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Politics (2000) 20(2) pp.

93–98

What is Politics?
Robinson Crusoe,
Deep Ecology and
Immanuel Kant
Tony Burns

This article considers the nature of politics. however, those who have challenged this
Robinson Crusoe is used to show that even view because they consider it to be too
the broadest understanding of politics found narrow. They have, in their different ways,
in the literature is inadequate, for the sought to broaden our understanding of the
situation of Crusoe on his island is a political nature of politics. For example, one alter-
situation even though he is completely alone. native account is that politics has to do with
An analogy is drawn between the deep the resolution, or at least the regulation, of
ecological understanding of politics and the conflict between individuals or groups
moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant. For (see Crick, 1971, p. 18; Miller, 1962, p. 14).
Kantian ethics, also, is built on the idea of a Another similar (though not identical) view
solitary individual who is at least existentially is that politics has to do with the preserva-
isolated. It is concluded that what makes any tion of order within a particular society or
situation political is the fact that in it some group (Crick, 1971, p. 18). There is also the
policy is required. view that politics involves processes of
collective decision-making in societies and
or groups (Hague et al., 1992 [1982], p. 3).
Introduction A fourth alternative is that politics has to do
with the exercise of power (Duverger, 1974,
What is politics? Most introductory textbooks p. 11–18; Leftwich, 1984, p. 64; Lukes, 1981
for students of politics begin with this ques- [1974]). As such, politics is an integral aspect
tion. There is, however, considerable disagree- of all social life. This is the understanding of
ment regarding how it should be answered. politics that one finds in much of the current
One view is that politics has to do solely and literature produced by post-structuralist
uniquely with the activities of the state (see writers such as, for example, Chantal Mouffe
Crick, 1971, pp. 17–18, 20–21 and 29–30; (Mouffe, 1993; Finlayson and Martin, 1997).
Laski, 1931; Pickles, 1964, ch. 2; Miller, 1962, Andrew Heywood has claimed recently that
part I; Heywood, 1997, pp. 5–6). There are, this last view is ‘both the broadest and the

Tony Burns, Nottingham Trent University

© Political Studies Association 2000. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK
and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. 93
Crusoe, Deep Ecology and Kant • Burns Politics (2000) 20(2) pp. 93–98

most radical’ definition of politics available in human beings themselves (Attfield, 1991;
the current literature (Heywood, 1997, p. 10). Attfield and Belsey, 1994; Elliot, 1995;
It is clear that these alternative accounts Taylor, 1992).
of the nature of politics are indeed much Now all of the accounts of the nature of
broader than the view that politics has to do politics referred to above would suggest that
simply with the activities of the state. There there is and could be no politics at all on
is, moreover, something to be said for each Crusoe’s island – at least until the arrival of
of them. At the same time, however, they Man Friday. The reason for this is that, in a
are also open to criticism. For example, one situation in which there is only one person,
common assumption that all of these ap- it is evident that there is no state, no conflict,
proaches make is that politics is necessarily no collective decision-making and no
a social activity. It is an activity that requires relationships of power. In short, there is no
at least two people. It is this assumption that social life. Consequently, as Heywood main-
I propose to subject to a critical examination. tains, so far as any of the above-mentioned
I shall do so by considering a situation taken senses of the term is concerned, there can be
from the history of English literature – the no politics either. It is Heywood’s contention
case of Robinson Crusoe marooned on a that solitary individuals such as Robinson
desert island. This has been used many times Crusoe just ‘cannot engage in politics’.
by students of the social sciences. It has, Heywood insists that in this situation politics,
for example, been employed recently by properly speaking, ‘only emerges with the
R. Hague et al. and Andrew Heywood within arrival of a Man (or Woman) Friday’
the discipline of politics, and by Mary (Heywood, 1997, p. 3). This is also the view
Midgley in her discussion of environmental of Hague et al. One of the discussion points
ethics (Hague et al., 1992 [1982], p. 21; at the end of the first, introductory chapter in
Midgley, 1995). their Comparative Government and Politics
relates to the following two questions: ‘Can
Robinson Crusoe engage in politics on his
desert island?’ and ‘Why not?’ (Hague et al.,
Robinson Crusoe and politics 1992 [1982], p. 21). The first of these ques-
from the standpoint of deep tions might legitimately be said to be an
ecology open one. The second question, however, is
evidently closed. It is clear from the wording
There is one line of reasoning, associated here that the authors do not really take
with the notion of deep ecology,1 that seriously the possibility that someone might
suggests that the claim that politics requires answer the first question in the affirmative.
at least two people is false. For the purposes From the standpoint of deep ecology, it
of the present discussion I shall characterise might be argued that all of the alternative
this deep ecological standpoint as being the approaches to politics referred to above are
view that nature possesses intrinsic worth or inadequate. This is so even in the case of
value (Attfield, 1981; Brennan, 1995; Mathews, the one which Heywood considers to be
1995; Rolston, 1994). In Kant’s terminology it the broadest and most radical approach, that
is an end-in-itself. It is deserving of ethical subscribed to by post-structuralists. For even
consideration by human beings in its own this view of politics focuses entirely on
right. Hence, the rightness or wrongness of human beings and their relationships with
those actions undertaken by human beings one another. Consequently, it excludes from
that have an impact on their natural environ- consideration by students of politics the
ment has nothing to do with any con- relationships in which human beings enter
sequences which these actions may have for into with other types of being (whether

