Sanidad vs comelec

165 Phil. 303

Facts: On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE
CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law. The Commission on Elections, by virtue of the power vested
by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), said R.A. 6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated
Resolution No. 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. In
a petition dated November 20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper columnist of the
"OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras,
assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which provides: Section 19. Prohibition on
columnists, commentators or announcers. — During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite
day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to
campaign for or against the plebiscite issues It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional because
it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the Constitution.

Issue : WON the said Section 19 of resolution No 2167 is unconstitutional

Held: it is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the power to supervise and
regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public
utilities, media of communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply,
including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured
Neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec
has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to
expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are
neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19
of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis. While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner's freedom of
expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the forum where he may express his view. No reason was advanced by
respondent to justify such abridgement. We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's
freedom of expression for no justifiable reason. Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people's
right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an
unabridged discussion of the issues, including the forum. The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should
not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised. Comelec spaces and
Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the
public concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or television times

MARTIN, J.:
The capital question raised in these prohibition suits with preliminary injunction relates to the power of the incumbent
President of the Philippines to propose amendments to the present Constitution in the absence of the interim National
Assembly which has not been convened.
On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 calling for a national referendum on
October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law,
the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for
the exercise by the President of his present powers. [1]
Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued another related decree, Presidential Decree No. 1031,
amending the previous Presidential Decree No. 991, by declaring the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 229 providing for
the mariner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-
plebiscite of October 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Section 4, of Presidential
Decree No. 991, the full text of which (Section 4) is quoted in the footnote below. [2]
On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree No. 1033, stating the questions to be
submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the
people's continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body
abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted
directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
The questions ask, to wit:
"(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?
(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the following amendments to the
Constitution? For the purpose of the second question, the referendum shall have the effect of a plebiscite within the
contemplation of Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:
1. There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly, an interim Batasang Pambansa. Members of the
interim BatasangPambansa which shall not be more than 120, unless otherwise provided by law, shall include the incumbent
President of the Philippines, representatives elected from the different regions of the nation, those who shall not be less than
eighteen years of age elected by their respective sectors, and those chosen by the incumbent President from the members of the
Cabinets Regional representatives shall be apportioned among the regions in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio while the sectors shall be determined by law. The number of
representatives from each region or sector and the manner of their election shall be prescribed and regulated by law.
2. The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its members shall have the same functions,
responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly
and the members thereof. However, it shall not exercise the power provided in Article VIII, Section 14 (1) of the Constitution.
3. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall, within 30 days from the election and selection of the members, convene
the interim Batasang Pambansa and preside over its sessions until the Speaker shall have been elected. The incumbent
President of the Philippines shall be the Prime Minister and he shall continue to exercise all his powers even after the
interim Batasang Pambansa is organized and ready to discharge its functions and likewise he shall continue to exercise his
powers and prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty five Constitution and the powers vested in the President and
the Prime Minister under this Constitution.
4. The President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet shall exercise all the powers and functions, and discharge the
responsibilities of the regular President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet, and shall be subject only to such disqualifications as
the President (Prime Minister) may prescribe. The President (Prime Minister) if he so desires may appoint a Deputy Prime
Minister or as many Deputy Prime Ministers as he may deem necessary.
5. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall have been lifted.
6. Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence
thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on
any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the
necessary decrees, orders or letters of instructions, which shall form part of the law of the land.
7. The barangays and sanggunians shall continue as presently constituted but their functions, powers, and composition may
be altered by law.
Referenda conducted thru the barangays and under the supervision of the Commission on Elections may be called at any time
the government deems it necessary to ascertain the will of the people regarding any important matter whether of national or
local interest.
8. All provisions of this Constitution not inconsistent with any of these amendments shall continue in full force and effect.
9. These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President shall have proclaimed that they have been ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in the referendum-plebiscite."
The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976 National Referendum-
Plebiscite.
On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, father and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition
with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum-
Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose
amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to
supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.
Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the
constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October
16 has no constitutional or legal basis.
On October 5, 1976, the Solicitor General filed the comment for respondent Commission on Elections. The Solicitor General
principally maintains that petitioners have no standing to sue; the issue raised is political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance
of this Court; at this state of the transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent
power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.
On September 30, 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was instituted by V
ICENT M. GUZMAN, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or
revision of, the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under
Section 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.[3]
Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on October 5, 1976 by RAUL M. GONZALES, his son
RAUL, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, docketed as L-44714, to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees
relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16.
These last petitioners argue that even granting him legislative powers under Martial Law, the incumbent President cannot act
as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution; a referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the
Constitutions of 1935 and 1973; the submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation
renders the plebiscite a nullity; to lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the people via referendum; and allowing 15-
year olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of
the Philippines 18 years of age and above.
We find the petitions in the three entitled cases to be devoid of merit.
I
Justiciabilityof question raised.
1. As a preliminary resolution, We rule that the petitioners in L-44640 (Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad)
possess locus standi to challenge the constitutional premise of Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033. It is now an
ancient rule that the valid source of a statute - Presidential Decrees are of such nature - may be contested by one who will
sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public
funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of
executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds.[4] The breadth of Presidential Decree No. 991
carries an appropriation of Five Million Pesos for the effective implementation of its purposes. [5] Presidential Decree No. 1031
appropriates the sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry out its provisions.[6] The interest of the aforenamed petitioners as
taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to litigate
the validity of the Decrees appropriating said funds. Moreover, as regards taxpayer's suits, this Court enjoys that open
discretion to entertain the same or not.[7] For the present case, We deem it sound to exercise that discretion affirmatively so
that the authority upon which the disputed Decrees are predicated may be inquired into.
2. The Solicitor General would consider the question at bar as a pure political one, lying outside the domain of judicial
review. We disagree. The amending process, both as to proposal and ratification, raises a judicial question. [8] This is especially
true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a function
normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose
amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory
Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments
becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XV I, 1973 Constitution). The
normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent
assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru
Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-electionte on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure
for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The
implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation
are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this
Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2), Article X of the new Constitution provides: "All cases involving the constitutionality of a
treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc, and no treaty, executive
agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. * * *." The Supreme
Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. [9] The amending,
like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court
is vested with that authority to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits.
Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the
controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political. What is in
the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the
Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether
the amending process confers on the President that power to propose amendments is therefore a
downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the President would merely be
a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can
declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid or not. [10]
We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that the question of the
President's authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the procedure adopted for submission of the proposals to
the people ultimately lie in the judgment of the latter. A clear Descartes fallacy of vicious circle. Is it not that the people
themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the authority and procedure for the amending process when they ratified the
present Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, that constitutional provision has been followed or not is indisputably a
proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves - of course - who exercise no power of judicial review, but by the
Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which includes the competence to determine
whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done
a priori not a posteriori, i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people.
Indeed, the precedents evolved by the Court on prior constitutional cases underline the preference of the Court's majority to
treat such issue of Presidential role in the amending process as one of non-political impression. In the Plebiscite Cases,[11] the
contention of the Solicitor General that the issue on the legality of Presidential Decree No. 73 "submitting to the Filipino people
(on January 15, 1973) for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention and appropriating funds therefor, " is a political one, was rejected and the Court unanimously
considered the issue as justiciable in nature. Subsequently, in the Ratification Cases[12] involving the issue of whether or not the
validity of Presidential Proclamation No. 1102, "announcing the Ratification by the Filipino people of the Constitution
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention," partakes of the nature of a political question, the affirmative stand of the
Solicitor General was dismissed, the Court ruled that the question raised is justiciable. Chief Justice Concepcion, expressing
the majority view, said, "(T)hus, in the aforementioned plebiscite cases, We rejected the theory of the respondents therein that
the question whether Presidential Decree No. 73 calling a plebiscite to be held on January 15, 1973, for the ratification or
rejection of the proposed new Constitution, was valid or not, was not a proper subject of judicial inquiry because, they claimed,
it partook of a political nature, and We unanimously declared that the issue was a justiciable one. With identical unanimity,
We overruled the respondents' contention in the 1971 habeas corpus cases, questioning Our authority to determine the
constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases of the Presidential proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus on August 21, 1971, despite the opposite view taken by this Court in Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro
vs. Castañeda, insofar as it adhered to the former case, which view We, accordingly, abandoned and refused to apply. For the
same reason, We did not apply and expressly modified, in Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, the political-question theory
adopted in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito."[13] The return to Barcelon vs. Baker and Mabanagvs. Lopez Vito, urged by the Solicitor
General, was decisively refused by the Court. Chief Justice Concepcion continued: "The reasons adduced in support thereof
are, however, substantially the same as those given in support of the political question theory advanced in
said habeas corpus and plebiscite cases, which were carefully considered by this Court and found by it to be legally unsound
and constitutionally untenable. As a consequence, Our decisions in the aforementioned habeas corpus cases partakes of the
nature and effect of a stare decisis which gained added weight by its virtual reiteration."
II
The amending process as laid out in the new Constitution.
1. Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains:
"SECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of
three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention.
(2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority
vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election.
SECTION 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision."
In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with that
amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads:
"SECTION 15. The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its
Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with
Article Sixteen hereof."
There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and period of
transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly
upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the
Members of the National Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in
an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments
may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the interim National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime
Minister.
2. This Court in Aquino v. COMELEC,[14] had already settled that the incumbent President is vested with that prerogative of
discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. Speaking for the majority opinion in that case,
Justice Makasiar said: "The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when
he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the
country." Concurring, Justice Fernandez, himself a member of that Constitutional Convention, revealed: "(W)hen the
Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same,
the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he could convene the interim National Assembly; it was so stated
plainly by the sponsor, Delegate Yaneza; as a matter of fact, the propose that it be convened 'immediately', made by Delegate
Pimentel (V), was rejected."[15] The President's decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found
support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution
was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the referendum of July 24, 1973,
the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim National
Assembly. Again, in the referendum of February 27, 1975, the proposed question of whether the interim National Assembly
shall be initially convened was eliminated, because some of the members of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional
Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion since in
that referendum of January, 1973, the people had already resolved against it.
3. In sensu strictiore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution, that
body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged in the amending process. [16] Rather, it is
exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for
in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for
the interim National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of
constitutional conferment, amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science a distinction is made
between constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative character. The distinction, however, is one of
policy, not of law.[17] Such being the case, approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer.[18] The
prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has
nothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution. [19]
III
Concentration of Powers in the President during crisis government.
1. In general, the governmental powers in crisis government - the Philippines is a crisis government today - are more or less
concentrated in the President.[20] According to Rossiter, "(t)he concentration of government power in a democracy faced by an
emergency is a corrective to the crisis inefficiencies inherent in the doctrine of the separation of powers. In most free states it
has generally been regarded as imperative that the total power of the government be parceled out among three mutually
independent branches - executive, legislature, and judiciary. It is believed to be destructive of constitutionalism if any one
branch should exercise any two or more types of power, and certainly a total disregard of the separation of powers is, as
Madison wrote in the Federalist, No. 47, 'the very definition of tyranny.' In normal times the separation of powers forms a
distinct obstruction to arbitrary governmental action. By this same token, in abnormal times it may form an insurmountable
barrier to a decisive emergency action in behalf of the state and its independent existence. There are moments in the life of any
government when all powers must work together in unanimity of purpose and action, even if this means the temporary union
of executive, legislative, and judicial power in the hands of one man. The more complete the separation of powers in a
constitutional system, the more difficult and yet the more necessary will be their fusion in time of crisis. This is evident in a
comparison of the crisis potentialities of the cabinet and presidential systems of government. In the former the all-important
harmony of legislature and executive is taken for granted; in the latter it is neither guaranteed nor to be to confidently
expected. As a result, cabinet is more easily established and more trustworthy than presidential dictatorship. The power of the
state in crisis must not only be concentrated and expanded; it must also be freed from the normal system of constitutional and
legal limitations.[21] John Locke, on the other hand, claims for the executive in its own right a broad discretion capable even of
setting aside the ordinary laws in the meeting of special exigencies for which the legislative power had not
provided.[22] The rationale behind such broad emergency powers of the Executive is the release of the government from "the
paralysis of constitutional restraints" so that the crisis may be ended and normal times restored.
2. The presidential exercise of legislative powers in times of martial law is now a conceded valid act. That sun clear
authority of the President is saddled on Section 3 (pars. 1 and 2) of the Transitory Provisions, thus: [23]
"The incumbent President of the Philippines shall initially convene the interim National Assembly and shall preside over its
sessions until the interim Speaker shall have been elected. He shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the
nineteen hundred and thirty-five Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this
Constitution until he calls upon the interim National Assembly to elect the interim President and the interim Prime Minister,
who shall then exercise their respective powers vested by this Constitution.
All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be
part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, binding, and effective even after lifting of martial law or the ratification of
this Constitution, unless modified, revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other
acts of the incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular National Assembly."
"It is unthinkable," said Justice Fernandez, a 1971 Constitutional Convention delegate, "that the Constitutional Convention,
while giving to the President the discretion when to call the interim National Assembly to session, and knowing that it may not
be convened soon, would create a vacuum in the exercise of legislative powers. Otherwise, with no one to exercise the
lawmaking powers, there would be paralyzation of the entire governmental machinery."[24] Paraphrasing Rossiter, this is an
extremely important factor in any constitutional dictatorship which extends over a period of time. The separation of executive
and legislature ordained in the Constitution presents a distinct obstruction to efficient crisis government. The steady increase
in executive power is not too much a cause for worry as the steady increase in the magnitude and complexity of the problems
the President has been called upon by the Filipino people to solve in their behalf, which involve rebellion, subversion,
secession, recession, inflation, and economic crisis - a crisis greater than war. In short, while conventional constitutional law
just confines the President's power as Commander-in-Chief to the direction of the operation of the national forces, yet the facts
of our political, social, and economic disturbances had convincingly shown that in meeting the same, indefinite power should
be attributed to the President to take emergency measures.[25]
IV
Authority of the incumbent President to propose amendments to the Constitution.
1. As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim National Assembly during the
transition period. However, the initial convening of that Assembly is a matter fully addressed to the judgment of the
incumbent President. And, in the exercise of that judgment, the President opted to defer the convening of that body in utter
recognition of the people's preference. Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to the
Constitution lies in the interimNational Assembly upon special call by the President (Sec. 15 of the Transitory
Provisions). Again, harking to the dictates of the sovereign will, the President decided not to call the interim National
Assembly. Would it then be within the bounds of the Constitution and of law for the President to assume that constituent
power of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body's legislative functions? The answer is yes. If the President
has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly
discharge the function of that Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to
it s gross legislative power. This, of course, is not to say that the President has converted his office into a constituent assembly
of that nature normally constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the interimNational Assembly not convened and only the
Presidency and the Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to act
as agent for and in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution. Parenthetically, by its very constitution,
the Supreme Court possesses no capacity to propose amendments without constitutional infractions. For the President to shy
away from that actuality and decline to undertake the amending process would leave the governmental machinery at
a stalmate or create in the powers of the State a destructive vacuum, thereby impeding the objective of a crisis government "to
end the crisis and restore normal times." In these parlous times, that Presidential initiative to reduce into concrete forms the
constant voices of the people reigns supreme. After all, constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions, like the President
now, are mere agents of the people.[26]
2. The President's action is not a unilateral move. As early as the referendums of January 1973 and February 1975, the
people had already rejected the calling of the interim National Assembly. The LupongTagapagpaganap of
the Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian, the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay, and
the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Kabataang Barangay, representing 42,000 barangays, about the same number
of Kabataang Barangay organizations, Sanggunians in 1,458 municipalities, 72 provinces, 3 sub-provinces, and 60 cities had
informed the President that the prevailing sentiment of the people is for the abolition of the interimNational Assembly. Other
issues concerned the lifting of martial law and amendments to the Constitution. [27] The national organizations
of Sangguniang Bayan presently proposed to settle the issues of martial law, the interim Assembly, its replacement, the period
of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of its present powers in a referendum to be held on
October 16.[28] The Batasang Bayan (legislative council) created under Presidential Decree 995 of September 10, 1976,
composed of 19 cabinet members, 9 officials with cabinet rank, 91 members of the Lupong Tagapagpaganap (executive
committee) of the Katipunan ng mga Sangguniang Bayan voted in session to submit directly to the people in a plebiscite on
October 16, the previously quoted proposed amendments to the Constitution, including the issue of martial law. [29] Similarly,
the "barangays" and the "sanggunians" endorsed to the President the submission of the proposed amendments to the people on
October 16. All the foregoing led the President to initiate the proposal of amendments to the Constitution and the subsequent
issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1033 on September 22, 1976 submitting the questions (proposed amendments) to the
people in the National Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.
V
The People as Sovereign.
1. Unlike in a federal state, the location of sovereignty in a unitary state is easily seen. In the Philippines, a republican and
unitary state, sovereignty ''resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.[30] In its fourth
meaning, Savigny would treat "people" as "that particular organized assembly of individuals in which, according to the
Constitution, the highest power exists." [31] This is the concept of popular sovereignty. It means that the constitutional
legislator, namely, the people, is sovereign.[32] In consequence, the people may thus write into the Constitution their
convictions on any subject they choose in the absence of express constitutional prohibition. [33] This is because, as Holmes said,
the Constitutions an experiment, as all life is an experiment." [34]"The necessities of orderly government," wrote Rottschaefer,
"do not require that one generation should be permitted to permanently fetter all future generations." A constitution is based,
therefore, upon a self-limiting decision of the people when they adopt it.[35]
12. The October 16 referendum-plebiscite is a resounding call to the people to exercise their sovereign power as constitutional
legislator. The proposed amendments, as earlier discussed, proceed not from the thinking of a single man. Rather, they are the
collated thoughts of the sovereign will reduced only into enabling forms by the authority who can presently exercise the powers
of government. In equal vein, the submission of those proposed amendments and the question of martial law in a referendum-
plebiscite expresses but the option of the people themselves implemented only by the authority of the President. Indeed, it may
well be said that the amending process is a sovereign act, although the authority to initiate the same and the procedure to be
followed reside somehow in a particular body.
VI
Referendum-Plebiscite not rendered nugatory by the participation of the 15 year olds.
1. October 16 is in parts a referendum and a plebiscite. The question - (1) Do you want martial law to be continued? - is a
referendum question, wherein the 15-year olds may participate. This was prompted by the desire of the Government to reach
the larger mass of the people so that their true pulse may be felt to guide the President in pursuing his program for a New
Order. For the succeeding question on the proposed amendments, only those of voting age of 18 years may participate. This is
the plebiscite aspect, as contemplated in Section 2, Article XVI of the new Constitution.[36] On this second question, it would
only be the votes of those 18 years old and above which will have valid bearing on the results. The fact that the voting populace
are simultaneously asked to answer the referendum question and the plebiscite question does not infirm the referendum-
plebiscite. There is nothing objectionable in consulting the people on a given issue, which is of current one and submitting to
them for ratification of proposed constitutional amendments. The fear of conmingled votes (15 -year olds and 18-year olds
above) is readily dispelled by the provision of two ballot boxes for every barangay center, one containing the ballots of voters
fifteen years of age and under eighteen, and another containing the ballots of voters eighteen years of age and above.[37] The
ballots in the ballot box for voters fifteen years of age and under eighteen shall be counted ahead of the ballots of voters
eighteen years and above contained in another ballot box. And, the results of the referendum-plebiscite shall be separately
prepared for the age groupings, i.e., ballots contained in each of the two boxes. [38]
2. It is apt to distinguish here between a "referendum" and a "plebiscite." A "referendum" is merely consultative
in charact er. It is simply a means of assessing public reaction to the given issues submitted to the people for their
consideration, the calling of which is derived from or within the totality of the executive power of the President.[39] It is
participated in by all citizens from the age of fifteen, regardless of whether or not they are illiterates, feeble-minded, or ex-
convicts.[40] A "plebiscite," on the other hand, involves the constituent act of those "citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year
and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the election." [41] Literacy, property, or any other
substantive requirement is not imposed. It is generally associated with the amending process of the Constitution, more
particularly, the ratification aspect.
VII
Freedoms of expression and assembly not disturbed.
1. There appears to be no valid basis for the claim that the regime of martial law stultifies in main the freedom to
dissent. That speaks of a bygone fear. The martial law regime which, in the observation of Justice Fernando, "is impressed
with a mild character" recorded no State imposition for a muffled voice. To be sure, there are restraints of the individual
liberty, but on certain grounds no total suppression of that liberty is aimed at. The machinery for the referendum-plebiscite on
October 16 recognizes all the embracing freedoms of expression and assembly. The President himself had announced that he
would not countenance any suppression of dissenting views on the issues, as he is not interested in winning a "yes" or "no"
vote, but on the genuine sentiment of the people on the issues at hand.[42] Thus, the dissenters soon found their way to the
public forums, voicing out loud and clear their adverse views on the proposed amendments and even on the valid ratification of
the 1973 Constitution, which is already a settled matter.[43] Even government employees have been held by the Civil Service
Commission free to participate in public discussion and even campaign for their stand on the referendum-plebiscite issues.[44]
VIII
Time for deliberation is not short.
1. The period from September 21 to October 16 or a period of 3 weeks is not too short for free debates or discussions on the
referendum-plebiscite issues. The questions are not new. They are the issues of the day. The people have been living with
them since the proclamation of martial law four years ago. The referendums of 1973 and 1975 carried the same issue of martial
law. That notwithstanding, the contested brief period for discussion is not without counterparts in previous plebiscites for
constitutional amendments. Justice Makasiar, in the Referendum Case, recalls: 'Under the old Society, 15 days were allotted
for the publication in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette of the women's suffrage amendment to the Constitution
before the scheduled plebiscite on April 30, 1937 (Corn. Act No. 34). The constitutional amendment to append as ordinance
the complicated Tydings -Kocials - kowski was published in only three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette for 10 days
prior to the scheduled plebiscite (Corn. Act 492). For the 1940 Constitutional amendments providing for the bicameral
Congress, the reelection of the President and Vice-President, and the creation of the Commission on Elections, 20 days of
publication in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette was fixed (Com. Act No. 517). And the Parity Amendment, an
involved constitutional amendment affecting the economy as well as the independence of the Republic was publicized in three
consecutive issues of the Official Gazette for 20 days prior to the plebiscite (Rep. Act No. 73)." [45]
2. It is worthy to note that Article XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to the specific date when the plebiscite
shall be held, but simply states that it "shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or
revision." In Coleman v. Miller,[46] the United States Supreme Court held that this matter of submission involves "an appraisal
of a great variety of relevant conditions, political, social and economic," which "are essentially political and not justiciable." The
constituent body or in the instant cases, the President, may fix the time within which the people may act. This is because, first,
proposal and ratification are not treated as unrelated acts, but as succeeding steps in a single endeavor, the natural inference
being that they are not to be widely separated in time; second, it is only when there is deemed to be a necessity therefor that
amendments are to be proposed, the reasonable implication being that when proposed, they are to be considered and disposed
of presently; and third, ratification is but the expression of the approbation of the people, hence, it must be done
contemporaneously.[47] In the words of Jameson, "(a)n alteration of the Constitution proposed today has relation to the
sentiment and the felt needs of today, and that, if not ratified early while that sentiment may fairly be supposed to exist, it
ought to be regarded as waived, and not again to be voted upon, unless a second time proposed by [proper body]."[48]
IN RESUME
The three issues are:
1. Is the question of the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees Nos. 991, 1031 and 1033 political or justiciable?
2. During the present stage of the transition period, and under the environmental circumstances now obtaining, does the
President possess power to propose amendments to the Constitution as well as set up the required machinery and prescribe the
procedure for the ratification of his proposals by the people?
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed therefor a sufficient and
proper submission?
Upon the first issue, Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro and Associate Justices Enrique M. Fernando, Claudio Teehankee, Antonio
P. Barredo, Cecilia Muñoz Palma, Hermogenes Concepcion Jr. and Ruperto G. Martin are of the view that the question posed
is justiciable, while Associate Justices Felix V. Makasiar, Felix Q. Antonio and Ramon C. Aquino hold the view that the question
is political.
Upon the second issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and
Martin voted in the affirmative, while Associate Justices Teehankee and Muñoz Palma voted in the negative. Associate Justice
Fernando, conformably to his concurring and dissenting opinion in Aquino vs. Enrile (59 SCRA 183), specifically dissents from
the proposition that there is concentration of powers in the Executive during periods of crisis, thus raising serious doubts as to
the power of the President to propose amendments.
Upon the third issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin are of
the view that there is a sufficient and proper submission of the proposed amendments for ratification by the people. Associate
Justices Barredoand Makasiar expressed the hope, however, that the period of time may be extended. Associate Justices
Fernando, Makasiar and Antonio are of the view that the question is political and therefore beyond the competence and
cognizance of this Court. Associate Justice Fernando adheres to his concurrence in the opinion of Chief
Justice Concepcion in Gonzales vs. COMELEC (21 SCRA 774). Associate Justices Teehankee and Muñoz Palma hold
that prescinding from the President's lack of authority to exercise the constituent power to propose the amendments, etc., as
above stated, there is no fair and proper submission with sufficient information and time to assure intelligent consent or
rejection under the standards set by this Court in the controlling cases of Gonzales, supra. and Tolentino vs. COMELEC (41
SCRA 702).
Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted to dismiss
the three petitions at bar. For reasons as expressed in his separate opinion, Associate Justice Fernando concurs in the
result. Associate Justices Teehankee and Muñoz Palma voted to grant the petitions.
ACCORDINGLY, the vote being 8 to 2 to dismiss, the said petitions are hereby dismissed. This decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

