The Bolívarian Blues: the Dialectic of Degeneration

Christian Cail

Political Science 453: The Politics of Economic Crisis

Dr. Cameron Ballard-Rosa

May 1, 2019
The crisis are crises

The Bolívarian Republic of Venezuela is in a deep, long, and attritional political

economic crisis, whose causes and effects have global origins and implications. The primary

economic crisis, which now constitutes the forefront of the Venezuelan meltdown, is sustained

hyperinflation. However, hyperinflation is one of many ongoing problems, some of which

(government corruption and dependency on imports) date as far back as 1922, when the largest

proven oil reserves on earth were discovered in Venezuela. The balance of state wealth with

large social redistributive programs and interstitial popular mobility begins with the election of

Hugo Chávez in 1998. Chávez’ cozy relationship with the military, rhetoric about socialism and

US imperialism, foreign exchange rate (forex) controls, and contradictory Bonapartist-populist

charisma (none of which are a priori wrong) have had lasting effects, which, under the current

president Nicolás Maduro, tend toward existential disaster and overwhelming contradiction.

Hugo Chávez’s leadership was always contended by and at siege from the United States who

supported the failed military coup of 2002, the oil strike in 2002-2003 (gobbling up $20 billion)1,

and have funded the Venezuelan opposition to the tune of tens of millions of dollars for decades

now.23 Sanctions and embargoes have only further punished Venezuela for daring to chart an

alternative path to the neoliberal consensus in America’s ‘backyard’.4 Some aspects of the crisis

are even more recent than the Chávez years, exploding with the plummet of oil prices and

election of Nicolás Maduro in 2014: deindustrialization, hyperinflation, increased corruption,

1
Toledo, Yuleidys Hernandez. "The 2002 Oil Lockout: 10 Years Later." Venezuelaanalysis.com. December 7, 2012.
https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/7527.
2
Golinger, Eva. "US: $20 Million for the Venezuelan Opposition in 2012." Venezuelaanalysis.com. August 12, 2011.
https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/6418.
3
"US Has Budgeted $49M for Venezuelan Right-Wing Since 2009." News | TeleSUR English. May 17, 2017.
https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/US-Has-Budgeted-49M-for-Venezuelan-Right-Wing-Since-2009-20170517-0018.html.
4
Weisbrot, Mark, and Jeffrey Sachs. Economic Sanctions as Collective Punishment: The Case of Venezuela. Report. Center for
Economic and Policy Research. April 2019. http://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/venezuela-sanctions-2019-
04.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1DxifneIeSHYiMwPbPLfwSW-xhHB7zMq4s_TWAWqLQZdYSCZvgw7Vstoc.
government folly and denialism, desperate shortages of basic goods, expansion of black market

activity, and a pitiable withering of grassroots democracy. I will touch on all of these things, as

each affects the others, compounding into larger framework of instability and crisis. The primary

emergency at the moment, as stated, is hyperinflation, but it’s cause and maintenance is not

singular. There is a constellation of factors - domestic and international, naive and pernicious,

unavoidable and preventable - all of which affect the others in a larger dialectical web of

degeneration. At the risk of being redundant, an all too easy result of covering a bunch of

interconnected things, I intend to cover each of these issues with some independence and

uncover their relationships.

Immiseration

Almost every article one can find on Venezuela from the last few years rattles off the

total immiseration of the people living there. This often serves a certain “I told you so” function

from US outlets never favorable toward Chavismo.5 Past the Schadenfreude, however, the

statistics are staggering and deserve great consideration. Additionally, the specific ways in which

the quality of life of average Venezuelans has plummeted, tells us a lot about the larger

structures at play, their potential solutions, and the government’s ineptitude. Venezuela has

topped Bloomberg’s “Misery Index” every year since 2015, the year after the massive oil price

drop.6 Hyperinflation is met with high unemployment (a nasty coupling). It’s difficult to get a

job and work, but when one can, one is paid in a currency which immediately begins to lose its

value. This results in dollarization: Venezuelans strive to use stable foreign currencies (primarily

the dollar) as opposed to the inflating and depreciating bolívar. One of the weirdest examples of

5
Weisbrot, Mark. "Venezuela: Response to Trolls | The Americas Blog." CEPR. August 23, 2018. http://cepr.net/blogs/the-
americas-blog/venezuela-response-to-trolls.
6
Hanke, Steve. "Hanke's Annual Misery Index 2018: The World's Saddest (And Happiest) Countries." Forbes. March 28, 2019.
Accessed April 28, 2019. https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevehanke/2019/03/28/hankes-annual-misery-index-2018-the-worlds-
saddest-and-happiest-countries/#3db2267a3bce.
this are the Venezuelans who play video games in order to trade virtual achievements for hard

dollars.7

Though during the Chávez years extreme poverty was slashed by 70%8 and imports were

cheap and plentiful, by 2017, 31 million people fell short of proper food intake and 10 million

people skipped at least one meal a day just to feed their children9, and the average citizen lost 24

pounds10. Crime, prostitution, and murder rates continue to soar in a country already well armed.

