ACE PROMOTION AND MARKETING CORPORATION vs REYNALDO URSABIA

G.R. No. 171703 | September 22, 2006

FIRST DIVISION | YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Facts:
The Petitioner, Ace Promotion and Marketing Corporation is engaged in the promotion of
various consumer products, commodities, and goods. Reynaldo Ursubia, Respondent, was a
company driver for the Petitioner.

On July 6 2001, Respondent failed to report to work. Gerry Garcia, his area supervisor, issued
and personally served him a memorandum asking for the Respondent’s explanation as to his
absence. The Respondent refused to acknowledge the said Memorandum.

On July 10 2001, Garcia noticed that the right front wheel of the vehicle assigned to the
Respondent was deflated. They also found out that the sliding door was slightly damage. For this
event, the Petitioner through Gerry Garcia, released another Memorandum which also asked for
an explanation from the Respondent. Also, an anonymous note that says ​(Good news) be careful
and save youre (sic) life because there's a time to come everybody x x x will die ​was found
among the stocks of the Petitioner. Upon examination by PNP, it was held that the writings in the
note matches the handwriting of the Respondent.

On August 6 2001, Respondent went to Petitioner’s office where he was served of his
termination letter. Petitioner also filed two criminal cases for Malicious Mischief and Grave
Threats against the respondent.

Displeased with his termination, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and
non-payment of other monetary benefits.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the Respondent is illegally dismissed

Held:
No, he is not illegally dismissed. The respondent is validly dismissed on the grounds of wilful
disobedience.

Respondent cannot be dismissed for ​abandonment​. To constitute a just and valid ground for
dismissal, abandonment requires the deliberate and unjustified refusal of the employee to resume
his employment. The subsequent conduct of respondent after he failed to report for work on July
6, 2001, shows that he had no intention to sever his employment with petitioner.
As to the alleged ​damage on the vehicle​, this cannot justify his dismissal. Termination is simply
disproportionate to such infraction not only because the extent of the damage was never proved
by petitioner but more importantly, no substantial evidence was presented to establish the guilt of
respondent.

With regard to the ​anonymous note​ purportedly written by the latter, petitioner failed to
discharge the burden of proving that the same was indeed a threat and that respondent was the
author thereof.

However, Respondent should be dismissed for​ willful disobedience​ of the Memoranda issued by
Petitioner. To be validly dismissed on the ground of willful disobedience requires the
concurrence of at least two requisites: (1) the employees assailed conduct must have been willful
or intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2)
the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must
pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. Respondent never replied to any of
the Memorandums presented to him. The Respondent had worked with petitioner for almost
seven years yet he did not give the courtesy, if not gratitude due it by complying with its
directives and explaining his conduct either verbally or in writing.

The Court further ruled that the Respondent was not given his procedural due process and rights.
In this case, the just cause to terminate respondent was his willful disobedience to the July 9 and
July 10, 2001 memoranda of petitioner. However, he was not given sufficient notice that his
services will be terminated on such grounds. Moreover, the final notice of termination of
respondent failed to specify the ground for his dismissal. It vaguely stated that he is being
terminated for violation of company rules which were not specified by petitioner.

We must note, however, that non-observance of such right does not entails the nullification of
the dismissal order. In ​Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission,​ it was held that where
the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of statutory due process should not
nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual.
(2) G.R. No. 167345 November 23, 2007

e PACIFIC GLOBAL CONTACT CENTER, INC. and/or JOSE VICTOR SISON, Petitioners
- versus -
MA. LOURDES CABANSAY, Respondent.

FACTS:
Respondent Ma. Lourdes Cabansay (Cabansay) was hired as Senior Traning Manager of ePacific Global
Contact Center, Inc. Subsequently, she became a regular employee.
Respondent was tasked to prepare a new training process for the company’s Telesales Trainees. After
reviewing the training module prepared by respondent, Mr. Rosendo S. Ballesteros (Ballesteros), the
company’s Senior Vice President-Business Development Group, found that the same did not contain any
changes and that they were not ready to present it. He thus instructed respondent through an electronic
mail (e-mail) to postpone the presentation and the implementation of the new training process.
Adversely reacting to respondent’s attitude because of the contents of reply through email to him, (This is
a very simple presentation and I WILL NOT POSTPONE it today, its very easy to comprehend and as per
YOUR INSTRUCTION we will be implementing it next week, so when should we present this to the TLs?
Lets not make SIMPLE THINGS COMPLICATED. I will go on with the presentation this afternoon.),
Ballesteros sent Cabansay a memo on April 6, 2002, informing the latter that he found her message to be
a clear act of insubordination, causing him to lose his trust and confidence in her as Manager of the
Training Department. He then asked respondent to explain in writing why she should not be terminated
as a consequence of her acts.

Meanwhile, no presentation of the training module was made.

Clarifying that this was merely a case of miscommunication and that she had no intention to disregard the
order to postpone the implementation of the new training process, Cabansay submitted two memoranda
dated April 8 and 11, 2002.
However, on April 11, 2002, the same day she submitted her second explanation, Cabansay received a
memorandum from the HR Department/Office of the President notifying her that she had been terminated
from the service effective immediately for having committed an act of insubordination resulting in the
managements loss of trust and confidence in her.
Respondent, thus, filed a case for illegal dismissal. She sought, among others, payment of full backwages,
separation pay, actual, moral and exemplary damages, cash equivalent of vacation and sick leave,
13th month pay, and attorney’s fees.

LA: Dismissed the complaint.

NLRC: Affirmed LA’s decision.

CA: Cabansay is declared to have been illegally dismissed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Cabansay was illegally dismissed.

RULING:
No. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter, as affirmed by the NLRC, dismissing the respondent’s complaint
for illegal dismissal is REINSTATED.
In the case at bar, the reasonableness and lawfulness of Ballesteros’ order is not in question, so is
its relation to the duties of respondent. It should be noted that what is involved in the directive is the new
training process, which logically cannot be implemented without being presented or communicated to the
team leaders of the company. Thus, when Ballesteros ordered the cessation of its implementation, there
can be no other inference than that he wanted to postpone the presentation of the training process which
was then already scheduled. Evident further in Ballesteros’ e-mail is that he did not find any changes in
the new module; hence, he wanted the implementation thereof to be deferred and instructed respondent to
consult with the other managers to gather more input.
Be that as it may, respondent cannot belie the fact that she well-understood the directive for her to
postpone the presentation of the module, as she herself acknowledged in her e-mail reply to SVP
Ballesteros that she would discuss the new training process and explain it to them in detail in the afternoon
on that day, thus, she would not postpone the scheduled presentation. There is no doubt, therefore, that
the order of Ballesteros was clearly made known to respondent.
As to the willfulness of her conduct, the same is manifest in her e-mail reply, which, as it is written,
is characterized by abject aggressiveness and antagonism: the e-mail has a begrudging tone and is replete
with capitalized words eliciting her resolve to indeed contravene the SVPs directive.
Indeed, by refusing to postpone the presentation and implementation of the new training process,
respondent intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse, breached the trust and
confidence reposed in her by her employer. To present and discuss a training module, which is deemed
by management as still inadequate in its content, will certainly not only waste the time, effort and energy
of the participants in the discussion but will also entail losses on the part of the company.
It is of no moment that the presentation did not push through, and that no actual damage was done
by respondent to the company. The mere fact that respondent refused to obey the reasonable and lawful
order to defer the presentation and implementation of the module already gave a just cause for petitioners
to dismiss her.
Respondents conduct, in this case, is sufficient basis for the company to lose its trust and
confidence in her. Under the circumstances, the company cannot be expected to retain its trust and
confidence in and continue to employ a manager whose attitude is perceived to be inimical to its
interests. Unlike other just causes for dismissal, trust in an employee, once lost, is difficult, if not
impossible to regain.
 SANTIAGO ALCANTARA, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE
PENINSULA MANILA, INC., respondents. G.R. No. 143397, August 6, 2002.

Facts:
Petitioner Santiago Alcantara, Jr., an employee of respondent The Peninsula Manila, Inc., seeks
the reversal of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals upholding his dismissal for
willful disobedience. At the time of his dismissal, petitioner worked as Commis II of the Food
and Beverage Department of the Peninsula Manila Hotel, Inc. He was also a Director of the
National Union of Workers in Hotels Restaurants and Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN)Manila
Peninsula Chapter.

The controversy stems from a Memorandum dated August 7, 1998 issued by respondent Hotel
prohibiting the union from using the union office from midnight until 6:00 in the morning. The
union office was located in the hotel premises.

On August 18, 1998, at about 1:30 in the morning, petitioner was seen inside the union office
with Conrad Salanguit and a certain Ma. Theresa Cruz. They left the office at about 2:20 in the
morning of the same day. On August 20, 1998, petitioner and a male companion were seen
entering the union office. Later that evening, petitioner was again seen in the office, seated with
both legs resting on a table. His male companion, who turned out to be Mr. Salanguit, was lying
on the bench. The office lights were off. DPO Lt. Caronan approached petitioner and reminded
him of the Memorandum dated August 7, 1998. Petitioner and Mr. Salanguit refused to leave,
however, and replied, Consult that to our President because we gave a reply to that
memorandum. Both petitioner and Mr. Salanguit stayed in the office until 3:30 in the morning of
August 21, 1998.

Petitioner submitted his letter of explanation dated August 28, 1998 intimating that the
Memorandum prohibiting the use of the union office was inconsistent with the CBA and was
necessarily ineffective..

On November 26, 1998, at around 12:50 until 5:50 in the morning, petitioner was again seen
lying on the bench inside the union office. On January 4, 1999, private respondent sent petitioner
a Notice of Termination for alleged willful and blatant refusal to comply with a lawful and valid
order (HRD Memorandum dated August 7, 1998) issued by his employer.

Meanwhile, the Union threatened to go on strike unless the memorandum in question was lifted
and petitioner reinstated. On April 5, 1999, Voluntary Arbitrator Noel G. Sanchez, to whom the
termination case was referred, rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the dismissal of SANTIAGO
ALCANTARA as ILLEGAL and directing the Company to reinstate him to his former position
without loss of seniority right and other privileges.”
Issue/s:
Whether or not termination was valid?

Ruling:
No, termination was not valid we agree with petitioner that his behavior did not constitute the
wrongful and perverse attitude that would sanction his dismissal. The surrounding circumstances
indicate that petitioner was motivated by his honest belief that the Memorandum was indeed
unlawful and unreasonable. Previous practice allowed the use of the union office 24 hours a day.
Section 1, Article III of the Collective Bargaining Agreement for 19962001 provided that, All
practices not expressly provided for in this Agreement which are presently being enjoyed by the
employees shall be continued by the HOTEL. Moreover, the Memorandum regulated the use of
the union office and petitioner, a union officer, interpreted such regulation as an unlawful
interference with legitimate union activities. Viewed in this light, petitioners attitude can hardly
be characterized as wrongful and perverse. While these circumstances do not justify his violation
of the regulation, they do not justify his dismissal either.

The Hotel cites previous infractions committed by petitioner as additional grounds for his
dismissal. The Court finds these to be nothing more than belated rationalizations; the Hotel did
not refer to these violations in its Notice of Termination to petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated November 24, 1999 and Resolution of the same court dated May 16,
2000 are SET ASIDE. The Peninsula Manila, Inc. is ordered to immediately reinstate petitioner
Santiago Alcantara, Jr. to his former, or an equivalent, position without loss of seniority and other
rights and to pay him back wages from the time of his dismissal to the time of actual
reinstatement less the value of wages for three days constituting the period of his suspension.

______________________________________________________________________________

Willful disobedience of the employers lawful orders, as a just cause for the dismissal of an
employee, envisages the concurrence of at least two requisites: (1) the employees assailed
conduct must have been willful or intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a wrongful
and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known
to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. [9]

(The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power
delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within
the contemplation of the term instrumentality in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. x x (The fact
that [the voluntary arbitrators] functions and powers are provided for in the Labor Code does not
place him within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasijudicial instrumentality as
contemplated therein.)
 4. FLP ENTERPRISES INC. - FRANCESCO SHOES/
EMILIO FRANCISCO B. PAJARO, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. JOERALYN D. DELA CRUZ and VILMA MALUNES, Respondents;
G.R. No. 198093; July 28, 2014.
Peralta, J.

Facts:

Petitioner FLPE hired respondents Dela Cruz and Malunes as sales ladies and assigned them both at its
Alabang Town Center store in Muntinlupa City. In March 2008, it was discovered that the store’s sales proceeds
for March 7 to March 9 were missing. The investigators found that it resulted from an "inside job" since the cash
register remained closed and there was no indication of forced entry into the store. FLPE thus required respondents
to explain in writing why they should not be terminated, contending that respondents clearly violated its company
policy which prohibits sales proceeds from being stored in the cash register. Accordingly, Dela Cruz and Malunes
submitted their respective written explanations, denying the existence of such company policy and having
knowledge thereof.

FLPE thereafter removed Dela Cruz and Malunes from service. Aggrieved, respondents filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal with money claims against the company.

LA: Dismissed respondents’ claim. Reason: FLPE was able to sufficiently prove that respondents were guilty of
habitually violating the company standard procedure on safekeeping of cash collection.

NLRC: Affirmed the decision of the LA.

CA: The Court of Appeals set aside the NLRC ruling and pronounced respondents as having been illegally
dismissed by FLPE. Thereafter, FLPE field a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied for lack of
merit.

Issue: Whether or not FLPE validly dismissed respondents Dela Cruz and Malunes.

(FLPE contended that because of the several previous incidents of theft in its retail outlets, it formulated a policy
which requires its sales staff to keep the sales proceeds in the stockroom instead of the cash register. It maintains
that said policy was properly announced, posted and implemented in all its retail outlets. Despite that, respondents
still refused to comply).

Ruling: No. FLPE illegally dismissed respondents Dela Cruz and Malunes.

It is a fundamental rule that an employee can be discharged from employment only for a valid cause. Here,
both the LA and the NLRC found that respondents have been validly terminated for gross and habitual neglect of
duties, constituting just cause for termination under Article 282 of the Labor Code (now Art. 297). As a valid
ground for dismissal under said provision, neglect of duty must be both gross and habitual. Gross negligence
entails want of care in the performance of one’s duties, while habitual neglect imparts repeated failure to perform
such duties for a period of time, depending on the circumstances.

Substantial evidence is also necessary for an employer to effectuate any dismissal. Uncorroborated
assertions and accusations by the employer would not suffice, otherwise, the constitutional guaranty of security
of tenure would be put in jeopardy.
 FLPE claims that its company policy that requires its sales managers and staff to keep the sales proceeds
in a shoebox in the stockroom and not inside the cash register, have been in existence since October 23, 2003.
However, FLPE failed to establish that such a company policy actually exists. If it does truly exist, FLPE also
failed to prove that the policy was posted and/or disseminated accordingly. Neither is there anything in the records
which reveals that the dismissed respondents were informed of said policy.

The company vehemently insists that it posted, announced, and implemented the subject Safekeeping
Policy in all its retail stores, especially the one in Alabang Town Center. It, however, failed to substantiate said
claim. It could have easily produced a copy of said memorandum bearing the signatures of Dela Cruz and Malunes
to show that, indeed, they have been notified of the existence of said company rule and that they have received,
read, and understood the same. FLPE could likewise have simply called some of its employees to testify on the
rule’s existence, dissemination, and strict implementation. But aside from its self-serving and uncorroborated
declaration, and a copy of the supposed policy as contained in the October 23, 2003 Memorandum, FLPE adduced
nothing more.

In termination cases, the burden of proof rests on the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just
cause. The one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; thus, FLPE should prove its allegation that it
terminated respondents for a valid and just cause. It must be stressed that the evidence to prove this fact must be
clear, positive, and convincing. When there is no showing of a clear, valid, and legal cause for the termination of
employment, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal

Assuming arguendo that respondents were aware of the alleged company policy, FLPE failed to prove
that they are guilty of disobedience amounting to gross and habitual neglect of duty. On March 9, 2008, Dela
Cruz did not even report to work because it was her rest day. As for Malunes, she admitted putting the sales
proceeds inside the cash register but she only did so upon the instructions of the store manager, who is basically
part of management. There is likewise want of competent evidence showing that respondents have repeatedly
violated said policy in the past.

True, an employer has the discretion to regulate all aspects of employment and the workers have the
corresponding obligation to obey company rules and regulations. Deliberately disregarding or disobeying the
rules cannot be countenanced, and any justification that the disobedient employee might put forth is deemed
inconsequential. However, the Court must emphasize that the prerogative of an employer to dismiss an employee
on the ground of willful disobedience to company policies must be exercised in good faith and with due regard to
the rights of labor.

For lack of any clear, valid, and just cause in terminating respondents' employment, FLPE is guilty of
illegal dismissal.
5. Santos v. San Miguel Corporation, G.R. No. 149416, March 14, 2003
Facts:
San Miguel Corporation (SMC) appointed petitioner Carmelita V. Santos as Finance Director of
its Beer Division for Luzon Operations. On September 6, 1989, respondent's Cash Department issued a
Memorandum prohibiting the encashment of personal checks at respondent's Plants and Sales Offices.
On January 10, 1991, respondent SMC, through its Cash Management Department, noticed that
petitioner encashed her three (3) personal checks in various Metro Manila Sales Offices. Two checks
were dishonored by the bank because of insufficient fund and the other one was accepted for payment.

Respondent commenced an audit investigation of the personal checks encashed by petitioner at

its sales offices. Pending the audit investigation, petitioner agreed to take a fifteen-day vacation leave
from January 25 to February 14, 1991. On January 29, 1991, petitioner received from respondent an
inter-office memorandum requiring her to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be taken
against her in view of her unauthorized encashment of her three personal checks at respondent's sales
offices. In a reply-memorandum, petitioner admitted that she encashed three personal checks at
respondent's sales offices but claimed that such act was not irregular since all personnel in respondent's
Beer Division were allowed to encash their personal checks at any sales office upon clearance from the
region management concerned. She stated that her encashment of personal checks had prior clearance.

Meanwhile, respondent obtained a copy of the audit results and learned that aside from
petitioner's reported encashment of three personal checks, she had previously encashed fifty (50)
personal checks from June 13, 1989 to January 19, 1991 in varying amounts. After receiving such
report, respondent SMC formed an Investigating Panel to conduct a full-blown investigation of
petitioner's encashment of personal checks and to determine: (1) whether the region management gave
prior consent to the transactions; (2) whether the person or persons who accepted or encashed the
personal checks were in fact authorized to do so; (3) if there is any policy, procedure and/or
accommodation for the encashment of personal checks and the extent/amount and frequency of such;
and (4) the loss or damage accruing to respondent, if any.

In the meantime, on or February 15, 1991, petitioner returned from her vacation leave and
reported for work. To her surprise, she found that she had been relieved of her present
assignment/position until the conclusion of the investigation. At the first investigative hearing, petitioner
appeared but requested a postponement of five days to enable her to submit a supplemental letter to the
Investigating Panel. Despite notice, she refused to attend subsequent hearings. The Investigating Panel
considered her refusal as a waiver of her right to be heard and thus continued the investigation in her
absence. Respondent adopted the findings of the Investigating Panel and informed petitioner of her
termination from employment for abuse of position as Finance Director, engaging in highly irregular
transactions to the detriment of the company and employer's loss of trust and confidence.

Five days before the end of the administrative investigation, or on March 15, 1991, petitioner
filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for constructive dismissal against respondent SMC and the
Chairman of the Investigating Panel which was later amended to illegal dismissal.

LA: dismissed the case, however, respondent is directed to give complainant financial assistance
equivalent to one month pay.
NLRC: held that respondent SMC was estopped from questioning petitioner's encashment of personal
checks, having allowed such practice for several years prior to the present case.

CA: rendering its decision annulling and setting aside that of the NLRC.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was dismissed from employment without just cause and violated her
right to due process.

Held:
Under the Labor Code, a valid dismissal from employment requires that: (1) the dismissal must
be for any of the causes expressed in Article 282 of the Labor Code and (2) the employee must be given
an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. Article 282(c) of the same Code provides that "willful
breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer" is a cause for the termination of
employment by an employer. This ground should be duly established. Substantial evidence is sufficient
as long as such loss of confidence is well-founded or if the employer has reasonable ground to believe
that the employee concerned is responsible for the misconduct and her act rendered her unworthy of the
trust and confidence demanded of her position. It must be shown, though, that the employee concerned
holds a position of trust. The betrayal of this trust is the essence of the offense for which an employee is
penalized.

Prolonged practice of encashing personal checks among respondent's payroll personnel does not
excuse or justify petitioner's misdeeds. Petitioner's willful and deliberate acts were in gross violation of
respondent's policy against encashment of personal checks of its personnel, embodied in its Cash
Department Memorandum dated September 6, 1989. She cannot feign ignorance of such memorandum
as she is duty-bound to keep abreast of company policies related to financial matters within the
corporation. Equally unmeritorious are her claims that the acts complained of are regular, being with the
knowledge and consent of her superiors and that she is being charged because she resisted the sexual
advances of her superior. Suffice it to state that she could have proved these matters during the
investigation had she attended the proceedings.

On petitioner's contention that she was denied due process . In this case, petitioner was required
to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be taken against her. She was also notified that a
full-blown administrative investigation will be conducted and was advised that she should be
represented by counsel. She submitted to the Investigating Panel a letter-explanation and a supplemental
response to the administrative complaint against her. At her request, the investigation was postponed
twice to enable her to procure the services of counsel. Yet, she vehemently refused to participate in the
administrative investigation. She cannot now claim denial of due process considering that she was
afforded the opportunity to be present (with counsel) during the investigation and to present her
evidence.