Pundaodaya vs comelec

FACTS:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assails the Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc which declared
private respondent Arsenio Densing Noble qualified to run for municipal mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental, in the May 14, 2007
Synchronized National and Local Elections. Petitioner Makil U. Pundaodaya is married to Judith Pundaodaya, who ran against Noble for
the position of municipal mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the 2007 elections.

Pundaodaya filed a petition for disqualification against Noble alleging that the latter lacks the residency qualification prescribed by existing
laws for elective local officials; that he never resided nor had any physical presence at a fixed place in Purok 3, Barangay Esperanza,
Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental; and that he does not appear to have the intention of residing therein permanently. Pundaodaya claimed that
Noble is in fact a resident of Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, where he also maintains a business called OBERT Construction Supply.
ISSUE;

Should “residence” and “domicile” be construed as referring to “dwelling”? Did Noble effectively change his domicile?

RULING:

No to both. In Japzon v. Commission on Elections, it was held that the term “residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation
as referring to “dwelling” or “habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or legal residence, that is, “the place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and
remain (animus manendi).” In Domino v. Commission on Elections, the Court explained that domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence
to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return.

The documentary evidence of Noble, however, failed to convince the Court that he successfully effected a change of domicile. To establish
a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. It requires not only such
bodily presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent to make it one’s fixed and permanent place of abode. In this case,
Noble’s marriage to Bernadith Go does not establish his actual physical presence in Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental. Neither does it prove an
intention to make it his permanent place of residence.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 179313 September 17, 2009

MAKIL U. PUNDAODAYA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSN and ARSENIO DENSING NOBLE, Respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition1 for certiorari under Rule 65 assails the August 3, 2007 Resolution2 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
En Banc in SPA No. 07-202, which declared private respondent Arsenio Densing Noble (Noble) qualified to run for municipal
mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental, in the May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Makil U. Pundaodaya (Pundaodaya) is married to Judith Pundaodaya, who ran against Noble for the position of
municipal mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the 2007 elections.

On March 27, 2007, Noble filed his Certificate of Candidacy, indicating therein that he has been a resident of Purok 3,
Barangay Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental for 15 years.

On April 3, 2007, Pundaodaya filed a petition for disqualification 3 against Noble docketed as SPA No. 07-202, alleging that the
latter lacks the residency qualification prescribed by existing laws for elective local officials; that he never resided nor had any
physical presence at a fixed place in Purok 3, Barangay Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental; and that he does not appear
to have the intention of residing therein permanently. Pundaodaya claimed that Noble is in fact a resident of Lapasan, Cagayan
de Oro City, where he also maintains a business called OBERT Construction Supply.
In his Answer,4 Noble averred that he is a registered voter and resident of Barangay Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental;
that on January 18, 1992, he married Bernadith Go, the daughter of then Mayor Narciso Go of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental;
that he has been engaged in electoral activities since his marriage; and that he voted in the said municipality in the 1998, 2001
and 2004 elections.

In a resolution dated May 13, 2007,5 the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled in favor of Pundaodaya and disqualified
Noble from running as mayor, thus:

Respondent Noble’s claim that he is a registered voter and has actually voted in the past three (3) elections in the said
municipality does not sufficiently establish that he has actually elected residency at Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental. Neither does
campaigning in previous elections sufficiently establish residence.

Respondent Noble failed to show that he has indeed acquired domicile at Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental. He failed to prove not
only his bodily presence in the new locality but has likewise failed to show that he intends to remain at Kinoguitan, Misamis
Oriental and abandon his residency at Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition to Disqualify Aresnio Densing Noble is hereby GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.6

Noble filed a motion for reconsideration of the above resolution. In the meantime, he garnered the highest number of votes and
was proclaimed the winning candidate on May 15, 2007. Pundaodaya then filed an Urgent Motion to Annul Proclamation. 7

On August 3, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc reversed the decision of the Second Division and declared Noble qualified to run
for the mayoralty position.

The COMELEC En Banc held that when Noble married Bernadith Go on January 18, 1992, the couple has since resided in
Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental; that he was a registered voter and that he participated in the last three elections; and although
he is engaged in business in Cagayan de Oro City, the fact that he resides in Kinoguitan and is a registered voter and owns
property thereat, sufficiently meet the residency requirement.8 Thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (en banc) RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the instant
Motion for Reconsideration and to REVERSE AND SET ASIDE the Resolution promulgated on May 13, 2007 issued by the
Commission (Second Division).

ACCORDINGLY, respondent ARSENIO DENSING NOBLE is QUALIFIED to run for the local elective position of Municipal
Mayor of the Municipality of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections.

SO ORDERED.9

Pundaodaya filed the instant petition for certiorari, alleging that the COMELEC En Banc acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it declared Noble qualified to run; when it did not annul Noble’s proclamation; and when it failed to proclaim the true
winning candidate, Judith Pundaodaya.

In a resolution dated November 13, 2007,10 the Court required the respondents to comment on the petition.

Public respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Manifestation and Motion11 praying that it be excused
from filing a separate comment and that the said pleading be considered sufficient compliance with the November 13, 2007
Resolution.

Meanwhile, for Noble’s failure to comply, the Court issued Resolutions 12 dated July 15, 2008 and December 9, 2008 requiring
him to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt, imposing a fine of ₱1,000.00, and
requiring him to file a comment. On June 2, 2009, the Court deemed Noble to have waived the filing of the comment. 13

The issues for resolution are: whether the COMELEC En Banc gravely abused its discretion: 1) in declaring Noble qualified to
run for the mayoralty position; and 2) in failing to order the annulment of Noble’s proclamation and refusing to proclaim Judith
Pundaodaya as the winning candidate.
Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, requires that an elective local official
must be a resident in the barangay, municipality, city or province where he intends to serve for at least one year immediately
preceding the election.14

In Japzon v. Commission on Elections,15 it was held that the term "residence" is to be understood not in its common
acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal residence, that is, "the place where a party
actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually
intends to return and remain (animus manendi)."

In Domino v. Commission on Elections,16 the Court explained that domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which,
whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return. It is a question of intention and
circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must have a
residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have
but one residence or domicile at a time.1avvphi1

If one wishes to successfully effect a change of domicile, he must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one, and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose.17 Without clear and positive proof of the concurrence of these three requirements, the domicile of
origin continues.18

Records show that Noble’s domicile of origin was Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. However, he claims to have chosen
Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental as his new domicile. To substantiate this, he presented before the COMELEC his voter
registration records;19 a Certification dated April 25, 2007 from Election Officer II Clavel Z. Tabada; 20 his Marriage
Certificate;21 and affidavits of residents of Kinoguitan22 attesting that he established residence in the municipality after his
marriage to Bernadith Go. In addition, he presented receipts23 from the Provincial Treasurer for payment of his water bills, and
Certifications from the Municipal Treasurer and Municipal Engineer that he has been a consumer of the Municipal Water
System since June 2003. To prove ownership of property, he also presented a Deed of Sale 24 over a real property dated June
3, 1996.

The above pieces of documentary evidence, however, fail to convince us that Noble successfully effected a change of
domicile. As correctly ruled by the COMELEC Second Division, private respondent’s claim that he is a registered voter and has
actually voted in the past 3 elections in Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental do not sufficiently establish that he has actually elected
residency in the said municipality. Indeed, while we have ruled in the past that voting gives rise to a strong presumption of
residence, it is not conclusive evidence thereof. 25 Thus, in Perez v. Commission on Elections,26 we held that a person’s
registration as voter in one district is not proof that he is not domiciled in another district. The registration of a voter in a place
other than his residence of origin is not sufficient to consider him to have abandoned or lost his residence. 27

To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention.
It requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent to make it one’s fixed and
permanent place of abode.28

In this case, Noble’s marriage to Bernadith Go does not establish his actual physical presence in Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental.
Neither does it prove an intention to make it his permanent place of residence. We are also not persuaded by his alleged
payment of water bills in the absence of evidence showing to which specific properties they pertain. And while Noble presented
a Deed of Sale for real property, the veracity of this document is belied by his own admission that he does not own property in
Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental.29

On the contrary, we find that Noble has not abandoned his original domicile as shown by the following: a) Certification dated
April 12, 2007 of the Barangay Kagawad of Barangay Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City stating that Noble is a resident of the
barangay;30 b) Affidavit31 of the Barangay Kagawad of Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental dated April 14, 2007, attesting
that Noble has not resided in Barangay Esperanza in Kinoguitan; c) photos 32and official receipts33 showing that Noble and his
wife maintain their residence and businesses in Lapasan; d) tax declarations 34 of real properties in Cagayan de Oro City under
the name of Noble; and e) the "Household Record of Barangay Inhabitants"35 of Mayor Narciso Go, which did not include
Noble or his wife, Bernadith Go, which disproves Noble’s claim that he resides with his father-in-law.

From the foregoing, we find that Noble’s alleged change of domicile was effected solely for the purpose of qualifying as a
candidate in the 2007 elections. This we cannot allow. In Torayno, Sr. v. Commission on Elections, 36 we held that the one-
year residency requirement is aimed at excluding outsiders "from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that
community for electoral gain." Establishing residence in a community merely to meet an election law requirement defeats the
purpose of representation: to elect through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of the
community.37 Thus, we find Noble disqualified from running as municipal mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the 2007
elections.
Notwithstanding Noble’s disqualification, we find no basis for the proclamation of Judith Pundaodaya, as mayor. The rules on
succession under the Local Government Code, explicitly provides:

SECTION 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. – If a permanent
vacancy occurs in the office of the xxx mayor, the xxx vice-mayor concerned shall become the xxx mayor.

xxxx

For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to
assume office, fails to qualify or is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to
discharge the functions of his office.

x x x x (Emphasis ours)

Thus, considering the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental occasioned by Noble’s
disqualification, the proclaimed Vice-Mayor shall then succeed as mayor.38

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The August 3, 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc in SPA No. 07-202
declaring respondent Arsenio Densing Noble qualified to run as Mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental, is REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE. In view of the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental, the proclaimed Vice-
Mayor is ORDERED to succeed as Mayor.

SO ORDERED.

Maruhom vs comelec

FACTS:

Petitioner Jamela Salic Maruhom was a mayoralty candidate in the Municipality of Marantao, Lanao del Sur.Her opponent, re-electionist
Mayor Abinal filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification against Maruhom, which alleged that she was a double registrant.

The COMELEC First Division found that Maruhom had two subsisting registrations, one in Marawi, and another in Marantao and
subsequently ordered the deletion of Maruhom’s name from the list of official candidates for municipal mayor of Marantao. Aggrieved,
Maruhom filed the instant Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of Court; imputing grave abuse of discretion on the
part of COMELEC, for the Comelec had no jurisdiction to declare null and void her registration as a registered voter of Marantao, Lanao el
Sur and to declare her as a double registrant.

ISSUE:

Is the challenge on Maruhom’s registration, an issue on the right to vote and, thus, beyond the COMELEC’s jurisdiction?

RULING:

No. The Court held that present case is not about her being denied her right to register as a voter, but is all about her making false material
representations in her COC, which would warrant the cancellation of the same.

COMELEC has laid down the rule that while the first registration of any voter subsists, any subsequent registration thereto is void ab initio.
Following this, Maruhom’s earlier registration in Marawi is deemed valid, while her subsequent registration in Marantao is void ab initio.
Accordingly, Maruhom cannot be considered a registered voter in Marantao and, thus, she made a false representation in her COC when she
claimed to be one.
It must be underscored that in addition to the express jurisdiction of COMELEC over petitions for cancellation of COCs, on the ground of
false material representations, under Section 78 of the OEC, the Constitution also extends to COMELEC all the necessary and incidental
powers for it to achieve the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. The determination, therefore, made by the
COMELEC that Maruhom’s Marawi registration is valid, while her Marantao registration is void, is only in accord with its explicit
jurisdiction, or at the very least, its residual powers.

The Resolution of the COMELEC en banc merely defeated Maruhom’s intent to run for elective office, but it did not deprive her of her
right to vote. Although Maruhom’s registration in Marantao is void, her registration in Marawi still subsists. She may be barred from voting
or running for mayor in the former, but she may still exercise her right to vote, or even run for an elective post, in the latter.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 179430 July 27, 2009

JAMELA SALIC MARUHOM, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and MOHAMMADALI "Mericano" A. ABINAL, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari1 with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction assailing the Resolution2 dated 21 August 2007 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc and
Resolution3 dated 8 May 2007 of the COMELEC First Division, both pertaining to SPA No. 07-093.

The facts gathered from the records are as follows:

Petitioner Jamela Salic Maruhom (Maruhom) and private respondent Mohammadali "Mericano" A. Abinal (Abinal) were
mayoralty candidates in the Municipality of Marantao, Lanao del Sur, for the 14 May 2007 national and local elections. Both
Maruhom and Abinal filed their respective sworn Certificates of Candidacy (COCs) for the said position with the COMELEC
Election Officer of Marantao. Abinal was then the incumbent Mayor of Marantao who was seeking re-election.

On 1 April 2007, Abinal filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification and to Deny Due Course to or Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy under Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, 4 otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code of
the Philippines (OEC),5 against Maruhom, which was docketed as SPA No. 07-093. Abinal alleged that Maruhom was a double
registrant, being a registered voter in Precinct No. 0208A, Barangay Panggao Saduc, Marawi City and Precinct No. 0040A,
Barangay Kialdan Proper, Marantao. Maruhom registered as a voter in Marawi on 26 July 2003. Only three days thereafter, on
29 July 2003, Maruhom registered again as a voter in Marantao, without canceling her Marawi registration. There being double
registration, Maruhom’s subsequent registration in Marantao was null and void ab initio. And, not being a registered voter in
Marantao, Maruhom was disqualified from running for municipal mayor of said municipality.6

Abinal also averred that Maruhom made false material representations in her registrations in Marawi and Marantao. 7 Maruhom
stated in her Marawi registration that: (1) she was "Jamela H. Salic Maruhom"; (2) she was born on 5 April 1960; (3) she was
born in Marawi; and (4) she had resided in Marawi for 43 years. On the other hand, Maruhom indicated in her Marantao
registration that: (1) she was "Hadja Jamelah Salic Abani"; (2) she was born on 3 September 1960; (3) she was born in
Marantao; and (4) she had resided in Marantao for 42 years.8

Abinal further claimed that Maruhom also made false material representations in her COC. Maruhom wrote in her Marantao
registration9 that she was born on 3 September 1960; she was a registered voter in Precinct No. 0040A, Marantao; and her
surname was "Abani" and her maiden/maternal name was "Salic." In contrast, Maruhom declared10 in her COC that she was
born on 5 April 1960; she was a registered voter in Precinct No. 0042A, Marantao; and her surname was "Salic" and her
maiden/maternal name was "Abani, Mama, Esmail, Maruhom." Moreover, Maruhom was registered in Marantao as "Hadja
Jamelah Salic Abani." This was inconsistent with the Certificate of Nomination dated 23 March 2007, issued by Dr. Ombra A.
Tamano, Lanao del Sur Provincial Chairman of Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino, stating that Maruhom’s full name was
"Jamelah Abani Salic."
Abinal asserted that the aforementioned false material representations made by Maruhom were valid grounds for denying due
course to, or cancellation of, the latter’s COC under Section 78 of the OEC. 11

Maruhom filed before the COMELEC an Answer with Motion to Dismiss SPA No. 07-093 contending that she was qualified to
run as municipal mayor of Marantao, as she had all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law. A
candidate could only be disqualified for a ground provided by law, and there was no law declaring double registration as a
ground for disqualification. Maruhom also insisted that she did not make false material representations in her COC, because
her complete name was "Salic, Jamelah, Abani, Mama, Esmail, Maruhom." Maruhom explained that "Salic" was her father’s
surname; "Jamelah" was her first name; that "Abani, Mama, Esmail" were her paternal and maternal grandparents’ names; and
"Maruhom" was her husband’s surname. Hence, Maruhom asked the COMELEC to dismiss Abinal’s Petition in SPA No. 07-
093.12

After submission of the parties’ Position Papers and Memoranda, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution in SPA No.
07-093 on 8 May 2007, granting Abinal’s Petition. The COMELEC First Division found that Maruhom had two subsisting
registrations, one in Marawi, and another in Marantao. Maruhom’s Marantao registration was void ab initio pursuant to
COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 00-1513, issued on 25 July 2000.13 Since Maruhom was not a registered voter in Marantao,
she was disqualified from being a mayoralty candidate therein. Thus, the COMELEC First Division ordered the deletion of
Maruhom’s name from the list of official candidates for municipal mayor of Marantao.

Maruhom filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 8 May 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, to which Abinal filed
an Opposition.14 The COMELEC First Division then referred Maruhom’s Motion for Reconsideration to the COMELEC en
banc for disposition.15

Meanwhile, the 14 May 2007 national and local elections were held, and Abinal won over Maruhom. Abinal was proclaimed the
duly elected municipal mayor of Marantao and, thereupon, assumed office. Maruhom filed an election protest against Abinal
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Sur, Branch 10, docketed as Election Case No. 1731-07.16

On 21 August 2007, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution denying Maruhom’s Motion for Reconsideration and
affirming in toto the 8 May 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division. The COMELEC En Banc further ordered the
referral of the case to the COMELEC Law Department for investigation on the possible commission of an election offense by
Maruhom.

Aggrieved, Maruhom filed the instant Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of Court, imputing grave abuse
of discretion on the part of COMELEC, based on the following grounds:

I.

THE COMELEC HAS NO JURISDICTION TO DECLARE NULL AND VOID THE REGISTRATION OF THE PETITIONER AS A
REGISTERED VOTER OF MARANTAO, LANAO DEL SUR IN THE MAY 14, 2007 ELECTIONS;

II.

THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
DECLARED THE PETITIONER AS A DOUBLE REGISTRANT.17

The Petition at bar has no merit.