The statistics like this go on, each year getting worse than the last. The result is the total

withering away of all the progress made under Chávez’s misiones which brought healthcare,

literacy, housing, and dignity to so many Venezuelans in the last two decades. One of the worst

and most recent results of the crisis is a migration boom comparable to Syria. Over 3 million

people have fled since 2014, around 10% of the population.11 There is no dearth of statistics such

as these; my goal, however, is not simply to moralize, as many articles surmise, but to dig deeper

into the multifaceted crisis which has brought such misery despite the earlier achievements,

goals, and popular mobility of the Bolívarian Revolution.

7
Rosati, Andrew. "Desperate Venezuelans Turn to Video Games to Survive." Bloomberg.com. December 5, 2017. Accessed April
28, 2019. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-05/desperate-venezuelans-turn-to-video-games-to-survive.
8
"Poverty Reduction in Venezuela." ReVista. Fall 2018. Accessed April 28, 2019. https://revista.drclas.harvard.edu/book/poverty-
reduction-venezuela.
9
Graham-Harrison, Emma. "Hunger Eats Away at Venezuela's Soul as Its People Struggle to Survive." The Guardian. August 26,
2017. Accessed April 28, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/26/Nicolás-maduro-donald-trump-venezuela-hunger.
10
Sequera, Vivian. "Venezuelans Report Big Weight Losses in 2017 as Hunger Hits." Reuters. February 21, 2018. Accessed April
28, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-food/venezuelans-report-big-weight-losses-in-2017-as-hunger-hits-
idUSKCN1G52HA.
11
Goldberg, Mark Leon. "Venezuela Is a Refugee Crisis." UN Dispatch. February 12, 2019. Accessed April 28, 2019.
https://www.undispatch.com/venezuela-is-a-refugee-crisis/.
Oil

“Ten years from now, 20 years from now, you will see - oil will bring us ruin. (It is) the devil’s excrement.”

-former Venezuelan Oil Minister and OPEC co-founder Juan Pablo Perez Alfonzo in 1973 12

“We stand before the collapse of a model of accumulation that was based on the

perception of increasing international surplus value. This process allowed consumption and

investment levels far greater than what the factors of domestic production could generate.” This

quote, from economist and former high-ranking Chávez government official, Victor Alvarez,

sums up part of the situation in Venezuela quite well: dependency on oil extraction and imports,

leading to contradiction and collapse. The quote is from 1989.13

In order to understand the ongoing crisis one must begin with the fundamental

commodity at the base of Venezuela’s economy for the last hundred years: oil. As has commonly

been pointed out, oil is a curse and blessing for nations in which it is abundant. In this,

Venezuela is no exception, as Alejandro Velasco points out:

In the 1950s a military dictatorship spent lavishly amidst an oil boom before a liberal democratic

regime replaced it ahead of an oil bust in the 1960s, leaving the budding government to fend with

accumulated debts and rising poverty. Then in the 1970s, the Mideast oil embargo shot prices to historic

highs, and Venezuela embarked on a spending and debt spree even more spectacular than the one before,

raising quality of life and making Venezuela the envy of the region. But when oil prices collapsed in the

early 1980s, two decades of rising inequality, political turmoil, and social unrest followed before

Venezuelans in 1999 elected as President Hugo Chávez, a former military officer who promised to make

government responsive to the needs of those left out of the oil pie. And he did, when crude prices again

rose sharply in the early 2000s, implementing massive public spending and social programs he later

12
Useem, Jerry. "'The Devil's Excrement'." Fortune Magazine, February 3, 2003.
http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2003/02/03/336434/index.htm.
13
Cañizález, Andrés. "Venezuela and Its Rentier Model: The Unfortunate Persistence of Relevance." Global Americans.
September 29, 2016. Accessed April 28, 2019. https://theglobalamericans.org/2016/09/venezuela-rentier-model-unfortunate-
persistence-relevance/.
 dubbed “socialism of the 21st century.” And as before, when oil prices plummeted in 2014, so did the

gains of the boom years.14

Venezuela’s oil, being of the largest proven reserves on earth, is not merely a domestic

matter, but has international demand and demands international investment. The annual year

change in oil prices from 2013 to 2014 dropped 45.55%; hovering around $100 per barrel to

under $50. The next year brought a drop of 30.70%; the year low for 2016 was a paltry $26.21.

