60. Go v. Looyuko, GR No.

196529
The Court has consistently upheld the registered owners’ superior right to
possess the property in unlawful detainer cases. It is an age-old rule that the person
who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to its possession. It has repeatedly been
emphasized that when the property is registered under the Torrens system, the
registered owner’s title to the property is presumed legal and cannot be collaterally
attacked, especially in a mere action for unlawful detainer. It has even been held that it
does not even matter if the party’s title to the property is questionable.
It has been also held that prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not an
indispensable requirement in an unlawful detainer case brought by a vendee or other
person against whom the possession of any land is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration or termination of a right to hold possession.

61. Katon v. Palanca, GR No. 151149

Under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except when
(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and (4)
prescription are evident from the pleadings or the evidence on record. In the four
expected instances, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the claim or action.
Under the new rules, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears
from the pleadings or evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter; when there is another cause of action pending between the same parties for the
same cause, or where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of
limitations.

62. Mejia-Espinoza v. Carino, GR No. 193397

There are two elementary rules in litigation that the CA failed to apply. First, the
party who alleges must prove his case. Second, questions of fact must be resolved
according to the evidence presented.
Under the Rules, there are three requirements that must be satisfied before a
Rule 47 petition can prosper. First, the remedy is available only when the petitioner can
no longer resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies through no fault of the petitioner. This means that a Rule 47
petition is a remedy of last resort-it is not an alternative to the ordinary remedies under
Rules 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, and 45. Second, an action for annulment of judgment may
be based only on two grounds: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. If based on
extrinsic fraud, it must be filed within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud;
if based on lack of jurisdiction, must be brought before it is barred by laches or estoppel.
Third, the action must be filed within the temporal window allowed by the Rules.

63. Sumbilla v. Matrix finance Corp, GR No. 197582

A final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or
be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land. However, this
Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering (a) matters of
life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances,
(c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence
of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby.

Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to

facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always
be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or
even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this
Court itself had already declared to be final.

64. Mamanteo vs. Deputy Sheriff Magumun AM No. P-98-1264

As observed by the OCA, the writ of replevin has been repeatedly used by
unscrupulous plaintiffs to retrieve their chattel earlier taken for violation of the Tariff and
Customs Code, tax assessment, attachment or execution. Officers of the court, from the
presiding judge to the sheriff, are implored to be vigilant in their execution of the law
otherwise, as in this case, valid seizure and forfeiture proceedings could easily be
undermined by the simple devise of a writ of replevin. Hence, sheriffs and deputy
sheriffs, as agents of the law, are called upon to discharge their duties with due
care and utmost diligence because in serving the courts writs and processes and
implementing the orders of the court, they cannot afford to err without affecting
the integrity of their office and the efficient administration of justice.

65. Lorenza C. Ongco v. Valeriana Ungco Dalisay, GR No. 190810

It can be readily seen that intervention is not a matter of right, but is left to the
trial court's sound discretion. The trial court must not only determine if the requisite legal
interest is present, but also take into consideration the delay and the
consequent prejudice to the original parties that the intervention will cause. Both
requirements must concur, as the first requirement on legal interest is not more
important than the second requirement that no delay and prejudice should result. To
help ensure that delay does not result from the granting of a motion to intervene, the
Rules also explicitly say that intervention may be allowed only before rendition of
judgment by the trial court.
There is wisdom in strictly enforcing the period set by Rule 19 of the Rules of
Court for the filing of a motion for intervention. Otherwise, undue delay would result from
many belated filings of motions for intervention after judgment has already been
rendered, because a reassessment of claims would have to be done. Thus, those who
slept on their lawfully granted privilege to intervene will be rewarded, while the original
parties will be unduly prejudiced.

66. RP v. Sandiganbayan GR. 90478

The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule, be
sued without its consent. But it is axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of its
sovereign character and sheds its immunity from suit, descending to the level of an
ordinary litigant. The PCGG cannot claim a superior or preferred status to the State,
even while assuming to represent or act for the State.

67. AFULUGENCIA, VS. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO G.R. NO. 185145
The calling the adverse party to the witness stand is not allowed, unless written interrogatories
are first served upon the latter, by way of an exception, the court may order an adverse party not
served with written interrogatories to give testimony in open court or to give a deposition pending
appeal for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice.

68. Teston v DBP G.R. NO. 144374

Consolidation is improper if the causes of action in the two cases arise from different events or
transactions, involve different issues, and ultimately will depend on different evidence. This rule
stands even if both cases which were raffled to the same court, involve similar prayer for
determination and payment of just compensation, and petitioners Teston and Colarina are
represented by the same counsel, and respondents LBP and DAR Secretary are common
defendants.

69. CASENT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP. v PHILBANKING CORPORATION G.R. NO.

150731
When the defense in the answer is based on an actionable document, a reply specifically denying
it under oath must be made; otherwise, the genuineness and due execution of the document will
be deemed admitted.