Maruhom challenges in her Petition the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in declaring her registration in Marantao void. She
asserts that Section 2, Article IX(c) of the Constitution prohibits the COMELEC from assuming jurisdiction or deciding issues
involving the right to vote. Section 33 of Republic Act No. 8189, or the Voter’s Registration Act of 1996 (VRA), confers upon the
Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs) and Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs) original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases of
inclusion and exclusion of voters in their respective cities or municipalities. Maruhom argues that the validity of her registration
in Marantao can only be directly challenged in a petition for exclusion filed with the MTC of Marantao, and cannot be
collaterally attacked in the Petition for Disqualification and to Deny Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy filed
by Abinal before the COMELEC. Maruhom further contends that the reliance by COMELEC on its "broad plenary powers to
enforce and administer all laws relating to election" is baseless in light of the aforementioned Section 33 of the VRA. The
Resolution dated 8 May 2007 of the COMELEC First Division and Resolution dated 21 August 2007 of the COMELEC En
Banc amount to judicial legislation, since the COMELEC has no authority to prescribe what the law does not provide, its
functions not being legislative.18
Maruhom, whether intentionally or inadvertently, is muddling the issues in this case. The present case is not about her being
denied her right to register as a voter, but is all about her making false material representations in her COC, which would
warrant the cancellation of the same.

Abinal’s Petition in SPA No. 07-093 primarily prays that the COMELEC deny due course to or cancel Maruhom’s COC under
Section 78 of the OEC, alleging that Maruhom made false material representations in her COC.

Under Section 78 of the OEC, a false representation of material fact in the COC is a ground for the denial or cancellation of the
COC. The false representation must pertain to a material fact that affects the right of the candidate to run for the election for
which he filed his COC. Such material fact refers to a candidate’s eligibility or qualification for elective office like citizenship,
residence or status as a registered voter.19 Aside from the requirement of materiality, the false representation must consist of
a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. In other words, it
must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate’s qualifications for public office.20

It is settled that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over a petition filed under Section 78 of the OEC. 21 In the exercise of such
jurisdiction, it is within the competence of the COMELEC to determine whether false representation as to material facts was
made in the COC.22

If the candidate states a material representation in the COC that is false, the COMELEC is empowered to deny due course to
or cancel the COC. The person whose COC is denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 of the OEC is not treated as a
candidate at all, as if such person never filed a COC. 23

Evidence on record supports the following facts: Maruhom registered as a voter in Marawi on 26 July 2003; 24 only three days
after, on 29 July 2003, Maruhom again registered as a voter in Marantao, without first canceling her registeration in
Marawi;25 and on 28 March 2007, Maruhom filed her COC declaring that she was a registered voter in Marantao and eligible to
run as a candidate for the position of mayor of said municipality. 26

Given Maruhom’s double registration in Marawi and Marantao, then COMELEC should determine which registration was valid
and which one was null. COMELEC could not consider both registrations valid because it would then give rise to the
anomalous situation where Maruhom could vote in two precincts at the same time. This would be a dangerous precedent that
would open the floodgates to massive election cheating and fraud. This was precisely the situation that the COMELEC
intended to address when it issued its Minute Resolution No. 00-1513 on 25 July 2000, seven years prior to the 14 May 2007
elections in which Maruhom intended to run. To foster honesty and credibility in the registration of voters, so as to avoid the
padding of vote registration, COMELEC laid down the rule in Minute Resolution No. 00-1513 that while the first registration of
any voter subsists, any subsequent registration thereto is void ab initio.

Following the clear and plain words of Minute Resolution No. 00-1513, therefore, Maruhom’s earlier registration in Marawi is
deemed valid, while her subsequent registration in Marantao is void ab initio. Accordingly, Maruhom cannot be considered a
registered voter in Marantao and, thus, she made a false representation in her COC when she claimed to be one.

Maruhom’s voter registration constitutes a material fact because it affects her eligibility to be elected as municipal mayor of
Marantao. Section 39(a) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, 27 requires that an
elective local official must be, among other things, a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province where he
intends to be elected.

Several circumstances convince us that Maruhom was aware that she had a subsisting registration in Marawi and deliberately
attempted to conceal said fact, which would have rendered her ineligible to run as mayoralty candidate in Marantao. Before
filing her COC, Maruhom requested the COMELEC to cancel her Marawi registration.28 It is undisputed that by the time
Maruhom filed her COC, the COMELEC had not yet acted on her request for cancellation of her Marawi registration. Despite
knowing that her request for cancellation of her Marawi registration was still pending before the COMELEC, Maruhom
proceeded to declare, under oath, in her COC, that she was a registered voter in Marantao and that she was eligible to run for
the position of mayor of said municipality. There is no showing that Maruhom informed or advised the election officer of
Marantao of her subsisting Marawi registration and her pending request for cancellation of the same. Evidently, Maruhom
would much rather sweep the fact of her Marawi registration under the carpet, than deal with the complications arising from it,
which may very well put in jeopardy her intention to run for mayor of Marantao.lawphil

Indeed, Maruhom made false material representations in her COC that she was a registered voter in Marantao and that she
was eligible to be a mayoralty candidate in said municipality.

Maruhom’s insistence that only the MTC has jurisdiction to rule on her voter registration is specious. It must be underscored
that in addition to the express jurisdiction of COMELEC over petitions for cancellation of COCs, on the ground of false material
representations, under Section 78 of the OEC, the Constitution also extends to COMELEC all the necessary and incidental
powers for it to achieve the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. 29 The determination, therefore,
made by the COMELEC that Maruhom’s Marawi registration is valid, while her Marantao registration is void, is only in accord
with its explicit jurisdiction, or at the very least, its residual powers. Furthermore, as aptly pointed out by Abinal and COMELEC,
through the Office of the Solicitor General,30the 8 May 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division and the 21 August
2007 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc merely defeated Maruhom’s intent to run for elective office, but it did not deprive
her of her right to vote. Although Maruhom’s registration in Marantao is void, her registration in Marawi still subsists. She may
be barred from voting or running for mayor in the former, but she may still exercise her right to vote, or even run for an elective
post, in the latter.

Maruhom does not deny at all that she registered twice. However, Maruhom calls our attention to the fact that on 30 December
2003, she made a written request to the election officer of Marawi to cancel her registration therein as a voter. On 20 March
2007, she reiterated her request to the same election officer. On 23 March 2007, she also informed the COMELEC Law
Department of her request for cancellation of her registration in Marawi. Thus, the failure of the election officer of Marawi to
cancel Maruhom’s voter registration in said municipality, despite repeated requests, should not be taken against the latter. 31

It is true that Maruhom did make several requests for the cancellation of her Marawi registration, but without official action by
the COMELEC thereon, they remain mere requests. They cannot simply be deemed granted. We take note that Maruhom’s
first request for cancellation of her Marawi registration was submitted on 30 December 2003, and her next request was made
only on 20 March 2007. Maruhom subsequently filed her COC for the mayoralty position in Marantao on 28 March 2007. Far
from convincing us that she had exercised due diligence in having her Marawi registration cancelled, we are more persuaded
that Maruhom had not been assiduous in ensuring that her request for cancellation be acted upon by COMELEC. Maruhom’s
reiteration of her request for cancellation of her Marawi registration on 20 March 2007, three years and three months since her
first request, and just a week prior to the filing of her COC for the mayoralty position in Marantao, reveals a harried attempt to
comply with the eligibility requirements for her candidacy than a sincere desire to right a wrong. COMELEC, thus, had more
than enough basis to support its conclusion of Maruhom being a double registrant whose subsequent registration in Marantao
was null and void, rendering her unfit to run as municipal mayor therein.

Therefore, Maruhom, at the time she filed her COC, could not have honestly declared therein that she was a registered voter of
Marantao and an eligible candidate for mayor of the said municipality. It is incumbent upon Maruhom to truthfully state her
eligibility in her COC, especially so because the COC is filled up under oath. 32 An elective office is a public trust. He who
aspires for elective office should not make a mockery of the electoral process by falsely representing himself. 33

The well-settled rule is that this Court will not interfere with a COMELEC decision/resolution unless the COMELEC is shown to
have committed grave abuse of discretion. Correctly understood, grave abuse of discretion is such "capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, or an exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act in a manner not at all in contemplation of law."34 Given our
foregoing discussion, we find no capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the COMELEC in rendering the
assailed Resolutions in SPA No. 07-093.

WHEREFORE, after due deliberation, the instant Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The Resolution dated 8 May
2007 of the COMELEC First Division and the Resolution dated 21 August 2007 of the COMELEC En Banc in SPA No. 07-093,
are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against petitioner Jamela Salic Maruhom.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

Domino vs comelec 1999

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. 134015 July 19, 1999

JUAN DOMINO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NARCISO Ra. GRAFILO, JR., EDDY B. JAVA, JUAN P. BAYONITO, JR., ROSARIO
SAMSON and DIONISIO P. LIM, SR., respondent, LUCILLE CHIONGBIAN-SOLON, intervenor.

DAVIDE, JR., CJ.:

Challenged in this case for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction are the Resolution of 6 May 1998 1 of the Second
Division of the Commission on Elections (hereafter COMELEC), declaring petitioner Juan Domino (hereafter DOMINO)
disqualified as candidate for representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani in the 11 May 1998
elections, and the Decision of 29 May 19982 of the COMELEC en banc denying DOMINO's motion for reconsideration.

The antecedents are not disputed.1âwphi1.nêt

On 25 March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the Lone Legislative District
of the Province of Sarangani indicating in item nine (9) of his certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he seeks
to be elected for one (1) year and two (2) months immediately preceding the election. 3

On 30 March 1998, private respondents Narciso Ra. Grafilo, Jr., Eddy B. Java, Juan P. Bayonito, Jr., Rosario Samson and
Dionisio P. Lim, Sr., fied with the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy, which was
docketed as SPA No. 98-022 and assigned to the Second Division of the COMELEC. Private respondents alleged that
DOMINO, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the
province of Sarangani where he seeks election. To substantiate their allegations, private respondents presented the following
evidence:

1. Annex "A" — the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent for the position of Congressman of
the Lone District of the Province of Sarangani filed with the Office of the Provincial Election
Supervisor of Sarangani on March 25, 1998, where in item 4 thereof he wrote his date of birth
as December 5, 1953; in item 9, he claims he have resided in the constituency where he
seeks election for one (1) year and two (2) months; and, in item 10, that he is registered voter
of Precinct No. 14A-1, Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani;

2. Annex "B" — Voter's Registration Record with SN 31326504 dated June 22, 1997 indicating
respondent's registration at Precinct No. 4400-A, Old Balara, Quezon City;

3. Annex "C" — Respondent's Community Tax Certificate No. 11132214C dated January 15,
1997;

4. Annex "D" — Certified true copy of the letter of Herson D. Dema-ala, Deputy Provincial &
Municipal Treasurer of Alabel, Sarangani, dated February 26, 1998, addressed to Mr.
Conrado G. Butil, which reads:

In connection with your letter of even date, we are furnishing you herewith certified xerox copy
of the triplicate copy of COMMUNITY TAX CERTIFICATE NO. 11132214C in the name of
Juan Domino.

Furthermore, Community Tax Certificate No. 11132212C of the same stub was issued to
Carlito Engcong on September 5, 1997, while Certificate No. 11132213C was also issued to
Mr. Juan Domino but was cancelled and serial no. 11132215C was issued in the name of
Marianita Letigio on September 8, 1997.

5. Annex "E" — The triplicate copy of the Community Tax Certificate No. 11132214C in the
name of Juan Domino dated September 5, 1997;

6. Annex "F" — Copy of the letter of Provincial Treasurer Lourdes P. Riego dated March 2,
1998 addressed to Mr. Herson D. Dema-ala, Deputy Provincial Treasurer and Municipal
Treasurer of Alabel, Sarangani, which states:
 For easy reference, kindly turn-over to the undersigned for safekeeping, the stub of
Community Tax Certificate containing Nos. 11132201C-11132250C issued to you on June 13,
1997 and paid under Official Receipt No. 7854744.

Upon request of Congressman James L. Chiongbian.

7. Annex "G" — Certificate of Candidacy of respondent for the position of Congressman in the
3rd District of Quezon City for the 1995 elections filed with the Office of the Regional Election
Director, National Capital Region, on March 17, 1995, where, in item 4 thereof, he wrote his
birth date as December 22, 1953; in item 8 thereof his "residence in the constituency where I
seek to be elected immediately preceding the election" as 3 years and 5 months; and, in item
9, that he is a registered voter of Precinct No. 182, Barangay Balara, Quezon City;

8. Annex "H" — a copy of the APPLICATION FOR TRANSFER OF REGISTRATION

RECORDS DUE TO CHANGE OF RESIDENCE of respondent dated August 30, 1997
addressed to and received by Election Officer Mantil Alim, Alabel, Sarangani, on September
22, 1997, stating among others, that "[T]he undersigned's previous residence is at 24
Bonifacio Street, Ayala Heights, Quezon City, III District, Quezon City; wherein he is a
registered voter" and "that for business and residence purposes, the undersigned has
transferred and conducts his business and reside at Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Province of
Sarangani prior to this application;"

9. Annex "I" — Copy of the SWORN APPLICATION FOR OF CANCELLATION OF THE

VOTER'S [TRANSFER OF] PREVIOUS REGISTRATION of respondent subscribed and
sworn to on 22 October 1997 before Election Officer Mantil Allim at Alabel, Sarangani. 4

For his defense, DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year residence requirement and that he has been
residing in Sarangani since January 1997. In support of the said contention, DOMINO presented before the COMELEC the
following exhibits, to wit:

1. Annex "1" — Copy of the Contract of Lease between Nora Dacaldacal as Lessor and
Administrator of the properties of deceased spouses Maximo and Remedios Dacaldacal and
respondent as Lessee executed on January 15, 1997, subscribed and sworn to before Notary
Public Johnny P. Landero;

2. Annex "2" — Copy of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate with Absolute Deed of sale
executed by and between the heirs of deceased spouses Maximo and Remedios Dacaldacal,
namely: Maria Lourdes, Jupiter and Beberlie and the respondent on November 4, 1997,
subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Jose A. Alegario;

3. Annex "3" — True Carbon Xerox copy of the Decision dated January 19, 1998, of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila, Branch 35, Quezon City, in Election Case NO. 725
captioned as "In the Matter of the Petition for the Exclusion from the List of voters of Precinct
No. 4400-A Brgy. Old Balara, Quezon City, Spouses Juan and Zorayda Domino, Petitioners, -
versus- Elmer M. Kayanan, Election Officer, Quezon City, District III, and the Board of Election
Inspectors of Precinct No. 4400-A, Old Balara, Quezon City, Respondents." The dispositive
portion of which reads:

1. Declaring the registration of petitioners as voters of Precinct No. 4400-A,

Barangay Old Balara, in District III Quezon City as completely erroneous as
petitioners were no longer residents of Quezon City but of Alabel, Sarangani
where they have been residing since December 1996;

2. Declaring this erroneous registration of petitioners in Quezon City as done

in good faith due to an honest mistake caused by circumstances beyond their
control and without any fault of petitioners;

3. Approving the transfer of registration of voters of petitioners from Precint

No. 4400-A of Barangay Old Balara, Quezon City to Precinct No. 14A1 of
Barangay Poblacion of Alabel, Sarangani; and
 4. Ordering the respondents to immediately transfer and forward all the
election/voter's registration records of the petitioners in Quezon City to the
Election Officer, the Election Registration Board and other Comelec Offices of
Alabel, Sarangani where the petitioners are obviously qualified to excercise
their respective rights of suffrage.

4. Annex "4" — Copy of the Application for Transfer of Registration Records due to Change of
Residence addressed to Mantil Alim, COMELEC Registrar, Alabel, Sarangani, dated August
30, 1997.

5. Annex "5" — Certified True Copy of the Notice of Approval of Application, the roster of
applications for registration approved by the Election Registration Board on October 20, 1997,
showing the spouses Juan and Zorayda Bailon Domino listed as numbers 111 and 112 both
under Precinct No. 14A1, the last two names in the slate indicated as transferees without VRR
numbers and their application dated August 30, 1997 and September 30, 1997, respectively.

6. Annex "6" — same as Annex "5"

7. Annex "6-a" — Copy of the Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous
Registration (Annex "I", Petition);

8. Annex "7" — Copy of claim card in the name of respondent showing his VRR No. 31326504
dated October 20, 1997 as a registered voter of Precinct No. 14A1, Barangay Poblacion,
Alabel, Sarangani;

9. Annex "7-a" — Certification dated April 16, 1998, issued by Atty. Elmer M. Kayanan,
Election Officer IV, District III, Quezon City, which reads:

This is to certify that the spouses JUAN and ZORAYDA DOMINO are no longer registered
voters of District III, Quezon City. Their registration records (VRR) were transferred and are
now in the possession of the Election Officer of Alabel, Sarangani.

This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr. JUAN DOMINO.

10. Annex "8" — Affidavit of Nora Dacaldacal and Maria Lourdes Dacaldacal stating the
circumstances and incidents detailing their alleged acquaintance with respondent.

11. Annexes "8-a", "8-b", "8-c" and "8-d" — Copies of the uniform affidavits of witness Myrna
Dalaguit, Hilario Fuentes, Coraminda Lomibao and Elena V. Piodos subscribed and sworn to
before Notary Public Bonifacio F. Doria, Jr., on April 18, 1998, embodying their alleged
personal knowledge of respondent's residency in Alabel, Sarangani;

12. Annex "8-e" — A certification dated April 20, 1998, subscribed and sworn to before Notary
Public Bonifacio, containing a listing of the names of fifty-five (55) residents of Alabel,
Sarangani, declaring and certifying under oath that they personally know the respondent as a
permanent resident of Alabel, Sarangani since January 1997 up to present;

13. Annexes "9", "9-a" and "9-b" — Copies of Individual Income Tax Return for the year 1997,
BIR form 2316 and W-2, respectively, of respondent; and,

14. Annex "10" — The affidavit of respondent reciting the chronology of events and
circumstances leading to his relocation to the Municipality of Alabel, Sarangani, appending
Annexes "A", "B", "C", "D", "D-1", "E", "F", "G" with sub-markings "G-1" and "G-2" and "H" his
CTC No. 111`32214C dated September 5, 1997, which are the same as Annexes "1", "2", "4",
"5", "6-a", "3", "7", "9" with sub-markings "9-a" and "9-b" except Annex "H".5

On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO disqualified as candidate for the
position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani for lack of the one-year residence requirement and likewise ordered
the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy, on the basis of the following findings:
 What militates against respondent's claim that he has met the residency requirement for the position sought is
his own Voter's Registration Record No. 31326504 dated June 22, 1997 [Annex "B", Petition] and his address
indicated as 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City. This evidence, standing alone, negates
all his protestations that he established residence at Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani, as early as
January 1997. It is highly improbable, nay incredible, for respondent who previously ran for the same position
in the 3rd Legislative District of Quezon City during the elections of 1995 to unwittingly forget the residency
requirement for the office sought.

Counting, therefore, from the day after June 22, 1997 when respondent registered at Precinct No. 4400-A, up
to and until the day of the elections on May 11, 1998, respondent clearly lacks the one (1) year residency
requirement provided for candidates for Member of the House of Representatives under Section 6, Article VI of
the Constitution.

All told, petitioner's evidence conspire to attest to respondent's lack of residence in the constituency where he
seeks election and while it may be conceded that he is a registered voter as contemplated under Section 12 of
R.A. 8189, he lacks the qualification to run for the position of Congressman for the Lone District of the
Province of Sarangani.6

On 11 May 1998, the day of the election, the COMELEC issued Supplemental Omnibus Resolution No. 3046, ordering that the
votes cast for DOMINO be counted but to suspend the proclamation if winning, considering that the Resolution disqualifying
him as candidate had not yet become final and executory.7

The result of the election, per Statement of Votes certified by the Chairman of the Provincial Board of Canvassers, 8shows that
DOMINO garnered the highest number of votes over his opponents for the position of Congressman of the Province of
Sarangani.

On 15 May 1998, DOMINO filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated 6 May 1998, which was denied by the
COMELEC en banc in its decision dated 29 May 1998. Hence, the present Petition for Certiorari with prayer for Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction alleging, in the main, that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that he did not meet the one-year residence requirement.

On 14 July 1998, acting on DOMINO's Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, the Court directed the parties to
maintain the status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of the instant petition.9

On 15 September 1998, Lucille L. Chiongbian-Solon, (hereafter INTERVENOR), the candidate receiving the second highest
number of votes, was allowed by the Court to Intervene.10 INTERVENOR in her Motion for Leave to Intervene and in her
Comment in Intervention 11 is asking the Court to uphold the disqualification of petitioner Juan Domino and to proclaim her as
the duly elected representative of Sarangani in the 11 May 1998 elections.

Before us DOMINO raised the following issues for resolution, to wit:

a. Whether or not the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City declaring
petitioner as resident of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final, conclusive and binding
upon the whole world, including the Commission on Elections.

b. Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject congressional district for at least
one (1) year immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections; and

c. Whether or not respondent COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition a quo for the
disqualification of petitioner.12

The first issue.

The contention of DOMINO that the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion proceedings
declaring him a resident of the Province of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final and conclusive upon the COMELEC
cannot be sustained.

The COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, over a petition to deny due
course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. In the exercise of the said jurisdiction, it is within the competence of the COMELEC
to determine whether false representation as to material facts was made in the certificate of candidacy, that will include, among
others, the residence of the candidate.
The determination of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion proceedings as to the right of DOMINO to be
included or excluded from the list of voters in the precinct within its territorial jurisdicton, does not preclude the COMELEC, in
the determination of DOMINO's qualification as a candidate, to pass upon the issue of compliance with the residency
requirement.