The essence of due process is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to
submit any evidence he may have in support of his defense. Procedural due process requires the
employer to give the employee two notices. First is the notice apprising him of the particular acts or
omissions for which his dismissal is sought. Second is the subsequent notice informing him of the
employer's decision to dismiss him. Records show that the petitioner received the required twin notices.
 6. Mirant (PH) Corp. v. Sario; G.R. No. 197598, November 21, 2012
“The Court stressed that willful disobedience of an employee contemplates the concurrence of at least
two requisites: the employee’s assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional, the willfulness
being characterized by a "wrongful and perverse attitude"; and the order violated must have been
reasonable, lawful and made known to the employee, and must pertain to the duties which he had been
engaged to discharge.”

FACTS:
Danilo Sario is employed by Mirant Corporation as a procurement officer wherein he is
obligated with the task of recommending suppliers, supervising the bidding process, among
others. Due to the findings of the company that some of its employees is involved in the rampant
practice of favoring certain suppliers, thereby tainting with bad reputation their transparency as a
company. In lieu of this fact, Mirant issued several revised policy and guidelines in order to curb
this practice. It also conducted seminars and proficiency exams which Sario also took.
On September 8, 2005, Sario received a show cause order wherein he is required to
explain his reason behind several disciplinary infractions he allegedly committed such as failing
to comply with the minimum bid requirements, non-awarding of bids to the lowest bidder, non-
compliance with the single tender justification requirement, among others. He submitted his
report with the help of his attorney.
The argument on his behalf contended that the policy was not properly disseminated and
that he never took the proficiency exam, and that he is only doing so in order to meet the quota
set by his employers.
The company eventually dismissed Sario for his failure to comply with company rules
and regulations, serious misconduct, and gross and habitual neglect of his duties.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that Sario has been illegally dismissed on the ground that the
manuals and policy did not indicate any commensurate penalties and that Sario does not exercise
discretionary powers over his duties. It was reversed by the NLRC wherein it ruled that Sario
was afforded due process. The Court of Appeals reinstated the ruling of the Labor Arbiter.
ISSUES:
• WON Sario is legally dismissed due to willfull disobedience? (YES)
RULING:
• There is willful disobedience on the part of Sario that justified his dismissal
Sario is not a mere rank-and-file employee. He is a procurement officer who is vital in
the business of the company. The finding that he committed twenty-seven violations in
the span of a year and a half justifies the company’s dismissal of his employment which
has become inimical to its operation.
Miguel Rubia v. National Labor Relations Commission, Fourth Division, Cebu City,
Community Water and Sanitation Cooperative and The Board of Directors; GR 178621, July
26, 2010.

Facts:
Petitioner Rubio was a member of the Board of Community Water and Sanitation
Cooperative (COWASSCO), a cooperative engaged in water and sanitation service for Argao, Cebu,
before he became General Manager. COWASSCO, through its Chairman of the Board, issued a
memorandum charging petitioner with mismanagement of operation relating to the non-monitoring
and non-compliance on the correct dosage of chlorine to the water system which was believed by the
Sangguniang Bayan to have caused a typhoid fever epidemic and requesting an explanation from
him within 48 hours after the receipt of this Memorandum.
Petitioner submitted his explanation and claimed that he complied with all the
recommendations of the Sangguniang Bayan. He shifted the blame to the Chlorinator and the
Master Plumber. He likewise asserted that the Board of Directors was equally culpable and
accountable to the lapses committed by said Chlorinator and Master Plumber.
Petitioner was terminated for loss of trust and confidence. The Board of Directors in the
course of their investigation found him guilty of mismanagement. Among others, his acts include the
following among others: the water was contaminated once again; he failed to implement the putting
up of a fence and putting open launders to all the spring boxes so that flood water cannot penetrate
and he failed to implement a Board Resolution to install a water gauge in the reservoir.
Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. He averred that his dismissal was illegal as
there was no clear showing of a clear, valid and legal cause.
The LA found petitioner’s dismissal as illegal. The LA ruled that respondents failed to prove
that there was loss of trust and confidence. Petitioner was not accorded due process when only one
incident of mismanagement was mentioned in the show-cause notice but petitioner was dismissed on
the ground of several other incidents.
Respondents appealed to the NLRC which reversed and set aside the LA’s decision. The
NLRC was mum on the issue of due process.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which dismissed the petition. The CA
held that petitioner was remiss in his duties and responsibilities as general manager of COWASSCO
in failing to see to it that the correct dosage of chlorine was added to the water. Petitioner was
rightfully dismissed.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner maintains that he was denied due process because the first
notice requirement for dismissing an employee was not observed. He elucidates that the show-cause
notice mentioned only of one incident. In the resolution terminating petitioner, there were other
incidents cited which petitioner was not previously informed.
Respondents allege that petitioner was validly dismissed for his numerous infractions, which
were all mentioned in the letter by the Sangguniang Bayan. They reiterate that petitioner was
afforded due process. They explain that they sent a memorandum to petitioner requiring him to
explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him. They even conducted a formal
investigation wherein petitioner was given the full opportunity to defend himself.

Issues:
1. Whether or not petitioner was validly dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence;
and
2. Whether or not the due process requirement for termination was observed.
Ruling:
1. YES. Article 282(c) of the Labor Code allows an employer to terminate the services of an
employee for fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer
or his duly authorized representative. The employee concerned must be holding a position of
trust and confidence and there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust and confidence.

As General Manager, petitioner was tasked the general operation of the cooperative. Petitioner held
a position of trust and confidence. He occupies a highly sensitive and critical position which
involves a high degree of responsibility. The NLRC aptly observed that in petitioner’s hands
therefore lies the health and even lives of the people of Argao. For breach of trust to constitute a
valid cause for dismissal, it must be willful, meaning it must be done intentionally, knowingly, and
purposely, without justifiable excuse. Petitioner did not deny that he was remiss in his duties.

2. YES. Article 277(b) of the Labor Code provides that “…the employer shall furnish the worker
whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the
causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires in accordance with company
rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the DOLE…”

Section 2, Rule 23, Book 5 of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code, requires the employer to
furnish the employee with two written notices - (1) a written notice served on the employee
specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving to said employee reasonable
opportunity within which to explain his side; and (2) a written notice of termination served on the
employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been
established to justify his termination.

The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the elements of due process in cases of
employee's dismissal. Notice is intended to inform the employee concerned of the employer's intent
to dismiss and the reason for the proposed dismissal. Hearing affords the employee an opportunity to
answer his employer's charges against him and accordingly to defend himself therefrom before
dismissal is effected.

The SC modified the findings of the CA which observed that petitioner was not afforded a hearing
or conference before the termination was effected. Petitioner was in fact given the opportunity to
defend himself in an investigation conducted by the BOD. The failure to implement a Board
Resolution providing for a Code of Ethical Standard to employees of COWASSCO, does not by
itself constitute denial of due process.

Petitioner was informed in the first memorandum regarding the incorrect application of chlorine,
which was the more important ground by which his dismissal was premised. Petitioner did not make
a categorical denial of this allegation against him. In the second notice, the issue of incorrect
chlorination was also discussed in detail. The BOD cited instances showing that petitioner had not
properly safeguarded the well-being of the water consumers. It cannot be concluded that there was
denial of due process.

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard; it is the denial of this opportunity
that constitutes violation of due process of law. As long as petitioner was given an opportunity to
explain his side, the requirements of due process have been substantially complied with.
ANITA LLOSA-TAN, petitioner,
vs.
SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, CARMELITO REGALADO, VANESSA
SUATENGCO AND NESTOR FAMATIGAN, respondents.
FACTS:
The complainant was front office cashier of Silahis International Hotel since November 2, 1976
until her questioned dismissal on October 30, 1982. She is also a member of the Silahis
International Hotel Employees Union.
The Silahis International Hotel, respondent herein, had a standing corporate policy which
instructs all cashiers of SMC and its affiliates to refuse the cashing of personal checks of
employees and officials. When a check bounces, management in effect extends credit to the
employee. In order to minimize these losses, it has no other recourse but to effect salary
deductions.
While petitioner was on duty, she was approached by Mr. Fernando Gayondato, the general
cashier of Puerto Azul Beach Resort —a sister company of Silahis International Hotel and
nephew of the Executive Vice President, to encash two (2) US dollar checks
These checks were drawn by Mr. Reynaldo Vicencio and were payable to cash. Although
petitioner politely explained the existence of Policy No. 014 prohibiting such transactions,
Gayondato persisted and assured that the presentation of aforesaid checks to the front office
cashier was upon instructions of the Executive Vice President.
Thus, petitioner, eventually encashed the aforesaid checks, notwithstanding Corporate Policy No.
014. Thereafter, the said checks bounced.
Respondent Vanessa Suatengco issued a memorandum to the petitioner requiring her to explain
in writing why she should not be terminated for encashing the two (2) personal checks without
proper authorization.
Petitioner contends that Mr. Gayondato assured her that he knows personally Mr. Reynaldo M.
Vicencio, being a close friend and a frequent guest at Puerto Azul, and the said checks were fully
funded
Because of His being the General Cashier of Puerto Azul, and his being a very close relative to
EVP Trinidad Diaz-Enriquez, and his repeated assurances that the checks were already passed
upon by EVP Trinidad Diaz-Enriquez, and considering his representation for his need for cash to
meet certain urgent disbursements in Puerto Azul, and the expected foreign exchange income
that will accrue to Silahis, undersigned was finally constrained in good faith to allow encashment
of said dollar checks.
Moreover, undersigned refused to allow encashment of a check issued in favor of Mr. Johannes
Jahms, Resident Manager of Silahis, due to her adherence to said Corporate Policy No. 014.
Instead of being praised and commended, undersigned received a memorandum from
management which in effect reprimanded her for following said policy and she almost got
dismissed for being inflexible and not using her sound discretion on the matter. When she took
up the matter with Mr. F. S. Famatigan, Jr., he then advised undersigned to be flexible and use
her sound discretion in future similar cases.

Despite petitioner's explanation in the aforesaid letter, her services were terminated effective
October 30, 1982. Subsequently, petitioner filed a complaint against respondents for illegal
dismissal.

LA ruled in favor of petitioner. NLRC reversed. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of petitioner constitute gross negligence resulting in a valid
ground for the termination of her employment.

HELD: NO.

Gross negligence has been defined as the want of any or slight care or the utter disregard of
consequences.

Admittedly, the encashment of the checks in question is a violation of Policy No. 014 of said
hotel. But as found by the Labor Arbiter, it was established that: (a) complainant was not
motivated by bad faith; (b) Policy No. 014 is not strictly or consistently enforced but has been
relaxed repeatedly to meet business exigencies; and (c) complainant's encashment of the checks
in question was not only with the knowledge but with clearance from her superiors who are more
knowledgeable as to the circumstances under which the enforcement of the same may be relaxed.

Moreover, it cannot be said that complainant was precipitate or that she has acted in utter
disregard of consequences. On the contrary, she refused to encash subject checks despite the
request of Mr. Gayondato, the general cashier of Puerto Azul, but was persuaded only upon the
assurances of the latter that such was the wish of the Executive Vice President and that said
encashment was necessary to meet certain disbursements in Puerto Azul. In addition, she
informed personally Mr. Samuel Grulla, Assistant Manager of the Silahis International Hotel, of
said encashment, who also told her that such is "alright".

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
is hereby DISMISSED, and SET ASIDE and private respondent Silahis International Hotel is
ordered to reinstate petitioner Anita Llosa-Tan to her former position or similar position without
loss of seniority rights with full backwages beginning October 30, 1982 for a period of three (3)
years therefrom.

SO ORDERED.
 R.B. MICHAEL PRESS and ANNALENE REYES ESCOBIA vs NICASIO C. GALIT
G.R. No. 153510, February 13, 2008, VELASCO, JR., J.:

FACTS:

Galit was employed by petitioner R.B. Michael Press as an offset machine operator.
During his employment, He was tardy for a total of 190 times, totaling to 6,117 minutes, and was
absent without leave for a total of nine and a half days.

On February 22, 1999, respondent was ordered to render overtime service in order to
comply with a job order deadline, but he refused to do so. The following day, February 23, 1999,
respondent reported for work but petitioner Escobia told him not to work, and to return later in
the afternoon for a hearing. When he returned, a copy of an Office Memorandum was served on
him. Then on February 24, 1999, respondent was terminated from employment. The employer,
through petitioner Escobia, gave him his two-day salary and a termination letter.

Respondent subsequently filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims. The
labor arbiter rendered a Decision finding that complainant was illegally dismissed. The NLRC
dismissed petitioners' the appeal for lack of merit and the CA affirmed NLRC with modification.

ISSUE: Was Galit illegally dismissed?

HELD:

No. For willful disobedience to be a valid cause for dismissal, these two elements must
concur: (1) the employees assailed conduct must have been willful, that is, characterized by a
wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful,
made known to the employee, and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to
discharge. There is no question that petitioners order for respondent to render overtime service to
meet a production deadline complies with the second requisite.

Respondent unjustifiably refused to render overtime work despite a valid order to do so.
The totality of his offenses against petitioner R.B. Michael Press shows that he was a difficult
employee. His refusal to render overtime work was the final straw that broke the camels back,
and, with his gross and habitual tardiness and absences, would merit dismissal from service.

On the other hand, the undue haste in effecting respondent’s termination shows that the
termination process was a mere simulation. The required notices were given, a hearing was even
scheduled and held, but respondent was not really given a real opportunity to defend himself; and
it seems that petitioners had already decided to dismiss respondent from service, even before the
first notice had been given.
 Anent the written notice of charges and hearing, it is plain to see that there was merely a
general description of the claimed offenses of respondent. The hearing was immediately set in
the afternoon of February 23, 1999 the day respondent received the first notice. Therefore, he
was not given any opportunity at all to consult a union official or lawyer, and, worse, to prepare
for his defense.

WHEREFORE, CA Decision, Decision of the NLRC, and the Decision of the Labor
Arbiter are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Court declares respondent’s dismissal
from employment VALID and LEGAL. Petitioners are, however, ordered jointly and solidarily
to pay respondent nominal damages in the amount of PhP 30,000 for violation of respondents
right to due process
 9. Inocente vs. St. Vincent Foundation for Children and Aging, Inc.
G.R. No. 202621. June 22, 2016.

ILLEGAL DISMISSAL. Supreme Court: "mere private sexual relations between two unmarried
and consenting adults, even if the relations result in pregnancy or miscarriage out of wedlock
and without more, are not enough to warrant liability for illicit behavior. The voluntary intimacy
between two unmarried adults, where both are not under any impediment to marry, where no
deceit exists, and which was done in complete privacy, is neither criminal nor so unprincipled as
to warrant disciplinary action."

Facts:

Respondent St. Vincent is a non-stock, non-profit foundation engaged in providing assistance to

children and aging people. It is financially supported by the Kansas based Catholic Foundation
for Children and Aging (CFCA). Petitioner Zaida was hired as a program assistant and was
promoted as a program officer a year later.

In 2001, Zaida met Marlon Inocente (also an employee of respondent) Zaida and Marlon became
close and soon became romantically involved with each other.

In September 2006, St. Vincent adopted the CFCA's Non-Fraternization Policy; it reads in full:

While CFCA does not wish to interfere with the off-duty and personal conduct of
its employees,... (we) strongly discouraged (employees) from engaging in
consensual romantic or sexual relationships with any employee or volunteer of
CFCA.

Despite St. Vincent's adoption of the Non-Fraternization Policy, Zaida and Marlon discretely
continued their relationship; they kept their relationship private and unknown to St. Vincent even
after Marlon resigned in July 2008.

Later, Zaida experienced severe abdominal pain requiring her to go to the hospital. The doctor
later informed her that she had suffered a miscarriage. Zaida informed St. Vincent of her
situation. On March 31, 2009, Zaida was again confined at the hospital for ectopic pregnancy.
Zaida, thereafter, underwent surgery to have one of her fallopian tubes removed.

Zaida was required to explain in writing why no administrative action should be taken against
her. She defended that:
(1) her relationship with Marlon started long before St. Vincent's Non-Fraternization Policy
took effect;
(2) Marlon was no longer connected with St. Vincent since 2008;
(3) her relationship with Marlon is not immoral as they were both of legal age and with no
impediments to marry;
 (4) they kept their relationship private and were discreet in their actions;
(5) Marlon stayed at her place only to take care of her while she was sick; and
(6) they already planned to get married as soon as she recovers and their finances improve.

Eventually, St. Vincent terminated Zaida's employment for (1) engaging in intimate out-of-
wedlock relationship with Marlon which it considered immoral; (2) her failure to disclose the
relationship to the management - an omission violating its Non-Fraternization Policy which it
characterized as gross misconduct; and (3) violating its Code of Conduct, i.e. committing acts
against her superiors' authority and her co-employees, violating the terms of her employment,
and engaging in immoral conduct that goes against its interest as a Christian institution.

Zaida and Marlon were subsequently married on June 23, 2009. Thereafter, Zaida filed before
the LA her complaint for illegal dismissal.

LA: dismissed Zaida's complaint for lack of basis  despite the implementation of the Non-
Fraternization Policy in 2006, Zaida maintained and concealed from St. Vincent her relationship
with Marlon. The LA pointed out that as a program officer, Zaida was under the obligation to
observe this Policy and to inform her employer of her relationship. Her acts, therefore, could be
characterized as an act of dishonesty constituting willful breach of trust and confidence justifying
her dismissal.

NLRC: agreed with LA’s findings

CA: denied Zaida's certiorari petition for lack of merit

Issue:
1. Whether the petitioner’s dismissal is proper due to serious misconduct/ loss of
confidence.
2. Whether the Procedural Due Process Requirements for termination of employment were
complied with.

Ruling:

1. No. The court finds the dismissal illegal for lack of valid cause. St. Vincent failed to
sufficiently prove its charges against Zaida to justify her dismissal for serious misconduct
and loss of trust and confidence.
For an employee to be validly dismissed on the ground of serious misconduct, the
employee must:
First, have committed misconduct or an improper or wrong conduct;
Second, the misconduct or improper behavior is:
 (a) serious;
(b) relate to the performance of the employee's duties; and
(3) show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the
employer.
Zaida's relationship with Marlon is neither illegal nor immoral; it also did not violate the
Non-Fraternization Policy. The said policy only discourages, not prohibit, romantic or
sexual relationships among employees or volunteers. Second, misconduct has been
defined as improper or wrong conduct. Morality must be based on secular standards.
There is nothing wrong about the petitioner's relationship with Marlon - both of them are
of legal age and without legal impediment to marry.
Moreover, in citing Vitarich Corp. v. NLRC, the court laid out the guidelines for the
application of the doctrine of loss of confidence, namely: (1) the loss of confidence
should not be simulated; (2) it should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which
are improper, illegal or unjustified; (3) it should not be arbitrarily asserted in the
face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary; and (4) it must be genuine, not a
mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith.
St. Vincent failed to show how Zaida's relationship with Marlon affected her performance
of her duties as a Program Officer and that she has become unfit to continue working for
it, whether for the same position or otherwise. Her dismissal based on this ground,
therefore, is without any factual or legal basis.

2. No. St. Vincent did not specify in what manner and to what extent Zaida unduly
influenced her co-workers and subordinates for hers and Marlon's benefit with regard to
the charge of committing acts against persons. It should have been supported by a
narration of the specific act/s she allegedly committed by which she unduly influenced
her co-worker and subordinates, of the dates when these act/s were committed, and of the
names of the co-workers and/or subordinates affected by her alleged actions.

WHEREFORE, in light of these considerations, we hereby GRANT the petition.

We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision dated February 27, 2012 and the resolution dated
July 11, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 118576. We declare petitioner Zaida
R. Inocente as illegally dismissed.
ARIEL A TRES REYES, petitioner, vs MAXIMS TEA HOUSE and JOCELYN POON, respondents.

FACTS:
Respondent Maxims Tea House (hereinafter Maxims for brevity) had employed Ariel Tres Reyes as a
driver since October 1995. He was assigned to its M.H. del Pilar Street, Ermita, Manila branch. His working
hours were from 5:00 P.M. to 3:00 A.M., and among his duties was to fetch and bring to their respective
homes the employees of Maxims after the restaurant closed for the day.
In the wee hours of the morning of September 27, 1997, petitioner was driving a Mitsubishi L300 van
and was sent to fetch some employees of Savannah Moon, a ballroom dancing establishment in Libis,
Quezon City. Petitioner complied and took his usual route along Julia Vargas Street in Pasig City. He was
headed towards Meralco Avenue at a cruising speed of 50to 60 kilometers per hour, when he noticed a ten-
wheeler truck coming his way at full speed despite the fact that the latters lane had a red signal light on.
Petitioner maneuvered to avoid a collision, but nonetheless the van he was driving struck the truck. As a
result, petitioner and seven of his passengers sustained physical injuries and both vehicles were damaged.
On October 15, 1997, the management of Maxims required petitioner to submit, within forty-eight
hours, a written explanation as to what happened that early morning of September 27, 1997. He complied
but his employer found his explanation unsatisfactory and as a result he was preventively suspended for
thirty (30) days, effective October 20, 1997.
On November 19, 1997, Maxims terminated petitioner for cause.
Feeling that the vehicular accident was neither a just nor a valid cause for the severance of his
employment, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

On July 20, 1998, the Labor Arbiter sustain the validity of the dismissal of complainant Ariel A. Tres
Reyes and found that petitioner was grossly negligent in failing to avoid the collision. Thus, LA order
respondent Maxim (sic) Tea House to pay him Financial assistance, 13th month pay for 1997 and Service
incentive leave pay. The total amount is P11,788.00

Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration with the NLRC, the NLRC reversed the decision
of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that there was no negligence on petitioners part.

