VOL.

74, NOVEMBER 29, 1976 171

Prosecution of Offenses (Rule 110)

ANNOTATION

PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES
(Rule 110)
By
Judge ABRAHAM P. VERA

———————————

A. Criminal Action

I. How commenced.

a. By complaint (Section 1, Rule 110).

b. By information (Section 1, Rule 110).

1. Firstly, criminal action maybe commenced by any person

presenting a complaint to a court or to a magistrate. This is
the process which begins the action and gives the court or
magistrate jurisdiction of the person of the complainant
and the subject matter of the action. The prosecution
proceeds upon the complaint alone and no other further
pleading on the part of the government is necessary.
2. Secondly, the action maybe commenced by the fiscal
by presenting to the court and filing with the clerk thereof
an information. Such information is the process which
institutes the action and the prosecution proceeds upon it
as the People’s pleading. It is the duty of the fiscal to
prosecute the action whether commenced by complaint or
information (People vs. Zurbano, No. L-32673, Feb. 22,
1971; 37 SCRA 565; Astero vs. Chief of Police of Dagupan
City, No. L-26741, July 31, 1969; 28 SCRA 1078; U. S. vs.
Narvas, 14 Phil. 410; Trinidad vs. Jarabe, 3 Phil. 518).

II. In whose name commenced.

 a. Must be instituted in the name of the “People of the
Philippines” (Sec. 1, Rule 110; City of Manila vs.
Rizal, 27 Phil. 50).

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Prosecution of Offenses (Rule 110)

b. Effect if not so named—An action erroneously

instituted in the name of the aggrieved party and
not in the name of the “People of the Philippines”
may not be quashed for failure to conform with the
Rule (Rule 117, Sec. 2 (d). Such a defect is merely
one of form (People vs. Santiago, 43 Phil. 120) and
curable at any stage of the trial (Ngo Yao Tit, et al.,
vs. Sheriff of Manila, 27 Phil. 378; Rule 117, Sec. 2,
last paragraph). However, if the information is
grossly deficient, it may be quashed if it does not
conform substantially to the prescribed form
required (Sec. 2 (d), Rule 117; Secs. 5 - 10, Rule
110).

III. Against whom instituted.

a. All persons who appear to be responsible for the

offense (See. I, Rule 110).

1. Although it is the duty of the prosecuting officer to

file the charges against whomsoever the evidence
may show to be responsible for an offense, it does
not mean he has no discretion on the matter. It
implies that those against whom no sufficient
evidence of guilt exists are not to be included in the
charge (Maddela vs. Aquino, 104 Phil. 433; People
vs. Solaña, No. L-13967, Sept. 29, 1962; 6 SCRA
60). He is not required to include the names of
unknown participants in an information he has
filed (U.S. vs. Abanzado, 37 Phil. 658). It is within
the discretion of the prosecuting officer to
determine who are the persons who appear to be
responsible for the commission of an offense (People
vs. Catli, No. L-11641, Nov. 29, 1962; 6 SCRA 642).
2. However, a fiscal who ignores his legal duty to
include in the information all persons who appear
responsible for a crime may be required to do so by
 the Court (Guiao vs. Figueroa, 94 Phil. 1018) as
when an accused has a right to demand that all
persons who have directly and actively taken part
in the commission of the offense be included in the
information (De Castro, Jr. vs. Castañeda, No. L
15137, April 28, 1961; 1 SCRA 1131).

b. Generally, a criminal action cannot lie against a

juridical person like a corporation (West Coast Life
Insurance Co. vs. Hurd, 27 Phil. 401). At moat the
officers and agents of the corporation should be liable for
the violation of law (People vs. Tan Boon Kong, 54 Phil.
607). However, a corporation may be

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Prosecution of Offenses (Rule 110)

held liable for violation of provisions against

involuntary servitude or for failure to submit to the
Securities and Exchange Commission the report of
any cessation of business or change of address
(Secs. 15 and 19, Act 1459, Corporation Law).