The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters are summary in character. Thus, the factual findings
of the trial court and its resultant conclusions in the exclusion proceedings on matters other than the right to vote in the precinct
within its territorial jurisdiction are not conclusive upon the COMELEC. Although the court in inclusion or exclusion proceedings
may pass upon any question necessary to decide the issue raised including the questions of citizenship and residence of the
challenged voter, the authority to order the inclusion in or exclusion from the list of voters necessarily caries with it the power to
inquire into and settle all matters essential to the exercise of said authority. However, except for the right to remain in the list of
voters or for being excluded therefrom for the particular election in relation to which the proceedings had been held, a decision
in an exclusion or inclusion proceeding, even if final and unappealable, does not acquire the nature of res judicata.13 In this
sense, it does not operate as a bar to any future action that a party may take concerning the subject passed upon in the
proceeding.14Thus, a decision in an exclusion proceeding would neither be conclusive on the voter's political status, nor bar
subsequent proceedings on his right to be registered as a voter in any other election.15

Thus, in Tan Cohon v. Election Registrar16 we ruled that:

. . . It is made clear that even as it is here held that the order of the City Court in question has become final,
the same does not constitute res adjudicata as to any of the matters therein contained. It is ridiculous to
suppose that such an important and intricate matter of citizenship may be passed upon and determined with
finality in such a summary and peremptory proceeding as that of inclusion and exclusion of persons in the
registry list of voters. Even if the City Court had granted appellant's petition for inclusion in the permanent list
of voters on the allegation that she is a Filipino citizen qualified to vote, her alleged Filipino citizenship would
still have been left open to question.

Moreover, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in its 18 January decision exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared
DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani, approved and ordered the transfer of his voter's registration from Precinct
No. 4400-A of Barangay Old Balara, Quezon City to precinct 14A1 of Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani. It is not within
the competence of the trial court, in an exclusion proceedings, to declare the challenged voter a resident of another
municipality. The jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion cases is limited only to determining the right of voter to remain in
the list of voters or to declare that the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precint in which he is registered, specifying
the ground of the voter's disqualification. The trial court has no power to order the change or transfer of registration from one
place of residence to another for it is the function of the election Registration Board as provided under Section 12 of R.A. No.
8189. 17 The only effect of the decision of the lower court excluding the challenged voter from the list of voters, is for the
Election Registration Board, upon receipt of the final decision, to remove the voter's registration record from the corresponding
book of voters, enter the order of exclusion therein, and thereafter place the record in the inactive file. 18

Finally, the application of the rule on res judicata is unavailing. Identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action are
indispensable requirements for the application of said doctrine. Neither herein Private Respondents nor INTERVENOR, is a
party in the exclusion proceedings. The Petition for Exclusion was filed by DOMINDO himself and his wife, praying that he and
his wife be excluded from the Voter's List on the ground of erroneous registration while the Petition to Deny Due Course to or
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy was filed by private respondents against DOMINO for alleged false representation in his
certificate of candidacy. For the decision to be a basis for the dismissal by reason of res judicata, it is essential that there must
be between the first and the second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter and identity of causes of action. 19 In the
present case, the aforesaid essential requisites are not present. In the case of Nuval v. Guray, et al., 20 the Supreme Court in
resolving a similar issue ruled that:

The question to be solved under the first assignment of error is whether or not the judgment rendered in the
case of the petition for the exclusion of Norberto Guray's name from the election list of Luna, is res judicata, so
as to prevent the institution and prosecution of an action in quo warranto, which is now before us.

The procedure prescribed by section 437 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3387, is of a
summary character and the judgment rendered therein is not appealable except when the petition is tried
before the justice of the peace of the capital or the circuit judge, in which case it may be appealed to the judge
of first instance, with whom said two lower judges have concurrent jurisdiction.

The petition for exclusion was presented by Gregorio Nuval in his dual capacity as qualified voter of the
municipality of Luna, and as a duly registered candidate for the office of president of said municipality, against
Norberto Guray as a registered voter in the election list of said municipality. The present proceeding
of quo warranto was interposed by Gregorio Nuval in his capacity as a registered candidate voted for the office
 of municipal president of Luna, against Norberto Guray, as an elected candidate for the same office.
Therefore, there is no identity of parties in the two cases, since it is not enough that there be an identity of
persons, but there must be an identity of capacities in which said persons litigate. (Art. 1259 of the Civil Code;
Bowler vs. Estate of Alvarez, 23 Phil., 561; 34 Corpus Juris, p. 756, par. 1165)

In said case of the petition for the exclusion, the object of the litigation, or the litigious matter was the exclusion
of Norberto Guray as a voter from the election list of the municipality of Luna, while in the
present que warranto proceeding, the object of the litigation, or the litigious matter is his exclusion or expulsion
from the office to which he has been elected. Neither does there exist, then, any identity in the object of the
litigation, or the litigious matter.

In said case of the petition for exclusion, the cause of action was that Norberto Guray had not the six months'
legal residence in the municipality of Luna to be a qualified voter thereof, while in the present proceeding
of quo warranto, the cause of action is that Norberto Guray has not the one year's legal residence required for
eligibility to the office of municipal president of Luna. Neither does there exist therefore, identity of causes of
action.

In order that res judicata may exist the following are necessary: (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of things; and
(c) identity of issues (Aquino v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 850). And as in the case of the petition for excluision
and in the present quo warranto proceeding, as there is no identity of parties, or of things or litigious matter, or
of issues or causes of action, there is no res judicata.

The Second Issue.

Was DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani for at least one year immediately preceding the 11 May 1998 election as
stated in his certificate of candidacy?

We hold in the negative.

It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective
office, means the same thing as "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. 21 "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return.22 "Domicile" is a question of
intention and circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man
must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a
man can have but one residence or domicile at a time.23

Records show that petitioner's domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos

Sur 24 and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon
City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of representative of the 3rd District of Quezon City in the May
1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his "residence" in Quezon City and has established
a new "domicile" of choice at the Province of Sarangani.

A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is
established. 25 To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which
correspond with the
purpose. 26 In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to
remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and
the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.27

It is the contention of petitioner that his actual physical presence in Alabel, Sarangani since December 1996 was sufficiently
established by the lease of a house and lot located therein in January 1997 and by the affidavits and certifications under oath
of the residents of that place that they have seen petitioner and his family residing in their locality.

While this may be so, actual and physical is not in itself sufficient to show that from said date he had transferred his residence
in that place. To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of
that intention. While "residence" simply requires bodily presence in a given place, "domicile" requires not only such bodily
presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent to make it one's fixed and permanent place of abode, one's
home.28
As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality involved and intention to adopt it as a
domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile. No change of domicile will result if either of these elements is
absent. Intention to acquire a domicile without actual residence in the locality does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor
does the fact of physical presence without intention.29

The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not adequately support a change of domicile. The lease
contract may be indicative of DOMINO's intention to reside in Sarangani but it does not engender the kind of permanency
required to prove abandonment of one's original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no
matter how long, without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of
domicile. 30 Thus the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot located in the province of Sarangani, i.e., 15 January
1997, cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement.

Further, Domino's lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is further strengthened by his act of registering as
voter in one of the precincts in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong
presumption of residence especially in this case where DOMINO registered in his former barangay. Exercising the right of
election franchise is a deliberate public assertion of the fact of residence, and is said to have decided preponderance in a
doubtful case upon the place the elector claims as, or believes to be, his residence. 31The fact that a party continously voted in
a particular locality is a strong factor in assisting to determine the status of his domicile. 32

His claim that his registration in Quezon City was erroneous and was caused by events over which he had no control cannot
be sustained. The general registration of voters for purposes of the May 1998 elections was scheduled for two (2) consecutive
weekends, viz.: June 14, 15, 21, and 22.33

While, Domino's intention to establish residence in Sarangani can be gleaned from the fact that be bought the house he was
renting on November 4, 1997, that he sought cancellation of his previous registration in Qezon City on 22 October 1997, 34 and
that he applied for transfer of registration from Quezon City to Sarangani by reason of change of residence on 30 August
1997,35 DOMINO still falls short of the one year residency requirement under the Constitution.

In showing compliance with the residency requirement, both intent and actual presence in the district one intends to represent
must satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. 36 Domino's failure to do so rendered him ineligible and his
election to office null and void.37

The Third Issue.

DOMINO's contention that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction in the present petition is bereft of merit.

As previously mentioned, the COMELEC, under Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, has jurisdiction over a petition
to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. Such jurisdiction continues even after election, if for any reason no
final judgment of disqualification is rendered before the election, and the candidate facing disqualification is voted for and
receives the highest number of votes38 and provided further that the winning candidate has not been proclaimed or has taken
his oath of office.39

It has been repeatedly held in a number of cases, that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's sole and exclusive
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress as provided under
Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives. 40

The fact of obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the position in the winning
candidate.41 A candidate must be proclaimed and must have taken his oath of office before he can be considered a member of
the House of Representatives.

In the instant case, DOMINO was not proclaimed as Congressman-elect of the Lone Congressional District of the Province of
Sarangani by reason of a Supplemental Omnibus Resolution issued by the COMELEC on the day of the election ordering the
suspension of DOMINO's proclamation should he obtain the winning number of votes. This resolution was issued by the
COMELEC in view of the non-finality of its 6 May 1998 resolution disqualifying DOMINO as candidate for the position.

Cosidering that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the Lone Congressional District of the Province of
Sarangani he cannot be deemed a member of the House of Representatives. Hence, it is the COMELEC and not the Electoral
Tribunal which has jurisdiction over the issue of his ineligibility as a candidate. 42

Issue raised by INTERVENOR.

After finding that DOMINO is disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the province of Sarangani, may
INTERVENOR, as the candidate who received the next highest number of votes, be proclaimed as the winning candidate?

It is now settled doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in
case the winning candidate is disqualified.43 In every election, the people's choice is the paramount consideration and their
expressed will must, at all times, be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate by giving the
highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, no one can be declared elected in his place.44

It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has
not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the
majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. 45 To simplistically assume that the
second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voters. He could not
be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the qualified candidate, the conditions
would have substantially changed.46

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the
election for that office, and it is fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected
and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. 47

The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an office is only that the election fails entirely, that the wreath of
victory cannot be transferred48 from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the law then as now only
authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes 49 and does not entitle the
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such case, the electors have failed to make a
choice and the election is a nullity.50 To allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the elective position despite
his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the
importance and meaning of democracy and the people's right to elect officials of their choice.51

INTERVENOR's plea that the votes cast in favor of DOMINO be considered stray votes cannot be sustained. INTERVENOR's
reliance on the opinion made in the Labo, Jr. case52 to wit: if the electorate, fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's
disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nevertheless cast their votes in favor of the
ineligible candidate, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously
misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number
of votes may be deemed elected, is misplaced.

Contrary to the claim of INTERVENOR, petitioner was not notoriously known by the public as an ineligible candidate. Although
the resolution declaring him ineligible as candidate was rendered before the election, however, the same is not yet final and
executory. In fact, it was no less than the COMELEC in its Supplemental Omnibus Resolution No. 3046 that allowed DOMINO
to be voted for the office and ordered that the votes cast for him be counted as the Resolution declaring him ineligible has not
yet attained finality. Thus the votes cast for DOMINO are presumed to have been cast in the sincere belief that he was a
qualified candidate, without any intention to misapply their franchise. Thus, said votes can not be treated as stray, void, or
meaningless.53

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The resolution dated 6 May 1998 of the COMELEC 2nd Division and the
decision dated 29 May 1998 of the COMELEC En Banc, are hereby AFFIRMED.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Santiago, JJ., concur.

Panganiban J., In the result; please see separate opinion.

Quisumbing, J., In the result, only insofar or Petitioner Domino is adjudged disqualified.

Purisima and Pardo JJ., took no part.

Domino vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the lone legislative
district of the Province of Sarangani indicating that he has resided in the constituency where he seeks to
be elected for 1 year and 2 months. Private respondents filed a petition seeking to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of Domino, alleging that Domino, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is not a
resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks election. Thereafter, the
COMELEC promulgated a resolution declaring Domino disqualified as candidate for the position of representative
of the lone district of Sarangani in the May 11, 1998 polls for lack of the one-year residency requirement and
likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy based on his own Voter’s Registration Record and
his address indicated as 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Hts., Old Balara, Quezon City.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner has resided in Sarangani Province for at least 1 year immediately preceding
the May 11, 1998 elections

Held: The term “residence,” as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office,
means the same thing as “domicile,” which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. “Domicile” denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to
return.

Records show that petitioner’s domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime in 1991, he acquired
a new domicile of choice in Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of representative
of the Third District of Quezon City in the May 1995election. Petitioner is now claiming that he
had effectively abandoned his residence in Quezon City and has established a new domicile of choice in the
Province of Sarangani.

A person’s domicile, once established, is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is
established. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual
change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one and definite acts whichcorrespond with the purpose.

The contract of lease of a house and lot entered into sometime in January 1997 does not adequately support a
change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of Domino’s intention to reside in Sarangani, but it
does not engender the kind of permanency required to proveabandonment of one’s original domicile. The mere
absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention to abandon it
does not result in loss or change of domicile. Thus, the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot in
Sarangani cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year
residence requirement. Further, Domino’s lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is
strengthened by his act of registering as voter in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it
does give rise to a strong presumption of residence especially in this case where Domino registered in his former
barangay.

Republic of the Philippines

Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila

Tenth Congress

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-third day of July, two thousand seven.

Republic Act No. 8436 December 22, 1997

Amended by RA 9369

AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO USE AN AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM IN THE MAY
11, 1998 NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL EXERCISES,
PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::

Section 1. Declaration of policy. - It is the policy of the State to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections,
and assure the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot in order that the results of elections, plebiscites, referenda, and other electoral
exercises shall be fast, accurate and reflective of the genuine will of the people.

Section 2. Definition of terms. - As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

1. Automated election system - a system using appropriate technology for voting and electronic devices to count votes
and canvass/consolidate results;

2. Counting machine - a machine that uses an optical scanning/mark-sense reading device or any similar advanced
technology to count ballots;

3. Data storage device - a device used to electronically store counting and canvassing results, such as a memory pack
or diskette;

4. Computer set - a set of equipment containing regular components, i.e., monitor, central processing unit or CPU,
keyboard and printer;

5. National ballot - refers to the ballot to be used in the automated election system for the purpose of the May 11, 1998
elections. This shall contain the names of the candidates for president, vice-president, senators and parties,
organizations or coalitions participating under the party-list system.

This ballot shall be counted by the counting machine;

6. Local Ballot - refers to the ballot on which the voter will manually write the names of the candidates of his/her choice
for member of the House of Representatives, governor, vice-governor, members of the provincial board, mayor, vice-
mayor, and members of the city/municipal council. For the purpose of the May 11, 1998 elections, this ballot will be
counted manually;

7. Board of Election Inspectors - there shall be a Board of Election Inspectors in every precinct composed of three (3)
regular members who shall conduct the voting, counting and recording of votes in the polling place.
 For the purpose of the May 11, 1998 elections, there shall be special members composed of a fourth member in each
precinct and a COMELEC representative who is authorized to operate the counting machine. Both shall conduct the
counting and recording of votes of the national ballots in the designated counting centers;

8. Election returns - a machine-generated document showing the date of the election, the province, municipality and
the precinct in which it is held and the votes in figures for each candidate in a precinct directly produced by the
counting machine;

9. Statement of votes - a machine-generated document containing the votes obtained by candidates in each precinct in
a city/municipality;

10. City/municipal/district/provincial certificate of canvass of votes - a machine-generated document containing the

total votes in figures obtained by each candidate in a city/municipality/district/ province as the case may be; and

11. Counting center - a public place designated by the Commission where counting of votes and
canvassing/consolidation of results shall be conducted.

Section 3. Qualifications, rights and limitations of the special members of the Board of Election Inspectors.- No person
shall be appointed as a special member of the board of election inspectors unless he/she is of good moral character and
irreproachable reputation, a registered voter, has never been convicted of any election offense or of any crime punishable by
more than six (6) months imprisonment or if he/she has pending against him/her an information for any election offense or if
he/she is related within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to any member of the board of election inspectors or
any special member of the same board of Election Inspector or to any candidate for a national position or to a nominee as a
party list representative or his/her spouse. The special members of the board shall enjoy the same rights and be bound by the
same limitations and liabilities of a regular member of the board of election inspectors but shall not vote during the proceedings
of the board of election inspectors except on matters pertaining to the national ballot.

Section 4. Duties and functions of the special members of the Board of Election Inspectors. -

1. During the conduct of the voting in the polling place, the fourth member shall:

(a) accomplish the minutes of voting for the automated election system in the precinct; and

(b) ensure that the national ballots are placed inside the appropriate ballot box;lawphi1.net

2. On the close of the polls, the fourth member shall bring the ballot box containing the national ballots to the
designated counting center;

3. Before the counting of votes, the fourth member shall verify if the number of national ballots tallies with the data in
the minutes of the voting;

4. During the counting of votes, the fourth member and the COMELEC authorized representative shall jointly
accomplish the minutes of counting for the automated election system in the precinct;

5. After the counting of votes, the fourth member and the COMELEC authorized representative shall jointly:

(a) certify the results of the counting of national ballots from the precinct; and

(b) bring the ballot box containing the counted national ballots together with the minutes of voting and
counting, and other election documents and paraphernalia to the city or municipal treasurer for safekeeping.

Section 5. Board of Canvassers. - For purposes of the May 11, 1998 elections, each province, city or municipality shall have
two (2) board of canvassers, one for the manual election system under the existing law, and the other, for the automated
system. For the automated election system, the chairman of the board shall be appointed by the Commission from among its
personnel/deputies and the members from the officials enumerated in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 6646.

Section 6. Authority to use an automated election system. - To carry out the above-stated policy, the Commission on
Elections, herein referred to as the Commission, is hereby authorized to use an automated election system, herein referred to
as the System, for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidation of results of the national and local
elections: Provided, however, That for the May 11, 1998 elections, the System shall be applicable in all areas within the
country only for the positions of president, vice-president, senators and parties, organizations or coalitions participating under
the party-list system.

To achieve the purpose of this Act, the Commission is authorized to procure by purchase, lease or otherwise any supplies,
equipment, materials and services needed for the holding of the elections by an expedited process of public bidding of
vendors, suppliers or lessors: Provided, That the accredited political parties are duly notified of and allowed to observe but not
to participate in the bidding. If, inspite of its diligent efforts to implement this mandate in the exercise of this authority, it
becomes evident by February 9, 1998 that the Commission cannot fully implement the automated election system for national
positions in the May 11, 1998 elections, the elections for both national and local positions shall be done manually except in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) where the automated election system shall be used for all positions.

Section 7. Features of the system. - The System shall utilize appropriate technology for voting, and electronic devices for
counting of votes and canvassing of results. For this purpose, the Commission shall acquire automated counting machines,
computer equipment, devices and materials and adopt new forms and printing materials.

The System shall contain the following features: (a) use of appropriate ballots, (b) stand-alone machine which can count votes
and an automated system which can consolidate the results immediately, (c) with provisions for audit trails, (d) minimum
human intervention, and (e) adequate safeguard/security measures.

In addition, the System shall as far as practicable have the following features:

1. It must be user-friendly and need not require computer-literate operators;

2. The machine security must be built-in and multi-layer existent on hardware and software with minimum human
intervention using latest technology like encrypted coding system;

3. The security key control must be embedded inside the machine sealed against human intervention;

4. The Optical Mark Reader (OMR) must have a built-in printer for numbering the counted ballots and also for printing
the individual precinct number on the counted ballots;

5. The ballot paper for the OMR counting machine must be of the quality that passed the international standard like
ISO-1831, JIS-X- 9004 or its equivalent for optical character recognition;

6. The ballot feeder must be automatic;

7. The machine must be able to count from 100 to 150 ballots per minute;

8. The counting machine must be able to detect fake or counterfeit ballots and must have a fake ballot rejector;

9. The counting machine must be able to detect and reject previously counted ballots to prevent duplication;

10. The counting machine must have the capability to recognize the ballot's individual precinct and city or municipality
before counting or consolidating the votes;

11. The System must have a printer that has the capacity to print in one stroke or operation seven (7) copies (original
plus six (6) copies) of the consolidated reports on carbonless paper;

12. The printer must have at least 128 kilobytes of Random Access Memory (RAM) to facilitate the expeditious
processing of the printing of the consolidated reports;

13. The machine must have a built-in floppy disk drive in order to save the processed data on a diskette;

14. The machine must also have a built-in hard disk to store the counted and consolidated data for future printout and
verification;

15. The machine must be temperature-resistant and rust-proof;

16. The optical lens of the OMR must have a self-cleaning device;
 17. The machine must not be capable of being connected to external computer peripherals for the process of vote
consolidation;

18. The machine must have an Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS);

19. The machine must be accompanied with operating manuals that will guide the personnel of the Commission the
proper use and maintenance of the machine;

20. It must be so designed and built that add-ons may immediately be incorporated into the System at minimum
expense;

21. It must provide the shortest time needed to complete the counting of votes and canvassing of the results of the
election;

22. The machine must be able to generate consolidated reports like the election return, statement of votes and
certificate of canvass at different levels; and

23. The accuracy of the count must be guaranteed, the margin of error must be disclosed and backed by warranty
under such terms and conditions as may be determined by the Commission.

In the procurement of this system, the Commission shall adopt an equitable system of deductions or demerits for deviations or
deficiencies in meeting all the above stated features and standards.

For this purpose, the Commission shall create an Advisory Council to be composed of technical experts from the Department
of Science and Technology (DOST), the Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines (ITFP), the University of the
Philippines (UP), and two (2) representatives from the private sector recommended by the Philippine Computer Society (PCS).

