ROGER POSADAS, ET. AL. VS. OMBUDSMAN, ET. AL., G.R. NO.

131492, 29 SEPTEMBER 2000

FACTS: The Philippine Supreme Court upheld the supremacy of the constitutional rights of Filipino
citizens over attempts by law enforcers to harass the lawyers and officials of the University of the
Philippines (UP) whose only fault was to defend and protect the basic right of two of their college
students (who were suspects in a fraternity-related death of a UP student) to be free from any form of
search and seizure without valid warrants of arrest issued by the courts for the purpose. The National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) retaliated against the UP lawyers and officials by filing a criminal complaint
against them for alleged violation of P.D. No. 1829

ISSUES: (1) Whether the attempted arrest of the student suspects by the NBI could be validly made
without a warrant.

(2) Whether there was probable cause for prosecuting petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829.

HELD:

(1) The arresting officers in this case did not witness the crime being committed. Neither were the
students fugitives from justice nor prisoners who had escaped from confinement. The question was
whether Rule 113 Sec. 5 paragraph

(b) of the Rules of Court applies because a crime had just been committed and the NBI agents had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the two students Narag and Taparan were probably guilty.
The NBI contended that a peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person "when an offense has in
fact just been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it" and that a law enforcer “who had knowledge of facts gathered by him
personally in the course of his investigation” may arrest a suspect without a warrant of arrest. The
Supreme Court however noted that in contrast, the NBI agents in the case at bar tried to arrest Narag
and Taparan “four days after the commission of the crime”. They had “no personal knowledge of any
fact” which might indicate that the two students were probably guilty of the crime. What they had were
the “supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, which is insufficient to justify the
arrest without a warrant by the NBI”. (2) The Court stressed that to allow the arrest which the NBI
agents intended to make without warrant “would in effect allow them to supplant the courts”. The
determination of the existence of probable cause that the persons to be arrested committed the crime
was for the judge to make. The law authorizes a police officer or even an ordinary citizen to arrest
criminal offenders only if the latter are “committing or have just committed a crime”. Otherwise, “we
cannot leave to the police officers the determination of whom to apprehend if we are to protect our civil
liberties”.

JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES VS. HON. MANUEL B. GAITE, ET. AL. G.R. NO. 165276, 25 NOVEMBER
2009
FACTS: On 13 April 1999, petitioner filed a complaint for Kidnapping under Article 271 of the Revised
Penal Code (Inducing a Minor to Abandon His Home) against Michael Vistan, the Tolentino spouses, the
Nazareno spouses and Guevarra spouses, all maternal relatives of Maria Mercedes Vistan. Prompted by
his overwhelming desire to retaliate against petitioner and get himself off the hook from the kidnapping
charge, Michael Vistan had deliberately, maliciously, selfishly and insensitively caused undue physical,
emotional and psychological sufferings to Maria Mercedes Vistan, all of which were greatly prejudicial to
her well-being and development. Thus, on 1 December 1999, petitioner filed a complaint against
Michael Vistan before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Malolos, Bulacan for five counts of
Violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7610, otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act, and for four
counts of Violation of Sec. 1 (e) of PD 1829. She likewise filed a complaint for Libel against Maria Cristina
Vistan, aunt of Michael and Maria Mercedes. However, Provincial Prosecutor Amando C. Vicente denied
the recommendation of the Investigating Prosecutor that Michael Vistan be indicted for Violation RA
7610. He also approved the recommendation for the dismissal of the charge for Violation of PD 1829.
On18 March 2003 petitioner contended in the Court of Appeals that the Department of Justice (DOJ)
erred in dismissing the complaint against respondent Michael Vistan for violations of Presidential Decree
No. 1829 (PD No. 1829). The CA ruled, however, that the facts of the case as portrayed by petitioner do
not warrant the filing of a separate Information for violation of Section 1(e) of PD No. 1829.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the dismissal by the DOJ secretary of the complaint of
violation of Section 1(e) of P.D. 1829 (Obstruction of Justice) against private respondent Michael Vistan.

