TRANSPORTATION LAW (HOJILLA)
G.R. No. L-1600; June 1, 1906 The spirit of our code is accurately set forth in a treatise on maritime law, from which we deem
THE PHILIPPINE SHIPPING COMPANY, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants vs.
FRANCISCO GARCIA VERGARA, defendant-appellee
ARELLANO, C.J.:
FACTS:
The Philippine Shipping Company, the owner of the steamship Nuestra Sra. de Lourdes, claims
an indemnification of P44,000 for the loss of the said ship as a result of a collision. Ynchusti &
Co. also claimed P24,705.64 as an indemnification for the loss of the cargo of hemp
and copra carried by the said ship on her last trip. Francisco Garcia Vergara was the owner of
the steamship Navarra, which collided with the Lourdes.
The court found that the steamship Lourdes was sailing in accordance with law, but that
the Navarra was not, and was therefore responsible for the collision. The court also found as a
fact that "both ships with their respective cargoes were entirely lost." Construing article 837 of
the Code Commerce, the court below held "that the defendant was not responsible to the
plaintiff for the value of the steamship Lourdes."
But the Philippine Shipping Company contends that Vergara should pay P18,000, the value of
the Navarra at the time of its loss; and that it was immaterial whether the Navarra had been
entirely lost, provided her value at the time she was lost could be ascertained, since the extent
of the liability of the owner of the colliding vessel for the damages resulting from the collision
is to be determined in accordance with such value.
ISSUE:
Whether Vergara should pay P18,000, the value of Navarra at the time of its loss. NO
HELD:
NO. Article 837 of the Code Commerce provides: "The civil liability contracted by the
shipowners in the cases prescribed in this section shall be understood as limited to the value of
the vessel with all her equipment and all the freight money earned during the voyage." This
section is a necessary consequence of the right to abandon the vessel given to the shipowner
in article 587 of the code.
There is no doubt that if the Navarra had not been entirely lost, the agent, having held liable
for the negligence of the captain of the vessel, could have abandoned her with all her
equipment and the freight money earned during the voyage, thus bringing himself within the
provisions of the article 837 in so far as the subsidiary civil liability is concerned.
This is the difference which exists between the lawful acts and lawful obligation of the captain
and the liability which he incurs on account of any unlawful act committed by him. In the first
case, the lawful acts and obligations of the captain beneficial to the vessel may be enforced as
against the agent for the reason that such obligations arise from the contract of agency, while
as to any liability incurred by the captain through his unlawful acts, the ship agent is simply
subsidiarily civilly liable. This liability of the agent is limited to the vessel and it does not extend
further.
1
proper to quote the following as the basis of this decision:
That which distinguishes the maritime from the civil law and even from the mercantile law in
general is the real and hypothecary nature of the former, and the many securities of a real
nature that maritime customs from time immemorial, the laws, the codes, and the later
jurisprudence, have provided for the protection of the various and conflicting interest which
are ventured and risked in maritime expeditions, such as the interests of the vessel and of the
agent, those of the owners of the cargo and consignees, those who salvage the ship, those who
make loans upon the cargo, those of the sailors and members of the crew as to their wages,
and those of a constructor as to repairs made to the vessel.
As evidence of this "real" nature of the maritime law we have (1) the limitation of the liability
of the agents to the actual value of the vessel and the freight money, and (2) the right to retain
the cargo and the embargo and detention of the vessel even cases where the ordinary civil law
would not allow more than a personal action against the debtor or person liable. It will be
observed that these rights are correlative, and naturally so, because if the agent can exempt
himself from liability by abandoning the vessel and freight money, thus avoiding the possibility
of risking his whole fortune in the business, it is also just that his maritime creditor may for any
reason attach the vessel itself to secure his claim without waiting for a settlement of his rights
by a final judgment, even to the prejudice of a third person.
Vergara is liable for the indemnification to which The Philippine Shipping Company is entitled
by reason of the collision, but he is not required to pay such indemnification of the reason that
the obligation thus incurred has been extinguished on account of the loss of the thing bound
for the payment. CFI affirmed except in so far as it requires Vergara to pay the costs of this
action, which is not exactly proper.