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Politics (2000) 20(2) pp. 93–98 Crusoe, Deep Ecology and Kant • Burns
inanimate or non-human animate) in their considered from this alternative standpoint
natural environment. According to this line (provided we accept that there are no other
of reasoning, what these alternative accounts life-forms that are rational agents capable of
all fail to do is to consider the possibility that making policy choices), it nevertheless
even a solitary, isolated individual like remains the case that politics must always
Crusoe on his island might be thought of as have at least something to do with at least
standing in some sort of ethical relationship one human being. This understanding of
with another, namely his natural environ- the nature of politics is itself based on the
ment. Even for Robinson Crusoe, therefore, assumption that what makes the situation
there are questions to be asked and choices characterised by Defoe in Robinson Crusoe a
to be made so far as everyday practical life political one is precisely the fact that Crusoe
is concerned. In particular, the question arises himself comes at some point to be ship-
for Crusoe of ‘what ought to be done?’ in re- wrecked on the island. From this point of
lation to the island that he inhabits. It is this view, and contrary to Heywood’s suggestion
issue which is addressed by Mary Midgley referred to earlier, it is at this juncture, and
in her paper on ‘Duties Concerning Islands’. not with the later appearance of Man Friday,
Midgley’s essay begins with the question that desert island politics begins.
‘Had Robinson Crusoe any duties?’ Her final From the standpoint of this particular
conclusion is that Crusoe did indeed ‘have version of deep ecology, therefore (which
duties concerning his island’ and that ‘we is clearly not as deeply green as some of
can reasonably call them duties to it’ (Midgley, its possible competitors), it would be inap-
1995, pp. 89 and 102). propriate to talk about politics in connection
From the standpoint of this particular with a world that consisted entirely of
version of deep ecology, there is no good inanimate objects, or which contained only
reason at all for excluding discussion of such non-human (or non-rational) life-forms. It
issues from consideration by students of would not be possible for us to talk here
politics. It is argued here that whether a about the politics of a situation in which
situation is or is not a social one is irrelevant there were no human beings at all – and
so far as its status as a political situation is hence, ex hypothesi, no being that is capable
concerned. On this view, the fundamental of asking the question of ‘what ought to be
question of all politics, and what character- done?’, or of making or sustaining policies
ises a situation as a political situation, is pre- in relation to its own practical conduct.
cisely this practical question of ‘what policy Consequently, even for this deep ecological
ought to be adopted?’ in the situation in account of the nature of politics, our under-
question. It is clear, however, that this ques- standing of politics remains (and must
tion can be asked by an individual human inevitably remain), to some extent at least,
being living in complete isolation from an anthropocentric one.
others. In the case of a latter-day Crusoe, for
example, such a situation evidently does
arise if it is accepted that human beings can Robinson Crusoe, politics
be morally obligated to something that is and Immanuel Kant
itself not human.
This deep ecological approach to politics Surprisingly, perhaps, there is an analogy
is critical of all preceding approaches because that might be drawn here between this deep
of what it considers to be their anthro- ecological understanding of the nature
pocentrism (Callicott, 1984; Dobson, 1990, of politics and the moral philosophy of
pp. 63–72; Goodpaster, 1978; Midgley, 1994). Immanuel Kant (Kant, 1972). Kant thinks of
It seems clear, however, that even when moral conduct as being the final outcome

