I.

THE COMELEC CASE # 11-13

CASE # 11 ABAD vs. COMELEC [GR 128877; Dec 10, 1999]

FACTS:

Petitioner Abad and private respondent Sarenas were both candidates for Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
chairman of Barangay Sta. Barbara, Llanera, Nueva Ecija, during the May 6, 1996, SK elections wherein
Abad emerged as winner and proclaimed SK chairman with 66 votes as against Sarenas’ 62 votes.

Sarenas then filed an election protest before the Second Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Gen.
Natividad, Nueva Ecija alleging fraud on Abad’s part through the registration of four unqualified voters
and asked for a recount of the votes cast.

Abad answered that Sarenas was barred from questioning the qualifications of the four voters because
he failed to ask for their exclusion from the voters' list as provided for under Section 22 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2824, the Rules and Regulations Governing the May 6, 1996 Elections of the SK; and
Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2832, the Instructions for the Registration of Voters in connection
with the SK elections.

Abad contended that the permanent registry list of voters is conclusive on the question of who has the
right to vote in an election under the Omnibus Election Code and also claimed that a recount is not
justified under the provisions of the same Code.

Abad also charged Sarenas with vote-buying and further alleged error on the part of the Board of Election
Tellers in the appreciation of votes.

In an Order dated June 3, 1996, the MCTC ruled in favor of private respondent ruling that while the
registry list of voters is indeed conclusive as to who can vote, this must be disregarded if justice were to
prevail and a recount of the votes would not be determinative of who actually won the SK chairmanship.

The four votes, representing the votes of those persons whose qualification as voters were questioned,
were instead ordered deducted from Abad resulting in a 62-62 tie between the contending candidates,
such that it was ordered that the winner be determined via drawing of lots or toss of a coin.

Abad then appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, which, however, dismissed his
appeal, since under COMELEC Resolution No. 2824, the decision of the MCTC insofar as the SK election is
concerned can only be elevated to the COMELEC en banc through a petition for review and only in
meritorious cases. The RTC ordered remand of the case to the court of origin.

In the drawing of lots, Sarenas emerged as and on the same day, the MCTC directed him to take his oath
of office and to assume his duties as SK chairman. Abad was absent although he was duly notified of the
proceeding. Abad then filed a petition for review with the COMELEC en banc.

The COMELEC dismissed the petition ruling that the Order of the Municipal Trial Court had, as of the filing
of the Petition for Review already become final. In short, the Petition as regards said Order had
prescribed failing to direct his petition to the Commission En Banc within thirty days from June 5, 1996,
the date the decision was served upon him, despite having several opportunities to avail of the correct
remedy and only acted when he lost the drawing of lots to respondent.
The COMELEC also ruled that the order’s implementation become mandatory having become executory
as of October 3, 1996. Petitioner was duly notified of the proceedings but did not appear despite notice.
He can not invoke his non-appearance as an excuse for questioning the proceedings. There is therefore
no cogent reason to warrant the setting aside of the result thereof.

Abad filed this petition forcertiorari before the Supreme Court seeking to annul the COMELEC En
Banc Resolution

ISSUE:

Whether the COMELEC sitting En Banc has jurisdiction to entertain petitions for review of the decision of
the MetC/MTC/MCTC.

HELD:

NO.

From the trial court, petitioner proceeded directly to the COMELEC en banc. Apparently, he was
proceeding pursuant to Section 49 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824, which provides:

. . . The Commission en banc in meritorious cases may entertain a petition for review of
the decision of the MetC/MTC/MCTC in accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
...

The rule however is not in accord but in conflict with Article IX-C, Section 3 of the Constitution, which
states that:

Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc.

In Sarmiento v. Commission on Elections, the court ruled that the COMELEC, sitting en banc, does not
have the requisite authority to hear and decide election cases in the first instance. This power pertains to
the divisions of the Commission. Any decision by the Commission en banc as regards election cases
decided by it in the first instance is null and void.

In the recent case of Zarate v. COMELEC the court nullified the decision of the COMELEC en banc, which
incidentally also concerns a 1996 SK election case appealed directly from the MTC and remanded the
case and ordered it assigned to an appropriate division of the COMELEC.

