Accounting Gimmick:

A Fraud Against Financial Statement for Personal Gain

Dani Usmar1, Yat Rospia Brata2, Dendy Syaiful Akbar3

123Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Galuh

Ciamis, Indonesia
1nieus08@gmail.com

Abstract
There are several reasons for manipulating financial statements, especially for personal
reasons. Whatever the reason, this action is fraudulent behavior. Such actions can reduce the
credibility of financial statements to the public. Some of the world's big companies that
commit fraud have caused losses to investors. This action is called accounting gimmick. On
this occasion, the author will conduct research to reveal the freedom to choose and use and
how to minimize the negative impact of accounting standards in preparing financial
statements.

Keywords: Accounting Gimmick, Fraud, Internal Control, Ethics, Accounting Standards.

Introduction
Manipulation of corporate finance is done by changing the amount of disclosure of
financial statements (Apostolou et al., 2000: p. 181; Xu, Zhang, & Chen, 2017). The
fraudulent behavior committed on the company's body is sticking out when it happens to
Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom (Wu, 2002). Fraud is difficult to eliminate, the potential for
fraud will always exist in a variety of lives, especially in the business world. This condition
shows the ineffectiveness of corporate governance Mellahi, 2005). Executives as key
decision makers can be motivated to manipulate financial statements to enrich themselves
(Zhang et al., 2008; Xu et al., 2017; Beasley et al., 1999).
Separation of the interests of the owner and the manager of the company has caused
managers to carry a high burden of responsibility, from the owners of the company. The
highest burden is partly attributed to efforts to achieve the highest profit. For the owner of the
achievement of the level of profit is a simple indicator in assessing the performance and
success of managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In fact, it is not uncommon in some studies
that achieving profit is the main indicator in evaluating the company's success in terms of
planning and implementation in selected human resources in a company (González-
Fernández & González-Velasco, 2018; Atalay, Anafarta & Sarvan, 2013; Geroski, Machin &
Reenen 1993; Heunks, 1998). In the private sector, the achievement of high-profit levels is a
positive capital in increasing the value of the company and positive interpretations of
investors, with the hope that it can behave positively towards the increase in the company's
shares sold (Schumpeter, 1934).
In relation to financial statements produced by an entity, financial statements are
products of accounting processes that are certainly generated by accounting disciplines
(FASB, 1997; Edmonds, Smith, & Stallings, 2018). So that ideally to compile and produce
financial reports needed educated and trained human resources in the field of accounting.
Therefore, a competent accountant is needed to produce a quality financial report. In addition,
an accountant plays an important role in implementing control in an organization (Armstrong,
1985; Ezzamel & Burns, 2005; Granlund & Lukka, 1998; Hopper, 1980; Lambert & Sponem,
2012; Simon, Guetzkow, Kozmetzky, & Tyndall, 1954; Vaivio, 1999; Goretzki & Messner,
2018). An accountant has an important role in the body of management. They act as
operational management partners and as financial informants for the board of commissioners
(Puyou, 2018; Busco et al., 2008; Lambert & Sponem, 2012).
Not many people understand that financial statements can be manipulated, especially
those related to achieving the expected level of profit (Hsieh, Chen, Tseng, & Lin, 2018).
Manipulation of financial statements is an action to intervene in the financial statement
process to obtain personal benefits (Schipper, 1989; Baader & Krcmar, 2018). Such behavior
has become one of the important topics in accounting studies for more than two decades. In