Respondents moved for reconsideration of the foregoing decision, but said motion was denied by the
Commission in its resolution dated May 12, 1999.
Respondents then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. the appellate
court decided in favor of the employer and its manager
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Is petitioners dismissal from employment valid and legal?
HELD:
The issue of whether a party is negligent is a question of fact. As a rule, the Supreme Court is not a
trier of facts and this applies with greater force in labor cases. Hence, factual findings of quasi-judicial
bodies like the NLRC, particularly when they coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter and if supported by
substantial evidence, are accorded respect and even finality by this Court. But where the findings of the
NLRC and the Labor Arbiter are contradictory, as in this case, the reviewing court may delve into the
records and examine for itself the questioned findings.
 Our perusal of the records shows that the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter primarily involved the
submission of position papers by the parties. No trial-type hearing was conducted at all by the Labor Arbiter.
Thus, the finding of the Court of Appeals that the latter was in a better position to evaluate the evidence as
he had the better opportunity to observe the demeanor of the parties at the hearing has no leg to stand on.
Moreover, based on the police traffic accident investigation report, we are convinced that the accident was
the fault of the ten-wheeler trucks driver. On seeing the signal light change to red, this driver stepped on
his brake, not just once but three times, but his truck could not stop. Since the truck was on the wrong lane,
petitioners van, which was in its proper lane with the green light, smashed into the out-of-control truck. This
episode led to petitioners dismissal which, in our view, is unjustified.
Under the Labor Code, gross negligence is a valid ground for an employer to terminate an employee.
Gross negligence is negligence characterized by want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious
indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. In this case, however, there is no
substantial basis to support a finding that petitioner committed gross negligence.
In sustaining the Labor Arbiters finding that petitioner was grossly negligent, the appellate court
stressed that the cited episode was the second vehicular accident involving petitioner, and as such it may
clearly reflect against [his] attitudinal character as a driver. We note, however, that the Commission found
that in the first vehicular accident involving petitioner he was the victim of the reckless and negligent act
of a fellow driver. We agree with the NLRC that an imputation of habitual negligence cannot be drawn
against petitioner, since the earlier accident was not of his own making.
The CA decision further faulted petitioner despite his explanation that he had the right in traversing
the point of collision because the traffic lights along his right of way was green. According to the CA, a
good driver of a motor vehicle has to know defensive attitude even on a clear way. However, such
observation does not support the conclusion that petitioner was negligent. The test to determine the
existence of negligence is as follows: Did petitioner in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable
care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would use in the same situation? It is not disputed that
petitioner tried to turn left to avoid a collision. To put it otherwise, petitioner did not insist on his right of
way, notwithstanding the green light in his lane. Still, the collision took place as the ten-wheeler careened
on the wrong lane. Clearly, petitioner exerted reasonable effort under the circumstances to avoid injury not
only to himself but also to his passengers and the van he was driving. To hold that petitioner was grossly
negligent under the circumstances goes against the factual circumstances shown. It appears to us he was
more a victim of a vehicular accident rather than its cause.
There being no clear showing that petitioner was culpable for gross negligence, petitioners dismissal
is illegal. It was error for the Court of Appeals to reverse and set aside the decision of the Third Division
of the NLRC.
 G.R. No. 111222 January 18, 1995
CITIBANK, N.A., petitioner,
vs.
DR. JOSE C. GATCHALIAN, in his capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, CITIBANK
PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES UNION (CPEU) and EMY LLONILLO, respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner Citibank N.A. prays for the reversal of the decision of voluntary arbitrator Dr. Jose C.
Gatchalian reinstating respondent Emerita "Emy" Llonillo to her former position as clerk-
typist/maker without backwages.
Respondent Llonillo, together with Teresita Supnad, her co-employee and Florence Verendia, an
employee of Asian-Pacific Broadcasting Company, Inc. (APBCI), were implicated in a scheme
to defraud petitioner bank in the amount of P740,000.00.
Petitioner bank's policy is for new and unsigned credit cards to be released only to the
cardholders concerned or their duly authorized representatives. However, a Citibank employee
may himself take delivery of new and unsigned credit cards after accomplishing a Card Pull-Out
Request Form wherein the employee assumes the responsibility of delivering the same to the
cardholder concerned.
On July 1992, petitioner bank discovered that the credit card applications of the alleged APBCI
employees were fictitious. Per report of the PNP-Crime Laboratory, Supnad and Verendia
falsified the signature of the alleged applicants. After getting the credit cards, the two used them
to purchase goods and avail of services from accredited commercial establishments worth more
than P200, 000.00.
Petitioner bank required respondent Llonillo to explain. In her reply, Llonillo admitted she
personally picked up seven (7) credit cards issued to Anjenette Caballa, Miriam Ramiro, Alen
Malic, Caroline Ramiro, Cecilia Ibañez, Lalaine Perez and Marife Bacuetes. She allegedly
wanted to help the bank deliver "fast, competent and problem-free service to clients." She
disclaimed knowledge that the APBCI applicants were fictitious. She also denied participation in
the fraudulent use of said credit cards.
On November 19, 1992, the committee recommended the termination of respondent's
employment with the bank for loss of trust and confidence and gross negligence. Petitioner bank
adopted the committee's recommendation and notified respondent of her immediate dismissal.
The bank also terminated the services of Supnad. In addition, it filed a case for estafa through
falsification of private/commercial documents against both Supnad and Verendia.
Pursuant to their existing Collective Bargaining Agreement, petitioner bank and respondent
union referred Llonillo's dismissal to the Grievance Machinery but the latter failed to resolve the
controversy. As a next step, the parties submitted the case for resolution to voluntary arbitrator
Dr. Jose C. Gatchalian.
On the basis of the record and the evidence presented by petitioner bank, voluntary arbitrator Dr.
Gatchalian rendered a decision ordering the reinstatement of respondent Llonillo without
payment of backwages.
ISSUES:
W/N THE DECISION OF THE VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR IS PATENTLY IN
CONTRAVENTION OF APPLICABLE LAWS AND DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE
COURT.
W/N THE DECISION OF THE VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR IS NOT SUPPORTED BY,
NAY, IGNORED, THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
W/N THE DECISION OF THE VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR CONSTITUTES GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION ON HIS PART.
HELD:
We find merit for the petitioner.
In ordering the reinstatement of respondent Llonillo, the voluntary arbitrator ruled that the law
requires that an employee's negligence, to be a valid ground for dismissal, must be both gross
and habitual. He did not find the negligence of respondent Llonillo as within this category.
Respondent arbitrator's ruling disregards tha fact that Llonillo was dismissed on two (2) grounds,
viz: loss of confidence and gross negligence. Petitioner's loss of confidence was anchored on its
suspicion that Llonillo conspired with Supnad and Verendia in the fraud. On the other hand, its
finding of gross negligence was grounded on Llonillo's act of carelessly delivering seven (7)
newly approved and unsigned Mastercards to Verendia and the latter's messenger.
We have carefully examined the records and we find no substantial evidence that would clearly
and convincingly prove that respondent Llonillo conspired with Verendia and Supnad in
defrauding petitioner bank over P200,000.00.
It was precisely on the basis of the above findings that only Verendia and Supnad (excluding
Llonillo) were charged with estafa through falsification of private/commercial documents. The
alleged close association of respondent Llonillo to her co-employee Supnad, even if true, does
not establish her complicity in the scheme to defraud the bank. By itself and without more, it is
insufficient to implicate her in the fraud committed by Supnad and Verendia. Be that as it may,
we find that respondent arbitrator gravely abused his discretion in finding that Llonillo did not
commit gross negligence in the performance of her duty.
Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or
the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting
any effort to avoid them. The evidence on record succinctly established the gross negligence of
respondent Llonillo. She admitted that the first time she was asked by Verendia to pick up one of
the newly approved and unused credit cards, she immediately acceded. Yet at that time, she had
not personally met nor previously seen Verendia. When asked how she came to know to whom
she would give the card, respondent Llonillo responded that Verendia described herself over the
phone and that was how she was able to identify Verendia when she first met her. Thus, on the
basis of a mere description over the telephone, respondent Llonillo delivered the credit cards to
Verendia.
Again, she admitted that Verendia would call her up at the office to say she was enroute to the
bank to get some of the newly approved and unused credit cards. Under the pretext that Verendia
had difficulty in finding a parking space within the bank's premises, Verendia would request her
to get the credit cards instead. Respondent Llonillo accede to the requests. She got the new and
unused credit cards and gave them to Verendia at the mezzanine floor of the bank. It did not
strike respondent Llonillo as strange that while Verendia allegedly found difficulty in finding a
parking space within the bank premises, yet she was always able to meet her at the mezzanine
floor of the bank to get the credit cards.
Respondent Llonillo claims as a defense that even if she did not pick up the seven (7) newly
approved and unused credit cards and deliver the same to Verendia, still, the latter could have
gotten hold of the same by herself. Respondent stresses that Verendia herself and bank employee
Supnad were able to personally pick up the other credit cards issued to fictitious APBCI
employees. The possibility is beside the point. It cannot obliterate the truth that she committed
gross negligence in the delivery of the seven (7) newly approved and unused credit cards to
Verendia and her messenger.
Neither are we impressed with respondent Llonillo's claim that she was singled out as negligent
in her taking delivery of the seven unused credit cards. As previously noted, the bank allows, as
an exception, any of its employees to take delivery of newly approved and unused credit cards
but in doing so, the said employee undertakes to deliver the same to the cardholder concerned
and assumes responsibility for its fraudulent use. Respondent Llonillo failed in this undertaking.
We also rule that respondent Llonillo's negligence is both gross and habitual. It was proved that
she picked up the newly approved credit cards on five (5) separate occasions and delivered the
same to Verendia and the latter's messenger. Certainly, these repetitive acts and omissions
bespeak of habituality.
Finally, respondent Llonillo's employment service for twenty-two (22) years would not, by itself,
mitigate her negligence, especially in view of the substantial loss incurred by petitioner bank. As
correctly pointed out by respondent voluntary arbitrator:
The appealed decision of voluntary arbitrator Dr. Jose C. Gatchalian is set aside. Respondent
Emerita "Emy" Llonillo is found guilty of gross negligence and is hereby dismissed from
service.
 Nissan Motors Phils. Inc. v. Angelo, G.R. No. 164181, [September 14, 2011]

FACTS: Respondent Victorino Angelo was employed by Nissan as payroll staff. On April 7 to
17, 2000, respondent was on sick leave, thus, he was not able to prepare the payroll for the said
period. Again, on April 27 and 28, 2000, respondent was on an approved vacation leave which
again resulted in the non-preparation of the payroll for that particular period.

Respondent received a Memorandum from the petitioner informing him that the Company is
considering his dismissal from employment on the grounds of serious misconduct, willful
disobedience and gross neglect of duties. He was given 3 days to submit his written answer. In
the meantime, respondent was placed on preventive suspension effective immediately.

Petitioner conducted an investigation and concluded that respondent's explanation was untrue
and insufficient. Thus, petitioner issued a Notice of Termination.[6]

Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner the charge of illegal dismissal.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed respondent's complaint for lack of merit. NLRC affirmed the
Decision. However, the CA reversed and set aside NLRC’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid termination.

RULING: YES.

One of the just causes enumerated in the Labor Code is serious misconduct. For misconduct or
improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal, (a) it must be serious; (b) it must relate to the
performance of the employees duties; and (c) it must show that the employee has become unfit
to continue working for the employer.

Going through the records, the Court found evidence to support the allegation of serious
misconduct or insubordination. Petitioner claims that the language used by respondent in his
Letter-Explanation is akin to a manifest refusal to cooperate with company officers, and resorted
to conduct which smacks of outright disrespect and willful defiance of authority or
insubordination. The Letter-Explanation[21] partly reads:
Again, it's not negligence on my part and I'm not alone to be blamed. It's
negligence on your part [Perla Go] and A.A. Del Rosario kasi, noong pang April
1999 ay alam ninyo na hindi ako ang dapat may responsibilidad ng payroll kundi
 ang Section Head eh bakit hindi ninyo pinahawak sa Section Head noon pa. Pati
kaming dalawa sa payroll, kasama ko si Thelma. Tinanggal nyo si Thelma. Hindi
nyo ba naisip na kailangan dalawa ang tao sa payroll para pag absent ang isa ay
may gagawa. Dapat noon nyo pa naisip iyan. Ang tagal kong gumawa ng
trabahong hindi ko naman dapat ginagawa.

The Court finds the above to be grossly discourteous in content and tenor. Past decisions of the
Court have been one in ruling that accusatory and inflammatory language used by an employee
to the employer or superior can be a ground for dismissal or termination.

Another just cause cited by the petitioner is willful disobedience. Disobedience, to be a just
cause for termination, must be willful or intentional, willfulness being characterized by a
wrongful and perverse mental attitude rendering the employees act inconsistent with proper
subordination. A willful or intentional disobedience of such rule, order or instruction justifies
dismissal only where such rule, order or instruction is (1) reasonable and lawful, (2) sufficiently
known to the employee, and (3) connected with the duties which the employee has been engaged
to discharge. This allegation of willful disobedience can still be adduced and proven from the
same Letter-Explanation cited earlier.

Petitioner also dismissed respondent because of gross or habitual negligence. Neglect of duty, to
be a ground for dismissal, must be both gross and habitual. In finding that petitioner was able to
adduce evidence that would justify its dismissal of respondent, the NLRC correctly ruled that the
latter's failure to turn over his functions to someone capable of performing the vital tasks which
he could not effectively perform or undertake because of his heart ailment or condition
constitutes gross neglect.

However, although the dismissal was legal, respondent is still entitled to a separation pay as a
measure of financial assistance, considering his length of service and his poor physical condition
which was one of the reasons he filed a leave of absence. As a general rule, an employee who
has been dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code is
not entitled to separation pay. Although by way of exception, the grant of separation pay or some
other financial assistance may be allowed to an employee dismissed for just causes on the basis
of equity.
13. Pedro Chavez v NLRC

FACTS:
The respondent company, Supreme Packaging Inc., is in the business of manufacturing
cartons and other packaging materials for export and distribution. It engaged the services of the
petitioner, Pedro Chavez, as a truck driver (from October 25, 1984) tasked to deliver the
respondent company’s products to its various customers. The respondent furnished petitioner
with a truck. All deliveries were made in accordance with the routing slips issued by the
respondent company indicating the order, time and urgency of delivery.
On 1992, the petitioner expressed to Alvin Lee, the plant manager, his desire to avail the
benefits that a regular employee were receiving such as overtime pay, nightshift differential pay,
and 13th month pay, among others but nothing was complied. On February 20, 1995, petitioner
filed a complaint for regularization with the Regional Arbitration Branch No. III of NLRC in San
Fernando, Pampanga. Before the case could be heard, respondent terminated the services of the
petitioner. Hence, the petitioner filed an amended complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor
practice and non-payment of overtime pay, nightshift differential, and 13th month pay, among
others. The respondents, for their part, denied the existence of an employer-employee
relationship between the respondent company and the petitioner. They averred that the petitioner
was an independent contractor as evidenced by the contract of service which he and the
respondent company entered into.
Labor Arbiter found respondent company guilty of Illegal dismissal. NLRC affirmed LA
decision but reversed upon Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents. CA reinstated LA
decision but also reversed.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there is employer-employee relationship between Supreme Packaging and
Pedro Chavez
2. Whether or not Pedro Chavez was illegally dismissed

RULING:
1. YES. The elements to determine the existence of an employment relationship are: (1) the
selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of
dismissal; and (4) the employers power to control the employees conduct. The most
important element is the employers control of the employees conduct, not only as to the
result of the work to be done, but also as to the means and methods to accomplish it. All
the four elements are present in this case. First. Undeniably, it was the respondents who
engaged the services of the petitioner without the intervention of a third party. Second. It
cannot be denied that the petitioner received compensation from the respondent company
 for the services that he rendered to the latter. Third. The respondent’s power to dismiss
the petitioner was inherent in the fact that they engaged the services of the petitioner as
truck driver. They exercised this power by terminating the petitioner’s services albeit in
the guise of severance of contractual relation due allegedly to the latter’s breach of his
contractual obligation. Fourth. Although the respondents denied that they exercised
control over the manner and methods by which the petitioner accomplished his work, a
careful review of the records shows that the latter performed his work as truck driver under
the respondent’s supervision and control.
2. YES. The Court agrees with the Labor Arbiter that the petitioner’s dismissal was anchored
on his insistent demand to be regularized. As a rule, the employer bears the burden to
prove that the dismissal was for just and valid cause. The respondents failed to prove any
such cause for the petitioners’ dismissal. They insinuated that the petitioner abandoned his
job. To constitute abandonment, these two factors must concur: (1) the failure to report
for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever
employer-employee relationship. The petitioner did not intend to severe his relationship
with the respondent company for at the time that he allegedly abandoned his job, the
petitioner just filed a complaint for regularization, which was forthwith amended to one
for illegal dismissal. Neither can the respondents claim that the petitioner was guilty of
gross negligence in the proper maintenance of the truck constitute a valid and just cause
for his dismissal. Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise
slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of
consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. The negligence, to warrant
removal from service, should not merely be gross but also habitual. The single and isolated
act of the petitioners’ negligence in the proper maintenance of the truck alleged by the
respondents does not amount to gross and habitual neglect warranting his dismissal. Thus,
the lack of a valid and just cause in terminating the services of the petitioner renders his
dismissal illegal.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
NATHANIEL PINUELA AND PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
G.R. No. 82471. February 18, 1991 FERNAN, C.J.

Facts: Private respondent Nathaniel Pinuela was ground equipment and tug operator of petitioner
Philippine Air Lines (PAL), responsible for towing aircraft from the hangar to the ramp area and
vice-versa. In line with his function, he held a professional driver’s license and an operator’s permit
issued by PAL after he had passed corresponding theoretical and practical tests to operate PAL
vehicles used for towing aircraft. He was already five (5) years in this particular line of work when
the incident in question arose.
May 31, 1985 - Pinuela was assigned as tow tug operator with Rolando Manalaysay — leadman
and wingtip guide; Rodrigo Camina — headsetman; Arturo Balagat — breakman, and a certain
Tañada — guide, in charge of the parking/positioning of said aircraft was Nolie Domingoto
position the Boeing 747 aircraft NAIA for a flight to the US. On or about 12:55 in the afternoon,
the aircraft was towed from the PAL technical center to Bay 16 area at the NAIA. While the Boeing
747 was being towed, the airplane collided with the bridge at Bay 16 causing damage to the plane’s
left landing light and the left wing flop and scratching its No. 2 engine. Pinuela was placed under
preventive suspension and was charged administratively. After investigation by the PAL
Administrative Board, he was dismissed from the service effective July 1, 1985. Pinuela filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice against PAL.
Labor Arbiter favored Pinuela and ordered PAL to reinstate him to his former position without
loss of seniority rights with full backwages until actual reinstatement.

NLRC affirmed LA but limited the award of backwages to two (2) years only. The Labor Tribunal
opined that "Pinuela could not be blamed for the accident as he relied on the signal of the
headsetman (Camina) who still signaled to him despite the fact that the nose of the aircraft being
towed was about to overshoot the yellow line and the aircraft wing was about to hit the airbridge."

Issue/s: WoN Pinuela is grossly negligent of his responsibilities as a tug operator

Ruling: Yes. Pinuela’s act of towing beyond normal speed, his failure to observe proper parking
procedure as provided in the Engineering and Maintenance Manual, and the unanimous statement
of the members of the towing crew that he completely disregarded their warning shouts indicate
that Pinuela is grossly negligent of his responsibilities as a tug operator. Pinuela’s dismissal must
therefore follow for a company has the right to dismiss its erring employees if only as a measure
of self-protection against acts inimical to its interest. Philippine Airlines, as employer, cannot be
legally compelled to continue with the employment of a person admittedly guilty of gross
negligence in the performance of his duties.

In his testimony, Pinuela stated that the normal procedure is for the ground equipment operator to
rely on the headsetman or the wing tipguide for guidance. Since Pinuela failed to see Manalaysay,
he merely relied on Camina who continued signaling when the accident happened. Such reliance
by Pinuela on Camina was unwarranted. Even assuming that Pinuela did not see Manalaysay, his
appropriate response should have been to stop towing. According to petitioner’s Engineering and
Maintenance Manual, "obstructed vision is a signal to stop and get necessary assistance."
To support his allegation that Camina continued signaling despite the fact that the nose of the
aircraft was about to overshoot the yellow line, Pinuela presented Ricardo Cruz, a ramp scheduler
who claims he was present during the incident. However, Ricardo Cruz’s statement that despite
his shouts of, "Ihinto ninyo, tatama kayo," Camina still proceeded signaling, is not convincing.
This is because Cruz admitted later that he was not familiar with the hand signals used by the
maintenance crew. Thus, Cruz is incompetent to interpret the hand signals of the ground crew.
Moreover, Cruz’s unsure responses to the questions propounded to him reveal that he did not have
a firm grasp of the events as they unfolded.

One must admit that towing an aircraft is a group activity necessitating group coordination. This
is explicit in petitioner’s Engineering and Maintenance Manual which states, "that the tug operator
must undertake and/or continue on towing/pushing procedure only when positive visual contact
with all guidemen is possible." The use of, "all necessary guidemen" indicates plurality or group
coordination. Thus, instead of relying solely on the signals of Camina, Pinuela should have also
checked with the other ground crew personnel.

Particularly, Pinuela should have relied on Manalaysay. Manalaysay, who was near the marked
line and the nearest obstruction which was the aerobridge and the parked service vehicle, was
strategically located. For Pinuela to claim that he relied on Camina for signals is not credible, for
he demonstrated before the Labor Arbiter that he had to turn 180 degrees to see Camina who was
directly at his back.

