NAME: Romana Hyde

COURSE AND SECTION: PHIL 103-09

DATE: 10-14-17

Executive Summary

David Hume’s theory that passion, instead of reason, determines the morality of action is

convincing. While reason is a useful tool in determining inherent truths about the world, it has

limitations when it comes to emotion. Because emotion is the motivating factor in action and

cannot be analyzed effectively with reason, it follows that emotions determine an action’s

morality. The logical fallacy of using reason to reach an emotional conclusion is demonstrated in

Hume’s law of not deriving an ‘ought’ from and ‘is’. A moral judgement cannot be reached

without a value premise based on emotion. This law is convincing based on the functionality of

reason, applications in fields such as modern evolutionary psychology, and the lack of valid

counter arguments. All evidence given together demonstrates the persuasiveness of the theory.

Essay

1. In this essay, I will attempt to show David Hume’s theory, that passion is the basis

for morality, is convincing based on the limitations of reason and the logical fallacy of

deriving moral judgements from reason alone. First, I illustrate the limitations of reason laid

forth by Hume and how these limitations preclude reason from determining the moral value of

action. Then I will evaluate the concept of no ‘is’ derived from an ‘ought’ proposed by Hume.

This is accomplished by first explaining the theory as given by Hume, then further explaining the

theory by using a modern application in evolutionary psychology. Finally, I will show that the

arguments against Hume’s law are unconvincing, as they have implied emotional values and so

fail to provide scenarios in which moral judgements are derived from facts alone. All of the

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evidence given, and the lack of satisfactory counter-arguments, creates a convincing argument in

favor of the theory laid forth in the first sections of David Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature.

2. In section I of the Treatise on Human Nature, David Hume contends that passion,

not reason, is what determines an actions morality. Reason is the simply a discovery of the truth

concerning ideas that are real and inherent in the world around us. People are not motivated by

facts and reason alone. Rather, people are motivated to act by the emotions that result from these

truths. According to Hume, reason cannot have any bearing on passions because emotions are, “.

. . original facts and realities, complete in themselves, and implying no reference to other

passions, volitions, and actions.” (Hume 216). There is no inherent truth in someone’s passion.

Given that passion is responsible for an action, reason cannot evaluate the morality of said

actions. The assertion that action does not exist free from passion is compelling. Practically,

humans live with reason indivisible from emotion. While we can attempt to make unbiased

decisions free from passion, it is certainly true that emotion is integral to human beings and

cannot be separated from our actions and decisions.

3. To further support the claim that moral action is derived from passion, Hume

famously asserts what is known as ‘Hume’s Law’ (Cohon). This theory states that moral

judgments cannot be made from factual observations, or ‘is’ statements alone. In other words,

facts can tell you the specifics of a circumstance, but a value premise derived from emotion is

necessary to make a moral judgement. To illustrate, if there was a plane crash, facts could tell us

what kind of plane it was, its destination, the number of people who died in the crash, and so on.

These are all ‘is’ statements. It requires an emotional response, the value premise that life is

precious and it is a tragedy when it ends suddenly, to reach the conclusion that the plane ought

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not to have crashed and those people ought not to have died. To state the theory simply, an

‘ought’ cannot be derived from an ‘is.’

4. The concept that moral ideals are not derived from factual evidence is often

applied by evolutionary psychologists when discussing their finding’s significance. Certain

findings in the field suggest a biological basis for behaviors that should not be considered

morally good. Researchers often remind those considering the findings that “The way something

is, isn’t necessarily the way it should be,” (Jackson). An effective example of this is that there

has likely been selective advantage for rape in the evolutionary history of humans. While this is

true, it is not evidence that rape is acceptable. A selective advantage for genes that control the

tendency to commit rape does not excuse or justify the action. It is faulty logic to state rape is

‘good’ in a moral sense because it may have once increased reproductive fitness (Sven). Facts

and reason can explain a vast amount of the world we live in, yet there are limitations. Hume’s

law demonstrates that facts alone cannot tell us the value of discoveries or the moral worth of an

action.

5. Many have attempted to disprove Hume’s Law by formulating situations in which

an ‘ought’ is derived from a set of factual ‘is’ statements. Famously, American philosopher John

Searle laid out the following counter example, paraphrased; Jones promises to pay Smith five

dollars, Jones is now under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars, Jones ought to pay Smith five

dollars (Solomon et al. 226). While this example does make the jump from ‘is’ to ‘ought’, it is

still subject to the logical fallacy described in Hume’s Law. Stating that Jones in under an

obligation does not imply that he ought to follow through with his promise, unless you apply the

value statement that it is deplorable to break obligations. Therefore, Searle’s example and those

like it are unconvincing because they have implied value statements. In a way, these counter

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examples are further evidence for the claim that no moral values can be derived from facts alone.

These examples, which supposedly disprove Hume’s Law, require implied value premises to be

valid. Consequently, the lack of validity in these arguments further exemplifies the theory’s

gravity.

6. Given these points, Hume’s theory concerning the emotional basis of morality and

action is highly convincing. Reason is an incredible tool that humans possess, however its

limitations are great. Facts only inform people on inherent truths in our universe. Given these

limitations, it is clear that something apart from reason must be responsible for how we value

facts. Instead of reason, passion seems to be what forms motivation for action; consequently,

passion is what allows us to apply value to truth. Hume’s law is an application of this theory that

shows the logical fallacy in attempting to create value from reason alone. It is hard to imagine a

scenario in which the law does not apply. In fact, those that attempt to disprove the law fall

victim to implied value statements that invalidate their arguments. Furthermore, the law was

adopted by evolutionary psychologists in response to similar logical fallacies that can be applied

to their research. All of this evidence taken together shows a convincing picture of Hume’s

theory. Reason is separate from morality. Emotion is what gives value to our actions and our

world.

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Literature Consulted

Cohon, Rachel. "Hume's Moral Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall
2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Web. 10 Oct. 2017.
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/hume-moral/>.

Hume, David. “A Treatise of Human Nature. Section I-II.” Morality and the Good Life: An
Introduction to Ethics through the Classical Sources. 5th ed. Eds. Robert C. Solomon,
Clancy W. Martin, and Wayne Vaught. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2009. 115-120. Print.

Jackson, Russell. “Lecture of Evolutionary Psychology – ISEM 101- Origin of the Mind.”
University of Idaho, Moscow, ID. Spring. 2017. Class Lecture.

Solomon, Robert C., Clancy W. Martin, and Wayne Vaught. “Commentary on Hume." Morality
and the Good Life: An Introduction to Ethics through the Classical Sources. 5th ed. Eds.
Robert C. Solomon, Clancy W. Martin, and Wayne Vaught. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2009.
225-227. Print.

Sven, Walter. “Evolutionary Psychology”, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, James Fieser

and Bradley Dowden (ed.). Web. 13 Oct. 2017. <http://www.iep.utm.edu/evol-
psy/#SH4b>