general, manipulation of financial statements has an impact on the decreasing credibility of
the company's financial statements (Dechow & Skinner, 2000; Hsieh et al., 2018).
Profit recording is largely determined by the accounting policies that apply to a
company. Whereas accounting policy cannot escape itself from accounting standards (Toms
& Shepherd, 2017). In this case, accounting standards provide opportunities and flexibility
for company managers to choose and apply standards in accounting activities (Stadler &
Nobes, 2018). Sometimes when triggered by owner pressure it is not uncommon to make
managers take advantage of loopholes in freedom or freedom in applying these standards. On
this basis, the recognition and recording of company profits are not impossible to only apply
certain methods, as long as they are not blamed on the basis of standards (Marketa, 2015;
Lambert, 2001). Although this allows for the denial of the real conditions of the company.
The pressure of the owner's need for high company profits, flexibility and freedom in
applying accounting standards motivates management to use justifications for their personal
interests. So it is estimated that it will trigger manager actions to take advantage of freedom
and freedom (Lambert, 2006; Alles & Datar, 1998; Baldenius, 2000; Baldenius et al., 1999;
Magee, 1988; Sansing, 1999; Smith, 2002; Wei, 2004). This condition causes accounting
manipulation to occur. This behavior is done to deceive stakeholders, for certain purposes
(accounting gimmick).
Managers may use their justifications in financial reporting, and organize transactions
to change financial statements to mislead stakeholders about the economic performance of
the company or to influence contract results that depend on the accounting figures reported
(Healy & Wehlan, 1999). When managers commit fraudulent financial statements for their
personal interests, there is a denial of the primary responsibility of detecting fraud (Baader &
Krcmar, 2018; Albrecht et al., 2012; Alles et al., 2006). Corporate management also has no
different responsibilities, due to the fact that they should be able to detect fraud within the
company through the internal controls that are implemented (Wu & Wang, 2018; Bedard &
Graham, 2011; Files, Swanson & Tse, 2009; Rice & Weber, 2012).
Understanding of accounting standards alone is not enough to minimize fraud but the
ethic behavior is needed so that understanding can be obedient. How effective control must
be carried out in order to prevent fraud. This indicates that in addition to understanding
accounting standards, other individual elements must be met, such as soft skills from a
manager. Olah, therefore, how accounting gimmicks can be minimized due to the impact of
the freedom to choose and use accounting standards.
Much of the research that has been done relates to fraudulent financial statements.
Previous researchers focused more on CEO incentives in manipulating accounting earnings,
such as (Burns & Kedia, 2006; Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006). There is also research on the
incentives and role of CFOs in material accounting manipulation (Feng, Ge, Luo, & Shevlin,
2011) or how to minimize and detect fraudulent practices of financial statements, for example
(Baader & Krcmar, 2018; Yang, Jiao, & Buckland, 2017) This research was conducted to
reveal the freedom to choose and use and how to minimize the negative impact of accounting
standards in preparing financial statements. The benefits of the results of this study are
expected to broaden the knowledge of the field of accounting, especially the study of
accounting behavior.
Method
The research method used in this research is development research from previous
research. Collecting data uses literature studies from journals, books, the internet, and others.
The data is then analyzed by means of translating the interpretation of accounting fraud at
this time. The last step is to conclude the data from the analysis so that it will bring up
practical meaning for manipulation of financial statements.