In contradiction to the Labor Arbiter’s opinion that petitioner’s stance is weak because PAL failed
to establish normal towing speed, we say that there is no necessity of determining the exact
numerical towing speed. From daily operations, we can safely assume that the ground crew knows
what "creeping" speed means. Through their working experience, they must certainly have gained
a sufficient degree of competence to determine whether a Boeing 747, weighing tons, was being
towed beyond normal speed or not. Indeed, the Labor Arbiter acted with grave abuse of discretion
in ignoring this vital piece of evidence for the petitioner.

Lastly, Pinuela should not compare the penalty of dismissal imposed on him in relation to lesser
sanctions previously meted by PAL on its other employees. We are solely concerned here with the
sufficiency of the evidence surrounding Pinuela’s dismissal. Besides, Pinuela’s examples do not
involve a plane with a scheduled flight. A mere delay on petitioner’s flight schedule due to aircraft
damage entails problems like hotel accommodations for its passengers, re-booking, the possibility
of law suits, and payment of special landing fees not to mention the soaring costs of replacing
aircraft parts. All told, Pinuela’s gross negligence which called for dismissal is evident and it was
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the labor tribunal to have ruled otherwise.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission dated January 29, 1988 is hereby set aside, and the complaint in NLRC-
NCR-7-2113-85 dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.
 MARIA LINDA FUENTES, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), PHILIPPINE BANKING
CORPORATION and JOSE LAUREL IV, as its President

Facts:

Petitioner was employed as a teller at the Philbanking's office at Ayala Avenue, Makati,
Metro Manila. On May 28, 1982, at about 10:30 a.m., petitioner, who was acting as an overnight
teller, received a cash deposit of P200,000.00. She counted the money with the assistance of a
co-teller, finishing the task at 10:40 a.m. or ten (10) minutes after her closing time. Before she
could start balancing her transactions, the Chief Teller handed her several payroll checks for
validation. Finding the checks to be incomplete, petitioner left her cage to get other checks,
without, however, bothering to put the P200,000.00 cash on her counter inside her drawer. When
she returned to her cubicle after three (3) to five (5) minutes, she found that the checks for
validation were still lacking, so she went out of her cubicle again to get the rest of the checks. On
her way to a co-teller's cubicle, she noticed that the P200,000.00 pile on her counter had been re-
arranged. She thus returned to her cage, counted the money and discovered that one (1) big
bundle worth P50,000.00 was missing therefrom. She immediately asked her co-teller about it
and getting a negative reply, she reported the matter to the Chief Teller. A search for the
P50,000.00 having proved unavailing, petitioner was asked to explain why she should not be
held liable for the loss. She submitted her explanation on June 24, 1982.

Subsequently, on June 3, 1983, petitioner was dismissed for gross negligence. On June 21, 1983,
she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with reinstatement and backwages.

Private respondent bank seasonably filed an answer with counterclaim that petitioner be ordered
to restitute the amount of P50,000.

On January 31, 1984, Labor Arbiter Bienvenido Hermogenes rendered a decision dismissing the
complaint as well as the counterclaim but without prejudice as to the latter. 1 Petitioner's appeal
to the NLRC was dismissed for lack of merit 2 and her motion for reconsideration was
denied. 3 Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s dismissal on the ground of gross negligence was justified
under Art. 282 of the Labor Code.

Ruling:
 YES. Applying the test of negligence, we ask: did the petitioner in doing the alleged
negligent act use reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have
used in the same situation? If not, she is guilty of negligence.

The circumstances surrounding the loss in question lend us no sympathy for the
petitioner. It was established that petitioner simply left the pile of money within the easy reach of
the crowd milling in front of her cage, instead of putting it in her drawer as required under the
private respondent bank's General Memorandum No. 211 (Teller's Manual of Operations) which
she was expected to know by heart. 4 Moreover, she left the P200,000.00 on two occasions. As a
teller, petitioner must realize that the amount of care demanded by reasonable conduct is that
proportionate to the apparent risk. Since it was payday and depositors were milling around,
petitioner should have been extra cautious. At no time than the occasion under consideration was
the need to be extra careful more obvious. It was certainly not the time to breach the standard
operating procedure of keeping one's cash in the drawer as a precautionary and security measure.

"A teller's relationship with the bank is necessarily one of trust and confidence. The teller as a
trustee is expected to possess a high degree of fidelity to trust and must exercise utmost diligence
and care in handling cash. A teller cannot afford to relax vigilance in the performance of his
duties."

Petitioner Fuentes cannot invoke private respondent's alleged contributory negligence as

there was no direct causal connection between the negligence of the bank in not conducting the
investigation and the loss complained of. In a legal sense, negligence is contributory only when it
contributes proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for its occurrence. In the case at
bar, the bank's inaction merely created a condition under which the loss was sustained.
Regardless of whether there was a failure to investigate, the fact is that the money was lost in the
first place due to petitioner's gross negligence. Such gross negligence was the immediate and
determining factor in the loss.

Although petitioner's infraction was not habitual, we took into account the substantial
amount lost. Since the deposit slip for P200,000.00 had already been validated prior to the loss,
the act of depositing had already been complete and from thereon, the bank had already assumed
the deposit as a liability to its depositors. Cash deposits are not assets to banks but are recognized
as current liabilities in its balance sheet. It would be most unfair to compel the bank to continue
employing petitioner. In Galsim v. PNB, 8 we upheld the dismissal of a bank teller who was
found to have given money to a co-employee in violation of bank rules and regulations. Said act,
which caused prejudice to the bank, was a justifiable basis for the bank to lose confidence in the
employee.

Lastly, an employer cannot legally be compelled to continue with the employment of a

person admittedly guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his duties and whose
continuance in his office is patently inimical to the employer's interest. "For the law in protecting
the rights of the employee/laborer authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the
employer.
School of Holy Spirit Quezon City vs. Taguiam [G.R. No. 165565. July 14, 2008]

Facts:

Respondent Taguiam was the class adviser of a Grade 5 class of petitioner school. After obtaining
permission from the principal, they were allowed to use the school swimming pool for their year-end
activity. With this, respondent Taguiam distributed the parent’s/guardian’s permit forms to the
students. The permit form of student Chiara Mae was unsigned. But because the mother personally
brought her to the school with her packed lunch and swimsuit, Taguiam concluded that the mother
allowed her to join. Before the activity started, respondent warned the pupils who did not know how to
swim to avoid the deeper area. However, while the pupils were swimming, two of them sneaked out.
Respondent went after them to verify where they were going. Unfortunately, while respondent was
away, Chiara Mae drowned. When respondent returned, the maintenance man was already
administering cardiopulmonary resuscitation on Chiara Mae. She was still alive when respondent rushed
her to the General Malvar Hospital where she was pronounced dead on arrival. The petitioner school
conducted a clarificatory hearing to which respondent attended and submitted her Affidavit of
Explanation. A month later, petitioner school dismissed respondent on the ground of gross negligence
resulting to loss of trust and confidence.

LA: respondent was validly terminated for gross neglect of duty. He opined that Chiara Mae drowned
because respondent had left the pupils without any adult supervision. He also noted that the absence of
adequate facilities should have alerted respondent before allowing the pupils to use the swimming pool.
The Labor Arbiter further concluded that although respondent’s negligence was not habitual, the same
warranted her dismissal since death resulted therefrom.

NLRC: Affirmed

CA: Reversed. The appellate court observed that there was insufficient proof that respondents
negligence was both gross and habitual.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent’s dismissal on the ground of gross negligence resulting to loss of trust and
confidence was valid

Held:

Yes. Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, gross and habitual neglect of duties is a valid ground for an
employer to terminate an employee. Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or a failure to
exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of
consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to
perform one’s duties for a period of time, depending upon the circumstances.
The SC concluded that respondent had been grossly negligent. First, it is undisputed that Chiara Mae’s
permit form was unsigned. Yet, respondent allowed her to join the activity because she assumed that
Chiara Mae’s mother has allowed her to join it by personally bringing her to the school with her packed
lunch and swimsuit. Second, it was respondent’s responsibility as Class Adviser to supervise her class in
all activities sanctioned by the school. Thus, she should have coordinated with the school to ensure that
proper safeguards, such as adequate first aid and sufficient adult personnel, were present during their
activity. She should have been mindful of the fact that with the number of pupils involved, it would be
impossible for her by herself alone to keep an eye on each one of them. Notably, respondent’s
negligence, although gross, was not habitual. In view of the considerable resultant damage, however,
the SC agreed that the cause is sufficient to dismiss respondent. Indeed, the sufficiency of the evidence
as well as the resultant damage to the employer should be considered in the dismissal of the employee.
In this case, the damage went as far as claiming the life of a child.
 17. RAMOS v. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK INC.
G.R. No. 203186 December 4, 2013 (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)
Facts:

Ramos was employed by BPI Family in 1995 and eventually became its Vice-President
for Dealer Network Marketing/Auto Loans Division. During his tenure, a client named Trezita B.
Acosta (Acosta) purportedly secured an auto loan from BPI Family in the amount of
P3,097,392.00 for the purchase of a Toyota Prado vehicle (subject loan) which had remained
unpaid. As it turned out, Acosta did not authorize nor personally apply for the subject loan,
rendering the transaction fraudulent.

After investigation, BPI Family found that Ramos released these documents without the
prior approval of BPI Family's credit committee; and he was grossly remiss in his duties since
his subordinates did not follow the banks safety protocols, particularly those regarding the
establishment of the loan applicants identity, and that the promissory note was not even signed
by the applicant in the presence of any of the marketing officers.

As a consequence, BPI Family lost P2,294,080.00, which amount was divided between
Ramos and his three (3) other subordinates, with Ramos shouldering the proportionate amount
ofP 546,000.00.

The foregoing amount was subsequently deducted from Ramos benefits which accrued
upon his retirement on May 1, 2006. Claiming that the deductions made by BPI Family were
illegal, Ramos filed a complaint for underpayment of retirement benefits and non- payment of
overtime and holiday pay and premium pay against BPI Family and/or its President at that time,
Alfonso L. Salcedo, Jr., before the NLRC.

The LA dismissed Ramoss complaint, ruling that the deduction made on his retirement
benefits was "legal and even reasonable"since Ramos was negligent in running his department.

On appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA decision, holding that the deduction complained of
was "illegal and unreasonable"in that (a) the alleged negligence committed by Ramos was not
substantially proven as he was not expected to personally examine all loan documents that pass
through his hands or to require the client to personally appear before him because he has
subordinates to do those details for him; (b) the issuance of the PO and ATD prior to the loans
approval is not an irregular procedure, but an ordinary occurrence in BPI Family;and (c) the
deduction does not fall under the exceptions prescribed under Article 113of the Labor Code on
allowable deductions.

Accordingly, it ordered BPI Family to return/refund to Ramos the amount of 546,000.00,

with additional payment of 10% thereof as attorneys fees.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the finding of negligence on the part of Ramos, holding that
Ramos was remiss in his duty as head of Dealer Network Marketing/Auto Loans Division in
failing to determine the true identity of "Trezita Acosta". However, it also attributed negligence
on the part of BPI Family since it sanctioned the practice of issuing the PO and ATD prior to the
approval of the credit committee. Such relaxed supervision over its divisions contributed to a
large extent to its defraudation. Thus, reducing the deductible amount from his retirement
benefits to P200,000.00.

Ramos moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a Resolution. Hence,
this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NLRC when it found the deduction made from Ramoss retirement benefits to be illegal and
unreasonable.

Ruling:

Yes, applying the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the CA to have erred in
attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in finding that the deduction made
from Ramoss retirement benefits was improper. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the petitioner must
satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion
conferred upon them. Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment exercised in a capricious and
whimsical manner that is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.

In labor disputes, the NLRCs findings are said to be tainted with grave abuse of
discretion when its conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence.

As a general rule, in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the
appellate court does not assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC based their conclusion. The query in this proceeding is limited to the
determination of whether or not the NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in rendering its decision. However, as an exception, the appellate court
may examine and measure the factual findings of the NLRC if the same are not supported by
substantial evidence
 Furthermore, BPI Family failed to establish that the duty to confirm and validate
information in credit applications and determine credit worthiness of prospective loan applicants
rests with the Dealer Network Marketing Department, which is the department under the
supervision of Ramos. Quite the contrary, records show that these responsibilities lie with the
banks Credit Services Department, namely its Credit Evaluation Section and Loans Review and
Documentation Section,of which Ramos was not part of.

As similarly observed by the NLRC, Ramos merely followed standing company practice
when he issued the PO and ATD without prior approval from the banks Credit Services
Department.

The report further noted that the practice has been adopted due in part to the stiff
competition with other banks and lending institutions. Resultantly, in 2005 alone, approximately
111 car loan applications were released ahead of the approval of the credit evaluation section. In
fact, in all 111 instances, the bank did not attempt to rectify the flaw by calling the respondents
attention to the manner by which he disregarded important bank procedure or protocol in
accommodating car loan applications.

Any conscientious, well-meaning banking institution would have raised the red flag the
moment the violation is first discovered. However, respondent bank did not sound alarm until the
discovery of the first defraudation. Without doubt, its uncharacteristically relaxed supervision
over its divisions contributed to a large extent to the unfortunate attainment of fraud.

Based on the foregoing, it is readily apparent that Ramos’ action of issuing the PO and
ATD ahead of the approval of the credit committee was actually conformant to regular company
practice which BPI Family itself sanctioned. As such, Ramos cannot be said to have been
negligent on his duties. As BPI Family "uncharacteristically relaxed supervision over its
divisions," yielding as it did to the demands of industry competition, it is but reasonable that
solely bears the loss of its own shortcomings.

Hence, the decision of the CA is reversed. The decision of the NLRC is reinstated.
18. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK V. PADAO, G.R. NOS. 180849 AND 187143,
[NOVEMBER 16, 2011]

FACTS: On August 21, 1981, Padao was hired by PNB as a clerk at its Dipolog City Branch. He
was later designated as a credit investigator in an acting capacity on November 9, 1993. He was
ultimately promoted to the position of Loan and Credit Officer IV.

In 1994, PNB became embroiled in a scandal involving "behest loans" as anomalous loans were
being granted by its officers. In line with this, Padao was administratively charged with
Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service, and violation of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The case
against Padao was grounded on his having allegedly presented a deceptively positive status of the
business, credit standing/rating and financial capability of 13 loan applicants. After due
investigation, PNB found Padao guilty of gross and habitual neglect of duty and ordered him
dismissed from the bank. Padao appealed to the banks Board of Directors. Velasco, Padaos
colleague, was also held guilty of the offenses charged, and was similarly meted the penalty of
dismissal. Her motion for reconsideration, however, was later granted by the bank, and she was
reinstated.

On October 11, 1999, after almost three (3) years of inaction on the part of the Board, Padao
instituted a complaint. The ELA found Padaos dismissal valid. The NLRC reversed and set aside
the ELA Decision and declared Padaos dismissal to be illegal. PNB filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA but it was dismissed. Hence the present petition.

ISSUES: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS ILLEGAL DISMISSAL

HELD: NONE. While it is an employer’s basic right to freely select or discharge its employees,
if only as a measure of self-protection against acts inimical to its interest, the law sets the valid
grounds for termination as well as the proper procedure to be followed when terminating the
services of an employee.

Thus, in cases of regular employment, the employer is prohibited from terminating the services of
an employee except for a just or authorized cause. Such just causes for which an employer may
terminate an employee are enumerated in Article 282 of the Labor Code:
a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or representative in connection with his work;
b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or
duly authorized representative;
d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or
any immediate family member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and
e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

Further, due process requires that employers follow the procedure set by the Labor Code. Under
Art. 277, workers may be dismissed only for a just cause and enjoy the right of due process which
includes notice and the ample opportunity to be heard and to defend his or her side.
In this case, Padao was dismissed by PNB for gross and habitual neglect of duties under Article
282 (b) of the Labor Code. Gross negligence connotes want of care in the performance of ones
duties, while habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform ones duties for a period of time,
depending on the circumstances. Padao was accused of having presented a fraudulently positive
evaluation of the business, credit standing/rating and financial capability 13 loan applicants.

The role that a credit investigator plays in the conduct of a banks business cannot be overestimated.
The amount of loans to be extended by a bank depends upon the report of the credit investigator
on the collateral being offered. If a loan is not fairly secured, the bank is at the mercy of the
borrower who may just opt to have the collateral foreclosed. If the scheme is repeated a
hundredfold, it may lead to the collapse of the bank.

Padao's repeated failure to discharge his duties as a credit investigator of the bank amounted to
gross and habitual neglect of duties under Article 282 (b) of the Labor Code. He not only failed to
perform what he was employed to do, but also did so repetitively and habitually, causing millions
of pesos in damage to PNB. Thus, PNB acted within the bounds of the law by meting out the
penalty of dismissal, which it deemed appropriate given the circumstances.

The CA was correct in stating that when the violation of company policy or breach of company
rules and regulations is tolerated by management, it cannot serve as a basis for termination. -
Such ruling, however, does not apply here. The principle only applies when the breach or
violation is one which neither amounts to nor involves fraud or illegal activities. In such a case,
one cannot evade liability or culpability based on obedience to the corporate chain of command.

Padao, in affixing his signature on the fraudulent reports, attested to the falsehoods contained
therein. Moreover, by doing so, he repeatedly failed to perform his duties as a credit investigator.

WHEREFORE, The June 21, 2001 Decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter is hereby ordered
REINSTATED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of financial assistance is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.
19 PHILIPPINE AEOLUS AUTOMOTIVE UNITED CORPORATION and/or FRANCIS
CHUA, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ROSALINDA C.
CORTEZ G.R. No. 124617 April 28, 2000 Bellosillo, J.

Facts:
Petitioner PAAUC is a corporation, Francis Chua is its President, while private respondent
Cortez was a company nurse until her termination on 7 November 1994. Three memorandums
were was issued to Cortez:
1st: Requiring her to explain within 48 hours why no disciplinary action should be taken against
her 1) for throwing a stapler at Plant Manager William Chua, her superior, and uttering
invectives against him (gross disrespect), 2) for losing the amount of P1,488.00 entrusted to her
by Chua to be given to Mr. Fang of the CLMC Department and 3) for asking a co-employee to
punch-in her time card thus making it appear that she was in the office in the morning of 6
September 1994 when in fact she was not (in at 8:02am but only arrived at 12:35pm).
Memorandum was refused by private respondent and she did not also submit the required
explanation, so while her case was pending investigation, the company placed her under
preventive suspension for 30 days.
2nd: While Cortez was still under preventive suspension, giving her 72 hours to explain why no
disciplinary action should be taken against her 4) for allegedly failing to process (an amount of
P900.00) the ATM applications of her 9 co-employees with the Allied Banking Corporation.
3rd: Informing her of her termination from the service effective on grounds of gross and habitual
neglect of duties, serious misconduct and fraud or wilfull breach of trust.

Cortez filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter: held the termination of Cortez as
valid and legal, at the same time dismissing her claim for damages. NLRC: reversed the
decision, found petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal of private respondent Cortez and ordered
PAAUC to reinstate respondent Cortez to her former position with back wages.

Issue: Whether or not Cortez was illegally dismissed and is entitled to damages.

Ruling: Yes. The penalty of dismissal is too excessive and not proportionate to the alleged
infractions committed considering that it does not appear that private respondent was an
incorrigible offender or that she inflicted serious damage to the company, nor would her
continuance in the service be patently inimical to her employer's interest.

1) First charge of gross disrespect: Cortez claims that she was receiving special treatment from
Plant Manager Chua (invite her "for a date”) and would make sexual advances (touching her
hands, putting his arms around her shoulders, running his fingers on her arms and telling her she
looked beautiful). The special treatment and sexual advances continued during her employment
for 4 years. He made her understand that if she would not give in to his sexual advances he
would cause her termination from the service; and he made good his threat when he started
harassing her. She just found out one day that her table was transferred without her knowledge to
a place with neither telephone nor intercom, for which reason, an argument ensued when she
confronted William Chua.

NLRC appears baffled why it took private respondent more than 4 years to expose Chua's
alleged sexual harassment. The gravamen of the offense in sexual harassment is not the violation
of the employee's sexuality but the abuse of power by the employer. Strictly speaking, there is no
time period within which he or she is expected to complain through the proper channels. The
time to do so may vary depending upon the needs, circumstances, and more importantly, the
emotional threshold of the employee.

2) The second charge, that P1,488.00 entrusted to her for transmittal was lost, she gave it to the
company personnel in charge for proper transmittal as evidenced by a receipt duly signed by the
latter.

3) The third imputation of asking someone to punch-in her time card, it was done in good faith
considering that she was asked by an officer (Richard Tan with permission from William Chua)
to perform a task outside the office, it was her first time to commit such infraction during her 5
year service in the company and the company did not lose anything by reason thereof as the
offense was immediately known and corrected.

4) The P900,000 money entrusted to her was in fact deposited in the respective accounts of the
employees concerned, although belatedly (1 month later). Petitioner did not show that opening
an ATM is one of her primary duties as company nurse and did not prove that the delay was
caused by Rosalinda's neglect or willful act.

Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or
the entire absence of care. It should not merely be gross but also habitual. The ground willful
breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer must be founded on facts
established by the employer who must clearly and convincingly prove by substantial evidence
the facts and incidents upon which loss of confidence in the employee may fairly be made to rest.

Serious misconduct warranting dismissal of an employee: (a) it must be serious; (b) must relate
to the performance of the employee's duties; and, (c) must show that the employee has become
unfit to continue working for the employer. The acts complained of did not in any way pertain to
her duties as a nurse.

