Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
2015
Collapsing Order,
Reluctant Guardians?
Published on the Occasion of the MSC 2015
Preface
As we gather for the 51st Munich Security Conference, a particularly difficult year in inter-
national security policy lies behind us. Over the past twelve months, numerous crises have
developed into crucial challenges and threats to international peace and security in ways that
many decision makers and analysts did not see coming. And, what is more, these crises have
exposed worrisome cracks in the international order and shed light on the shortcomings of
existing collective security mechanisms and structures.
The document you are holding in your hands, the first edition of the Munich Security Report
(MSR), is designed to help us make sense of current developments. It assembles material
from many different sources and is an edited selection – heavy on graphics, charts, and
maps – of some of the most interesting analytical and research work from the past year in key
areas of the international security agenda. It also includes brief summaries of critical security
debates, including some of the most poignant quotes of the last twelve months.
Here is what the MSR is not: it is neither comprehensive nor is it meant to offer a systematic
ranking of the most serious security concerns we are facing. We are fully aware that a number
of critical issues, including cybersecurity and global health security, are largely missing from
these pages. We had to make difficult choices, much like when we put together the MSC
conference agenda every year.
The report is meant, first and foremost, as a – hopefully thought provoking – conversation
starter for our conference. But we hope that it will prove to be a useful tool far beyond the
Munich weekend – for decision makers, security professionals, and the interested public.
The MSR is one among several new initiatives to keep the Munich Security Conference young
and fresh in the year after our 50th anniversary.
We could not have put this report together without the help of many great institutions and per-
sonal friends and partners who allowed us to include their work. Some even prepared m aterial
exclusively for us or made their data available prior to their official publication.* I want to use
this opportunity to thank all contributing organizations, listed at the end of this report, once
again and express our hope that even more institutions will wish to work with us in the future.
Please feel welcome to share any feedback or draw our attention to research and analytical work
you feel should be included in this digest. We know that there is a lot of brilliant work out there,
and we will do our very best to make future editions of the MSR even more of a “must-read.”
Sincerely yours
Wolfgang Ischinger
Chairman of the Munich Security Conference
* In the report, we acknowledge partners who collected data specifically for the MSR or who provided data
before their official release by printing their logos along with their respective charts, maps, or tables.
Contents
Collapsing Order, Reluctant Guardians? 4
Section 1: Actors 8
Germany: Ready to Lead? 10
The US: World-Weary or War-Weary? 12
Europe: Defense Matters? 14
NATO: Back Home for Good? 18
Russia: Bear or Bust? 20
Emerging Powers: Free Risers? 22
Section 3: Challenges 32
Hybrid Warfare: Who Is Ready? 34
War on Terror: Are We Losing It? 36
Refugee Crisis: Crossing the Line? 40
Energy Security: Running out of St(r)eam? 42
Defense Suppliers: Going to Merge? 44
Acknowledgments 58
Endnotes 60
4 | Collapsing Order, Reluctant Guardians?
Order,
the seams”6 base their pessimism on eroding
structures. After all, the flaws of today’s inter
Reluctant
national order that these a nalyses assess will
probably be with us for a long time.
“The world is not falling to leave their homes. It can hardly be said for security governance.
apart. […] Why is the has now also metasta- Our collective ability to solve problems has
world always ‘more dan sized into the broader decreased, and major institutions of global
gerous than it has ever region, enabling the security governance have been weakened.
been’ – even as a greater rise of the self-pro- This leaves the world with a huge gulf be-
and greater majority of claimed Islamic State tween demand for and supply of international
humanity lives in peace and further contributing governance.
and dies of old age?”9 to disintegrating orders
Steven Pinker and in the region. Crises in Collapsing orders “Our hope lies in the
Andrew Mack, Libya and Yemen have are arguably both a greater unity, under
22 December 2014 moved toward civil driver and an effect
standing and commo
wars, Egypt’s demo of an increasing reluc- nality between the great
cratic interlude is over, and the conflict between tance of its traditional democracies. If they
Israelis and Palestinians erupted v iolently again. guardians. As potential don’t lead, it can lead to
While a few governments have embarked on leaders stop acting the a state of anarchy. […]
a path of reform, only Tunisia has made real way they used to, other Democracy is one of
progress toward a democratic future. actors make use of
the most powerful tools
their opportunity to test for dealing with security
In the Asia-Pacific, even as major incidents limits. And as orders
problems.”12
were avoided, the state of play is precarious. are crumbling and Ajit Doval,
Asia is the only region in which defense ex- become much harder
21 October 2014
penditures have increased each year for the to maintain or manage,
past two and a half decades. The rhetoric potential leaders might consider the chal-
employed by numerous actors has become lenge to do so too great. Call it the vicious
much more assertive, the regional security circle of international disorder.
architecture is far from solid, and the num-
ber of u
nresolved border disputes stagger- To be sure, many charges leveled at the
ing. Moreover, the rise of a power of China’s United States are exaggerated. But, at the
clout has historically always been an enor- very least, the focus on “nation b uilding at
mous challenge. home” that President Obama has repeatedly
announced has led to a per
ception of
“Rather than fearing In Western Africa, the retreat. Shrill warnings of an A merican em-
strong, opposing states, Ebola pandemic has pire, voiced only a de-
we worried about state almost shut down a cade ago, have given “[The post-1945 arrange
weakness, the breakup number of states. And way to fears that Un- ments are] the worst
of countries, or the in other regions of the cle Sam might disen- system of international
global reach of non- continent, humanitarian gage from the world. governance – except for
state, terrorist networks. disasters and protract- Both in Europe and all the others.”13
Today, however, renewed ed conflicts threaten in Asia, Washington Kevin Rudd,
competition between the lives of millions. had to make clear 21 October 2014
key actors is a concern. that defending its al-
[…] Geopolitics – and In terms of the lies remained a core interest of the United
realpolitik – is once again conditions for effective States. But it is not certain how long the US
taking center stage.”10 global governance, can and will bear this extraordinary burden.
Espen Barth Eide, 2014 challenges also
abound. While struc In Europe, many coun tries are still trying to
tures for global economic governance have overcome the impact of the financial and eco-
arguably per formed rather well in manag- nomic crisis as well as domestic block ades
ing the g lobal crisis after 2008,11 the same and rising Euroskepticism. Europe’s global
6 | Collapsing Order, Reluctant Guardians?
“We should be fully role, while now some- economic considerations. The number of
mindful of the complexity times on the agenda, relevant actors and potential spoilers has sky
of the evolving internatio will not soon be spelled rocketed, also contributing to a d ecreased abil-
nal architecture, and we out in a meaningful way. ity of countries to solve problems on their own
should also recognize At the same time, many or in coordination. This and the increasing inter
that the growing trend Europeans openly say,
dependence of today’s
toward a multi-polar Russia’s policies have globalized s ocieties fur- “Our age is insistently, at
world will not change.”14 done a lot to help them ther exacerbate broad- times almost desperately,
Xi Jinping, move closer together in er risks, for example in pursuit of a concept
29 November 2014 matters of foreign poli- risks stemming from of world order. Chaos
cy. If there is anything climate
change or threatens side by side
positive about the crisis of European security, cyber attacks. with unprecedented
it is that this wake-up call cannot be ignored. interdependence: in the
Finally, our ability to pre- spread of weapons of
Many now consider Russia more of a spoiler dict major crises, let mass destruction, the
than a contributor to international security and alone prevent them, ap- disintegration of states,
stability. Yet Moscow has played a constructive pears to be weakening the impact of environ
role in certain areas – notably in the negotia- as well. The more com- mental depredations, the
tions between the P5+1 and Iran over Tehran’s plex and complicat- persistence of genocidal
nuclear program. But against the backdrop of ed the world gets, the practices, and the spread
Russia’s role in the war in Ukraine, cooperation harder it is to get it right. of new technologies
with Moscow will remain a severe challenge. Put differently, it’s much threatening to drive con
easier today to overlook flict beyond human con
And while the so-called rising powers have or misjudge the signals trol or comprehension.”15
assumed crucial roles in the world economy, amid the noise. Henry Kissinger, 2014
their contributions to safeguarding the inter
national order have in the eyes of many Thinking back to the situation in early 2014,
been limited. as hundreds of decision makers were about
to travel to Munich: if many “missed” the rise
Of course, not all breakdown in order can be of ISIS and the coming fundamental c risis in
attributed merely to changing great p ower European security a year ago, the question
relations, a change in domestic
priorities, or now must be: What are we missing today?
“Geopolitics is back. As 2015 begins, political conflict among the world’s great powers
is in play more than at any time since the end of the Cold War.”
