June 19, 2017

SEAPOWER SHIPPING ENT. INC., v. HEIRS OF WARREN M. SABANAL, REPRESENTED BY ELVIRA ONG-
SABANAL

Facts:

Warren Sabanal was hired by petitioner as Third Mate onboard MT Montana on July 20, 1995. On
September of the same year, during voyage, Sabanal started exhibiting unusual behavior. The Captain
decided to monitor and guard him, moreover only simple tasks were assigned to Sabanal. However, the
next day, Sabanal requested the sailor-on-guard that he be allowed to return to the deck for some fresh
air. Once on deck, Sabanal suddenly ran to the stem and jumped to the sea. The ship's rescue attempts
proved futile, and Sabanal's body was never recovered. The wife of the deceased relied on the statement
of petitioner that she has to wait for a period of seven to ten years before Sabanal can be declared dead
thereafter she can claim for benefits. On 2005, she went back to the petitioner to claim benefits she is
entitled. The petitioner informed the widow that she is only entitled to death benefits from the SSS.
Seapower raised as defenses the prescription of Elvira's action and the non-compensability of death
resulting from suicide. Both the Labor Arbiter and NLRC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
death was not compensable, since it was suicide.

Issue: W/N the death is compensable? - NO

Ruling:

NO. As a general rule under POEA-SEC, the employer is generally liable for death compensation benefits
when a seafarer dies during the term of employment. However there are instances which exempt the
employer from liability if it can successfully prove that the seafarer's death was caused by an injury directly
attributable to his deliberate or willful act.

Sabanal's death happened during the term of the employment contract. Seapower submitted the ship log
entries and master's report to prove that Sabanal suddenly jumped overboard the MT Montana. CA ruled
that Sabanal's act was not a willful one because he was not in his right mental state when he committed
the act. Evidence of insanity or mental sickness may be presented to negate the requirement of willfulness
as a matter of counter-defense. But the burden of evidence is then shifted to the claimant to prove that
the seafarer was of unsound mind. In order for insanity to prosper as a counter-defense, the claimant
must substantially prove that the seafarer suffered from complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act or complete absence of the power to discern the consequences of his action. Mere
abnormality of the mental faculties does not foreclose willfulness. In fact, the ship log shows Sabanal was
still able to correct maps and type the declarations of the crew hours before he jumped overboard. The
captain observed that Sabanal did not appear to have any problems while performing these simple tasks,
while the sailor-on-guard reported that Sabanal did not show any signs of unrest immediately before the
incident. Such circumstances, coupled with the legal presumption of sanity, tend to belie the widow’s
claim that Sabanal no longer exercised any control over his own senses and mental faculties. Hence, the
death was not compensable.
January 30, 2017

GSIS vs. APOLINARIO PAUIG

Facts:

Apolinario Pauig was the Municipal Agriculturist of the Municipality of San Pablo, lsabela. He started in
the government service on 1964 as Emergency Laborer on casual status. He became a temporary
employee from 1972 to 1977. He became a permanent employee on July 19, 1977 and a GSIS member on
August 1, 1977. He retired from service on 2004 upon reaching 65 years of age. According to GSIS he only
contributed 27 years as creditable services since no premium payment was made during his first 14 years
in service. According to the Premium-Based Policy of the GSIS only periods of service where premium
payments were made and duly remitted to the System shall be included in the computation of retirement
benefits. He filed a case before the RTC who ruled in his favor.