Thus, consistent with the rulings in Zarate and Sarmiento cases, the questioned resolution of the
COMELEC en banc in this case of Abad is declared as null and void SET ASIDE and the Commission is
ordered to assign the case to one of its Divisions for prompt resolution
CASE # 12 BAGATSING vs. COMELEC [GR 134047; Dec 08, 1999]

FACTS:

Petitioners Amado S. Bagatsing, Ernesto M. Maceda and Jaime Lopez and herein private respondent Jose
L. Atienza were candidates for the position of Mayor of Manila in the May 11, 1998 elections.

On May 18, 1998, seven (7) days after the elections, petitioners filed with the COMELEC a complaint for
disqualification against for allegedly causing the disbursement of public funds in the amount of Three
Million Three Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand (P3,375,000.00) Pesos, more or less, within the prohibited
forty-five-day period before the elections in violation of Article 22, Section 261 (g) (2) of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881, as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines. The alleged disbursement was intended to be
distributed in the form of financial assistance to the public school teachers of the City of Manila who
manned the precinct polls in that city during the elections.

The COMELEC (First Division) issued an order ruling that the evidence presented consisting of
disbursement voucher and the general payroll evidencing payment to the teachers in the form of financial
assistance dated May 5, 1998, show a probable cause of commission of election offenses which are
grounds for disqualification, and the evidence in support of disqualification is strong.

The City Board of Canvassers of Manila was directed to complete the canvassing of election returns of the
City of Manila, but to suspend proclamation of Atienza should he obtain the winning number of votes for
the position of City Mayor of Manila, until such time when the petition for disqualification against him
shall have been resolved.

On June 4, 1998, the COMELEC, acting on a Motion for Reconsideration filed by Atienza rendered a
resolution dismissed the petition as a disqualification case but referred the charges of election offense
against Atienza to the Law Department for appropriate action in conformity to Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code in relation to Section 6 of Republic Act 6646 otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law
of 1987.

In view of the issued resolution the COMELEC also granted the Motion to lift the order of suspension of
repondent’s proclamation and directed the City Board of Canvassers of Manila to CONVENE, COMPLETE
the CANVASS and PROCLAIM the candidate obtaining the highest number of votes for said position

That same day at around eleven o'clock in the morning, petitioners filed a Motion to Suspend Immediate
Intended Proclamation of Respondent. In the afternoon of the same day, petitioners likewise filed a
Motion for Reconsideration and a Second Motion to Suspend Immediate Intended Proclamation of
Respondent before COMELEC en banc.

Meanwhile, the City Board of Canvassers of Manila reconvened at three o'clock in the afternoon of the
same day, June 4, 1998, and proclaimed Atienza as the duly elected Mayor of the City of Manila.

On June 25, 1999, without waiting for the resolution of their motion for reconsideration pending before
the COMELEC en banc, petitioners filed the instant petition to set aside the June 4, 1998 Resolution of
the COMELEC's First Division.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC’s Resolution, dismissing the disqualification case, referring the charges to
the Law Department for Preliminary Investigation and directing the proclamation of private respondent
Atienza as Mayor of the City of Manila, should be set aside

HELD:

COMELEC Resolution No. 2050, adopted on November 3, 1988, reads:

xxxxx…..

1. Any complaint for the disqualification of a duly registered candidate based upon any of
the grounds specifically enumerated under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, filed
directly with the Commission before an election in which the respondent is a candidate, shall
be inquired into by the Commission for the purpose of determining whether the acts
complained of have in fact been committed. Where the inquiry by the Commission results in
a finding before election, that the respondent candidate did in fact commit the acts
complained, the Commission shall order the disqualification of the respondent candidate
from continuing as such candidate.

In case such complaint was not resolved before the election, the Commission may motu
proprio, or an (sic) motion of any of the parties, refer the complaint to the law Department
of the Commission as the instrument of the latter in the exercise of its exclusive power to
conduct a preliminary investigation of all cases involving criminal infractions of the election
laws. Such recourse may be availed of irrespective of whether the respondent has been
elected or has lost in the election.

2. Any complaint for disqualification based on Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in
relation to Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 6646 filed after the election against a candidate who
has already been proclaimed as winner shall be dismissed as a disqualification case.
However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law
Department of the Commission.

Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before proclamation of the respondent
candidate, the complaint shall, nevertheless, be dismissed as a disqualification case.
However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law
Department. If, before proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima facie finding of
guilt and the corresponding information has been filed with the appropriate trial court, the
complainant may file a petition for suspension of the proclamation of the respondent with
the court before which the criminal case is pending and the said court may order the
suspension of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong.