In moral damages, it suffices to prove that the claimant has suffered anxiety, sleepless nights,
besmirched reputation and social humiliation by reason of the act complained of. Exemplary
damages, on the other hand, are granted in addition by way of example or correction for the
public good. For the anxiety, the seen and unseen hurt that Cortez suffered, petitioners should be
made to pay her moral damages, plus exemplary damages, for the oppressive manner with which
petitioners effected her dismissal from the service, and to serve as a forewarning to lecherous
officers and employers who take undue advantage of their ascendancy over their employees.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission
finding the dismissal of private respondent Rosalinda C. Cortez to be without just cause and
ordering petitioners Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation and/or Francis Chua to
pay her back wages computed from the time of her dismissal, which should be full back wages,
is AFFIRMED. However, in view of the strained relations between the adverse parties, instead of
reinstatement ordered by public respondent, petitioners should pay private respondent separation
pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service until finality of this judgment. In
addition, petitioners are ordered to pay private respondent P25,000.00 for moral damages and
P10,000.00 for exemplary damages. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
 20. SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY v. JOY C. CABILES

FACTS: Repsondent Joy C. Cabiles (Cabiles) was recruited by petitioner Sameer Overseas
Placement Agency (Sameer) as quality control job in Taiwan with a monthly salary of
NT$15,360. Sameer required her to pay a placement fee of P70,000 when she signed the
employment contract.

When she was already in Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter, instead of the promised
quality control job. Thereafter, her employer, Wacoal, informed Sammer that she was terminated
and that “she should immediately report yo their office to get her salary and passport”. Joy stated
that she only received NT$9,000 because Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to
Manila.

Sameer stated that her termination was due to her inefficieny, negligence in her duties and failure
to comply with the work requirements of her employer.

Furthermore, the petitioner contends that the twin requirements of notice and hearing applies
strictly only when the employment is within the Phiilppines and that these need not be strictly
observed in cases of international mareitme or overseas employment.

Cabales filed a comlaint for illegal dismissal to the Labor Arbiter. LA dismissed the complaint
stating that her complaint was based in mere allegations.

NLRC reversed the decision and declared that Joy was illegally dismissed. It reiterated the
doctrine that the burden of proof to show that the dismissal was based on a just or valid cause
belongs to the employer. It found that Sameer failed to prove that here were just causes for
termination. CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cabiles was legally dismissed (NO) and whether or not she afforded due
process (NO)

RULING: NO. Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes of termination by the
employer. Thus:

Art. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of the
following causes:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or representative in connection with his work;

(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly
authorized representative;

(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives; and

(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

The burden of proving that there is just cause for termination is on the employer. "The employer
must affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable
cause." 70 Failure to show that there was valid or just cause for termination would necessarily
mean that the dismissal was illegal. 71

To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in work is valid, it must be shown that: 1) the
employer has set standards of conduct and workmanship against which the employee will be
judged; 2) the standards of conduct and workmanship must have been communicated tothe
employee; and 3) the communication was made at a reasonable time prior to the employee’s
performance assessment.

In this case, petitioner merely alleged that respondent failed to comply with her foreign
employer’s work requirements and was inefficient in her work. 74 No evidence was shown to
support such allegations. Petitioner did not even bother to specify what requirements were not
met, what efficiency standards were violated, or what particular acts of respondent constituted
inefficiency.

Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show that there was just cause for causing Joy’s
dismissal. The employer, Wacoal, also failed to accord her due process of law.

While the law acknowledges the plight and vulnerability of workers, it does not "authorize the
oppression or self-destruction of the employer." 62 Management prerogative is recognized in law
and in our jurisprudence.

This prerogative, however, should not be abused. It is "tempered with the employee’s right to
security of tenure." 63 Workers are entitled to substantive and procedural due process before
termination. They may not be removed from employment without a valid or just cause as
determined by law and without going through the proper procedure.

The provisions of the Constitution as well as the Labor Code which afford protection to labor
apply to Filipino employees whether working within the Philippines or abroad. Moreover, the
principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made) governs in this
jurisdiction. In the present case, it is not disputed that the Contract of Employment entered into
by and between petitioners and private respondent was
executed here in the Philippines with the approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA). Hence, the Labor Code together with its implementing rules and
regulations and other laws affecting labor apply in this case.
21. PAMELA FLORENTINA P. JUMUAD - versus - HI-FLYER FOOD, INC. and/or
JESUS R. MONTEMAYOR; G.R. No. 187887, September 7, 2011

Facts:

On May 22, 1995, petitioner Pamela Florentina P. Jumuad (Jumuad) began her employment with
respondent Hi-Flyer Food, Inc. (Hi-Flyer), as management trainee. Hi-Flyer is a corporation
licensed to operate Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) restaurants in the Philippines. Based on her
performance through the years, Jumuad received several promotions until she became the area
manager for the entire Visayas-Mindanao region.

Aside from being responsible in monitoring her subordinates, Jumuad was tasked to: 1) be highly
visible in the restaurants under her jurisdiction; 2) monitor and support day-to-day operations;
and 3) ensure that all the facilities and equipment at the restaurant were properly maintained and
serviced. Among the branches under her supervision were the KFC branches in Gaisano Mall,
Cebu City (KFC-Gaisano); in Cocomall, Cebu City (KFC-Cocomall); and in Island City Mall,
Bohol (KFC-Bohol).

In just her first year as Area Manager, Jumuad gained distinction and was awarded the 3rd top
area manager nationwide. She was rewarded with a trip to Singapore for her excellent
performance.

Hi Flyer conducted a food safety, service and sanitation audit at KFC-Gaisano. The audit,
denominated as CHAMPS Excellence Review (CER), revealed several sanitation violations,
such as the presence of rodents and the use of a defective chiller for the storage of food. When
asked to explain, Jumuad first pointed out that she had already taken steps to prevent the further
infestation of the branch. As to why the branch became infested with rodents, Jumuad faulted
managements decision to terminate the services of the branch’s pest control program and to rely
solely on the pest control program of the mall. As for the defective chiller, she explained that it
was under repair at the time of the CER. Soon thereafter, Hi-Flyer ordered the KFC-Gaisano
branch closed.

Hi-Flyer audited the accounts of KFC-Bohol amid reports that certain employees were covering
up cash shortages. As a result, irregularities were discovered. Jumuad in her report regarding the
incident disclaimed any fault in the incident by pointing out that she was the one responsible for
the discovery of this irregularity.

Hi-Flyer conducted another CER, this time at its KFC-Cocomall branch. Grout and leaks at the
branch’s kitchen wall, dried up spills from the marinator, as well as a live rat under postmix, and
signs of rodent gnawing/infestation were found. This time, Jumuad explained to management
that she had been busy conducting management team meetings at the other KFC branches and
that, at the date the CER was conducted, she had no scheduled visit at the KFC-Cocomall
branch.
Seeking to hold Jumuad accountable for the irregularities uncovered in the branches under her
supervision, Hi-Flyer sent Jumuad an Irregularities Report and Notice of Charges. Jumuad
submitted her written explanation. Hi-Flyer held an administrative hearing where Jumuad
appeared with counsel. Apparently not satisfied with her explanations, Hi-Flyer served her a
Notice of Dismissal.

This prompted Jumuad to file a complaint against Hi-Flyer and/or Jesus R. Montemayor
(Montemayor) for illegal dismissal before the NLRC praying for reinstatement and payment of
separation pay, 13th month pay, service incentive leave, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorneys fees.

LA ruled that Jumuad was illegally dismissed.

NLRC affirmed in toto the LA decision and held that the active participation of Montemayor in
the illegal dismissal of Jumuad justified his solidary liability with Hi-Flyer.

Issue: Whether or not there is a valid termination of Jumuad by Hi-Flyer

Ruling:

Yes. Jumuad willfully breached her duties as to be unworthy of the trust and confidence
of Hi-Flyer. First, there is no denying that Jumuad was a managerial employee. As correctly
noted by the appellate court, Jumuad executed management policies and had the power to
discipline the employees of KFC branches in her area. She recommended actions on employees
to the head office. A managerial employee as one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to
lay down and execute management policies and/or hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall,
discharge, assign or discipline employees. The mere existence of the grounds for the loss of trust
and confidence justifies petitioners dismissal.

In the present case, the CERs reports of Hi-Flyer show that there were anomalies committed in
the branches managed by Jumuad. On the principle of respondeat superior or command
responsibility alone, Jumuad may be held liable for negligence in the performance of her
managerial duties. She may not have been directly involved in causing the cash shortages in
KFC-Bohol, but her involvement in not performing her duty monitoring and supporting the day
to day operations of the branches and ensure that all the facilities and equipment at the restaurant
were properly maintained and serviced, could have truly prevented the whole debacle from ever
occurring.

Moreover, it is observed that rather than taking proactive steps to prevent the anomalies at her
branches, Jumuad merely effected remedial measures. In the restaurant business where the health
and well-being of the consuming public is at stake, this does not suffice. Thus, there is
reasonable basis for Hi-Flyer to withdraw its trust in her and dismissing her from its service.
PLDT v Joey Teves

Facts: Petitioner terminated respondent through an Inter-Office Memorandum dated on

account of his three (3) unauthorized leaves of absence committed within three (3)
years in violation of petitioners rules and regulations. His first absence was from August
23 to September 3, 1990 as his wife gave birth on August 25 and they do not have any
household maid to help the family. He was suspended thereafter for 20 days. His
second absence was stated in a Memorandum to aid his eldest and youngest daughter
were sick and had to be confined at the nearby clinic. His third absence was because of
the fact that he had many accounts in the office which were already due and
demandable and thought of prolonging such payment by absenting himself. Thus,
respondent was terminated from service effective June 1, 1992 due to his third
unauthorized absence within a three-year period.

Respondent filed a Complaint for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal. LA ruled in favour
of petitioner. The NLRC ruled in favor of respondent and was affirmed by the CA.

Issue: Whether or not respondent was illegally dismissed?

Ruling: YES, he was illegally dismissed.

On the first absence, Respondent had shown that he had given petitioner prior
notice of his absences from August 23 to September 3, 1990. As the NLRC found,
petitioner admitted that on August 23, 1990, he (respondent) called up through a third
party to inform PLDT that he would go on an extended leave. When respondent
returned for work on September 4, 1990, he immediately submitted a letter to petitioner
explaining his absence and attaching a medical certificate (of his wife giving birth)
thereto to attest to the reason of his absence. Thus, the suspension imposed on him
was not proper. However, respondent's second unauthorized absence, while
respondent had relayed his inability to report for work on May 29, 1991 to a co-
employee, who unfortunately did not also report for work, he was negligent in not
verifying whether his notice of absence had reached petitioner, and the duration of his
absence. Thus it was an unauthorized but not unjustified absence. Respondents
absence from February 11 to 19, 1991 (third absence) which was made to prolong
payment of his demandable financial obligations in the office, and which absence was
found by both the NLRC and the CA to be unjustified, was respondents second
unauthorized absence. We find that respondent's termination for committing three
unauthorized absences within a three-year period had no basis; thus, there was no valid
cause for respondent's dismissal. There was only two unauthorized absences and not
three.

Even assuming that respondent's absenteeism constitutes wilful disobedience,

such offense does not warrant respondent's dismissal. Not every case of
insubordination or wilful disobedience by an employee reasonably deserves the penalty
of dismissal. There must be a reasonable proportionality between the offense and the
penalty. While management has the prerogative to discipline its employees and to
impose appropriate penalties on erring workers, pursuant to company rules and
regulations, however, such management prerogatives must be exercised in good faith
without abuse of discretion for the advancement of the employers interest and not for
the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special
laws and valid agreements. Dismissal is the ultimate penalty that can be meted to an
employee. Even where a worker has committed an infraction, a penalty less punitive
may suffice, whatever missteps maybe committed by Labor ought not to be visited with
a consequence so severe Thus, respondent's absence from August 23 to September 3,
1990 was justified and not unauthorized as there was prior notice. His absence from
May 29 to June 12, 1991, although found to be unauthorized, was not at all unjustified.
Thus, his absence during the period from February 11 to 19, 1991, being the only
unauthorized and unjustified absence and his second unauthorized absence, should not
merit the penalty of dismissal.

Considering that respondent was illegally dismissed from service, he is entitled to

be reinstated, without loss of seniority rights and the payment of backwages from the
time respondents compensation was withheld from him until his reinstatement on
November 12, 1997. However, since we find that respondent's absence from February
11 to 19, 1992 was unjustified and unauthorized, thus, his suspension for thirty days
would be in order. Hence, the amount equivalent to the thirty-day suspension, which
respondent should have served for his absence on February 11 to 19, 1992, should be
deducted from the backwages to be awarded to him.
 G.R. No. 141717. April 14, 2004]

PHILIPS SEMICONDUCTORS (PHILS.), INC., petitioner, vs. ELOISA

FADRIQUELA, respondent.

FACTS: The petitioner Philips Semiconductors (Phils.), Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged
in the production and assembly of semiconductors. It caters to domestic and foreign corporations
that manufacture computers, telecommunications equipment and cars. Petitioner employed 1,029
regular workers subjected to periodic performance appraisal. Respondent Eloisa Fadriquela
executed a Contract of Employment with the petitioner in which she was hired as a production
operator. After the expiration of her initial contract, it was renewed four times. However, she
incurred absences and failed to offer valid reasons for such and as a consequence of which her
performance rating declined Velayo recommended to the petitioner that the respondents
employment be terminated due to habitual absenteeism, in accordance with the Company Rules
and Regulations. Thus, the respondents contract of employment was no longer renewed.

The respondent filed a complaint before the NLRC for illegal dismissal against the petitioner.
She alleged that there was no valid cause for the termination of her employment as she was not
notified of any infractions she allegedly committed; neither was she accorded a chance to be
heard. According to the respondent, the petitioner did not conduct any formal investigation
before her employment was terminated. She further contends that she is a regular employee and
could not be terminated without any justifiable cause. Moreover, her absences were covered by
the proper authorizations.

Petitioner contended that the respondent had not been dismissed, but that her contract of
employment merely expired and was no longer renewed because of her low performance
rating. Hence, there was no need for a notice or investigation. Furthermore, the respondent had
already accumulated five unauthorized absences which led to the deterioration of her
performance, and ultimately caused the non-renewal of her contract.

The Labor Arbiter and NLRC ruled in favor of petitioner. The CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was accorded the requisite notice and investigation prior to
her dismissal.

HELD: NO. The court agrees with the appellate court that the respondent was dismissed by the
petitioner without the requisite notice and without any formal investigation. Given the factual
milieu in this case, the respondents dismissal from employment for incurring five (5) absences in
April 1993, three (3) absences in May 1993 and four (4) absences in June 1993, even if true, is
too harsh a penalty. We do agree that an employee may be dismissed for violation of reasonable
regulations/rules promulgated by the employer. Neither can the conferences purportedly held
between the respondent and the line supervisor be deemed substantial compliance with the
requirements of notice and investigation.

we emphasized in PLDT v. NLRC[36] that:

Dismissal is the ultimate penalty that can be meted to an employee. Where a penalty less
punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may have been committed by the worker ought not to
be visited with a consequence so severe such as dismissal from employment. For, the
Constitution guarantees the right of workers to security of tenure. The misery and pain attendant
to the loss of jobs then could be avoided if there be acceptance of the view that under certain
circumstances of the case the workers should not be deprived of their means of livelihood
Rene Valiao Vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 146621 July 30, 2004

Facts

 Feb 1990, Rene was employed as Student Affairs Director at West Negros College.
 He was always tardy and was caught one time manipulating the bundy clock
 Dec. 1991, He received a suspension order for 15 days without pay for dishonesty
 June 1992, A memorandum was sent for his frequent tardiness
 The School gave him another chance and appointed him as information assistant
 Dec. 1992 Rene was ordered to prepare a media blitz about the school’s victory over the
officials of the union, which he refused
 Jan 1993 he was transferred Records evaluator, which he was relieved for his poor
performance and habitual absenteeism
 He was one of those arrested in Bacolod City for allegedly possessing marijuana, shabu
and unlicensed firearm along with 4 other persons
 He was asked to explain within 24 hours why he should not be terminated immediately
 He had answered 2 days after, and he was terminated.
 Feb 1993 he asked for due process and the notice for termination was lifted and was
placed under preventive suspension.
 He was terminated for serious misconduct and habitual neglect of his duties
 LA valid dismissal for absenteeism and tardiness is willful disobedience but also gross
and habitual neglect of duties.
 NLRC affirmed the LA
 CA affirmed NLRC

Issue

 Whether or not the dismissal is valid

Ruling

Yes, Dismissal is valid. For an employee’s dismissal to be valid:

(a) the dismissal must be for a valid cause and
(b) the employee must be afforded due process.
Gross negligence connotes want of care in the performance of one’s duties. Habitual neglect
implies repeated failure to perform one’s duties for a period of time, depending upon the
circumstances.
The contention of the petitioner that he was dismissed due to his previous arrest is
untenable, since the was terminated due to Serious Misconduct and Gross Habitual Neglect
MANSION PRINTING CENTER and CLEMENT CHENG, Petitioners, vs. DIOSDADO BITARA,
JR. Respondent.
G.R. No. 168120 January 25, 2012

FACTS:
In 1998, Mansion Printing Center engaged the services of respondent Bitara as a helper (kargador).
Respondent was later promoted as the company’s sole driver tasked to pick-up raw materials for the
printing business, collect account receivables and deliver the products to the clients within the delivery
schedules.

Petitioners aver that the timely delivery of the products to the clients is one of the foremost considerations
material to the operation of the business. It being so, they closely monitored the attendance of respondent.
They noted his habitual tardiness and absenteeism.

Petitioners issued a Memorandum requiring respondent to submit a written explanation why no

administrative sanction should be imposed on him for his habitual tardiness.

Records of lates and absences:

1st quarter of the year 2000: 19 times out of the 47 times he reported for work (late). 19 out of 66 working
days during the quarter (absence).

Davis Cheng, General Manager of the company and son of petitioner Cheng, issued another
Memorandum. He personally handed the Notice to Explain to respondent but the latter, after reading the
directive, refused to acknowledge receipt thereof. He did not submit any explanation and, thereafter,
never reported for work.

Davis Cheng personally served another Memorandum (Notice of Termination) upon him informing him
that the company found him grossly negligent of his duties, for which reason, his services were
terminated.

Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioners before the Labor Arbiter. He
prayed for his reinstatement and for the payment of full backwages, legal holiday pay, service incentive
leave pay, damages and attorney’s fees.

Respondent: He took a leave of absence from due to an urgent family problem. He returned to work but
Davis Cheng allegedly refused him admission because of his unauthorized absences. Respondent
explained that he was compelled to immediately leave for the province on due to the urgency of the
matter and his wife informed the office that he will be absent for a week. The management found his
explanation unacceptable and offered him an amount equivalent to his one (1) month salary as separation
pay but respondent refused the offer because he wanted to keep the job.

Labor Arbiter: dismissed the complaint for lack of merit

NLRC: the findings of the Labor Arbiter was AFFIRMED en toto.

Court of Appeals: found for the respondent and reversed the findings of the Commission and ordered for
the Reinstatement or if no longer feasible, Separation Pay, backwages and 5 days SIL

ISSUE:
Whether or not Bitara was legally dismissed (YES)
RULING:
In Valiao, we defined gross negligence as "want of care in the performance of one’s duties" and habitual
neglect as "repeated failure to perform one’s duties for a period of time, depending upon the
circumstances." These are not overly technical terms, which, in the first place, are expressly sanctioned by
the Labor Code of the Philippines, to wit:

ART. 282. Termination by employer. - An employer may terminate an employment for any of the
following causes:

(a) xxx

(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

xxx

Clearly, even in the absence of a written company rule defining gross and habitual neglect of duties,
respondent’s omissions qualify as such warranting his dismissal from the service.

We cannot simply tolerate injustice to employers if only to protect the welfare of undeserving employees.
As aptly put by then Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing:

Needless to say, so irresponsible an employee like petitioner does not deserve a place in the workplace,
and it is within the management’s prerogative xxx to terminate his employment. Even as the law is
solicitous of the welfare of employees, it must also protect the rights of an employer to exercise what are
clearly management prerogatives. As long as the company’s exercise of those rights and prerogative is in
good faith to advance its interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of
employees under the laws or valid agreements, such exercise will be upheld.

And, in the words of then Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez in Philippine Long Distance and
Telephone Company, Inc. v. Balbastro:

While it is true that compassion and human consideration should guide the disposition of cases involving
termination of employment since it affects one's source or means of livelihood, it should not be
overlooked that the benefits accorded to labor do not include compelling an employer to retain the
services of an employee who has been shown to be a gross liability to the employer. The law in protecting
the rights of the employees authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. It should
be made clear that when the law tilts the scale of justice in favor of labor, it is but a recognition of the
inherent economic inequality between labor and management. The intent is to balance the scale of justice;
to put the two parties on relatively equal positions. There may be cases where the circumstances warrant
favoring labor over the interests of management but never should the scale be so tilted if the result is an
injustice to the employer. Justitia nemini neganda est (Justice is to be denied to none).

NLRC decision are hereby REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that petitioners are ORDERED
to pay respondent the money equivalent of the five-day service incentive leave for every year of service
covering his employment period from August 1988 to 1 April 2000. This case is hereby REMANDED to
the Labor Arbiter for the computation of respondent’s service incentive leave pay.
RE: EMPLOYEES INCURRING HABITUAL TARDINESS IN THE
1ST SEMESTER OF 2007

Moral obligations, performance of household chores, traffic problems, health

conditions, and domestic and financial concerns are not sufficient reasons to excuse
habitual tardiness or to exempt the guilty employee from the imposition of the penalty,
although these may be considered to mitigate their liability.

Facts:
Atty. Eden T. Candelaria (Atty. Candelaria), Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief
Administrative Officer of this Court, recommended the imposition of administrative
penalties on 16 employees who committed habitual tardiness during the first semester of
2007, in accordance with Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 4,
Series of 1991 (Policy on Absenteeism and Tardiness) and Memorandum Circular No.
19, Series of 1999 (Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil Service). It
was referred that the list of employees who incurred tardiness 10 times or more in a
month for the first semester (January to June) of 2007 must be directed for appropriate
action. Atty. Candelaria then required the employees in said list to explain within five
days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against them.

