Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
FACULTY OF LAW
ASSIGNMENT ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ON
“PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE: RIGHT TO BE
HEARD”
1|Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I would like to express my special thanks of gratitude to my teacher
Dr. Chandra Nath Singh who gave me the golden opportunity to do
this wonderful project on the topic “Principles of Natural Justice:
Right to be Heard”, which also helped in doing a lot of research and
I came to know about so many new things and I am really thankful to
them.
---Pragya Srivastava
2|Page
INDEX
1. Introduction 4
4. Conclusion 16
5. Bibliography 17
3|Page
INTRODUCTION
The term ―Principles of Natural Justice (PNJ), derived from the expression “Jus Natural”
of the Roman Law, does not have force of law as they may or may not form part of statute but
they are necessarily to be followed. The adherence to principles of natural justice as
recognized by all civilized States is of supreme importance when a quasi judicial body
embarks on determining disputes between the parties, or any administrative action involving
civil consequences is in issue. These principles are well settled.
Principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid down by the Courts as being
the minimum protection of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary procedure that
may be adopted by a judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authority while making an
order affecting those rights. These rules are intended to prevent such authority from doing
injustice. The rules of natural justice do not supplant the law of the land but only supplement
it. It is now firmly established that in the absence of express provisions in any statute
dispensing with the observance of the principles of natural justice, such principles will have
to be observed in all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings which involve
civil consequences to the parties. & Maneka Gandhi (AIR 1978 S.C.597). Natural justice is
the essence of fair adjudication, deeply rooted in tradition and conscience, to be ranked as
fundamental. The purpose of following the principles of natural justice is the prevention of
miscarriage of justice.
The doctrine of natural justice seeks not only to secure justice but also to prevent miscarriage
of justice. The norms of natural justice are based on two ideas:
1. audi alteram partem-
‘the person, who has to be effected by a decision has a right tobe heard’; and
2. nemo judex in re sua-
‘the authority deciding the matter should be free from bias.’
In India, the Supreme Court has reiterated that the principles of natural justice are neitherrigid
nor they can be put in a straight jacket but are flexible. In the case of
R. S. Dass v.Union of India1, the Supreme Court observed that: “It is well established that
rules of natural justice are not rigid rules, they are flexible and their application depends
upon the setting and background of statutory provisions, nature of the right which may be
1
1987 AIR 593, 1987 SCR (1) 527.
4|Page
affected and the consequences which may entail, its application depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each case”.
Audi Alteram Partem
The principle of audi alteram partem is that the basic conception of the principle of natural
justice. The omnipotence inherent within the philosophy is that nobody ought to be
condemned unheard within the field of body action, this principle has been applied to make
sure truthful play and justice to affected persons. Its application depends upon the factual
matrix to enhance body potency, advantage and to give justice. The procedure adopted should
be simply and truthful. The expression audi alteram partem implies that an individual should
run a chance to defend himself. This principle may be a trigonometric function qua non of
each civilised society.2
2
William Wade; Christopher Forsyth (2009), "Retention of Discretion", Administrative Law (10th ed.), Oxford:
Oxford University Press, pp. 259–285 at 259, ISBN 978-0-19-92316.
3
1960 AIR 468, 1960 SCR (2) 909.
4
1985 SCC (3) 545.
5|Page
would be violative of the principles of fair hearing and thus violative of Articles 14 and 21 of
the Indian Constitution. In
Law envisages that in the cases classified as quasi judicial, the duty to follow completely
the principles of natural law exists. But the cases which are classified as the administrative,
the duty on the administrative authority is to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily. In
the1970 case of A. K. Karaipak v. Union of India5, the Supreme Court made a statement that
the fine distinction between the quasi-judicial and administrative function needs to be
discarded for giving a hearing to the affected party. Before the Karaipak’s case,
the Court applied the natural justice to the quasi-judicial functions only. But after the case,
the natural justice could be applied to the administrative functions as well.
1. NOTICE
In the celebrated case of Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works6, the principle was thus
stated:- “Even God did not pass a sentence upon Adam, before he was called upon to make
his defence. “Adam” says God, “where art thou? Hast thou not eaten of the tree whereof I
commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat”. It says that no one should be condemned
unheard. Notice is the first limb of this principle. It must be precise and unambiguous. It
should appraise the party determinatively the case he has to meet. Time given for the purpose
should be adequate so as to enable him to make his representation. In the absence of a notice
of the kind and such reasonable opportunity, the order passed becomes wholly vitiated. Thus,
it is but essential that a party should be put on notice of the case before any adverse order is
passed against him. This is one of the most important principles of natural justice. It is after
all an approved rule of fair play.
The term ‘notice’ originates from the Latin word ‘notitia’ which means ‘being known’.