Which region will be most affected by rising geostrategic competition in the next
12–18 months?
Assessment by the World Economic Forum's global knowledge network
Percent
Asia-Pacific 33
Europe 22
North America 12
Sub-Saharan Africa 7
Latin America 6
Asia-Pacific 1 16 61 22
Europe 1 14 55 30
North America 8 57 35
Sub-Saharan Africa 8 65 27
Latin America 2 14 57 27
Ready to
armed support for the Kurds. Or they can
refer to what George
Lead?
H. W. Bush opined on “But I come here today,
the occasion of the Berlin, to say compla
25th anniversary of cency is not the character
the Berlin Wall. Asked of great nations.”8
whether he thought Barack Obama,
“It is quite a sensation that took place at Germany had ful- 19 June 2013
the Munich Security Conference,” one filled his
expectations
of G ermany’s leading newspapers, Die to “contribute in full measure as a force for
Zeit, analyzed in February of 2014. “Three peace and stability in world a ffairs,” as he
improbable allies” – German President
himself had put it in 1990, Bush in 2014 re-
Joachim Gauck, Defense Minister Ursula von plied: “Yes, and then some!”9
der L eyen, and Foreign M
inister Frank-Walter
Steinmeier – “did nothing less than jointly
Others argue that the “In my opinion, Germany
inaugurate a new foreign policy course.”1 recent increase in should make a more sub
German activity has, stantial contribution, and it
“The United States and “Germany should make at best, been minor – should make it earlier and
the Federal R epublic have a more substantial con- and hardly substantial. more decisively if it is to
always been firm friends tribution, and it should Skeptics further high- be a good partner.”10
and allies, but today we make it earlier and light that the German Joachim Gauck,
share an added role: part more decisively if it is public remains reluc- 31 January 2014
ners in leadership.”2 to be a good partner,” tant and that recent
George H. W. Bush, Gauck said.3 “Germany revelations about the Bundeswehr’s state
31 May 1989 must be ready for of equipment and procurement perfectly
earlier, more decisive
epitomize the enormous gap b
etween
and more substantive engagement in the for- rhetoric and capabilities.
eign and s
ecurity policy sphere,” Steinmeier
announced.4 “Indifference is not an option for Critics also say that Germany’s international
Germany,” von der Leyen added.5 popularity stems from an often passive
approach to security policy. Abroad and at
“I fear German p ower less Ever since, these home, observers are wondering whether
than I am beginning to speeches have served Germany’s Western integration really is as
fear German inactivity. You as the points of refer- strong as many assume. Heinrich A ugust
have become Europe’s ence in the vivid inner- Winkler, a German historian and public intel-
indispensable nation.”6 German d ebate about lectual, said that there is “reason for doubt”
Radosław Sikorski, Germany’s international since “a strong minority q
uestions fundamental
28 November 2011 responsibility that fol-
elements of our Western integration.”11
lowed. The German
Foreign Office launched its “Review 2014”
In any case, the debate about Germany’s new
process, engaging international experts and role has just begun. The Social Democratic
the public in an unprecedented effort to Friedrich Ebert Foundation made a ques-
raise the level of discourse by asking: “What tion that is on many Berlin minds the theme
is wrong with German foreign policy? What of its annual foreign policy conference in
needs to be changed about it?”7 Results will September 2014: “Assuming responsibility –
be presented in February. but how?”12
Actors – Germany: Ready to Lead? | 11
What Germans think: Should Germany become more engaged in international crises?
Percent
Germany should become more involved Germany should continue to exercise restraint
62 60 62
37 37 34
For a more detailed
look at the 2015
results, see p. 54
What Germans think: Where should Germany become more involved, where less
(April/May 2014)?
Percent
Less involvement Same level of involvement More involvement
Humanitarian assistance 94 86
Diplomatic negotiations 10 3 85
Acceptance of refugees 45 6 47
Support for other countries in armed conflicts without
53 3 41
direct military participation
Military missions of the German armed forces (Bundeswehr) 82 2 13
What Germans think: When is the deployment of German armed forces in missions
abroad justified (April/May 2014)?
Percent
No, I don’t think this is justified Yes, I think this is justified
For humanitarian purposes, e.g., to ensure that supplies reach crisis regions 13 85
World-
ing more things in more places today than
maybe ever before. How we’re doing it is
Weary or
differently.”3
Not whether, but how we will lead A desire to shed the unusual burdens
“Those who […] suggest that America is “If a breakdown in the world order that
in decline, or has seen its global leader America made is occurring, it is not
ship slip away [are] misreading history or because America’s power is declining
engaged in partisan politics. […] So the […]. At the core of American unease is
United States is and remains the one in a desire to shed the u nusual burdens of
dispensable nation. […] The question we responsibility that previous generations
face, the question each of you will face, of Americans took on […] and to return
is not whether America will lead, but how to being a more normal kind of nation
we will lead. […] American isolationism […]. Unless Americans can be led back
is not an option. […] I b
elieve that a to an understanding of their e nlightened
world of greater freedom and tolerance self-interest, to see again how their fate is
is not only a moral imperative, it also entangled with that of the world, then the
helps to keep us safe. But to say that prospects for a peaceful twenty-first cen-
we have an interest in pursuing peace tury in which Americans and American
and freedom beyond our borders is not principles can thrive will be bleak. […]
to say that every problem has a military The conventional wisdom these days is
solution. Since World War II, some of our that Americans are war-weary. But it may
most costly mistakes came not from our be more accurate to say they are world-
restraint, but from our willingness to rush weary. […] As in the past, Americans will
into military adventures without thinking be among the last to suffer grievously
through the consequences […]. Here’s from a breakdown of world order. […]
my bottom line: America must always There is no democratic superpower wait
lead on the world stage. If we don’t, no ing in the wings to save the world if this
one else will.”7 democratic superpower falters.”8
Barack Obama, 28 May 2014 Robert Kagan, 26 May 2014
Europe: 13,000,000,000
Defense
euros annually by pooling defense procurement.4
McKinsey, June 2013
“Defense matters” is the very first sentence What is more, there “I have got the impression
of the European Council conclusions from continues to be a that we already lost time
December 2013. The document, the last of huge gap between by looking too much at
its kind to focus on security and defense, decisiveness and poli- our national courtyards
continues with a summary of the state of cies on the one hand instead of focusing on the
affairs: “An effective and r hetoric on the whole set of European
“Washington will not Common Security and other when it comes forces. If we Europeans
always take the lead Defense Policy helps to Euro pean security want to remain a credible
when it comes to power to enhance the secu and defense affairs. actor in security policy,
projection. The United rity of European citi- Over the past few we must plan and act
States will demand […] zens and contributes years, many declara- together.”5
that Europeans assume to peace and stability tions have stressed the Ursula von der Leyen,
their responsibilities in our neighborhood importance of much 31 January 2014
in preserving order, and in the broader closer defense co-
especially in Europe’s world. But Europe’s operation, of pooling and sharing, in order
periphery.”1 strategic and geo- to maintain and eventually expand critical
Anders Fogh political environment capabilities. Many consequential decisions in
Rasmussen, July 2011 is evolving rapidly. this realm, however, still remain to be taken.
Defense budgets in
Europe are constrained, limiting the ability “After decades in which all too many people
to develop, deploy and sustain military ca- took peace for granted, it is now the power of
pabilities. Fragmented European defense arms that is the dictating force in the immediate
markets jeopardise the sustainability and European neighborhood. We must see the full
competitiveness of Europe’s defense and truth for what it is: we have entered much more
security industry.”2 dangerous times.”6
Carl Bildt, 29 September 2014
“[…] the question we And, one could add,
have to ask ourselves with a large portion of
is should we really fearUS troops gone from
the loss of sovereignty? Europe, many key
Or should we define the European platforms
concept of sovereignty in massively reduced,
a less traditional way?”3
and a war taking place
Jeanine Hennis- in Eastern Europe,
Plasschaert,challenges really do
2 February 2013 abound for European
defense. Against this
backdrop, many observers have questioned
whether the magnitude and importance of
Actors – Europe: Defense Matters? | 15
Italy
8.4%
Norway 2.4%
2.5%
Sweden 18.5%
France
4.4%
Other Central Europe
3.6%
Poland
3.7%
15.3% 2.3%
Netherlands
Germany Other Western Europe
Balkans -22.2
While significant cuts have also occurred in Western Europe, with aggregate real outlays down by 8.4% over
four years, Western Europe remains Europe’s highest spending sub-region, accounting for almost half of
regional outlays (46.0%).
Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies10
Actors – Europe: Defense Matters? | 17
How does the size of the European Who is providing tactical aviation
tactical aviation fleet compare to the US? in Europe?
