (DMZ) the size of Switzerland” (US
Congress Senate Committee on Appropriations, 2000: 2). This con-
cern was echoed by Representative Dan Burton: “We have to go to the
source of the problem in Colombia. The FARC guerrillas have sanctu-
ary down there right now. They can go out and attack and kill people”
(US Congress House Committee on Government Reform, 2000b: 13).
The possibility of state failure or collapse was also underscored in the
congressional hearings on Colombia. For example, Peter Romero, the
acting assistant secretary of state for the Western Hemisphere, asserted,
“We need to help the Colombian government succeed. The likely price
of a failure would be further disintegration of the Colombian state”
(US Congress House Committee on International Relations, 1999:
10). Senator Paul Coverdell put the matter in more dire terms: “If you
allow total destabilization of Colombia and the surrounding coun-
tries . . . we could be creating an era of just total collapse” (US Congress
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1999: 12). In a statement
that strikingly foreshadowed the argument of the ungoverned spaces

framework, Thomas Pickering, the under secretary of state for Political
Affairs, argued,
Colombia’s national sovereignty is increasingly threatened by well-armed

and ruthless guerrillas, paramilitaries and the narcotrafficking interests
to which they are inextricably linked. Although the Government is not
directly at risk, these threats are slowly eroding the authority of the
central government and depriving it of the ability to govern in outly-
ing areas. It is in these lawless areas, where the guerrilla groups, para-
militaries and narcotics traffickers f lourish, that the narcotics industry
is finding refuge. (US Congress Senate Committee on Appropriations,
2000: 17)
In a separate hearing, Ted McNamara, a former US ambassador to

Colombia, reiterated Pickering’s conclusion with the assertion that “most
of the violence, corruption, and human rights crimes in Colombia stem
from the weakness of the state, not its excessive strength” (US Congress
House Committee on Government Reform, 2000a: 163).
This concern with state weakness naturally led to a focus on enhancing
governance, rule of law, and stable institutions in Colombia. As Michael
Shifter, a senior fellow at the Inter-American Dialogue put it, “A sound
policy should deal with Colombia’s underlying problems. The country
is experiencing rampant lawlessness and insecurity . . . Drugs are, to be
sure, an important dimension of Colombia’s crisis, but the core problem is
one of state authority and governance” (US Congress House Committee
on International Relations, 2000: 63). Rand Beers, assistant secretary
of state for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement asserted that
Plan Colombia sought to do just that: “Plan Colombia . . . enhances
Colombian governing capability, encourages respect for and protec-
tion of human rights, [and] strengthens democratic institutions” (ibid.,
94). The importance of establishing the rule of law in Colombia was
underscored by both proponents and opponents of Plan Colombia. For
example, William Ledwith, director of International Operations at the
Drug Enforcement Administration, declared, “Colombia faces dra-
matic challenges to the rule of law, many of which are directly related
to drug trafficking. Plan Colombia addresses many of these elements”
(US Congress House Committee on Government Reform, 2000a: 104).
Likewise, Barry McCaffrey argued, “The support we are providing to
Colombian democratic institutions, to the CNP [Colombian National
Police] and the armed forces will be used to provide the rule of law
160 l John C. Dugas
in southern Colombia” (ibid., 66). On the other hand, Representative

Janice Schakowsky noted, “I voted against Plan Colombia, and it’s
not because I am against helping Colombia. I would like to see us put
more into strengthening the rule of law which helps Colombian citi-
zens” (US Congress House Committee on Government Reform, 2000b:
11). Finally, discussion returned repeatedly to the need to strengthen
democratic institutions in Colombia. Thus, Michael Shifter argued,
“Increased United States support for the Colombian armed forces
should be seriously considered but that step should be an appendage of
a broader strategy designed to strengthen democratic institutions” (US
Congress House Committee on Government Reform, 1999: 129). Luis
Alberto Moreno, Colombia’s ambassador to the United States, appeared
to concur, testifying, “To consolidate and preserve all of the expected
results of our strategy, we must focus on strengthening Colombia’s dem-
ocratic institutions. We are working to improve the accountability and
effectiveness of our courts, make local governments more responsive to
citizen’s needs, and to expand educational and economic opportunities
throughout Colombian society” (US Congress Senate Committee on
Appropriations, 2000: 44). Thomas Pickering sought to portray Plan
Colombia as seeking precisely this end: “USAID and DOJ will fund
programs to improve human rights conditions and justice institutions
giving the Colombian people greater access to the benefits of demo-
cratic institutions” (ibid., 18).
The pattern of discussing Plan Colombia using the terminology
of instability, safe havens/sanctuaries, weak/failed state, and effective
g overnance/rule of law/stable democratic institutions continued dur-
ing the George W. Bush administration, even after the 9/11 terrorist
attacks. Notably, the first mention of ungoverned areas in a congres-
sional hearing focused on Colombia came in May 2003, when Senator
Orrin Hatch expressed a generic concern about “the nexus forming
between international organized crime, political movements and ter-
rorism arising out of certain ungovernable areas of the world” (US
Congress Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 2003: 1). After Hatch’s
general expression of concern, the term was used only three more times
over the next two years in congressional hearings that highlighted Plan
Colombia (see Appendix). Indeed, a thorough review of 40 congres-
sional hearings between 1999 and 2010 in which Colombia figured
prominently reveals that the ungoverned spaces concept was used spar-
ingly throughout the decade. To wit, in nearly 5,000 pages of hear-
ing proceedings, the term appears only 15 times. Specifically, it was
employed in nine hearings, by ten distinct speakers. Such a paucity

of use might suggest that the concept was largely irrelevant to policy
makers concerned with Plan Colombia, especially since the preexisting
terminology continued to be used throughout this period. However,
such a conclusion is not entirely warranted. Indeed, if we examine who
employed the terminology, it is notable that six of the speakers were
high-level US government officials—two from the State Department
and four from the Department of Defense.
For example, Ambassador David T. Johnson, assistant secretary of
state for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs, employed the ungoverned spaces concept in testimony before
two House hearings and one Senate hearing in 2010. His repeated use
of the concept indicates that it had clearly influenced his thinking.
Thus, on March 3, 2010, in testimony before the National Security and
Foreign Affairs subcommittee of the House Oversight and Government
Reform Committee, he stated,
Helping foreign governments build the institutions of governance is

the long run, durable answer to this problem . . . [H]elping build those
institutions with our foreign partners gives people in the DEA and the
Treasury and other places in our government partners to work with. And
it goes back to the main problem here, and that is that ungoverned space
will bite you. And whether it is ungoverned space in a remote part of
the world or it is ungoverned space in a neighborhood, in a close-by
country, that is I think where the key is to dealing with this problem.
(US Congress House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
2010a: 85)
Four months later, in testimony before the Domestic Policy subcom-

mittee of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee,
Johnson expanded upon these views, asserting,
I think that a durable, effective, long-term program will have to have

some element, perhaps a significant element, particularly on the rule of
law side. We have had, from my point of view, a successful eradication
program in Colombia, but that program will be durable over time to
the extent that the Colombian authorities, with our support, are able to
extend the reach of the State and provide State services, particularly secu-
rity services and rule of law in areas that are ungoverned or poorly gov-
erned. (US Congress House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform, 2010b: 103)
162 l John C. Dugas
Although concern with governance, institution building, and rule of

law had long preceded the ungoverned spaces concept, Johnson uses the
latter notion as a framing device to bring them together in a coherent
fashion.
Likewise, top military officials incorporated the concept into their
testimony before congressional committees. Notably, all three com-
manders of the US Southern Command (which has responsibility for
US military activities in South and Central America) between August
2002 and June 2009 made use of the term in congressional testimony.
For example, General James T. Hill, in one of the earliest uses of ungov-
erned spaces in a hearing devoted to Colombia, declared in October
2003,
The FARC, ELN, and AUC operate across the porous borders of
Colombia’s neighbors, and the remote nature of many of these areas
makes them ever more attractive as safe havens. While we are seeing
increased coordination and cooperation among most of Colombia’s
neighbors, some of those countries also lack the resources to maintain
territorial sovereignty in these ungoverned spaces. (US Congress Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, 2003: 27)
Similarly, in a hearing before the House Armed Services Committee,

General Bantz J. Craddock argued that in Latin America “ungoverned
spaces, porous borders, organized crime, and narco-terrorism pose
enormous challenges to freely elected leaders and often undermine
legitimate governments” (US Congress House Committee on Armed
Services, 2006: 4). Finally, Admiral James Stavridis noted that the US
Southern Command used funds to provide support to “the Colombian
government’s ‘Colombian Coordination Centers for Integrated Action’
(CCIA). The CCIA is a program designed to reestablish governance
in previously ungoverned spaces of Colombia” (US Congress House
Committee on Armed Services, 2009: 172).
That the commanding officers of the US Southern Command would
make use of the ungoverned spaces concept in their testimony on
Colombia should not be surprising. Of all the entities comprising the
US government, the Department of Defense appears to have embraced
this concept most fully. Beyond its employment in congressional testi-
mony, the concept figures prominently in numerous publications related
to the Defense Department. For example, the 2007 Rand volume on
ungoverned territories financed by the US Air Force contains a chap-
ter that examines the ungoverned area along the C olombia-Venezuela
border in which the FARC, the ELN, and the AUC all vie for control in
the absence of a significant state presence (Boraz, 2007: 243–276). Of
particular note is the number of recent graduate theses written by US
military officers at institutes such as the US Army War College (e.g.,
Bourque, 2004; Buckley, 2004; Campsey, 2005; Mejía, 2008; Weiler,
2004) and the Naval Postgraduate School (e.g., Andrade-Garzon,
2008; Farrell, 2007; Pires, 2012; Whittenburg, 2009) that have used
the ungoverned spaces in writing about Plan Colombia. Notably, with
few exceptions (e.g., Burroughs, 2010), these authors utilize the con-
cept uncritically—that is, they proceed as though the concept is both
widely accepted and unproblematic. This in itself is perhaps a useful
indicator of how thoroughly the concept has permeated the military
establishment.
One interesting example of the incorporation of the ungoverned
spaces concept into the analysis of Plan Colombia is seen in the writ-
ings of Gabriel Marcella, a prolific author and (now retired) professor
at the US Army War College. Between 1999 and 2009, Marcella pub-
lished a half dozen monographs analyzing Colombia during the lead-up
to, adoption, and subsequent implementation of Plan Colombia. In
the earliest monographs (Marcella and Schulz, 1999; Marcella, 2001;
Marcella et al., 2001), Marcella employed many of the traditional
concepts noted in this chapter that have long been used with refer-
ence to US foreign policy concerns in Latin America. For example,
in March 1999, prior to the advent of discussions on Plan Colombia,
Marcella argued, “Drug criminals, guerrillas, and paramilitary ‘self-
defense’ organizations are feeding a spiral of violence and corruption
that makes ‘colombianization’ a metaphor for a failing state” (Marcella
and Schulz, 1999: 1). He declared that while “Colombia is nowhere near
the failed state syndrome” (ibid., 24), its “very weakness . . . as a nation-
state threatens international order in the region” (ibid., 6). Moreover,
he underscored “the weakness of the state—its inability to command an
effective presence—in rural areas” (ibid., 14). Not least, he called for a
strategy to “establish legitimate and responsible governmental authority
over territory and population . . . achieved through participatory elec-
tions and then sustained by effective governance” (ibid., 22). Two years
later, after the inauguration of Plan Colombia, Marcella continued to
highlight the same themes without any explicit mention of ungoverned
spaces. Hence, he describes Colombia as being on “the brink of total
failure as a democracy” (Marcella, 2001: 18), and declares that “the
institutional capacity of the state to deal with the problems of gover-
nance and public security is manifestly weak” (ibid., 2). Notably, he
164 l John C. Dugas
also concludes that “there is no alternative to Plan Colombia at this

time,” which “provides an excellent foundational strategy that must
be further developed, applied to the entire country, and sustained for
many years to come” (ibid., 18). Later in 2001, he argued, “The insti-
tutional capacity of Colombia to deal with public security, to control
its borders, and to protect the lives of its citizens has declined to such
a degree that it’s become a Hobbesian hell” (Marcella et al., 2001: 2).
Without using the terminology of ungoverned spaces, he clearly under-
scored its major contention: “[Colombia’s] troubles are due not only to
drugs, but also to the lack of state authority, legitimacy, and effective
governance in major portions of a national territory three times the size
of Montana, with enormous empty spaces absent government presence”
(ibid.). Moreover, writing in support of Plan Colombia, he declared,
“Unless the Colombian security forces (military and police) can reestab-
lish effective control over the national territory, the economic support
and the institution building are not likely to take deep root in such an
environment of insecurity” (ibid., 3).
By 2003, however, Marcella began to incorporate explicitly the
ungoverned spaces concept into his writings. Thus, in May 2003, he
described the Colombian conflict as part of “a recurring global geopo-
litical reality, of which Colombia is a paradigm: the problem of weak
states and ungoverned space” (Marcella, 2003: ix). Colombia was seen
as “a surprisingly weak state under assault by a powerful combination of
ungoverned national territory, insurgent terrorism of the left and right,
international crime organized around drug trafficking, a deeply rooted
counterculture of violence and impunity, ecological damage, and insti-
tutional corruption” (ibid., 1). Moreover, such a situation allowed “crim-
inal nonstate actors . . . [to] take advantage of ungoverned space, weak to
nonexistent border controls, the facility offered by globalization, and
the corresponding corruption of government officials and institutions”
(ibid., 2). In a more general monograph published in 2007, Marcella
laments that “One nefarious result of the comparatively ‘long peace’ in
Latin America is . . . inattention to ungoverned space” (Marcella, 2007:
34). He then observes,
Colombians, for example, having one of the most formidable geogra-