Results and Discussion

The preparation of accounting standards is intended to be used as a general reference
or guideline in the preparation of financial statements. Accounting standards are statements
about official provisions relating to accounting issues issued by a competent official body.
These standards are applied to certain environments which generally contain definitions,
methods of measurement (assessment), recognition, and disclosure of elements of financial
statements. Simply put, the standard is a framework that becomes a guideline and procedure
in the preparation of financial statements, for uniformity in the presentation of financial
statements.
In addition to functioning as a guideline, accounting standards have another role as a
guide to facilitate financial report users in understanding, comparing and interpreting the
entity's financial statements. With regard to its implementation, standards provide flexibility
for managers to choose and treat them according to managerial needs. A manager will choose
a particular method or policy in the hope of maximizing or increasing the value of the
company. This means that managers can use their professional abilities to choose accounting
standards that will be used.
The ability of managers to use judgment and accounting policies gives them the
power to determine the allowable accounting methods and estimation of accounting methods.
The manager's discretion makes judgments in choosing standards that are suitable for his
company, so the manager will carry out creative processes in accounting. Creative accounting
itself is a euphemism of intentional disloyalty in preparing reports on the actual financial
condition of the company. Accounting creative is a process where several parties use the
ability to understand accounting knowledge (including standards, techniques, etc.) and use it
to manipulate financial reporting.
Accounting creative provides an overview of managerial behavior trends in reporting
business activities and their motivation to regulate financial data reported for a certain period.
Potential causes of this are: (a) flexible regulators, (b) lack of regulations, (c) management
has considered the scope to estimate freedom of policy selection, (d) actual transactions can
be arranged to give the desired impression in accounts, (e) made-up transactions can be
entered to manipulate the balance sheet amount and to transfer profits between accounting
periods, and (f) reclassification and presentation of financial figures.
The problem in implementing accounting standards is not fully detailed in managing
transactions that are possible to occur in an entity. Moreover, there are several standards that
give freedom to management to choose and establish methods for measuring, and recognizing
values in recording transactions. This condition was complicated by the development and
progress of the financial industry and the capital market which gave birth to new financial
instruments. So that this condition triggers a uniformity in the accounting treatment of
transactions between entities, even though in reality the transactions that occur are the same
or similar.
Other conditions, the implications of agency theory sometimes put pressure on
managers. The demands of the owners so that managers can optimally generate high
operating profits. This condition will actually be a burden for managers, especially if what is
the owner's demands cannot be met, and results in sanctions for managers. Therefore,
management will use its skills to make a judgment in utilizing freedom and freedom. The aim
is for the comfort and safety of its position, through accounting actions that tend to be
manipulative (accounting gimmick). This is based on asymmetric action triggered by the
provisions of bonuses and sanctions related to the creation and achievement of profits.
Managers who conduct materially misleading accounting gimmicks does not mean
they do not understand accounting standards. Instead, they have a high level of understanding
so that they understand professionally where the gap of the accounting standards is. Indeed,
some research results state that understanding of accounting standards can have a positive
influence on the quality of reports. The basic concept of the quality of financial statements is
determined by the understanding of accountants. Based on the assumption that an
accountant's understanding is influenced by education, age, experience, and the length of time
a person works. But most of the previous research did not reveal the emotional condition and
atmosphere of the compilers or financial report makers at that time.
The conditions of freedom for the selection and determination of standard policies,
open opportunities for fraud that stand out for personal purposes. Manipulation as the ability
to increase or decrease profits in the future. Accountability manipulation and income
statement reporting, and also include with statements of financial position. The practice
represents important events of purpose, motivation, and timing of manipulation. The practice
of accounting manipulation which later developed into a tool that aims to manage, such as
seeking debt and profit per capita.
It is very clear, that the freedom of election and the determination of accounting
standard policies opens opportunities for fraud when judgment conducted by managerial is
aimed at his personal interests (accounting gimmick). In general, the reason for management
to do accounting gimmicks is to boost profits. But the concrete level based on the results of
research by the CFA Institute published in 2008, there are several factors that influence the
reasons for management to do accounting gimmicks. These factors are intention, opportunity,
and justification. The intention is a factor that is the most dominant reason for causing
management to do accounting gimmicks. On a logical level, management intends to do this
because there are certain reasons, such as giving bonuses that are associated with
performance in achieving a certain level of profit. Motivation increases the value of the
company through the act of boosting the stock price, implying personal rewards in the form
of bonuses that are obtained through a share ownership program such as the ESOP
(Employee Stock Ownership Program) or the Higher Ownership Management Program.
Besides intention is an opportunity. It turned out that the research results of the CFA
Institute were surprising, that the opportunity factor was dominated by the weak supervision
of the capital market regulator body on accounting practices in public companies. This is
triggered by regulatory acceleration conditions that have not been optimal in improving the
quality of supervision of accounting practices. Another reason is justification. Factors of
justification are generally triggered by changes in the conditions of financial accounting
standards that provide a gap for management to judge for their personal interests. Changes in