IV. By whom commenced.

a. The fiscal (Sec. 3, Rule 110) or a special prosecutor

or state prosecutor (People vs. Sierra, Jr. Nos. L-
27611-13, August 30, 1972; 46 SCRA 717; Nasser
vs. Perez, No. L-28779, Feb. 28, 1973; 49 SCRA.
508).
b. The offended party (Sec. 2, Rule 110).

1. A widow may be considered an “offended party”

entitled to file a complaint for the murder of her
deceased husband (Del Rosario, Jr. vs. Vda, de
Mercado, L-25710, Aug. 28, 1969, 29 SCRA 117).

c. Any peace officer (Sec. 2, Rule 110).

1. A police sergeant acting as chief of police has

authority to file complaint (Manzano vs. Villa, L-
27018, Aug. 30, 1972; 46 SCRA 711).
 d. Any employee of the government or governmental
institution in charge of the law violated (See. 2,
Rule 110).

B. Complaint

I. Concept

a. A sworn written statement charging a person with

an offense, subscribed by the offended party, any
peace officer or other employee of the government
or governmental institution in charge of the
enforcement or execution of the law violated (Sec. 2,
Rule 110).

C. Information

I. Concept

a. An accusation in writing charging a person with an

offense subscribed by the fiscal and filed with the
court (Sec. 3,

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174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Prosecution of Offenses (Rule 110)

Rule 110).

D. Complaint distinguished from information

I. Signing of pleading

a. A complaint is signed by the offended party, peace

officer or other employee of the government or
governmental institution in charge of the
enforcement or execution of the law violated (Sec. 2,
Rule 110, Albano vs. Arranz, No. L-24403, Dec. 22,
1965; 15 SCRA 518). However, it has been held that
the omission of the signature of the person who
 swears to the complaint is not a jurisdictional
defect and at most a defect of form which does not
affect the substantial rights of the accused (U.S. vs.
Ago-Chi, 6 Phil. 227), An information is signed by
the fiscal (Sec. 3, Rule 110).

II. Requirement of Oath

a. A complaint is sworn to by the offended party or

any peace officer or any employee of the
government or governmental institution in charge
of the enforcement or execution of the law violated
(Sec. 2, Rule 110).

1. But the fact that the complaint by a private person

is not sworn to is a defect of form for which
judgment rendered thereon cannot be set aside
when no objection thereto was raised during the
trial (U.S. vs. Bibal, 4 Phil. 369; U.S. vs. Bailoses, 2
Phil. 49).

b. The fiscal or state attorney shall certify under oath

in the information to be filed by him that he has
conducted the preliminary investigation pursuant
to Presidential Decree Nos. 77 and 911.

III. Where filed

a. A complaint may be filed either in Court or in the

fiscal’s office for preliminary investigation while an
information is already filed in Court (People vs.
Zurbano, supra; Espiritu vs. Dela Rosa, 78 Phil.
827; Secs. 2 and 3, Rule 110).

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Prosecution of Offenses (Rule 110)

E. Sufficiency of complaint or information

I. It must state:
 a. The name of the defendant
b. The designation of the offense by the statute
c. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense
d. The name of the offended party
e. The approximate time of the commission of the
offense.
f. The place wherein the offense was committed (Sec
5, Rule 110).

1. Name of the defendant

(a) He must be identified by his name and surname or

any appellation or nickname by which he has been
or is known;
(b) If his name cannot be discovered, he must be
described under a fictitious name with the
statement that his true name is unknown.

(1) In the latter case, if in the course of the proceedings

the true name of the defendant is disclosed by him
or appears in some manner to the Court, the latter
shall cause the true name of the defendant to be
inserted in the complaint or information as well as
in the records (Sec. 6, Rule 110).

(c) The purpose of requiring the name and surname of

the accused to be stated in the complaint or
information is to enable the court to acquire
jurisdiction over his person and to inform him of the
facts. If his name is misspelled or appears
erroneously, he should raise the question promptly.
Otherwise, if he pleads to the same, the court
acquires jurisdiction over his person and he is
estopped from raising the question of jurisdiction on
appeal or even at the trial (21 C. J. S. 123). When
the defendant is described in the complaint or
information with a name different from his true
name, and upon arraignment he offers no objection
thereto, the trial court may render judgment
against

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Prosecution of Offenses (Rule 110)
 him in the same erroneous name under which he was
arraigned (U. S. vs. Bautista, 4 Phil. 188). As a general
rule, questions of identity of the defendant should be
raised at the period of arraignment and not for the first
time on appeal. Thus, where one “Primo Marvaes” is
arraigned under the name of “Pedro Narvaes” and under
that name he enters his plea of “not guilty”, he cannot, on
appeal, raise for the first time the question of his identity
(People vs. Narvaes, 59 Phil. 738).