phies in the world and lots of ungoverned territory east and west of the
Andean intermontane valleys, have shown in their history a remarkable
proclivity for small and weak central government, de facto ceding major
portions of the extensive and difficult national territory (estimated
as high as 40 percent) and international borders to an assortment of
autonomy movements (in the 19th century), criminals, contrabandists,

n arco-traffickers, paramilitaries, and insurgent terrorists. (ibid., 35)
Finally, in a monograph published in 2009, Marcella notes that “a large

part of Colombia’s national territory had not been under government
authority” (Marcella, 2009: 13), and that “the challenge of ungoverned
space and noninstitutionalized Colombia was intensified by groups out-
side the law . . . that operated with near impunity—the n arco-traffickers,
the terrorist guerrillas, and the paramilitaries” (ibid., 16–17).
Marcella’s writings are worth noting because they usefully under-
score the central contentions of this chapter. First, Plan Colombia
was conceived of, debated, and implemented prior to the widespread
usage of the concept of ungoverned spaces. Second, scholars and policy
makers alike had long had an array of concepts to draw upon (such
as instability, safe havens/sanctuaries, weak/failed states, and rule of
law/governance/stable institutions) when debating perceived security
threats to the United States in the Western Hemisphere. Such concepts
were widely used in the debates over the introduction and implementa-
tion of Plan Colombia. Third, the concept of ungoverned spaces came
late to issue of Plan Colombia. While many US government officials,
particularly in the military, incorporated the concept into their sub-
sequent analyses, it served primarily as a framing device to organize
preexisting concepts, ideas, and rationales. In short, it contributed little
novel information to the ongoing debate about Plan Colombia. Rather
it functioned as new packaging—a new wineskin, if you will—that
could structure long-standing arguments in a seemingly more cohesive
and convincing fashion, helping to justify continued US government
support for Plan Colombia.
Concluding Reflections
Critics of Plan Colombia have long argued, as Representative Jan
Schakowsky did in 2001, that it was “too heavily weighted in helicop-
ters and military hardware, instead of support for civil society, demo-
cratic institutions, and human rights defenders” (US Congress House
Committee on Government Reform, 2001: 6). Normatively, such an
assessment has proven to be correct, as seen retrospectively by some
of the evidence reviewed in this chapter regarding IDPs, impunity for
demobilized paramilitary murderers, and the rise in extrajudicial assas-
sinations committed by Colombian state security forces. Nonetheless,
there is a certain irony in the introduction of the ungoverned spaces
166 l John C. Dugas
concept into the discussion of Plan Colombia. To wit, even as the

ungoverned spaces framework was embraced by government officials
as a means to justify the continuation of a policy with many norma-
tively undesirable results, the framework also provides a rationale for
providing precisely those state services that critics of Plan Colombia
have held were so often lacking. Thus, even a staunch defender of Plan
Colombia like Professor Marcella can argue, working from a framework
of ungoverned spaces, that “Colombia faces a long period of building
and rebuilding the institutional capacity to prevent further conflict,
establish effective democratic governance and support for civil society,
expand social services such as education and health, expand infrastruc-
ture and market mechanisms, and address the needs of displaced peo-
ple” (Marcella, 2009: 8).
In brief, like many concepts, ungoverned spaces is a two-edged sword.
For much of the decade of the 2000s, the concept provided a useful
framework for US government officials to justify high levels of military
spending to strengthen the Colombian state security forces. But nota-
bly, the concept is currently being used to help justify a Colombian gov-
ernment initiative, the National Territorial Consolidation Plan (Plan
Nacional de Consolidación Territorial, PNCT) that seeks to ensure the
presence of the state by providing basic social services such as health,
education, and justice. Significantly, even some of Plan Colombia’s
most high-profile detractors have now incorporated the ungoverned
spaces concept into their efforts to support the expansion of basic social
services to Colombia’s hinterlands through this plan. For example,
the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) recently released a
report critical of the progress of the PNCT. What is noteworthy from
the perspective of the discussion in this chapter is how the report uncrit-
ically utilizes the ungoverned spaces concept throughout. For example,
the report seeks “to identify the conditions that should be in place for
civilians to replace military personnel as quickly as possible in previ-
ously ungoverned and conflictive areas” (Isacson, 2012: 2). It lauds the
Colombian military’s belated
realization that only a full state presence, one that goes well beyond the
military to incorporate the state’s civilian institutions, can secure places
like Meta, Guaviare, Caquetá, Cauca, or Putumayo, and integrate them
into Colombia’s civic and economic life in a way that improves living
standards. This realization represented a break with Colombia’s historic
pattern of leaving peripheral areas ungoverned, in the hands of warlords,
or up to the military. (ibid., 4–5)
Toward the end of the report, the author expresses a fear that high-
level backing for the consolidation plan is waning in both the US and
Colombian governments but “still hold[s] out the possibility that talk of
‘stagnation’ or the decline of Consolidation—or rather, the decline of
the very idea of bringing civilian governance to ungoverned areas—is
misplaced” (ibid., 21).
Perhaps, then, the concept of ungoverned spaces is more flexible
than many of its well-intentioned critics have realized. Just as it has
served as a new wineskin for the old wine of rationalizing vast amounts
of security assistance, so too it might serve as a means for justifying the
expansion of civilian rule and state-provided social services to all citi-
zens. Given the concept’s increasingly widespread usage, a key challenge
to scholars and advocates is to ensure that it is utilized in such ethically
defensible ways.
Notes
1. Strictly speaking, Plan Colombia was a six-year plan that formally con-
cluded at the end of 2005 (Veillette, 2005: 1–2, 12). Most of its financing
came from the broader Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), supple-
mented by funding from the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program,
the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, and
the Defense Department Counternarcotics Account (Veillette, 2006: 2–6).
Nonetheless, even after Plan Colombia officially ceased to exist, the term
has continued to be used to refer to the ongoing heightened level of US
assistance to Colombia that began in 2000.
2. For specific kidnapping statistics by year, see the online database of the
Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica at http://www.cifrasyconceptos
.com/secuestro/presentacion_reportes.php.
Works Cited
2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery from and Response to
Terrorist Attacks on the United States (2002, August 2). Public Law 107–206.
Andrade-Garzon, Celso (2008). Has Plan Colombia ignored neighboring coun-
tries? Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
of Master of Science in Defense Analysis. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate
School.
Arias, Enrique Desmond (2010). Understanding criminal networks, political order,
and politics in Latin America. In Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas
(eds.), Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened
Sovereignty. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
168 l John C. Dugas
Boraz, Steven (2007). Case study: The Colombia-Venezuela border. In Angel Rabasa
et al. (eds.), Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks.
Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
Bourque, Alan G. (2004). Changing U.S. strategy in South America: Adjusting
and exporting Plan Colombia. Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. Carlisle Barracks, PA:
US Army War College.
Buckley, Kevin W. (2004). U.S. support to Plan Colombia: A heading check. Thesis
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic
Studies Degree. Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College.
Burroughs, Jeffery T. (2010). The efficacy of security force assistance in countering
violent extremist organizations in failed and potentially failing states. Thesis
presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of
Military Art and Science (Military Strategy). Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army
Command and General Staff College.
Bush, George H. W. (1990, March). National Security Strategy of the United States.
Campsey, Mark (2005). Balancing U.S. strategy in Colombia. Thesis submitted in
partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree.
Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College.
Central Intelligence Agency (1978). International Terrorism in 1977. Washington,
DC: Central Intelligence Agency—National Foreign Assessment Center.
Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (2013). Una verdad secuestrada: cuarenta
años de estadísticas de secuestro 1970–2010. Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 20 de
junio.
Clinton, Bill (1998, October). A National Security Strategy for a New Century.
Clinton, Bill (1994, July). A National Security Strategy of Engagement and
Enlargement. Washington, DC: The White House.
Clunan, Anne L. (2010). Ungoverned spaces? The need for reevaluation. In Anne L.
Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas (eds.), Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State
Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Clunan, Anne L., and Harold A. Trinkunas (2010a). Conceptualizing ungoverned
spaces: Territorial statehood, contested authority, and softened sovereignty. In
Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas (eds.), Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives
to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press.
Clunan, Anne L., and Harold A. Trinkunas (2010b). Alternative governance and
security. In Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas (eds.), Ungoverned Spaces:
Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty. Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press.
Crandall, Russell (2008). Driven by Drugs: U.S. Policy toward Colombia, 2nd ed.
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Dirección de Investigación Criminal e Interpol (2012). Tabla 4—Comparativo
Delitos de Impacto Social 2010–2011. Revista Criminalidad, 54(1), 96.
Dirección de Investigación Criminal e Interpol (2004). Tabla 4—Comparativo

Delitos de Impacto Social 2002–2003. Revista Criminalidad, 46, 58.
Dugas, John C. (2005). The Colombian nightmare: Human rights abuses and
the contradictory effects of U.S. foreign policy. In Cecilia Menjívar and Nestor
Rodríguez (eds.), When States Kill: Latin America, the U.S. and Technologies of
Terror. Austin: University of Texas Press.
Farrell, Michelle L. (2007). Sequencing: Targeting insurgents and drugs in
Colombia. Thesis Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Master of Arts in National Security Affairs. Monterey, CA: Naval
Postgraduate School.
Felbab-Brown, Vanda (2010). Rules and regulations in ungoverned spaces: Illicit
economies, criminals, and belligerents. In Anne L. Clunan and Harold A.
Trinkunas (eds.), Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of
Softened Sovereignty. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Haugaard, Lisa, Isacson, Adam, & Johnson, Jennifer (2011, November). A cau-
tionary tale: Plan Colombia’s lessons for US policy toward Mexico and beyond.
Latin America Working Group Education Fund, Center for International Policy,
and Washington Office on Latin America.
Human Rights Watch (1996). Colombia’s Killer Networks: The Military-paramilitary
Partnership and the United States. New York: Human Rights Watch.
Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses (2012, Julio).
“Comportamiento del Homicidio. Colombia, 2011,” Forensis 2011: Datos Para
la Vida, 13(1), 67–99.
Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses (2011, Junio).
“Descripción del Comportamiento del Homicidio. Colombia, 2010,” Forensis
2010: Datos Para la Vida, 12(1), 19–55.
International Crisis Group (2010, June 29). Improving security policy in Colombia.
Latin America Briefing No. 23, Bogotá, Brussels.
Isacson, Adam (2012, December). Consolidating “consolidation.” Washington,
DC: Washington Office on Latin America.
Isacson, Adam (2010, July 14). Don’t call it a model: On Plan Colombia’s tenth
anniversary, claims of “success” don’t stand up to scrutiny. Washington Office
on Latin America. Retrieved July 8, 2013, from http://justf.org/files/pubs/
notmodel.pdf.
Isacson, Adam (2004). Optimism, pessimism, and terrorism: The United States
and Colombia in 2003. Brown Journal of World Affairs, 10(2), 245–255.
Isacson, Adam (2002). Colombia’s human security crisis. Disarmament Forum—
Human Security in Latin America, 2, 25–40.
Just the Facts (2013). U.S. aid to Colombia, all Programs, 2000–2012. Retrieved
July 8, 2013, from http://justf.org/Country?country=Colombia&year1=2000&
year2=2012&funding=All+Programs&x=84&y=4.
Lamb, Robert D. (2008). Ungoverned Areas and Threats from Safe Havens.
Lindsay-Poland, John (2012, May 23–26). The damage done: Measuring the
human rights impact of U.S. military aid in Colombia. Unpublished paper
170 l John C. Dugas
delivered at the 2012 Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, San
Francisco, CA.
Marcella, Gabriel (2009, December). Democratic governance and the rule of law:
Lessons from Colombia. US Army War College—Strategic Studies Institute.
Marcella, Gabriel (2007, September). American grand strategy for Latin America
in the age of resentment. US Army War College—Strategic Studies Institute.
Marcella, Gabriel (2003, May). The United States and Colombia: The journey
from ambiguity to strategic clarity. US Army War College—Strategic Studies
Institute.
Marcella, Gabriel (2001, April). Plan Colombia: The strategic and operational
imperatives. US Army War College—Strategic Studies Institute.
Marcella, Gabriel, et al. (2001, June). Plan Colombia: Some differing perspectives.
US Army War College—Strategic Studies Institute.
Marcella, Gabriel, & Schulz, Donald. (1999, March 5). Colombia’s three wars: U.S.
strategy at the crossroads. US Army War College—Strategic Studies Institute.
Mason, Ann C. (2010). National security. In Rex A. Hudson (ed.), Colombia:
A Country Study. Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Federal Research
Division.
Mejía, Alberto (2008). Colombia’s national security strategy, a new “COIN”
approach. Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the
Master of Strategic Studies Degree. Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War
College.
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (2004). The
9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks upon the United States. New York: Norton. p. 366.
NSS (2006, March). The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.
Pires, Nuno M. (2012). Deviant globalization and the unintended consequences
of coca eradication in Colombia. Thesis Submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Security Studies (Western
Hemisphere). Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School.
Rabasa, Angel, et al. (eds.) (2007). Preface. In Ungoverned Territories: Understanding
and Reducing Terrorism Risks. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
Rabasa, Angel, & Peters, John E. (2007a). Understanding lack of governance. In
Angel Rabasa et al. (eds.), Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing
Terrorism Risks. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
Rabasa, Angel, & Peters, John E. (2007b). Dimensions of ungovernability. In
Rabasa, Angel, & Peters, John E. (2007c). Comparative analysis of case studies. In
Reagan, Ronald (1986, April 8). National Security Decision Directive
221—Narcotics and National Security. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Archives. Retrieved July 7, 2013, from http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives

/reference/Scanned%20NSDDS/NSDD221.pdf.
Roosevelt, Theodore (1904, December 6). Fourth annual message. Online by
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. Retrieved
July 5, 2013, from (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29545).
Rumsfeld, Donald H. (2002). Defense ministerial of the Americas: Statement by
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Santiago, Chile, Tuesday, November
19, 2002. US Department of Defense. Retrieved March 5, 2013, from http:
//www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=308.
Shalikashvili, John M. (1997). National Military Strategy. Washington, DC: US
Department of Defense.
Tate, Winifred (2000). Repeating past mistakes: Aiding counterinsurgency in
Colombia. NACLA Report on the Americas, 34(2): 16–19.
US Congress House Committee on Armed Services (2009, March 18). Security
developments in the areas of responsibility of the U.S. Southern Command, etc.
111th Cong., 1st sess.
US Congress House Committee on Armed Services (2006, March 16). National
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2007—budget request from the U.S.
Southern Command. 109th Cong., 2nd sess.
US Congress House Committee on Government Reform (2001, March 2). The
study of Plan Colombia: An assessment of successes and challenges. 107th
Cong., 1st sess.
US Congress House Committee on Government Reform (2000a, February 15).
The crisis in Colombia: What are we facing? 106th Cong., 2nd sess.
US Congress House Committee on Government Reform (2000b, October 12).
Getting U.S. aid to Colombia. 106th Cong., 2nd sess.
US Congress House Committee on Government Reform (1999, August 6). The
narcotics threat from Colombia. 106th Cong., 1st sess.
US Congress House Committee on International Relations (2000, September 21).
Implementing Plan Colombia: The U.S. role. 106th Cong., 2nd sess.
To receive an update on selected regional issues to include: Colombia and U.S.
policy, etc. 106th Cong., 1st sess.
US Congress House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (2010a,
March 3). Transnational drug enterprises (part II): U.S. perspectives on the
threats to global stability. 111th Cong., 2nd sess.
US Congress House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (2010b,
December 1). Latin America in 2010: Opportunities, challenges and the future
of U.S. policy in the hemisphere. 111th Cong., 2nd sess.
US Congress Senate Committee on Appropriations (2000, February 24). Joint
hearing on supplemental request for Plan Colombia. 106th Cong., 2nd sess.
US Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (2003, October 29).
Challenges and successes for U.S. policy toward Colombia: Is Plan Colombia
working? 108th Cong., 1st sess.
172 l John C. Dugas
US Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (1999, 6 October). Crisis in

Colombia: U.S. support for peace process and anti-drug efforts. 106th Cong.,
1st sess.
US Congress Senate Committee on the Judiciary (2003, May 20). Narco-terrorism:
International drug trafficking and terrorism—a dangerous mix. 107th Cong.,
1st sess.
US Department of State (1989, March). Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1988.
Washington, DC: US Department of State—Office of the Secretary of State,
Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism.
Veillette, Connie (2006, January 27). Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and
related funding programs: FY2006 assistance. Washington, DC: Library of
Congress, Congressional Research Service.
Veillette, Connie (2005, February 17). Plan Colombia: A progress report.
Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service.
Weiler, Stephen G. (2004). Colombia: Gateway to defeating transnational hell in
the Western Hemisphere. Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the require-
ments of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army
War College.
Whittenburg, Scott R. (2009). Opium in Afghanistan: Lessons learned from the
counterdrug strategies of Colombia. Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Defense Analysis.
Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School.
Williams, Phil (2010). Here be Dragons: Dangerous spaces and international secu-
rity. In Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas (eds.), Ungoverned Spaces:
APPENDIX
Key Congressional Hearings on

Colombia (1999–2010)
Date Chamber Committee Subcommittee Title of hearing Pages Ungoverned
spaces?
Aug. 6, 1999 House Government Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, The Narcotics Threat from 160 No
Reform and Human Resources Colombia
Sep. 29, 1999 House International Western Hemisphere To Receive an Update on Selected 54 No
Relations Regional Issues to Include:
Colombia and U.S. Policy, etc.
Oct. 6, 1999 Senate Foreign Crisis in Colombia: US Support for 70 No
Relations Peace Process and Anti-Drug Efforts
Feb. 15, 2000 House Government Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, The Crisis in Colombia: What Are 225 No
Reform and Human Resources We Facing?
Feb. 22, Senate Finance International Trade (and Senate United States Assistance Options for 177 No
174
2000 Caucus on Intl. Narcotics the Andes

Control)
Feb. 24, 2000 Senate Appropriations Foreign Operations, Defense, Joint Hearing on Supplemental 70 No
and Military Construction Request for Plan Colombia
Sep. 21, 2000 House International Western Hemisphere Implementing Plan Colombia: The 99 No
Relations U.S. Role
Oct. 12, House Government Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, Getting U.S. Aid to Colombia 139 No
2000 Reform and Human Resources
Mar 2, House Government Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, The Study of Plan Colombia: 204 No
2001 Reform and Human Resources An Assessment of Successes and
Challenges
Oct. 3, 2001 House Government Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, Drug Trade and the Terror Network 121 No
Reform and Human Resources
Feb. 26, 2002 House Government Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, The National Drug Control 85 No
Reform and Human Resources Strategy for 2002
Mar. 13, 2002 Senate Judiciary Technology, Terrorism, and Narco-Terror: The Worldwide 60 No
Government Information Connection between Drugs and
Terrorism
Apr. 24, Senate Foreign Western Hemisphere, Peace U.S.-Colombia Policy: What’s Next? 81 No
2002 Relations Corps, and Narcotics Affairs
Dec. 12, 2002 House Government America’s Heroin Crisis, Colombian 216 No
Reform Heroin, and How We Can Improve
Plan Colombia
May 20, 2003 Senate Judiciary Narco-terrorism: International 113 Yes
Drug Trafficking and Terrorism—A 1 mention
175
Dangerous Mix
Jul. 9, 2003 House Government Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, Disrupting the Market: Strategy, 126 No
Reform and Human Resources Implementation, and Results in
Narcotics Source Countries
Oct. 29, 2003 Senate Foreign Relations Challenges and Successes for U.S. 92 Yes
Policy toward Colombia: Is Plan 1 mention
Colombia Working?
Mar. 2, 2004 House Government Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, Andean Counterdrug Initiative 76 Yes
Reform and Human Resources 2 mentions
Apr. 24, 2004 House Government Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, DOD Counternarcotics: What Is 138 No
Reform and Human Resources Congress Getting for Its Money?
continued
spaces?
Jun. 17, 2004 House Government The War against Drugs and Thugs: 232 No
Reform A Status Report on Plan Colombia
Successes and Challenges
Mar. 9, 2005 House International Western Hemisphere The State of Democracy in Latin 92 No
Relations America
Apr. 20, 2005 House International Western Hemisphere Gangs and Crime in Latin America 75 No
Relations
May 10, 2005 House Government Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 2006 DOD Counternarcotics 76 No
Reform and Human Resources Budget: Does It Deliver the
Necessary Support?
176
May 11, 2005 House International Plan Colombia: Major Successes and 106 No
Relations New Challenges
Jul. 27, 2005 House International Western Hemisphere U.S. Diplomacy in Latin America 57 No
Relations
Sept. 28, 2005 House International Western Hemisphere Keeping Democracy on Track: 60 No
Relations Hotspots in Latin America
Mar. 16, 2006 House Armed Services National Defense Authorization 57 Yes
Act for Fiscal Year 2007—Budget 5 mentions
Request from the U.S. Southern
Command
Mar. 30, 2006 House International Western Hemisphere Counternarcotics Strategies in Latin 119 No
Relations America
Jun. 21, 2006 House International Western Hemisphere Democracy in Latin America: 69 No
Relations Successes, Challenges and the
Future
Sep. 21, 2006 House Judiciary; Crime, Terrorism, and Need for European Assistance to 68 No
International Homeland Security (Judiciary); Colombia for the Fight against
Relations Western Hemisphere ( Illicit Drugs
International Relations)
Mar. 1, 2007 House Foreign Affairs Western Hemisphere Overview of U.S. Policy toward 88 No
Latin America
Apr. 24, 2007 House Foreign Affairs Western Hemisphere U.S.-Colombia Relations 118 Yes
2 mentions
Jun. 19, 2007 House Foreign Affairs South America and the United 69 No
177
States: How to Fix a Broken

Relationship
Mar. 11, 2008 House Oversight and National Security and Foreign National Security and Latin 76 No
Government Affairs America: Challenges and
Reform Opportunities on Energy
Cooperation
Feb. 4, 2009 House Foreign Affairs Western Hemisphere U.S. Policy toward Latin America in 84 No
2009 and Beyond
Feb. 12, 2009 House Education and Examining Workers’ Rights and 110 No
Labor Violence against Labor Union
Leaders in Colombia
continued
spaces?
Mar. 18, 2009 House Armed Services Security Developments in the 174 Yes
Areas of Responsibility of the U.S. 1 mention
Southern Command, etc.
Oct. 1, 2009 House Oversight and National Security and Foreign Transnational Drug Enterprises: 85 Noa
Government Affairs Threats to Global Stability and U.S.
Reform National Security from Southwest
Asia, Latin America, and West
Africa
Oct. 15, 2009 House Foreign Affairs Western Hemisphere Assessing U.S. Drug Policy in the 70 No
178
Americas
Mar. 3, 2010 House Oversight and National Security and Foreign Transnational Drug Enterprises 156 Yes
Government Affairs (Part II): U.S. Perspectives on the 3 mentions
Reform Threats to Global Stability and U.S.
National Security
Notes:
Number of hearings: 40
Number of mentions of “ungoverned spaces”: 15
Number of distinct speakers who utilized “ungoverned spaces” concept: 10 (3 legislators; 4 Department of Defense officials; 2 Department of State officials; and 1 outside
specialist)
Number of hearings with mentions of “ungoverned spaces”: 9
Total pages of hearings: 4983 pages
a
Two mentions were made of “ungoverned spaces” in the hearing, but both were in reference to Africa, not Colombia.
CHAPTER 9
US Response to the Haitian

Earthquake in the Context of
the Concepts of Failed State and
Ungoverned Spaces
Gary Prevost
Introduction
The relationship between the United States and Haiti is a long-standing
one stretching back over two centuries to the founding of the two repub-
lics. One nation, the United States, emerged as the dominant power
politically, economically, and militarily in the twentieth century while
Haiti, founded with great hope and expectation, as the world’s first
black republic in 1804, has languished in the last century as the poor-
est country in the Western Hemisphere. This chapter will explore how
the contemporary relationship between the United States and Haiti,
especially in the wake of the devastating earthquake that struck Port-
Au-Prince in January 2010 has been framed by the concept of “failed
states,” that in the wake of the September 11, 2011, attack on the United
States, has held a prominent place in the strategic thinking of the United
States government.1 The concept of failed states is not a new one, hav-
ing entered US political thinking in the early 1990s, but the 9/11 events
focused attention on the failure of the Afghan state to prevent the oper-
ation of Al-Qaeda on its territory. The situation in Afghanistan, and
subsequent growing concern about states perceived to be similar, only
intensified concern about the role of failed states in harboring or aid-
ing terrorism. This outlook was codified in the US National Security
180 l Gary Prevost
Strategy of 2002, which declared, “America is now threatened less by

conquering states than by failing ones.” 2
While the failed state concept has remained central to US war mak-
ing strategy in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, the center of US atten-
tion in the last decade, it has been broadened to include the entire world
including Latin America. The list of countries has grown to encompass
states as diverse as Colombia, East Timor, Indonesia, North Korea, Cote
d’Ivoire, Haiti, Iraq, Somalia, and the Sudan.3 This extension to Latin
America has been significant because it has meant that during the past
12 years US policy in the Western Hemisphere has shifted away from
the primarily economic emphasis of the 1990s, the era of the Free Trade
Area of the Americas project, back to a security focus reminiscent of the
Cold War era.4 The last ten years have witnessed a significant increase
in US military presence in the region highlighted by the relaunching of
the Caribbean-based Fourth Fleet, the militarization of drug fighting
efforts in Mexico, and the establishment of several new military bases in
Colombia, the staunchest US ally in the region. While not based solely
on the failed state or “contested spaces” rhetoric, the shift has in part
utilized that rhetoric to justify the renewed military focus in spite of
any concrete evidence that terror plots aimed at the US homeland have
been created in Latin America. It is the author’s perspective that the
renewed US focus in Latin America has little to do with real fears of ter-
ror attacks emanating from the region and more to do with defending
long-standing political and economic interests in the region in the face
of political forces embodied in Venezuela and its forthright challenge to
US hegemony in the region.
Haiti has always been on the short list of failed states, but the tragic
events of January 10, 2010, brought renewed focus to that country and
a US government response that was primarily a military-oriented one
and shaped in a significant way by the fear that Haiti would become
a definitively failed state. The magnitude of the natural disaster made
those fears plausible. The quake killed between 46,190 and 86,691 peo-
ple and injured 200,000 more. It destroyed 250,000 homes, displaced
1.3 million people, and caused property damage of US$14 billion. This
natural disaster came on the heels of tumultuous political events that
had marked the country over the previous two centuries.
Haiti’s History
Haiti’s history is known to some for its emergence in 1804 as the first
black republic and one of the first, after the United States, independent
US Response to the Haitian Earthquake l 181
postcolonial governments. The heroic figure of the Haitian indepen-

