■ MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.

G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940

Doctrine: Social Justice

LAUREL, J.:

Facts:

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the
Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that
animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period of one year
from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:

1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas

Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and

2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to

Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director
of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of thethemeasure
proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of theCommonwealth
Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the Secretary of the Public
Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of
and traffic on national roads.

On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the
recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications.
The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of
Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the
rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick
up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the
riding public as well.

Issues:

1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of
Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade
and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?

2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept
regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the
people?

Held:

1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on
national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National
Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by
the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare
lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the general
welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations.
Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government,
the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to
prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to
prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact
that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.

2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social
justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through
the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members
of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the
time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among
divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”

Facts: The National Traffic Commission recommended the Director of Public Works and to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communication that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from
passing along Rosario St. extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarinas St. from 7:30
am to 12 pm and 1:30 pm to 5:30 pm and also along Rizal Avenue from 7 am to 11 pm from a
period of one year from the date of the opening of Colgante Bridge to traffic. It was subsequently
passed and thereafter enforce by Manila Mayor and the acting chief of police. Maximo Calalang
then, as a citizen and a taxpayer challenges its constitutionality.
Issue: Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works infringes
upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice

Held: The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards
any given group. It is the promotion of the welfare of all people. It is neither communism,
despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social
and economic forces by the state so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception
may at least be approximated.

■ US vs TURIBIO
G.R. No. L-5060 January 26, 1910 THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LUIS
TORIBIO, defendant-appellant.

Facts: Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabao, residing in the town of Carmen in the province
of Bohol. The trial court of Bohol found that the respondent slaughtered or caused to be
slaughtered a carabao without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein it
was slaughtered, in violation of Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the
registration, branding, and slaughter of Large Cattle. The act prohibits the slaughter of large cattle
fit for agricultural work or other draft purposes for human consumption.

The respondent counters by stating that what the Act is (1) prohibiting is the slaughter of large
cattle in the municipal slaughter house without a permit given by the municipal treasurer.
Furthermore, he contends that the municipality of Carmen has no slaughter house and that he
slaughtered his carabao in his dwelling, (2) the act constitutes a taking of property for public use
in the exercise of the right of eminent domain without providing for the compensation of owners,
and it is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power of the state for it deprives them of
the enjoyment of their private property.

Issue: Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large
cattle, is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power.

Held: It is a valid exercise of police power of the state.

Facts: The Supreme court Said sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering
or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption of large cattle at any place without the permit
provided for in section 30
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that
construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the
lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be
rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the
object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment

The Supreme Court also said that if they will follow the contention of Toribio it will defeat the
purpose of the law.

The police power rests upon necessity and the right of self-protection and if ever the invasion of
private property by police regulation can be justified, The Supreme Court think that the
reasonable restriction placed upon the use of carabaos by the provision of the law under discussion
must be held to be authorized as a reasonable and proper exercise of that power.

The Supreme Court cited events that happen in the Philippines like an epidemic that wiped 70-
100% of the population of carabaos.. The Supreme Court also said that these animals are vested
with public interest for they are fundamental use for the production of crops. These reasons satisfy
the requesites of a valid exercise of police power

The Supreme court finally said that article 1147 is not an exercise of the inherent power of
eminent domain. The said law does not constitute the taking of caraboes for public purpose; it just
serve as a mere regulation for the consumption of these private properties for the protection of
general welfare and public interest.

■ Churchill & Tait v. Rafferty

32 Phil. 580 (1915)

In re: Police power of the State, Lawful Subject of police power

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. The case involves a
dual question one involving the power of the court to restrain by injunction the collection of the
tax in question and the other relating to the power of the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove
any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the ground that the same is offensive to the sight or is
otherwise a nuisance.
The focus of this digest is to highlight the cases’ latter aspect as correlated to the police power of
the State.

Facts

Appellees, Francis A. Churchill and Stewart Tait are involved in the advertising business,
particularly in billboard advertising. Their billboards located upon private lands in the Province of
Rizal were removed upon complaints and by the orders of the defendant Collector of Internal
Revenue by virtue of the provisions of subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339.
Appellees, in their supplementary complaint challenge the power of the of the Collector of
Internal Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the ground that the same is
offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance and maintain that the billboards in question “in no
sense constitute a nuisance and are not deleterious to the health, morals, or general welfare of the
community, or of any persons.” Defendant Collector of Internal Revenue avers that after due
investigation made upon the complaints of the British and German Consuls, the defendant
“decided that the billboard complained of was and still offensive to the sight and is otherwise a
nuisance.”

Issue

1. Was the enactment assailed by the plaintiffs was a legitimate exercise of

the police power of the Government?