G.R. No. L-47447-47449; October 29, 1941
TEODORO R. YANGCO, petitioner vs. MANUEL LASERNA, respondents
MORAN, J.:
FACTS:
At about 1pm of May 26, 1927, the steamer S.S. Negros, belonging to Teodoro R. Yangco left
the port of Romblon on its return trip to Manila. Typhoon signal No. 2 was then up, of which
fact the captain was duly advised and his attention thereto called by the passengers
themselves before the vessel set sail. The boat was overloaded as indicated by the loadline
which was 6 to 7 inches below the surface of the water. Baggage, trunks and other equipment
were heaped on the upper deck, the hold being packed to capacity. In addition, the vessel
carried thirty sacks of crushed marble and about one hundred sacks of copra and some lumber.
The passengers, numbering about 180, were overcrowded, the vessel's capacity being limited
to only 123 passengers. After two hours of sailing, the boat encountered strong winds and
rough seas between the islands of Banton and Simara, and as the waves splashed the ladies'
dresses, the awnings were lowered. As the sea became increasingly violent, the captain
ordered the vessel to turn left, evidently to return to port, but in the maneuver, the vessel was
caught sidewise by a big wave which caused it to capsize and sink. Many of the passengers died
in the mishap.
TRANSPORTATION LAW (HOJILLA)
The respondents instituted in CFI Capiz separate civil actions against Yangco to recover G.R. No. L-51165; June 21, 1990
damages for the death of the passengers. The court awarded the heirs of sums of money. After HEIRS OF AMPARO DE LOS SANTOS, et al., petitioners vs. CA and COMPANIA
the rendition of the judgment, Yangco, by a verified pleading, sought to abandon the vessel, MARITIMA, respondents
without prejudice to his right to appeal. The abandonment having been denied, an appeal was
MEDIALDEA. J.:
taken to the CA, wherein all the judgments were affirmed. Yangco, now deceased, appealed
FACTS:
and is here represented by his legal representative.
This is a complaint originally filed in 1968 by the heirs of Delos Santos and others as pauper
litigants against the Compania Maritima, for damages due to the death of several passengers
ISSUE:
as a result of the sinking of the latter’s vessel, the M/V 'Mindoro', on November 4, 1967.
May the shipowner or agent, notwithstanding the total loss of the vessel as a result of the
negligence of its captain, be properly held liable in damages for the consequent death of its
M/V 'Mindoro' sailed from pier 8 North Harbor, Manila at about 6:00pm (should have been
passengers? NO
2:00 p.m.) bound for New Washington, Aklan, with many passengers aboard. It appears that
said vessel met typhoon 'Welming' on the Sibuyan Sea, Aklan, at about 5:00am, causing the
HELD:
death of many of its passengers, although about 136 survived. Mauricio delos Santos lost his
NO. Article 587 of the Code of Commerce reads: “The agent shall also be civilly liable for the
common-law wife, Amparo delos Santos, and 6 children as they all drowned and died.
indemnities in favor of third persons which arise from the conduct of the captain in the care of
the goods which the vessel carried; but he may exempt himself therefrom by abandoning the
It appears that in a decision of the Board of Marine Inquiry, it was found that the captain and
vessel with all her equipment and the freight he may have earned during the voyage.”
some officers of the crew were negligent in operating the vessel and imposed upon them a
suspension and/or revocation of their license certificates. It appears, however, that this
The provisions accords a shipowner or agent the right of abandonment; and by necessary
decision cannot be executed against the captain who perished with the vessel.
implication, his liability is confined to that which he is entitled as of right to abandon — "the
vessel with all her equipment and the freight it may have earned during the voyage." It is true
Compania Maritima alleges that no negligence was ever established and, in fact, the
that the article appears to deal only with the limited liability of shipowners or agents for
shipowners and their officers took all the necessary precautions in operating the vessel.
damages arising from the misconduct of the captain in the care of the goods which the vessel
Furthermore, the loss of lives as a result of the drowning of some passengers was due to force
carries, but this is a mere deficiency of language and in no way indicates the true extent of such
majeure because of the strong typhoon 'Welming.' It appears also that there was a note of
liability. The consensus of authorities is to the effect that notwithstanding the language of the
marine protest in connection with the sinking of the vessel as substantiated by affidavits.
provision, the benefit of limited liability applies in all cases wherein the shipowner or agent
may properly be held liable for the negligent or illicit acts of the captain.