dence was a freed slave, Toussaint L’Overture, who became Haiti’s
leader by the mid-1790s. They fought off British occupation in the north
and in 1802 they stalemated a French attempt to retake the nation.
However, Toussaint was captured by the French, taken into custody,
and died in 1803 in France. The break with France came with great
consequences for Haiti. In 1825, France imposed crippling reparations
on the new nation, which hobbled the country for generations. In Haiti,
Jean Jacques Dessalines, who completed the job of expelling the French,
declared himself emperor. Two years later, he was assassinated and the
country divided along racial lines, a black north and a mulatto south. A
pattern of political instability had taken hold.
In 1915, the United States, uneasy from the start about an ex-slave
republic in the region, invaded Haiti, apparently to protect American
economic and political interests. The troops did not leave until 1935,
after which the United States continued to influence and oversee parts
of the Haitian economy until 1947. The US intervention in Haiti was
part of the larger pattern of US intervention in the Caribbean Basin
region in the first third of the twentieth century under the rubric of
the Era of Gunboat Diplomacy. The era was marked by more than 50
armed US interventions aimed at placing in power local governments
that were friendly to US business interests. After 1933, with the costs
of the interventions rising and faced with increasing local resistance,
the administration shifted tactics somewhat with its lofty language of
a Good Neighbor Policy for the region. The policy involved stepping
back from direct military interventions and replacing that approach
with military and economic aid to local governments that were willing
to accept US political and military domination of the region and con-
tinued to favor US private investment in the region over investment and
trade from other regions. For Haiti, the era of post American occupa-
tion provided some hope. US assistance facilitated some infrastructure
development and a professionally run Central Bank. By 1950, Haiti
had begun to move ahead of some of its neighbors in the education
arena and it also began to develop a tourism industry, attracted by the
country’s vibrant culture. This progress was in line with the thinking
of the New Deal and the Good Neighbor Policy that developing Latin
American economies could become a market for US exports, not just a
source of cheap natural resources and labor.
Unfortunately for Haiti, this positive period was short-lived. In
1956, modernizing military leader Paul Magloire was overthrown
and in 1957, with the support of the military, Francois Duvalier, a
182 l Gary Prevost
traditional country physician known as Papa Doc, got himself elected

president and soon declared himself president for life. In the Duvalier
era, Papa Doc was followed in the presidency, in 1971, by his son,
Jean-Claude, perhaps the most known of Haiti’s tortuous modern his-
tory. The Duvaliers systematically repressed the population through
their hated private policy force, the Tonton Macoutes, and pocketed
the country’s wealth in a manner that sharply limited the country’s
economic, social, and political development. Jean-Claude was driven
out from office by a 1986 popular uprising that ultimately led in 1990
to Haiti’s first truly democratic election. In that year, Jean-Bertrand
Aristide, a youthful priest, was elected on a populist platform. But
in the next year, he was overthrown by General Raoul Cédras with
ties to the traditional Haiti ruling elites who feared the progressive
direction of Aristide’s administration. In spite of sanctions imposed by
the international community against the military rulers, Aristide was
only returned to power in 1994 under US military pressure. Back in
power, Aristide was not the forthright populist who had taken power
four years earlier. He abandoned the attempt to fundamentally reshape
Haitian society. The stance was clearly part of a deal that the Clinton
administration had brokered with Aristide in return for US support for
his reinstatement. Aristide also quickly stepped aside for Rene Preval, a
Lavalas Party colleague to win the 1995 election. This act was in keep-
ing with the Haitian Constitution, but it meant that Aristide served
only two years of his five-year term with little ability to make any real
impact on the country.
Aristide won a second term in 2000 but in 2004 was driven out
from office by armed actions of supporters of the traditional elites.
The United States and France refused to come to his aid and Aristide
was sent into exile in South Africa. In spite of that development, he
remained a popular figure and in 2006 his protégé Rene Preval won the
presidential election amid a background of political turmoil. In 2004,
in the wake of Aristide’s departure, the task of Haitian security was
again assumed by foreigners, this time not a French or US operation
but a UN peacekeeping mission, named United Nations Mission for
Stabilization in Haiti (MINUSTAH), commanded and staffed primar-
ily by Brazil. Ten years after its creation, the mission remains in place
and its role is bitterly contested. For some, it has stabilized the country,
allowing for presidential elections in both 2006 and 2010–2011, but for
others it continues the negative past of foreign military occupation. It
was in that political and security context that the earthquake of January
2010 occurred.
US Response to Earthquake
The character of the US response to the earthquake was primarily a
military one. At its peak, the mission involved a total of 22,000 per-
sonnel; 7,000 based on land and the rest on 15 ships and 58 aircraft,
according to the US military’s Southern Command, which directed the
operation. The US military mission was supplemented on the civilian
side by the US Agency for International Development (USAID), which
involved numerous tasks, among them providing temporary shelter and
later permanent housing for those displaced. USAID was also involved
with the Haitian government in restoring basic services such as water
and electricity but those tasks moved slowly because of the enormity
of the task. While the US military mission did carry out some tasks
that the recovery needed, recovery was not the primary mission of the
troops. Operating within the framework of the Pentagon’s failed state
and “ungoverned spaces” concept,5 the overwhelming focus of the mis-
sion was one of security aimed at preventing widespread rioting in
Port-Au-Prince against the surviving assets of the Haitian elites and pre-
venting a flow of refugees to the United States. Most controversially, in
the first week after the quake when saving lives was the highest priority,
the US military took control of Port-Au-Prince’s damaged airport and,
in the eyes of many international relief agencies, gave too much priority
to planes connected solely to the deployment of US troops engaged in
security, not relief operations. The US military contributed a naval hos-
pital ship, the Comfort, that docked off Port-Au-Prince and treated 871
people but this effort was dwarfed by the land medical operations staffed
primarily by Haitians and a range of foreigners, including Cubans that
treated tens of thousands of people. The Obama administration, eager
to build its reputation in Latin America, put the best possible face on
the operation, stressing the large amount of relief supplies distributed by
US forces, but in reality it was a military operation carried out primarily
under considerations for US national security. The reality of this focus
is also underscored by the political framework created in the aftermath
of the earthquake. Using as a justification the severe damage done to the
Haitian government structures and loss of lives among Haitian govern-
ment personnel, the international community led by the United States
set up what amounts to a parallel governing structure for the country
dominated by foreigners. In spring 2010, the Interim Haiti Recovery
Commission (IHRC) was formed to channel assistance to Haiti and
chaired by the then prime minister, Jean-Max Bellrive, and former US
president Bill Clinton. All major recovery projects—officially called
184 l Gary Prevost
of “national significance”—have to be submitted for approval by the

commission, which has both Haitian and foreign members on its board.
Most significantly, the executive director of the board is not a Haitian
but rather a former USAID official. The body was created following a
March 2010 meeting at the United Nations where US$5.3 billion was
pledged for relief efforts and rebuilding. While some international over-
sight was inevitable, the treatment of Haiti as a special case emerged
from thinking within the United States. In Washington, DC, Senator
Richard Lugar of Indiana, the ranking Republican member on the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee released reports in June and July
2010 6 that in effect warned Haiti that without credible political leader-
ship, development would stall and investors would shy away from the
country. Given broad skepticism of the Haitian government, the Lugar
position was credible but it has been used to continue a foreign domina-
tion of Haitian politics that is long standing. In addition to the control
over the relief and recovery money, the IHRC was instrumental in shap-
ing the Haitian national elections in November 2010 and March 2011.
The primary objective of the US government and its European partners
was to make sure that the Haitian political leadership that emerged from
the elections was under the complete control of the United States and its
allies. Most importantly, that meant the exclusion of the Jean-Bertrand
Aristide and the Lavalas party from the ballot. The earthquake had only
deepened the class divisions on the island and the election of Aristide
and a parliamentary majority for his Lavalas party was a very real pos-
sibility. Faced with that possibility, the IHRC pressured the Haitian
Electoral Commission to exclude the Lavalas party from the ballot and
the United States used its influence to keep Aristide in exile in South
Africa in spite of repeated requests to return to his homeland. Aristide
would eventually be allowed to return to Haiti in March 2011 but only
after the Haitian government allowed the former dictator, Jean-Claude
Duvalier to return in early 2011 from 25 years in exile and Aristide had
been formally excluded from the ballot and not a part of the final runoff
scheduled for late March.
In the absence of Aristide and the Lavalas party, the eventual win-
ner of the presidential election was Michel Martelly, a popular carnival
singer. Martelly’s election was partial victory for the Haitian people
because initial results of the November election had excluded Martelly
from the scheduled runoff. However, following widespread allegations
of fraud in the first round of voting at the behest of the traditional
elites, Martelly was certified in second place setting up a March run-
off with Mirlande Manigat, former first lady, and favored candidate
of the traditional Haitian ruling elites and the United States and its
allies. However, in spite of a widespread boycott by Aristide support-
ers, Martelly won in a landslide with 68 percent votes. Once in power,
Martelly quickly learned the framework in which the United States and
its allies had engineered his election as an alternative to Aristide and
the Lavalas Party. Just days after assuming office, Martelly, in appar-
ent collaboration with his North American sponsors, nominated neo-
liberal businessman Daniel Gerard Rouzier to be his prime minister but
the more progressive legislature quickly rejected his choice underscor-
ing that as an independent candidate he had no working majority in
the national legislation. His next nominee, former minister of justice,
Bernard Grousse, an equally neoliberal figure was also rejected. Only in
2012 did the new government succeed in completing its administration
in a manner that was acceptable in Washington.
As Haiti struggled to rebuild, the combination of IHRC and the
USAID’s coordinator for Haiti, Thomas Adams, made the main decisions
including Haiti’s adoption of a new constitution in May 2011. Unlike
other new constitutions in the Latin American region of a progressive
character, the Haitian constitution is primarily neoliberal and by allow-
ing Haitian dual citizenship, the main impact of the latter reform is to
allow for a much greater role for the middle-class Haitian diaspora—a
very transparent effort to dilute the influence of the Lavalas Party by
the inevitably more conservative tilt of the Haitian diaspora. The exact
political direction of Haiti and its rebuilding are unclear but its ability
to shape its own destiny remains deeply compromised by the alliance
between the Haitian elites and their North American sponsors.
Notes
1. The growing prominence of the failed state concept was demonstrated
when, in 2010, the United Nations World Development Report created a
fragile state list and the Fund for Peace has been publishing a Failed State
Index since 2004. In 2009, this index listed 60 states as failed or failing.
The official attention of the US government to the concept is embodied in
the Robert Lamb, “Ungoverned areas and threats from safe havens,” final
report of the Ungoverned Areas Project prepared for the Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense, Washington, DC, January
2008. The report is the product of a US interagency working group devoted
to defining ungoverned spaces and outlining responses to them. The report’s
definition of an ungoverned area is “a place where the state or the central
government is unable or unwilling to extend control, effectively govern,
or inf luence the local population, and where a provincial, local tribal, or
186 l Gary Prevost
autonomous government does not fully or effectively govern, due to inad-

equate governance capacity, insufficient political will, gaps in legitimacy,
the presence of conf lict, or restrictive norms of behavior.”
2. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002),
Washington, DC: President of the United States. http://georgewbush-
w hitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/.
3. Numerous articles place Haiti within the realm of a failed state. Among
the most important are James Cockayne (2009, February), Winning Haiti’s
protection competition: Organized crime and peace operations past, pres-
ent and future, International Peacekeeping, 16(1), 77–99; Stéphane Bernard
(2008, March), Foreign policy making toward failed and failing states:
Measuring the inf luence of pressure groups in the Canadian response to
Haiti between 1993 and 2003, International Studies Association paper, San
Francisco, CA; Kamil Shah (work in progress), The failure of state building
and the promise of state failure: Reinterpreting the security-development
nexus in Haiti; Jean-Germain Gros (1996), Towards a taxonomy of failed
states in the new world order: Decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and
Haiti, Third World Quarterly, 17(3), 455–471; Antonio Jorge Ramalho da
Rocha (2009, March), Do peacekeeping missions reinforce state failure,
International Studies Association paper.
4. For a detailed treatment of the shift see Gary Prevost and Carlos Oliva
Campos (2007), The Bush Doctrine and Latin America, New York:
Palgrave.
5. The ungoverned spaces concept is unpackaged well in Anne L. Clunan and
Harold Trinkunas (2010), Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority
in an Era of Softened Sovereignty, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
For two excellent critiques of the concept, see Charles T. Call (2008), The
fallacy of the “failed state,” Third World Quarterly, 29(8), 1491–1507; and
Justin Logan and Christopher Preble (2008, Winter), Fixing failed states: A
cure worse than the disease? Harvard International Review, 29(4), n.p.
6. Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate (2010, June), Haiti:
No leadership—no elections, Washington, DC: US Government Printing
Off ice. UR L: lugar.senate.gov/issues/foreign/lac/haiti/pdf/report.pdf;
and Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate (2010, July),
Without reform, no return on investment in Haiti, Washington, DC: US
Government Printing Office. URL: lugar.senate.gov/issues/foreign/lac/
haiti/pdf/i nvestment.pdf.
CHAPTER 10
Conclusion
Gary Prevost, Carlos Oliva Campos, Luis
Fernando Ayerbe, and Harry E. Vanden
T
he security policy of the United States in the whole of the
Western Hemisphere must be placed in its broad historic per-
spective with attention to the current moment of the twenty-
first century. For two centuries, back to the time of Thomas Jefferson
and James Monroe, leaders in Washington, DC, have viewed the
hemisphere as the natural sphere of influence for the United States,
a place of great economic interest for the United States in terms of
investment, raw materials, and markets. That reality has not changed
over two centuries, only changes over time have been in the ability of
the United States to extend its dominance in the region. The part of
the region closest to the United States—Mexico, Central America, and
the Caribbean—came under US control in the first 30 years of the
twentieth century and remain there in the twenty-first century. That
control remains primarily through regional trade agreements and the
newly launched security initiatives. The United States’ influence in
South America has always been more fluid and it remains so in the early
twenty-first century. The United States has always sought a dominant
role in South America due to its vast resources and markets. In the nine-
teenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, the United
States extended some measure of economic influence throughout South
America but the reality of British and French political and economic
power thwarted US domination. However, in the second half of the
twentieth century, following World War II, the United States expanded

188 l Prevost, Campos, Ayerbe, and Vanden
its level of influence through such institutions as the Organization of