Held

The High Court is of the opinion that unsightly advertisements or signs, signboards, or billboards
which are offensive to the sight, are not disassociated from the general welfare of the public. This
is not establishing a new principle, but carrying a well- recognized principle to further application.
Moreover, if the police power may be exercised to encourage a healthy social and economic
condition in the country, and if the comfort and convenience of the people are included within
those subjects, everything which encroaches upon such territory is amenable to the police power.
Judgment reversed.

■ U.S. v. Salaveria, Malcolm as ponente: (applying present Admin Code provision) It is a general
rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare clause
must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation, and not
inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.

• If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed
ordinance would pass the test of validity. In the two leading cases above set forth, this Court had
stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal
corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State.

• It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could
qualify under the term reasonable as objective of fostering public morals can be attained by a
measure that does not encompass too wide a field such as reasonable restrictions as opposed to
absolute prohibition.

• Furthermore, this case refers to R.A. 938 which was originally entitled: “an act granting
municipal or city boards and councils the power to regulate the establishment, maintenance and
operation of certain places of amusement within their respective territorial jurisdictions.”

• This act gives the municipal or city board or council of each chartered city the power to
regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, and
other similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction. Then the 1st section was
amended to include not merely “the power to regulate, but likewise “Prohibit … ”
• The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA 938. The power granted
remains that of regulation, not prohibition. There is thus support for the view advanced by
petitioners that to construe RA 938 as allowing the prohibition of the operation of night clubs
would give rise to a constitutional question.

• The Constitution mandates: “Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof. ” (Art. VIII, Sec. 19, par. 1).

• Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it
would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the
operation of a night club was prohibited.

• There is reinforcement to the conclusion reached by virtue of a specific provision of the

recently-enacted Local Government Code whose general welfare clause clearly provides that
municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but
not prevented from carrying on their business.

• Respondents cited Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City
Mayor of Manila. However, in that case, it imposed a regulatory measure. Necessarily, there was
no valid objection on due process or equal protection grounds. It did not prohibit motels. It merely
regulated the mode in which it may conduct business in order precisely to put an end to practices
which could encourage vice and immorality.

Held: writ of certiorari is granted and the decision of the lower court reversed, set aside, and
nulled. Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975 of the Municipality of Bocaue is declared void and
unconstitutional.

■
Jacobson v. Massachusetts

Brief Fact Summary. A state statute was alleged to be unconstitutional for requiring vaccination.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. In order to protect public health and safety, the scope of the state"s
police power includes the authority to enact reasonable regulations to do so.

Facts. Cities in Massachusetts could require that all residents be vaccinated, as authorized by a
state statute. This type of regulation was adopted by the city of Cambridge.
Issue. In order to protect public health and safety, does the scope of the state"s police power
include the authority to enact reasonable regulations to do so?

Held. (Harlan, J.) Yes. In order to protect public health and safety, the scope of the state"s police
power includes the authority to enact reasonable regulations to do so. The Constitution secures
liberty for every person within its jurisdiction, but does not give an absolute right for each person
to be free from restraint at all times and in all circumstances. Every person is required to be
subject to various restraints for the common good. The efforts by Cambridge to stamp out
smallpox are substantially related to the protection of public health and safety. There has been
nothing to clearly justify the Court holding the statute to be unconstitutional. Affirmed.

Discussion. This case was never repudiated. The Court suggested there is no liberty interest in
conduct that may put others at risk. The courts were extremely deferential to a state"s power to
protect the public health in the early part of the twentieth century.

■ Summary of Buck v. Bell

Citation: 274 U.S. 200 (1927)

Relevant Facts: Carrie Buck, a resident of the State of Virginia, was a “feeble-minded" eighteen
year old woman, whose mother was similarly feeble-minded. Ms. Buck, who was not married,
was also the mother of a child likewise described by the State of Virginia as feeble-minded. In
1924, Virginia passed a statute authorizing the superintendents of institutions for certain classes of
persons afflicted with hereditary conditions causing insanity of imbecility to order the sterilization
of such persons. In order for the sterilization procedure to proceed, superintendents were required
to present a petition to the board of directors for their institutions, notify the inmate and their
guardian, and convene a hearing to present evidence for and against conducting the procedure. In
this case, Dr. John Hendren Bell conducted the proceedings against Ms. Buck after her first
physician passed away during the pendency of her case. Dr. Bell similarly pushed for sterilization
under the statute, based on the same justification.

Issue: May a State, consistent with due process and equal protection, order the sterilization of a
woman deemed mentally deficient by a state agency and review board?

Holding: Yes, states can require the sterilization of certain citizens without breaching
constitutional rights. The statute in question provided adequate safeguards, and appropriate
opportunity for notification and review, to comport with due process requirements.

