Carmen Aquino-Sarmiento vs.

Manuel Morato
(G.R. No. 92541 Nov. 13, 1991)

Facts: In February 1989, petitioner herself, a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer requesting that she be allowed to examine the
board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a
review of the movies and television productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are either banned,
cut or classified accordingly. Acting on the said request, the records officer informed petitioner that she
has to secure prior clearance from respondent Morato, as chairman of MTRCB, to gain access to the
records sought to be examined. Petitioner's request was eventually denied by Morato on the ground that
whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as reflected in the
individual voting slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and completely
private and personal. It is the submission of respondents that the individual voting slips is the exclusive
property of the member concerned and anybody who wants access thereto must first secure his (the
member's) consent, otherwise, a request therefor may be legally denied. Petitioner argues, on the other
hand, that the records she wishes to examine are public in character and other than providing for
reasonable conditions regulating the manner and hours of examination, Morato and the classification
board have no authority to deny any citizen seeking examination of the board's records. On February 27,
1989, Morato called an executive meeting of the MTRCB to discuss, among others, the issue raised by
petitioner. In said meeting, 17members of the board voted to declare their individual voting records as
classified documents which rendered the same inaccessible to the public without clearance from the
chairman. Thereafter, respondent Morato denied petitioner's request to examine the voting slips.
However, it was only much later, i.e., on July 27, 1989, that respondent Board issued Resolution No. 10-
89which declared as confidential, private and personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and the
voting slips of the members. Petitioner brought the matter to the attention of the Executive Secretary,
which in turn, referred the same to respondent Morato for appropriate comment, and which still denied
petitioner’s request; hence this petition. Respondents, however, argue at the outset that the instant
petition should be dismissed outright for having failed to comply with the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.

Issues:

1. WON petitioner failed to comply with the said doctrine?

2. WON citizen's right of access to official records is violated?

Held:

1. No. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrate remedies simply provides that before a party litigant is
allowed resort to the courts, he is required to comply with all administrative remedies available under the
law. The rationale behind this salutory principle is that for reasons of practical considerations, comity and
convenience, the courts of law will not entertain a case until all the available administrative remedies
provided by law have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given ample
opportunity to act and to correct the errors committed in the administrative level. If the error is rectified,
judicial intervention would then be unnecessary. Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not absolute. The applicability of the principle admits of certain exceptions,
such as: 1) when no administrative review is provided by law; 2) when the only question involved is one
of law; 3) where the party invoking the doctrine is guilty of estoppel; 4) where the challenged
administrative action is patently illegal, arbitrary and oppressive; 5) where there is unreasonable delay or
official inaction that would greatly prejudice the complainant; 6) where to exhaust administrative review
is impractical and unreasonable; and 7) where the rule of qualified political agency applies.

The issue raised in the instant petition is one of law, hence the doctrine of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedy relied upon by respondents is inapplicable and cannot be given any effect. At any
rate, records are replete with events pointing to the fact that petitioner adhered to the administrative
processes in the disposition of the assailed resolutions of public respondents prior to filing the instant
petition by, among others, writing the Executive Secretary and bringing the matter to the attention of the
Office of the President. Respondents' claim that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies must
therefore fail.

2. Yes. We find respondents' refusal to allow petitioner to examine the records of respondent MTRCB,
pertaining to the decisions of the review committee as well as the individual voting slips of its members,
as violative of petitioner's constitutional right of access to public records. More specifically, Sec. 7, Art. III
of the Constitution provides that: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall
be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development,
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. As we held in Legaspi
v. Civil Service Commission, this constitutional provision is self-executory and supplies "the rules by means
of which the right to information may be enjoyed by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to
afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized maybe asserted
by the people upon the ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature.
What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access
to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State Policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest(Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28)."

Respondents contend, however, that what is rendered by the members of the board in reviewing films
and reflected in their individual voting slip is their individual vote of conscience on the motion picture or
television program and as such, makes the individual voting slip purely private and personal; an exclusive
property of the member concerned. The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning,
an individual person, company, or interest"; whereas, public means "pertaining to, or belonging to, or
affecting a nation, state, or community at large". May the decisions of respondent Board and the
individual members concerned, arrived at in an official capacity, be considered private? Certainly not. As
may be gleaned from PD 1986 creating the respondent classification board, there is no doubt that its very
existence is public is character; it is an office created to serve public interest. It being the case, respondents
can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity
and not to a governmental agency or officers tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties.
There can be no invasion of privacy in the case at bar since what is sought to be divulged is a product of
action undertaken in the course of performing official functions. To declare otherwise would be to clothe
every public official with an impregnable mantle of protection against public scrutiny for their official acts.

Further, the decisions of the Board and the individual voting slips accomplished by the members
concerned are acts made pursuant to their official functions, and as such, are neither personal nor private
in nature but rather public in character. They are, therefore, public records access to which is guaranteed
to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental law of the land. Being a public right, the exercise thereof
cannot be made contingent on the discretion, nay, whim and caprice, of the agency charged with the
custody of the official records sought to be examined. The constitutional recognition of the citizen's right
of access to official records cannot be made dependent upon the consent of the members of the board
concerned, otherwise, the said right would be rendered nugatory.