The trial court sustained Compania Maritima. CA affirmed and ruled that Maritima cannot be
held liable in damages based on the principle of limited liability of the shipowner or ship agent
This provision has cleared the doubt which existed as to the extent of the liability, both of the
under Article 587 of the Code of Commerce. Hence, the appeal.
agent and of the owner of the vessel. Such liability is limited by the proposed code to the value
of the vessel and other things appertaining thereto. The policy which the rule is designed to
ISSUE:
promote is the encouragement of shipbuilding and investment in maritime commerce. So that
Whether Maritima is negligent, thus Art. 587 is not applicable. YES
it is evident that, by this law, the owner's liability was coextensive with his interest in the vessel
and its freight, and ceased by his abandonment and surrender of these to the parties sustaining
HELD:
loss.
YES. There is no dispute as to the finding of the captain's negligence in the mishap. Art. 587 of
the Code of Commerce provides: “The ship agent shall also be civilly liable for indemnities in
If the shipowner or agent may in any way be held civilly liable at all for injury to or death of
favor of third persons which may arise from the conduct of the captain in the care of the goods
passengers arising from the negligence of the captain in cases of collisions or shipwrecks, his
which he loaded on the vessel, but he may exempt himself therefrom by abandoning the vessel
liability is merely co-extensive with his interest in the vessel such that a total loss thereof
with all her equipment and the freight it may have earned during the voyage.”
results in its extinction. The ship was a common carrier. But assuming that Yangco is liable for a
breach of contract of carriage, the exclusively "real and hypothecary nature" of maritime law
Under this provision, a shipowner or agent has the right of abandonment; and by necessary
operates to limit such liability to the value of the vessel, or to the insurance thereon, if any. In
implication, his liability is confined to that which he is entitled as of right to abandon-"the
the instant case it does not appear that the vessel was insured. Whether the abandonment of
vessel with all her equipment and the freight it may have earned during the voyage".
the vessel was in accordance with law of not, is immaterial. The vessel having totally perished,
Notwithstanding the passage of the New Civil Code, Article 587 of the Code of Commerce is still
any act of abandonment would be an idle ceremony. Judgment REVERSED and Yangco is
good law. The reason lies in the peculiar nature of maritime law which is exclusively real and
absolved of all the complaints.
hypothecary that operates to limit such liability to the value of the vessel, or to the insurance
thereon, if any.
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TRANSPORTATION LAW (HOJILLA)
Contrary to the petitioners' supposition, the limited liability doctrine applies not only to the
goods but also in all cases like death or injury to passengers wherein the shipowner or agent
may properly be held liable for the negligent or illicit acts of the captain. It must be stressed at
this point that Article 587 speaks only of situations where the fault or negligence is committed
solely by the captain. In cases where the shipowner is likewise to be blamed, Article 587 does
not apply. Such a situation will be covered by the provisions of the New Civil Code on Common
Carriers.
There were imprints of Maritima's negligence calling for the reversal of the conclusion of the
CA. Maritima claims that it did not have any information about typhoon 'Welming' until after
the boat was already at sea. Modern technology belies such contention. In allowing the ship to
depart late from Manila despite the typhoon advisories, Maritima displayed lack of foresight
and minimum concern for the safety of its passengers taking into account the surrounding
circumstances of the case.