American States, Rio Pact, and Inter-American Development Bank. As
the twentieth century was coming to an end, the level of US domination
was to have become further extended by the successful implementation
of the Free Trade Areas of the Americas. However, the limitations on
US influence in the southern reaches of the hemisphere were revealed
when Latin American political resistance (previously described in this
volume’s introduction) emerged and blocked the implementation of the
agreement. However, the setback of the failure to implement the Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) has not prevented the United States
in the post September 11, 2001, era from including South America in its
efforts to gain new security arrangements, including permanent mili-
tary bases. Beyond the obvious focus on Colombia, the United States
has been especially aggressive in the Southern Cone region using in part
its analysis of the Triple Border region as being an especially dangerous
“ungoverned space.” In this context, the United States has focused its
effort on the governments of Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Paraguay.
Given the nationalist sentiments of the Brazilian government, the estab-
lishment of a permanent US base there is unlikely but in recent years,
the two countries have approved higher levels of cooperation in the
context of the “war on drugs.” However, the United States is gaining
traction in the other countries. The year 2012 saw the establishment of
new permanent US bases in both Argentina and Chile. Paraguay has a
base built by the United States in the Chaco region near Bolivia and is
pressing for a permanent US presence. All of these initiatives in recent
years have been accompanied by frequent visits by high-level US delega-
tions including the secretaries of defense of both the Bush and Obama
administrations. It is clearly a bipartisan initiative deeply rooted in
long-term US strategic interests but backed wholeheartedly by the cur-
rent in vogue rhetoric of “ungoverned spaces” and “failed states.”
Bibliography
Adams, J. J., & Pizarro, J. M. (2009). MS-13: A gang profile. Journal of Gang
Research, 16(4), 1–14.
Aguilar, J. (2006, Winter). Los efectos contraproducentes de los Planes Mano
Dura. Quorum, 16, 84–94.
Aguilar, J. (2004, May). La mano dura y las “politicas” de seguridad. Estudios
Centroamericanos, 667, 439–449.
Amín, Samir (1974). El Desarrollo desigual. Ensayo sobre las formaciones sociales
del capitalismo periférico. Barcelona: Editorial Fontanella.
Andersen, Martin Edwin (2007). Failing states, ungoverned spaces and the indig-
enous challenge in Latin America. In Angel Rabasa, Steven Boraz, Peter Chalk,
Kim Cragim, Theodore W. Karazik, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Kevin A. O´Brien,
and John E. Peters (eds.), Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing
Terrorism Risks. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. MG-561AF. Available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monography/MG561/.
Andrade-Garzon, Celso. 2008. Has Plan Colombia ignored neighboring coun-
tries? Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
of Master of Science in Defense Analysis. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate
School.
Angelo, P. J. (2006). To hell in a handbasket: Mano dura repression and the rule of
law in Central America. Unpublished honors paper, US Naval Academy.
Arana, A. (2005). How the street gangs took Central America. Foreign Affairs,
84(3), 98–110.
Arias, Enrique Desmond. 2010. Understanding criminal networks, political order,
and politics in Latin America. In Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas
(eds.), Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened
Sovereignty. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Barry, Tom, & Preusch, Deb (1986). The Central America Fact Book. New York:
Grove Press.
Boerman, T. (2007). Central American gangs: An overview of the phenomenon in
Latin America and the U.S. Journal of Gang Research, 15(1), 35–52.
Boraz, S. C., & Bruneau, T. C. (2006, November–December). Are the maras over-
whelming governments in Central America? Military Review, 86(6), 36–40.
Available at http://www.ccmr.org/public/library_file_proxy.cfm/lid/5553.
190 l Bibliography
Boraz, Steven (2007). Case study: The Colombia-Venezuela border. In Angel Rabasa
et al. (eds.), Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks.
Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
Bourque, Alan G. (2004). Changing U.S. strategy in South America: Adjusting
and exporting Plan Colombia. Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. Carlisle Barracks, PA:
US Army War College.
Brands, H. (2009, June 10). Gangs and the new insurgency in Latin America.
WPR: World Politics Review. Retrieved October 25, 2009 from http://www.
worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=3882.
Brevé, F. (2007, July–August). The maras: A menace to the Americas. Military
Review, 87(4), 88–95. Available at http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview
/English/JulAug07/Breve.pdf.
Brigadas Internacionales de Paz [Peace Brigades International] (2007). Boletín
Especial: El Petén, [Special Bulletin, El Petén] April, proyecto Guatemala
[Guatemala Project], Guatemala.
Bruneau, Thomas C. (2005, May). The maras and national security in Central
América. Strategic Insights, 4(5), 1–12.
Buckley, Kevin W. (2004). U.S. support to Plan Colombia: A heading check. Thesis
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic
Studies Degree. Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College.
Bunker, Robert J. (2011). Grand strategic overview: Epochal change and new reali-
ties for the United States. Special Issue of Small Wars and Insurgencies, Criminal
Insurgency in Mexico and the Americas, 22(5), 728–741.
Burroughs, Jeffery T. (2010). The efficacy of security force assistance in countering
violent extremist organizations in failed and potentially failing states. Thesis
presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of
Military Art and Science (Military Strategy). Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army
Command and General Staff College.
Bush, George H. W. (1990, March). National Security Strategy of the United States.
Campuzano, Juan José (2004). México y Guatemala: de la vecindad a la asociación,
en: Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior [Mexico and Guatemala: From vicinity to
partnership], No. 72, Instituto Matías Romero de Estudios Diplomáticos, México.
Carranza, M. (2005). Detención o muerte: Hacia donde van los “pandilleros” de
El Salvador. Report prepared in the context of the study Neither war nor peace:
International comparisons of children and youth in organised armed violence
(conducted by Viva Rio, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2005). San Salvador: IUDOP.
Castells, Manuel (2009). Comunicación y poder. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
Castro, M., & Carranza, M. (2005). Maras y pandillas en Honduras. Tegucigalpa:
Editorial Guaymuras.
Castro Valverde, Carlos (2002). Migración nicaragüense en Costa Rica: población,
empleo y necesidades básicas insatisfechas. Informe final de investigación.
Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales. Sede académica Costa Rica. 5
diciembre de 2002.
Bibliography l 191
Central Intelligence Agency (1978). International Terrorism in 1977. Washington,

DC: Central Intelligence Agency—National Foreign Assessment Center.
Centro de Estudios y Programas Interamericanos (2013). Depto. de Estudios
Internacionales. Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México. Red Transnacional
de Análisis sobre Maras. Diagnósticos: Caso México; Caso El Salvador; Caso
Honduras; Caso Guatemala; Caso Nicaragua; Caso Washington, DC. Available
at http://interamericanos.itam.mx/maras/diagnosticos.html.
Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (2013). Una verdad secuestrada: cuarenta años
de estadísticas de secuestro 1970–2010. Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 20 de junio.
Cerbino, M. (2007). El (en)cubrimiento de la inseguridad o el “estado de hecho”
mediático. Nueva Sociedad, 208, 86–102. Available at http://www.nuso.org
/upload/articulos/3419_1.pdf.
Cerny, Philip G. (2005, Winter). Terrorism and the new security dilemma. Naval
War College Review, 58(1), 11–33.
Chabat, J. (2006, March). Franchises for crime: The “maras” and North American
security. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies
Association, Town & Country Resort and Convention Center, San Diego, CA.
Cisneros, José Luis (2011). El discurso político para justificar la llamada guerra
contra el crimen organizado. In José Luis Cisneros, Everardo Carballo, and Juan
Manuel (eds.), Violencia, crimen organizado y Estado mexicano. Mexico City:
UAM-Xochimilco. pp. 19–50.
Clinton, Bill (1998, October). A National Security Strategy for a New Century.
Clinton, Bill (1994, July). A National Security Strategy of Engagement and
Enlargement. Washington, DC: The White House.
Clinton, Hillary R. (2010) Foreign policy priorities: The FY2011 international
affairs budget. Retrieved February 18, 2011, from http://www.state.gov/secre-
tary/rm/2010/02/137256.htm.
Clunan, Anne L. (2010). Ungoverned spaces? The need for reevaluation. In Anne L.
Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas (eds.), Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State
Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
COPAE (Comisión pastoral Paz y Ecología) [Pastoral Comission: Peace
and Ecology] (2010). It can be consulted in PDF format, at http://
goldcorpoutofguatemala.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/tercer20informe20anu-
al20del20monitoreo.pdf.
Crandall, Russell (2008). Driven by Drugs: U.S. Policy toward Colombia, 2nd ed.
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Creedon, K. (2003). El Salvador: War on gangs. NACLA Report on the Americas,
37(3), 1–2.
Cruz, J. M. (2010). Central American maras: From youth street gangs to transna-
tional protection rackets. Global Crime, 11(4), 379–398. doi:10.1080/17440572
.2010.519518.
Cruz, J. M. (2007). Street Gangs in Central America. San Salvador: UGA Editores.
Cruz, J. M. (ed.) (2006). Maras y pandillas en Centroamérica. Las respuestas de la
sociedad civil organizada. Vol. IV. San Salvador: UCA Editores.
192 l Bibliography
Cruz, J. M. (2005). Los factores asociados a las pandillas juveniles en Centroamérica.

Estudios Centroamericanos, (685–686), 1155–1182.
Cruz, J. M. (2001). Pandillas y capital social [Gangs and social capital]. Estudios
Centroamericanos, 56(637–638), 1099–1118.
Cruz, J. M. (2000). Violencia, democracia y cultural politica en America Latina
[Violence, democracy and political culture in Latin America]. Estudios
Centroamericanos, 55(619–620), 511–525.
Cruz, J. M. (1999). La victimization por violencia urbana: niveles y factores asocia-
dos en ciudades de America Latina y Espana [Victimization by urban violence:
Likelihood and associated factors in cities of Latin America and Spain]. Revista
PanAmericana de Salud Publica/Pan American Journal of Public Health, 5(4–5),
259–267.
Cruz, J. M. (1997). Los factores posibilitadores y las expresiones de la violencia
en los noventa [Enabling factors and expressions of violence in the nineties].
Estudios Centroamericanos, 52(588), 977–992.
Cruz, J. M., & Armando Gonzalez, L. (1997). Magnitud de la violencia en El
Salvador [The magnitude of violence in El Salvador]. Estudios Centroamericanos,
52(588), 953–966.
Cruz, J. M., & Carranza, M. (2006). Pandillas y políticas públicas: El caso de El
Salvador. In Javier Moro (ed.), Juventudes, violencia y exclusión: Desafíos para las
políticas públias. Guatemala: IDB, Magna Torres ediciones.
Cruz, J. M., Portillo Peña, N., & Homies Unidos (1998). Solidaridad y violencia en
las pandillas del gran San Salvador: Más allá de la vida loca. 1st ed. San Salvador:
UCA Editores.
Cruz, J. M., Santacruz Giralt, M. (2005). Universidad Centroamericana José
Simeón Cañas, Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública, Programa Sociedad
sin Violencia (El Salvador), Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Pública (El Salvador),
& United Nations Development Programme. La victimización y la percepción
de seguridad en El Salvador en 2004 (1st ed.). San Salvador: Ministerio de
Gobernación, Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Pública.
Deare, Craig E. (2008). La militarización en América Latina y el papel de Estados
Unidos. Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica, 8(3), 22–34.
DeCesare, D. (2006, Fall). Documenting migration’s revolving door. (An essay in
words and photographs). Nieman Reports, 60(3), 23–28.
DeCesare, D., & Montaigne, F. (1999, July–August). Deporting America’s gang
culture. Mother Jones, 44–51.
Demoscopía S. A. (2007, August 1). Maras y pandillas comunidad y policía en
Centroamérica: Hallazgos de un estudio integral. [Dr. José Alberto Rodríguez
Bolaños, et al., prinicipal authors]. Stockholm: Agencia Sueca para el Desarrollo
Internacional / Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
(ASDI/SIDA). Retrieved October 25, 2009, from http://www.undp.org
.gt/data/publicacion/Maras%20y%20pandillas,%20comunidad%20y%20
polic%C3%ADa%20en%20centro%20am%C3%A9rica.pdf.
Diaz, T. (2009). No Boundaries: Transnational Latino Gangs and American Law
Enforcement. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Bibliography l 193
Domínguez, Jorge I. (2001). Conflictos territoriales y limítrofes en América