3. The Law Department shall terminate the preliminary investigation within thirty (30) days
from receipt of the referral and shall submit its study, report and recommendation to the
Commission en banc within five (5) days from the conclusion of the preliminary
investigation. If it makes a prima facie finding of guilt, it shall submit with such study the
Information for filing with the appropriate court.

The above-quoted resolution covers two (2) different aspects:

First, as contemplated in paragraph 1, a complaint for disqualification filed before the election must be
inquired into by the COMELEC for the purpose of determining whether the acts complained of have in
fact been committed. Where the inquiry results in finding before the election, the COMELEC shall order
the candidate's disqualification. In case the complaint was not resolved before the election, the COMELEC
may motu propio or on motion of any the parties, refer the said complaint to the Law Department of the
COMELEC for preliminary investigation.

Second, paragraph 2 refers to a complaint for disqualification filed after the election against a candidate
who has not yet been proclaimed or who has already been proclaimed as a winner. In both cases, the
complaint shall be dismissed as a disqualification case but shall referred to the Law Department of the
COMELEC for preliminary investigation. However, if before proclamation, the Law Department makes
a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding information has been filed with the appropriate trial
court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of the proclamation of the respondent with the
court before which the criminal case is pending and the said court may order the suspension of the
proclamation of the evidence of guilt is strong.

Contrary to petitioners' contention, the Court did not nullify in toto COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 in the
recent case of Sunga v. COMELEC.

What the Court found objectionable therein was the second paragraph of paragraph 1 of Resolution No.
2050 as said provision clearly infringes on Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which mandates that should a
disqualification case be not resolved before an election, the COMELEC shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the case. It should not be referred to the Law Department as the resolution provides. The
COMELEC's failure to distinguish between a complaint for disqualification filed before an election and one
filed after an election resulted in the controversy. There, the COMELEC misapplied the rules pertaining to
complaints filed after the election to a case clearly filed prior to the May 8, 1995 elections.

The rules on disposition and resolution of cases filed before or after an election vary. The Sunga case
cannot apply to the instant case because here, the disqualification case was filed on May 18, 1998, seven
(7) days after the May 11, 1998 elections. Therefore, the provisions of paragraph 2 of Resolution No.
2050 must apply, in that, the complaint shall be dismissed as a disqualification case, but referred to the
Law Department of the COMELEC for preliminary investigation.

Petitioners likewise fault the COMELEC for not ordering the suspension of respondent's proclamation as
mayor despite their timely-filed "Motion to Suspend Immediate Intended Proclamation of Respondent"
and which motion was reiterated in a second motion.

COMELEC did not err in not ordering the suspension of respondent's proclamation. The second paragraph
of paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 2050 provides that where a complaint is filed after the elections but
before proclamation, as in this case, the complaint must be dismissed as a disqualified case but shall be
referred to the Law Department for preliminary investigation. If before the proclamation, the Law
Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding information has been filed with
the appropriate trial court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of the proclamation of
respondent with the court before which the criminal case is pending and that court may order the
suspension of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong. It appearing that none of the foregoing
circumstances obtain herein as there is no prima facie finding of guilt yet, a suspension of respondent's
proclamation is not warranted. The mere pendency of a disqualification case against a candidate, and a
winning candidate at that, does not justify the suspension of his proclamation after winning in the
election. To hold otherwise would unduly encourage the filing of baseless and malicious petitions for
disqualification if only to effect the suspension of the proclamation of the winning candidate, not only to
his damage and prejudice but also to the defeat of the sovereign will of the electorate, and for the undue
benefit of undeserving third parties.

When the petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari on June 25, 1999, they knew pretty well that
the motion for reconsideration they filed to assail the June 4, 1998 resolution of the First Division of the
Commission was still pending with the COMELEC en banc. Notwithstanding that knowledge, they went to
this Court to seek another remedy which was not exactly available to them at that time. This practice falls
short of forum-shopping in the technical sense and will not be allowed.
CASE # 13 BEDOL vs. COMELEC [GR 179830; Dec 03, 2009]

Challenged in this petition for certiorari are the twin Resolutions issued by the respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in the case entitled "In the Matter of the Charge of Contempt of the
Commission Against Election Supervisor Lintang Bedol." The first Resolution 1 dated August 7, 2007, held
petitioner guilty of contempt of the COMELEC and meted out to him the penalty of six (6) months
imprisonment and a fine of ₱1,000.00. The second Resolution2 dated August 31, 2007, denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.