Number of tactical aircraft (2015) Number of tactical aircraft (2015)
Germany 238
France 223
Italy 208
UK 206
Spain 161
Sweden 134
Other European
747
US Europe states
Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies11 Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies12
How have principal US combat forces deployed to Europe been reduced since 1989?
Selected US European command organizations and equipment
1989 2001 2015
Total personnel (army, air force, navy, marine corps) 326,400 98,000 66,200
Armored brigade 10 3 0
Armored infantry brigade 4 1 0
Light infantry brigade 1 0 0
Airborne brigade 0 1 1
Mechanized cavalry regiment 0 0 1
Tactical aviation squadrons 28 8 6
Main battle tanks 5,000 657 29
Armored infantry fighting vehicles 940 887 33
Artillery 1,600 508 97
Short-range ballistic missiles 120 0 0
Tactical aviation (fighter/ground attack) 639 174 136
Attack helicopters 279 134 48
The numbers of US organizations and equipment deployed to Europe have declined significantly since 1989,
though in terms of capability deployed US forces remain significant. The US is investing in ballistic missile
defense infrastructure and capabilities in Europe, and there have been increased deployments to Eastern
Europe in 2014 and plans to increase army prepositioned stocks as part of an Enhanced European Activity
Set. US forces remaining in Europe still present formidable capabilities, notably in terms of airpower. Indeed,
the size of the US Air Force in Europe tactical fleet still surpasses that of many European air forces.
Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies13
18 | Actors – NATO: Back Home for Good?
Home for
and disagreed about job both easy – and hard.
the meaning of the Easy, because we know
Good?
NATO-Russia Founding what to do. And hard,
Act. However, at the because we still have
Wales Summit, NATO much to do. And time is
members managed to short.”3
approve the most im- Jens Stoltenberg,
Only a year ago, many observers wondered portant restructuring of 28 October 2014
whether the end of the combat mission in NATO’s defense pos-
Afghanistan, the operation that shaped
ture in decades, including a persistent pres-
NATO’s day-to-day work for about a decade, ence in NATO’s Eastern member states and
would trigger another re-run of the old “Is the creation of a new “spearhead force.”
NATO still relevant?” debate.
Since September 2014, NATO has been busy
Instead, 2014 became a wake-up call for implementing the decisions. Many
pledges
NATO and turned the Wales Summit into made in Wales were rather modest, to be
the probably most important Alliance sum- sure. But, even so, freeing the necessary
mit since the end of resources clearly requires a concerted effort
“[…] the defense of Tal the Cold War. In light by all Allies. Will they all make good on their
linn and Riga and Vilnius of Russia’s application defense pledges? And will they be ready in
is just as important as of “hybrid” warfare in time or be overtaken by events?
the defense of Berlin and Ukraine and President
Paris and London.”1 Putin’s stated position Wales Summit Declaration 2014
Barack Obama, that Russian-speak- “[…] Russia’s aggressive actions against
3 September 2014 ing populations every- Ukraine have fundamentally c hallenged
where should receive our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at
protection by Russia, NATO members had peace. Growing instability in our southern
to ask themselves whether they were pre- neighborhood, from the Middle East to
pared for defending against a similar Russian North Africa, as well as transnational and
playbook on their territory. The Alliance, in multi-dimensional threats, are also chal
other words, was suddenly very much back lenging our security. […] In order to en
“in area.” On top, the emergence of the sure that our Alliance is ready to respond
“Islamic State” made clear that NATO could swiftly and firmly to the new security
not just r eturn home and neglect “out of area” challenges, today we have approved the
challenges. But populations in both North NATO Readiness Action Plan. It provides
America and Europe are intervention-weary, a coherent and comprehensive package
and support for the different types of NATO of necessary measures to respond to
operations varies widely across the Alliance. the changes in the security environment
on NATO’s borders and further afield that
After NATO had agreed to a first set of are of concern to Allies. […] The Plan will
reassurance measures in spring 2014,
contribute to ensuring that NATO remains
then-NATO Secretary General Rasmussen a strong, ready, robust, and responsive
repeatedly emphasized that every Ally was
Alliance capable of meeting current and
a contributor.2 Yet, in the beginning, the com- future challenges from wherever they
mitment level differed substantially across the may arise.”4
Alliance. For the first half of 2014, the Allies still
Actors – NATO: Back Home for Good? | 19
100
Territorial 59
defense of
80 Europe 73
Military opera-
tions outside of 49
60
the US and 43
Europe
40 53
Providing arms
or training 43
20
Providing arms
or training to 55
0 countries like 41
Ukraine
2004 06 08 10 12 2014
Stability in 53
Afghanistan 57
Source: The German Marshall Fund of the United Source: The German Marshall Fund of the United
States (GMF)5 States (GMF)6
or Bust?
after Russia’s actions in Ukraine, many inter-
national worries center on what has been
called the “Putin Doctrine” in Russia’s foreign
policy. In March 2014, the Russian president
made the case that not only Russian citi-
In mere months, most of the work of 25 years zens, but also a more widely defined group
has evaporated. Only four years ago in Lis- of Russian-speaking people should receive
bon, NATO member states and Russia de- protection by Russia.5 Will this logic, taken
clared that they had “embarked on a new as far as in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, be
stage of cooperation towards a true strategic applied to other states with Russian-speak-
partnership.”1 Today, this statement seems to ing minorities as well?
stem from another age.
Another open question concerns the
82%
of Germans say Russia
Western leaders have
accused Russia of
violating international
funda
mental orientation of Russian policy:
Will Russia permanently pivot away from
Europe and search for partnerships else
“cannot be trusted”2 law and introduced where? Does the Russian government itself
ARD-Deutschlandtrend, far-reaching economic know how far it will take the break from the
August 2014 sanctions. At the West? How will Moscow handle the biting
same time, Russian impact of the sanctions, steeply falling oil
President Vladimir Putin has described him- prices, and the massive outflow of capital?
self as a protector of international law and Putin has denied that R ussia is embarking
made clear that Russia would not be de- on a path of self-isolation.6 Yet, what path he
terred by widespread international criticism. will take, only he knows.
“We are stronger,” V ladimir Putin said in No-
vember, answering a q uestion on Crimea. The most malignant manifestation of Putinism
“Stronger than who?,” the journalist asked. “Putin’s aggression only makes sense against the
“Everybody,” Putin replied. “Because we are backdrop of what has been the defining theme of
right. Truth is power. When a Russian feels his presidency: turning back the clock. For years
he is right, he is invincible.”3 that has meant […] reinstating key attributes of the
Soviet system within the borders of the Russian
Federation. But there were also indications that, if
Russia will not yield given a chance, Putin might extend his agenda, his
“The misunderstanding is that this is, at root, a rule, and what he hopes will be his legacy beyond
stand-off over Ukraine. To Russians, it is something those borders. […] Therein lies the most malignant
far more important: a struggle to stop others manifestation of Putinism: it violates international
expanding their sphere of control into territories law, nullifies Russia’s past pledges to respect the
they believe are vital to Russia’s survival. It is a sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbors,
miscalculation because Russia is far stronger, carries with it the danger of spinning out of control
and the west far weaker, than many imagine. […] and sparking a wider conflict, and establishes a
Russia will not yield. This has become a matter of precedent for other major powers to apply their own
our nation’s life and death.”4 version of the Putin Doctrine when convenient.”7
Sergey Karaganov, 15 September 2014 Strobe Talbott, 19 August 2014
Actors – Russia: Bear or Bust? | 21
What Russians think: Are the big What Russians think (April 2014): Does
Western countries (US, Germany, Japan, Russia have the right to annex territories
Great Britain, and others) partners or of the former Soviet republics, justifying it
opponents of Russia? by the statement that Russian people can
Percent experience rights infringement or are
already discriminated there?
Percent
15 12
Not generally,
It is difficult 54 Yes
to say 21 but yes in 34
case of Crimea
42 44
Partners
29 13
of Russia
8
90
600
80
80 81 81 80 81 81
500 78
75 70
72
66 67 68
60
400 60
50
300
40
200 30
20
100
10
0 0
2002 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 2014
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; International Monetary Fund; US Energy
Information Administration; Freedom House10
22 | Actors – Emerging Powers: Free Risers?
Powers:
Through the BRICS to consensually fashion
group, Brazil, R ussia, a new set of norms
Free Risers?