A. Employees with previous penalties of habitual tardiness:

1. Habitual Tardiness: Ms. Maria Teresa P. Olipas (Ms. Olipas), Court Stenographer
III, Court Management Office.
In her comment:
• That she is a single parent with no one to assist her in taking care of her
two daughters needs.
• There are times when she suffers a severe pain on her left foot which gives
her a hard time in getting up from bed.
• She admitted, however, she incurred tardiness but without any intention to
violate the said CSC Memorandum Circular.
• She now begs for the kind indulgence and compassion of the Court for her
predicament.

2. Ms. Marivic C. Azurin (Ms. Azurin), Clerk IV, Leave Division-OCA

Azurin did not submit her explanation. Hence, deemed to have waived her right to
comment.

3. Atty. Wilson Baniel (Atty. Baniel), Court Attorney VI, Office of the Clerk of
Court-En Banc
In his comment:
• That it was a balance of priorities between domestic troubles and family
problems as against the rules being required of civil servants.
• He admitted that to decide between priorities, the latter should prevail.
• He now asks for temperance and promises to persevere and sacrifice more
as he approaches his eighteenth year of service to the Court.

4. Mr. Allan Michael L. Chua (Mr. Chua), Clerk IV, Office of the Court
Administrator
In his comment:
• That such incursion was neither intentional nor ingrained with bad faith.
 • Having been employed only in July 2006 as co-terminus, he is still at a
loss on the procedure on attendance in the government.
• That due to some domestic problems that he dealt with during said period,
his performance at work was somehow affected.
• Mr. Chua now begs for the kind consideration on his case so as not to
prejudice his chance of being employed elsewhere in the future when his
appointment expires.

5. Jovito V. Sanchez (Mr. Sanchez), Information System Analyst III, Management

Information Systems Office
In his comment:
• That it has been a year now since he was separated with his wife. On 10
December 2006, his estranged wife left for Singapore to work. Their three
children, two of whom are already attending school, are now living with
him since she left and they are all being taken care of by himself alone.
• He is considering the idea of getting a household help but finds it difficult
to get one.
• He now begs that any disciplinary action that may be imposed on him as a
result of his being habitually tardy be accorded with utmost compassion
for humanitarian reasons

B. Employees incurring habitual tardiness for the first time:

1. Ms. Maria Victoria S. Buzon (Ms. Buzon), Management & Audit Analyst
II, Court Management Office-OCA.
In her comment:
• That having acquired hypertension last year, she finds it difficult to adjust
and still is unable to handle the situations up to the earlier part of this year.
• She added that she is not used to uncomfortable feelings brought about by
attacks of hypertension which caused her to slow down especially in the
morning. This predicament, she said, was compounded by the
unprecedented street diggings that caused so much traffic along the
different routes used by public utility vehicles which she takes to reach the
office.
2. Mr. Crisanto C. Carrillo, Jr. (Mr. Carrillo), Judicial Officer III, MCLEO.
In his comment:
• Personal and health problems he was dealing with at that time
compounded by the demand in school where he enrolled for his post
graduate studies. He promised to be more circumspect in his actions
despite this predicament.

3. Mr. Manolito V. De Guzman (Mr. De Guzman), Data Entry Machine Operator IV,
Office of ACA Antonio Dujua, OCA
In his comment:
• his wife was sick and would not be able to take of their seven
children, six of whom are attending their classes. That during those
times, he was the one who took care of all the children’s needs as
he could not afford to get a household help.
• He is hoping for the kind consideration on his predicament.
4. Mr. Roderick I. Duero (Mr. Duero), Utility Worker II, Office of the Chief
Attorney
In his comment:
• As a family man who is desolated by his better-half, he said that he has to
attend to all the needs of his four kids, three of whom are attending
schools
• Nonetheless, he pleads that any disciplinary action that may be imposed
on him for the said infraction be accorded with leniency for humanitarian
reasons.

5. Mr. Rodel A. Gombio (Mr. Gombio), Human Resource Management Officer II,
Office of Administrative Services.
In his comment:
• That during those times, his wife was set to travel to Australia for
one year and had a short period to prepare for her trip. Most of the
time, he had to do the errands as his wife could not afford to be
absent nor late for work.
• He added further that two days before his wife left for Australia,
his brother came home from Dubai and stayed there for his month-
long vacation.
• With his wife away, he had to run the household by himself and
attend to the needs of their children.
• Despite all of these, he said that he tried his best to wake up early
and catch the Court of Appeals shuttle bus at 6:00 a.m. At times
that he missed the shuttle service, he is sure that on his way to the
office he will be caught in terrible traffic that hindered him from
coming to work on time.

6. Mr. Eduardo M. Iglesias (Mr. Iglesias), SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer,

Personnel Division-OCA
In his comment:
• That he was not fully aware of his being tardy ten times or more for two
consecutive months. He humbly expresses his apology and assured not to
commit the same infraction in the future.

7. Atty. Teresita Asuncion M. Lacandula-Rodriguez (Atty. Lacandula-Rodriguez),

Court Attorney VI, Office of Justice Renato C. Corona.
In her comment:
• That she lives in Quezon City and during the period she was tardy,
repairs to the Ayala Bridge (where she passes) were made which
made her travel time longer than usual. I
• n addition, she cites the circumstances in her family as her reason
for her coming to the office late.
• She nonetheless resolves to rearrange her schedule so she can
henceforth arrive on time.
• She asks the kind consideration on this matter and offers her sincere
apology to the Court for the inconvenience she may have caused it.

8. Mr. Ronald C. Napolitano (Mr. Napolitano), Information Officer IV,

Public Information Office.
In his comment:
 • That being the Public Information Offices Primary Artist and
Layout Editor, he rendered overtime, on a regular basis, just to
complete his tasks within the deadlines.
• Because of this, he has difficulty waking up early in the
morning. He said that he already requested for a change in his
official time.
• He begs for kind consideration and pledges to endeavor not to
repeat the same infraction in the future.

9. Ms. Digna C. Palafox (Ms. Palafox), Clerk IV, Court Management Office
In his comment:
• That her tardiness for the above-mentioned months was caused by her
severe symptoms of menopause which frequently wake her all night long.
• Being forty-nine (49) years of age, she finds difficulty to get up in the
morning after a very troublesome sleep.
• Despite this predicament, she has been trying her best to adjust her
schedule and has been successful in not incurring tardiness ten (10) times a
month prior to April and May 2007, and the months thereafter.

10. Ms. Sandra O. Pendon (Ms. Pendon), Clerk IV, Office of Court
Administrator Jose P. Perez.
In her comment:
• That she has no household help to take care of all the needs of her
two nieces who were left by their mother to her charge.
• She prays for kind consideration on the matter.

11. Mr. Rolando N. Yacat (Mr. Yacat), Clerk III, Office of Administrative Services-
OCA
In his comment:
• That he and his family are living in Kawit, Cavite
• That during the month of February, part of the road along Island Cove,
where they usually take as their route, is undergoing renovation and
because of the volume of the vehicles going to Manila, heavy traffic builds
up during the morning. This causes him to arrive late in the office.
• He added that he already remedied his predicament by changing his work
schedule from 8:00 a.m. to 8:30 a.m. He prays for consideration and
understanding on the matter.

Issue: Whether or not an employee guilty of habitual tardiness be exempted from

imposition of penalty

Ruling:

NO. By being habitually tardy, these employees have fallen short of the stringent
standard of conduct demanded from everyone connected with the administration of
justice. By reason of the nature and functions of their office, officials and employees of
the Judiciary must be role models in the faithful observance of the constitutional canon
that public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. Inherent in this mandate
is the observance of prescribed office hours and the efficient use of every moment thereof
for public service, if only to recompense the Government, and ultimately, the people who
shoulder the cost of maintaining the Judiciary. Thus, to inspire public respect for the
justice system, court officials and employees are at all times behooved to strictly observe
official time. As punctuality is a virtue, absenteeism and tardiness are impermissible.
Moral obligations, performance of household chores, traffic problems, health conditions,
and domestic and financial concerns are not sufficient reasons to excuse habitual
tardiness or to exempt the guilty employee from the imposition of the penalty, although
these may be considered to mitigate their liability.

WHEREFORE, as recommended by Atty. Candelaria, we find the concerned Supreme

Court employees administratively liable for habitual tardiness and are penalized as
follows:
1. Ms. Maria Teresa P. Olipas is SUSPENDED for fifteen (15) days without pay, for
being habitually tardy for the third time, with a FINAL WARNING that a repetition of
the same shall be dealt with more severely;
2. Ms. Marivic C. Azurin, Atty. Winston R. Baniel, and Mr. Jovito V. Sanchez are
SUSPENDED FOR 5 DAYS, for being habitually tardy for the second time, with a
FINAL WARNING that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely;
3. Mr. Allan Michael L. Chua is SUSPENDED for 5 days for being habitually tardy for
the second time. However, as such administrative sanction can no longer be imposed
since his appointment expired on 30 November 2007, let a copy of this Decision be
entered into his personal file for record purposes; and
4. The following employees: (a) Ms. Maria Victoria S. Buzon, (b) Mr. Crisanto C.
Carrillo, Jr., (c) Mr. Manolito V. de Guzman, (d) Mr. Roderick L. Duero, (e) Mr. Rodel
A. Gombio, (f) Mr. Eduardo M. Iglesias, (g) Atty. Teresita Asuncion M. Lacandula-
Rodriguez, (h) Mr. Ronald Napolitano, (i) Mr. Digna C. Palafox, (j) Ms. Sandra O.
Pendon, and (k) Mr. Rolando N. Yacat are REPRIMANDED with a WARNING that a
repetition of the same act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
 27. VIRGINIA A. SUGUE AND THE HEIRS OF RENATO S. VALDERAMA V.
TRIUMPH INTERNATIONAL (PHIL.) INC. GR NO. 164804, 164784. JANUARY 30,
2009
FACTS: Triumph hired Sugue in May 1990 as its Assistant Manager for Marketing and was
subsequently promoted to Marketing Services Manager with a monthly salary of P82,500.00. On
the other hand, Valderrama was hired in April 1993 as Direct Sales Manager with a monthly salary
of P121,000.00. Their main function/responsibility was to ensure that the companys sales targets
and objectives were met.
Beginning sometime in October 1999, Triumphs top management began to notice a sharp decline
in the sales of the company. Moreover, in the following months, the actual sales figures continued
to be significantly below the sales targets set by Valderrama himself.
On June 1, 2000, Sugue and Valderrama filed a complaint with the NLRC against Triumph for
payment of money claims arising from allegedly unpaid vacation and sick leave credits, birthday
leave and 14th month pay for the period 1999-2000.
On June 23, 2000, Valderrama and Sugue were directed to submit a written explanation as to why
they used company time and the company vehicle and driver in attending the preliminary
conference at the NLRC and why they left the office without advising the Managing Director.
They explained that they believed they may use company time and the company vehicle since the
hearing they attended. On June 28, 2000, Triumph charged the one-half day utilized by Sugue and
Valderrama in attending the NLRC hearing on June 19, 2000 to their vacation leave credits
pursuant to a complaint that they filed as employees of the company.
On July 17, 2000, Valderrama wrote the company a letter stating that he considered himself
constructively dismissed due to the unreasonable pressures and harassments he suffered the past
months which prevented him from effectively exercising his tasks as Direct Sales Manager.
on July 28, 2000, Triumph issued a memorandum requiring Valderrama to explain, under pain of
dismissal, his continued absences without official leave. Valderrama failed to respond, thus,
on August 11, 2000, Triumph decided to terminate Valderramas employment for abandonment of
work.
Meanwhile, on July 25, 2000, Sugue also wrote the company stating that she considers herself
constructively dismissed. From the pleadings, Sugues charge of constructive dismissal was based
on the fact that her request for vacation leave from July 14 to 15, 2000 was subject to the condition
that she first submit a report on the company’s 2001 Marketing Plan. Also, the approval of her
request for executive check-up was deferred. Then, on July 18, 2000, she received a memorandum
instructing her to report to Mr. Efren Temblique, who was appointed OIC for Marketing as a result
of a reorganization prompted by Valderramas continued absences. Sugue claimed that such act by
Triumph was an outright demotion considering that Mr. Temblique was her former assistant.
On August 11, 2000, Triumph required Sugue to explain why she should not be terminated for
continued absences without official leave. Sugue failed to comply, thus, on September 1, 2000,
her employment was terminated for abandonment of work.
LA: Declaring that Sugue and Valderrama were constructively dismissed.
NLRC: Reversed the ruling of LA
CA: While pending, Valderrama passed away and notice of his death was filed by his counsel.
Decision of the LA is reinstated, subject to deletion of the award of attorney’s fee and the reduction
of the award of moral damages to P500,000 and exemplar damages to P250,000 for each of the
petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not Valderrama and Sugue were constructively dismissed by Triumph.

HELD: NO, Constructive dismissal is defined as an involuntary resignation resorted to when

continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion
in rank or a diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an
employer becomes unbearable to an employee.
The acts which purportedly show discrimination and bad faith on the part of Triumph are
summarized below:
In the case of Valderrama:
1.The half-day he spent in attending the NLRC hearing on June 19, 2000 was charged to his
vacation leave credit
2. His application for sick leave for July 3 to 5, 2000 was disapproved; and
3. His request for executive check-up was denied.
In the case of Sugue:
1. The half-day she spent in attending the NLRC hearing on June 19, 2000 was charged to her
vacation leave credit;
2. The approval of her application for leave of absence for July 14 and 15, 2000 was made subject
to the condition that she should first submit a report on the 2001 Marketing Plan;
3. The approval of her request for executive check-up was deferred until after the visit of the
companys regional marketing manager; and
4. A memorandum was issued instructing her to report to her former assistant, Mr. Temblique,
which was allegedly tantamount to a demotion.
With respect to the first alleged discriminatory act, we can conceive of no reason to ascribe bad
faith or malice to Triumph for charging to the leave credits of Sugue and Valderrama the half-day
that they spent in attending the preliminary conference of the case they instituted against Triumph.
It is fair and reasonable for Triumph to do so considering that Sugue and Valderrama did not
perform work for one-half day on June 19, 2000. Second alleged discriminatory act, the court held
that their contention that the approval of their request was indefinitely withheld is apocryphal. In
fact, there is nothing that prevented them from scheduling their executive check-up after the visit
of the regional marketing manager. Third, it is well within the power and authority of an employer
to deny an employees application for leave and the same cannot be perceived as discriminatory or
harassment. Lastly, Triumphs directive for Sugue to report to Temblique was not unreasonable,
inconvenient or prejudicial to her considering that it did not entail a demotion in rank or diminution
of salaries, benefits and other privileges. Even assuming there was a change in the personalities to
whom Sugue is required to report, she continued to assume her position as Marketing Services
Manager and to exercise the same functions. Neither did she assert, much less prove, that there
was any diminution in her salary or other benefits. There is no demotion where there is no
reduction in position, rank or salary.
 METRO TRANSIT ORGANIZATION, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and VICTORIO T. TURING, respondents.
G.R. No. 119724. May 31, 1999

Facts:
Petitioner Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit) is a subsidiary of the Light Rail
Transit Authority which operates a light rail transit system. Private respondent Victorio T.
Turing was a train operator of the light rail transit system of petitioner.

On January 9, 1990, private respondent had been suspended for three (3) days, for absence
without leave for ten (10) days on December 1989. On February 14, 1990, he applied for leave of
absence for three (3) days (February 17, 20, and 21, 1990), but after his leave had expired, he
failed to report for work. On March 6, 1990, the company’s social worker, Emma Luciano, went
to see him at his home address but did not find him as he had gone to Calamba,
Laguna. Nonetheless, private respondent, on the same day, informed petitioner that he would be
reporting for work on March 15, 1990. As a matter of fact, he returned to work on March 12,
1990, explaining that he had been absent because his wife left him and their six children because
of some misunderstanding. However, on March 29, 1990, private respondent was dismissed for
abandonment of work.

The Labor Arbiter found private respondent’s dismissal to be illegal and directed Metro Transit
to reinstate him, without loss of seniority rights and with payment of backwages equivalent to six
months, or the amount of TWENTY-FOUR THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED PESOS
(P24,900.00), and attorneys fees of P2,490.00.

On appeal, the Labor Arbiter’s decision was affirmed by the NLRC and petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion
by the NLRC for denying petitioners right as employer to discipline its employees. Petitioner
maintains that private respondent was guilty of abandonment of work.

Issue:
Whether or not NLRC abused its discretion.

Ruling:
NO. Petitioner dismissed Turing for abandonment of work for having incurred a total of 17 days
of absence from February 17, 20, & 21, 1990 to March 13, 1990 without official leave and after
his explanation was found unmeritorious. Thus, the main point in controversy hinges on the
merit and validity for which the absence was availed.

We have taken into account the admission made by the complainant regarding his unauthorized
absence not only from the statement he made before the Social Worker who attended to his case
but also before the respondent company under a subsequent letter on March 12, 1990. As
correctly pointed out by the Labor Arbiter who rendered the decision, the problem that
confronted the complainant was very personal and too serious that any one affected would surely
lose concentration in his job especially during the early stages of its occurrence and discovery
and that is followed by the further observation that complainant’s plea for understanding and
forgiveness should have merited kind consideration. The Labor Arbiter also observed correctly
that the nature of the complainant’s job involves safety of passengers and mental lapse on his
part, being a train operator, would surely endanger many lives.

Judging from the nature the absence was committed, the admission made, his repentance and the
promise made to report normally for work after recovering, the dismissal of complainant Turing
should have been cautiously studied and examined since it affects one’s property which is
protected against undue deprivation. We find the absence of the complainant not willful as to be
characterized for a total relinquishment of one’s job. As aptly pointed out by our Supreme Court,
unauthorized absence does not amount to gross neglect of duty or abandonment (Velasco vs.
Inciong, 164 SCRA 775, August 4, 1998).

For abandonment of work to be a just and valid ground for dismissal, there must be a deliberate
and unjustified refusal on the part of an employee to resume his employment. Considering the
reason for his absence, private respondent cannot be said to have abandoned his work. Indeed,
petitioner has adduced no proof of overt acts on the part of private respondent showing clearly
and unequivocably his intention to abandon his work. To the contrary, the evidence shows that
private respondent declared his intention to return to work on March 15, 1990. As a matter of
fact, he reported for work on March 12. In his letters to petitioner dated March 12 and 13, 1990,
he expressed regrets for his absences. Then, after learning that he had been dismissed, private
respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. All these belie petitioners allegation that
private respondent had abandoned his job. We have ruled in several cases that a timely filing of
an illegal dismissal case negates abandonment.

However, no matter what marital problems private respondent had, he had no excuse for not
informing his employer of the reason for his failure to report for work. Private respondent should
have taken care that his absence was not considered habitual, at least by sending word to his
employer that he had a good excuse. Consequently, we hold that while private respondent may
not be dismissed for abandonment of work, he should be suspended for three months for being
absent without leave. For this purpose, he should be considered suspended for the period March
29, 1990 to June 26, 1990, inclusive.

We affirm the resolution of the NLRC, with modification, however, that full backwages should
be granted to private respondent in accordance with R.A. No. 6715, which took effect on March
21, 1989. Private respondent is entitled to payment of full backwages considering that his
dismissal took place on March 29, 1990, after the effectivity of R.A. No. 6715. Such backwages
should cover the period from the time private respondents compensation was withheld from him
(which, as a rule, is from the time of his illegal dismissal) up to the time of his actual
reinstatement, less backwages for three months corresponding to the period of his suspension for
the period March 29, 1990 to June 26, 1990, inclusive, and should include allowances and other
benefits or their monetary equivalent. The award should be made without deducting from
backwages the earnings derived elsewhere by the concerned employee during the period of his
illegal dismissal.
29. PHILIPPINE RURAL RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT (PRRM), Petitioner,
vs.
VIRGILIO E. PULGAR, Respondent.

G.R. No. 169227 July 5, 2010

Facts:

PRRM is a non-stock, non-profit, non-governmental organization. Pulgar was the

manager of PRRM’s branch office – the Tayabas Bay Field Office (TBFO) – in Quezon
Province. When Pulgar was reassigned to PRRM’s central office, PRRM, through Goyena
Solis (Solis), conducted an investigation into alleged financial anomalies committed at the
TBFO.

In her investigation report, Solis stated that part of the funds allotted to the TBFO was
missing or not properly accounted for. The report also stated that some of the receipts
that the TBFO submitted to liquidate the organization’s financial transactions were
fictitious and manufactured.4A

The PRRM management sent Pulgar a copy of the report, together with a memorandum,
asking him to explain these findings.5

In a letter, Pulgar admitted that TBFO’s reported expenses did not reflect its actual
expenses. He explained that as field manager, he presumed he had the discretion to
determine when and how the funds would be used, as long as the use was devoted to
the implementation of TBFO projects. Thus, there were instances when he used the funds
intended for one project to sustain the activities of other projects. Pulgar further admitted
that some of the receipts he submitted to liquidate TBFO’s expenses were not genuine;
he claimed that he had to produce fake receipts to comply with the central office’s
requirements and deadlines, otherwise the release of TBFO’s subsequent funds would
be delayed. Pulgar also disclosed that he had, on his own initiative, opened a separate
bank account at the Capitol Bank6 for TBFO’s savings; the account had a remaining
balance of ₱206,958.50. Lastly, Pulgar manifested his willingness to attend a meeting
with the senior officers, scheduled on February 28, 1997, to further explain his side.