FACTS:

On May 14, 2007, the National and Local elections were held and Bedol was charged with the duties as
both Chair of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) for the province of Maguindanao as well as
being the concurrent Provincial Elections Supervisor for the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan a neighboring
province of Maguindanao.

Bedol failed to attend the scheduled canvassing of the Provincial Certificates of Canvass (PCOC) of
Maguindanao of which he is the Provincial Election Supervisor on May 22, 2007.

On May 25, 2007, Bedol appeared before the Commission, en banc to submit the provincial certificate of
canvass for Maguindanao, as Provincial Elections Supervisor and chair of the PBOC for Maguindanao. Due
to certain ‘observations’ on the provincial certificates of canvass by certain parties, canvassing of the
certificate was held in abeyance and Bedol was queried on the alleged fraud which attended the conduct
of elections in his area.

He was already informed of the resetting of the canvassing for May 30, 2007, but failed to appear despite
prior knowledge.

Acting on a certification that the canvassing documents for all municipalities of the province of
Maguindanao in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections were not transmitted by the Provincial
Election Supervisor of said province nor the respective Board of Canvassers, the COMELEC in the exercise
of its investigatory powers to determine existing controversies created the Task Force Maguindanao, ,
which was tasked to conduct a fact-finding investigation on the conduct of elections and certificates of
canvass from the city and municipalities in Maguindanao.

Bedol, appearing before the Task Force during its June 11, 2007 fact finding activity, explained that,
while in his custody and possession, the election paraphernalia were stolen sometime on May 29, 2007,
or some fifteen (15) days after the elections. This was the first time such an excuse was given and no
written report was ever filed with the Commission regarding the alleged loss.

Bedol was duly informed to be present in the next scheduled investigative proceedings. However, despite
actual notice in open session, Bedol not only failed to appear but also failed and refused to submit a
written explanation of his absences which he undertook to submit on June 13, 2007, but was only
received by this Commission belatedly on July 03, 2007.

Bedol, on June 26, 2007,instead appeared before the ‘Inquirer’ and GMA-7, with a gleaming 45 caliber
pistol strapped to his side, and in clear defiance of the Commission issued a challenge against those who
wants to file cases against him in connection with the alleged cheating in Maguindanao.

On June 27, 2007, the COMELEC through Task Force Maguindanao, issued a Contempt Charge and Show
Cause Order against Bedol citing various violations of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Bedol was
directed to appear before the COMELEC En Banc on July 3, 2007 at 10:00 o’clock in the morning to
personally explain why he should not be held in contempt for the above-mentioned offenses.

On July 2, 2007, petitioner was arrested on the basis of an Order of Arrest issued on June 29, 2007 by
the COMELEC after petitioner repeatedly failed to appear during the fact-finding proceedings before Task
Force Maguindanao.

During the July 3, 2007 hearing, petitioner questioned the COMELEC’s legal basis for issuing the warrant
of arrest and its assumption of jurisdiction over the contempt charges.

During the hearing on July 17, 2007, Bedol reiterated his objection to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
over the contempt charges due to the absence of a complaint lodged with the COMELEC by any private
party which was denied forthwith by the COMELEC. He was then required to present evidence which he
refused to do.

On July 31, 2007, petitioner again belatedly filed his Memorandum maintaining his objection to the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC to initiate the contempt proceedings on ground that the COMELEC, sitting en
banc as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of senators, was performing its administrative
and not its quasi-judicial functions. Petitioner argued that the COMELEC, in that capacity, could not
punish him for contempt.

On August 7, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc rendered the first assailed Resolution finding Bedol guilty of
Contempt of the Commission through his acts and omissions disrespecting the COMELEC sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months and to pay a fine of One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00).

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the COMELEC in the other
assailed Resolution dated August 31, 2007.

Hence, petitioner filed before the Court the instant petition for certiorari raising the following issues:

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS HAS JURISDICTION TO INITIATE OR PROSECUTE

THE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE PETITIONER.

HELD:

YES

The main thrust of petitioner’s argument is that the COMELEC exceeded its jurisdiction in initiating the
contempt proceedings when it was performing its administrative and not its quasi-judicial functions as the
National Board of Canvassers for the election of senators. According to petitioner, the COMELEC may only
punish contemptuous acts while exercising its quasi-judicial functions.