2. Designation of the offense

(a) A complaint or information should state:

(1) Whenever possible, the designation given to the

offense by the statute.

(aa) If there is no such designation, reference should be

made to the section or sub-section of the Statute
punishing it (Sec. 7, Rule 110).
(bb) Mistake in caption of information is not a fatal
defect (People vs. Navarro, Nos. L-38453-54, March
25, 1975; 63 SCRA 264).

(2) The statement of the acts or omissions constituting

such offense.

(aa) The evident purpose of the requirement is to inform

and apprise the accused of the true charges against
him with a view to accord him full opportunity to
defend himself against the crime he stands charged
(People vs. Abad Santos, 76 Phil. 744; Sugay vs.
Pamaran, Nos, L-33877-79, Sept. 30, 1971; 41
SCRA 260).

3. Cause of accusation

(a) The acts or omissions complained of must be stated

in ordinary and concise language without
repetition, not necessarily in the terms of the
statute

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Prosecution of Offenses (Rule 110)
 defining the offense but in such form as is sufficient
to enable-a person of common understanding to
know what offense is intended to be charged and
enable the Court to pronounce proper judgment.
Such allegation need not necessarily be quoted in
the terms of the ‘statute defining the offense (Sec. 8,
Rule 110; People vs. Bandojo, 63 Phil. 1053;
Matilde, Jr. vs. Jabson, No. L-38392, Dec. 29, 1975;
68 SCRA 456).
(b) Examples of matters which should be alleged in an
information:

(1) Qualifying aggravating circumstances and if they

are not alleged and are proved in the trial, they will
be considered only as generic aggravating
circumstance. (People vs. Bayot, 64 Phil. 269).
(2) Habitual delinquency must cite specifically the
dates, the last conviction or release and the other
previous convictions or releases of the accused
(People vs. Venus, 63 Phil. 435).
(3) In libel, the prosecution must single out the libelous
statements and quote them verbatim in the
complaint or information (People vs. Burgos, 59
Phil. 375).

(c) Examples of matters which need not be alleged:

(1) In an information for frustrated homicide the words

“intent to kill” it being sufficient that these words
are inferable from other allegations in the
information. (People vs. Padios, 97 Phil. 19)
(2) In a crime against property the words “intent to
gain” because it can be proven from the allegations
in the information that the accused appropriated to
himself the things belonging to the offended party.
(U.S. vs. Alabot, 38 Phil 698)
(3) “Alevosia” because it is sufficient that the
information alleges clear and sufficient facts to
show that the crime was committed

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Prosecution of Offenses (Rule 110)
 with “alevosia” without the use of the specific word,
(People vs. Gustaham 47 Phil. 376).
(4) Generic aggravating circumstance and maybe
proved at the trial. (People vs. Martinez, L-12268,
Nov. 28, 1959).

4. Name of the offended party

(a) A complaint or information must state the name

and surname of the person against whom or against
whose property the offense was committed, or any
appellation or nickname by which such person has
been or is known, and if there is no better way of
identifying him, he must be described under a
fictitious name (Sec. 11, Rule 110).

(1) In case of offenses against property, if the name of

the offended party is unknown, the property,
subject matter of the offense, must be described
with such particularity as to properly identify the
particular offense charged (Sec. 11 (a), Rule 110).
Thus, where the information is incorrect as to the
name of the owner of the property stolen and the
information insufficiently identifies the offense
charged, there can be no conviction for robbery
(U.S. vs. Lahoylahoy, 38 Phil. 330).
(2) If in the course of the trial the true name of the
person against whom or against whose property the
offense was committed is disclosed or ascertained,
the court must cause the true name to be inserted
in the complaint or information or record (Sec. 11
(b), Rule 110).
(3) If the offended party is a corporation or any other
juridical person, it is sufficient to state the name of
such corporation or juridical person, or any name or
designation by which it hat; been or is known, or by
which it may be identified, without necessity of
stating that it is a corporation, or that it is
organized in accordance with law (Sec. 11 (c), Rule
110).