Notice is the starting of any hearing. Unless a person knows the formulation of subject and
issues involved in the case, he cannot defend himself. A notice must be adequate and contain:
1)Time, place and nature of hearing,
2)Legal authority under which hearing is to be held,
5
AIR 1970 S.C.150.
6
(1863) 143 ER 414.
6|Page
3)Statement of specific charges (or grounds) and proposed action (or grounds) which the
person has to meet.
The test of adequacy of notice will be whether it gives sufficient information and material so
as to enable the person concerned to put up an effective defence.
However, the requirement of notice will not be insisted upon as a mere technical formality,
when the concerned party clearly knows the case against him, and is not thereby prejudiced in
any manner in putting up an effective defence. Therefore in Keshav Mills Co. V Union of
India7, the court did not quash the order of the government taking over the mill for a period
of 5 years on the technical ground that the appellants were not issued notice before this action
was taken, because, at an earlier stage, a full-scale hearing had already been given and there
was nothing more which the appellant wanted to know. Similarly, in Maharashtra State
Financial Corpn. V Suvarna Board Mill8, the court held that a notice calling upon the party
to repay dues within 15 days failing which factory would be taken over is sufficient for taking
over the factory and no fresh notice is required for pulling down an unauthorised structure
when notice for removing such structure has already been given.
Where a statute expressly provides that a notice must be given, failure to give notice makes
the act void. Article 22 of Constitution requires that detenu must be furnished with the
grounds of detention and if the grounds are vague, the detention order may be quashed by the
court. The grounds given in notice on which the action is proposed to be taken must be clear,
specific and unambiguous. A notice is vague if it merely mentions the charges without
mentioning the action proposed to be taken.
7
1973 AIR 389, 1973 SCR (3) 22.
8
1994 AIR 2657, 1994 SCC (5) 566.
7|Page
4. In case of non-issue of notice, or defective service, which violates the principles of natural
justice; an administrative authority may decide the case de novo with proper notice.
5. Show-cause notice if contains unspecified, vague or unintelligent allegations would imply
a denial of proper opportunity if being heard.
2. EVIDENCE
2.1. Right To Know The Evidence Against Him
Every person before an administrative authority exercising adjudicatory powers has the right
to know the evidence to be used against him. This principle was firmly established
in Dhakeshwari Cotton Mills Ltd V. Cit.9 In this case the appellate income tax tribunal did
not disclose the information supplied to it by the department. The SC held that the assessee
was not given fair hearing. However, the supply of adverse material, unless the law otherwise
provides, in original form is not necessary. It is sufficient if the summary of the contents of
the material is supplied provides it is not misleading. A person may be allowed to inspect a
file and take notes. Whatever mode is used, the fundamental remains the same that nothing
should be used against the person which has not been brought to his notice.
9
1955 AIR 65, 1955 SCR (1) 941.
10
1971 AIR 1093, 1971 SCR (3) 483.
11
Ibid.
8|Page
decision of the administrative authority on the ground that not allowing the assessee to
produce material evidence violates the rule of fair hearing.
3. CROSS-EXAMINATION
It is the most powerful weapon to elicit and establish truth. However, the courts do not insist
on cross-examination in administrative adjudication unless the circumstances are such that in
the absence of it the person cannot put an effective defence. The SC in Town Area
Committee V. Jagdish Prasad12, the department submitted the charge-sheet, got an
explanation and thereafter straightaway passed the dismissal order. The court quashed the
order holding that the rule of fair hearing includes an opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses and to lead evidences. However, in externment proceedings and proceedings before
customs authorities to determine whether goods are smuggled or not the right of cross-
examination was held not to be a part of natural justice.
On the grounds of practicability also opportunity of cross-examination may be disallowed.
In Hira Nath Mishra V. Principal, Rajendra Medical College13, the SC rejected the
contention of the appellants that they were not allowed to cross-examine the girl students on
the ground that if it was allowed no girl would come forward to give evidence, and further
that it would not be possible for the college authorities to protect girl students outside the
college premises.
4. LEGAL REPRESENTATION
Normally representation through a lawyer in any administrative proceeding is not considered
an indispensable part of the rule of natural justice as oral hearing is not included in the
minima of fair hearing. This denial of legal representation is justified on the ground that
lawyers tend to complicate matters, prolong the proceedings and destroy the essential
informality of the proceedings. It is further justified on the ground that representation through
a lawyer of choice would give an edge to the rich over the poor who cannot afford a good
lawyer.
It is relevant to note at this stage that the SC in M.H. Hoskot V. State of Maharashtra14,
while importing the concept of ‘fair procedure’ in Article 21 of the Constitution held that the
right to personal liberty implies provision by the State of free legal service to a prisoner who
12
AIR 1978 SC 60, 1978 (37) FLR 108, (1979) 1 SCC 60, 1978 (10) UJ 359 SC.