accounting standards with a more flexible direction instead provide opportunities for
justification (rationalization) for management to conduct accounting gimmicks.
Based on the reason the managers do accounting gimmick actions can be indicated in
the act of violating professional ethics and lack of effective control. The ethical basis that can
be used to trace related to these reasons is the basis of ethical decision making initiated by
Brook and Dunn (2012). They combine ethical theories in the explanation of ethical decision
making. Both theories are virtue ethics and theory of justice. Virtue ethics is a theory that
focuses on the character of the decision maker. This theory is considered suitable to assess
manager's actions in making decisions to do accounting gimmicks. Meanwhile, the theory of
justice is a theory of ethics that focuses on the context of social contracts that occur in
society.
Using the Bertens (2000) approach, that ethics consists of (1) a normative ethical
approach, namely ethics that is forcing people to do what is considered right. Ethics are
ordered based on arguments that refer to moral norms that cannot be negotiated. In other
words, behavior that can be said to be true if the human is doing what is considered right, if
the human is doing outside the argument that refers to the moral then the behavior is said to
be wrong. (2) The descriptive ethical approach, namely ethics that focuses on the full picture
of human moral behavior universally that we can meet every day in people's lives. This
approach does not provide a sharp and straightforward interpretation, but only describes a
fact that is happening and developing in a particular society. The ethics only discuss and
provide an analysis of its assessment of certain events. (3) The ethical approach to
mathematics is an approach related to behavior that is said to be good and right from a moral
point of view. Not only because the behavior helps or increases the dignity of others, but also
that behavior fulfills a moral requirement that is helped.
From the approaches of these theories, it is clear that accounting gimmicks are fraud.
Fraud cannot be justified based on arguments that refer to moral norms that cannot be
negotiated. Fraud is fraud or behavior that is not ethically or legally justified. This action
must be punished because it is contrary to the full picture of human moral behavior
universally that we can meet every day in people's lives. Even though the behavior helps or
enhances the dignity of others, it also must fulfill a certain moral requirement that is
considered right in society.
The basic statement of Schilit & Perker (2010) is very simple. One does not have to
have a background in the field of forensic accounting to find fraud or violations. But on the
contrary, it is relatively easy to find as long as we use logic (common sense). One warning
signal that must be considered is a sudden change in accounting policy. This change may be
done to camouflage deteriorating operations or sales. Another warning signal is misleading
management incentives. Management that benefits from stock options and performance-
related bonuses may be motivated to apply dishonesty or accounting fraud (accounting
chicanery).
Efforts to control accounting gimmicks require carefulness and sensitivity in
analyzing financial statements in order to detect fraud. The auditor can see the financial
shenanigans in the report. The CFRA has identified thirty accounting gimmicks that are
grouped into seven categories, this condition that companies (managers) use to trick investors
and other stakeholders. The seven categories are: (1) acknowledging the existence of income
before time; (2) acknowledging the existence of false income as income; (3) increase profits
with incidental benefits; (4) change the recording period of the current year to the previous
period or after it; (5) not registering or intentionally reducing the value of liabilities; (6) move
the recording of income for the period to the future period; (7) moving future expenses to the
current period as residential losses.
In addition, most financial shenanigans come from two main problem areas, namely
accounting for acquisition and revenue recognition. The company makes acquisitions by
combining non-profit entities. This event can increase income, profits and short-term stock
prices, but is detrimental to long-term investors. Shifts losses to the "stub" period. Stub
period is a period that appears when the reporting period of the entity acquired is different
from the period of the acquiring entity. In this period, it can be used to regulate the
recognition of income or expenses to influence the acquisition price and write-off before and
after the acquisition. Releasing reserves created as a result of write-offs and changing the
acquisition price allocation to create goodwill and capitalize acquisition costs. The
acquisition price discount is recognized as the income of the acquiring entity and provides
share warrants as a sweetener for future purchase commitments.
By looking at the indications of materially misleading accounting gimmicks, then
deciphering them based on existing definitions, it can be described that weak and ineffective
controls will trigger open opportunities for such practices. This is in line with the statement,
that internal control is an organizational action that has an audit function that is more able to
detect accounting fraud (Coram et al. 2008). Another explanation states that the internal
control system is a policy and procedure designed to provide reasonable assurance
management that the company has achieved its goals and objectives (Arens, Randal, &
Beasley, 2015).
Based on the results of the CFA Institute's research, it turns out that the three reasons
for fraud, in reality, are not always interdependent and are simultaneous. This means that
each of these factors can stand on their own. In other words, the reason for management is
accounting gimmicks, not only because there is the intention but also because there is an
opportunity and/or justification.
Reflecting on the case of WorldCom's collapse due to accounting scandals, the
Lehman Brother case which indicated an attempt to "beautify" financial conditions or
window dressing also on the results of CFA research. Simply prove that (1) managers are
very familiar with accounting standards, (2) the application of accounting standards has gaps
that can be used by management to justify their personal interests by creating accounting
actions that tend to be manipulative, (3) management triggers accounting practices the
gimmick is not only because of the intention, but the opportunity and behavior of
rationalization, (4) the importance of the ethics base in understanding and applying
accounting standards in order to produce obedience so as to avoid and control accounting
gimmick trigger factors, (5) weak supervision and control has triggered the occurrence of
cumulative accounting practices.