Latina y el Caribe. Pensamiento Propio, Revista bilingue de Ciencias Sociales.
No. 14. Julio-Diciembre 2001. Año 6. Pag. 5–31. Ediciones CRIES, Managua,
Nicaragua.
Dudley, S. S. (2010, July 20). How Mexico’s Drug War Is Killing Guatemala. Foreign
Policy.
Dugas, John C. (2005). The Colombian nightmare: Human rights abuses and
the contradictory effects of U.S. foreign policy. In Cecilia Menjívar and Nestor
Rodríguez (eds.), When States Kill: Latin America, the U.S. and Technologies of
Terror. Austin: University of Texas Press.
Eiras, Ana (et al.) (2002). Time to change U.S. strategy for the Andean region.
Retrieved February 15, 2011, from http://www.heritage.org/Research/
Reports/2002/02/Time-to-Change-US-Strategy-for-the-Andean-Region.
Envío (2006). Los imprescindibles migrantes nicas y la impresentable ley que
los afectará. Revista Envío. Número 289. Abril 2006. UCA: Universidad
Centroamericana, en Managua, Nicaragua http://www.envio.org.ni.
Estado de la Región (2008). Desarrollo Humano Sostenible 2008. Un informe
desde Centroamérica para Centroamérica. Programa Estado de la Nación,
en Costa Rica. http://w w w.estadonacion.or.cr/estadoregion2008/index
.htm.
Farrell, Michelle L. (2007). Sequencing: Targeting insurgents and drugs in
Colombia. Thesis Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Master of Arts in National Security Affairs. Monterey, CA: Naval
Postgraduate School.
Felbab-Brown, Vanda. (2010). Rules and regulations in ungoverned spaces: Illicit
economies, criminals, and belligerents. In Anne L. Clunan and Harold A.
Trinkunas (eds.), Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of
Softened Sovereignty. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Franco, C. (2008, January 30). The MS-13 and 18th Street gangs: Emerging trans-
national gang threats? CRS Report for Congress.
Galeano, Eduardo (2006). Las venas abiertas de América Latina. México: Siglo XXI
Editores.
García Hoyos, Juan Carlos (2007). De la coca a la cocaina. Una historia por contar.
Bogotá: Editorial Universidad del Rosario.
Gates, Robert M. (2010). Helping others defend themselves. Foreign Affairs, 89, 3.
Gawronski, V., & Owens, L. (2008). The transnationalization of Central American
gangs: Penetrating the U.S. deep south? Paper presented at the Midwestern
Political Science Association, 66th, Chicago, IL. pp. 1–22.
Giudice Baca, Víctor (2005). Teorías geopolíticas. Gestión en el Tercer Milenio.
Revista de Investigación de la Facultad de Ciencia Administrativas, UNMSM,
8(15). Lima. Julio 2005.
Gleason, Megan et al. (2011, February). State building in situations of fragility and
conflict: Relevance for US policies and programs. Office of Conflict Management
and Mitigation. Available at http://csis.org/files/publication/110218_
Statebuilding_in_Situations_Fragility_Conflict.pdf.
194 l Bibliography
González Amador, Roberto (2011, April 15). Con Calderón aumenta el gasto mili-
tar; se estancan salud y educación. La Jornada (Mexico).
González Casanova, Pablo (1978). Imperialismo y liberación en América Latina.
México: Siglo XXI Editores.
Gray, H. L. (2009). Gangs and transnational criminals threaten Central American
stability. Strategy Research Project. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College.
Gutierrez Rivera, L. (2009). Enclaves y territorios: Estrategias territoriales del
estado y delas pandillas en Honduras. Doctoral dissertation, Freie Universität
Berlin.
Hanson, Kylla (2009). My Life Crazy, A Gringa’s Life with the Salvadoran Gangs.
Mustang, OK: Tate Publishing and Enterprises.
Hartung, William D. (2012). The Obama defense plan: Roadmap for continu-
ing global hegemony. Posted on January 16, 2012, on the Americas Program
of the Center for International Policy website: http://www.cipamericas.org
/archives/6170.
Haugaard, Lisa, Isacson, Adam, & Johnson, Jennifer (2011, November). A cau-
tionary tale: Plan Colombia’s lessons for US policy toward Mexico and beyond.
Latin America Working Group Education Fund, Center for International Policy,
and Washington Office on Latin America.
Hernández Norzagaray, Ernesto (ed.) (2010). Elecciones en tiempos de guerra. Baja
California, Chihuahua, Durango, Nuevo León, Sinaloa, Tamaulipas, Veracruz.
Culiacán: Autonomous University of Sinaloa.
Human Rights Watch (1996). Colombia’s Killer Networks: The Military-Paramilitary
Partnership and the United States. New York: Human Rights Watch.
Hume, M. (2007b). “(Young) men with big guns”: Reflexive encounters with
violence and youth in El Salvador. Bulletin of Latin American Research, 26(4),
480–496. doi:10.1111/j.1470–9856.2007.00239.x.
INCSR (2012, March 7). International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. Report. Washington, DC.
International Crisis Group (2010, June 29). Improving security policy in Colombia.
Latin America Briefing No. 23, Bogotá, Brussels.
Isacson, Adam (2012, December). Consolidating “consolidation.” Washington,
DC: Washington Office on Latin America.
Isacson, Adam (2002). Colombia’s human security crisis. Disarmament Forum—
Human Security in Latin America, 2, 25–40.
Jenkins, B., & Sereseres, C. D. (1977). U.S. military assistance and the Guatemalan
armed forces. Armed Forces & Society, 3(4), 575–594.
Jiménez, Gabriela Christina, & MacDonald, Laura (2006). Hacia las ´fronteras int
eligentes´norteamericanas:¿convergencia o divergencia en las políticas de control
de fronteras? Foro Internacional 185, 46(3), 549–579.
Johnson, M. H. (2006, April). National policies and the rise of transnational gangs.
Migration Policy Institute. Migration Information Source.
Johnson, Stephen (2005). Latin America’s security puzzle. Retrieved February
15, 2011, from http://www.heritage.org/Research/Testimony/Latin-A mericas-
Security-Puzzle.
Bibliography l 195
Joint Statement of Secretary Clinton and CARICOM Ministers on the Commitment

of Bridgetown (2010, June 10). Partnership for Prosperity and Security. Media
Note. Office of the Spokesman. Washington, DC.
Justice Policy Institute (2007). Gang wars: The failure of enforcement tactics and
the need for effective public safety strategies. Available at http://www.justice-
policy.org/content.php?hmID=1811&smID=1581&ssmID=22.
Jưutersonke, O., Muggah, R., & Rodgers, D. (2009). Gangs, urban violence, and
security interventions in Central America. Security Dialogue, 40(4/5), 373–397.
doi: 10.1177/0967010609343298.
Kirkpatrick, Jeanne, J. (1979, November). Dictatorships and double standards.
Commentary Magazine. Available at http://www.commentarymagazine.com
/article/dictatorships-double-standards/.
Koonings, K., & Kruijt, D. (2004). Armed Actors: Organised Violence and State
Failure in Latin America. London; New York: Zed Books.
Lamb, Robert D. (2008). Ungoverned Areas and Threats from Safe Havens.
Lara Klahr, M. (2006). Hoy te toca la muerte: el imperio de las maras visto desde
dentro. Mexico, DF: Editorial Planeta.
LeoGrande, William M. (2005/2006, Winter). From the red menace to radical pop-
ulism. U.S. insecurity in Latin America. World Policy Journal, 22 (4), 25–35.
Lindsay-Poland, John (2011, May–June). Mexico’s drug crisis: Alternative perspec-
tives. NACLA Report on the Americas.
Luke, Timothy W. (1996). Governmentality and contragovernmentality:
Rethinking sovereignty and territoriality after the Cold War. Political Geography,
15(6/7), 491–507.
Malamud, Carlos, & García, Encina Carlota (2011). El conflicto fronterizo entre
Costa Rica y Nicaragua: ¿medio ambiente, soberanía, narcotráfico o mero
instrumento electoral? Real Instituto Elcano. No. 22. February 7, 2011.
Manaut, Raúl Benítez, & Celi, Pablo, & Diamint, Rut (2009). Los desafíos de la
seguridad y la defensa en Latinoamérica. Entre las nuevas amenazas, la nueva
geopolítica y los viejos conflictos. En: Anuario 2009. Seguridad regional en
América Latina y El Caribe, Op. Cit. p. 1.
Manwaring, M. G. (2011). Security, stability and sovereign challenges of politi-
cized gangs and insurgencies in the Americas. Special Issue of Small Wars
860–889.
Manwaring, M. G. (2007). A Contemporary challenge to state sovereignty: Gangs
and other illicit transnational criminal organizations in Central America, El
Salvador, Mexico, Jamaica, and Brazil. US Army War College, Strategic Studies
Institute.
Manwaring, M. G. (2006, August–November). Gangs and Coups D’ Streets in the
New World disorder: Protean insurgents in post-modern war. [Special issue on
Criminal-States and Criminal-Soldiers] Global Crime, 7(3–4), 505–543.
Marcella, Gabriel (2009, December). Democratic governance and the rule of law:
Lessons from Colombia. US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute.
196 l Bibliography
Marcella, Gabriel (2007, September). American grand strategy for Latin America
in the age of resentment. US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute.
Marcella, Gabriel (2003, May). The United States and Colombia: The journey
from ambiguity to strategic clarity. US Army War College, Strategic Studies
Institute.
Marcella, Gabriel (2001, April). Plan Colombia: The strategic and operational
imperatives. US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute.
Marcella, Gabriel, et al. (2001, June). Plan Colombia: Some differing perspectives.
US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute.
Marcella, Gabriel, & Schulz, Donald (1999, March 5). Colombia’s three wars: U.S.
strategy at the crossroads. US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute.
Medina Núñez, Ignacio (2011). Cultura, Desarrollo y procesos de Integración en
América Latina. Un acercamiento a la cultura como clave del desarrollo. Editorial
Académica Española. Publicado en Saarbrücken, Germany.
Medina Núñez, Ignacio (coordinador) (2010). Centroamérica: Democracia,
Militarismo y conflictos sociales en el siglo XXI. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Elaleph.
Medina Núñez, Ignacio (2009). Elecciones presidenciales en América Latina. El
surgimiento de una izquierda heterogénea. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Elaleph.
Mejía, Alberto (2008). Colombia’s national security strategy, a new “COIN”
approach. Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the
Master of Strategic Studies Degree. Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War
College.
Menkhaus, Ken (2007). Terrorist activities in ungoverned spaces: Evidence
and observations from the horn of Africa. Southern Africa and International
Terrorism workshop. Retrieved September 9, 2010, from http://www
.t hebrenthurstfoundation.org/Files/terror_talks/Terrorist%20Activities%20
in%20Ungoverned%20Spaces.pdf.
Millett, R. L., & Perez, O. J. (2005). New threats and old dilemmas: Central
America’s armed forces in the 21st century. Journal of Political and Military
Sociology, 33(1), 59–79.
Miko, Francis T. (2004). Removing Terrorist Sanctuaries: The 9/11 Commission,
Recommendations and U.S. Policy. Washington, DC: Congressional Research
Service.
Milenio Semanal (2010). 200 municipios controlados por el narco. Retrieved on
March 24, 2012, from http://www.msemanal.com/node/2889.
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] (2004, January
28–30). Informe de Guatemala al Comité Interamericano contra el Terrorismo
[Guatemalan Report to the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism], at
the OEA [Fourth Period of Ordinary Sessions], Montevideo, Uruguay.
Monteforte, Mario (1997). La frontera Móvil [The Moving Border], Universidad
Autónoma de México–United Nations]—Ministerio de Cultura y Deportes de
Guatemala [Ministry of Culture and Sports of Guatemala], Guatemala.
Nagle, L. E. (2008). Criminal gangs in Latin America:The next great threat to
regional security and stability? Texas Hispanic Journal of Law and Policy, 14(1),
7–27.
Bibliography l 197
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (2004). The
9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks upon the United States. New York: Norton. p. 366.
Nogué Font, Joan, & Rufí, Joan Vicente (2001). Geopolítica, identidad y global-
ización. Barcelona: Ariel Geografía. pp. 112–113.
NSS (2006, March). The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.
Oliva Campos, Carlos (2009). Estados Unidos y América Latina a principios del
siglo XXI, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad nacional de Costa Rica.
Ordóñez, César E. (2006). Tendencias de la integración económica en Guatemala
y el Sureste Mexicano [Economical Integration Trends in Guatemala and the
Southeast of Mexico], Universidad de San Carlos-Asociación para el Avance de
las Ciencias Sociales en Guatemala, Guatemala.
Managua, Nicaragua.
Petras James, Vasapolio, & Veltmeyer, Casadio (2004). Imperio con imperialismo.
La dinámica globalizadora del capitalismo neoliberal. Editorial de Ciencias
Sociales, Cuba.
Pfetsch, Frank R., & Rohloff, Christoph (2000). National and International
Conflicts, 1945–1995: New Empirical and Theorical Approaches. London:
Routledge.
Pickard, Miguel (2008). Justificando la militarización de México. Retrieved on
January 25, 2012, from http://barbarosdelnorte.blogspot.com/2011/08/justifi-
cando-la-militarizacion-de.html.
Pires, Nuno M. (2012). Deviant globalization and the unintended consequences
of coca eradication in Colombia. Thesis Submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Security Studies (Western
Hemisphere). Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School.
PNUD (2011). Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano 2011. Sostenibilidad y equidad:
Un mejor futuro para todos. Publicado por el Programa de las Naciones Unidas
para el Desarrollo (PNUD). Ediciones Mundi-Prensa México S. A. de C.V.
PNUD (2010). Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano 2010. La verdadera riqueza de
las naciones. Caminos al desarrollo Humano. Programa de las Naciones Unidas
para el Desarrollo (PNUD). Ediciones Mundi-Prensa México S.A. México.
Pratt, Martin (2007). Case concerning territorial and maritime dispute between
Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras). Hague
Justice Journal, 2(3).
Pratt, Martin (2001, Summer). The maritime boundary dispute between Honduras
and Nicargua in the Caribbean Sea. International Boudaries Research Unit,
University of Durham. A revised versión of a paper originally published in
IBRU’s Boundary and Security Bulletin, 9(2).
Raab, Jörg, & Brinton Milward, H. (2003, October). Dark networks as problems.
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 13(4), 413–439.
198 l Bibliography
Rabasa, Angel et al. (2007). Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing

Terrorism Risks. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
Reagan, Ronald (1986, April 8). National Security Decision Directive 221—
Narcotics and National Security. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Archives.
Retrieved July 7, 2013, from http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/reference
/Scanned%20NSDDS/NSDD221.pdf.
Riney, T. J. (2009). How is MS-13 a threat to US national security? [Research
report] Air War College, Air University. Available at http://www.ntis.gov/search
/product.aspx?ABBR=ADA540139.
Rocha, J. L. (2007). Mapping the labyrinth from within: The political economy
of Nicaraguan youth policy concerning violence. Bulletin of Latin American
Research, 26(4), 533–549.
Rodgers, D., & Muggah, R. (2009). Gangs as non-state armed groups: The Central
American case. Contemporary Security Policy, 30(2), 301–317.
Rotberg, Robert I. (2002a). The new nature of nation-state failure. Washington
Quarterly, 25, 85–96.
Rotberg, Robert I. (2002b). Failed states in a world of terror. Foreign Affairs, 81,
1–13.
Rumsfeld, Donald H. (2002). Defense ministerial of the Americas: Statement by
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Santiago, Chile, Tuesday, November
19, 2002. US Department of Defense.
Salazar Pérez, Robinson, & Echegaray, Melissa Salazar (2011). Militarización,
seguridad y lucha contra el crimen organizado en América Latina. In José Luis
Cisneros and Juan Manuel Everardo Carballo (eds.), Violencia, crimen organizado
y Estado mexicano. Mexico City: UAM-Xochimilco. pp. 205–232.
Saltsman, T. W., & Welch III, B. J. (2008). Maras in Central America: National
security implications of gang activity south of the border. Small Wars Journal.
Schultz, R., Godson, R., Hanlon, Q., & Ravich, S. (2011). The sources of instabil-
ity in the twenty-first century: Weak states, armed groups, and irregular con-
flict. Strategic Studies Quarterly, 5(2), 73–94.
Selser, Gregorio (1989). Panamá. Érase un país a un canal pegado. Universidad
obrera de México. México.
Shalikashvili, John M. (1997). National Military Strategy. Washington, DC: US
Department of Defense.
Sullivan, J. P. (2008, July). Transnational gangs: The impact of third generation
gangs in Central America. Air & Space Power Journal.
Sullivan, John P., & Bunker, Robert J. (2011). Rethinking insurgencies: Criminality,
spirituality, and society welfare in the Americas. Numero especial de Small Wars
742–763.
Tate, Winifred (2000). Repeating past mistakes: Aiding counterinsurgency in
Colombia. NACLA Report on the Americas, 34(2), 16–19.
Torriello Garrido, Guillermo (1976). Tras la cortina del banano. México: Fondo de
Cultura Económica.
Bibliography l 199
United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Human Development Report

& Fuentes, J. A. (2005). Violent conflict and human development in Latin
America: The cases of Colombia, El Salvador and Guatemala! United States,
Agency for International Development (USAID). Available at http://hdr.undp.
org/en/reports/global/hdr2005/papers/HDR2005_Fuentes_Juan_Alberto_10.
pdf; & Creative Associates International. (2006). Central America and Mexico
gang assessment. Annex 3: Honduras profile. Available at https://www.hsdl
.org/?view&did=486557.
USAID (2006). Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment. USAID Bureau
for Latin American and Caribbean Affairs, Office of Regional Sustainable
Development.
USAID (2005). Fragile States Strategy. Washington, DC: US Agency for
International Development.
USAID (2004). Good Governance in Latin American and the Caribbean. Washington,
DC: US Agency for International Development.
USAID (2002). Foreign Aid in the National Interest. Washington, DC: US Agency
for International Development.
US Congress House Committee on Armed Services (2009, March 18). Security
developments in the areas of responsibility of the U.S. Southern Command, etc.
111th Cong., 1st sess.
US Congress House Committee on Armed Services (2006, March 16). National
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2007–budget request from the US
Southern Command. 109th Cong., 2nd sess.
US Congress House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on the Western
Hemisphere (2007, June 26). Violence in Central America: Briefing and hear-
ing before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives. 110th Cong., 1st sess.
US Congress House Committee on Government Reform (2001, March 2). The
study of Plan Colombia: An assessment of successes and challenges. 107th
Cong., 1st sess.
US Congress House Committee on Government Reform (2000, February 15). The
crisis in Colombia: What are we facing? 106th Cong., 2nd sess.
US Congress House Committee on Government Reform (1999, August 6). The
narcotics threat from Colombia. 106th Cong., 1st sess.
Implementing Plan Colombia: The U.S. Role. 106th Cong., 2nd sess.
To receive an update on selected regional issues to include: Colombia and U.S.
policy, etc. 106th Cong., 1st sess.
US Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (2003, October 29).
Challenges and successes for U.S. policy toward Colombia: Is Plan Colombia
working? 108th Cong., 1st sess.
US Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (1999, October 6). Crisis in
Colombia: U.S. support for peace process and anti-drug efforts. 106th Cong., 1st sess.
200 l Bibliography
US Congress Senate Committee on the Judiciary (2003, May 20). Narco-terrorism:

International drug trafficking and terrorism—A dangerous mix. 107th Cong.,
1st sess.
US Department of Defense (2012). Inaugural Meeting of North American Defense
Ministers Joint Statement. Available at http://www.defense.gov/releases/release
.aspx?releaseid=15141.
Fraser, United States Southern Command, before the Senate Armed Services
Committee.
Fraser, United States Air Force Commander, United States Southern Command,
before the 111th Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee.
US SOUTHCOM (2007, March). Partnership for the Americas.
US SOUTHCOM (2004, March 24). Posture Statement of General James T. Hill,
FY 2005 Budget, Defense Programs. House Armed Services Committee.
Vanaik, Achin (ed.) (2010a). Casus Belli: cómo los Estados Unidos venden
la guerra. Edición del Transnational Institute, eBooks, con el permiso de
Interlink Publishing Group, Massachusetts, Estados Unidos. Ver el capítulo
escrito por Achin: “Terrorismo político y el proyecto imperial estadounidense.”
pp. 100–122.
Vanaik, Achin (2010b). Terrorismo político y el proyecto imperial estadounidense.
In Achin Vanaik (ed.), Casus Belli: cómo los Estados Unidos venden la guerra.
pp. 100–122. (Originally published in English as a book chapter titled, “Political
Terrorism & the US Imperial Project,” in Achin Vaniak [2007] [ed.] Selling US
Wars. Northampton: Olive Branch Press [Interlink Publishers]. pp. 119–146.)
Vautravers, Guadalupe (2005). Estudio comparativo de la frontera Tabasco,
México-El Petén, Guatemala [Comparative Study on the Tabasco, Mexico-El
Petén, Guatemala Border], Universidad Juárez Autónoma de Tabasco, México.
Veillette, Connie (2006, January 27). Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and
related funding programs: FY2006 assistance. Washington, DC: Library of
Congress, Congressional Research Service.
Veillette, Connie (2005, February 17). Plan Colombia: A progress report.
Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service.
Villafuerte, Daniel (2006). Integraciones en el norte y sur de México: del NAFTA
al CAFTA [Integrations in the North and South of Mexico: from NAFTA to
CAFTA], at Villafuerte, Daniel and Leyva, Xochitl (Coordinators), Geoeconomía
y geopolítica en el área del Plan Puebla-Panamá [Geoeconomics and Geopolitics
in the Area of the Puebla-Panama Plan], Cámara de Diputados, LIX Legislatura
[Chamber of Deputies of Mexico LIX Legislature].-CIESAS-Miguel Ángel
Porrúa Editor, México, pp. 85–116.
Voss, M. A. (2005, Fall). Young and marked for death: Expanding the definition of
“particular social group” in asylum law to include youth victims of gang persecu-
tion. Rutgers Law Journal, 37(1), 235–275.
Bibliography l 201
Weiler, Stephen G. (2004). Colombia: Gateway to defeating transnational hell in

the Western Hemisphere. Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the require-
ments of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army
War College.
Whittenburg, Scott R. (2009). Opium in Afghanistan: Lessons learned from the
counterdrug strategies of Colombia. Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Defense Analysis.
Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School.
Williams, Phil (2010). Here be dragons: Dangerous spaces and international secu-
rity. In Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas (eds.), Ungoverned Spaces:
World Bank (2011). Crimen y violencia en Centroamérica. Un desafío para el desar-
rollo [Crime and Violence in Central America. A Challenge for Development],
Sustainable Development Department and Poverty Reduction and Economical
Management Unit. Latin America and the Caribbean Region. Washington,
DC.
Wyler, Liana Sun (2008). Weak and Failing States. Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service.
Yearwood, D., & Rhyne, A. (2007, December). Hispanic/Latino gangs: A compar-
ative analysis of nationally affiliated and local gangs. Journal of Gang Research,
14(2), 1–18.
About the Authors
Editors
Luis Fernando Ayerbe is a professor in the department of economics
and the post-graduate program in international relations at the State
University of Sao Paulo (UNESP). He has also been a visiting researcher
at the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies at Harvard
University and the University of Barcelona. He is the coordinator of the
Institute for Economic and International Studies (IEEI), member of the
Academic Board of the National Institute for Studies on the United States
(INEU), member of the board of directors of the Regional Coordination
for Economic and Social Research (CRIES), and associate member of
the Center of Studies on Contemporary Culture (CEDEC). He was a
visiting scholar at Harvard University and at Barcelona’s Autonomous
University. His book, Los Estados Unidos y la América Latina: la con-
strucción de la hegemonía, has won the “Casa de las Américas” award.
Carlos Oliva Campos teaches philosophy and history at the University
of Havana. He formerly worked as a researcher at the Center for Study
of the Americas and the Center for Study of the United States. For many
years he served as executive director of the Association for the Unity of
Our America, an NGO based in Havana. He has also been a visit-
ing professor at the University of Texas and John Hopkins University.
He is the author, coauthor, and editor of numerous books including
The Bush Doctrine and Latin America and Panamericanism and Neo
PanAmericanism: The View from Latin America (with Gary Prevost); La
situación actual en Cuba: desafíos y alternativas, and Relaciones interna-
cionales en America Central y el Caribe durante los anos 80.
Gary Prevost is professor in the Department of Political Science,
St. John’s University/College of Saint Benedict, Minnesota. He received
his PhD in political science from the University of Minnesota and has
published widely on Latin America and Spain. His books include Politics
204 l About the Authors
of Latin America—The Power Game and Democracy and Socialism in

Sandinista Nicaragua, coauthored with Harry E. Vanden; The 1990
Nicaraguan Elections and Their Aftermath, coedited with Vanessa Castro;
The Undermining of the Sandinista Revolution, coedited with Harry E.
Vanden; Cuba: A Different America, coedited with Wilber Chaffee; The
Bush Doctrine and Latin America, coedited with Carlos Oliva Campos;
Revolutionaries to Politicians, coedited with David Close and Kalatowie
Deonandan; and United States-Cuban Relations—A Critical History,
coauthored with Esteban Morales, in addition to numerous articles
and book chapters on Nicaragua and Spanish politics. His research on
Latin America has been supported by a number of grants, including a
Fulbright Central American Republics Award.
Harry E. Vanden is professor of Political Science and International
Studies at the University of South Florida, Tampa. He received his
PhD in political science from the New School for Social Research and
also holds a graduate Certificate in Latin American Studies from the
Maxwell School of Syracuse University. He has lived in several Latin
American countries, including Peru, where he was a Fulbright Scholar
and later worked in the Peruvian government’s National Institute of
Public Administration, and in Brazil, where he held a second Fulbright
and taught at the State University of São Paulo. His scholarly publica-
tions include numerous articles and book chapters and the following
books: Mariátegui, Influencias; National Marxism in Latin America; A
Bibliography of Latin American Marxism; Democracy and Socialism in
Sandinista Nicaragua, coauthored with Gary Prevost; The Undermining
of the Sandinista Revolution, coedited with Gary Prevost; Inter-American
Relations in an Era of Globalization. Beyond Unilaterialism?, edited with
Jorge Nef; and Latin American Social Movements in the Twenty-First
Century, edited with Richard Stahler-Sholk and Glen Kuecker.
Contributors
John C. Dugas is professor of Political Science at Kalamazoo College

(Michigan).
Angel L. Florido Alejo is a researcher at the University of Guadalajara.
Luiza R. Mateo is a PhD candidate in international relations at the State
University of Sao Paulo and researcher at the Institute for International
Relations and Economic Studies.
About the Authors l 205
Ignacio Medina Núñez holds a doctorate in the social sciences from

University of Guadalajara and is a research professor in the social sci-
ences and the humanities at the University of Guadalajara and the Jesuit
University of Guadalajara.
Jaime A. Preciado Coronado is a research professor in the Center of
the Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of Guadalajara,
Mexico, and an affiliate of the Department of Iberian and Latin
American Studies.
Aline P. dos Santos holds a masters in international relations from the
State University of San Paulo and is a researcher at the Institute for
International Relations and Economic Studies.
Daniel Villafuerte Solís holds a PhD in the social sciences from the
Metropolitan Autonomous University of Mexico and is a researcher
at the Center for Advanced Studies of Mexico and Central America,
University of Science and Arts of Chiapas, Mexico.
Index
3+1 Forum, 21 Bush, George W., 3, 9, 15, 26, 35, 39,

62, 118, 124, 137, 143, 150, 152,
Alliance for Security and Prosperity 155, 160, 168, 188, 190, 203, 204
Partnership of North America (SPP)
or (ASPAN), 3, 4, 5, 62, 67, 69, 124, Calderon, Felipe, 3, 4, 44, 107
126, 137 Calero Island, 102, 104, 109
Al-Qaeda, 1, 11, 16, 17, 37, 179 Caño Limón-Coveñas oil pipeline, 155
Amazon, 52 Caravan for Peace with Justice and
Analysis & Anti-Narcotics Dignity, 77
Investigation Service (SAIA), 127 Caribbean Basin Security Initiative
Andean Initiative, 65, 66, 152 (CBSI), 6, 41, 42, 43, 45, 48, 49, 50,
Andean region, 4, 6, 24, 27, 32, 38, 84, 51, 52, 53, 54, 57, 58, 124, 181
126, 193 Cédras, General Raoul, 182
Archipelago of San Andres, 102 Center for International Policy, 65, 78,
Arias, Oscar, 108, 148, 167 169, 194
Aristide, Jean Bertrande, 8, 182, Center for Strategic & International
184, 185 Studies (CSIS), 10, 24, 38, 193
AUC (see United Self Defense Forces Central American Federation, 94
of Colombia), 19, 23, 152, 155, 156, Central American Free Trade
162, 163 Agreement (CAFTA), 55, 96, 106,
123, 140, 200
Banco Monex, 77 Central American Security Initiative
Barack, Obama, 3, 9, 17, 35, 39, (CASI), 6, 7, 89, 113
62, 113 Chavez, Hugo, 2, 54
Bellrive, Jean-Max, 184 Chiapas, 110, 113, 114, 115, 125, 140, 205
Berlin Wall, 51 Chinchilla, Laura, 108
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Clinton, Hillary, 38, 133
Our America (ALBA), 2, 98, 105 Clinton, William, 2, 58
Brookings Institution, 10, 24, 38 Colom, Alvaro, 98, 121, 128, 129, 135
Brownfield, William, 106, 132 Colombian Coordination Centers for
Bureau of International Narcotics and Integrated Action (CCIA), 162
Law Enforcement Affairs, 106, 111, Colombian National Police (CNP),
132, 161, 194 152, 159
208 l Index
Community of Latin American & the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), 21