While the captain was negligent for overloading the ship, Maritima shares equally in his
negligence. The ship's departure was delayed for four hours. It was due to this interim that the
CA noted that "indeed there is a great probability that unmanifested cargo (such as dump
truck, 3 toyota cars, steel bars, and 6,000 beer cases) and passengers (about 241 more than the
authorized 193 passengers) were loaded during the 4-hour interval".
The foregoing clearly demonstrates that Maritima's lack of extraordinary diligence coupled
with the negligence of the captain were the proximate causes of the sinking of M/V Mindoro.
Hence, Maritima is liable for the deaths and injury of the victims. This case has been pending
for 23 years. Appealed decision REVERSED.
G.R. No. L-29166; October 22, 1928
AUGUSTO LOPEZ, plaintiff-appellant vs. JUAN DURUELO, et
al., defendants. ALBINO JISON, appellee
STREET, J.:
FACTS:
Augusto Lopez instituted this action in CFI Occidental Negros for the purpose of recovering
damages for personal injuries inflicted upon him by reason of the negligence of Juan Duruelo
and Albino Jison.
On February 10, 1927, Lopez, a resident of Silay, was desirous of embarking upon the
interisland steamer San Jacinto in order to go to Iloilo. This boat was at the time in the
anchoring-ground of the port of Silay, some half a mile distant from the port. Lopez therefore
embarked at the landing in the motor boat Jison, which was then engaged in conveying
passengers and luggage back and forth from the landing to boats at anchor, and which was
owned and operated by Albino Jison, with Juan Duruelo as patron. The engineer (maquinista)
aboard on this trip was one Rodolin Duruelo, a boy of only 16 years of age, on the third day of
his apprenticeship. Aboard were fourteen passengers, while its capacity was only for eight or
nine. As the motor boat approached the San Jacinto in a perfectly quiet sea, it came too near to
the stern of the ship, and as the propeller of the ship had not yet ceased to turn, the blades of
the propeller struck the motor boat and sank it at once. As the Jison sank, Lopez was thrown
3
into the water against the propeller, and the revolving blades inflicted various injuries upon
him, he was hospitalized for approximately eight months.
ISSUE:
Whether protest under Art. 835 is necessary for cause of action to arise in this case. NO
HELD:
NO. It is accordingly insisted that, under article 835 of the Code of Commerce, Lopez has shown
no cause of action. Assuming that the article relied upon states a condition precedent to the
maintenance of an action in case where protest is required and that the making of protest
must be alleged in the complaint in order to show a good cause of action, protest was not
necessary in the case.
The article in question is found in the section dealing with collisions, and the context shows the
collisions intended are collisions of sea-going vessels. Said article cannot be applied to small
boats engaged in river and bay traffic. Vessels which are licensed to engage in maritime
commerce, or commerce by sea, whether in foreign or coastwise trade, are no doubt regulated
by Book III of the Code of Commerce. Other vessels of a minor nature not engaged in maritime
commerce, such as river boats and those carrying passengers from ship to shore, must be
governed, as to their liability to passengers, by the provisions of the Civil Code or other
appropriate special provisions of law.
Jison was propelled by a second-hand motor, originally used for a tractor plow; and it had a
capacity for only eight persons. The use to which it was being put was the carrying of
passengers and luggage between the landing at Silay and ships in the harbor. This was not such
a boat as is contemplated in article 835 of the Code of Commerce, requiring protest in case of
collision.
It is therefore clear that a passenger on a boat like the Jison, in the case, is not required to
make protest as a condition precedent to his right of action for the injury suffered by him in
the collision described in the complaint. In other words, article 835 of the Code of Commerce
does not apply. But even if said provision had been considered applicable to the case in hand,
an individual who has suffered a compound fracture of the femur and received other physical
injuries sufficient to keep him in a hospital for many months, cannot be supposed to have in a
condition to make protest within twenty-four hours of such occurrence. It follows that the
demurrer in this case was not well taken and should have been overruled. Judgment appealed
from is reversed.