The Council may avail itself of the expertise and services of resource persons of known competence and probity.

The Commission in collaboration with the DOST shall establish an independent Technical Ad Hoc Evaluation Committee,
herein known as the Committee, composed of a representative each from the Senate, House of Representatives, DOST and
COMELEC. The Committee shall certify that the System is operating properly and accurately and that the machines have a
demonstrable capacity to distinguish between genuine and spurious ballots.

The Committee shall ensure that the testing procedure shall be unbiased and effective in checking the worthiness of the
System. Toward this end, the Committee shall design and implement a reliability test procedure or a system stress test.

Section 8. Procurement of equipment and materials. - The Commission shall procure the automated counting machines,
computer equipment, devices and materials needed for ballot printing and devices for voting, counting and canvassing from
local or foreign sources free from taxes and import duties, subject to accounting and auditing rules and regulations.

Section 9. Systems breakdown in the counting center. - In the event of a systems breakdown of all assigned machines in
the counting center, the Commission shall use any available machine or any component thereof from another city/municipality
upon the approval of the Commission en banc or any of its divisions.

The transfer of such machines or any component thereof shall be undertaken in the presence of representatives of political
parties and citizens' arm of the Commission who shall be notified by the election officer of such transfer.

There is a systems breakdown in the counting center when the machine fails to read the ballots or fails to store/save results or
fails to print the results after it has read the ballots; or when the computer fails to consolidate election results/reports or fails to
print election results/reports after consolidation.

Section 10. Examination and testing of counting machines. - The Commission shall, on the date and time it shall set and
with proper notices, allow the political parties and candidates or their representatives, citizens' arm or their representatives to
examine and test the machines to ascertain that the system is operating properly and accurately. Test ballots and test forms
shall be provided by the Commission.

After the examination and testing, the machines shall be locked and sealed by the election officer or any authorized
representative of the Commission in the presence of the political parties and candidates or their representatives, and
accredited citizens' arms. The machines shall be kept locked and sealed and shall be opened again on election day before the
counting of votes begins.

Immediately after the examination and testing of the machines, the parties and candidates or their representatives, citizens'
arms or their representatives, may submit a written report to the election officer who shall immediately transmit it to the
Commission for appropriate action.

Section 11. Official ballot. - The Commission shall prescribe the size and form of the official ballot which shall contain the
titles of the positions to be filled and/or the propositions to be voted upon in an initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Under each
position, the names of candidates shall be arranged alphabetically by surname and uniformly printed using the same type size.
A fixed space where the chairman of the Board of Election inspectors shall affix his/her signature to authenticate the official
ballot shall be provided.

Both sides of the ballots may be used when necessary.

For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for registration/manifestation to participate in the
election shall not be later than one hundred twenty (120) days before the elections: Provided, That, any elective official,
whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he/she is holding in a permanent capacity, except for
president and vice-president, shall be deemed resigned only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the
position for which he/she is running: Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take
effect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That, for purposes of the May 11, 1998 elections, the
deadline for filing of the certificate of candidacy for the positions of President, Vice President, Senators and candidates under
the Party-List System as well as petitions for registration and/or manifestation to participate in the Party-List System shall be on
February 9, 1998 while the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy for other positions shall be on March 27, 1998.

The official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing Office and/or the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas at the price
comparable with that of private printers under proper security measures which the Commission shall adopt. The Commission
may contract the services of private printers upon certification by the National Printing Office/Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that it
cannot meet the printing requirements. Accredited political parties and deputized citizens' arms of the Commission may assign
watchers in the printing, storage and distribution of official ballots.

To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the Committee shall ensure that the serial number on the ballot
stub shall be printed in magnetic ink that shall be easily detectable by inexpensive hardware and shall be impossible to
reproduce on a photocopying machine, and that identification marks, magnetic strips, bar codes and other technical and
security markings, are provided on the ballot.

The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each city/municipality at the rate of one (1) ballot for every registered voter
with a provision of additional four (4) ballots per precinct.

Section 12. Substitution of candidates. - In case of valid substitutions after the official ballots have been printed, the votes
cast for the substituted candidates shall be considered votes for the substitutes.

Section 13. Ballot box. - There shall be in each precinct on election day a ballot box with such safety features that the
Commission may prescribe and of such size as to accommodate the official ballots without folding them.

For the purpose of the May 11, 1998 elections, there shall be two (2) ballot boxes for each precinct, one (1) for the national
ballots and one (I) for the local ballots.

Section 14. Procedure in voting. - The voter shall be given a ballot by the chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors. The
voter shall then proceed to a voting booth to accomplish his/her ballot.

If a voter spoils his/her ballot, he/she may be issued another ballot subject to Section 11 of this Act. No voter may be allowed
to change his/her ballot more than once.

After the voter has voted, he/she shall affix his/her thumbmark on the corresponding space in the voting record. The chairman
shall apply indelible ink on the voter's right forefinger and affix his/her signature in the space provided for such purpose in the
ballot. The voter shall then personally drop his/her ballot on the ballot box.

For the purpose of the May 11, 1998 elections, each voter shall be given one (1) national and one (1) local ballot by the
Chairperson. The voter shall, after casting his/her vote, personally drop the ballots in their respective ballot boxes.
Section 15. Closing of polls. - After the close of voting, the board shall enter in the minutes the number of registered voters
who actually voted, the number and serial number of unused and spoiled ballots, the serial number of the self-locking metal
seal to be used in sealing the ballot box. The board shall then place the minutes inside the ballot box and thereafter close, lock
and seal the same with padlocks, self-locking metal seals or any other safety devices that the Commission may authorize. The
chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors shall publicly announce that the votes shall be counted at a designated counting
center where the board shall transport the ballot box containing the ballots and other election documents and paraphernalia.

For the purpose of the May 11, 1998 elections, the chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors shall publicly announce that
the votes for president, vice-president, senators and parties, organizations or coalitions participating in the party-list system
shall be counted at a designated counting center. During the transport of the ballot box containing the national ballots and
other documents, the fourth member of the board shall be escorted by representatives from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or from the Philippine National Police, citizens' arm, and if available, representatives of political parties and
candidates.

Section 16. Designation of Counting Centers. - The Commission shall designate counting center(s) which shall be a public
place within the city/municipality or in such other places as may be designated by the Commission when peace and order
conditions so require, where the official ballots cast in various precincts of the city/municipality shall be counted. The election
officer shall post prominently in his/her office, in the bulletin boards at the city/municipal hall and in three (3) other conspicuous
places in the city/municipality, the notice on the designated counting center(s) for at least fifteen (15) days prior to election day.

For the purpose of the May 11, 1998 elections, the Commission shall designate a central counting center(s) which shall be a
public place within the city or municipality, as in the case of the National Capital Region and in highly urbanized areas. The
Commission may designate other counting center(s) where the national ballots cast from various precincts of different
municipalities shall be counted using the automated system. The Commission shall post prominently a notice thereof, for at
least fifteen (15) days prior to election day, in the office of the election officer, on the bulletin boards at the municipal hall and in
three (3) other conspicuous places in the municipality.

Section 17. Counting procedure. - (a) The counting of votes shall be public and conducted in the designated counting
center(s).

(b) The ballots shall be counted by the machine by precinct in the order of their arrival at the counting center. The election
officer or his/her representative shall log the sequence of arrival of the ballot boxes and indicate their condition. Thereafter, the
board shall, in the presence of the watchers and representatives of accredited citizens' arm, political parties/candidates, open
the ballot box, retrieve the ballots and minutes of voting. It shall verify whether the number of ballots tallies with the data in the
minutes. If there are excess ballots, the poll clerk, without looking at the ballots, shall publicly draw out at random ballots equal
to the excess and without looking at the contents thereof, place them in an envelope which shall be marked "excess ballots".
The envelope shall be sealed and signed by the members of the board and placed in the compartment for spoiled ballots.

(c) The election officer or any authorized official or any member of the board shall feed the valid ballots into the machine
without interruption until all the ballots for the precincts are counted.

(d) The board shall remain at the counting center until all the official ballots for the precinct are counted and all reports are
properly accomplished.

For the purpose of the May 11, 1998 elections, the ballots shall be counted by precinct by the special members of the board in
the manner provided in paragraph (b) hereof.

Section 18. Election returns. - After the ballots of the precincts have been counted, the election officer or any official
authorized by the Commission shall, in the presence of watchers and representatives of the accredited citizens' arm, political
parties/ candidates, if any, store the results in a data storage device and print copies of the election returns of each precinct.
The printed election returns shall be signed and thumbmarked by the fourth member and COMELEC authorized representative
and attested to by the election officer or authorized representative. The Chairman of the Board shall then publicly read and
announce the total number of votes obtained by each candidate based on the election returns.

Thereafter, the copies of the election returns shall be sealed and placed in the proper envelopes for distribution as follows:

A. In the election of president, vice-president, senators and party-list system:

(1) The first copy shall be delivered to the city or municipal board of canvassers;

(2) The second copy, to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate;
 (3) The third copy, to the Commission;

(4) The fourth copy, to the citizens' arm authorized by the Commission to conduct an unofficial count. In the
conduct of the unofficial quick count by any accredited citizens' arm, the Commission shall promulgate rules
and regulations to ensure, among others, that said citizens' arm releases in the order of their arrival one
hundred percent (100%) results of a precinct indicating the precinct, municipality or city, province and region:
Provided, however, that, the count shall continue until all precincts shall have been reported.

(5) The fifth copy, to the dominant majority party as determined by the Commission in accordance with law;

(6) The sixth copy, to the dominant minority party as determined by the Commission in accordance with law;
and

(7) The seventh copy shall be deposited inside the compartment of the ballot box for valid ballots.

The citizens' arm shall provide copies of the election returns at the expense of the requesting party.

For the purpose of the May 11, 1998 elections, after the national ballots have been counted, the COMELEC authorized
representative shall implement the provisions of paragraph A hereof.

B. In the election of local officials and members of the House of Representatives:

(1) The first copy shall be delivered to the city or municipal board of canvassers;

(2) The second copy, to the Commission;

(3) The third copy, to the provincial board of canvassers;

(4) The fourth copy, to the citizens' arm authorized by the Commission to conduct an unofficial count. In the
conduct of the unofficial quick count by any accredited citizens' arm, the Commission shall promulgate rules
and regulations to ensure, among others, that said citizens' arm releases in the order of their arrival one
hundred percent (100%) results of a precinct indicating the precinct, municipality or city, province and region:
Provided, however, That, the count shall continue until all precincts shall have been reported.

(5) The fifth copy, to the dominant majority party as determined by the Commission in accordance with law;

(6) The sixth copy, to the dominant minority party as determined by the Commission in accordance with law;
and

(7) The seventh copy shall be deposited inside the compartment of the ballot box for valid ballots.

The citizens' arm shall provide copies of election returns at the expense of the requesting party.

After the votes from all precincts have been counted, a consolidated report of votes for each candidate shall be
printed.

After the printing of the election returns, the ballots shall be returned to the ballot box, which shall be locked, sealed
and delivered to the city/municipal treasurer for safekeeping. The treasurer shall immediately provide the Commission
and the election officer with a record of the serial numbers of the ballot boxes and the corresponding metal seals.

Section 19. Custody and accountability of ballots. - The election officer and the treasurer of the city/municipality as deputy
of the Commission shall have joint custody and accountability of the official ballots, accountable forms and other election
documents as well as ballot boxes containing the official ballots cast. The ballot boxes shall not be opened for three (3) months
unless the Commission orders otherwise.

Section 20. Substitution of Chairman and Members of the Board of Canvassers. - In case of non-availability, absence,
disqualification due to relationship, or incapacity for any cause of the chairman, the Commission shall appoint as substitute, a
ranking lawyer of the Commission. With respect to the other members of the board, the Commission shall appoint as substitute
the following in the order named: the provincial auditor, the register of deeds, the clerk of court nominated by the executive
judge of the regional trial court, or any other available appointive provincial official in the case of the provincial board of
canvassers; the officials in the city corresponding to those enumerated in the case of the city board of canvassers; and the
municipal administrator, the municipal assessor, the clerk of court nominated by the judge of the municipal trial court, in the
case of the municipal board of canvassers.

Section 21. Canvassing by Provincial, City, District and Municipal Boards of Canvassers. - The city or municipal board
of canvassers shall canvass the votes for the president, vice-president, senators, and parties, organizations or coalitions
participating under the party-list system by consolidating the results contained in the data storage devices used in the printing
of the election returns. Upon completion of the canvass, it shall print the certificate of canvass of votes for president, vice-
president, senators and members of the House of Representatives and elective provincial officials and thereafter, proclaim the
elected city or municipal officials, as the case may be.

The city board of canvassers of cities comprising one (1) or more legislative districts shall canvass the votes for president,
vice-president, senators, members of the House of Representatives and elective city officials by consolidating the results
contained in the data storage devices used in the printing of the election returns. Upon completion of the canvass, the board
shall print the canvass of votes for president, vice-president, and senators and thereafter, proclaim the elected members of the
House of Representatives and city officials.

In the Metro Manila area, each municipality comprising a legislative district shall have a district board of canvassers which shall
canvass the votes for president, vice-president, senators, members of the House of Representatives and elective municipal
officials by consolidating the results contained in the data storage devices used in the printing of the election returns. Upon
completion of the canvass, it shall print the certificate of canvass of votes for president, vice-president, and senators and
thereafter, proclaim the elected members of the House of Representatives and municipal officials.

Each component municipality in a legislative district in the Metro Manila area shall have a municipal board of canvassers which
shall canvass the votes for president, vice-president, senators, members of the House of Representatives and elective
municipal officials by consolidating the results contained in the data storage devices used in the printing of the election returns.
Upon completion of the canvass, it shall prepare the certificate of canvass of votes for president, vice-president, senators,
members of the House of Representatives and thereafter, proclaim the elected municipal officials.

The district board of canvassers of each legislative district comprising two (2) municipalities in the Metro Manila area shall
canvass the votes for president, vice-president, senators and members of the House of Representatives by consolidating the
results contained in the data storage devices submitted by the municipal board of canvassers of the component municipalities.
Upon completion of the canvass, it shall print a certificate of canvass of votes for president, vice-president and senators and
thereafter, proclaim the elected members of the House of Representatives in the legislative district.

The district/provincial board of canvassers shall canvass the votes for president, vice-president, senators, members of the
House of Representatives and elective provincial officials by consolidating the results contained in the data storage devices
submitted by the board of canvassers of the municipalities and component cities. Upon completion of the canvass, it shall print
the certificate of canvass of votes for president, vice-president and senators and thereafter, proclaim the elected members of
the House of Representatives and the provincial officials.

The municipal, city, district and provincial certificates of canvass of votes shall each be supported by a statement of votes.

The Commission shall adopt adequate and effective measures to preserve the integrity of the data storage devices at the
various levels of the boards of canvassers.

Section 22. Number of copies of Certificates of Canvass of Votes and their distribution. - (a) The certificate of canvass
of votes for president, vice-president, senators, members of the House of Representatives, parties, organizations or coalitions
participating under the party-list system and elective provincial officials shall be printed by the city or municipal board of
canvassers and distributed as follows:

(1) The first copy shall be delivered to the provincial board of canvassers for use in the canvass of election results for
president, vice-president, senators, members of the House of Representatives, parties, organizations or coalitions
participating under the party-list system and elective provincial officials;

(2) The second copy shall be sent to the Commission;

(3) The third copy shall be kept by the chairman of the board; and
 (4) The fourth copy shall be given to the citizens' arm designated by the Commission to conduct an unofficial count. It
shall be the duty of the citizens' arm to furnish independent candidates copies of the certificate of canvass at the
expense of the requesting party.

The board of canvassers shall furnish all registered parties copies of the certificate of canvass at the expense of the
requesting party.

(b) The certificate of canvass of votes for president, vice-president and senators, parties, organizations or coalitions
participating under the party-list system shall be printed by the city boards of canvassers of cities comprising one or more
legislative districts, by provincial boards of canvassers and by district boards of canvassers in the Metro Manila area, and other
highly urbanized areas and distributed as follows:

(1) The first copy shall be sent to Congress, directed to the President of the Senate for use in the canvas of election
results for president and vice-president;

(2) The second copy shall be sent to the Commission for use in the canvass of the election results for senators;

(3) The third copy shall be kept by the chairman of the board; and

(4) The fourth copy shall be given to the citizens' arm designated by the Commission to conduct an unofficial count. It
shall be the duty of the citizens' arm to furnish independent candidates copies of the certificate of canvass at the
expense of the requesting party.

The board of canvassers shall furnish all registered parties copies of the certificate of canvass at the expense of the
requesting party.

(c) The certificates of canvass printed by the provincial, district, city or municipal boards of canvassers shall be signed and
thumbmarked by the chairman and members of the board and the principal watchers, if available. Thereafter, it shall be sealed
and placed inside an envelope which shall likewise be properly sealed.

In all instances, where the Board of Canvassers has the duty to furnish registered political parties with copies of the certificate
of canvass, the pertinent election returns shall be attached thereto, where appropriate.

Section 23. National Board of Canvassers for Senators. - The chairman and members of the Commission on Elections
sitting en banc, shall compose the national board of canvassers for senators. It shall canvass the results for senators by
consolidating the results contained in the data storage devices submitted by the district, provincial and city boards of
canvassers of those cities which comprise one or more legislative districts. Thereafter, the national board shall proclaim the
winning candidates for senators.

Section 24. Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for President and Vice-President. - The Senate and the
House of Representatives in joint public session shall compose the national board of canvassers for president and vice-
president. The returns of every election for president and vice-president duly certified by the board of canvassers of each
province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the president of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of
canvass, the president of the Senate shall, not later than thirty (30) days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in
the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session and the Congress upon determination of
the authenticity and the due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass all the results for president and vice-
president by consolidating the results contained in the data storage devices submitted by the district, provincial and city boards
of canvassers and thereafter, proclaim the winning candidates for president and vice-president.

Section 25. Voters' education. - The Commission together with and in support of accredited citizens' arms shall carry out a
continuing and systematic campaign through newspapers of general circulation, radio and other media forms, as well as
through seminars, symposia, fora and other non-traditional means to educate the public and fully inform the electorate about
the automated election system and inculcate values on honest, peaceful and orderly elections.

Section 26. Supervision and control. - The System shall be under the exclusive supervision and control of the Commission.
For this purpose, there is hereby created an information technology department in the Commission to carry out the full
administration and implementation of the System.

The Commission shall take immediate steps as may be necessary for the acquisition, installation, administration, storage, and
maintenance of equipment and devices, and to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for the effective
implementation of this Act.
Section 27. Oversight Committee. - An Oversight Committee is hereby created composed of three (3) representatives each
from the Senate and the House of Representatives and three (3) from the Commission on Elections to monitor and evaluate
the implementation of this Act. A report to the Senate and the House of Representatives shall be submitted within ninety (90)
days from the date of election.

The oversight committee may hire competent consultants for project monitoring and information technology concerns related to
the implementation and improvement of the modern election system. The oversight committee shall be provided with the
necessary funds to carry out its duties.

Section 28. Designation of other dates for certain pre-election acts. - If it shall no longer be reasonably possible to
observe the periods and dates prescribed by law for certain pre-election acts, the Commission shall fix other periods and dates
in order to ensure accomplishment of the activities so voters shall not be deprived of their suffrage.

Section 29. Election offenses. - In addition to those enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as
amended, the following acts shall be penalized as election offenses, whether or not said acts affect the electoral process or
results:

(a) Utilizing without authorization, tampering with, destroying or stealing:

(1) Official ballots, election returns, and certificates of canvass of votes used in the System; and

(2) Electronic devices or their components, peripherals or supplies used in the System such as counting
machine, memory pack/diskette, memory pack receiver and computer set;

(b) Interfering with, impeding, absconding for purpose of gain, preventing the installation or use of computer counting
devices and the processing, storage, generation and transmission of election results, data or information; and

(c) Gaining or causing access to using, altering, destroying or disclosing any computer data, program, system
software, network, or any computer-related devices, facilities, hardware or equipment, whether classified or
declassified.

Section 30. Applicability. - The provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, otherwise known as the "Omnibus
Election Code of the Philippines", and other election laws not inconsistent with this Act shall apply.

Section 31. Rules and Regulations. - The Commission shall promulgate rules and regulations for the implementation and
enforcement of this Act including such measures that will address possible difficulties and confusions brought about by the
two-ballot system. The Commission may consult its accredited citizens' arm for this purpose.

Section 32. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be charged against the
current year's appropriations of the Commission. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the continuous
implementation of this Act shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.

In case of deficiency in the funding requirements herein provided, such amount as may be necessary shall be augmented from
the current contingent fund in the General Appropriations Act.

Section 33. Separability clause. - If, for any reason, any section or provision of this Act or any part thereof, or the application
of such section, provision or portion is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the remainder thereof shall not be affected by such
declaration.

Section 34. Repealing clause. - All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 35. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

Approved, December 22, 1997.

G.R. No. 222731, March 08, 2016

BAGUMBAYAN-VNP MOVEMENT, INC., AND RICHARD J. GORDON, AS CHAIRMAN OF BAGUMBAYAN-

VNP MOVEMENT, INC., Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
 RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

A petition for mandamus may be granted and a writ issued when an agency "unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office." 1

Petitioners Bagumbayan Volunteers for a New Philippines Movement, Inc. (Bagumbayan-VNP, Inc.) and
Former Senator Richard J. Gordon (Gordon) filed this Petition2 for mandamus before this court to compel
respondent Commission on Elections to implement the Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail security feature.