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Prosecution of Offenses (Rule 110)
 (b) An error in designating the offended party is not
reversible where the offense can still be ascertained
despite such error, as in estafa where the offended
party was the drawee bank instead of the payee as
alleged (U. S. vs. Kepner, 1 Phil. 519) or as in
illegal practice of medicine which affects the public
at large, Diel vs. Martinez 76 Phil. 273). But where
the identity of the offended party is an essential
element of the offense charged, an error in such
designation is fatal, (e. g.) robbery with homicide,
the name of the person robbed is an essential
element (U. S. vs. Lahoylahoy, supra) since Article
294 of the Revised Penal Code requires that the
homicide be by reason (if or on the occasion of the
robbery and also in oral defamation or libel where
the victim must be correctly named (People vs. Uba,
99 Phil. 134), since the law requires that the
offended party must either be identified or
identifiable from the imputations made.

5. Time of the commission of the offense

(a) The precise time by which an offense is committed

need not be alleged in the information, except when
time is a material ingredient of the offense. But the
act may be alleged to have been committed at
anytime as near to the actual date at which the
offense was committed as the information or
complaint will permit (Sec. 10, Rule 110)

(1) While the precise time of the commission of the

crime need not be alleged in the complaint or
information, nevertheless, it must be sufficiently
definite and certain to give the accused an
opportunity to prepare his actual defense. The time
averred must be as near to the actual date as the
information of the prosecuting officer will permit
and when this is done, any time may be proved
which does not surprise and substantially prejudice
the defense (U.S. vs. Dichao, 27 Phil. 421).

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Prosecution of Offenses (Rule 110)

(b) Time is an essential element in the crimes of:

 (1) Infanticide
(2) Physical injuries
(3) Violation of Blue Sunday Law

6. Place of commission of offense

(a) The complaint or information must show that the

offense was committed or some of the essential
ingredients thereof occurred at some place within
the jurisdiction of the Court (Sec. 9, Rule 110).
Unless the particular place of commission is an
essential element of the offense charged, conviction
may be had even if it appears that the crime was
committed not at the place alleged in the
information, provided the place of actual
commission was within the jurisdiction of the Court
(People vs. Mabuyo, No. L-29129; May 8, 1975, 63
SCRA 532).
(b) Allegation of the particular place wherein the
offense charged was committed is essential:

(1) Where the place of commission constitutes an

essential element of the offense; or
(2) Where the place of commission is necessary for
identifying the offense charged.

(c) Place is an essential element in the crimes of:

(1) Trespass to dwelling

(2) Robbery in an inhabited place
(3) Offensive acts in places devoted to religious worship
(4) Illegal occupation of property
(5) Theft of property at the National Library or
National Museum

II. Defective complaint or information; how cured

a. May be done through introduction of evidence by

prosecution except when the defect is jurisdictional
(People vs. Abad Santos, 76 Phil. 744) or when the
complaint or information does not charge any
offense (People vs. Austria, 94 Phil. 897).

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 Prosecution of Offenses (Rule 110)

F. Who must prosecute criminal actions:

I. All criminal actions either commenced by complaint

or information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the fiscal (Sec. 4, Rule 110;
Talusan vs. Ofiana, No. L-31028, June 29, 1972; 45
SCRA 467).

a. This duty to direct and control the prosecution of

criminal cases requices the presence of the fiscal
during the proceedings although he may turn over
the active conduct of trial to a private prosecutor
(People vs. Beriales, No. L-39962, April 7, 1976, 70
SCRA 361). This requirement applies to the trial
and prosecution of criminal cases before the courts
of first instance, circuit criminal courts and city
courts (which are provided by law with their own
city fiscals) only, and not to the municipal courts.
The procedure in the trial of criminal cases before
the municipal courts and city courts which do not
have their own city fiscals has not in anyway been
altered or modified by the pronouncement in this
case. Under Sec. 2, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Court, and in the light of the ruling in the cases of
People vs. Alvarez and People vs. Perez, et al. (74
Phil. 20) police, constabulary and other peace or law
enforcement officers and private prosecutors may
prosecute criminal cases in the said courts, but this
authority ceases upon actual intervention of the
provincial or city fiscals or their assistants, or upon
the elevation of the case to the court of first
instance (Resolution, People vs. Beriales, et al., GR
L-39962, March 3, 1977).