G.R. No. L-10195; December 29, 1916
YU CON, plaintiff-appellee vs. GLICERIO IPIL, NARCISO LAURON, and JUSTO
SOLAMO, defendants-appellants
ARAULLO, J.:
FACTS:
Yu Con seeks to recover from Glicerio Ipil, Narciso Lauron and Justo Solamo jointly and
severally the sum of P450, which he delivered to Ipil and Solamo, master and supercargo,
respectively, of a banca named Maria belonging to Lauron, to be carried, together with various
merchandise belonging to Yu Con, from the port of Cebu to the town of Catmon. By virtue of a
contract, the money and merchandise were to be transported by the said craft in consideration
TRANSPORTATION LAW (HOJILLA)
of the payment of a certain sum for each voyage. The money disappeared from said craft
during the night of October 18, 1911, while it was anchored in the port of Cebu and ready to
sail for its destination, Catmon, and was not afterwards found. Yu Con based his action on the
charge that the disappearance of said sum was due to the abandonment, negligence, or
voluntary breach of the duty in safe-keeping the sum.
Ipil, et al. pleaded in special defense that Yu Con, at his own expense and under his exclusive
responsibility, chartered the said banca for the fixed period of three days, at the price of P10
per diem, and that the misfortune, negligence, or abandonment of Yu Con himself caused the
theft committed by unknown thieves.
The trial court held in favor of Yu Con, pursuant to articles 589, 587, and 618 of the Code of
Commerce, the latter therefore being entitled to recover the amount lost. Motion for new trial
denied. Hence, the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether Lauron, as shipowner, should be held liable with Ipil and Solamo. YES
HELD:
YES, applying articles 586, 587, and 618 of the Code of Commerce in favor of Yu Con. Evidence
shows that Yu Con, a merchant and a resident of the town of San Nicolas, engaged in the sale
of cloth and domestic articles, had several times chartered the banca named Maria for the
transportation of certain merchandise and some money. While the money was still in a trunk
abroad the vessel, Ipil and Solamo transferred the P450 to their trunk, which was in a
stateroom of the banca, from which both the trunk and the money disappeared.
It was likewise proven by the affidavits the day following the commission of the theft that they
knew of the existence of the money in the trunk inside the stateroom and witnessed its
removal to said trunk from Yu Con’s and that no person not belonging to the vessel knew that
the money was in the trunk inside said stateroom. They claimed robbery since a small window
was broken. They were tired asleep and did not notice. It is therefore beyond all doubt that the
loss or disappearance of the P450 occurred through the manifest fault and negligence of Ipil et
al. for not only did they fail to take the necessary precautions but also they did not expressly
station some person inside the stateroom for the guarding and safe-keeping of the trunk. Their
sleeping was not an excuse and they should have heard the noise. Under such circumstances,
Ipil and Solamo were the depositaries of the money.
It is well and good that the shipowner be not held criminally liable for such crimes or quasi
crimes committed by the captain; but he cannot be excused from liability for the damage and
harm which, in consequence of those acts, may be suffered by the third parties who contracted
with the captain, in his double capacity of agent and subordinate of the shipowner himself. In
maritime commerce, the shippers and passengers in making contracts with the captain do so
through the confidence they have in the shipowner who appointed him. On the other hand, if
the shipowner derives profits from the results of the choice of the captain and the crew, when
the choice turns out successful, it is also just that he should suffer the consequences of an
unsuccessful appointment.
4
The Code of Commerce in force omits the declaration of non-liability contained in the old code,
and clearly makes the shipowner liable civilly for the loss suffered by those who contracted
with the captain, in consequence of the misdemeanors and crimes committed by the latter or
by the members of the crew. It is therefore evident that, in accordance with the provisions of
the Code of Commerce in force, Lauron, as the proprietor and owner of the craft should, for
said loss or theft, be held civilly liable to Yu Con. Therefore, the trial court did not err in so
holding in the judgment appealed from.