India, China, and best suited to sustain a
South Africa are joining rules-based order at the
forces in a coordinated global level. Managing
fashion. So far, they the peaceful arrival of
have mainly focused a polycentric world will
This year, China’s economy, if adjusted for on economic and require compromise,
purchasing power, has overtaken the United financial matters, for
tolerance, and recognition
States’ economy as instance through the of political diversity.”6
“[…] our coordination the world’s largest.1 creation of the New Trine Flockhart et al.,
is well established in Despite the rising eco- Development Bank.7 2014
various multilateral and nomic importance of
plurilateral initiatives and the emerging powers, In broader political and security terms, the
intra-BRICS cooperation is some analysts con- BRICS have often been lacking a common
expanding to encompass tinue to label them position: If they are “unified at all, it’s out of
new areas. Our shared “reluctant stakehold- a common perception of the strength of
views and commitment ers,”2 noting that their the West and a shared interest in limiting
to international law and contributions to global the West’s ability to
to multilateralism, with governance have not dictate the terms of “From the perspective of
the United Nations at its increased very much. international play.”8 the BRICS, the hubris and
center and foundation, are Are they free risers, Yet, given their tra- arrogance of policy-ma
widely recognized and are they learning to ditional insistence kers in the US-led West
constitute a major con route around long- on sovereignty and is so breathtaking as to
tribution to global peace, established structures, territorial integrity, the be scarcely believable. It’s
economic stability, social or do they contribute BICS’ muted response as though they have lost
inclusion, equality, sustain more than commonly to Russian action in the capacity to see how
able development and assumed? Ukraine heightened others see them. Or they
mutually beneficial coope concerns that the just don’t care.”9
ration with all countries.”3 Clearly, while W estern BRICS might turn into Ramesh Thakur,
BRICS Summit representatives usually an anti-Western bloc.10 21 July 2014
Fortaleza Declaration, point out that rising
15 July 2014 global influence comes Others, however, o bserve “a concerted effort
with more g lobal re- by the emerging powers to c onstruct parallel
sponsibility, the emerging powers feel that multilateral architectures that route around the
their voices are not respected enough. liberal order.”11 While
Brazil 26 45
China 42 42
South Africa 31 39
India 36 38
Russia 45 31
Germany 18 60
Canada 15 57
UK 21 56
France 22 50
Japan 30 49
US 39 42
Source: BBC/GlobeScan13
Catching up?
GDP
Current USD billions
20,000
European Union
15,000 US
10,000 China
Brazil
5,000
Russia
India
0 South Africa
2006 07 08 09 10 11 12 2013
60,000
US
50,000
40,000
European Union
30,000
Russia
20,000 Brazil
China
10,000
South Africa
0 India
2006 07 08 09 10 11 12 2013
Source: World Bank14
2Hot Spots
26 | Hot Spots – Ukraine: Tug or War?
Ukraine: deficit, d
epleted foreign
reserves, and a bank-
civilisational and even
sacral importance for
Tug or War?
ing system in c risis, Russia, like the Temple
“Ukraine is at risk of a Mount in Jerusalem for
financial meltdown.”6 the followers of Islam and
Judaism. And this is how
Moreover, there is a we will always c
onsider it.”7
In the summer of 2012, tens of thousands of real danger that we Vladimir Putin,
European football fans flocked to the Donbass are witnessing the 4 December 2014
Arena in Donetsk for five games of the Euro development of a new
2012 championship. “
cordon sanitaire” between East and West.
“[…] we fully recognize Less than two years Aware of this risk, the Ukrainian parliament
the freedom of States later, after negotiations dropped the country’s non-aligned status
to choose their own over a rather limited law in late December 2014. According to
security arrangements.”1 EU Association Agree- Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev, this
Charter of Paris for a ment had snow balled decision amounted
New Europe, 1990 into an armed conflict, to “in e ssence, an “Russia is violating the
Donetsk was a war
application for joining territorial integrity and the
zone. A cease-fire agreement, c oncluded in NATO” and turned sovereignty of Ukraine. It
Minsk in early September 2014, has been Ukraine into a “poten- regards one of its neigh
routinely violated. In the first ten weeks after tial enemy of Russia.”8 bors, Ukraine, as part of a
it was signed alone, more than 900 people While NATO countries sphere of influence. After
were killed in outbreaks of fighting and affirm Ukraine’s free- the horrors of two world
shelling,2 and the sep dom to choose its wars and the end of the
“Ukraine chooses its aratists have continued own path, most of Cold War, this calls the
own path and for this it to solidify their p osition. them strongly oppose entire European peaceful
has become a victim of Ukrainian membership order into question.”9
aggression.”3 While Russia denies in the Alliance in the Angela Merkel,
Toomas Hendrik Ilves, direct involvement in
near future. 17 November 2014
October 2014 the war, most U krainians
have soured on the
Russian government and are turning towards Budapest Memorandum 1994
Europe, as numerous opinion polls show. In “[Russia, the UK, and the US] reaffirm
September of 2014, over 66% of Ukrainians their commitment to Ukraine to respect
supported the EU Association Agreement the independence and sovereignty and
(16% were against). 17 months before, only the existing borders of Ukraine. [They]
42% had been in favor.4 Moreover, the October reaffirm their obligation to refrain from
parliamentary election results strongly favored the threat or use of force against the
pro-European parties. territorial integrity or political indepen
“If Ukraine wants to join The coalition agree- dence of Ukraine, and that none of
the EU and if the EU ac ment has been hailed their weapons will ever be used against
cepts Ukraine as a mem as an outline of an im- Ukraine except in self-defense or other
ber, Russia, I think, would portant reform agenda. wise in accordance with the Charter of
welcome this because we However, the structural the United Nations.”10
have a special relationship challenges the new
with Ukraine.”5 government is facing
Vladimir Putin, in many sec tors are
10 December 2004 formidable. And, in light
Hot Spots – Ukraine: Tug or War? | 27
On the outcome of the consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group concerning joint steps
towards the implementation of the Peace Plan of the Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko
and initiatives of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin.
Does Ukraine face a threat from Russia? How has Ukraine’s economy developed?
Share of Ukrainians who say “Yes” GDP per capita based on PPP
Percent Current USD ‘000
Ukraine Poland
76
25
20
15
23 10
5
0
July September 1992 95 98 2001 04 07 10 2014
2013 2014
Source: Razumkov Centre12 Source: MSC, based on IMF data13
28 | Hot Spots – Middle East: Orders Built on Sand?
Orders Built
coming back to roost.
America’s best friends in
But except in T unisia, the Arab world are the
on Sand?
and leaving aside kings.”6
some reforms in mod- Aaron David Miller,
erate monarchies, the 30 October 2014
hopes that came with
the Arab uprisings have “The best framework for
“Arab civilization, suchNowhere is the head been dashed. understanding the regio
as we knew it, is all butline of “collapsing nal politics of the Middle
gone. The Arab world order” more fitting than Civil wars, once con East is as a cold war in
today is more violent, in today’s M
iddle East. fined to state borders, which Iran and Saudi
unstable, fragmented and “We are just at the have become region Arabia play the leading
driven by extremism – the beginning of a long
alized. The twin wars in roles.”7
extremism of the rulers period […] of tur bu Syria and Iraq threaten F. Gregory Gause III,
and those in opposition – lence which I think will the stability of several July 2014
than at any time since the leave no country of neighbors. And numer-
collapse of the Ottoman the region unaffected,” ous countries in the region now fall in the
Empire a century ago.”1 Volker Perthes ana
range between weak and failing states – with
Hisham Melhem, lyzes.2 “There are ob- crises in Libya and Yemen deepening, in par-
18 September 2014 vious differences be ticular – while non-state actors in different
t
ween the events of shades have grown in strength significantly.
1618-1648 in Europe and those of 2011-2014
in the Middle East. But the similarities are Moreover, in many “US and Iran both attack
many – and sobering,” Richard Haass writes.3 areas, once tolerant
ISIS, but try not to look
coexistence between like allies”8
“It’s not just between Many key features of different sects and eth New York Times head-
Sunna and Shia. […] today’s Arab world are nicities is no more. In line, 3 December 2014
The longer struggle and very worrisome indeed. fact, questions of ide
probably the more violent ology and identity – “Too many countries in
[and] difficult struggle will The “Sykes-Picot” post- about the most prom the MENA region are held
be the struggle for hege World War I order in ising incarnations of back by inefficient and
mony within Sunni Islam.”4 the Levant, as flawed political Islam, about inequitable economic poli
Volker Perthes, as it was, is vanishing. nationalism and citizen cies, unresponsive political
16 October 2014 Borders are dissolving. ship – are front and institutions, inadequate
And there is no new center in many conflicts investments in education,
“With the exception of order in sight, much in the region today. and a lack of fairness to
perhaps Iraq, the breakup less potential guard wards women. Fixing that
of Middle Eastern states ians for it, be it external Meanwhile, majorities is a long-term proposition,
is not foretold. […] Even actors or a regional of citizens in many but long-term commit
the most artificial of states concert of powers. Arab states continue ments are precisely what
can survive if its leaders to believe that democ we need right now.”9
discover a powerful vision The decades-long fail racy is the most prefer John Kerry,
of what it means to be ure of elites in many able form of govern 17 November 2014
part of that society.”5 states to provide ser- ment, even as their
Stephen A. Cook, vices to their citiz ens, to disillusion with politics continues to grow.