On March 4, 1997, Pulgar met with PRRM representatives to discuss the findings of the
investigation report. During the meeting, Pulgar furnished these representatives with a
photocopy of a savings account passbook with Account Number 1103508 under
Pulgar’s name at the Cooperative Bank of Quezon. The passbook showed that the
account had a balance of ₱207,693.10. According to Pulgar, this balance represented the
TBFO savings he mentioned in his response. At this point, two versions of the story
develop.

PRRM maintains that while the investigation was ongoing, Pulgar went on leave on March
3-10, March 20-25, and April 1-15, 1997. After the lapse of his last leave on April 15,
1997, Pulgar no longer reported to work, leading PRRM to believe that Pulgar had
abandoned his work to evade any liability arising from the investigation. PRRM was
therefore surprised to learn that Pulgar had filed an illegal dismissal case on April 3, 1997.

Pulgar tells another tale. According to him, on March 17, 1997, he submitted a letter to
PRRM to complain that he was not given the right to confront and question Solis, 8 but his
letter went unanswered. Thereafter, on March 31, 1997, he was not allowed to enter the
premises of the organization. Pulgar also alleges that PRRM’s representatives removed
his personal properties and records from his office, placed them in boxes and kept them
in storage.

Believing he was constructively dismissed by PRRM’s actions, Pulgar filed a complaint

against PRRM on April 3, 1997 for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, and nonpayment
of service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay. Pulgar also asked for actual damages,
moral damages, and attorney’s fees. At the mandatory conferences before Labor Arbiter
Pablo Espiritu, Jr. (Labor Arbiter), Pulgar dropped the illegal suspension charge, as well
as his claim for payment of service incentive leave with pay.9

LA: Pulgar was illegally dismissed and ordered PRRM to pay Pulgar ₱319,387.50 as full
backwages. However, the Labor Arbiter chose not to award Pulgar moral or exemplary
damages after finding that PRRM had legitimate grounds to investigate Pulgar. Due to
the strained relations between PRRM and Pulgar, the Labor Arbiter opted to award Pulgar
separation pay instead of ordering his reinstatement.

NLRC: Reversed. Pulgar abandoned his work.

CA: Granted Pulgar’s petition and reinstated LA’s decision.

Issue: WON Pulgar was illegally dismissed. (NO)

Ruling:

No, we underscore the fact that when Pulgar filed an illegal dismissal complaint on April
3, 1997, he was still on leave from the organization. In other words, from PRRM’s
standpoint, Pulgar was still its employee when he filed the illegal dismissal case
against the organization.

Pulgar claims that he was forced to file an illegal dismissal complaint against PRRM while
he was on leave because he was not allowed to enter the office premises on March 31,
1997. But aside from making this allegation, Pulgar failed to provide any other details
on how he was prevented from entering the premises. Was he physically prevented from
entering the premises by a security guard? Did the senior officers of PRRM refuse to let
him into the office when he reported to work? We are left to guess the particulars of how
PRRM prevented Pulgar from entering the premises, leaving us to doubt the veracity of
this allegation.
To bolster his contention that he was constructively dismissed, Pulgar asserts that his
personal things were taken from his office, placed in boxes and put in storage. To support
this allegation, he attached three photographs.16 But the only thing seen in these
photographs is a storage room with sealed boxes on the floor. Taken at face value, there
is nothing in the photographs that proves that the boxes in the storage room even contain
Pulgar’s personal things. Absent such proof, we cannot use these pictures to prove that
Pulgar was constructively dismissed from employment.

Significantly, while Pulgar claims he was constructively dismissed when he was barred
from the premises on March 31, 1997, he still filed his application for leave for April
1-15, 1997. The fact alone that Pulgar was able to return to the office to file his application
for leave for April 1-15, 1997 raises doubt as to his purported ban from the premises.
More importantly, if Pulgar truly believed that he had already been constructively
dismissed on March 31, 1997, reason dictates that he would no longer bother to apply for
a leave of absence from PRRM for April 1-15, 1997. The fact that he did belies his
contention that he believed he had already been constructively dismissed on March 31,
1997.

Also worth mentioning is the fact that Pulgar continued to receive his salary from PRRM
even after March 31, 1997, or the date of his alleged constructive dismissal. In fact, Pulgar
received his salary up until April 15, 1997, when his vacation and sick leaves had been
consumed.

These circumstances, taken together, lead us to conclude that PRRM did not terminate
Pulgar’s employment. On the contrary, what appears from the evidence is that it was
Pulgar himself who terminated his employment with PRRM when he filed an illegal
dismissal complaint against the organization while he was on leave.

Noticeably, from Pulgar’s disclosures alone, a prima facie case for estafa can already be
made out against Pulgar. With the danger of criminal prosecution hanging over his head,
Pulgar’s abrupt decision to terminate his employment with PRRM becomes easily
understandable.

While we recognize the rule that in illegal dismissal cases, the employer bears the burden
of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause, in the present case,
however, the facts and the evidence do not establish a prima facie case that the employee
was dismissed from employment. Before the employer must bear the burden of proving
that the dismissal was legal, the employee must first establish by substantial evidence
the fact of his dismissal from service. Logically, if there is no dismissal, then there can be
no question as to its legality or illegality.Bare allegations of constructive dismissal, when
uncorroborated by the evidence on record, cannot be given credence.
INTERTRANZ CONTAINER LINES, INC. and JOSEFINA F. TUMIBAY, Petitioners, vs.
MA. TERESA I. BAUTISTA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 187693 , July 13, 2010

BRION, J.:

FACTS:
Intertranz Container Lines, Inc. and Josefina F. Tumibay (petitioners) are engaged in local and
international freight forwarding services. On February 14, 2002, the petitioners employed Ma.
Teresa I. Bautista as Customs Representative.

On September 10, 2004, Bautista filed a complaint against the petitioners for illegal dismissal,
money claims, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. She stated that as the
company’s customs representative, she attended to the processing of import documents of the
company’s clients and the delivery of their cargoes. Her daily work schedule was from 8:30 a.m.
to 5:30 p.m., but her duties required her to work up to midnight without overtime compensation.
Her monthly salary was increased to P8,000.00 upon her promotion as account officer with the
duty of looking for clients. The company did not give her incentive leave and 13 th month pay.
On July 15, 2004, the petitioners terminated her employment without a valid reason and prior
investigation; by reason of her dismissal, she suffered and continues to suffer extreme mental
anguish and serious anxiety. She also claimed that Tumibay shouted at her when she was
dismissed, and threatened to shoot her if she did not leave.

In defense, the petitioners alleged that on Bautista was caught redhanded overcharging the
company for truck rental; she requested a cash advance of P6,000.00 to pay for the rental, but she
actually paid the trucking service only P4,500.00, keeping for herself the balance of P1,500.00.
Bautista denied any wrongdoing and justified her taking a share from the truck rental as her
referral fee, by claiming that she was the one coordinating/dealing with the trucking company.
Bautistas insolent reply angered Tumibay who then told Bautista to resign; instead of resigning,
she filed the complaint.On July 19, 2004, Bautista, representing herself as manager of a
competitor company, Ramaga Cargo Express, sent a letter, dated July 18, 2004, to [6] Sandvik
Tamrock Phils., Inc., soliciting business, an act of moon shining. To avoid being formally
charged with a fraudulent and dishonest act, Bautista opted to leave the company and stopped
reporting for work.Since Bautista, by her acts, intentionally severed her employment with the
company, a letter of notice for her to return to work and a show cause letter would have been a
futile exercise. Moreover, the petitioners maintained that Bautista's dishonest acts constituted a
just and valid cause for her dismissal, pursuant to company rules and regulations.The petitioners
denied liability for Bautistas money claims as they paid her 13 th month benefits (except in 2004
when Bautista went on absence without leave) and service incentive pay. Her claim for overtime
pay allegedly lacked basis because it was not supported by a pre-approved overtime schedule and
a daily time record; as a member of the marketing department, she had no regular working hours.
The petitioners likewise argued that Bautista cannot claim damages for mental anguish and
anxiety because it was her own fraudulent and dishonest act that caused her dismissal from the
company.
Labor Arbiter declaring Bautista's dismissal illegal
NLRC dismissed the petitioners appeal for non-perfection, as they filed the replacement bond
beyond the 10-day period. NLRC issued a Resolution dismissing the petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the labor arbiters order of December 15, 2005, granting Bautista's payroll
reinstatement.
The CA denied the petition and affirmed the assailed decision and resolution of the NLRC.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not Bautista abandoned her employment or whether she was illegally dismissed.

RULING:

Yes.We find it clear from the records that Bautista committed fraud or willful breach of her
employers trust, a just cause for termination of employment under the law. The evidence the cash
voucher for the truck rental transaction proves that Bautista processed the truck rental with intent
to defraud the company; she asked the company for P6,000.00 (as reflected in the voucher) to
cover the truck rental when the actual fee was only P4,500.00. In her Reply, she admitted that
she retained the P1,500.00 difference. She claimed that it was a discount that pertained to her as
she was able to obtain it from the trucking firm. Bautista's allegation that the P1,500.00 was a
discount is not a valid defense; nowhere in the records does it appear that she was authorized to
keep the discount for herself, assuming that it was indeed a discount. She provided sufficient
cause for her dismissal; her involvement in the anomalous truck rental transaction defrauded the
company, and her dishonest act resulted in the breach of her employer’s trust.

The elements of abandonment are present in Bautistas case: (1) the failure to report for work
without valid or justifiable reason and (2) a clear intention on her part to sever the employer-
employee relationship. While as a rule, the immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal
negates abandonment, peculiar circumstances can arise when the immediate filing of an illegal
dismissal complaint does not disprove.

The labor arbiter awarded Bautista overtime pay for every workday of her employment with the
petitioners.We find no basis for the overtime pay award. The records do not support Bautistas
incredible claim that she worked everyday until midnight during her entire employment with the
petitioners. In the face of the petitioners defense that overtime pay can be claimed only if an
employee has a pre-approved overtime schedule and daily time record, the labor arbiter should
have asked for the production of daily time records and proof that she had been allowed or
required to render overtime work in the manner and to the extent she sweepingly claimed. For
lack of credible evidence supporting the award, the labor arbiter gravely abused his discretion in
the grant he made. A claim for overtime pay, it must be stressed, cannot be granted in the absence
of supporting factual and legal basis.
On Bautista's claim for 13 th month , petitioner fails to establish their payment of Bautista's 13 th
month benefits. Bautista is therefore entitled to 13 th month pay for the years 2002 and 2003, and
for proportionate entitlement for the period January 1, 2004 to July 15, 2004.

Regarding Bautistas claim for service incentive leave pay, the petitioners presented evidence
only for the years 2003 and 2004, when Bautista enjoyed leave benefits. For this reason, we
affirm the labor arbiters award to Bautista of the monetized equivalent of her service incentive
leaves for 2002.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated June 15, 2005 of Labor Arbiter Aliman
D. Mangandog is hereby MODIFIED. Accordingly, we DISMISS the complaint for illegal
dismissal in light of the proven valid cause for dismissal. However, petitioner Intertranz
Container Lines, Inc. is directed to pay respondent Ma. Teresa I. Bautista 13 th month pay for
2002 and 2003 and for the period January 1, 2004 to July 15, 2004 and the monetary equivalent
of her service incentive leave for 2002, as well as nominal damages in the amount of P20,000.00.
The NLRC is ordered to recompute Bautista's total monetary award in accordance with this
Decision.

Other issue:
On April 18, 2006, the NLRC issued an Order directing the petitioners to replace, within ten (10)
days, the appeal bond they posted on July 11, 2005, on the ground that the accreditation of the
bondsman the Summit Guaranty and Insurance Company, Inc. expired on July 31, 2005 and had
not been renewed. On May 8, 2006, the petitioners filed, instead of the required bond, a Motion
for Reconsideration with Motion for Suspension/Extension, asking for a period of one month to
replace the bond.The CA found that the NLRC correctly dismissed the petitioners appeal for
non-perfection.The CA noted that the bond that the petitioners posted on July 11, 2005 was valid
only until July 31, 2005, the expiry date of the accreditation of the surety firm that issued the
bond. The CA further noted that the petitioners posted a new bond on June 1, 2006, beyond the
10-day period mandated by the NLRC.

RULING OF THE SC:

Jurisprudence tells us that in labor cases, an appeal from a decision involving a monetary award
may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond. The Court, however, has
relaxed this requirement under certain exceptional circumstances in order to resolve
controversies on their merits. These circumstances include: (1) fundamental consideration of
substantial justice; (2) prevention of miscarriage of justice or of unjust enrichment; and (3)
special circumstances of the case combined with its legal merits, and the amount and the issue
involve .Following jurisprudential standards, we find that a relaxation of the rules on the appeal
bond requirement in this case is in order. It is clear from the records that the petitioners never
intended to evade the posting of an appeal bond.
 PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, AVELINO MICABALO and PROSPERO ENRIQUEZ,
respondents.

FACTS:
-Private respondent Avelino Micabalo was hired on March 16, 1979 as ticket freight clerk while private respondent Prospero
Enriquez was hired as load control clerk on August 11, 1975 by petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL). They were
assigned at the Davao Station of PAL. The two were union officials. Micabalo was a member of the board of directors of
the Philippine Airlines Employees Association (PALEA) from October 1986 to February 1990 while Enriquez served as its
chief steward.
-Petitioner conducted an audit check of its Davao Station, where it discovered that some employees at its ticketing office
procured for themselves the money paid by the passengers for their tickets and then charged the same to their or their co-
employees' credit cards.
-On June 2, 1989, Micabalo was investigated by a committee for using his credit card to pay for four (4) plane tickets of
various passengers. On June 18, 1989, he was administratively charged for fraud under Section 2, Article VIII and for
falsification of company documents under Section 3, Article VIII of petitioner's Code of Discipline. The committee found
him to have charged to his VISA credit card the payment for some plane tickets in spite of the cash allegedly falsified the
entries in the flight coupon to conceal the irregularity.
-Micabalo was placed under preventive suspension pending his administrative investigation. On June 30, 1989, he filed his
answer to the charges against him saying, he issued the tickets subject of the charge upon the request of a close friend and
the passengers themselves [proposed] that the supposed payment of the said tickets be charged to his Visa Card due to the
non-availability of their funds. On the contrary, it was for the company to generate funds. Without him charging the amount
of the tickets to his Visa Card, the passengers would not have pursued their Flight as they had no money during that time to
purchase the tickets within the ticketing limits. The move of the undersigned was merely to render public service by having
a considerate heart.
-On July 5, 1989, a second administrative charges was filed against Micabalo for similar irregularities committed on
different occasions.
-On August 4, 1989, Micabalo submitted his written explanation. He denied his participation in the sale of the tickets and
alleged that he has liquidated the amounts due from him on the foregoing transactions.
-On August 16, 1989, a third administrative charge was filed against Micabalo.
-On October 7, 1989, an answer was filed by Micabalo reiterating the defenses in his original answer and on November 27,
1989, he was served with a notice of dismissal.
-On the other hand, private respondent Enriquez was investigated on June 28, 1989 for ticket anomalies in his station. On
July 9, 1989, he was placed under preventive suspension by the company as formal charges were made against him for
violation of Section 2, Article VIII and Section 5, Article VIII of the Code of Discipline.
-On August 3, 1989, Enriquez executed his Counter Affidavit and explained that it was a case of pure accommodation for
a friend wherein the latter intended to borrow from him certain amount of money to buy plane ticket. But since he had no
cash at that time as he was also economically depressed, he resorted to the use of the credit card of his co-employees.
According to him, that while it might be true there was some sort of falsification, the same was done in good faith with no
intention at all to cause damage to anybody.
-On August 16, 1989, a second administrative charge was filed against Enriquez for anomalous activities on ticket refunds
and he was dismissed on November 18, 1989.
-In addition to private respondents, petitioner PAL actually charged and dismissed five (5) other employees for the same
irregularities.
-In their Position Paper, Micabalo and Enriquez claimed that they were dismissed due to their union activities. Micabalo
alleged that the charges against him were brought about by his membership in the PALEA Board of Directors and the
January 21, 1989 PALEA strike which he led. In addition, he averred that Mr. James Hannen, then PAL Director for
Mindanao, harbored a grudge against him for the grievance suits he filed which were later on amicably settled.
-Lastly, he stressed that there was no prohibition against employees using their credit cards. Enriquez similarly asserted that
the charges against him were due to his union activities as Chief Steward of PALEA and his active participation in the
PALEA strike. He alleged that after the strike, Mr. Hannen personally monitored their movements. Petitioner PAL, on the
other hand, maintained that private respondents were dismissed for just and valid causes pursuant to its Code of Discipline.
-Labor Arbiter Antonio M. Villanueva ruled that private respondents were illegally dismissed. According to him, Although
herein-respondents alleged that herein-complainants were dismissed for just cause, i.e., the latter were found guilty of
Falsification of Company documents and Violation of Procedures, facts of the case will show that there was really an intent
on the part of herein-respondents to terminate the services of herein- complainants. Further stating, It is highly suspicious
that herein-respondents would file a series of administrative charges only against those who instituted grievance suits against
them and those who actively participated in the aforementioned strike if not for an ulterior motive.
Hence, ordered their reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and awarded one year backwages plus 10% of the total
monetary award as attorney's fees. On appeal, public respondent NLRC affirmed in toto the Labor Arbiter's decision and
denied PAL's motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: whether or not public respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of or
want of jurisdiction when it affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision that private respondents were illegally dismissed.

HELD:
-Firstly, the court do not agree with the finding that the charges against private respondents were the off-shoot of several
grievance suits filed by them against PAL and their active participation in the January 21, 1989 PALEA strike. To support
this finding, public respondent cited Micabalo's opposition to the alleged iniquitous promotion system followed by Mr.
Hannen under their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). According to the court, these circumstances do not constitute
substantial evidence to support the conclusion that private respondents were illegally dismissed due to their union activities.
Petitioner PAL, on the other hand, presented concrete evidence of repeated wrong doings by private respondents. The
different entries in the box for the mode of payment for the tickets purchased found in the audit coupon and the flight coupon
clearly showed the falsifications committed by private respondents. Also, it was only after these irregularities were
discovered and only after proper investigation were the private respondents dismissed from service. Without these
irregularities, private respondents were not charged by petitioner. -Second, the court cannot upheld the finding of the NLRC
that petitioner filed charges only against those who instituted grievance suits. As stressed by the Solicitor General, petitioner
indiscriminately conducts company-wide audit on all its ticket sales involving any or all personnel, and those found to have
committed infractions were correspondingly charged for their misdeeds. Thus it is clear that respondents have not presented
any proof that employees who committed similar infractions were dissimilarly treated. Hence, private respondents have not
shown that they have been selectively prosecuted by the petitioner for their union activities.
-Thirdly, the court cannot sustain public respondent's held that petitioner failed to prove the damage it sustained. The court
ruled that petitioner has claimed and the claim has not been disputed that the use of credit cards when passengers are willing
to pay in cash deprived the company of the immediate use of cash payments. Petitioner also had to pay for service fees when
credit cards are used, thus resulting in income diminution.
-Hence, as correctly observed by the Solicitor General, public respondent NLRC and the Labor Arbiter committed grave
abuse of discretion when they gave more credence to the illogical suppositions and inferences proffered by private
respondents and disregarded the established evidence that they committed falsification and diverted the cash payments made
by the passengers through the use of credit cards for their personal gain and satisfaction.
-Undoubtedly, the offenses committed by the private respondents involve fraud and falsification. These are serious offenses
and private respondents cannot be heard to complain that they were unaware that dismissal awaits any employee who
transgresses petitioner's rules fraud and falsification.
WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY PHILIPPINES v.NOWELLA REYES G.R. No. 208321, July 30,
2014, Velasco, Jr., J.
FACTS: With the services of an External Auditor, WUP was discovered that there were irregularities
in the handling of petitioner’s finances, mainly, the encashment by its Treasury Department of
checks issued to WUP personnel, a practice purportedly in violation of the imprest system of
cash management, and the encashment of various crossed checks payable to the University
Treasurer by Chinabank despite management’s intention to merely have the funds covered
thereby transferred from one of petitioner’s bank accounts to another.

On June 18, 2009, respondent submitted her Explanation. WUP’s Human Resources
Development Office conducted an investigation. Finding respondent’s Explanation
unsatisfactory, the HRDO, on July 2, 2009, submitted an Investigation Report to the University
President containing its findings and recommending respondent’s dismissal as University
Treasurer. For her acts constituted to loss of trust due to the following: (1) encashing a check
payable to the University Treasurer in the amount 300K; (2) encashing crossed checks payable to
the University Treasurer, when the intention of management in this regard was to merely transfer
funds from one of petitioner’s accounts to another in the same bank; and (3) spurious duplicate
checks bearing her signature were encashed causing damage to petitioner.

Upon receipt of her notice of termination on July 9, 2009, respondent post-haste filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal with the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission. She contended that her dismissal was illegal, void and unjust.

Petitioner, for its part, predicated its defense on the contention that respondent was a highly
confidential employee who handled significant amounts of money as University Treasurer and
that the irregularities attributed to her in the performance of her duties justify her dismissal on
the basis of loss of trust and confidence.

