FRANCISCO CHAVEZ v RAUL GONZALES

GR 168338

February 15, 2008

Article III, Section 4 No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression,
or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievances.

FACTS:

In light of the release of an audiotape of a mobile phone conversation allegedly between

the President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and a high-ranking official of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC)
warned media broadcasters that airing of such false information and/or willful misrepresentation
shall be just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or
authorizations issued to the said companies. Because of this, the petitioner argues that this is a
violation of the freedom on expression and of the press, and the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern. The petitioner also avers that it constitutes a form of impermissible
prior restraint. NTC then argued that broadcast media enjoy lesser constitutional guarantees
compared to print media, and the warning was issued pursuant to the NTC’s mandate to regulate
the telecommunications industry.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the NTC violated the right of freedom on expression and of the press, and
the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.
2. Whether the mere press statements of the Secretary of Justice and of the NTC in
question constitute a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the
Constitution.
3. Whether broadcast media enjoys free speech rights that are lesser in scope to that of
print media.

HELD:

1. Yes. The NTC has violated the right of freedom on expression and of the press, and
the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.
It is clear that the challenged acts in the case at bar need to be subjected to
the clear and present danger rule, as they are content-based restrictions. The acts of
respondents focused solely on but one object—a specific content— fixed as these
were on the alleged taped conversations between the President and a COMELEC
official. Undoubtedly these did not merely provide regulations as to the time, place or
manner of the dissemination of speech or expression.
On the basis of the records of the case at bar, respondents who have the burden to
show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech and of the press failed to
hurdle the clear and present danger test. It appears that the great evil which
government wants to prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of
the anti-wiretapping law. The records of the case at bar, however, are confused and
confusing, and respondents’ evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present
danger test. Firstly, the various statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the

Prepared by: Lina Maria D Domingo 1!

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 identity of the voices in the tape recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped
conversation is also suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the public two versions,
one supposed to be a “complete” version and the other, an “altered” version. Thirdly,
the evidence of the respondents on the who’s and the how’s of the wiretapping act is
ambivalent, especially considering the tape’s different versions. The identity of the
wire-tappers, the manner of its commission and other related and relevant proofs are
some of the invisibles of this case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the
tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping law.

2. Yes. The press statements constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on the
right to free speech and press.
It is sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents while in the
exercise of their official functions. Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales made his
statements as Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its statement as the
regulatory body of media. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf
of the government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior
restraint. The concept of an “act” does not limit itself to acts already converted to a
formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the non-formalization of an act into an
official order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on
prior restraint. The press statements at bar are acts that should be struck down as
they constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on the right to free speech and
press.

3. Yes. The freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope
than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media.
According to U.S. Courts, the three major reasons why broadcast media stands
apart from print media are: (a) the scarcity of the frequencies by which the medium
operates [i.e., airwaves are physically limited while print medium may be
limitless]; (b) its “pervasiveness” as a medium; and (c) its unique accessibility to
children.
Our cases show two distinct features of this dichotomy. First, the difference in
treatment, in the main, is in the regulatory scheme applied to broadcast media that is
not imposed on traditional print media, and narrowly confined to unprotected speech
(e.g., obscenity, pornography, seditious and inciting speech), or is based on a
compelling government interest that also has constitutional protection, such as
national security or the electoral process.
Second, regardless of the regulatory schemes that broadcast media is subjected
to, the Court has consistently held that the clear and present danger test applies to
content-based restrictions on media, without making a distinction as to traditional
print or broadcast media.
All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of
expression clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of television and radio
broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper
and print media. Thus, when this Court declared in the Dans case that the freedom
given to broadcast media was “somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded
to newspaper and print media,” it was not as to what test should be applied, but the
context by which requirements of licensing, allocation of airwaves, and application of
norms to unprotected speech.

Prepared by: Lina Maria D Domingo 2!

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