Conclusion
The practice of accounting gimmick is an act of fraud if in its event involves
managerial judgment personally. Such behavior can be triggered by the owner's pressure as
an agency implication and a loophole of the standard that is used by the manager for
judgment of his personal interests. The practice of accounting gimmicks can be prevented by
increasing understanding of standards to be used as obedience, appreciation, and application
of the principles of professional ethics. Besides accounting gimmicks can be minimized by
increasing the effectiveness of internal controls as a tool to identify fraud occurrences.
The weakness of this research is that it is not discussed accounting practices in public
sector organizations. So for the next researcher, it is recommended that research is conducted
on public sector organizations. So that the results of the research can provide clear direction
to minimize fraud in the organization, because the management of funds originating from the
community, such as from tax revenues.

Bibliography
Albrecht, W.S., Albrecht, C.O., Albrecht, C.C., Zimbelman, M.F., (2012). Fraud
Examination, 4 ed. Cengage Learning, Mason (USA).
Alles, M., Brennan, G., Kogan, A., Vasarhelyi, M.A., (2006). Continuous monitoring of
business process control: a pilot implementation of a continuous auditing system at
Siemens. Int. J. Account. Inf. Syst. 7 (2), 137–161.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.accinf.2005.10.004.
Alles, M., & Datar, S. (1998). Strategic transfer pricing. Management Science, April, 451–
461.
Arens, A. A., Randal J. E., & Beasley, M.S., (2015). Auditing and Assurance Services,
Fifteenth Edition. Pearson Education Inc: New Jersey.
Armstrong, P. (1985). Changing management control strategies: The role of competition
between accountancy and other organizational professions. Accounting, Organizations
and Society, 10(2), 129e148.
Atalay, M., Anafarta, N., & Sarfan, F., (2013). The relationship between innovation and firm
performance: empirical evidence from Turkish automotive supplier industry. Procedia –
Social and Behavior Science, 75(3), 226-235.
Apostolou, B., Hassell, J.M., Webber, S.A., (2000). Forensic expert classification of
management fraud risk factors. J. Forensic Account. 1, 181e191.
Baader, G., & Krcmar, H. (2018). Reducing false positives in fraud detection: Combining the
red flag approach with process mining. International Journal of Accounting Information
Systems, 31(June), 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.accinf.2018.03.004
Baldenius, T. (2000). Intrafirm trade, bargaining power, and specific investments. Review of
Accounting Studies, March, 27–56.
Baldenius, T., Reichelstein, S. & Sahay, S. (1999). Negotiated versus cost-based transfer
pricing. Review of Accounting Studies, June, 67–92.
Beasley, M.S., Carcello, J.V., Hermanson, D.R., (1999). Fraudulent Financial Reporting
1987e1997: an Analysis of U.S. Public Companies. Committee of Sponsoring
Organizations of the Treadway Commission, New York.
Bedard, J. C., & Graham, L. (2011). Detection and severity classifications of Sarbanes-Oxley
section 404 internal control deficiencies. The Accounting Review, 86(3), 825–855.
Bergstresser, D., Philippon, T., 2006. CEO incentives and earnings management. Journal of
Financial Economics 80 (3), 511–529.
Bertens, K., (2000). Etika. Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama.
Brooks, L. J., & Dunn, P., (2012). Business and Professional Ethics for Directors,
Executives, and Accountants. Mason City: South-Western Cengage Learning.
Busco, C., Giovannoni, E., Scapens, R.W., 2008. Managing the tensions in integrating global
organizations: the role of performance management system. Manage. Account. Res. 19
(2), 103–125.
Burns, N., & Kedia, S., 2006. The impact of performance-based compensation on
misreporting. Journal of Financial Economics 79 (1), 35–67.
Edmonds, M. A., Smith, D. B., & Stallings, M. A. (2018). Financial statement comparability
and segment disclosure. Research in Accounting Regulation, 30(2), 103–111.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.racreg.2018.09.012
Ezzamel, M., & Burns, J. (2005). Professional competition, economic value added and
management control strategies. Organization Studies, 26(5), 755e777.
Feng, M., Ge, W., Luo, S., & Shevlin, T. (2011). Why do CFOs become involved in material
accounting manipulations? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 51(1–2), 21–36.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.09.005
Files, R., Swanson, E. P., & Tse, S. (2009). Stealth disclosure of accounting restatements.
The Accounting Review, 84(5), 1495–1520.
Financial Accounting Standards Board. (2010). Conceptual Framework for Financial
Reporting Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts.
González-Fernández, M., & González-Velasco, C. (2018). Innovation and corporate
performance in the Spanish regions. Journal of Policy Modeling.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpolmod.2018.05.005
Goretzki, L., & Messner, M. (2018). Backstage and frontstage interactions in management