13
AIR 1973 SC 1260, (1973) IILLJ 111 SC, (1973) 1 SCC 805.
14
1978 AIR 1548, 1979 SCR (1) 192.
9|Page
is indigent or otherwise disabled from securing legal assistance where the ends of justice call
for such service.
In Khatri V. State of Bihar15, the SC further ruled that the State is constitutionally bound to
provide legal aid to the poor or indigent accused not only at the stage of trial but at the time
of remand also. Such right cannot be denied on the ground of financial constraints or
administrative inability or that the accused did not ask for it. The SC emphasised that it is the
duty of the presiding officer to inform the accused of such right.
In the same manner in Nalini Satpathy V. P.L.Dani16, the court held that the accused must be
allowed legal representation during custodial interrogation and the police must wait for a
reasonable time for the arrival of a lawyer. However, the Court which took the right step, did
not take a long stride in holding that the State must provide a lawyer if the accused is
indigent. The observation of the Court could well be inducted in the administration. In the
area of criminal justice the CPC now provides for legal aid to the accused.
5. HEARING
5.1. Institutional Decision or One Who Decides Must Hear
The expression ‘one who decides must hear’ which is popular in common law jurisdiction is
known by the term ‘institutional or anonymous decisions’ in American law. Unlike law
courts, the decision in many administrative proceedings is not the decision of one man from
start to finish. Often one person hears and another decides. The divided responsibility may
work contrary to the concept of fair hearing.
In Gullupalli Nageshwara Rao v. Apsrtc17 is a case where an administrative action was
challenged on the ground that the one who decides did not hear. In this case, the petitioners
challenged the order of the government confirming the scheme of road nationalisation. The
Secretary of the Transport Department gave the hearing but the final decision came from the
Chief Minister. The SC held that this divided responsibility was against the concept of fair
hearing because if one who decides does not hear the party, he gets no opportunity of clearing
doubts in his mind by reasoned arguments.
5.2. Decision Post-Haste
15
1981 SCR (2) 408, 1981 SCC (1) 627.
16
1978 AIR 1025, 1978 SCR (3) 608.
17
1959 AIR 308, 1959 SCR Supl. (1) 319
10 | P a g e
Fundamentals of ‘fair hearing’ require that the administrative authority must not haste in
making decisions. In S.P. Kapoor v. State of H.P18, the SC quashed the action of the
government taken in haste. In this case the Departmental Promotional Committee was
constituted the very next day of the finalisation of the seniority list of the candidates who
were continuing on ad hoc promotion for about six years. At the time of the constitution of
the committee, one of the members was on the leave for a short time and therefore, the person
officiating was included in his place as a committee member. Selections were made and the
orders of appointment were also issued on the very date of the constitution of the committee.
The SC held that the way whole thing was completed in haste gives rise to the suspicion that
some high-up was interested in pushing through the matter hastily and hence the matter
requires to be considered afresh.
5.3 Enquiry Report to be Furnished or Not
In no administrative proceeding it is necessary that everything must be done by the same
officer alone. He is permitted to take help from his subordinates. If it is not so, the
administration would come to a grinding halt, because today the administration is ubiquitous
and impinges freely and deeply on every aspect of an individual’s life.
In many cases, especially in disciplinary matters, it happens that the inquiry is entrusted to
someone else and on the report being submitted; action is taken by the competent authority.
Under these circumstances a very obvious question which arises is ‘whether the copy of the
repost of the enquiry officer is supplied to the charged employee before a final decision is
taken by the competent authority’?
Looking at the importance of the above question Thakker, J., in Union of India V. E.
Bashyan19 did not venture to pronounce a final judgment on it but rather thought it proper to
refer this question to a larger Bench. This was a special leave petition by the Union of India
from the judgment and order dated November 12, 1987 of the Central Administrative
Tribunal, New Bombay, wherein this question had been answered in the affirmative by
holding that the failure to supply the inquiry report to the delinquent before the disciplinary
authority takes a final decision would constitute a violation of Article 311(2) of the
Constitution and violation of the principles of natural justice.
This question is important from the constitutional and administrative laws points of view.
One of the cardinal principles of administrative law is that any action which ahs civil
consequences for any person cannot be taken without complying with the principles of
18
1981 AIR 2181, 1982 SCR (1)1043.
19
1988 AIR 1000, 1988 SCR (3) 209..
11 | P a g e
natural justice.
For the first time on November 6, 1987 that a Full Bench of the Central Administrative
Tribunal, speaking through K. Madhava Reddy,J., Chairman, held that failure to supply a
copy of the inquiry report to the delinquent before recording a finding against him is
obligatory or failure to do so vitiate the inquiry.