G.R. No. 115286; August 11, 1994
INTER-ORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES, INC., SEA HORSE SHIP, INC. and
TRENDA WORLD SHIPPING (MANILA), INC., petitioners vs. NLRC and
RIZALINO D. TAYONG, respondents
FELICIANO, J.:
FACTS:
Captain Rizalino Tayong, a licensed Master Mariner with experience in commanding ocean-
going vessels, was employed in by Trenda World Shipping (Manila), Inc. and Sea Horse Ship
Management, Inc. through Inter-Orient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. as Master of the vessel M/V
Oceanic Mindoro, for a period of 1 year, as evidenced by an employment contract.
Captain Tayong assumed command of the vessel at the port of Hongkong. His instructions were
to replenish bunker and diesel fuel, to sail forthwith to Richard Bay, South Africa, and there to
load 120,000 metric tons of coal. While at the Port of Hongkong and in the process of
unloading cargo, Captain Tayong received weather report that a storm code-named "Gordon"
would shortly hit Hongkong. Precautionary measures were taken to secure the safety of the
vessel, as well as its crew, considering that the vessel's turbo-charger was leaking and the
vessel was 14 years old.
Captain Tayong followed-up the requisition by the former captain of the Oceanic Mindoro for
supplies of oxygen and acetylene, necessary for the welding-repair of the turbo-charger and
the economizer. The vessel sailed from Hong Kong for Singapore. In the Master's sailing
message, Captain Tayong reported a water leak and that the vessel had stopped in mid-ocean
for 6hrs and 45mins due to a leaking economizer.
Captain Tayong called the shipowner, Sea Horse, and informed them that the departure of the
vessel for South Africa may be affected because of the delay in the delivery of the supplies. Sea
Horse advised Captain Tayong to contact its Technical Director, Mr. Clark, who responded that
by shutting off the water to the turbo chargers and using the auxiliary boiler, there should be
no further problems. The requisitioned supplies were delivered and Captain Tayong
immediately sailed for Richard Bay. Upon arrival, Captain Tayong was instructed to turn-over
his post to the new captain. He was thereafter repatriated to the Philippines, after serving for a
little more than two weeks. He was not informed of the charges against him.
Captain Tayong instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal before the POEA. Petitioners denied
and alleged that he had refused to sail immediately to South Africa to their prejudice and
damage as the vessel was placed "off-hire" by the charterers for 12 hours. They stated that
they had dismissed him for loss of trust and confidence. The POEA dismissed Captain Tayong's
complaint. On appeal, NLRC reversed and set aside the decision of the POEA. Hence, the
appeal.
TRANSPORTATION LAW (HOJILLA)
ISSUE:
Whether Captain Tayog’s dismissal is with cause. NO
HELD:
NO. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that confidential and managerial employees cannot be
arbitrarily dismissed at any time, and without cause as reasonably established in an
appropriate investigation. Such employees, too, are entitled to security of tenure, fair
standards of employment and the protection of labor laws. The captain of a vessel is a
confidential and managerial employee within the meaning of the above doctrine. A master or
captain, for purposes of maritime commerce, is one who has command of a vessel. A captain
commonly performs three (3) distinct roles: (1) he is a general agent of the shipowner; (2) he is
also commander and technical director of the vessel; and (3) he is a representative of the
country under whose flag he navigates. Of these roles, by far the most important is
commanding the vessel; for such role has to do with the operation and preservation of the
vessel during its voyage and the protection of the passengers (if any) and crew and cargo.
It is plain from the records that Captain Tayong was denied any opportunity to defend himself.
Petitioners curtly dismissed him from his command and summarily ordered his repatriation to
the Philippines without informing him of the charge or charges levelled against him, and much
less giving him a chance to refute any such charge.
More importantly, a ship's captain must be accorded a reasonable measure of discretionary
authority to decide what the safety of the ship and of its crew and cargo specifically requires
on a stipulated ocean voyage. The captain is held responsible, and properly so, for such safety.
It is the right and duty of the captain, in the exercise of sound discretion and in good faith, to
do all things with respect to the vessel and its equipment and conduct of the voyage which are
reasonably necessary for the protection and preservation of the interests under his charge. It is
a basic principle of admiralty law that in navigating a merchantman, the master must be left
free to exercise his own best judgment.