Caribbean States (CELACS), 2 Fourth Fleet, 2, 5, 56, 66, 180
Comprehensive Program for the Fox, Vicente, 3, 137
Southern Border of Mexico, 131 Fraser, General Douglas, 56, 60, 200
Convention on the Rights and Duties Free Trade Area of the Americas
of States (Montevideo Convention of (FTAA), 2, 55, 96, 124, 180, 188
1933), 83, 92 Fund for Peace, 11, 69, 70, 78, 99, 100,
Crazy Harrisons Solvatrucho, 45 111, 185, 199
Crazy Normans, 45 Funes, Mauricio, 7, 99
Crucitas mining project, 102
Gates, Robert, 12, 38, 133, 193
Darien jungle, 50 good governance, 13, 18, 28, 31, 35,
Department of Alta Verapaz, 129 40, 147, 150, 151, 158, 199
Department of Defense (US), 16, 62, Good Neighbor Policy, 149, 181
79, 92, 118, 161, 162, 171, 178, 185, Guantanamo Naval Base, 43, 48
198, 200 Guatemalan Anti-Narcotic
Department of Homeland Security Institution, 126
(US), 86 Guatemalan Petén, 50
Department of State (US), 9, 43, 46, 48, Gulf of Fonseca, 101, 102, 108, 109, 110
51, 52, 54, 57, 89, 150, 172, 178 Gulf War, 52
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), 44,
55, 58, 102, 104, 150, 161 Hamas (Islamic Resistance), 22, 48
Drug Trafficking Organization Hatch, Orrin, 160
(DTO), 103, 104, 118 Heritage Foundation, 10, 24
Duvalier, Jean-Claude, 184 Hezbollah, 22, 48
Hill, General James T., 54, 60, 162,
Energy and Climate Partnership of the 200
Americas, 31 Holder, Eric, 133
European Security Strategy of 2003, 68 House Armed Services Committee, 60,
Evo, Morales, 25, 44 162, 176, 178, 200
House Oversight and Government
failed states, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, Reform Committee, 161, 177, 178
12, 16, 17, 18, 24, 29, 43, 50, 60, Hudson Institute, 10, 29
61, 62, 67, 68, 69, 70, 75, 78, 93, 99, Human Development Index (HDI),
100, 101, 111, 118, 144, 149, 150, 95, 96, 98, 100, 105
158, 160, 163, 165, 179, 180, 183,
185, 186, 198 Iguazu Falls, 24
Familia Michoacana, 44 Institutional Revolutionary Party
Farabundo Martí for National (PRI), 3, 4, 5, 62, 75, 77
Liberation Front (FMLN), 98, 99 Intelligent Borders, 124
FARC (see Revolutionary Armed Forces Inter-American Commission on
of Colombia) Human Rights (IACHR), 120, 121,
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 139, 196
55, 58, 89 Inter-American Convention on
First Capital Command, 25 Terrorism, 19, 39
Index l 209
Inter-American Democratic Charter, 66 Mexico-Guatemala High Level Security

Inter-American Development Bank, Group (GANSEG), 127, 128
134, 188 Microfinance Growth Fund for the
Inter-American Social Protection Western Hemisphere, 31
Network, 31 Millennium Challenge Corporation
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal (MCC), 35
Assistance (TIAR), 66 Molina, Otto Perez, 98
Interim Haiti Recovery Commission MS-13, 14, 85, 88, 90, 91, 189, 193, 198
(IHRC), 183, 184, 185 MS 18, 85, 88, 91
International Commission Mullen, Mike, 133
against Impunity in Guatemala
(CICIG), 122 Napolitano, Janet, 133
International Conference in Support National Action Party (PAN)
of the Central America Security (Mexico), 3
Strategy, 83, 133 National Council for Protected Areas
International Court of Justice (ICJ), (CONAP), 119
104, 110 National Defense Strategy (NDS), 15,
International Labor Organization 16, 17, 39
(ILO), 121 National Institute of Migration, 131
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2 National Liberation Army (ELN), 19,
International Narcotics & Law 23, 152, 155, 162, 163
Enforcement Affairs (INL), 89, 106, National Migration Institute, 115
111, 132, 159, 161, 194 National Military Strategy (NMS), 17,
39, 150, 171
Jamat-al-Muslimeen, 48 National Republication Alliance
Johnson, Ambassador David T., 161, 162 (ARENA), 98
National Security Decision Directive,
Lavalas Party, 182, 184, 185 221, 152, 170, 198
Leahy Amendment, 153 National Security Strategy (NSS), 1,
Lenin, Vladimir, 83 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 25, 36, 37, 39,
Lobo, Porfirio, 107, 108 68, 118, 150, 168, 170, 186, 190,
Los Antrax, 44 191, 197
Los Mendoza, 120 National Territorial Consolidation Plan
Los Pelones, 44 (PNCT), 166
New Generation Guadalajara Cartel, 44
Mara Salvatrucha, 45, 85 Nieto, Enrique Pena, 5, 77
maras, 45, 46, 47, 58, 60, 81, 82, 83, North American Free Trade Agreement
85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 131, 190, (NAFTA), 66, 74, 77, 24, 140, 200
191, 192, 195, 198 North American Leaders’ Summit, 4,
Martelly, Michel, 184, 185 62, 67, 69
Martinelli, Ricardo, 99 North Atlantic Treaty Organization
McCaffrey, Barry, 69, 125, 158, 159 (NATO), 13, 57
Medellín drug cartel, 152 Northern Command, 52, 132
Merida Initiative, 14, 132 Northern Triangle of Central America,
Mesoamerica Project, 65, 117 45, 57, 81, 82, 85
210 l Index
Obrador, Lopez, 62, 76 Sandinista National Liberation

Office for Central America Front (Frente Sandinista de
International Law Liberacion Nacional
Enforcement Academy (FSLN)), 98
(ILFA), 89 Sendero Luminoso, 19, 23
Office of Conflict Management & Southern Command, 48, 51, 52, 53,
Mitigation, 30, 193 54, 55, 56, 60, 66, 89, 162, 171, 176,
Office of the Coordinator for 178, 183, 199, 200
Counterterrorism, 23, 40 Subcomandante Marcos, 75
Office of Transition Initiatives, 30 Summit of the Americas, 29, 32, 37,
Organization of American States 66, 69
(OAS), 20, 25, 35, 39, 91, 105, 113,
121, 123, 139, 188, 191 Threshold Program, 33, 34, 35
Ortega, Daniel, 98, 104, 105 Torrijos, General Omar, 99
Trans-Amazonian Highway, 84
Pan American Integration Model, 66 Trans-Andean Highway, 84
Panama Canal, 43 Transformational Diplomacy, 25, 40
Partido Liberal de Honduras (PLH) Treaty of Westphalia, 82
(Liberal Party of Honduras), 98 Trinidad & Tobago, 48, 53
Partido Nacional de Honduras (PNH) Triple Border, 48, 52, 188
(National Party of Honduras), 98 Triple Frontier, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25
Party of National Liberation (PLN) Trujillo, Rafael Leonidas, 50
(Costa Rica), 19, 98, 152 Tupac Amaru Revolutionary
Pastrana, Andrés, 58, 153, 154 Movement, 23
Pathways to Prosperity in the Americas
Initiative, 31 ungoverned areas, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,
Plan Colombia, 24, 53, 58, 65, 66, 106, 15, 17, 18, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 36, 38,
132, 143, 144, 151, 152, 153, 154, 39, 92, 143, 144, 146, 151, 160, 167,
155, 156, 157, 158, 160, 161, 163, 169, 185, 195
166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, ungoverned spaces, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9,
174, 175, 176, 189, 190, 194, 196, 13, 16, 38, 47, 49, 58, 59, 82, 92,
199, 200 93, 99, 101, 106, 107, 109, 118, 143,
Plan Maya Jaguar, 118, 120, 138 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150,
151, 157, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163,
RAND Corporation, 10, 24, 39, 58, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 174,
168, 170, 189, 190, 198 176, 178, 179, 183, 185, 186, 188,
Reagan, Ronald, 10, 53, 152, 170, 171, 198 189, 191, 193, 196, 201
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Union of South American Nations
Colombia (FARC), 6, 18, 19, 23, 25, (UNASUR), 2, 78
152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, United Nations (UN), 13, 96, 102,
162, 163 103, 112, 136, 182, 184, 185, 192,
Rice, Condoleeza, 26, 51, 59 196, 199
Rogue States, 10 United Nations Development Program
Rumsfeld, Donald, 124, 143, 171, 198 (UNDP), 96, 192, 199
Index l 211
United Nations Mission US Department of Justice, 90

for Stabilization in Haiti US National Intelligence Council, 68
(MINUSTAH), 53, 182
United Nations Office on war on drugs, 4, 5, 6, 45, 53, 54, 62,
Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 74, 152, 155, 188
102, 112 Washington Consensus, 2, 47
United Self-Defense Forces of Weber, Max, 83
Colombia (AUC), 19, 23, 152 Wikileaks, 24, 38
Uribe, Álvaro, 155, 157 World Bank, 2, 29, 113, 130, 131, 134,
US Agency for International 135, 141, 201
Development (USAID), 9, 10, 18, World Health Organization (WHO),
25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 81, 97
35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 57, 117, 118, 136,
160, 183, 184, 199 Zapatista, 7
US Congress, 28, 35, 134, 153, 158, Zelaya, Manuel, 98
159, 160, 161 Zetas, 44, 50, 118, 129, 130, 135

PREVOST Et Al (2014) USA National Security Latin America Ungoverned Spaces Failed States PDF

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Originaltitel

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

PREVOST Et Al (2014) USA National Security Latin America Ungoverned Spaces Failed States PDF

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

US National Security Concerns in

Latin America and the Caribbean

All rights reserved.

List of Illustrations vii

9 US Response to the Haitian Earthquake in the Context of the

G. Prevost et al. (eds.), US National Security Concerns in Latin

States. While all of these projects and several others of a narrower

bringing together police and military officials of Mexico, Canada,

Mexican economy remained reasonably healthy. Most analysts saw the

the rubric of the CASI. However, it is interesting how the different

From the US Department of State,

G. Prevost et al. (eds.), US National Security Concerns in Latin

(USDS); the US Agency for International Development (USAID); and

From Practice to Theory: Defining Ungoverned Areas

States” contributed little in understanding the growing challenges to

predatory government presence, partially collapsed states in which state

Table 2.1 Subcategories of ungoverned areas

Governance Threat Description

Source: LAMB, 2008: 19–20.

According to some critics, ungoverned and undergoverned areas

authority, such as social services and humanitarian aid in conflict areas.

way they govern.” The understanding of the subject is split, therefore,

The Ungoverned Areas in the US Grand Security Strategy

defense policy should therefore help to “shrink the ungoverned areas of

disaster or postconflict recovery: “Good governance is the only path to

State Weakness and Terrorism: The Approach of the USDS

by the USDS on the subject. Therefore, it will be possible to identify

●● Intensive supervision of financial activities

●● Cooperation and exchange of information between national and

Although the agreements are related to the internal functions of states

In order to minimize these impacts, the United States should help

Terrorists in the region are becoming increasingly active in illicit trans-

The terms used refer to an incipient but nonetheless clear definition

to Venezuela, the Colombian border, and the Triple Frontier (USDS,

In the years 2006 and 2007, several counterterrorist initiatives were

even though there is no confirmation of an operational presence of the

The Think Tanks’ View within the Framework of

A careful look at Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires or Caracas—just

To complete the range of regional threats, the Heritage Foundation

economic difficulties with the perpetuation of poverty in these coun-

Ungoverned Areas in the USDS and USAID

force, their purpose lying in the relationship between freedom, security,

●● Achieving peace and security

We also observed that the goals of international peace and security

●● Political, social, or economic instability

We could note here the convergence of the points mentioned by the

executive for foreign policy activities in 201111 totaled US$52.8 billion

External Aid and Good Governance: USAID in Action

the combined impact of investments . . . to improve people’s lives and

Table 2.2 The fragility framework

Source: USAID, 2005a: 12.

Researches show that the instability connected to fragile states is a

institutional decay, disputed elections, poor income distribution, lack

USAID recognizes that quality governance positively inf luences the

Through local leadership, it is possible to reach the sources of underde-

Country Programs Geographic distribution of the Investments % share of programs

Paraguay Democracy Concentrated in the Southern 18.000b

from the provision of training on the cultivation of other products

Miko, Francis T. (2004). Removing Terrorist Sanctuaries: The 9/11 Commission,

The United States and the

G. Prevost et al. (eds.), US National Security Concerns in Latin

●● return to the “state-centered” concept, in which the state defines

In the US perspective, the following general inventory of the security

List of Illustrations vii

9 US Response to the Haitian Earthquake in the Context of the