II. The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be

prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the
offended spouse.

a. The offended party cannot institute criminal action

—

1. Without including both the guilty parties if they are

both alive.
 2. Nor in any case if he shall have consented or
pardoned the offender (People vs. Oplado, No. L-
20146, Sept. 30, 1964; 12 SCRA 147; Sec. 4, Rule
110).

III. The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of

lasciviousness shall be prosecuted by:

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Prosecution of Offenses (Rule 110)

a. The offended party:

1. Even if she were a minor she has the right to

institute the prosecution of the above offenses
independently of her parents, grandparents or
guardian unless she is incompetent or incapable of
doing so upon grounds other than her minority.
2. When the offended party who is a minor fails to file
the complaint, her parents, grandparents or
guardian may file the same (Tolentino vs. Dela
Costa, 66 Phil. 100).

b. The parents, grandparents or guardian.

1. The right to file the action granted to the parents,

grandparents or guardian shall be exclusive of
other persons and shall be exercised successively in
the rule stated (U.S. vs. Dela Santa, 9 Phil. 22).
2. Either of the parents can file the written
complaint (People vs. Balmero, CA-G-R. No. 08740-
Cr. May 29, 1970, 67 O.G. 10062).
3. If the parents cannot file the complaint or otherwise
are incapable, the grandparents can do so. Either of
them can initiate the action (U.S. vs. Dela Santa,
supra).
4. Only legal or judicial guardians are qualified to
initiate the action (People vs. Dela Cruz, 59 Phil.
531).

(a) There will be no prosecution of these crimes if the

offender has been expressly pardoned (Sec. 4, Rule
110).
 IV. No criminal action for defamation which consists in
the imputation of the crimes of adultery,
concubinage, rape, abduction, seduction and acts of
lasciviousness shall be brought except at the
instance of and upon complaint filed by the
offended party (Fernandez vs. Lantin, L-44759,
Dec. 17, 1976; People vs. Blanco, 70 Phil. 735;
People vs. Santos, 98 Phil. 111; Sec. 14, Rule 110;
Art. 360, Revised Penal Code).

G. Remedies of an aggrieved party should the fiscal

refuse to file any information or include a person as
an accused despite evidence or to prosecute a case:

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Prosecution of Offenses (Rule 110)

a. He may file a new complaint with the municipal

court having jurisdiction over the case or with the
provincial fiscal and then ask for a new
examination (Pangan, et al., vs. Pasicolan, et al., L-
12517, May 19, 1958).
b. He may take up the matter with the Secretary of
Justice who may take such measures as maybe
necessary in the interest of justice (Sec. 1679 of the
Revised Administrative Code, Pangan, et al. vs.
Pasicolan, et al., Ibid; Asst. Prov. Fiscal of Bataan
vs. Dollete, 103 Phil. 914).
c. He may institute criminal charges against the
hearing officer (Bagatua vs. Revilla, 104 Phil 392).
d. He may file criminal charges under Art. 208 of the
Revised Penal Code (Bagatua vs. Revilla, ibid).
e. He may file a civil action for damages under Art. 27
of the New Civil Code (Zulueta vs. Nicolas, 54 O.G.
6412).
f. He may secure the appointment of another fiscal
(Ricafort vs. Zernan, 54 O.G. 8,2534).
g. He may institute another criminal action if no
double jeopardy is involved (People vs. Lipana, 72
Phil. 166).
H. Injunction or prohibition to stop filing of criminal
action.