15 August 2014 build inclusive political They won’t soon get their wish.
Hot Spots – Middle East: Orders Built on Sand? | 29
What share of people in the region perceive religious and ethnic hatred as the
greatest threat to the world?
Choice of five threats – the others were inequality, nuclear weapons, pollution and
environment, as well as AIDS and other diseases
Percent; by country
2007 2014
58
44
39 40 39
34
29 30
25 27
20 19
16
Concerned or not concerned about What are Arabs’ attitudes toward the
Islamic extremism in your country (2014)? “Arab spring”?
Percent Percent
Concerned Not concerned
What are attitudes in the region concerning the appro- 1 = Very appropriate
2 = Appropriate to some extent
priateness of certain forms of government (2014)? 3 = Inappropriate to some extent
Percent 4 = Completely inappropriate
5 = Do not know/decline to answer
1 2 3 4 5
Democracy 51 26 9 6 8
Islamic sharia 13 17 24 37 10
Authoritarian rule 4 10 26 49 10
Pow(d)er
the world’s most important trade routes, with
almost a third of global crude oil and over half
Keg?
of global LNG trade passing through it.5
“[A]n effective security order for Asia must Selected procurement and upgrade
be based – not on spheres of influence, or priorities in Asia since 2010
Number of countries purchasing and upgrading
coercion, or intimidation where big nations
bully the small – but on alliances of mutual Frigates 13
security, international law and international Corvettes 9
norms […]. We have an ironclad commit
Amphibious vessels 9
ment to the sovereignty, independence,
and security of every ally. […] And by the Submarines 9
end of this decade, a majority of our Navy Offshore patrol vessels 7
and Air Force fleets will be based out of the Destroyers 4
Pacific, because the United States is, and Aircraft and helicopter
3
will always be, a Pacific power.”10 carriers
Barack Obama, Cruisers 1
15 November 2014 Source: IISS11
Maritime disputes and selected naval capabilities in the South China Sea
Shading = 200nm exclusive economic zone claims based on China (South Sea Fleet)
C H I N A
coastlines (including Pratas Island but excluding Paracel Islands).
China/Taiwan EEZ shown as one claim.
3 SSBN
2 SSN
The Military Balance
Possible exclusive economic zones generated by Paracel and Spratly 18 SSK
Islands, assuming island status for small number of features deemed 6 DDGHM Guangzhou
able to qualify under UNCLOS and equidistance with overlapping EEZs. 8 FFGHM
12 FFG Shantou
China’s ‘nine-dashed line’
Stonecutter’s Island
Naval base
Xiachuan Dao
Beihai
Occupied by Haiphong Zhanjiang
Pratas Island
China
Haikou
Philippines
Malaysia
Vietnam L AO S Hainan
Taiwan
Yalong Bay
SSBN Ballistic missile submarine
SSI Midget submarine
SSN Nuclear-powered submarine Common Fishery Zone
Philippines (whole navy)
SSK Diesel-electric submarine
Paracel 1 FF
DDGHM Destroyer with Anti-ship Missile Danang Islands
(AShM), SAM and hangar Macclesfield
T H A ILA N D
FFGHM Frigate with AShM, SAM and hangar Bank
FFGM Frigate with AShM and SAM Vietnam (whole navy)
2 SSI Cavite
FFG Frigate with AShM
2 SSK Scarborough
FF Frigate 2 FFGM S O U T H Reef Subic Bay
PHILIPPINES
VIETNAM C H I N A
CA M B O DI A Mindo
ro St
rait
S E A
Cam Ranh Bay
Nhon Trach
Sprat l y I sl ands
fare: Who Is
NATO faces in deterring, or mounting an ad-
equate response to, such an attack poses a
Ready?
fundamental risk to NATO’s credibility.”2 At the
Wales Summit, NATO member states directly
addressed the “specific challenges posed by
hybrid warfare threats, where a wide range
of overt and covert military, paramilitary, and
Before 2014, the notion of “hybrid warfare” civilian measures are employed in a highly
was a topic for military experts and strate- integrated design.”
gists. The Ukraine crisis changed that. War
has come back to Europe – albeit in a new Yet it is far from clear what “the necessary
shape. tools and procedures required to deter and
respond effectively to hybrid warfare threats”
“What we see in Russia now in this hybrid are.3 The “weaponization of information,” for
pproach to war is to use all of the tools that they
a instance, by which the line between facts and
have […] to reach into a nation and cause instabil falsehoods are effectively blurred and conflict
ity, use their energy tools, use their finance tools, parties create their own realities, is no option
use what I think is probably the most amazing for liberal democracies.4 But what if free me-
information warfare blitzkrieg we have ever seen in dia and their reports are just not heard? In the
the history of informational warfare, using all these end, the essential question is: If states face
tools to stir up problems that they can then begin hybrid threats, what does the best design for
to exploit with their m ilitary tool – through coercion a hybrid defense look like?
[…] or through, what we see now in Crimea, what
we’ve seen in Eastern Ukraine, Russian regular “The very ‘rules of war’ have changed. The role
and irregular forces, these little green men without of non-military means of achieving political and
badges inside of nations stirring trouble.”1 strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases,
Philip M. Breedlove, they have exceeded the power of force of weap
4 September 2014 ons in their effectiveness. The focus of applied
methods of conflict has altered in the direction of
By definition, hybrid warfare employs a broad the broad use of political, economic, informational,
range of tools. Over the course of the crisis, humanitarian, and other non-military measures –
Russian leaders denied any active involve- applied in coordination with the protest potential
ment but sent irregular forces dubbed “little of the population. All this is supplemented by
green men,” spread propaganda and encour- military means of a concealed character, including
aged local unrest, assembled regular forces carrying out actions of informational conflict and
at the border, and engaged in diplomacy try- the actions of special operations forces. The open
ing to keep up the narrative that Moscow was use of forces – often under the guise of peace
not a party to the conflict. Putin’s pledge to keeping and crisis regulation – is resorted to only
protect Russian-speaking populations abroad at a certain stage, primarily for the achievement of
rang alarm bells especially in those Western final success in the conflict.”5
countries with considerable Russian-speak- Valery Gerasimov,
ing minorities. How would NATO react in case 27 February 2013
parts of the Ukrainian playbook were to be
repeated in a NATO state? A report of the UK
House of Commons Defence Committee
concluded that a “Russian unconventional
Challenges – Hybrid Warfare: Who Is Ready? | 35
Special forces
Regular military
Irregular forces
forces
Hybrid warfare
Economic = Support of
warfare Combination of multiple conventional local unrest
and unconventional tools of warfare
Information
Cyber attacks warfare and
propaganda
Diplomacy
Source: MSC
In recent months, many are saying that Do you think that the following are
Russian federal media are conducting an conducting an information war against
information war against Ukraine. Do you Russia?
agree with this, and if so, what is your attitude
toward this?
It is difficult
I agree and think it is to say 9 9
3 3 1
right and justified given Definitely not 5
It is difficult the situation in Ukraine Mostly no
to say
Mostly yes 29 33
17 13
I agree and
11 think that the
media’s policy
is dangerous
and harmful
Definitely yes 54 55
59
I disagree, Russian media
give an objective picture
of events in Ukraine Ukraine US and
Western
countries
Source: Levada Center6
36 | Challenges – War on Terror: Are We Losing It?
h avens and fueling “[ISIS] is no longer a
Terror: Are
and Syria, where the worse than Al Qaeda.”5
self-proclaimed Islamic Brett McGurk,
We Losing It?