Oil prices are now roughly where they were in 2005, but the damage has been done and the

production levels necessary are stunted.15

The management (or mismanagement) of oil and its relationship to overall economic

stability is one of the transhistorical factors of the current crisis. However, the devil is in the

details when it comes to exactly how the oscillating global oil prices affect any given petrostate.

For his part, Alejandro Velasco is also quick to point out that simply claiming the petrostate

curse in response to the Venezuelan crisis is not enough, and can obscure other important forces.

The extent to which the dip in oil prices in 2014 affected Venezuela was preventable, according

to Venezuelan economist and former government official Francisco Rodríguez who lays the fault

squarely upon the shoulders of the Chávez government:

Venezuela ended up in a much more vulnerable position than just about any other oil exporting

country when the shock hit. At the end of 2013, despite a prolonged period of buoyant oil markets that

had taken the price of a Venezuelan barrel above $100, Venezuela’s international reserve were only

$22bn, enough to pay for just 5 months of imports. By contrast, Saudi Arabia at the time had

accumulated $725bn in reserves covering 5 years of imports.16

14
Velasco, Alejandro. "Explaining the Venezuelan Crisis." NACLA. October 28, 2016. Accessed April 28, 2019.
https://nacla.org/news/2017/04/28/explaining-venezuelan-crisis.
15
"Crude Oil Prices - 70 Year Historical Chart." MacroTrends. Accessed April 28, 2019. https://www.macrotrends.net/1369/crude-
oil-price-history-chart.
16
"Crude Realities: Understanding Venezuela's Economic Collapse." Venezuelan Politics and Human Rights. September 20, 2018.
Accessed April 28, 2019. https://venezuelablog.org/crude-realities-understanding-venezuelas-economic-collapse/.
 Similarly, Victor Alvarez, has stated that Chávez’s oil model was simply “neo-rentier

socialism”, combined with the even more troubling foreign exchange controls.17 Oil sales are

imminently tied to the ability of the government to import commodities. The historical irony of

this is that the Venezuelan dependency on imports is fueled by its monoculture of oil. The

relationship creates a positive feedback loop: when oil is booming, you buy up imports when you

ought to diversify because imports are cheap (especially with Chávez’ foreign exchange rate);

when oil busts, you have nothing to fall back on, and the inability to pay for imports leads to a

further debt, shortages, and immiseration. The only way out of this is long-term planning, saving,

and caps on spending. Increased deindustrialization and loss of revenues as a result of the crash

has pushed Venezuela to borrow heavily from both China and Russia to maintain what is left of

Chávez’s programs18. China and Russia are now becoming aware that their loans may not return.

The question then comes to this: could have Chávez diversified the economy of Venezuela and

relinquished the oil’s iron grip? Everyone seems to agree that not enough was done and, sadly,

the consequences of the government’s efforts to fix problems so often create further issues. The

Dutch Disease, for its part, helps explains much, but not all, of the crisis today.

Deindustrialization

Deindustrialization, as it pertains to the oil sector, is now a major threat to the well-being

of Venezuela. In a nation where oil makes up 95% of the nation’s exports, any change in the oil

industry will affect the larger economy. Mismanagement, brain drain, lack of proper skill, and

the oil strike of 2002-2003 all did damage to the oil sector and its ability to keep oil rents

profitable enough to maintain redistributive programs and the wages of a growing public sector.

17
"Victor Alvarez: “Venezuela’s Currency Controls Are No Longer Justified, and Are Only Used as a Means of Political
Domination”." Interview by Mario Villegas. Venezuela Analysis, May 5, 2015.
18
Sigalos, MacKenzie. "China and Russia Loaned Billions to Venezuela - and Then the Presidency Went up for Grabs." CNBC.
February 07, 2019. Accessed April 28, 2019. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/07/venezuela-china-and-russia-owed-debts-as-
presidential-fight-rages.html.
Along with later expropriations and nationalizations, the deadliest sins of the international

neoliberal order, Venezuela increasingly raised suspension to investment markets. And to be a

noted adversary of the most powerful capitalist nation on earth does not do much for one’s

ability to garner trust from international capital. When oil prices fell, the ability to finance the

PDVSA and keep it competitive, crumbled.