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Crusoe, Deep Ecology and Kant • Burns Politics (2000) 20(2) pp. 93–98

of a process of moral decision-making on then recognises an obligation to implement


the part of what is in effect, existentially these policies in practice afterwards. He
speaking, an isolated individual, even is someone who, in the manner of Kant,
though that individual is living together with transforms maxims into practical laws by an
others in society – although of course, unlike autonomous act of legislative will.
Crusoe before the arrival of Man Friday, this It has been suggested that Kant’s moral
individual is not actually physically isolated philosophy is itself anthropocentric, and
from other human beings. hence of little value for those interested in
Kant’s employment of legislative meta- environmental ethics and politics (Broadie
phors in his account of the nature of morality and Pybus, 1974; Hayward, 1994; Hoff, 1983;
is really quite striking. The process of moral Taylor, 1986). There is at least something
decision-making, as Kant understands it, has to be said for this view. For example, Kant
a number of features in common with the explicitly states, at one point, that ‘humanity
legislative process within the sphere of so far as it is capable of morality’ is ‘the only
politics. For example, in the first place it is a thing which has dignity’ (Kant, 1972, pp. 96–
process in which the individual in question 97). Nevertheless, from the standpoint of
proposes a particular ‘maxim’ or policy as a deep ecology, there is no good reason why
possible guide for his or her own future we should not extend Kant’s idea of certain
conduct – as an answer to the question of types of entity as being ends in themselves
‘what ought to be done?’ interpreted in an beyond the category of the human, even
ethical sense (Kant, 1972, pp. 66–68 and though Kant himself is unwilling to do so. If,
84–85). In the second place, this process also unlike Kant (and indeed Daniel Defoe), we
involves reasoned argument. The reasoning take this idea to include inanimate nature as
in question appeals to all of the relevant in- well as non-human animate beings, then the
formation available and recognises that some situation of Crusoe on his island might then
ethically significant other, with interests and be thought of as being precisely that of a
rights that are deserving of moral considera- ‘law making member in a kingdom of ends’
tion, is going to be affected by the policy in (Kant, 1972, p. 96). Admittedly, however
question should it be implemented. More- (and paradoxically), this would be a political
over, the intention, here, is that the final community in which there is only one
decision which is made with respect to the human being.
proposed policy should not be based on the The similarities between this situation and
casual, subjective, arbitrary or private interests a more conventional legislative situation
and desires of any one individual, but should involving more than one person of the sort
be the appropriate or right thing to do in the usually envisaged by students of politics are
situation in question. Finally, the proposed evidently very close. From the present point
maxim or policy is, in a manner of speaking, of view, there are only two differences here
voted on by the individual who is doing the (neither of which, it is claimed, are of any
deliberating. If it is considered to be a policy great importance). The first is that Kant’s
that is appropriate then it becomes a prac- principal concern is with a particular class of
tical law for the individual concerned. From policies, namely those which relate spe-
this point of view, then, the situation of cifically to ethical issues. It is clear, however,
Crusoe on his island is one in which there is that not all policies fall into this class.2 Thus,
quite literally just one isolated individual in the more conventional situation, not all
who is autonomous, self-legislating or self- laws and obligations are moral or ethical laws
governing, in Kant’s sense (Kant, 1972, and obligations in Kant’s sense. The second
pp. 93–97). Crusoe is someone who legislates is that in the ‘kingdom of ends’ that is
or makes policy decisions for himself and Crusoe’s island the ruler and the subject, or