HELD:

NO. There is no jurisprudence that would support the stance taken by petitioner. Notwithstanding
petitioner's vehement objection in the manner the CA had disposed of the said issue, this Court agrees
with the same. The CA ruled that the position taken by petitioner was contrary to the spirit of the law on
"obstruction of justice,” in the wise: x x x It is a surprise to hear from petitioner who is a member of the
bench to argue that unserved warrants are tantamount to another violation of the law re: "obstruction
of justice." Petitioner is like saying that every accused in a criminal case is committing another offense of
“obstruction of justice” if and when the warrant of arrest issued for the former offense/ charge is
unserved during its life or returned unserved after its life – and that the accused should be charged
therewith re: "obstruction of justice." What if the warrant of arrest for the latter charge ("obstruction of
justice") is again unserved during its life or returned unserved? To follow the line of thinking of
petitioner, another or a second charge of "obstruction of justice" should be filed against the accused.
And if the warrant of arrest issued on this second charge is not served, again, a third charge of
"obstruction of justice" is warranted or should be filed against the accused. Thus, petitioner is effectively
saying that the number of charges for "obstruction of justice" is counting and/or countless, unless and
until the accused is either arrested or voluntarily surrendered. We, therefore, find the position taken by
petitioner as contrary to the intent and spirit of the law on "obstruction of justice." x x x As correctly
observed by the CA, the facts of the case, as portrayed by petitioner, do not warrant the filing of a
separate information for violation of Section 1(e) of PD No. 1829. This Court agrees with the CA that
based on the evidence presented by petitioner, the failure on the part of the arresting officer/s to arrest
the person of the accused makes the latter a fugitive from justice and is not equivalent to a commission
of another offense of obstruction of justice

LLER VS. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 144261-62. 09 MAY 2001

This was a case for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus raising the issue of the propriety of the
assumption of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases entitled “People of the Philippines vs.
Prudente D. Soller, Preciosa M. Soller, Rodolfo Salcedo, Josefina Morada, Mario Matining and Rommel
Luarca” wherein petitioners are charged with Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal
Offenders as defined and penalized under P.D. No. 1829. It appears that in the evening of March 14,
1997, Jerry Macabael a municipal guard, was shot and killed along the national highway at Bansud,
Oriental Mindoro while driving a motorcycle together with petitioner Soller’s son, Vincent M. Soller. His
body was brought to a medical clinic located in the house of petitioner Dr. Prudente Soller, the
Municipal Mayor, and his wife Dr. Preciosa Soller, who is the Municipal Health Officer. An autopsy was
conducted on the same night on the cadaver by petitioner Dr. Preciosa Soller with the assistance of
petitioner Rodolfo Salcedo, Sanitary Inspector, and petitioner Josefina Morada, Rural Health Midwife. A
complaint was later filed against the petitioners by the widow of Jerry Macabael with the Office of the
Ombudsman charging them with conspiracy to mislead the investigation of the fatal shootout of Jerry
Macabael by: (a) altering his wound ; (b) concealing his brain; (c) falsely stating in police report that he
had several gunshot wounds when in truth he had only one; and (d) falsely stating in an autopsy report
that there was no blackening around his wound when in truth there was. Petitioners Soller denied
having tampered with the cadaver of Jerry Macabael, and claimed, among others that Jerry Macabael
was brought to their private medical clinic because it was there where he was rushed by his companions
after the shooting, that petitioner Prudente Soller, who is also a doctor, was merely requested by his
wife Preciosa Soller, who was the Municipal Health Officer, to assist in the autopsy considering that the
procedure involved sawing which required male strength, and that Mrs. Macabael’s consent was
obtained before the autopsy. But two Information were indeed filed with the Sandiganbayan charging
the petitioners for criminally alter and suppress the gunshot wound and conceal the brain of Jerry
Macabael with intent to impair its veracity, authenticity, and availability as evidence in the investigation
of criminal case for murder against the accused Vincent Soller, the son of herein respondents.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash on the principal ground that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction
over the offenses charged. The Sandiganbayan denied petitioners’ Motion to Quash on the ground that
the accusation involves the performance of the duties of at least one of the accused public officials, and
if the Mayor is indeed properly charged together with that official, then the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the entire case and over all the coaccused.

HELD: The Supreme Court found the petition meritorious. The court held that the rule is that in order to
ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction or not, the provisions of the law should be inquired into.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the court must appear clearly from the statute law or it will not be held
to exist. It cannot be presumed or implied. For this purpose in criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the
court is determined by the law at the time of the commencement of the action. The Court found: The
action here was instituted with the filing of the Informations on May 25, 1999 charging the petitioners
with the offense of Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders as defined and
penalized under Section 1, Paragraph b of P.D. 1829.