Reasoning: Justice Holmes delivered a short majority opinion on behalf of the Court. He pointed
out that the challenge to the law before the Court was properly considered a challenge to the law
itself, not to compliance with the safeguards contained therein. He then argued that as the State
can require sacrifices from citizens, up to and including their very lives, it is not unusual to require
something less than the sacrifice of their life on behalf of the public good. Making a policy case,
Justice Holmes opined that society would be better served by preventing reproduction by members
of society most likely to produce progeny dependent on the government. The Court also made
clear that the process for review of a sterilization order properly considered the rights of those
whom the State targeted for such procedures. Finally, Justice Holmes dismissed concerns
regarding equal protection. Here he reasoned that while not all citizens were equally subject to the
potential to have their reproductive capacity forfeited, the State could reasonably direct its
attention to those deemed unfit to reproduce and thereby conserve necessary resources for other
prerogatives. Comparing forced sterilization to mandatory vaccination, Justice Holmes argued that
both were for the overall benefit of society. Noting the sad history of Ms. Buck, her mother, and
her child, Justice Holmes suggested that “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough."

Dissent: Justice Butler dissented, but did not file a dissenting opinion.

Conclusion: While subsequently overturned as public opinion on eugenics changed, the Court here
concluded that sterilization was not only a legitimate policy aim for the states, but entirely
consistent with the Constitution.

■ Agustin vs Edu
Generally Accepted Principles of International Law – Police Power

Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter of
Instruction No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have early warning devices particularly to
equip them with a pair of “reflectorized triangular early warning devices”. Agustin is arguing that
this order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars are
already equipped with blinking lights which is already enough to provide warning to other
motorists. And that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning
devices is redundant and would only make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.

HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive,
for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) ‘blinking-lights in the fore and aft of said
motor vehicles,’ 2) ‘battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles,’ 3) ‘built-in
reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles,’ or 4) ‘well-lighted two (2)
petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the
said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least
400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized
rectangular early warning device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude,
without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway,
there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers
passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built-in
warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning
because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a
law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the
motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision.

On Police Power

The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is
conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former,
however, that while embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due process and equal
protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in passing.
The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was originally identified by Chief
Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as “nothing more or less than
the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty” was stressed in the aforementioned
case of Edu v. Ericta thus: “Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came
into force, Calalang v. Williams, identified police power with state authority to enact legislation
that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.
Persons and property could thus ‘be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state. Shortly after independence in 1948,
Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as ‘the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and
general welfare of the people.’ The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in
a pre-Commonwealth decision as ‘that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to
prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.’ In that sense it could be
hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative
power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is, to
quote Justice Malcolm anew, ‘the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable powers,’
extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out ‘to all the great public needs.’ Its scope, ever
expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be
done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances
thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: ‘Needs that were narrow or
parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is
critical or urgent changes with the time.’ The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably
vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and
imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby
to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of
such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.”

It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin, compounded by the fact that the
particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It
would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of that
character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The latest
decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, an enactment
conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a
statute, the purpose of which was: “To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstruction on roads
and streets designated as national roads . . .” As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be
nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, with petitioner
failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public safety.

■ City Government of QC vs Judge Ericta & Himlayang Pilipino

Police Power – Not Validly Exercised

Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled “ORDINANCE REGULATING THE

ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE
CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF”. The law basically provides that
at least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity
burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5
years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. QC justified the law by
invoking police power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid.

HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable relation
between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for
charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order,
safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without
compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the
municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the
city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

City Government of QC vs Ericta

G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983

Facts: Respondent Himlayang Pilipino filed a petition to annul Section 9 of “ORDINANCE

REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE
MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF
QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF”, which
stated that “At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set
aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon
City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The
area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than
six months from the date of approval of the application.” Respondent alleged that the same is
contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised
Administrative Code.

Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent’s property is a valid and reasonable exercise of
police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of
paupers. They further argue that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the
exercise of local police power, ” to make such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to
law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this
Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote
the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.”

On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the taking or confiscation of
property is obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property
such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use
of his property. The respondent also stresses that the general welfare clause is not available as a
source of power for the taking of the property in this case because it refers to “the power of
promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property.” The
respondent points out that if an owner is deprived of his property outright under the State’s police
power, the property is generally not taken for public use but is urgently and summarily destroyed
in order to promote the general welfare.

Issue: Whether there is, according to respondent, a taking or confiscation of property

Held: Yes. There is, according to respondent, a taking or confiscation of property.