The Court and the NLRC are unable to hold that Captain Tayong's decision to wait 7 hours in
Singapore constituted merely arbitrary, capricious or grossly insubordinate behavior on his
part. The conclusion of the NLRC is not a grave abuse of discretion amounting to an excess or
loss of jurisdiction. Petition DISMISSED.
G.R. No. L-46340; April 28, 1983
SWEET LINES, INC., petitioner vs. CA, MICAELA B. QUINTOS, FR. JOSE
BACATAN, S.J., MARCIANO CABRAS and ANDREA VELOSO, respondents
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
FACTS:
For having by-passed a port of call without previous notice, Sweet Lines, Inc. and the ship
captain were sued for damages by four of its passengers in CFI Cebu. Quintos et al. purchased
first-class tickets. They were to board M/V Sweet Grace, bound for Catbalogan, Western
Samar. Instead of departing at the scheduled hour of about midnight on July 8, 1972, the vessel
set sail at 3am the next day only to be towed back to Cebu due to engine trouble, arriving there
at 4pm on the same day. Repairs having been accomplished, the vessel lifted anchor again at
8am the next day. Instead of docking at Catbalogan, which was the first port of call, the vessel
proceeded direct to Tacloban at around 9pm. They had no recourse but to disembark and
5
board a ferryboat to Catbalogan. Hence, this suit for damages for breach of contract of carriage
which the CFI and CA affirmed.
The governing provisions are found in the Code of Commerce, such as ART. 614: "A captain
who, having agreed to make a voyage, fails to fulfill his undertaking, without being prevented
by fortuitous event or force majeure, shall indemnify all the losses which his failure may cause,
without prejudice to criminal penalties which may be proper” and ART. 698: “In case of
interruption of a voyage already begun, the passengers shall only be obliged to pay the fare in
proportion to the distance covered, without right to recover damages if the interruption is due
to fortuitous event or force majeure, but with a right to indemnity, if the interruption should
have been caused by the captain exclusively. If the interruption should be caused by the
disability of the vessel, and the passenger should agree to wait for her repairs, he may not be
required to pay any increased fare of passage, but his living expenses during the delay shall be
for his own account”
ISSUE:
Whether there was a fortuitous event to relieve Sweet Lines from liability. NO
HELD:
NO. As found by both Courts below, there was no fortuitous event or force majeure which
prevented the vessel from fulfilling its undertaking of taking Quintos et al. to Catbalogan. In the
first place, mechanical defects in the carrier are not considered a caso fortuito that exempts
the carrier from responsibility. In the second place, even granting arguendo that the engine
failure was a fortuitous event, it accounted only for the delay in departure. When the vessel
finally left the port of Cebu, there was no longer any force majeure that justified by-passing a
port of call.
The reason for by-passing the port of Catbalogan, as admitted by Sweet Lines’ General
Manager, was to enable the vessel to catch up with its schedule for the next week. The record
also discloses that there were 50 passengers for Tacloban compared to 20 passengers for
Catbalogan, so that the Catbalogan phase could be scrapped without too much loss for the
company.
Sweet Lines, not complying with conditions, did not cancel the ticket nor did it refund the value
of the tickets. Besides, it was not the vessel's sailing schedule that was involved. The complaint
is directed not at the delayed departure the next day but at the by-passing of Catbalogan, their
destination. Had petitioner notified them previously, and offered to bring them to their
destination at its expense, or refunded the value of the tickets purchased, perhaps, this
controversy would not have arisen. Furthermore, the conditions cannot prevail over Articles
614 and 698 of the Code of Commerce.
The voyage to Catbalogan was "interrupted" by the captain upon instruction of management.
The "interruption" was not due to fortuitous event or for majeure nor to disability of the
vessel. Having been caused by the captain upon instruction of management, the passengers'
right to indemnity is evident. The owner of a vessel and the ship agent shall be civilly liable for
the acts of the captain. That finding of bad faith is binding. Judgment modified as to lowering
moral damages.