5.4 Post Decisional Hearing
The idea of post-decisional hearing has been developed to maintain a balance between
administrative efficiency and fairness to the individual. The harmonising tool was developed
by the SC in Maneka Gandhi V. Union of India20. In this case the passport dated June 1,
1976 of the petitioner, a journalist, was impounded ‘in the public interest’ by an order dated
July 2, 1977 and the government having declined to furnish her the reasons for its decision
she filed a petition before the SC under Article 32 challenging the validity of the impounding
order. The government also did not give her any pre-decisional notice and hearing. One of the
contentions of the government was that the rule of audi alteram partem must be held to be
excluded because it may have frustrated the very purpose of impounding the passport.
Rejecting the contention the court rightly held that though impounding of the passport was an
administrative action yet the rule of fair hearing is attracted by necessary implication and it
would not be fair to exclude the application of this cardinal rule on the ground of
administrative convenience.
The same technique of validating void administrative decision by post-decisional hearing was
adopted in Swadeshi Cotton Mills V. Union of India21. The court validated the order of the
government for taking over the management of the company which had been passed in
violation of the audi alteram partem rule and which was found to have been attracted by
necessary implication because the government had agreed to give post-decisional hearing.
Justifying the idea of post-decisional hearing, Professor de Smith writes: “can the absence of
a hearing before a decision is made be adequately compensated for by a hearing ex post
facto? A prior hearing may be better than a subsequently hearing but a subsequently hearing
is better than no hearing at all; and in some cases courts have held that statutory provision for
an administrative appeal or even full judicial review on merits is sufficient to negative the
existence of any implied duty to hear before the original decision is made. The approach may
be acceptable where the original decision does not cause serious detriment to the person
affected, or where there is also a paramount need for prompt action, or where it is
20
1978 AIR 597, 1978 SCR (2) 621.
21
1981 AIR 818, 1981 SCR (2) 533.
12 | P a g e
impracticable to afford antecedent hearings.”
22
1981 AIR 818, 1981 SCR (2) 533.
23
1980 AIR 1666, 1981 SCR (1) 618.
13 | P a g e
Constitution of India excludes the principles of natural justice in Articles 22, 31(A), (B), (C)
and 311(2) as a matter of policy. Nevertheless if the legislative exclusion is arbitrary,
unreasonable and unfair courts may quash such a provision under Articles 14 and 21 of the
Constitution. Union of India V. Cynamide India Ltd.24 when the Supreme Court that no
principles of natural justice had been violated when the government issued a notification
fixing the prices of certain drugs. The Court reasoned that since the notification flowed from
a legislative act and not an administrative one so the principles of natural justice would not
apply.
24
1987 AIR 1802, 1987 SCR (2) 841.
25
[1974] 2 SCR 348.
26
1994 SCC (3) 552, JT 1994 (3) 96.
14 | P a g e
6. Exclusion In Case of Government Policy Decision
In Balco Employees Union V. Union of India27, the Apex Court was of the view that in
taking of a policy decision in economic matters at length, the principles of natural justice
have no role to play. In this case employees had challenged the government’s policy decision
regarding disinvestment in Public sector undertakings. The Court held that even though
workers may have interest in the decision, but unless the policy decision to disinvest is
capricious, arbitrary, illegal or uninformed , and is not contrary to law, the decision cannot be
challenged on the grounds of violation of the principles of natural justice. Therefore, if in
exercise of executive powers the government takes any policy decision, principles of natural
justice can be excluded because it will be against public interest to do so.
27
2002 2 SCC 333.
15 | P a g e
CONCLUSION
Audi alteram partem is a wide concept than what it seems to be. It is one of the cardinal
principles of the rules of natural justice rather it would be unjustified to think about natural
justice without taking into account the concept of audi alteram partem. It mean right to fair
hearing. This phrase though sounds simple but it embraces in itself the whole story of justice
right from sending notice to post decisional hearing.
Though, there are certain exceptions where this principle is not followed. But then these
exceptions also have to be justified. There has to be a rational behind skipping this very
concept which forms the very basis of the justice.
The principle of natural justice has evolved through civilization. It has not evolved from the
constitution but from mankind itself. Every person has the right to speak and be heard when
allegations are being put towards him or her. The Latin maxim, ‘Audi Alteram Partem’ is the
principle of natural justice where every person gets a chance of being heard. The meaning of
the maxim itself says no person shall be condemned unheard. Hence, no case or judgment can
be decided without listening to the point of another party. There are many cases where this
principle of natural justice is excluded, and no option is given to the party to speak. Natural
justice means that justice should be given to both the parties in a just, fair and reasonable
manner. Before the court, both the parties are equal and have an equal opportunity to
represent them.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
16 | P a g e
17 | P a g e