I. General rule—Injunction (preliminary or final or

writ of prohibition may not be issued to restrain
criminal prosecution (Kwong Sing vs. City of
Manila, 41 Phil. 103; UP. vs. City Fiscal of Quezon
City, No. L-18562, July 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 980).
II. Exceptions:

a. For the orderly administration of justice (Dimayuga

vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; U.P. vs. City Fiscal of
Quezon City, ibid; Hernandez vs. Albano, No. L-
19272, Jan. 25, 1967; 10 SCRA 95; People vs.
Pineda, No. L-26222, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 748).
b. To prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in
an oppressive or vindictive manner (Dimayuga vs.
Fernandez, ibid; U.P. vs. City Fiscal of Quezon
City, Ibid; Hernandez vs. Albano, ibid).
c. To avoid multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga vs.
Fernandez, ibid; Hernandez vs. Albano. ibid).
d. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional
rights of the accused (Hernandez vs. Albano, ibid;
People

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184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Prosecution of Offenses (Rule 110)

vs. Pineda, supra).

e. To prevent the prosecution of a person for acts
constituting a crime which are sub-justice and from
which arises an administrative prejudicial question
(De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202).
f. the acts of an officer or person are without or in
excess of authority (Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 75).
g. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law,
ordinance or regulation (Young vs. Rafferty, 33
Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385;
Hernandez vs. Albano, supra).
h. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent
(Sangalang vs. People of the Philippines, 109 Phil.
1140).
 i. Where the Court has no jurisdiction over the
offense (Lopez, et al., vs. City Judge, No. L-25795,
Oct. 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616).

I. Duplicity of offenses.

I. A complaint or information shall charge but one

offense (Sec. 12, Rule 110). A duplicitous complaint
or information is that which charges more than one
offense (People vs. Pasis, 51 Phil. 923) and is not
allowed except in cases where the law provides a
single penalty for various offenses.

a. The reason against duplicity is to give the

defendant the necessary knowledge of the charge so
that he may not be confused in his defense (People
vs. Ferrer, 54 O.G. 1348).

II. The remedy of an accused against duplicity of

offenses is a motion to quash (Sec. 2-e, Rule 117). If
the accused does not object to the continuation of
the trial upon an information charging more than
one offense, he could be declared guilty of each and
everyone of the offenses proven and imputed to him
(People vs. Masin, 64 Phil. 757; People vs. Balaba,
37 Phil. 260).
III. Exceptions against the rule of duplicity.

a. When a single act results in two or more grave or

less grave offenses (Art. 48, Revised Penal Code;
People vs. Remollino, 109 Phil. 607).
b. When one offense is a necessary means for
committing the other (Art. 48, Revised Penal Code;
Parulan vs. Rodas, 78 Phil. 855).

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c. When by reason of or on the occasion of a robbery,

physical injuries or homicide is committed (Art,
294, Revised Penal Code).
d. When the robbery shall have been accompanied by
rape or intentional mutilation (ibid).
 e. When by reason of or on the occasion of a rape,
whether attempted, frustrated, or consummated, a
homicide is committed (Art. 335, Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 2632 and
Republic Act 4111).

J. Amendment.

I. Before plea.

a. As to substance or to form

1. The substantial matter in a complaint or

information is the allegation of facts constituting
the offense charged and the jurisdiction of the
Court. All other matters are merely of form.
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, p. 54,
Vol. IV, 1970 Edition).

b. Without leave of court (Sec. 13, Rule 110).

1. This rule vests the prosecuting officer with a

discretionary power. Ordinarily, however, the
presentation of one information or complaint would
be sufficient, or at the most the amended
information or complaint is all that should be
expected. Otherwise, if the fiscal can constantly
shift his attack, the accused would become victim of
official vacillation or procrastination (Conde vs.
Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 45 Phil. 193).

II. After plea.

a. As to matter of form.
b. By leave and at the discretion of the Court.
c. If such an amendment can be done without
prejudice to the rights of the accused.

1. The allowance of formal amendment is

discretionary with the Court and would be proper
only if it

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186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

 Prosecution of Offenses (Rule 110)

will not prejudice the rights of the accused (People

vs. Opemia, 98 Phil. 698).

III. Substitution of original complaint or information:

a. If a mistake has been made in charging the proper

offense the Court may dismiss the original
complaint or information at anytime before
judgment and a new one charging the proper
offense maybe filed provided the defendant would
not be placed in double jeopardy (Sec. 13, 2nd par.,
Rule 110; Calion vs. People, 106 Phil. 943).