Bagumbayan-VNP, Inc. is a non-stock and non-profit corporation.3 It operates through Bagumbayan

Volunteers for a New Philippines,4 a national political party duly registered with the Commission on Elections.5

Former Senator Gordon is a registered voter and taxpayer. 6 He is an official candidate for the Senate of the
Philippines7 and is the Chairperson of Bagumbayan-VNP, Inc. Gordon authored Republic Act No. 9369, the law
that amended Republic Act No. 8436, otherwise known as the Automated Election System Law. 8

The Commission on Elections is a government entity9 "vested by law to enforce and administer all laws relative
to the conduct of elections in the country."10

On December 22, 1997, Republic Act No. 843611 authorized the Commission on Elections to use an automated
election system for electoral exercises.12 After almost a decade, Republic Act No. 936913 amended Republic Act
No. 8436. Republic Act No. 9369 introduced significant changes to Republic Act No. 8436, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, and other election-related statutes.14

Automation is hailed as a key "towards clean and credible elections," reducing the long wait and discouraging
cheating.15 In 2010 and 2013, the Commission on Elections enforced a nationwide automated election system
using the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines. For the 2016 National and Local Elections, the
Commission on Elections has opted to use the Vote-Counting Machine.16 The vote-counting machine is a
"paper-based automated election system,"17 which is reported to be "seven times faster and more powerful
than the PCOS because of its updated processor."18 Likewise, it is reported to have more memory and security
features,19 and is "capable of producing the Voter Verification Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT)." 20 This VVPAT
functionality is in the form of a printed receipt and a touch screen reflecting the votes in the vote-counting
machine.21

Petitioners allege that under Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, there are several
safeguards or Minimum System Capabilities to ensure the sanctity of the ballot. Among these is the
implementation of the VVPAT security feature, as found in Section 6(e), (f), and (n).

The full text of Section 6 is as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 6. Minimum System Capabilities. - The automated election system must at least have the following
functional capabilities:

(a) Adequate security against unauthorized access;

(b) Accuracy in recording and reading of votes as well as in the tabulation, consolidation/canvassing, electronic
transmission, and storage of results;

(c) Error recovery in case of non-catastrophic failure of device;

(d) System integrity which ensures physical stability and functioning of the vote recording and counting
process;

(e) Provision for voter verified paper audit trail;

(f) System auditability which provides supporting documentation for verifying the correctness of reported
election results;
(g) An election management system for preparing ballots and programs for use in the casting and counting of
votes and to consolidate, report and display election result in the shortest time possible;

(h) Accessibility to illiterates and disable voters;

(i) Vote tabulating program for election, referendum or plebiscite;

(j) Accurate ballot counters;

(k) Data retention provision;

(l) Provide for the safekeeping, storing and archiving of physical or paper resource used in the election
process;

(m) Utilize or generate official ballots as herein defined;

(n) Provide the voter a system of verification to find out whether or not the machine has registered his choice;
and

(o) Configure access control for sensitive system data and function. (Emphasis supplied).
Petitioners claim that VVPAT "consists of physical paper records of voter ballots as voters have cast them on
an electronic voting system."22 Through it, the voter can verify if the choices on the paper record match the
choices that he or she actually made in the ballot.23 The voter can confirm whether the machine had actually
read the ballot correctly. Petitioners seek to compel the Commission on Elections to have the vote-counting
machine issue receipts once a person has voted.

According to petitioners, the VVPAT "will ensure transparency and reduce any attempt to alter the results of
the elections."24 There will be "an electronic tally of the votes cast" or the vote stored in the vote-counting
machine, as well as "a paper record of the individual votes" cast or the VVPAT receipt. 25 Should there be any
doubt, "the electronically generated results . . . can then be audited and verified through a comparison . . .
with these paper records."26

In the Terms of Reference for the 2016 National and Local Elections Automation Project, the Commission on
Elections lists the Minimum Technical Specifications of the Optical Mark Reader or Optical Scan System,
precinct-based technologies that the poll body shall accept.27cralawred

Component 1 (B), subparagraphs (5) and (19) states as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
5. The system's hardware shall have a display panel that is capable to display customizable messages or
prompts of each stage of the process execution, including prompts and messages for user interaction
purposes.

..
.

19. The system shall have a vote verification feature which shall display and print the voter's choices,
which can be enabled or disabled in the configuration using the [Election Management System].
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners claim that the Commission on Elections refuses to implement the VVPAT function based on fears
that the security feature may aid in vote-buying, and that the voting period may take longer.28 On February 9,
2016, petitioners read from ABS-CBN News Online that with a vote of 7-0, the Commission on Elections En
Banc decided not to implement the VVPAT for the 2016 Elections.29 Petitioners attached a copy of the
article.30 Other news reports state that the Commission on Elections ruled similarly against the voting receipts
in 2010 and 2013.31
At the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee on the Automated Election System on February 16,
2016,32 the Commission on Elections, through its Chairperson Andres D. Bautista (Chairperson Bautista),
supposedly gave its reasons for refusing to issue paper receipts. First, "politicians can use the receipts in vote
buying[;]" second, it may increase voting time to five to seven hours in election precincts:33
[T]he poll body has decided against printing the receipt because it might be used for vote buying and that it
would result in the vote-counting process being extended from six to seven hours since it takes about 13
seconds to print a receipt, meaning each machine would have to run for that long for the receipts.

Bautista said another "big concern" is that "there might be losing candidates who might question the results,
basically instructing their supporters that when the machine prints out the receipt, regardless of what the
receipt says, they will say that it's not correct." 34ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On February 11, 2016, the Commission on Elections issued Resolution No. 10057 35 providing for "rules and
general instructions on the process of testing and sealing, [as well as] voting, counting, and transmission of
election results."36 Adopting Resolution No. 10057 by a vote of 7-0, the Commission on Elections En Banc
made no mention using VVPAT receipts for the 2016 national elections.

Petitioners argue that the Commission on Elections' fears are "baseless and speculative." 37 In assailing the
Commission on Elections' reasons, petitioners cite the Position Paper 38 of alleged automated elections expert,
Atty. Glenn Ang Chong (Atty. Chong). Atty. Chong recommended that the old yellow ballot boxes be used
alongside the voting machine. The VVPAT receipts can be immediately placed inside the old ballot boxes. 39

After the voter casts his or her vote, he or she gets off the queue and walks to where the old ballot box is.
There, the voter may verify if the machine accurately recorded the vote; if so, the voter drops the VVPAT
receipt into the old ballot box.40 Should there be any discrepancy, the voter may have it duly recorded with the
poll watchers for analysis and appropriate action.41 The poll watchers must ensure that all receipts are
deposited into the old ballot box.42 This will guarantee that no voter can sell his or her vote using the receipt. 43

At the end of the polling, the old ballot boxes shall be turned over to the accredited citizens' arm or
representatives of the public for the manual verification count of the votes cast. A member of the Board of
Election Inspectors may supervise the count. The result of the manual verification count (using the old ballot
boxes) shall be compared with that of the automated count (saved in the vote-counting machine).44

Petitioners add that during Senate deliberations,45 the main proponent of the amendatory law, Former Senator
Gordon, highlighted the importance of "an audit trail usually supported by paper[.]" 46

On November 10, 2015, Bagumbayan-VNP, Inc. sent Commission on Elections Chairperson Bautista a letter
demanding the implementation of the VVPAT feature for the May 9, 2016 Elections.47 However, the
Commission on Elections never answered the letter. 48

According to petitioners, the inclusion of VVPAT, a "mandatory requirement under the automated election
laws, [has been] flagrantly violated by [COMELEC] during the 2010 and 2013 Elections." They claim that the
previous demands made on the Commission on Elections to reactivate the VVPAT security feature "fell on deaf
ears."49 In the 2010 and 2013 Elections, all a voter received from the voting machines were the words,
"Congratulations! Your vote has been counted," or an otherwise similar phrase. 50

Petitioners claim that under Section 28 of Republic Act No. 9369, amending Section 35 of Republic Act No.
8436, anyone "interfering with and impeding . . . the use of computer counting devices and the processing,
storage, generation and transmission of election results, data or information" commits a felonious act. 51 The
Commission on Elections allegedly did so when it refused to implement VVPAT. 52

In view of the foregoing, petitioners filed a Special Civil Action for Mandamus under Rule 65, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court. They ask this court to compel the Commission on Elections to comply with the provisions of
Section 6(e), (f), and (n) of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended.

Petitioners argue that mandamus is proper to "enforce a public right" and "compel the performance of a public
duty."53 Under Article VIII, Section 5(1) of the Constitution, this court has original jurisdiction over petitions
for mandamus. In addition, Rule 65, Section 4 of the Rules of Court allows for a civil action for mandamus to
be directly filed before this court.54 There is no reglementary period in a special civil action for mandamus.55
According to petitioners, the law prescribes the "minimum" criteria of adopting VVPAT as one of the security
features. The use of the word "must" 56 makes it mandatory to have a paper audit "separate and distinct from
the ballot."57 The Commission on Elections allegedly has neither leeway "nor right to claim that the ballot itself
is the paper audit trail."58 Likewise, the words, "voter verified" in VVPAT means the voter, not the Commission
on Elections, must be the one verifying the accuracy of the vote cast. 59

Petitioners conclude that the Commission on Elections' "baseless fear of vote buying" is no excuse to violate
the law. "There is greater risk of cheating on a mass scale if the VVPAT were not implemented because digital
cheating" is even more "difficult to detect . . . than cheating by isolated cases of vote buying."60

In the Resolution dated February 23, 2016, this court required the Commission on Elections to comment on
the petition within a non-extendible period of five (5) days after receiving the notice.

Instead of submitting its Comment, the Commission on Elections filed a Motion for Additional Time to File
Comment through the Office of the Solicitor General.61 The Office of the Solicitor General alleged that it "has
not yet received a copy of the Petition and has yet to obtain from COMELEC the documents relevant to this
case."62

It is not often that this court requires the filing of a comment within a non-extendible period. This is resorted
to when the issues raised by a party is fundamental and the ambient circumstances indicate extreme urgency.
The right of voters to verify whether vote-counting machines properly recorded their vote is not only a
statutory right; it is one that enables their individual participation in governance as sovereign. Among all
government bodies, the Commission on Elections is the entity that should appreciate how important it is to
respond to cases filed by the public to enable these rights. It perplexes this court that the Commission on
Elections failed to immediately transmit relevant documents to the Office of the Solicitor General to allow them
to respond within the time granted.

The Office of the Clerk of Court En Banc noted that both the Commission on Elections and the Office of the
Solicitor General were already furnished with a copy of the Petition when this court ordered them to file a
comment.63 Due to the urgency to resolve this case, this court denied the Commission on Elections' Motion.
This court cannot fail to act on an urgent matter simply because of the non-compliance of the Commission on
Elections and the Office of the Solicitor General with its orders. This court cannot accept the lackadaisical
attitude of the Commission on Elections and its counsel in addressing this case. This court has been firm that
as a general rule, motions for extension are not granted, and if granted, only for good and sufficient
cause.64 Counsels, even those from government, should not assume that this court will act favorably on a
motion for extension of time to file a pleading.65

For this court's resolution is whether the Commission on Elections may be compelled, through a writ of
mandamus, to enable the Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail system capability feature for the 2016 Elections.

We grant the Petition.

Mandamus is the relief sought "[w]hen any tribunal corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station," and "there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." 66

Through a writ of mandamus, the courts "compel the performance of a clear legal duty or a ministerial duty
imposed by law upon the defendant or respondent"67 by operation of his or her office, trust, or station. The
petitioner must show the legal basis for the duty, and that the defendant or respondent failed to perform the
duty.

Petitioners argue that the Commission on Elections unlawfully neglected to perform its legal duty of fully
implementing our election laws, specifically Republic Act No. 8436, Section 6(e), (f), and (n), as amended by
Republic Act No. 9369:68
SEC. 6. Minimum System Capabilities. — The automated election system must at least have the following
functional capabilities:

....

(e) Provision for voter verified paper audit trail;

(f) System auditability which provides supporting documentation for verifying the correctness of reported
election results;

....

(n) Provide the voter a system of verification to find out whether or not the machine has registered his choice;
Commission on Elections Resolution No. 10057 promulgated on February 11, 2016 did not include mechanisms
for VVPAT. Under Part III of the Resolution, it merely stated:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 40. Manner of voting. -

a. The voter shall:

1. Using a ballot secrecy folder and the marking pen provided by the Commission, fill his/her ballot
by fully shading the circle beside the names of the candidates and the party, organization or
coalition participating in the party-list system of representation, of his/her choice; and

2. After accomplishing his/her ballot, approach the VCM, insert his/her ballot in the ballot entry
slot;

i. The VCM will display "PROCESSING.../PAKIHINTAY... KASALUKUYANG PINOPROSESO";

ii. The ballot shall automatically be dropped inside the ballot box. The VCM will then display
the message "YOUR VOTE HAS BEEN CAST/ANG IYONG BOTO AY NAISAMANA."

iii. The VCM will display the message "AMBIGUOUS MARK DETECTED" if the ovals are not
properly shaded or an unintentional mark is made. It will display the message
"AMBIGUOUS MARKS DETECTED/MAY MALABONG MARKA SA BALOTA." The following
options shall be provided "TO CAST BALLOT PRESS/PARA IPASOK ANG BALOTA,
PINDUTIN" or "TO RETURN BALLOT, PRESS/PARA IBALIK ANG BALOTA, PINDUTIN." Press
the "TO RETURN BALLOT, PRESS/PARA IBALIK ANG BALOTA, PINDUTIN" to return the
ballot to the voter. Let the voter review the ballot and ensure that the ovals opposite the
names of the candidate voted for are fully shaded.

iv. In case of illiterate voters, PWD voters who are visually-impaired, and senior citizens
(SCs) who may need the use of headphones, the BEI shall insert the headphones so they
can follow the instructions of the VCM.

b. The poll clerk/support staff shall:

1. Monitor, from afar, the VCM screen to ensure that the ballot was successfully accepted;

2. Thereafter, whether or not the voter's ballot was successfully accepted, apply indelible ink to the
voter's right forefinger nail or any other nail if there be no forefinger nail; and

3. Instruct the voter to return the ballot secrecy folder and marking pen, and then leave the polling
place.

In a press conference last March 4, 2016, Commission on Elections Chairperson Andres Bautista manifested
that the Commission on Elections decided "to err on the side of transparency" and resolved to allow voters to
have 15-second on-screen verification of the votes they have casted through the vote-counting
machine.69 Allowing on-screen verification is estimated to add two (2) hours to the voting period on May 9,
2016. As reported, the meeting of the Commission on Elections En Banc to pass this Resolution was on March
3, 2016, three (3) days after they were required to file a comment before this court.

Nonetheless, the inaction of the Commission on Elections in utilizing the VVPAT feature of the vote-counting
machines fails to fulfill the duty required under Republic Act No. 8436, as amended.

Article XI(C), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution empowered the Commission of Elections to "[e]nforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election." One of the laws that the
Commission on Elections must implement is Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369,
which requires the automated election system to have the capability of providing a voter-verified paper audit
trail.

Based on the technical specifications during the bidding, the current vote-counting machines should meet the
minimum system capability of generating a VVPAT. However, the Commission on Elections' act of rendering
inoperative this feature runs contrary to why the law required this feature in the first place. Under Republic Act
No. 8436, as amended, it is considered a policy of the state that the votes reflect the genuine will of the
People.70 The full text of the declaration of policy behind the law authorizing the use of an automated election
system states:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. — It is the policy of the State to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful,
credible and informed elections, plebiscites, referenda, recall and other similar electoral exercises by improving
on the election process and adopting systems, which shall involve the use of an automated election system
that will ensure the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot and all election, consolidation and transmission
documents in order that the process shall be transparent and credible and that the results shall be fast,
accurate and reflective of the genuine will of the people.

The State recognizes the mandate and authority of the Commission to prescribe the adoption and use of the
most suitable technology of demonstrated capability taking into account the situation prevailing in the area
and the funds available for the purpose.
By setting the minimum system capabilities of our automated election system, the law intends to achieve the
purposes set out in this declaration. A mechanism that allows the voter to verify his or her choice of
candidates will ensure a free, orderly, honest, peaceful, credible, and informed election. The voter is not left to
wonder if the machine correctly appreciated his or her ballot. The voter must know that his or her sovereign
will, with respect to the national and local leadership, was properly recorded by the vote-counting machines.

The minimum functional capabilities enumerated under Section 6 of Republic Act 8436, as amended, are
mandatory. These functions constitute the most basic safeguards to ensure the transparency, credibility,
fairness and accuracy of the upcoming elections.

The law is clear. A "voter verified paper audit trail" requires the following: (a) individual voters can verify
whether the machines have been able to count their votes; and (b) that the verification at minimum should be
paper based.

There appears to be no room for further interpretation of a "voter verified paper audit trail." The paper audit
trail cannot be considered the physical ballot, because there may be instances where the machine may
translate the ballot differently, or the voter inadvertently spoils his or her ballot.

In Maliksi v. Commission on Elections,71 the losing mayoralty candidate questioned the result of the elections.
Upon inspection of the physical ballots, several votes were invalidated due to the presence of double-shading.
However, when the digital printouts of the ballots were checked, the questioned ballots only had single shade.
The physical ballots were tampered to invalidate several votes.

The situation in Maliksi could have been avoided if the Commission on Elections utilized the paper audit trail
feature of the voting machines. The VVPAT ensures that the candidates selected by the voter in his or her
ballot are the candidates voted upon and recorded by the vote-counting machine. The voter himself or herself
verifies the accuracy of the vote. In instances of Random Manual Audit 72 and election protests, the VVPAT
becomes the best source of raw data for votes.

The required system capabilities under Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, are the minimum safeguards
provided by law. Compliance with the minimum system capabilities entails costs on the state and its
taxpayers. If minimum system capabilities are met but not utilized, these will be a waste of resources and an
affront to the citizens who paid for these capabilities.

It is true that the Commission on Elections is given ample discretion to administer the elections, but certainly,
its constitutional duty is to "enforce the law." The Commission is not given the constitutional competence to
amend or modify the law it is sworn to uphold. Section 6(e), (f), and (n) of Republic Act No. 8436, as
amended, is law. Should there be policy objections to it, the remedy is to have Congress amend it.
The Commission on Elections cannot opt to breach the requirements of the law to assuage its fears regarding
the VVPAT. Vote-buying can be averted by placing proper procedures. The Commission on Elections has the
power to choose the appropriate procedure in order to enforce the VVPAT requirement under the law, and
balance it with the constitutional mandate to secure the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot. 73

We see no reason why voters should be denied the opportunity to read the voter's receipt after casting his or
her ballot. There is no legal prohibition for the Commission on Elections to require that after the voter reads
and verifies the receipt, he or she is to leave it in a separate box, not take it out of the precinct. Definitely, the
availability of all the voters' receipts will make random manual audits more accurate.

The credibility of the results of any election depends, to a large extent, on the confidence of each voter that
his or her individual choices have actually been counted. It is in that local precinct after the voter casts his or
her ballot that this confidence starts. It is there where it will be possible for the voter to believe that his or her
participation as sovereign truly counts.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Mandamus is GRANTED. The Commission on Elections is ORDERED to enable
the vote verification feature of the vote-counting machines, which prints the voter's choices without prejudice
to the issuance of guidelines to regulate the release and disposal of the issued receipts in order to ensure a
clean, honest, and orderly elections such as, but not limited to, ensuring that after voter verification, receipts
should be deposited in a separate ballot box and not taken out of the precinct.

SO ORDERED.
BAGUMBAYAN-VNP MOVEMENT v. COMELEC, GR No. 222731, 2016-03-08
Facts:
Petitioners Bagumbayan Volunteers for a New Philippines Movement, Inc. (Bagumbayan-VNP, Inc.) and Former Senator
Richard J. Gordon (Gordon) filed this Petition[2] for mandamus before this court to compel respondent Commission on
Elections to implement the Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail security feature.
The Commission on Elections is a government entity[9] "vested by law to enforce and administer all laws relative to the
conduct of elections in the country."... epublic Act No. 8436[11] authorized the Commission on Elections to use an automated
election system for electoral exercises.
Republic Act No. 9369 introduced significant changes to Republic Act No. 8436, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known
as the Omnibus Election Code, and other election-related statutes.
In 2010 and 2013, the Commission on Elections enforced a nationwide automated election system using the Precinct Count
Optical Scan (PCOS) machines. For the 2016 National and Local Elections, the Commission on Elections has opted to use the
Vote-Counting Machine.[16] The vote-counting machine is a "paper-based automated election system,"[17] which is reported
to be "seven times faster and more powerful than the PCOS because of its updated processor."[18] Likewise, it is reported to
have more memory and security features,[19] and is "capable of producing the Voter Verification Paper Audit Trail
(VVPAT)."[20] This VVPAT functionality is in the form of a printed receipt and a touch screen reflecting the votes in the vote-
counting machine.[
Issues:
whether the Commission on Elections may be compelled, through a writ of mandamus, to enable the Voter Verified Paper
Audit Trail system capability feature for the 2016 Elections.
Ruling:
Article XI(C), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution empowered the Commission of Elections to "[e]nforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election." One of the laws that the Commission on Elections must implement is
Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, which requires the automated election system to have the
capability of providing a voter-verified paper audit trail.
he current vote-counting machines should meet the minimum system capability of generating a VVPAT. However, the
Commission on Elections' act of rendering inoperative this feature runs contrary to why the law required this feature in the first
place.
. A "voter verified paper audit trail" requires the following: (a) individual voters can verify whether the machines have been able
to count their votes; and (b) that the verification at minimum should be paper based.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 7941

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM,
AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR

Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the "Party-List System Act."

Section 2. Declaration of part y. The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations
and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards
this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadcast possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for
and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.

Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may
participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies
for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions.
It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities
and provinces comprising the region.