Labor Arbiter ruled in her favor. However, this was reversed by NLRC. On appeal, CA
reinstated the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE: Whether there was a valid dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence
RULING: YES. Petitioner adequately proved respondent’s dismissal was for a just cause, based
on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts as required by jurisprudence.
The question of whether she was a managerial or rank-and file employee does not matter in this
case because not only is there basis for believing that she breached the trust of her employer, her
involvement in the irregularities attending to petitioner’s finances has also been proved. A
company has the right to dismiss its employees if only as a measure of self-protection. This is
truer in the case of supervisors or personnel occupying positions of responsibility. Respondent
was not an ordinary rank-and-file employee as she was the Treasurer who was in charge of the
coffers of the University. It would be oppressive to require petitioner to retain in their
management an officer who has admitted to knowingly and intentionally committing acts which
jeopardized its finances and who was untrustworthy in the handling and custody of University
funds.
33. Esguerra v. Valle Verde Country Club, Inc., G.R. No. 173012, [June 13, 2012]

Facts:

Valle Verde hired Esguerra as Head Food Check and in 1999 she was promoted to Cost Control
Supervisor. She was assigned to oversee a seminar held in two function rooms “Ballroom” and “Tanay
Room”. Valle Verde management found out the only the proceed from the Tanay Room was remitted to
the accounting department whie there were unauthorized charges of food on the account of one of the
participants. Hence, Valle Verde conducted an investigation summoning all employees assigned in the
function rooms to explain in writing what transpired.

The management required Esguerra to explain and she was placed under sa preventive suspension with
pay, in her response she denied to misappropriate funds and explained that her daughter was assigned as
a food checker and lost the money and that she paid the unaccounted amount when she was informed by
her daughter. With regard to the charges on one of its participant, Esguerra stated that the guest simply
took pity on her and told her to take some food home and charge it to his account.

Esguerra was then terminated, and she filed an illegal dismissal complaint.

LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit but ordered Valle Verde to pay Esguerra 13 th month pay,
rice subsidy and 10% attorneys fee.

NLRC modified the decision of LA, awarding P143,000 to Esguerra, the amount was the sum of one
half month pay for every year of service.

CA affirmed her dismissal stating that she was dismissed for loss of trust and confidence.

Issue:

Whether or not Esguerra was illegally dismissed

Ruling:

No.

There was a valid notice and hearing, that she was informed of the charges against her and was clearly
directed to show cause, in writing, why no disciplinary action should be imposed against her. The
existence of an actual, formal “trial-type” hearing is not absolutely necessary to satisfy the employee’s
right to be heard. She was able to present her defense and only after proper consideration that she was
terminated. Valle Verde complied with the two-notice requirement.

In Perez v PTTC the court provided that guiding principles in connection with the hearing requirement
in dismissal cases:

a) "ample opportunity to be heard" means any meaningful opportunity (verbal or

written) given to the employee to answer the charges against him and submit
evidence in support of his defense, whether in a hearing, conference or some other
fair, just and reasonable way.
 b) a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory only when requested by the
employee in writing or substantial evidentiary disputes exist or a company rule or
practice requires it, or when similar circumstances justify it.

c) the "ample opportunity to be heard" standard in the Labor Code prevails over the
"hearing or conference" requirement in the implementing rules and regulations.

Esguerra, who held the position of Cost Control Supervisor had the duty to remit the cash sales proceeds
from every transaction she was assigned to. She occupies a position of trust and confidence and any
breach of the trust imposed upon her can be a valid cause for dismissal.

In Jardine Davies v NLRC the court held that loss of confidence can be invoke as just cause when the
employee holds a position of responsibility, trust and confidence. That in order for it to constitute a just
cause, the act complaint must be related to the performance of the duties of the dismissed employee,

There was no merit on the allegation that it was Esguerra’s daughter that should be held liable, since she
was only a food checker and Esguerra should have promptly reported that problem. Her failure to make
the proper report reflects on her irresponsibility in the custody of case for which she was accountable.
 34. Marina Port Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission
G.R. No. 80962. January 28, 1991 , Cruz, J.

Facts:
Philippine Ports Authority canceled its arrastre management contract with Metro Port
Services, Inc. and directly assumed the cargo handling operations in the South Harbor of Manila.

Two days later, it awarded a permit to Marina Port Services(Marina) to undertake arrastre
services in the same port, subject inter alia to the following stipulation embodied in Paragraph 7
of the terms and conditions of the said permit:
Labor and personnel of previous operator, except those positions of trust and confidence, shall be
absorbed by grantee. Labor or employees benefits provided for under existing CBA shall
likewise be honored.

Marina retained the bulk of the 2,700-man personnel of Metro but refused to continue the
employment of 65 of the 123 persons constituting the security force. The guards excluded were
served with notices of separation, thus, they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

Marina maintains that they had no right to be re-hired because they were occupying
positions of trust and confidence as members of the security force and so came under the
exception in Paragraph 7.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Security guard falls within the positions of trust and confidence.
2. Whether or not dismissal was valid.

Ruling:
1. No. security guard must also be considered as enjoying the trust and confidence of his
employer, whose property he is safeguarding. Like the janitor, he has access to this property. He
too, is charged with its care and protection.
May
Notably, however, and like the janitor again, he is entrusted only with the physical task of
protecting that property. The employer's trust and confidence in him is limited to that ministerial
function. He is not entrusted, in the Labor Arbiter's words, "with the duties of safekeeping and
safeguarding company policies, management instructions, and company secrets such as operation
devices." He is not privy to these confidential matters, which are shared only in the higher
echelons of management. It is the persons on such levels who, because they discharge these
sensitive duties, may be considered holding positions of trust and confidence. The security guard
does not belong in such category.

2. No. Dismissal on the ground of lost of confidence must be established in proper

proceedings before an employee can be lawfully dismissed.
 In this case, the record shows that the procedure required was not followed by the
petitioner when it dismissed the private respondents. There was no hearing conducted as required
by the rules, only an alleged background investigation that supposedly linked them to pilferages
in the pier. No charges were formally preferred against the private respondents nor where they
given a chance to defend themselves. They were simply and arbitrarily separated and served
notices of termination in disregard of their rights to due process and security of tenure.

Loss of confidence constitutes a just cause for terminating an employer-employee

relationship. But for dismissal for loss of confidence to be warranted, there should naturally be
some basis for it. Unsupported by sufficient proof, loss of confidence is without basis and may
not be successfully invoked as a ground for dismissal. Loss of confidence as a ground for
dismissal has never been intended to afford an occasion for abuse by the employer of its
prerogative, as it can easily be subject to abuse because of its subjective nature.

The burden of proof rests upon the employer that the dismissal is for cause, and the
failure of the employer to do so would mean that the dismissal is not justified.

PETITION DENIED
CAÑETE, JR. VS NLRC & ROBINSONS LAND Sec. 2.08. Breach by employee of the trust reposed in him by
management or by a company representative.
CORPORATION (RLC)
September 30, 1999
Labor Arbiter:
GR No. 130425
• Ruled in favor Cañete declaring his dismissal illegal, ordering
Bellosillo, J.
payment of his 13th month pay and back wages.
• The act prohibited by the company rules was the “act of
FACTS:
obtaining or accepting money or anything of value by entering
• Petitioner Cañete, Jr. was hired by RLC as Security Officer at
into an authorized agreement”, which Cañete did not do under
the Robinson’s Galleria Mall. RLC’s Shift Security Supervisor
the premises.
Balajadia caught a vendor, Ben Maniago, selling food to tenants
and employees inside the mall, in violation of RLC’s Rules and
NLRC: (On appeal of RLC)
regulations.
• Cañete’s dismissal was justified since he was tasked with the
• During interrogation, Ben Maniago claimed that he had the
enforcement of company rules and policies inside the mall and
permission of Cañete, Jr.. Ben Maniago stated that he was
having been proved to be remiss in his duty by his allowing
allowed to do so on the condition that he would give Cañete free
Maniego’s illicit activities, RLC had every reason to lose their
daily meals but later on modified his statement, saying that
trust and confidence in him.
Cañete would pay him during paydays.
• Cañete admitted ordering food from Ben Maniago but denied
ISSUE:
that he received the same for free. Ben Maniago had previously
• WON NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding
been apprehended but was released after he explained that the
that he was validly dismissed despite the failure of RLC to prove
food was intended for the mall’s low-wage sales personnel.
just cause
• Cañete pointed out that there were also other vendors at the
offices of RLC and their being prevalent, made him believe that
Petitioner’s Contention:
it was allowed.
• Under Sec. 2.04, he argues that the extension of credit to him
• RLC issued a memorandum terminating his services on the
can hardly be equated with “anything of value” as the rule
ground of loss of confidence and declaring that security is a
intends to deter employees from receiving “kickbacks” in terms
position of trust and confidence.
of money or anything of value from suppliers, clients, or
• Hence, Cañete filed a complaint before the NLRC for illegal
outsiders and doesn’t apply to vendors.
dismissal and other money claims. RLC answered that Cañete
• NLRC also gravely abused its discretion when it declared that he
violated Sec. 2.04 and 2.08 of the Employee Discipline Policies
was validly dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and
and Guidelines.
Sec. 2.04. Obtaining of accepting money or anything of value by confidence saying that his position of a security officer is not
entering into an arrangement(s) with suppliers, clients or other one of trust and confidence.
outsiders.
HELD:
• NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that
Cañete’s dismissal was justified. Sec. 2.04 was correctly
interpreted by the NLRC to encompass the extension of credit to
petitioner by Ben inasmuch as the latter could not have sold him
food on credit if he didn’t allow Ben to sell food to other
employees inside the mall.
• The extension of credit was the consideration for Ben Maniago’s
entry into the mall premises without being bothered by the mall
security. To limit the meaning of “anything of value” to
“kickbacks” alone would be to jeopardize company interests as
RLC clearly intended to prohibit its employees from receiving
money or any other consideration by entering into any and all
arrangements. Further, it would be a myopic interpretation of
said rule if vendors were to be excluded from the prohibition
since Sec. 2.04 clearly states “other outsiders.”
• On the issue of loss of trust and confidence, NO, Cañete was
not just a mere security guard but one of those seven in-house
security and safety officers of RLC and, as such, occupied a
position of trust and confidence. He was also assigned on cases
subject for investigations, thus, he will be acting as Security
Investigator on all crimes against persons or properties
committed therein. Hence, RLC had clearly placed reliance on
petitioner’s abilities.
• Therefore, the dismissal of Cañete, Jr. is with just cause.
Santos v. Shin Hung Plastics Co. Inc., G.R. No. 172306, September 29,2008

FACTS:

Santos was employed by Respondent as Administrative Assistant having responsibility of

purchasing equipment and supplies of the corporation. It was alleged that he purchased
silkscreen and paint thinner from JPN, Inc., only acknowledgment receipts, instead of official
receipts, were received and recorded by the corporations accounting department and that he
obtained a P5,000 commission from the transaction with Roos. As a result, the respondent
terminated him. He filed for illegal dismissal. Santos averred that he was dismissed due to job-
related jealousy, which was further bolstered and aggravated upon by Mr. Oscar Deiparines
connivance with the Respondents; that he purchased the silkscreen and thinner during times of
urgent need when no official receipts could be issued.

Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Santos which was reversed by NLRC which found petitioners
dismissal for just cause but that due process requirements were not complied with. Court of
Appeals affirmed NLRC.

ISSUE: WON petitioner was dismissed for just cause

HELD:

YES. Petitioner was dismissed by reason of loss of trust and confidence.

Loss of confidence should ideally apply only to cases involving employees
occupying positions of trust and confidence or to those situations where the
employee is routinely charged with the care and custody of the employers money
or property. To the first class belong managerial employees, i.e., those vested with
the powers or prerogatives to lay down management policies and/or to hire,
transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or
effectively recommend such managerial actions; and [to] the second class belong
cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc., or those who, in the normal and
routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money
or property.

In this case, petitioner’s duties included purchasing supplies and equipment of the
corporation. He thus regularly handled significant amounts of money and property in the normal
and routine exercise of his functions. His position was thus one of trust and confidence, loss of
which is a just cause for dismissal.

Therefore, he was dismissed for just cause.

 FLORDELIZA MARIA REYES-RAYEL,
vs.
PHILIPPINE LUEN THAI HOLDINGS, CORPORATION/L&T INTERNATIONAL
GROUP PHILIPPINES, INC.,
G.R. No. 174893 | July 11, 2012
FIRST DIVISION | DEL CASTILLO, ​J.

Facts
In February 2000, PLTHC hired petitioner as Corporate Human Resources (CHR) Director for
Manufacturing for its subsidiary/affiliate company, L&T. In the employment contract, petitioner
was tasked to perform functions in relation to administration, recruitment, benefits,
audit/compliance, policy development/ structure, project plan, and such other works as may be
assigned by her immediate superior, Frank Sauceda (Sauceda), PLTHC’s Corporate Director for
Human Resources.

On September 6 2001, Petitioner received a Notice from the Corporate Legal Counsel,
Ma.Lorelie Edles, which informs her that due the her various failure in the performance and
observance of various management directives, the company has lost its trust and confidence in
her as an employee. The Petitioners worst infraction was her undermining statements about the
company’s Human Resource Information System (HRIS) or HR2 Program. This was taken by
the Respondent as a flagrant inability to incite collaboration and harmony within the Corporate
Human Resources Division.

In Petitioner’s response, she alleged that her failure to observe such management directives was
due to the malfunctioning email system - assailing that she failed to receive such directives. She
further denied causing disharmony in her division. Petitioner emphasized that in June 2001, she
received a relatively good rating of 80.2% in her overall performance appraisal.

LA : Illegally dismissed
NLRC: Dismissal is legal
CA : Validly dismissed due to loss of trust and confidence

Issue/s
Whether or not the Petitioner is validly dismissed

Held
Yes,, the Petitioner is validly dismissed.
Mere existence of a basis for believing that a managerial employee has breached the trust of the
employer justifies dismissal. "[L]oss of confidence as a ground for dismissal does not require
proof beyond reasonable doubt as the law requires only that there be at least some basis to justify
it."

The Petitioner was directly responsible for managing her own departmental staff. It is therefore
without question that the CHR Director for Manufacturing is a managerial position saddled with
great responsibility. Because of this, petitioner must enjoy the full trust and confidence of her
superiors. Not only that, she ought to know that she is "bound by more exacting work ethics".
Respondents also impute upon petitioner gross negligence and incompetence which are likewise
justifiable grounds for dismissal. The burden of proving that the termination was for a valid
cause lies on the employer. Here, respondents were able to overcome this burden as the evidence
presented clearly support the validity of petitioner’s dismissal.
1. records show that petitioner indeed unreasonably failed to effectively communicate with
her immediate superior. This is evident from the various emails showing that she failed to
update Sauceda on the progress of her important assignments on several occasions.
2. the affidavits of petitioner’s co-workers revealed her negative attitude and unprofessional
behavior towards them and the company. Agnes Suzette Pasustento, L&T’s Manager for
the Corporate Communications Department, attested to petitioner’s "badmouthing" of
Sauceda (petitioner’s superior) in one of their meetings abroad and of discussing with her
about filing a labor case against the company. There were also testimonies of her bad
temper and petitioner was described as irrational and condescending.
3. Petitioner’s also displayed inefficiency and ineptitude in her job as a CHR Director. In
the affidavit of Ornida B. Calma, Chief Accountant of L&T’s affiliate company,
petitioner, on two occasions, gave wrong information regarding issues on leave and
holiday pay which generated confusion among employees in the computation of salaries
and wages.

Petitioner was also accorded due process. The Prerequisite Notice is free from any ambiguity.
The said notice properly advised petitioner to explain through a written response her failure to
perform in accordance with management directives, which deficiency resulted in the company’s
loss of confidence in her capability to promote its interest.

It has been held in a plethora of cases that due process requirement is met when there is simply
an opportunity to be heard and to explain one’s side even if no hearing is conducted. In the case
of ​Perez v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company,​this Court pronounced that an
employee may be afforded ample opportunity to be heard by means of any method, verbal or
written, whether in a hearing, conference or some other fair, just and reasonable way.
G.R. No. 165960 February 8, 2007
JEFFREY O. TORREDA, Petitioner, vs. TOSHIBA INFORMATION EQUIPMENT (PHILS.),
INC., and GERARDO C. CRISTOBAL, JR., Respondents.

FACTS:
Torreda was employed at Toshiba as finance accountant under the Finance and Accounting Department
headed by Kobayashi, Vice-President and Sepulveda, Finance Manager.

From September 1-3, 1998, Sepulveda received some complaints from separated employees and from
incumbent employees on maternity and other benefits

In order to retrieve the claimants’ payroll and SSS files, which Torreda kept in his drawer, Sepulveda,
with prior approval from Kobayashi, had the drawer forcibly opened by a staff member of the General
Administration Section. The drawer was opened in the presence of Oscar Eusebio, Noralyn Florencio
and Flor Berdin of the Finance Department

On Sept. 7, 1998 Sepulveda requested Torreda to submit his key for duplication to prevent similar
incidents. Torreda refused. Sepulveda sent a formal request through e-mail directing him to turn over his
drawer key to the General Administrator of the company for the duplication and to explain in writing
why he refused to surrender his key.

Torreda replied through e-mail accusing Sepulveda of robbery. Torreda furnished copies of this e-mail
to several employees.

On the same day, Sepulveda sent to the HRD a complaint/request for investigation via e-mail regarding
Torreda’s accusation and his abusive and rude behavior.

The staff of the General Administration (GA) Section conducted an investigation of the complaint
against Sepulveda and submitted his report declaring that there was no factual basis for Torreda’s
robbery charge against Sepulveda.

The GA recommended that Torreda be dismissed conformably with its findings that he committed grave
slander under the company’s Employee Handbook.

Subsequently, Torreda received a letter from Gerardo Cristobal, Jr. informing him that his employment
had been terminated effective at the end of official working hours on that day, for grave slander, which
under the Employee Handbook is punishable by dismissal.

LA: Torreda’s dismissal from employment was unjustified.

NLRC: Reversed the decision of LA.
CA: Affirmed the ruling of NLRC in dismissing petitioner’s complaint. However, the appellate court
found that petitioner committed grave slander when he concocted the charge of theft against Sepulveda,
the penalty for which, under the Employee’s Handbook, is dismissal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s dismissal is valid.

RULING:
Yes. Torreda’s dismissal is valid.

We hold that the CA correctly affirmed the NLRC Resolution ordering the Labor Arbiter to dismiss
petitioner’s complaint. However, the appellate court erred in ruling that petitioner committed grave
slander against Sepulveda and in applying the Employee’s Handbook as basis for his dismissal.

The false attribution by the petitioner of robbery (theft) against Sepulveda was made in writing; patently
then, petitioner committed libel, not grave slander against Sepulveda.

There is abundant evidence on record showing that petitioner committed libel against his immediate
superior, Sepulveda, an act constituting serious misconduct which warrants the dismissal from
employment.

Petitioner maliciously and publicly imputed on Sepulveda the crime of robbery of ₱200.00. He knew
that it was not Sepulveda who opened his drawer. Thus, by his own admission, petitioner was well
aware that the robbery charge against Sepulveda was a concoction, a mere fabrication with the sole
purpose of retaliating against Sepulveda’s previous acts.

The records show that Sepulveda was impelled to forcibly open petitioner’s drawer. She needed to
retrieve the benefits applications of retirees and incumbent employees of respondent-corporation, which
petitioner had failed to process for payment before his leave. Before opening petitioner’s drawer,
Sepulveda saw to it that she had Kobayashi’s approval. Delos Santos opened the drawer of petitioner in
the presence of his co-employees in the Financial Section. Thereafter, the claims were processed and
payments were effected. Thus, Sepulveda acted in good faith.

The employer’s right to conduct the affairs of his business, according to its own discretion and
judgment, is well-recognized. An employer has a free reign and enjoys wide latitude of discretion to
regulate all aspects of employment, including the prerogative to instill discipline in its employees and to
impose penalties, including dismissal, upon erring employees. This is a management prerogative, where
the free will of management to conduct its own affairs to achieve its purpose takes form. The law, in
protecting the rights of workers, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the appellate court in
CA-G.R. SP No. 76289 is AFFIRMED.
 ARMANDO C. YRASEUGUI vs PHILIPPINE AIRLINES INC.
G.R. No. 168081. October 17, 2008. REYES R.Y.

FACTS:
This case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was
dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline
company. The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to
166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew
Administration Manual of PAL. In 1984, the weight problem started, which prompted
PAL to send him to an extended vacation until November 1985. He was allowed to
return to work once he lost all the excess weight. But the problem recurred. He again
went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to February 1989. Despite the lapse
of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner remained
overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain
grounded until such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight standards.
Again, he was directed to report every two weeks for weight checks, which he failed to
comply with.

On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report
for weight check would be dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of weight
check dates, which he did not report to.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative
Charge for violation of company standards on weight requirements. Petitioner insists
that he is being discriminated as those similarly situated were not treated the same.
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability
to attain his ideal weight, “and considering the utmost leniency” extended to him “which
spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5) years,” his services were considered
terminated “effective immediately.”

LABOR ARBITER: held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the
nature of the job of petitioner. However, the weight standards need not be complied with
under pain of dismissal since his weight did not hamper the performance of his duties.

NLRC affirmed.

CA: the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed
because he repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight standards. It is obvious that
the issue of discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for purposes of escaping the
result of his dismissal for being overweight.

ISSUE/s:
Whether or not he was validly dismissed.
Ruling:
YES, A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than
that they constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job.
The dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code.

In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioner’s claims that
obesity is a disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly
shows that it is possible for him to lose weight given the proper attitude, determination,
and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory hearing on December 8, 1992,
petitioner himself claimed that “[t]he issue is could I bring my weight down to ideal
weight which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it now.”

Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of the
company physician, per the advice of PAL.

In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as
flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code
that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is
nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it, “[v]oluntariness basically means that
the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any external force
influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs through all just causes under
Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and
habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the
element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).”

NOTES:
The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification
defense. Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular
sex, religion, or national origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or
national origin is an actual qualification for performing the job. The qualification is called
a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). In short, the test of reasonableness of
the company policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid “provided it
reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance.”

The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely
transport its passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its
employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on board the aircraft.
The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms of discipline
upon its employees.

The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew is
flight safety. Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as
an act of social justice or based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for
serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral character.