CRUELTY – HINDU LAW

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

If the respondent has, “after the solemnization of the marriage, treated the petitioner with
cruelty”, it is a good ground on which the petitioner can seek divorce. 1 However, this is no
longer a good ground if the petitioner has condoned the cruelty in question. 2

The Act does not define what exactly amounts to cruelty, or condonation of the same. Hence,
we must turn to judicial precedents to understand the meaning of these terms, as interpreted by
the courts over time.

MEANING OF CRUELTY

The general contours of the meaning of “cruelty” is visible through a study of cases.

P.L. Sayal v. Sarla Rani (1961)

At the outset, the standard of cruelty was laid down in P.L. Sayal v. Sarla Rani (1961). 3 The
appellant had filed for judicial separation from the respondent on the ground of cruelty. From
the very beginning, there was a persistent marital discord between the husband and wife. The
trial court found that the respondent had administered some “love potion” given to her by a
fakir, with the hopes that this would cure the marital discord between them, and bring peace to
the household. The husband’s health suffered as a result. The respondent argued that the plea
of cruelty is a mere ploy to camouflage the real intention of the petitioner, which is to marry
her very own niece. The trial court found against the appellant. He went up in appeal to the
Punjab & Haryana HC, hence this case. The appellant himself admitted that he was diagnosed
with nervous breakdown due to domestic troubles. The court reiterated that the threshold to be
reached is: the conduct in question must cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the
petitioner that it would be harmful or injurious to continue to live with the respondent.
Intention is irrelevant, so long as this threshold is reached. The court satisfied itself that there
is a very real, and not unfounded, fear in the mind of the appellant that if he continues to live
with his wife, he may be subject to the same treatment again. Although the defence of

1
Hindu Marriage Act 1955, s 13(1)(ia).
2
Ibid s 23(1)(b).
3
P.L. Sayal v. Sarla Rani, AIR 1961 P&H 125.
condonation was raised, the court found no evidence to substantiate it. Hence, it found in favour
of the appellant, and awarded a decree of judicial separation.

Dastane v. Dastane (1975)

The next, and a very major, case on this issue is Dastane v. Dastane (1975). 4 The appellant
had filed for three alternative reliefs: (a) an annulment on the ground of fraud, (b) divorce on
the ground of unsoundness of mind, or (c) judicial separation on the ground of cruelty. The
court held many important points of law, which may be summarised as follows:

1. Burden on Proof: The burden of proof, quite obviously, lies on the petitioner, as the
general rule is that such burden lies on the person who affirms a fact, and not the one
who denies it.
2. Standard of Evidence: Being a civil dispute, the standard of evidence the petitioner
must satisfy is a preponderance of probabilities (which is the standard applicable in all
civil cases, as opposed to the “beyond all reasonable doubt” standard in criminal cases).
3. Threshold of Cruelty: Unlike in English law, under the HMA, cruelty need not reach
the standard of a reasonable apprehension of danger to life, limb, or health. Under the
HMA, if the conduct in question reaches the threshold of causing a reasonable
apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it would be injurious or harmful to
continue to leave with the respondent, it amounts to cruelty. The latter is clearly a lower
standard than the former, and encompasses the former.
4. No Concept of Reasonable Man: In determining whether there is a “reasonable
apprehension”, the court must not import the standard of the reasonable man used to
try cases of negligence. In judging whether this standard has been satisfied, the
yardstick the court must be guided by is not an ideal husband and wife, but the
particular husband and wife in question.
5. Baseline: The court will not consider “simple trivialities which may truly be described
as the reasonable wear and tear of married life” as cruelty. Only if the conduct in
question is consisted of “grave and weighty incidents” which rise above this baseline
will the court consider it.
6. Condonation of Cruelty: The aggrieved spouse is allowed to condone the cruelty in
question. Such condonation consists of two things, (a) forgiveness, i.e. one party

4
N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane, (1975) 2 SCC 326.
 forgives the offending spouse, and (b) restoration, i.e. it restores the offending spouse
to the same position he/she occupied before the cruelty in question was committed.
7. Revival of Cruelty: Condonation of cruelty is always subject to the implied condition
that the offending spouse will not repeat it, i.e. it is conditional. Condonation does not
erase or obliterate cruelty, but merely obscures it. If the offending spouse repeats it, it
revives the entire chain of events, not just the new events. Since it revives the entire
chain, and not just the new events, very slight new evidence is required to prove
cruelty, especially when the cruelty condoned was much egregious.
8. Cohabitation Not Evidence of Condonation of Cruelty: The law does not require
the aggrieved spouse to leave the house at the first appearance of cruelty. Hence, the
mere fact that the aggrieved spouse continued to live with the offending spouse is not
a good ground to argue condonation of cruelty. Further, such an interpretation would
hinder attempts at reconciliation, which would defeat the very purpose of marriage
laws.
9. Sexual Intercourse as a Positive Inference of Condonation: Sexual intercourse per
se is not evidence of condonation, as it may be a stray act of lust. However, sex is an
integral aspect of a functional, proper married life. If the parties to a marriage continue
to have sexual intercourse, and thus lead a life of sexual intimacy characterising a
normal matrimonial relationship, unaffected by the cruelty, it raises a positive
inference of condonation of cruelty, unless rebutted.

The court held that the actions of the wife – threatening to commit suicide, to set the house on
fire, to make the husband lose his job and publish it in the papers, tearing apart the mangalsutra,
locking the husband out when he is due to return from the office, rubbing chilli powder on the
tongue of an infant child, beating a child mercilessly when in high fever, etc. – have reached
the required threshold of cruelty, as they are so grave as to “imperil the appellant’s sense of
personal safety, mental happiness, job satisfaction and reputation”. Hence, the court found the
respondent (the wife) guilty of cruelty. However, it also ruled that the spouses continued to live
a normal sexual life characterising a smooth matrimonial relationship, unaffected by this act of
cruelty. It even led to the birth of a child, which the court was unwilling to accept as a
consequence of a stray act of carnal lust. The court hence found that although the wife had
committed cruelty, the husband had condoned it thus. The court did not find enough evidence
to support the argument of the appellant that there was a revival of cruelty. Hence, the court
dismissed the appeal.
Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi (1988)

In Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi (1988), 5 the court held that persistent demands for dowry
and money, with the connivance of the husband, amounts to matrimonial cruelty. The
appellant-wife had filed for a divorce on the ground of cruelty. In her plaint, she alleged that
her mother-in-law used to constantly make demands for money, with the connivance of the
respondent. She further stated that she was afraid of speaking up against these persistent
demands, and she thus developed an aversion to going back to the respondent’s house. The
appellant’s advocate had also written a letter which testified to this. Both the trial court and the
HC rejected the suit and the appeal respectively, ruling that there was no satisfactory evidence
to establish that the demands for money bordered on harassment. The appellant went up in
appeal to the SC. The court held accordingly.

5
Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, (1988) 1 SCC 105.