IV. Distinctions between amendment and substitution of

information:

a. Amendment may involve either formal or

substantial changes while substitution necessarily
involves a substantial change from the original
charge.
b. Amendment; before entering plea can be made
without leave of court but substitution of
information must necessarily be with leave of court
as the original information has to be dismissed.
c. Where amendment is only as to form there is no
need for another preliminary investigation and the
accused does not have to plead anew. While in
substitution of information another preliminary
investigation is required and the accused has to
make another plea to the new information.
d. An amended information refers to the same
offenses charged in the original information or to
the offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the original charge. Hence,
substantial amendment to the information after the
plea has been taken cannot be made over the
objection of the accused, for if the original
information would be withdrawn the accused can
invoke double jeopardy. Upon the other hand,
substitution presupposes that the new information
involves a different offense not included in the
original charge and the accused, therefore, cannot
cite double jeopardy.
K. Where criminal action instituted.

I. General rule—shall be instituted and tried in the

court of the municipality or province where the
offense was committed

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Prosecution of Offenses (Rule 110)

or where anyone of the initial ingredients thereof

took place (Sec. 14 (a), Rule 110).

a. This principle is fundamental. Thus, where an

offense is wholly committed outside the territorial
limits where the court operates, said court is
powerless to try the case. For the rule is that one
cannot be held to answer for any crime committed
by him except in the jurisdiction whore it was
committed. (Hernandez vs. Albano, et al., supra, 95
citing Beltran vs. Ramos, 96 Phil. 149 and People
vs. Mercado, 65 Phil. 665).

1. The purpose of this requirement is to prevent the

defendant from being compelled to move to and
appear in a different court as this would cause him
great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and
other evidence in another place (Beltran vs. Ramos,
ibid).

II. Where an offense is committed on a railroad train,

in an aircraft or in any other public or private
vehicle while in the course of its trip—

a. It may be instituted and tried in the court of any

municipality or province through which such train,
aircraft or other vehicle passed during such trip
(Sec. 14. (b), Rule 110).

1. In the case of train or moving vehicle, if the offense

was committed in the course of its trip but while
said train or vehicle was stationary in an
immediate stop or station, or at either of its
 terminal stations, the general rule on venue will
apply.
2. In case of an aircraft, the offense must be
committed while in flight within the Philippines.
Otherwise, the rule in par. (d), Sec. 14, Rule 110,
will apply.

III. Where an offense is committed on board a vessel

registered or licensed in accordance with the laws of
the Philippines and in the course of its voyage—

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188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Prosecution of Offenses (Rule 110)

a. It may be instituted and tried in the proper court of

entry or of any municipality or province through
which the vessel passed during such voyage (Sec. 14
(c), Rule 110).
b. Where the offense is committed aboard a vessel
while navigating outside Philippine waters
jurisdiction may be exercised by the court of first
instance of any province into which the ship or
watercraft upon which the crime or offense was
committed shall come after the commission thereof
(Sec. 44 (g), Rep. Act 296, as amended).

IV. Other crimes committed outside the Philippines

punishable under Article 2, Revised Penal Code,
shall be cognizable by the court of first instance in
which the charge is filed

a. This refers to the so-called extra-territorial crimes

where the prosecution has the option to file the case
in any court of first instance.

L. Intervention of offended party.

I. Rights granted to the injured party:

a. To take part in the prosecution of the offense.

b. To exact civil liability arising therefrom.
 c. To appeal from such order of the court which affects
his rights to restitution, and indemnification but
not with respect to the criminal action (Gonzales vs.
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, 63 Phil. 826).

II. An offended party may not intervene:

a. When he has waived civil liability (Sec. 15, Rule

110).
b. When he has expressly manifested the right to
institute the civil action separately from the
criminal action (ibid).
c. When he has actually filed the civil action prior to
the filing of the criminal action (Gorospe vs.
Gatmaitan, 95 Phil. 900).
d. When the offense is one to which no civil liability
attaches (People vs. Maceda, 73 Phil. 679).

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189

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