State (also ISIS or ISIL) 23 July 2014
has taken proto-state
shape. Even the group’s name has become
subject to political debate. While the militants
call themselves the “ Islamic State,” religious
On 20 September 2001, nine days after 9/11, and other leaders have criticized those who
then-US President George W. Bush first spoke have adopted that nomenclatura and a rgue
of the “war on terror.” It “begins with Al Q aeda, that the Arabic acronym Daesh should be
but it does not end there,” he argued. “It will used. The combination of air strikes and a
not end until e very ter- more cap able response by regional actors
“[…] changes in Islamist rorist group of global seems to have slowed down or even halted
terrorism over the past reach has been found, advances made by
five years will be as con stopped, and defeated.”1 Daesh. But n ecessary “[IS] can’t live up to the
sequential in that realm structural conditions myth it has propagated.
as those that came about At the time, already, for rolling back IS sig- The fact is, the caliphate
in the broader geopoliti some questioned that nificantly, among which bears greater resemblan
cal sphere after the fall of war aim as too broad are solid governance ce to a failing state than
the Berlin Wall.”2 and thus as hardly on both sides of the an aspiring one.”6
John McLaughlin, attainable at all. Today, Iraq-Syria border, are Die Zeit,
3 March 2014 the goal remains elu- hardly in sight. 4 December 2014
sive. The number of
jihadist groups has mushroomed in recent
Moreover, the success and ambition of the
years, as have the numbers of militants and “Islamic State” – a c learly totalitarian, c
learly
attacks worldwide. expansionist, c learly hegemonic jihadist state-
building p roject, as
To be sure, the leadership of al-Qaeda’s core Volker Perthes put it7 – “Our objective is clear:
has been decimated. And a RAND study found do not only represent we will degrade, and
that about 99% of the attacks by Al Qaeda a new kind of chal- ultimately destroy, ISIL
and affiliated groups in 2013 were “against lenge on the ground. It through a comprehensive
‘near enemy’ targets,” s
uggesting that these has also captured the and sustained counter-
groups “have deliber- imagination of many terrorism strategy.”8
“[The] announcement ately chosen to focus thousands of young Barack Obama,
that [IS] has restored the on the near enemy for citizens of Western 10 September 2014
caliphate is likely the most the moment, found it countries, creating
significant development increasingly difficult to unprecedented problems when it comes to
in international jihadism strike ‘far enemy’ tar- dealing with returning fighters. And as recent
since 9/11[…]. Al Qaeda gets in the West, or a attacks in Western cities and an apparent
affiliates and independent combination of both.”4 new sense of compe-
jihadist groups must now tition between ISIS and “O soldiers of the Islamic
definitively choose to sup Yet, the global jihadist Al Qaeda demonstrate, State, continue to harvest
port and join the Islamic landscape today has the current energy the soldiers. Erupt volca
State or to oppose it.”3 become more diver- level in jihadist circles
noes of jihad everywhere.”9
Charles Lister, sified and decentral- will also be directly Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,
2 July 2014 ized, creating new safe aimed at the West. 13 November 2014
Challenges – War on Terror: Are We Losing It? | 37
1,545
4 - 8 million
Confirmed number of air strikes in
Estimated number of people living under
Syria and Iraq by US-led coalition, until
IS rule, November/December 201415
4 January 201514
Source: RAND; New York Times; Newsweek; Zeit; Independent; BBC; CNN
41 Al Shabab 266
Al Qaeda in the
36 Arabian Peninsula 410
Source: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence16
What respondents from the region think: Do you support or oppose the military air
strikes by the US-led international coalition against Islamic militant groups including
ISIL and other groups in Iraq and Syria?
Percent, by country
Strongly support Support Oppose Strongly oppose Do not know/Refused
Lebanon 68 8 6 16 2
Syrian refugees 32 26 22 15 5
Iraq 29 46 19 3 3
Tunisia 22 32 26 18 3
Jordan 19 40 28 8 5
Palestine 16 36 28 18 3
Saudi Arabia 16 34 28 17 6
Egypt 6 46 44 41
Finland
50 - 70
Western Europe
Sweden
150 - 180
Norway
60
Denmark Russia
100 - 150 800 - 1,500
Ireland
30 Netherlands
200 - 250
UK Belgium
Canada 500 - 600 440 Balkans and Central Asia
100 Eastern Europe
Germany Kazakhstan
North 500 - 600
Ukraine
America France 50 250
1,200
Switzerland
40 Austria Uzbekistan
US Spain 100 - 150 500
Serbia
100 50 - 100 50 - 70 Kyrgyztan
100
Italy Bosnia Macedonia
80 Albania 330 12
90 Kosovo Tajikistan
100 - 150 Turkey Turkmenistan 190
600 360
China
Lebanon 300
900 Syria
Iraq
Jihadism rising?
Number of active Salafi-jihadist fighters worldwide
High estimate Low estimate
120,000
100,000
80,000
60,000
40,000
20,000
0
1988 93 98 2003 08 2013
50
40
30
20
10
0
1988 93 98 2003 08 2013
Source: RAND18
1,000
Al Nusra Front AQ in Islamic Maghreb Al Shabab
Core AQ AQ in Arabian Peninsula AQ in Iraq
800
600
400
200
0
2007 08 09 10 11 12 2013
Source: RAND19
40 | Challenges – Refugee Crisis: Crossing the Line?
Crisis:
in about a year.4 Disap resolve or prevent con
pointed by its partners’ flict. […] Humanitarians
Crossing
reluctance to support can help as a palliative,
the operation, I
taly but political s
olutions are
recently announced it
vitally needed. Without
the Line? is
ending the
(but does con
smaller
mission
tinue
efforts). Some
this, the alarming levels
of conflict and the mass
suffering that is reflected
in Europe have even in these figures will con
More than At the end of 2013, over argued that a continu tinue.”5
27,000
people died on their way
50 million p
eople in the
world were
the h
refugees,
ighest total since
ation of Mare Nostrum
or a similar mission
would create incentives
António Guterres,
June 2014
to Europe since 2000.1 the UN has begun to for people to risk the dangerous voyage.6
The Migrants’ Files, compile those figures.
December 2014 86% are hosted in A small follow-up EU mission to Mare N ostrum
developing regions, 14 has been criticized by human rights advocates.7
% in developed regions.2 While the number They fear that it will
of refugees has long been over 30 million, it focus on border protec- “There needs to be a
dramatically spiked since 2011, in particular as tion, to the detriment of united response to the
a result of the war in Syria. rescue at sea, even as question of migration. We
the UNHCR has called cannot allow the Mediter
By the end of 2014, a ccording to UN data, the Mediterranean “the ranean to become a vast
10.9 million out of a pre-war Syrian population deadliest route of all.”8 cemetery.”9
of 22 million were uprooted from their homes. Pope Francis,
Syria’s neighbors are shouldering e normous In addition to the urgent 25 November 2014
burdens. Lebanon, for instance, has a ccepted humanitarian challenge
a number of Syrian the refugee crisis represents, it also high-
207,000
refugees have attempted
refugees that totals a
quarter of its own pop-
ulation, whereas many
lights the need to improve governance and
economic conditions in the refugees’ o
rigin
countries – and to support key transit or host
to cross the Mediter European states have countries for refugees.
ranean Sea to reach been very reluctant.
Europe in 2014; about Germany and Sweden As the German and “The Mediterranean is
Turkey
1,165,279
≙ 1.5% of total population
Syria
IDPs Iraq
Lebanon 228,484
7,600,000
1,147,788
≙ 0.6% of
≙ 25.5% of total population total population
Source: UN High Commissioner for Refugees; UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs13
40 Sudan 649,300
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 499,500
30
Myanmar 479,600
20 Iraq 401,400
10 Colombia 396,600
Vietnam 314,100
0
Eritrea 308,000
1993 97 2001 05 09 2013
Source: UNHCR14 Source: UNHCR15
42 | Challenges – Energy Security: Running out of St(r)eam?
Running out
logical, regulatory, and economic enablers
that produced the US shale revolution is not
present in Europe.
55%
Upper estimate of
The increase in trade
and diversification
has been a truly
production. Further, US exports of shale LNG
are unlikely to drive down European gas
prices to US levels. The US will become an
Europe’s additional gas game-changing trend. exporter of LNG, but delivered cost to Europe
supply need in 2030 New import markets will be around USD 9 to 11.5 per MMBtu5. Add
McKinsey Energy have opened (China, in a margin for the supplier, and this becomes
Insights India, Latin America, higher than the price Germany pays for
the Middle East, and imports of ca. USD 9.2 per MMBtu6 today.