Issue: W/N GSIS should include Pauig's first 14 years in government service for the calculation of the
latter's retirement benefits claim? - NO

Ruling:

Pauig cited the case of GSIS v. CSC, where the Court ruled that the basis for the provision of retirement
benefits is service to the government. Pauig's reliance on the said case is misplaced. In GSIS v. CSC, the
Court allowed the claimants to avail of their retirement benefits although no deductions were made from
their salaries during the disputed periods when they were paid on a per diem basis. However, unlike in
the case at bar, deductions were actually made from claimant's fixed salary before and after the short
controversial period. She assumed in all good faith that she continued to be covered by the GSIS insurance
benefits considering that, in fact and in practice, the deductions are virtually mandatorily made from all
government employees on an essentially involuntary basis. More importantly, neither of the claimants in
this case of GSIS v. CSC was a casual or temporary employee like Pauig, both of them being elective
officials. In the present case, the main reason why there were no deductions during those 14 years was
because Pauig was not yet a GSIS member at that time. There was thus no legal obligation to pay the
premium as no basis for the remittance of the same existed. And since only periods of service where
premium payments were actually made and duly remitted to the GSIS shall be included in the computation
of retirement benefits, said disputed period of 14 years must be removed from Pauig's creditable service.
November 19, 2018

HENRY DIONIO v. TRANS-GLOBAL MARITIME AGENCY, INC., GOODWOOD SHIPMANAGEMENT PTE LTD.,
AND MICHAEL ESTANIEL

Facts:

Henry Dionio was engaged by Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc. as bosun on board the vessel M/T Samco
Asia for and in behalf of Goodwood Shipmanagement, PTE, Ltd. He embarked on February 2, 2011,
however on February 25, 2011 he experienced dizziness, slurred speech, chest pain, difficulty in breathing,
repeated vomiting and minor loss of strength in his right hand. He was diagnosed with a possible transient
Ischaemic Attack or Labyrinthitis in a hospital in Cape Town, South Africa. On March 8, 2011, he was
repatriated to the Philippines and was referred to the Metropolitan Medical Center for further evaluation
and treatment. The initial evaluation conducted on March 9, 2011 considered his sickness as Transient
Ischemic Attack. He was later diagnosed with Bilateral Cerebellar Infarct with a disability grading of 10.
On November 10, 2011, he filed a complaint against respondents for permanent disability benefits. He
consulted Dr. Antonio Pascual who diagnosed him with S/P Cerebrovascular Disease, Bilateral Cerebellar
Infarct and concluded that he was medically unfit to work as seaman. A neurological assessment stated
that he had Vertebro Bassilar Insufficiency was made by Dr. Enrique Puentespina. Both are his chosen
physician. When the case was elevated to the CA, such court concluded that the findings of the company
doctor as to the extent and severity of the seafarer's disability must be sustained.

Issue:

W/N the company doctor is the only one who is tasked with the determination of a seafarer's disability or
fitness?

Ruling:

The company-designated physician will have the first opportunity to examine the seafarer and, thereafter,
issue a certification as to the seafarer's medical status. On the basis of the said certification, seafarers
would be initially informed if they are entitled to disability benefits. The seafarers are not precluded from
challenging the diagnosis of the company-designated physicians should they disagree with such findings.
They have the option to seek another opinion from a physician of their choice and, in case the latter's
findings differ from that of the company- designated physician, the conflicting findings shall be submitted
to a third-party doctor, as mutually agreed upon by the parties.

The referral to a third doctor has been held by the Court to be a mandatory procedure as a consequence
of the provision in the POEA-SEC that the company-designated doctor's assessment should prevail in case
of non-observance of the third-doctor referral provision in the contract. Failure to comply with the
requirement of referral to a third-party physician is tantamount to violation of the terms under the POEA-
SEC, and without a binding third-party opinion, the findings of the company-designated physician shall
prevail over the assessment made by the seafarer's doctor.

It has been held that there is total disability when the employee is unable to earn wages in the same kind
of work or work of similar nature that he or she was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind of
work which a person of his or her mentality and attainments could do. Meanwhile, there is permanent
disability when the worker is unable to perform his or her job for more than 120 or 240 days, as the case
may be, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his or her body. In this case, while
much weight is given to the company-designated doctor's findings, as a result of Dionio's failure to initiate
the referral to a third doctor, an assessment of the medical certificate issued by the company doctor itself
shows that Dionio's claim for permanent and total disability is in order.