The debt incurred from better days and inability to pay led to the current near total investment

blackout.19 This type of massive debt assumption is similar to that faced by Iceland in 2008-2011

when a booming economy seemed to offer nothing but potential.20 The US government’s 2017

sanctions issued by Donald Trump, blacklisted Venezuela by cutting them out of US financial

markets. As Mark Weisbrot and Jeffrey Sachs write that:

19
"Debt 2.0: Cadivi and the World's Most Profitable McFiesta." Caracas Chronicles. May 04, 2016. Accessed April 28, 2019.
https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2016/05/04/debt-2-0-cadivi-worlds-profitable-mcfiesta/.
20
Curtis, Amber K., Joseph Jupille, and David Leblang. "Iceland on the Rocks: The Mass Political Economy of Sovereign Debt
Resettlement." International Organization 68, no. 3 (June 9, 2014): 721-40.
 The August 2017 sanctions adversely impacted oil production in Venezuela. But following the

August 2017 executive order, oil production crashed, falling at more than three times the rate of the

previous twenty months. This would be expected from the loss of credit and therefore the ability to

cover maintenance and operations and carry out new investments necessary to maintain production

levels. This acceleration in the rate of decline of oil production would imply a loss of $6 billion in oil

revenue over the ensuing year.21

The Venezuelan government’s response to debt and deindustrialization has been the

expansion of the bolívar causing reckless inflation: instead of patching the hole, the government

is only removing buckets of water one at a time, and the ship is sinking ever the same.

Aside from the oil sector, automobile production has shrunk, “Between 2007 and 2015 …

production has reduced by an impressive 89%; the figure in 2015 is almost as low as the one in

1962, when the auto industry was formally created and 10,000 vehicles were assembled.”22

Hyperinflation only continues to compound the deindustrialization trend: “According to our

calculations, the GDP contraction between 2013 and 2018 may be as high as 45%. No recent

hyperinflation has brought a similar destruction of wealth.” Another effect of this downtown is

fewer jobs, which are met with a contradictory wage depreciation thanks to inflation. Renaud

Lambert, writing in Le Monde Diplomatique, ties domestic production to currency exchange

rates and imports: “Pegging the bolívar to the dollar meant overvaluing it. There was no better

recipe for destroying domestic production. Not only did it become more expensive to produce

locally than to import, but the country rediscovered a particularly lucrative business — over-

invoicing imports.”23 This leads us into our next section on imports and corruption.

21
Weisbrot, Mark, and Jeffrey Sachs. Economic Sanctions as Collective Punishment: The Case of Venezuela. Report. Center for
Economic and Policy Research. April 2019. http://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/venezuela-sanctions-2019-
04.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1DxifneIeSHYiMwPbPLfwSW-xhHB7zMq4s_TWAWqLQZdYSCZvgw7Vstoc.
22
Sutherland, Manuel. "Hyperinflation, Industry, Cash and Salaries in Venezuela." Venezuelaanalysis.com. September 7, 2018.
https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/14037.
23
Lambert, Renaud. "Venezuela's Economic Volcano Erupts." Le Monde Diplomatique. December 01, 2016. Accessed April 28,
2019. https://mondediplo.com/2016/12/05venezuela.
Corruption and Imports

In Venezuela, whoever holds the power over imports holds the consumptive capacity of

the entire population. Venezuela’s dependency on imports began with the discovery of oil and

the abandonment of non-oil exports: “Between 1920 and 1930, the oil sector’s share of GDP rose

to nearly 40%, while agriculture fell from 39% to 12.2%.”24 In good times, when oil prices are

high, it is especially easy to import cheap foreign goods.

There was greater potential for corruption along the import chain and once the foreign

exchange controls were established in 2003. The loophole for corruption was progressively torn

asunder. Here Renaud Lambert describes the process of over-invoicing imports, scamming the

government and the people at large.

It’s a simple transaction. The importer has a network that allows him to buy bottled water at

10 cents a bottle. He asks the state for dollars with which to buy a million bottles, which he declares at

20 cents each, through an offshore company that he has set up for the purpose. He is left with an extra

$100,000. (Temir) Porras said: ‘The profit is often made even before the product reaches the market.