The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit (People vs. Esguerra, 81 PhiL 33,
Vega vs. Municipal Board of Iloilo, L-6765, May 12, 1954; 39 N.J. Law, 70, Mich. 396). A
fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question
not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery, because under
Section 13 of said ordinance, ‘Violation of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine and/or
imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to operate and maintain a private
cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled.’ The confiscatory clause and the penal provision in effect
deter one from operating a memorial park cemetery.

Petitioner’s contention that the taking is justified by the exercise of valid police power is untenable
since the same is “usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of
liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or
confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate
private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of
promoting the general welfare.”

There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area
of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of
health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people It seems to the court that
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation
but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of
law, nay, even without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers
who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public
cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by

Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city
council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide
for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds
and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section
177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may “provide for the burial of the dead in such place and
in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance” it simply authorizes the city to provide its own
city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has
been the law and practice in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires
payment of just compensation.

■ Restituto Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court

Police Power – Not Validly Exercised

There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To
strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos
from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught
transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A.
Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due
process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even
without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a
valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the
indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated
a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area
to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given
to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be
confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose
of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the
property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned
and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt
of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers
to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken.

■ Valentin Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Board

Delegation of Power – Delegation to Administrative Bodies
In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory
Board” was enacted which gave broad powers to the VRB to regulate and supervise the videogram
industry. The said law sought to minimize the economic effects of piracy. There was a need to
regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of
videograms has significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and
that such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Section 10 of the PD imposes a
30% tax on the gross receipts payable to the LGUs.

In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred that it is unconstitutional on the following
grounds:

1. Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on gross receipts, is a rider and is not germane
to the subject matter of the law.

2. There is also undue delegation of legislative power to the VRB, an administrative body, because
the law allowed the VRB to deputize, upon its discretion, other government agencies to assist the
VRB in enforcing the said PD.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Valentin Tio’s arguments are correct.

HELD: No.

1. The Constitutional requirement that “every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof” is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to
include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. In the case at bar, the questioned
provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the
general object of the PD, which is the regulation of the video industry through the VRB as
expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject
and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms
scattered throughout the PD.

2. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the VRB. VRB is not being tasked to
legislate. What was conferred to the VRB was the authority or discretion to seek assistance in the
execution, enforcement, and implementation of the law. Besides, in the very language of the
decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a “fixed and limited period”
with the deputized agencies concerned being “subject to the direction and control of the [VRB].”

■ Lozano vs Martinez Digest

Facts:

Petitioners were charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Check Law).
They moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the acts charged did not
constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the
respondent trial courts, except in one case, wherein the trial court declared the law
unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected thus appealed.

Issue:

1. Whether or not BP 22 is violative of the constitutional provision on non-imprisonment due to

debt
2. Whether it impairs freedom of contract
3. Whether it contravenes the equal protection clause

Held:

1. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The gravamen of the offense punished by
BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The
law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to
prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by
the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public
order.

Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of money. It is an
order addressed to a bank and partakes of a representation that the drawer has funds on deposit
against which the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure payment upon its presentation to the bank.
There is therefore an element of certainty or assurance that the instrument will be paid upon
presentation. For this reason, checks have become widely accepted as a medium of payment in
trade and commerce. Although not legal tender, checks have come to be perceived as convenient
substitutes for currency in commercial and financial transactions. The basis or foundation of such
perception is confidence. If such confidence is shaken, the usefulness of checks as currency
substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become nil. Any practice therefore tending to
destroy that confidence should be deterred for the proliferation of worthless checks can only create
havoc in trade circles and the banking community.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties
directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The
mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The
harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold,
can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.

2. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into “lawful”
contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind
that checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this
modem day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking
system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.

3. There is no substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal protection of the laws
or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is contended
that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the
indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime.
This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both
the swindler and the swindled. The petitioners’ posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the
clause “equal protection of the laws.” The clause does not preclude classification of individuals,
who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not
unreasonable or arbitrary. (Lozano vs Martinez, G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986)

■ Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc.

(TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was
declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to
show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Petitioner
GMA Network, on the other hand, had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge.
Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the
enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881.

Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:

“Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as the
“Comelec Time” which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the
area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio
broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time,
free of charge, during the period of campaign.”

Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print
space in newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be
procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out radio and
television stations to provide free air time.

Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC
Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it
stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the
primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers
and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private
property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one
hour each day and, in this year’s elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of
COMELEC’s requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such.
Issues:

(1) Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the
equal protection of the laws.

(2) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process
of law and without just compensation.

Held: Petitioner’s argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television
stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are
more individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and television
broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies
through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary
privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the
performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate
broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable
public funds in licensing and supervising them.

The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time
as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print
space they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires
spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast
industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.

As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by
the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.