(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5
hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector,

(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical
attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.

(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political
and/or election purposes.

Section 4. Manifestation to Participate in the Party-List System. Any party, organization, or coalition already registered with the
Commission need not register anew. However, such party, organization, or coalition shall file with the Commission, not later
than ninety (90) days before the election, a manifestation of its desire to participate in the party-list system.

Section 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the
party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its
president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or
organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of
government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That
the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.

The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within fifteen (15) days from the date it was submitted
for decision but in no case not later than sixty (60) days before election.

Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:

(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes;
 (2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly
or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the
votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.

Section 7. Certified List of Registered Parties. The COMELEC shall, not later than sixty (60) days before election, prepare a
certified list of national, regional, or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions which have applied or who have manifested
their desire to participate under the party-list system and distribute copies thereof to all precincts for posting in the polling
places on election day. The names of the part y-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list.

Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the
COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list
representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes.

A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be named in the list.
The list shall not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the
immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same
shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination,
becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral
representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned.

Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year
immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he
seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age
on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the
day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue in office until the expiration of his term.

Section 10. Manner of Voting. Every voter shall be entitled to two (2) votes: the first is a vote for candidate for member of the
House of Representatives in his legislative district, and the second, a vote for the party, organizations, or coalition he wants
represented in the house of Representatives: Provided, That a vote cast for a party, sectoral organization, or coalition not
entitled to be voted for shall not be counted: Provided, finally, That the first election under the party-list system shall be held in
May 1998.

The COMELEC shall undertake the necessary information campaign for purposes of educating the electorate on the matter of
the party-list system.

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of
the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.

For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the
House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-
list system.

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:
 (a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of
votes they garnered during the elections.

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes : Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the
parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate
party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition
as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.

Section 13. How Party-List Representatives are Chosen. Party-list representatives shall be proclaimed by the COMELEC
based on the list of names submitted by the respective parties, organizations, or coalitions to the COMELEC according to their
ranking in said list.

Section 14. Term of Office. Party-list representatives shall be elected for a term of three (3) years which shall begin, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No party-list representatives shall
serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list representative who changes his political party or sectoral
affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he changes his political party or sectoral affiliation
within six (6) months before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list representative under his new party
or organization.

Section 16. Vacancy. In case of vacancy in the seats reserved for party-list representatives, the vacancy shall be automatically
filled by the next representative from the list of nominees in the order submitted to the COMELEC by the same party,
organization, or coalition, who shall serve for the unexpired term. If the list is exhausted, the party, organization coalition
concerned shall submit additional nominees.

Section 17. Rights of Party-List Representatives. Party-List Representatives shall be entitled to the same salaries and
emoluments as regular members of the House of Representatives.

Section 18. Rules and Regulations. The COMELEC shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.

Section 19. Appropriations. The amount necessary for the implementation of this Act shall be provided in the regular
appropriations for the Commission on Elections starting fiscal year 1996 under the General Appropriations Act.

Starting 1995, the COMELEC is hereby authorized to utilize savings and other available funds for purposes of its information
campaign on the party-list system.

Section 20. Separability Clause. If any part of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions thereof
shall remain valid and effective.

Section 21. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.

Section 22. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

Approved, March 3, 1995.

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT v. COMELEC, GR No. 179271, 2009-07-08

Facts:
are only 219 legislative districts... alloted seats for party-list representation should only be... declared as winners 55 party-list
representatives.
whether it should enroll in its... his act not violate the above-cited Constitutional provision considering that the total members
would now rise to 270.
d whether there is no more minimum vote requirement to qualify as a party-list representative.
clarified whether there is no more minimum vote requirement to qualify as a party-list representative.
"the filling up of the allowable seats for party-list representatives is not mandatory,"
Issues:
The Number of Members of the House of Representatives... in the 2007 Elections
Ruling:

250. However, the 1987 Constitution expressly allows for an increase in the number of members of the House of
Representatives provided a law is enacted for the purpose. This is clear... from the phrase "unless otherwise provided
by law"... option to choose whether the increase in the number of members of the House of Representatives is done by
piecemeal legislation or by enactment... of a law authorizing a general increase.

Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads in part:

The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under
the party-list.
Thus, for every four district representatives,... the 1987 Constitution mandates that there shall be one party-list representative.
Any change in the number of legislative districts brings a corresponding change in the number of party-list seats.
However, the number of legislative districts was subsequently reduced to 219 with our ruling on 16 July 2008... declaring void
the creation of the Province of Sharif Kabunsuan.[3] Thus, in the 2007 elections, the number of party-list seats available for
distribution should be correspondingly reduced from 55 to 54.
e filling-up of all available party-list seats is not mandatory. Actual occupancy of the party-list seats depends on the number of
participants in the party-list election.
If only ten parties participated in the 2007 party-list election, then, despite the availability of 54... seats, the maximum possible
number of occupied party-list seats would only be 30 because of the three-seat cap. In such a case, the three-seat cap
prevents the mandatory allocation of all the 54 available seats.
Under Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941, garnering 2% of the total votes cast guarantees a party one seat. This 2% threshold for
the first round of seat allocation does not violate any provision of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, the Court upholds this 2%
threshold for the guaranteed... seats as a valid exercise of legislative power.
In the second round allocation of additional seats, there is no minimum vote requirement to obtain a party-list seat because the
Court has struck down the application of the 2% threshold in the allocation of additional seats. S
Otherwise, the 20 percent party-list seats in the total membership of... the House of Representatives as provided in the 1987
Constitution will mathematically be impossible to fill up.
deemed a sufficient number of votes is dependent upon the circumstances of each election, such as the number of
participating parties, the... number of available party-list seats, and the number of parties with guaranteed seats received in the
first round of seat allocation.
However, a party-list organization has to obtain a sufficient number of votes to gain a seat in the second round of seat
allocation. What is deemed a sufficient number of votes is dependent upon the circumstances of each election, such as the
number of participating parties, the... number of available party-list seats, and the number of parties with guaranteed seats
received in the first round of seat allocation.
To summarize, there are four parameters in a Philippine-style party-list election system:
Twenty percent of the total number of the membership of the House of Representatives is the maximum number of seats
available to party-list organizations, such that there is automatically one party-list seat for every four existing legislative
districts.
Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the party-list elections guarantees a party-list organization one seat. The
guaranteed seats shall be distributed in a first round of seat allocation to parties receiving at least two percent of the total party-
list... votes.
The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats after allocation of the guaranteed seats, shall be distributed to the party-list
organizations including those that received less than two percent of the total votes. The continued operation of the two percent
threshold as... it applies to the allocation of the additional seats is now unconstitutional because this threshold mathematically
and physically prevents the filling up of the available party-list seats. The additional seats shall be distributed to the parties in a
second round of seat... allocation according to the two-step procedure laid down in the Decision of 21 April 2009 as clarified in
this Resolution.
The three-seat cap is constitutional. The three-seat cap is intended by the Legislature to prevent any party from dominating the
party-list system. There is no violation of the Constitution because the 1987 Constitution does not require absolute
proportionality for the... party-list system. The well-settled rule is that courts will not question the wisdom of the Legislature as
long as it is not violative of the Constitution.
604 Phil. 131; 609 Phil. 751

CARPIO, J.:
The House of Representatives, represented by Speaker Prospero C. Nograles, filed a motion for leave to intervene in G.R. Nos.
179271 and 179295. The House of Representatives filed a motion for clarification in intervention and enumerated the issues for
clarification as follows:

A. There are only 219 legislative districts and not 220. Accordingly, the alloted seats for party-list representation should
only be 54 and not 55. The House of Representatives seeks clarification on which of the party-list representatives shall
be admitted to the Roll of Members considering that the Court declared as winners 55 party-list representatives.

B. The House of Representatives wishes to be guided on whether it should enroll in its Roll of Members the 32 named
party-list representatives enumerated in Table 3 or only such number of representatives that would complete the 250
member maximum prescribed by Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. In the event that it is ordered to admit all 32,
will this act not violate the above-cited Constitutional provision considering that the total members would now rise to
270.

C. The Court declared as unconstitutional the 2% threshold only in relation to the distribution of additional seats as found
in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. Yet, it distributed first seats to party-list groups which did not
attain the minimum number of votes that will entitle them to one seat. Clarification is, therefore, sought whether the
term "additional seats" refer to 2nd and 3rd seats only or all remaining available seats. Corollary thereto, the House of
Representatives wishes to be clarified whether there is no more minimum vote requirement to qualify as a party-list
representative.

D. For the guidance of the House of Representatives, clarification is sought as to whether the principle laid down in
Veterans that "the filling up of the allowable seats for party-list representatives is not mandatory," has been
abandoned.[1]

On the other hand, Armi Jane Roa-Borje (Roa-Borje), third nominee of Citizens' Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), filed a
motion for leave for partial reconsideration-in-intervention, alleging that:

The Supreme Court, in ruling on the procedure for distribution of seats, has deprived without due process and in violation of
the equal protection clause, parties with more significant constituencies, such as CIBAC, Gabriela and APEC, in favor of parties
who did not even meet the 2% threshold.[2]
Following the Court's Decision of 21 April 2009, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) submitted to this Court on 27 April
2009 National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 09-001. NBC Resolution No. 09-001 updated the data used by this
Court in its Decision of 21 April 2009. The total votes for party-list is now 15,723,764 following the cancellation of the
registration of party-list group Filipinos for Peace, Justice and Progress Movement (FPJPM). Moreover, the total number of
legislative districts is now 219 following the annulment of Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the province of
Shariff Kabunsuan. Thus, the percentage and ranking of the actual winning party-list groups are different from Table 3 of the
Decision in G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.

The Number of Members of the House of Representatives

in the 2007 Elections

Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:

The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed
by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations. (Emphasis supplied)
The 1987 Constitution fixes the maximum number of members of the House of Representatives at 250. However, the 1987
Constitution expressly allows for an increase in the number of members of the House of Representatives provided a law is
enacted for the purpose. This is clear from the phrase "unless otherwise provided by law" in Section 5(1), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. The Legislature has the option to choose whether the increase in the number of members of the House of
Representatives is done by piecemeal legislation or by enactment of a law authorizing a general increase. Legislation that
makes piecemeal increases of the number of district representatives is no less valid than legislation that makes a general
increase.

In 1987, there were only 200 legislative districts. Twenty legislative districts were added by piecemeal legislation after the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution:

Republic Act Year Signed into Law Legislative District

1 7160 1992 Biliran

2 7675 1994 Mandaluyong City
3 7854 1994 Makati (2nd District)
4 7878 1995 Apayao
5 7896 and 7897 1995 Guimaras
6 7926 1995 Muntinlupa City
7 8470 1998 Compostela Valley
8 8487 1998 Taguig City (2nd District)
9 8526 1998 Valenzuela City (2nd District)
10 9229 2003 Parañaque (2nd District)
11 9230 2003 San Jose del Monte City
12 8508 and 9232 1998 and 2003 Antipolo (1st District)
13 9232 2003 Antipolo (2nd District)
14 9269 2004 Zamboanga City (2nd District)
15 9355 2006 Dinagat Island
16 9357 2006 Sultan Kudarat (2nd District)
17 9360 2006 Zamboanga Sibugay (2nd District)
18 9364 2006 Marikina City (2nd District)
19 9371 2007 Cagayan de Oro (2nd District)
20 9387 2007 Navotas City
Thus, for purposes of the 2007 elections, there were only 219 district representatives. Navotas City became a separate district
on 24 June 2007, more than a month after the 14 May 2007 elections.

The Number of Party-List Seats

in the 2007 Elections

Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads in part:

The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under
the party-list. x x x
The 1987 Constitution fixes the ratio of party-list representatives to district representatives. This ratio automatically applies
whenever the number of district representatives is increased by law. The mathematical formula for determining the number of
seats available to party-list representatives is

Number of seats Number of seats available to

x .20 =
party-list representatives.
available
to legislative
districts
----------------
.80
As we stated in our Decision of 21 April 2009, "[t]his formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number
of seats available for party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law." Thus, for every
four district representatives, the 1987 Constitution mandates that there shall be one party-list representative. There is no need
for legislation to create an additional party-list seat whenever four additional legislative districts are created by law. Section
5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution automatically creates such additional party-list seat.

We use the table below to illustrate the relationship between the number of legislative districts and the number of party-list
seats for every election year after 1987.

Number of
Election Total Number of Members of
Number of Legislative Districts Party-List
Year the House of Representatives
Seats
1992 200 50 250
1995 206 51 257
New Districts: Biliran Mandaluyong City Makati (2nd District)
Apayao Guimaras Muntinlupa City
1998 209 52 261
New Districts: Compostela Valley Taguig City (2nd District)
Valenzuela City (2nd District)
2001 209 52 261
2004 214 53 267
New Districts: Parañaque City (2nd District) San Jose del
Monte City Antipolo (1st District) Antipolo (2nd District)
Zamboanga City (2ndDistrict)
2007 219 54 273
New Districts: Dinagat Island Sultan Kudarat (2nd District)
Zamboanga Sibugay (2nd District) Marikina City (2nd District)
Cagayan de Oro (2ndDistrict)
2010 220 55 275
New District: Navotas City (assuming no additional districts
are created)
We see that, as early as the election year of 1995, the total number of members of the House of Representatives is already
beyond the initial maximum of 250 members as fixed in the 1987 Constitution.

Any change in the number of legislative districts brings a corresponding change in the number of party-list seats. However, the
increase in the number of members of the House of Representatives went unnoticed as the available seats for party-list
representatives have never been filled up before. As of the oral arguments in G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295, there were 220
legislative districts. Fifty-five party-list seats were thus allocated. However, the number of legislative districts was subsequently
reduced to 219 with our ruling on 16 July 2008 declaring void the creation of the Province of Sharif Kabunsuan. [3] Thus, in the
2007 elections, the number of party-list seats available for distribution should be correspondingly reduced from 55 to 54.

The filling-up of all available party-list seats is not mandatory. Actual occupancy of the party-list seats depends on the number
of participants in the party-list election. If only ten parties participated in the 2007 party-list election, then, despite the
availability of 54 seats, the maximum possible number of occupied party-list seats would only be 30 because of the three-seat
cap. In such a case, the three-seat cap prevents the mandatory allocation of all the 54 available seats.

Under Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941, garnering 2% of the total votes cast guarantees a party one seat. This 2% threshold for the
first round of seat allocation does not violate any provision of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, the Court upholds this 2% threshold
for the guaranteed seats as a valid exercise of legislative power.

In the second round allocation of additional seats, there is no minimum vote requirement to obtain a party-list seat because the
Court has struck down the application of the 2% threshold in the allocation of additional seats. Specifically, the provision in
Section 11(b) of the Party-List Act stating that "those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in the proportion to their total number of votes" can no longer be given any effect. Otherwise, the 20 percent
party-list seats in the total membership of the House of Representatives as provided in the 1987 Constitution will
mathematically be impossible to fill up.

However, a party-list organization has to obtain a sufficient number of votes to gain a seat in the second round of seat
allocation. What isdeemed a sufficient number of votes is dependent upon the circumstances of each election, such as the
number of participating parties, the number of available party-list seats, and the number of parties with guaranteed seats
received in the first round of seat allocation. To continue the example above, if only ten parties participated in the 2007 party-
list election and each party received only one thousand votes, then each of the ten parties would receive 10% of the votes cast.
All are guaranteed one seat, and are further entitled to receive two more seats in the second round of seat allocation.

Similarly, a presidential candidate may win the elections even if he receives only one thousand votes as long as all his
opponents receive less than one thousand votes. A winning presidential candidate only needs to receive more votes than his
opponents. The same policy applies in every election to public office, from the presidential to the barangay level. Except for the
guaranteed party-list seat, there is no minimum vote requirement before a candidate in any election, for any elective office, can
be proclaimed the winner. Of course, the winning candidate must receive at least one vote, assuming he has no opponents or all
his opponents do not receive a single vote.

In the absence of a minimum vote requirement in the second round of party-list seat allocation, there is no need to belabor the
disparity between the votes obtained by the first and last ranked winning parties in the 2007 party-list elections. In the same
manner, no one belabors the disparity between the votes obtained by the highest and lowest ranked winners in the senatorial
elections. However, for those interested in comparing the votes received by party-list representatives vis-a-vis the votes
received by district representatives, the 162,678 votes cast in favor of TUCP, the last party to obtain a party-list seat, is
significantly higher than the votes received by 214 of the 218 elected district representatives.[4]

The Actual Number of Party-List Representatives

in the 2007 Elections

The data used in Table 3 of our Decision promulgated on 21 April 2009 was based on the submissions of the parties. We used
the figures from Party-List Canvass Report No. 32, as of 6:00 p.m. of 31 August 2007. The NBC issued NBC Report No. 33 on 11
June 2008, updating the 31 August 2007 report. The parties did not furnish this Court with a copy of NBC Report
No. 33. In any case, we stated in the dispositive portion of our Decision that "[t]he allocation of additional seats under the
Party-List System shall be in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this decision." Party-List Canvass Report No.
32 is not part of the procedure.

The computation of the COMELEC in NBC No. 09-001 applying the procedure laid down in our Decision requires correction
for purposes of accuracy. Instead of multiplying the percentage of votes garnered over the total votes for party-list by 36, the
COMELEC multiplied the percentage by 37. Thirty-six is the proper multiplier as it is the difference between 54, the number of
available party-list seats, and 18, the number of guaranteed seats. Only the figures in column (C) are affected. The allocation
of seats to the winning party-list organizations, however, remains the same as in NBC No. 09-001. Our
modification of the COMELEC's computation in NBC No. 09-001 is shown below:

Votes Garnered (B) plus

Guaranteed Applying
Votes overTotal Votes Additional Seats(Second (C), in
Rank Party Seat (First the three
Garnered for Party List, in Round) whole
Round) seat cap
% integers
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
1 BUHAY 1,169,338 7.44% 1 2.68 3 N.A.
BAYAN
2 979,189 6.23% 1 2.24 3 N.A.
MUNA
3 CIBAC 755,735 4.81% 1 1.73 2 N.A.
4 GABRIELA 621,266 3.95% 1 1.42 2 N.A.
5 APEC 619,733 3.94% 1 1.42 2 N.A.
6 A Teacher 490,853 3.12% 1 1.12 2 N.A.
7 AKBAYAN 466,448 2.97% 1 1.07 2 N.A.
8[5] ALAGAD 423,165 2.69% 1 1 2 N.A.
COOP-
9 409,987 2.61% 1 1 2 N.A.
NATCCO
10 BUTIL 409,168 2.60% 1 1 2 N.A.
11 BATAS 385,956 2.45% 1 1 2 N.A.
12 ARC 374,349 2.38% 1 1 2 N.A.
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,323 2.36% 1 1 2 N.A.
14 AMIN 347,527 2.21% 1 1 2 N.A.
15 ABONO 340,002 2.16% 1 1 2 N.A.
16 YACAP 331,623 2.11% 1 1 2 N.A.
17 AGAP 328,814 2.09% 1 1 2 N.A.
18 AN WARAY 321,516 2.04% 1 1 2 N.A.
19 UNI-MAD 251,804 1.60% 0 1 1 N.A.
20 ABS 235,152 1.50% 0 1 1 N.A.
21 ALIF 229,267 1.46% 0 1 1 N.A.
22 KAKUSA 229,036 1.46% 0 1 1 N.A.
23 KABATAAN 228,700 1.45% 0 1 1 N.A.
24 ABA-AKO 219,363 1.40% 0 1 1 N.A.
SENIOR
25 213,095 1.36% 0 1 1 N.A.
CITIZENS
26 AT 200,030 1.27% 0 1 1 N.A.
27 VFP 196,358 1.25% 0 1 1 N.A.
28 ANAD 188,573 1.20% 0 1 1 N.A.
29 BANAT 177,068 1.13% 0 1 1 N.A.
ANG
30 170,594 1.08% 0 1 1 N.A.
KASANGGA
31 BANTAY 169,869 1.08% 0 1 1 N.A.
32 ABAKADA 166,897 1.06% 0 1 1 N.A.
33 1-UTAK 165,012 1.05% 0 1 1 N.A.
34 TUCP 162,678 1.03% 0 1 1 N.A.
35 COCOFED 156,007 0.99% 0 0 0 N.A.

Total 18 54
Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) and Ang Laban ng Indiginong Filipino (ALIF) both
have pending cases before the COMELEC. The COMELEC correctly deferred the proclamation of both BATAS and ALIF as the
outcome of their cases may affect the final composition of party-list representatives. The computation and allocation of seats
may still be modified in the event that the COMELEC decides against BATAS and/or ALIF.

To address Roa-Borje's motion for partial reconsideration-in-intervention and for purposes of computing the results in future
party-list elections, we reiterate that in the second step of the second round of seat allocation, the preference in the distribution
of seats should be in accordance with the higher percentage and higher rank, without limiting the distribution

to parties receiving two-percent of the votes.[6] To limit the distribution of seats to the two-percenters would mathematically
prevent the filling up of all the available party-list seats.

In the table above, CIBAC cannot claim a third seat from the seat allocated to TUCP, the last ranked party allocated with a seat.
CIBAC's 2.81% (from the percentage of 4.81% less the 2% for its guaranteed seat) has a lower fractional seat value after the
allocation of its second seat compared to TUCP's 1.03%. CIBAC's fractional seat after receiving two seats is only 0.03 compared
to TUCP's 0.38 fractional seat. Multiplying CIBAC's 2.81% by 37, the additional seats for distribution in the second round, gives
1.03 seat, leaving 0.03 fractional seat. Multiplying TUCP's 1.03% by 37 gives a fractional seat of 0.38, higher than CIBAC's
fractional seat of 0.03. The fractional seats become material only in the second step of the second round of seat allocation to
determine the ranking of parties. Thus, for purposes of the second step in the second round of seat allocation,[7] TUCP has a
higher rank than CIBAC.