The COMELEC possesses the power to conduct investigations as an adjunct to its constitutional duty to
enforce and administer all election laws, by virtue of the explicit provisions of paragraph 6, Section 2,
Article IX of the 1987 Constitution.

The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus
Election Code, may be classified into administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial. The quasi-
judicial power of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from the
enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies; and of all
contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to the
issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative functions
as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress. Its administrative function refers to the enforcement
and administration of election laws. In the exercise of such power, the Constitution (Section 6, Article IX-
A) and the Omnibus Election Code (Section 52 [c]) authorize the COMELEC to issue rules and regulations
to implement the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code. 7

The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its quasi-judicial power in pursuit of
the truth behind the allegations of massive fraud during the elections in Maguindanao. To achieve its
objective, the Task Force conducted hearings and required the attendance of the parties concerned and
their counsels to give them the opportunity to argue and support their respective positions.

The effectiveness of the quasi–judicial power vested by law on a government institution hinges on its
authority to compel attendance of the parties and/or their witnesses at the hearings or proceedings.

To withhold from the COMELEC the power to punish individuals who refuse to appear during a fact-
finding investigation, despite a previous notice and order to attend, would render nugatory the
COMELEC’s investigative power, which is an essential incident to its constitutional mandate to secure the
conduct of honest and credible elections. In this case, the purpose of the investigation was however
derailed when petitioner obstinately refused to appear during said hearings and to answer questions
regarding the various election documents which, he claimed, were stolen while they were in his
possession and custody. Undoubtedly, the COMELEC could punish petitioner for such contumacious
refusal to attend the Task Force hearings.

Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC was acting as a board of canvassers at that time it required
petitioner to appear before it, the powers of the board of canvassers are not purely ministerial. The board
exercises quasi-judicial functions, such as the function and duty to determine whether the papers
transmitted to them are genuine election returns signed by the proper officers. When the results of the
elections in the province of Maguindanao were being canvassed, counsels for various candidates posited
numerous questions on the certificates of canvass brought before the COMELEC. The COMELEC asked
petitioner to appear before it in order to shed light on the issue of whether the election documents
coming from Maguindanao were spurious or not. When petitioner unjustifiably refused to appear,
COMELEC undeniably acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed resolutions.

On the procedure adopted by the COMELEC in proceeding with the indirect contempt charges against
petitioner, Section 52 (e), Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code pertinently provides:

Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections.

xxx

(e) Punish contempts provided for in the Rules of Court in the same procedure and with the same
penalties provided therin. Any violation of any final and executory decision, order or ruling of the
Commission shall constitute contempt thereof. [Emphasis ours.]

The aforecited provision of law is implemented by Rule 29 of COMELEC’s Rules of Procedure, Section 2 of
which states:

Rule 29 – Contempt
 Sec. 1. xxx

Sec. 2. Indirect Contempt. – After charge in writing has been filed with the Commission or Division, as
the case may be, and an opportunity given to the respondent to be heard by himself or counsel, a person
guilty of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

(a) Misbehavior of the responsible officer of the Commission in the performance of his official duties or in
his official transactions;

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of the
Commission or any of its Divisions, or injunction or restraining order granted by it;

(c) Any abuse of or any inlawful interference with the process or proceedings of the Commission or any
of its Divisions not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rules;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice by the Commission or any of its Divisions;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney and acting as such without authority; and

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served.

SEC. 3 Penalty for Indirect Contempt. – If adjudged guilty, the accused may be punished by a fine not
exceeding one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos or imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or both, at
the discretion of the Commission or Division.

The language of the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is broad enough to
allow the initiation of indirect contempt proceedings by the COMELEC motu proprio. Furthermore, the
above-quoted provision of Section 52(e), Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code explicitly adopts the
procedure and penalties provided by the Rules of Court. Under Section 4, Rule 71, said proceedings may
be initiated motu proprio by the COMELEC, viz:

SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. – Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio
by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring
the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with
supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full
compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If
the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition
for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately,
unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action
for joint hearing and decision.

Hence, the COMELEC properly assumed jurisdiction over the indirect contempt proceedings which were
initiated by its Task Force Maguindanao, through a Contempt Charge and Show Cause Order,
notwithstanding the absence of any complaint filed by a private party.