accountants’ identity work. Accounting, Organizations, and Society.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2018.09.001
Geroski, P., Machin, S., & Reenen, J. V. (1993). The profitability of innovating firms. The
Rand Journal of Economics, 24(2), 198-211.
González-Fernández, M., & González-Velasco, C. (2018). Innovation and corporate
performance in the Spanish regions. Journal of Policy Modeling.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpolmod.2018.05.005
Heunks, F.J. (1998). Innovation, creativity, and success. Small Business and Economics,
10(3), 263-272.
Hopper, T. M. (1980). Role conflicts of management accountants and their position within
organization structures. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 5(4), 401e411.
Hsieh, Y.-T., Chen, T.-K., Tseng, Y.-J., & Lin, R.-C. (2018). Top Management Team
Characteristics and Accrual-Based Earnings Management. The International Journal of
Accounting, (xxxx), 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intacc.2018.11.004
Jensen, M.C., Meckling, W.H., (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency
costs, and ownership structure. J. Finance. Econ. 3, 305e360.
Lambert, C., & Sponem, S. (2012). Roles, authority and involvement of the management
accounting function: A multiple case-study perspectives. European Accounting Review,
21(3), 565e589.
Lambert, R. A. (2006). Agency Theory and Management Accounting. Handbooks of
Management Accounting Research, 1(6), 247–268. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1751-
3243(06)01008-X
Magee, R. (1988). Variable cost allocations in a principal-agent setting. The Accounting
Review, January, 42–54.
Marketa, B. (2015). Agency Theory and Management Accounting. Procedia Economics and
Finance, 5–13. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1751-3243(06)01008-X
Mellahi, K., (2005). The dynamics of boards of directors in failing organizations. Long Range
Plan. 38, 261e279.
Puyou, F. R. (2018). Systems of secrecy: Confidences and gossip in management
accountants’ handling of dual role expectations and MCS limitations. Management
Accounting Research, 40(January), 15–26. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mar.2018.01.001
Rice, S. C., & Weber, D. P. (2012). How effective is internal control reporting under SOX
404? Determinants of the (non-)disclosure of existing material weaknesses. Journal of
Accounting Research, 50(3), 811–843.
Sansing, R. (1999). Relationship-specific investments and the transfer pricing paradox.
Review of Accounting Studies, June, 119–134.
Schumpeter, A. (1934). The theory of economic development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Schipper, K. (1989). Commentary on earnings management. Accounting Horizons, 3(4), 91–
102.
Schilit, H. M., & Perker, J., (2010). Financial Shenanigan - How to Detect Accounting
Gimmick & Fraud in Financial Reports, 3rd Edition. McGraw Hill.
Simon, H. A., Guetzkow, H., Kozmetzky, G., & Tyndall, G. (1954). Centralization vs. De-
centralization in organizing the controller's department. Houston: Scholars Book Co.
Smith, M. (2002). Tax and incentive trade-offs in transfer pricing. Journal of Accounting,
Auditing, and Finance, 17(3), 209–236.
Stadler, C., & Nobes, C. W. (2018). Accounting for government grants: Standard-setting and
accounting choice. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 37(2), 113–129.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2018.02.004
Toms, S., & Shepherd, A. (2017). Accounting and social conflict: Profit and regulated
working time in the British Industrial Revolution. Critical Perspectives on Accounting,
49(2016), 57–75. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2017.03.002
Wu, M., (2002). Earnings Restatements: a Capital Market Perspective. Doctoral dissertation.
New York University.
Wu, X., & Wang, J. (2018). Management’s Materiality Criteria of Internal Control
Weaknesses and Corporate Fraud: Evidence from China. International Journal of
Accounting, 53(1), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intacc.2018.02.001
Xu, Y., Zhang, L., & Chen, H. (2017). Board age and corporate financial fraud: An
interactionist view. Long Range Planning. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lrp.2017.08.001
Yang, D., Jiao, H., & Buckland, R. (2017). The determinants of financial fraud in Chinese
firms: Does corporate governance as an institutional innovation matter? Technological
Forecasting and Social Change, 125(June), 309–320.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2017.06.035

Acknowledgments
Thank you to the Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Galuh and the Accounting Study Program
for financial and moral support.

Appendixes
First and Middle Name
Last Name
ACFE Membership Status
Email Address
Phone Number
Home Address
Company/Organization
Company/Organization
Participant Category
: Dani
: Usmar
: Non Member
: nieus08@gmail.com
: +6282218280262
: Jl. Sadananya No. 113 Ciamis- West Java - 46256
: Fakultas Ekonomi – Universitas Galuh
: Jl. R.E. Martadinata No. 150 Ciamis – West Java - 46251
: National (Indonesia)