So some importers leave the goods in the warehouse, and only sell what they need to buy more

dollars.’ Between 2002 and 2012, import value increased five-fold, from around $10bn to $50bn,

rising far faster than volume. This highly profitable sector attracted many participants: the

‘bolibourgeois’, whom the government described as socialist bosses, as well as soldiers, senior civil

servants and criminals.25

Former Chávez Planning Minister and anarchist revolutionary Roland Denis sums up the

corruption process in a damning revolutionary screed pointing to bureaucracy, currency controls,

the old private banking sector; the result is a lot of waste and debt.

24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
 Unfortunately in the last three years, the shameless appropriation of oil income by the transnational,

monopoly, and financial sectors, with the consent of this corrupt caste, has brought us to a disastrous

situation. It is a true national embezzlement for which they have used the secret bureaucratic

mechanisms of currency controls, a state financial policy designed to exclusively favor the oligarchic

banking sector, with which they have come to pocket 300 billion dollars via capital flight, internal

debt, etc. It is something bestial and vomit inducing, but at this stage, with industry in shambles, with

hyperinflation accelerating impoverishment, all of this is creating the conditions for the Right and old

bourgeoisie to take power again.26

The waste that the corrupt embezzlement pipeline creates mounts to horrific sums.

According to former Venezuela Central Bank President, Edmée Betancourt, the country lost 20

billion dollars to fraudulent transactions in 2012 alone.27 “One economic consulting firm,

Ecoanalítica, estimated that about $69.5 billion was stolen through import fraud from 2003 to

2012. It said that 20 percent of the importing done by private companies had been bogus, while

40 percent of the imports carried out by government agencies and government-run companies

had been fraudulent.”28

(Voters) could see that the gulf between rich and poor was once again widening. Last

year (2018), Chávez’s ex-minister of finance, Jorge Giordani, published a statement showing that

$500 billion had disappeared from the state’s coffers. The news simply confirmed what most

people already knew: Chavismo had provided massive opportunities for corruption and graft, as

the state bureaucracy diverted state funds into private bank accounts.29

26
"Roland Denis: "Chávez Didn't Dare to Do What He Had to Between 2002 and 2003”." Interview by Salvador López Arnal.
Venezuela Analysis, June 12, 2015.
27
Torres, William Neuman and Patricia. "Venezuela's Economy Suffers as Import Schemes Siphon Billions." The New York Times.
December 21, 2017. Accessed April 28, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/06/world/americas/venezuelas-economy-suffers-
as-import-schemes-siphon-billions.html.
28
Ibid.
29
Gonzalez, Mike. "Being Honest About Venezuela." Jacobin. July 8, 2017. Accessed April 30, 2019.
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/07/venezuela-maduro-helicopter-attack-psuv-extractivism-oil.
 The two central pieces which create the import scheme are the 2003 currency controls

and that Chávez allowed much of the old bourgeoisie to maintain their wealth and connections.

The proximity of corruption to the party and state and the erosion of representation in recent

years makes the fraud harder to combat and identify. This is where many leftists speak of “the

revolution going halfway”, like former London mayor Ken Livingstone, who said in 2017, “One

of the things that Chávez did when he came to power, he didn’t kill all the oligarchs. There was

about 200 families who controlled about 80% of the wealth in Venezuela … I suspect a lot of

them are using their power and control over imports and exports to make it difficult and to

undermine Maduro.”30 What Livingstone may not suspect is how close to Maduro and the ruling

socialist coalition these schemes go. Indeed many multi-millionaires have been made through the

process.

Corruption tows the line between older private elite networks, the new bourgeoisie forged

by Chávez, sneaky government officials and privileges, military impunity, and deficient

contaminated policy. It’s a public and private affair which in the name of revolution has widened

inequality and crushed Venezuela’s former status of a success story.31 When oil prices were high,

there was simply enough wealth to go around.32 Capital could more or less remain unharmed

while oil rents could go to programs financed through subsidies via the exchange controls. All

these elements created instability: the elites remained rich, oil prices changed, and the currency

controls created a path from the state to private banks via corrupt officials and unscrupulous

importers. Much of this is a symptom of Chávez’s legitimate desire to make the revolution