Southeast Asia). Producers like the Middle
East, Russia, and West Africa all serve multiple The US path of achiev “[…] markets and prices
markets today,1 and we expect trade, pipe ing energy indepen around the world will of
line growth, and LNG flows b etween regions dence through shale course be influenced
to continue to grow. Buyers and sellers are gas is not a fix for by the increased sup
strengthening bonds and e xploiting diversi Europe in the short
ply. Naturally, that also
fication oppor tunities – the most prominent or medium term. influences energy policy
case being the Russia-China deal in 2014. To achieve energy strategies in Europe.”7
security, Europe needs Frank-Walter Steinmeier
In this game of interdependence and inter- to engage in the com- on shale gas
regional deal-making, Europe does not yet petitive global game 28 May 2014
seem to have a coherent strategy to secure of gas trade. Partner-
its supplies. This is curious, as Europe is h
ighly ship is not a given and must be earned, as
dependent on imports. On the contrary, many supplying countries now have alternatives,
hopes rest on more energy independence and economics play an increasing role.
through shale gas – either as imports from
the US or as a European project of the future.
“Energy Security: Running out of St(r)eam?”
The ‘shale revolution’ has clearly been a was prepared by MSC’s knowledge partner
disruptive force, benefiting the US. Total gas McKinsey & Company
Challenges – Energy Security: Running out of St(r)eam? | 43
How has growing global gas trade linked regional gas markets
Pipe and LNG export routes of more than 10 bcma
Norway
Russia
Canada
Europe Central
Asia
US China North Asia
North Africa Middle
Central East
America India/
West South Southeast
South Africa Asia Asia
America
Australia
Excludes for simplicity flows within former Soviet Union and Europe
4-5
Going to
challenges, its success factors for conso li
dation are d ifferent. Commercial factors do
not play the main role; rather, it is political
“We have seen some Between 2011 and To address these chal lenges, decision
consolidation in the 2013, major EU makers can c
onsider three c onsolidation
industry in areas such countries
cut their approaches (see figure). Potential m
erger
as space, missiles and defense budgets on scenarios along these approaches are
electronics. But there average by 5.3%. In
based on both economics and political
has been almost none in addition, many large-
concerns. To account
military aircraft, ships or scale projects will be for the economics, “[…] the iceberg that
ground systems.”1 completed within the the scenarios use a is Europe’s defense
Thomas Enders, next five years and will high-level estimation industrial and techno
12 May 2014 likely not be replaced of p
otential cost syner- logical base is slowly
on the same scale. This gies and competitive- melting away.”2
has directly affected the supplier landscape: ness of the resulting Frank Mattern,
total industry revenues for land and naval company. To reckon 31 January 2014
equipment have decreased by 1% p.a. since with the p olitical per-
2011, and export revenues of EU defense spective, an assessment of the feasibility of
suppliers have d eclined since 2006 by about potential mergers based on publicly available
5% annually. If revenues continue to fall, over- information on political strategies is used.
capacity could lead to a signi ficant drop in
EBITA margin which is – with 7.8% – already For European countries, the latter is the most
lacking behind the more consoli dated US challenging task of all.
defense industry with 12.6%.
9.9 4.8
9.4
7.8
3.5
6.4 6.6
6.2
4.4 2.2
Hans Kundnani
Henry Kissinger The Paradox of German
World Order Power
As Hillary Clinton put it, this Without question, under
tome is “vintage K issinger, standing the drivers of
with his singular com German foreign policy
bination of breadth and is becoming ever more
acuity along with his knack important. Kundnani has
for connecting headlines written a p
rovocative
to trend lines.” And con- book on the “paradox”
trary to his image of a real of German power, “characterized by a
politiker, Kissinger puts equal emphasis on strange mixture of economic assertiveness
legitimacy, culture, and interpretations when and m ilitary
abstinence,” a worthwhile and
discussing the workings of past, current, and thoughtful read even for those who do not
future world orders. agree with him.
part s
ocial commentary, it describes in a se- Peter W. Singer & Allan
ries of vignettes how state-controlled media Friedman
was essential in building the “New Russia” Cybersecurity and
where “everything is possible.” Cyberwar
What Everyone Needs to
Know
Jan Zielonka Navigating the r
eader
Is the EU Doomed? between the S cylla of igno-
In this original take on the fu- rance and the Charybdis
ture of European integration, of hysteria, Singer and
Zielonka offers his vision of Friedman offer an accessible primer on all
a “neo- medieval” European things cyber security and explain what, in-
Union that is d ifferent both deed, everyone should know about these still
from a unified federalist poorly understood security challenges.
European super-state and
the cacophony of n ation
states, but rather a new type of order with dif- Thomas Piketty
ferent n
etworks of cities, regions, or NGOs that Capital in the
bring to the fore a new European polyphony. Twenty-First Century
In what was probably the
most discussed book in
Bill Hayton 2014, Piketty argues that
The South China Sea the returns on capital that
The Struggle for Power in tend to exceed the rate of
Asia economic growth gener-
Hayton’s vivid account ate inequalities threatening
analyzes the South C
hina to eventually undermine democratic stability.
Sea’s significance as a This makes it an important book for security
major
passageway for wonks, too.
global trade and as the
stage for a classical security
dilemma in a ction whose development may Dayo Olopade
well shape the world order of the 21st century. The Bright Continent
Breaking Rules and Mak-
ing Change in Modern
Marwan Muasher Africa
The Second Arab Challenging the prevailing
Awakening stereotypes about what
And the Battle for some used to call the “dark
Pluralism continent,” Dayo Olopade
Many obituaries of the provides an optimistic
Arab Spring have been perspective on modern and vibrant Africa,
written in the West already. emphasizing the multiple commercial and
Muasher takes a longer
technological innovations on the community
view: he sees signs of a level. Her book recommends making use of
promising third force that might succeed in exactly those homegrown tools to tackle the
the long run, opposing both the illiberalism of manifold challenges Africa is facing.
political Islam and the authoritarianism of the
old regimes.
50 | More Food for Thought – Reports
Pakistan
Number of casualties Number of drone strikes
1,000 140
Unknown casualties
Civilian casualties
120
800 Militant casualties
100
600
80
60
400
40
200
20
0 0
2004 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 2014
Yemen
Number of casualties Number of strikes
300 30
200 20
100 10
0 0
2002 2009 10 11 12 13 2014
… that 46% of all countries have participated in armed conflict in 2013, the highest
share since 1946?
Percent
50
40
30
20
10
0
1946 52 58 64 70 76 82 88 94 2000 06 2013
Even as a given country is less likely to have armed conflict on its own territory today, and
the general trend in war deaths points downwards, countries are more likely to participate in
armed conflict, mostly because several conflicts in the recent past have been fought by
large coalitions.
Source: Gleditsch et al., What Do We Know About Civil War?, based on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset2
... that the number of countries possessing weapons-usable nuclear materials has
been cut by more than half since 1991?
Number of countries
60 Colombia Denmark
Georgia Bulgaria
50 Greece Latvia
Chile
Portugal Czech
Serbia
Iraq Turkey Republic
40 Spain Vietnam
Hungary
Brazil
30 South
Countries that Philippines
Korea
removed weapons- Slovenia Libya
usable materials Thailand Romania
20
Taiwan Austria
Mexico
10 Sweden
Ukraine
0
1991 92 96 97 98 99 2005 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 2013
Efforts to eliminate all weapons-usable nuclear material began in 1992 when the United Nations
Special Commission removed all highly enriched uranium from Iraq after the Gulf War.
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Success Partial success Failure
Source: Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan4
... that Green party voters in Germany are most likely to be in favor of a stronger
German engagement in international crises (January 2015)?
Percent; by party preference of voters
Germany should become more involved
Germany should continue to exercise restraint
Do not know/no response
Christian Democratic/
41 55 4
Social Union (CDU/CSU)
Social Democratic Party (SPD) 37 60 3
Green Party 62 35 3
Others 39 56 5
Events
MSC Kickoff 26 January 2015
Berlin, Germany
Acknow
ledgments
This report draws on the research and input by many generous institutions and their staff.
The Munich Security Conference would like to thank:
the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, the Atlantic Council of the United States, the
Brookings Institution, the Carnegie Moscow Center, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, the
Eurasia Group, Freedom House, the German Federal Foreign Office, the German M arshall
Fund of the United States, the Global Public Policy Institute, GlobeScan, the International Centre
for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, the International Institute for Strategic
Studies, the Körber Foundation, the Levada Centre, McKinsey & Company, the New America
Foundation, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the Peace Research Institute Oslo, the Pew Research
Center, the Polish Institute of International Affairs, the RAND Corporation, the Razumkov Center,
the Russian International Affairs Council, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, the Stockholm Inter-
national Peace Research Institute, Transparency International, the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, the Wilson Center, and the World Economic Forum.