Drilon vs Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O.
464 “Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive
Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes”. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for
being unconstitutional.

In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those
employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
and the Philippine National Police (PNP).

The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them
to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive
election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called “Gloriagate
Scandal”.

Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464,
Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.

ISSUE:

Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?
RULING:

No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The
doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of
necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an
exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of
such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid
of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it
must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.

The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests
for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor.
By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is frustrated.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued
that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:

Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to
their publication;

Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature
may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous
publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without
any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra
vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be
directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the
wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their
dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding
unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure
and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry
or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

Bantay vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 177271
May 4, 2007

FACTS:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set aside
certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which have
manifested their intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.

A number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations and subsequently were accredited by
the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections. Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941) and the Urban Poor
for Legal Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify, seeking to disqualify the
nominees of certain party-list organizations. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent
petition has yet to be resolved.

Meanwhile petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed 2 letters to the Director of the Comelec’s
Law Department requesting a list of that groups’ nominees. Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales,
et al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724 under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring
the nominees’ names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales’ basic disclosure request.
Comelec’s reason for keeping the names of the party list nominees away from the public is deducible from
the excerpts of the news report appearing in the April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, is that there
is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to disclose the names of nominees, and that party list
elections must not be personality oriented according to Chairman Abalos.
In the first petition (G.R. No. 177271), BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR assail the Comelec resolutions accrediting
private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list elections without
simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees possess the requisite qualifications
defined in R.A. No. 7941, or the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector each seeks to.

In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and
Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution dated April 3, 2007.

While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the
nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR have the
additional prayers that the 33 private respondents named therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to
participate in the party-list elections and that the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups
from participating in the elections.

ISSUE:

1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the respondent party-list groups
named in their petition on the ground that these groups and their respective nominees do not appear to
be qualified.
2. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various party-
list groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the
Constitution; and
3. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public the names of
said nominees.

HELD:
The 1st petition is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the accreditation of the respondents named
therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the
nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007
elections, the 2 petitions are GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately
disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups,

1. The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation of
accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. The exercise would require the Court to
make a factual determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial review by way of special civil
action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called upon to decide factual issues and the
case must be decided on the undisputed facts on record. The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to
address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does not include a review of the
tribunal’s evaluation of the evidence. (note that nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the
qualification of a party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an
organization. )

2. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:

Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well
to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject
to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

COMELEC’s basis of its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of subject party-list groups, Section
7 of R.A. 7941,which last sentence reads: "[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on
the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. There
is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing
through mediums other than the "Certified List" of the names.

It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their representatives
on the basis of an informed judgment. While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party,
such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in
the House of Representatives. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that would
hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election.

3. COMELEC has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list
groups named in the herein petitions. The right to information is a public right where the real parties in
interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise, but like all constitutional guarantees, however, the
right to information and its companion right of access to official records are not absolute. The people’s
right to know is limited to "matters of public concern" and is further subject to such limitation as may be
provided by law. But no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the
nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list
groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.
Right to Information (Access to Public Records)
DOMINADOR C. BALDOZA, complainant, vs. HON. JUDGE RODOLFO B. DIMAANO, respondent.
A.M. No. 1120-MJMay 5, 1976

FACTS:
In a verified letter-complaint dated September 9, 1975, the Municipal Secretary of Taal, Batangas, charges
Municipal Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano, of the same municipality, with abuse of authority in refusing to allow
employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal docket records of the Municipal Court to
secure data in connection with their contemplated report on the peace and order conditions of the said
municipality.

Respondent answered that there has never been an intention to refuse access to official court records but
that the same is always subject to reasonable regulation as to who, when, where and how they may be
inspected. He further asserted that a court has the power to prevent an improper use or inspection of its
records and furnishing copies may be refuse when the motivation is not serious and legitimate interest,
out of whim or fancy or mere curiosity or to gratify private site or promote public scandal.

The case was thereupon referred to Judge Francisco Mat. Riodique for investigation and report. At the
preliminary hearing on October 16, 1975, Taal Mayor Corazon A. Caniza filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint but the motion was denied by the Investigating Judge. After formal investigation, he
recommended the exoneration of respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the rules and conditions imposed by Judge Dimaano on the inspection of
thedocket books infringe upon the right of individuals to information.

RULING:
No. As found by the Investigating Judge, the respondent allowed the complainant to open and view the
docket books of respondent certain conditions and under his control and supervision. It has not been
shown that the rules and conditions imposed by the respondent were unreasonable. The access to public
records predicated on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public concern.
The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange
of information in a democracy. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the
exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such information depends
on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the flow
inevitably ceases.” However, restrictions on access to certain records may be imposed by law. Thus,
access restrictions imposed to control civil insurrection have been permitted upon a showing of
immediate and impending danger that renders ordinary means of control inadequate to maintain order.