Roa-Borje's position stems from the perceived need for absolute proportionality in the allocation of party-list seats. However,
the 1987 Constitution does not require absolute proportionality in the allocation of party-list seats. Section 5(1), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution provides:

(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed
by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of
a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties and organizations. (Boldfacing and italicization supplied)
The phrase "legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" in Section 5(1) of Article
VI requires thatlegislative districts shall be apportioned according to proportional representation. However, this principle of
proportional representation applies only to legislative districts, not to the party-list system. The allocation of seats under the
party-list system is governed by the last phrase of Section 5(1), which states that the party-list representatives shall be "those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system," giving the Legislature wide discretion in
formulating the allocation of party-list seats. Clearly, there is no constitutional requirement for absolute proportional
representation in the allocation of party-list seats in the House of Representatives.

Section 2, on Declaration of Policy, of R.A. No. 7941 provides that the "State shall promote proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof x x x." However, this proportional representation in Section 2 is qualified
by Section 11(b)[8] of the same law which mandates a three-seat cap, which is intended to bar any single party-list organization
from dominating the party-list system. Section 11(b) also qualifies this proportional representation by imposing a two percent
cut-off for those entitled to the guaranteed seats. These statutory qualifications are valid because they do not violate the
Constitution, which does not require absolute proportional representation for the party-list system.

To summarize, there are four parameters in a Philippine-style party-list election system:

 1. Twenty percent of the total number of the membership of the House of Representatives is the maximum number of
seats available to party-list organizations, such that there is automatically one party-list seat for every four existing
legislative districts.

2. Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the party-list elections guarantees a party-list organization one seat.
The guaranteed seats shall be distributed in a first round of seat allocation to parties receiving at least two percent of
the total party-list votes.

3. The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats after allocation of the guaranteed seats, shall be distributed to the
party-list organizations including those that received less than two percent of the total votes. The continued operation
of the two percent threshold as it applies to the allocation of the additional seats is now unconstitutional because this
threshold mathematically and physically prevents the filling up of the available party-list seats. The additional seats
shall be distributed to the parties in a second round of seat allocation according to the two-step procedure laid down in
the Decision of 21 April 2009 as clarified in this Resolution.

4. The three-seat cap is constitutional. The three-seat cap is intended by the Legislature to prevent any party from
dominating the party-list system. There is no violation of the Constitution because the 1987 Constitution does not
require absolute proportionality for the party-list system. The well-settled rule is that courts will not question the
wisdom of the Legislature as long as it is not violative of the Constitution.

These four parameters allow the mathematical and practical fulfillment of the Constitutional provision that party-list
representatives shall comprise twenty percent of the members of the House of Representatives. At the same time, these four
parameters uphold as much as possible the Party-List Act, striking down only that provision of the Party-List Act that could not
be reconciled anymore with the 1987 Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the Court's Decision of 21 April 2009 in the present case is clarified accordingly.

SO ORDERED.

Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, (G)
G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013

FACTS:

 The case constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52 party-list groups
and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system,
or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.
 Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531,
approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections
 December 5, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s resolution to grant Partido ng
Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was
denied participation in the elections because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
 13 petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013
issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official.
 Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary hearings to
determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of intent to participate in the elections have
continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang
Bagong Bayani).
 39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court, directing the COMELEC to include the
names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the elections.
 Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. This Court
issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions.

ISSUE:
 Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
disqualifying petitioners from participating in the elections.
HELD:
 No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions in disqualifying
petitioners from participating in the coming elections. However, since the Court adopts new parameters in the qualification of
the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we
remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the party-
list system, and to participate in the coming elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
 Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three consecutive terms of
Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be
filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows
again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.
 First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to non-sectoral
party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the
"marginalized and underrepresented."
 Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first "three consecutive
terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list system fully open after the end of the first three
congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that
qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system.
 Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
 R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the party-list system to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from
the party-list system. How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections,
participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list system
is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them
from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of
the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941
G.R. No. 203766

CARPIO, J.:
The Cases

These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition[1] filed by 52 party-list groups
and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list
system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.

This Court resolved to consolidate the 54 petitions in the Resolutions dated 13 November 2012,[2] 20 November 2012,[3] 27
November 2012,[4] 4 December 2012,[5] 11 December 2012,[6] and 19 February 2013.[7]

The Facts

Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531,
approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.

The COMELEC, however, denied the petitions for registration of the following groups and organizations:

In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012,[19] the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division's resolution to
grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida's (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political party in the National Capital Region.
However, PBB was denied participation in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections because PBB does not represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector; PBB failed to apply for registration as a party-list group; and PBB failed to
establish its track record as an organization that seeks to uplift the lives of the "marginalized and underrepresented."[20]

These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA, ALAM, KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN,
PPP, and PBB) were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued
Resolution No. 9604,[21]and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013
party-list elections.

Pursuant to paragraph 2[22] of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary hearings to
determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of intent to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections have continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC[23] (Ang Bagong Bayani). The COMELEC disqualified the following groups and organizations from participating in
the 13 May 2013 party-list elections:

The Issues

We rule upon two issues: first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new
petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-
list organizations; and second, whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani
and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections [49] (BANAT) should be
applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.

The Court's Ruling

We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions of this Court in
disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts in
this Decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby
abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all
the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to
participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.

The Party-List System

The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put, the party-list system is
intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to
win seats in the House of Representatives.[50] The voter elects two representatives in the House of Representatives: one for his
or her legislative district, and another for his or her party-list group or organization of choice. The 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 5, Article VI

(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed
by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C

Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the
party-list system as provided in this Constitution.

Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be represented in the
voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be
entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.

Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that "the party-list system is not
synonymous with that of the sectoral representation."[51] The constitutional provisions on the party-list system should
be read in light of the following discussion among its framers:

MR. MONSOD: x x x.

I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal for the party list system is not synonymous
with that of the sectoral representation. Precisely, the party list system seeks to avoid the dilemma of choice of sectors
and who constitute the members of the sectors. In making the proposal on the party list system, we were made aware of the
problems precisely cited by Commissioner Bacani of which sectors will have reserved seats. In effect, a sectoral representation
in the Assembly would mean that certain sectors would have reserved seats; that they will choose among themselves who would
sit in those reserved seats. And then, we have the problem of which sector because as we will notice in Proclamation No. 9, the
sectors cited were the farmers, fishermen, workers, students, professionals, business, military, academic, ethnic and other
similar groups. So these are the nine sectors that were identified here as "sectoral representatives" to be represented in this
Commission. The problem we had in trying to approach sectoral representation in the Assembly was whether to stop at these
nine sectors or include other sectors. And we went through the exercise in a caucus of which sector should be included which
went up to 14 sectors. And as we all know, the longer we make our enumeration, the more limiting the law become because
when we make an enumeration we exclude those who are not in the enumeration. Second, we had the problem of who comprise
the farmers. Let us just say the farmers and the laborers. These days, there are many citizens who are called "hyphenated
citizens." A doctor may be a farmer; a lawyer may also be a farmer. And so, it is up to the discretion of the person to say "I am a
farmer" so he would be included in that sector.

The third problem is that when we go into a reserved seat system of sectoral representation in the Assembly, we are, in effect,
giving some people two votes and other people one vote. We sought to avoid these problems by presenting a party list system.
Under the party list system, there are no reserved seats for sectors. Let us say, laborers and farmers can form a sectoral party or
a sectoral organization that will then register and present candidates of their party. How do the mechanics go? Essentially,
under the party list system, every voter has two votes, so there is no discrimination. First, he will vote for the representative of
his legislative district. That is one vote. In that same ballot, he will be asked: What party or organization or coalition do you
wish to be represented in the Assembly? And here will be attached a list of the parties, organizations or coalitions that have
been registered with the COMELEC and are entitled to be put in that list. This can be a regional party, a sectoral party, a
national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or a regional party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say that he wants the farmers'
party to be represented in the Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any party. At the end of the day, the COMELEC will then
tabulate the votes that had been garnered by each party or each organization one does not have to be a political party and
register in order to participate as a party and count the votes and from there derive the percentage of the votes that had been
cast in favor of a party, organization or coalition.

When such parties register with the COMELEC, we are assuming that 50 of the 250 seats will be for the party list system. So,
we have a limit of 30 percent of 50. That means that the maximum that any party can get out of these 50 seats is 15. When the
parties register they then submit a list of 15 names. They have to submit these names because these nominees

have to meet the minimum qualifications of a Member of the National Assembly. At the end of the day, when the votes are
tabulated, one gets the percentages. Let us say, UNIDO gets 10 percent or 15 percent of the votes; KMU gets 5 percent; a
women's party gets 2 1/2 percent and anybody who has at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote qualifies and the 50 seats are
apportioned among all of these parties who get at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote.

What does that mean? It means that any group or party who has a constituency of, say, 500,000 nationwide gets a seat in the
National Assembly. What is the justification for that? When we allocate legislative districts, we are saying that any district that
has 200,000 votes gets a seat. There is no reason why a group that has a national constituency, even if it is a sectoral or special
interest group, should not have a voice in the National Assembly. It also means that, let us say, there are three or four labor
groups, they all register as a party or as a group. If each of them gets only one percent or five of them get one percent, they are
not entitled to any representative. So, they will begin to think that if they really have a common interest, they should band
together, form a coalition and get five percent of the vote and, therefore, have two seats in the Assembly. Those are the
dynamics of a party list system.

We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation while at the same time making sure that those
who really have a national constituency or sectoral constituency will get a chance to have a seat in the National Assembly.
These sectors or these groups may not have the constituency to win a seat on a legislative district basis. They may not be able to
win a seat on a district basis but surely, they will have votes on a nationwide basis.

The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if
we count their votes nationwide; have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third place or fourth place in
each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the
Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and
objectives of the party list system.

BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, am I right in interpreting that when we speak now of party list system though we refer to
sectors, we would be referring to sectoral party list rather than sectors and party list?

MR. MONSOD: As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the party list system, we do not even have to mention sectors because
the sectors would be included in the party list system. They can be sectoral parties within the party list system.

xxxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system because we wanted to
open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x x We are for opening up the system,
and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a
ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the
party list system. x x x.

xxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties. My question
is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties?
Can they run under the party list concept or must they be under the district legislation side of it only?

MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned can field
candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral
candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under
the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also participate
in the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only sectoral
candidates.

MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different
marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.

MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents the farmers, would he
qualify?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.

MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would
pass on whether he is a farmer or not?

MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly minority political
parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are also
organized along sectoral lines.

MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it is precisely the
contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are represented in them. Would
the Commissioner agree?

MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will dominate the party list at
mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng
diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa
political parties.

MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner Villacorta and probably
also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running under the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone, UNIDO may be
allowed to register for the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?

MR. TADEO. The same.

MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.

MR. MONSOD: Sino po ang magsasabi kung iyong kandidato ng UNIDO ay hindi talagang labor leader or isang laborer?
Halimbawa, abogado ito.

MR. TADEO: Iyong mechanics.

MR. MONSOD: Hindi po mechanics iyon because we are trying to solve an inherent problem of sectoral representation. My
question is: Suppose UNIDO fields a labor leader, would he qualify?

MR. TADEO: The COMELEC may look into the truth of whether or not a political party is really organized along
a specific sectoral line. If such is verified or confirmed, the political party may submit a list of individuals
who are actually members of such sectors. The lists are to be published to give individuals or organizations
belonging to such sector the chance to present evidence contradicting claims of membership in the said
sector or to question the claims of the existence of such sectoral organizations or parties. This proceeding
shall be conducted by the COMELEC and shall be summary in character. In other words, COMELEC decisions
on this matter are final and unappealable.[52] (Emphasis supplied)

Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral parties but also
non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list
system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list
system "[F]or as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall
designate in this Constitution."[53]

In fact, the framers voted down, 19-22, a proposal to reserve permanent seats to sectoral parties in the House of
Representatives, or alternatively, to reserve the party-list system exclusively to sectoral parties. As clearly explained by Justice
Jose C. Vitug in his Dissenting Opinion in Ang Bagong Bayani:

The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5, subsection (2), of the 1987 Constitution took off from two
staunch positions the first headed by Commissioner Villacorta, advocating that of the 20 per centum of the total seats in
Congress to be allocated to party-list representatives half were to be reserved to appointees from the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. The proposal was opposed by some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod expressed the difficulty in
delimiting the sectors that needed representation. He was of the view that reserving seats for the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors would stunt their development into full-pledged parties equipped with electoral machinery potent
enough to further the sectoral interests to be represented. The Villacorta group, on the other hand, was apprehensive that
pitting the unorganized and less-moneyed sectoral groups in an electoral contest would be like placing babes in the lion's den,
so to speak, with the bigger and more established political parties ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941 recognized this
concern when it banned the first five major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives from participating in the party-list system for the first party-list elections held in 1998 (and to be automatically
lifted starting with the 2001 elections). The advocates for permanent seats for sectoral representatives made an effort towards a
compromise that the party-list system be open only to underrepresented and marginalized sectors. This proposal was further
whittled down by allocating only half of the seats under the party-list system to candidates from the sectors which would garner
the required number of votes. The majority was unyielding. Voting 19-22, the proposal for permanent seats, and in
the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups, was voted down. The only
concession the Villacorta group was able to muster was an assurance of reserved seats for selected sectors for three consecutive
terms after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, by which time they would be expected to gather and solidify their electoral
base and brace themselves in the multi-party electoral contest with the more veteran political groups.[54] (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was outvoted. Instead, the reservation of
seats to sectoral representatives was only allowed for the first three consecutive terms. [55] There can be no doubt whatsoever
that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected the proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral
parties only, and that they clearly intended the party-list system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties.

The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to win in legislative district
elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number of votes that winning candidates can garner in
legislative district elections. The party-list system will be the entry point to membership in the House of Representatives for
both these non-traditional parties that could not compete in legislative district elections.

The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the party-list system both sectoral and non-
sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution, which states:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more that two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. Emphasis supplied)

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be "a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." The commas after the words "national[,]" and "regional[,]" separate
national and regional parties from sectoral parties. Had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended national and regional
parties to be at the same time sectoral, they would have stated "national and regional sectoral parties." They did not, precisely
because it was never their intention to make the party-list system exclusively sectoral.

What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any clearer: the party-list system is
composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only one of the three groups. The text of Section 5(1)
leaves no room for any doubt that national and regional parties are separate from sectoral parties.

Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2) regional parties
or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations are different from
sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and
need not represent any particular sector.

Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three consecutive terms of Congress
after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth,
and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the
party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.

First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to non-sectoral party-list
representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the
"marginalized and underrepresented." Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only
for the first "three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list system fully open
after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any
class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system.

Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for
non-sectoral parties.

Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that implements the party-list system prescribed in the
Constitution, provides:

Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may
participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles
and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing
their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public
office.

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a
regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces
comprising the region.

(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in
Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.

(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes
or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.

(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political
and/or election purposes. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties."
Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a "political
party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for
the general conduct of government." On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral
party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose
principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector." R.A. No. 7941 provides different
definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.

R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the party-list system to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from
the party-list system. How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district
elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the party-
list system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To
exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and
express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.

Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different from a sectoral party. A
political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement
in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is
sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance
principles and policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.

Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."[56] The sectors
mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily "marginalized and underrepresented." For sure, "professionals" are not by
definition "marginalized and underrepresented," not even the elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth may "lack well-defined political constituencies," and can thus organize themselves into sectoral
parties in advocacy of the special interests and concerns of their respective sectors.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law does not require national or regional
parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented."
Section 6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC to refuse or cancel the registration of parties or organizations after due
notice and hearing.

Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:

(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or
through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-representation of the "marginalized and
underrepresented."

The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in R.A. No. 7941, in Section 2 on Declaration of
Policy.[57]Section 2 seeks "to promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through the party-list system," which will enable Filipinos belonging to the "marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies," to
become members of the House of Representatives. While the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 broadly refers to
"marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties," the specific implementing provisions of R.A. No. 7941
do not define or require that the sectors, organizations or parties must be "marginalized and underrepresented." On the
contrary, to even interpret that all the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are "marginalized and underrepresented" would lead to
absurdities.

How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 with its specific implementing
provisions, bearing in mind the applicable provisions of the 1987 Constitution on the matter?

The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that are, by their
nature, economically "marginalized and underrepresented." These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a
majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented." The
nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for
the sector represented. Belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector does not mean one must "wallow in
poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class. More specifically, the
economically "marginalized and underrepresented" are those who fall in the low income group as classified by the National
Statistical Coordination Board.[58]

The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly, women and the
youth, need not be "marginalized and underrepresented" will allow small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack
"well-defined political constituencies" a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins
of society, will give the "marginalized and underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win seats in the House of
Representatives.

This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a multi-party system where
those "marginalized and underrepresented," both in economic and ideological status, will have the opportunity to send
their own members to the House of Representatives. This interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and
transparent, eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list representatives to masquerade as "wallowing in poverty,
destitution and infirmity," even as they attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.

The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections. Major political parties cannot
participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack "well-defined political constituencies" nor represent "marginalized
and underrepresented" sectors. Thus, the national or regional parties under the party-list system are necessarily
those that do not belong to major political parties. This automatically reserves the national and regional parties under
the party-list system to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them the opportunity to have members in
the House of Representatives.

To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second guideline for the accreditation of parties under the party-list
system, that "while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the
party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling 'Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors xxx to be elected to the House of Representatives.' " However, the requirement in Ang Bagong
Bayani, in its second guideline, that "the political party xxx must represent the marginalized and underrepresented,"
automatically disqualified major political parties from participating in the party-list system. This inherent
inconsistency in Ang Bagong Bayani has been compounded by the COMELEC's refusal to register sectoral wings officially
organized by major political parties. BANAT merely formalized the prevailing practice when it expressly prohibited major
political parties from participating in the party-list system, even through their sectoral wings.

Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress" from participating in the May 1988 party-list
elections.[59] Thus, major political parties can participate in subsequent party-list elections since the
prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list elections. However, major political parties should
participate in party-list elections only through their sectoral wings. The participation of major political parties through their
sectoral wings, a majority of whose members are "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political
constituencies," will facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies" as members of the House of Representatives.

The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list elections so as to encourage
them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the "marginalized and underrepresented" and to those who "lack
well-defined political constituencies." The participation of major political parties in party-list elections must be geared towards
the entry, as members of the House of Representatives, of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack well-
defined political constituencies," giving them a voice in law-making. Thus, to participate in party-list elections, a major
political party that fields candidates in the legislative district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list system.

Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government,
officers and members, a majority of whom must belong to the sector represented. The sectoral wing is in itself an independent
sectoral party, and islinked to a major political party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941,
which provides that "component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently (in party-list elections)
provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system."

Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This provision prescribes a special qualification
only for the nominee from the youth sector.

Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he
seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on
the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the
day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue in office until the expiration of his term.

A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she seeks to represent. In the case
of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one must either belong to the sector represented, or
have a track record of advocacy for such sector.

In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. Ang Bagong
Bayani laid down the guidelines for qualifying those who desire to participate in the party-list system:

First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups
identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. x x x

Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list
system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives." x x x.

xxxx

Third, x x x the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. x x x.

xxxx

Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for
disqualification as follows:

"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or
through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered."
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the
government. x x x.

xxxx

Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941
reads as follows:

"SEC 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year
immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he
seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on
the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the
day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue in office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented
sectors; so also must its nominees. x x x.

Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that
will benefit the nation as a whole. (Emphasis supplied)

In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling further. In BANAT, the majority
officially excluded major political parties from participating in party-list elections,[60] abandoning even the lip-service that Ang
Bagong Bayaniaccorded to the 1987 Constitution and R.A.No. 7941 that major political parties can participate in party-list
elections.

The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties can participate in the party-list system through their
sectoral wings. The minority expressed that "[e]xcluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against
the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political
engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the
Constitution and the law."[61] The experimentations in socio-political engineering have only resulted in confusion and absurdity
in the party-list system. Such experimentations, in clear contravention of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, must now
come to an end.

We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in disqualifying petitioners. In following
prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have committed grave abuse of discretion. However, for the coming 13 May
2013 party-list elections, we must now impose and mandate the party-list system actually envisioned and
authorized under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. In BANAT, this Court devised a new formula in the allocation of
party-list seats, reversing the COMELEC's allocation which followed the then prevailing formula in Ang Bagong Bayani.
In BANAT, however, the Court did not declare that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. Similarly, even as we
acknowledge here that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion, we declare that it would not be in accord with
the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 to apply the criteria in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT in determining who are
qualified to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. For this purpose, we suspend our rule[62] that a
party may appeal to this Court from decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion.

Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013
and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
 1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional
parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and
do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field
candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative
district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under
the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party
through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined
political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented"
must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they
represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented,"
or that represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors,
or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did not satisfy these two criteria:
(1) allnational, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors,
and (2) allnominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have been
disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they
represent may have been disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees
of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been
disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified
nominee. As discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to
the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.

This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from engaging in socio-economic
or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-
write the Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to
participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court.

WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which have been granted Status Quo Ante
Orders but without mandatory injunction to include the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the
Commission on Elections only for determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system under
the parameters prescribed in this Decision but they shall not participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections. The 41
petitions, which have been granted mandatory injunctions to include the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are
remanded to the Commission on Elections for determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list
system and to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the parameters prescribed in this Decision. The
Commission on Elections may conduct summary evidentiary hearings for this purpose. This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.