The Munich Security Conference would also like to acknowledge the following individuals for
their significant support:
Tarek Abou Chabake (UNHCR), Ian Anthony (SIPRI), Katinka Barysch, Thorsten Benner (GPPi),
Ian Bremmer (Eurasia Group), Fabian Burkhardt, Erica Chenoweth, John Chipman (IISS), Ivo
Daalder (Chicago Council), K aren D onfried (GMFUS), Espen Barth Eide (WEF), James H ackett
(IISS), Jane
Harman ( Wilson Center), François Heisbourg, Igor Ivanov (RIAC), Seth Jones
(RAND), Fred Kempe ( Atlantic Council), John M cLaughlin, Nora Müller (Körber Foundation),
Peter Neumann (ICSR), M atthias Nothacker (Körber Foundation), Volker Perthes (SWP), J ürgen
Rogalski (SWP), Philipp
Rotmann (GPPi), Anne-Marie Slaughter (New America Foundation),
Javier Solana, Maria J. Stephan, Strobe Talbott (Brookings), Dmitri Trenin (Carnegie Moscow),
Henrik Urdal (PRIO), Wolff van Sintern (McKinsey), and Marcin Zaborowski (PISM).
Impressum
The Munich Security Report 2015 is published by the Munich Security Conference Foundation
gGmbH (Prinzregentenstr. 7, 80538 Munich, Germany) on the occasion of the 51st Munich
Security Conference. The Munich Security Conference is one of the world’s leading platforms
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it organizes a number of events around the world. More information on the MSC, its structure,
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Should you wish for further information on this report or want to share criticism, suggestions,
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Copyright
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original source and consult with the contributing organization or institution. All parts of this
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Munich Security Report is acknowledged as source.
Endnotes
Please note that all links have last been checked on 9 January 2015. All quotes in British English have been
changed to American English.
19 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2015 (London: Routledge, forth-
coming), http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/military%20balance/issues/the-military-balance-2015-5ea6
Section 1: Actors
14 Körber Foundation, Involvement or Restraint?, p. 5. Don’t know/no response: differences between totals
and 100%.
15 Körber Foundation, Involvement or Restraint?, p. 6. Don’t know/no response: differences between totals
and 100%.
7 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2015 (London: Routledge, forth-
coming), http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/military%20balance/issues/the-military-balance-2015-5ea6
8 IISS, The Military Balance 2015.
9 IISS, The Military Balance 2015.
10 IISS, The Military Balance 2015.
11 IISS, The Military Balance 2015.
12 IISS, The Military Balance 2015.
13 IISS, The Military Balance 2015.
10 When the UN General Assembly voted on a resolution that condemned the annexation of Crimea as
illegal (and was supported by 100 countries), Brazil, China, India, and South Africa abstained. See UN
General Assembly, “Territorial Integrity of Ukraine,” A/RES/68/262, New York, 27 March 2014. For the
voting records see A/68/PV.80.
11 Naazneen Barma, Ely Ratner, Steven Weber, “Welcome to the World Without the West,” The National
Interest, 12 November 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/welcome-the-world-without-the-west-11651
12 World Economic Forum, Outlook on the Global Agenda 2015 (Davos: WEF, 2014), http://reports.weforum.
org/outlook-global-agenda-2015/, p. 66. The figures are drawn from the Survey on the Global Agenda,
which polled 1,767 respondents from WEF‘s global knowledge network, consisting of “member and
alumni of the Global Agenda Councils, as well as Young Global Leaders and Global Shapers.” Ibid., p. 91.
The 87% is composed of 32% who strongly agreed, and 55% who agreed.
13 BBC World Service Poll, “Negative Views of Russia on the Rise: Global Poll,” 3 June 2014,
http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/country-rating-poll.pdf. The poll of 24 nations was conducted
by GlobeScan/PIPA among 24,542 people around the world between December 2013 and April 2014.
Tracking countries include Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Ghana, India, Indonesia,
Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Russia, Spain, South Korea, Turkey, the UK, and the US.
Note: Average ratings exclude the target country‘s rating of itself. Data missing to 100% = “Depends,”
“Neither/neutral,” and “DK/NA”. Asked of half of sample (except in Japan).
14 The World Bank, World DataBank, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx
12 Razumkov Centre, “Citizens of Ukraine on Security: Assessment, Threats, Ways of Solving Problems,”
sociological survey implemented with financial support of the NATO Information and Documentation
Center (NIDC) in Ukraine, September 2014, http://www.razumkov.org.ua/upload/1412757450_file.pdf
[original poll]. In 2014, Ukrainians in all of Ukraine except for Crimea were polled. The English transla-
tions were provided directly by the Razumkov Centre.
13 International Monetary Fund, “World Economic Outlook Database,” October 2014, http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/weodata/index.aspx. 2014 figures represent IMF projections.
6 Xu Hong, “Remarks by Mr. Xu Hong, Director-General of the Department of Treaty and Law of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on
the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines,”
7 December 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1217150.shtml
7 Pew Research Center, Spring 2014 Global Attitudes Survey (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center,
2014), http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2014/07/PG-2014-07-14-balance-of-power-4-03.png
8 Shinzō Abe, “Shangri-La Dialogue 2014 Keynote Address,” Singapore, 30 May 2014,
https://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/2014-c20c/opening-remarks-and-
keynote-address-b0b2/keynote-address-shinzo-abe-a787
9 Chuck Hagel, “The United States’ Contribution to Regional Stability,” Singapore, 30 May 2014,
https://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/2014-c20c/plenary-1-d1ba/chuck-
hagel-a9cb
10 Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama at the University of Queensland,” Brisbane,
15 November 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/15/remarks-president-obama-
university-queensland
11 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2015 (London: R
outledge,
forthcoming), http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/military%20balance/issues/the-military-balance-2015-
5ea6. Figures reflect the number of countries acquiring/upgrading (or requesting funds or opening
tenders or evaluating offers for the acquisition/upgrade of) a particular equipment type, rather than the
number of individual acquisition programs or their cumulative contract value.
12 IISS, The Military Balance 2013, with naval information added. Based on The Philippine Enquirer; The
New York Times; BBC News; Google Earth; Nguyen Hong Thao, “Maritime Delimitation and Fishery Co-
operation in the Tonkin Gulf,” Ocean Development & International Law 36, no. 1 (2005), 25-44; UNCLOS;
David Hancox and Victor Prescott, “A Geographical Description of the Spratly Islands and an Account of
Hydrographic Surveys Amongst Those Islands,” Maritime Briefing 1, no. 6 (1995); Mark J. Valencia, Jon
M. Van Dyke, and Noel A. Ludwig, Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea (Honolulu: University
of Hawaii Press, 1999).
Section 3: Challenges
2 UNHCR, Global Trends 2013. War’s Human Cost (Geneva: UNHCR, 2014),
http://www.unhcr.org/5399a14f9.html, p. 2
3 UNHCR, “Focus on Saving Lives,” Geneva, 10 December 2014, http://www.unhcr.org/5481bf796.html
4 UNHCR, “UNHCR Concerned Over Ending of Rescue Operation in the Mediterranean,” Geneva,
17 October 2014, http://www.unhcr.org/5440ffa16.html
5 UNHCR, Global Trends 2013, p. 6.
6 BBC, “Mediterranean Migrants: EU Rescue Policy Criticized,” 12 November 2014,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30020496
7 Amnesty International, “Triton Is No Substitute for Live-Saving Mare Nostrum,” 31 October 2014,
http://amnesty.ie/news/triton-no-substitute-life-saving-mare-nostrum
8 UNHCR, “Focus on Saving Lives,” Geneva, 10 December 2014, http://www.unhcr.org/5481bf796.html
9 As quoted by Eleanor Biles, “Stop Mediterranean Becoming Vast Migrant Cemetery, Pope Tells
Europe,” Reuters, 25 November 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/25/us-pope-europe-
idUSKCN0J911320141125
10 Cecilia Malmström, “Statement by EU Commissioner Cecilia Malmström on Operation Triton,”
7 October 2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-302_en.htm
11 Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Paolo Gentiloni, “Building High Fences Will Not Be Enough,”
28 October 2014, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/sid_CCC7F0CE95776FF265A8887A63BB4D44/EN/
Infoservice/Presse/Interview/2014/141128_BM_Gentiloni_FR.html?nn=471076. The original versions in
German and Italian were published in Frankfurter Rundschau and Il Messagero, respectively.
12 UNHCR, “Syria Regional Refugee Response, Inter-Agency Information Sharing Portal,” Geneva,
December 2014, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php
13 Data compiled by UNHCR and OCHA between 30 November and 16 December 2014:
http://syria.unocha.org/ and UNHCR, “Syrian Regional Refugee Response Portal.”
14 UNHCR, Global Trends 2013, p. 6, with data provided directly by the UNHCR.
15 UNHCR, Global Trends 2013, p. 6, with data provided directly by the UNHCR.
8 Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain.
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