96 © Political Studies Association 2000


Politics (2000) 20(2) pp. 93–98 Crusoe, Deep Ecology and Kant • Burns
the legislator who makes the law and the understanding. For example, in the light of
citizen who obeys it, happen to be one and our discussion, it could be argued that
the same person. According to the deep politics has to do not so much with general
ecological line of reasoning we are currently social rules, but simply with general rules or
considering, therefore, why should a policies, whether these be social or not.
policy-making situation of this sort be From this perspective the discipline of
thought of as having nothing at all to do politics is more or less identical with that of
with politics? Why should this situation not policy studies, understood in such a broad
be thought of as being a genuinely political sense. For here man is thought of as a policy-
situation? following animal. On this view, the existence
of a state is not a necessary precondition for
the existence of politics. Nor is the presence
Conclusion of conflict. Nor is the presence of power (if
by power one means what post-structuralists
This alternative understanding of the nature mean by it – for that is a relational view
of politics, which we have associated both of power, which requires the presence of at
with the standpoint of deep ecology, on the least two human beings). Nor is the presence
one hand, and that of Kant on the other, is of collective decision-making. Indeed, this
of course an extreme one. However, if this view of politics goes so far as to suggest that
line of reasoning has anything at all to be even the idea that politics is necessarily a
said for it then Andrew Heywood is clearly social activity might be brought into question.
wrong when he says that politics is ‘above Rather, from this standpoint, what charac-
all a social activity’. It is ‘always a dialogue terises a situation as a political situation is
and never a monologue’ (Heywood, 1997, the fact that it is a situation in which, for
p. 3) – unless, of course, one were to main- whatever reason, a policy is required. The
tain, with Freud (and perhaps also Defoe), fundamental question of all politics, there-
that the monologues of isolated human fore, is always ‘what ought that policy to
beings always amount, in effect, to dialogues be?’ The principal reason why the situation
with themselves. Heywood’s own definition of Crusoe on his island might, properly
of politics is that it has to do with ‘the speaking, be said to be a political situation
making, preserving and amending of general is precisely because even in his solitary
social rules’. In his opinion this definition is isolation Crusoe remains a policy-following
‘sufficiently broad to encompass most, if not being. In short, he remains a human being.
all, of the competing definitions’ of politics In so far as Crusoe’s policy-making activity
that one finds offered in the current literature relates (and even accords priority) to ethical
(Heywood, 1997, pp. 3–4). It is clear, how- issues (for example the duties that, accord-
ever, that this definition is not able to deal ing to Midgley, Crusoe has to the island that
satisfactorily with the situation of Crusoe on he inhabits) then this is an understanding of
his island. Consequently, it would be argued the nature of politics of which even Aristotle
by deep ecologists that even Heywood’s would have approved.
definition of politics is still not yet broad
enough.
In the end, of course, the point of Notes
considering the example of Crusoe on his
1 For the idea of deep ecology, see: Dobson,
island is to shed light on our understanding
1990; Fox, 1986; Naess, 1984; Sylvan, 1984a;
of politics in more conventional (social) Sylvan, 1984b.
situations. It is assumed that what we have 2 This amounts to recognising, as Kant him-
said about Crusoe is relevant to such an self does, that not all imperatives are ethical

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Crusoe, Deep Ecology and Kant • Burns Politics (2000) 20(2) pp. 93–98

or categorical imperatives – some are and the Natural Environment, Cambridge:


hypothetical imperatives. See Kant, 1972, Cambridge University Press, pp. 129–141.
pp. 76–83. Heywood, A. (1997), Politics, London: Macmillan.
Hoff, C. (1983), ‘Kant’s Invidious Humanism’,
Environmental Ethics 5, pp. 63–70.
Kant, Immanuel (1972), The Moral Law: Kant’s
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