30
Elgot, Jessica. "Ken Livingstone: Venezuela Crisis Due to Chávez's Failure to Kill Oligarchs." The Guardian. August 03, 2017.
Accessed April 28, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/aug/03/ken-livingstone-venezuela-crisis-hugo-Chávez-
oligarchs.
31
Venezuela: Latin America's Inequality Success Story." From Poverty to Power. August 6, 2010. Accessed April 28, 2019.
https://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/venezuela-latin-americas-inequality-success-story/.
32
Grandin, Greg. "LRB · Greg Grandin · Down from the Mountain: What Happened to Venezuela?" London Review of Books. June
28, 2017. Accessed April 30, 2019. https://www.lrb.co.uk/v39/n13/greg-grandin/down-from-the-mountain.
painless for everyone, including the old guard. Even in the height of power, Chávez largely left

banks, telecommunications, and construction in private hands (avoiding strategic

nationalizations).33 Later in life, Chávez would write about the need for a rethinking and

revitalization of the state and democracy to end the reproduction of corruption:

People’s power should be able to shape up new social relations in our everyday life, where fraternity

and solidarity go hand in hand with the continued emergence of new forms of planning and production

of material wealth for our people. To achieve that, it is necessary to completely pulverize the

bourgeois State that we have inherited, which is still being replicated through its old and nefarious

practices, and ensure continuity in the process of creation of new forms of policy management.34

It is also not the case that Chávez and Maduro ignored corruption, it’s simply that they

attacked the symptoms and not the system:

But under (Chávez’s) presidency, a Chavista governor, a mayor of the city of Valencia, and a

president of a major state company were arrested on charges of corruption, and in 2017 several

executives from the state oil company, PDVSA, in eastern Venezuela faced a similar fate. In early

2017 the ex-governor received an eighteen-year jail sentence. These actions, however, have done little

to contain corruption, which has become routine and highly visible.35

In 2017, Maduro had the military to take over the food imports and distribution sector.

This served two purposes 1) reduce private and unaccountable corruption 2) bring the military

even closer to him against mounting opposition. The latter has been the singular success. The

former only amplified the existing problem. Now, instead of private import fraud, one has public

fraud. What is worse, the fraud is committed by the well-organized, armed, and unaccountable

military. One such food deal between the military and a businessman was described by journalist

33
Velasco, Alejandro. "Behind the News, 5/3/18." Interview by Doug Henwood. Jacobin Magazine, May 3, 2018.
34
Hugo Chávez. "Proposal of the Candidate of the Homeland, Commander Hugo Chávez, for the Socialist Bolívarian Government,
2013–2019." News release, October 31, 2012. Links.org. Links International Journal of Socialist Renewal.
35
Ellner, Steve. "Venezuela's Fragile Revolution." Monthly Review. October 09, 2017. Accessed April 28, 2019.
https://monthlyreview.org/2017/10/01/venezuelas-fragile-revolution/.
Hannah Dreier: “The corn was billed at double the going rate, so Venezuela gave him a contract

to import $25 million worth of corn for $50 million …(he) was able to get that sweet contract

because he gave millions in kickbacks to the food minister.”36 Instead of addressing the root

cause of corruption, the government has consistently chopped away at stray branches. The result

is a deepened and thriving network of corruption which only leaves the masses in hunger and

want.

Maduro more than halved imports in 2016 (to the tune of 18 billion) in order to save

money for paying off debt.37 Altogether, imports have been cut by 75% since 2012, defying the

expectations of Venezuelan consumers and lowering their standard of living.38

Whither Democracy?

Chávez was democratically elected president of Venezuela in 1998 after having been

something of a national hero after a failed military coup in 1992. During the 1990s poverty and

inflation grew, leaving many Venezuelans behind and unrepresented in a two-party system.

Corruption and inflation, as bad as it is in Venezuela now, was notably gripping throughout the

1980s and 90s39 culminating in El Caracazo, a brutal week of lower class and barrio revanchism

wherein the government killed 300 to 3,000 people.40 Chávez both deepened and threatened

representation for different groups. He fought oligarchs and bureaucrats (even within his own

party) while simultaneously making strategic deals with supportive nouveau riche whom he

36
Pratt, Anna. "Venezuela's Military Has Turned Its Food Crisis into a 'racket.' And It's Profiting from People Going Hungry." Public
Radio International. January 6, 2017. Accessed April 28, 2019. https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-01-06/venezuelas-military-has-
turned-its-food-crisis-racket-and-its-profiting-people.
37
"Venezuela 2016 Imports down More than Half to $18 Billion: President." Reuters. January 11, 2017. Accessed May 01, 2019.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-economy-idUSKBN14T221.
38
"Venezuela's President Maduro Presents New Economic Measures." Interview by Sharmani Peries and Mark Weisbrot.
Venezuelaanalysis. September 14, 2017. https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/13364.
39
Desjardins, Jeff. "From Richer to Poorer: Venezuela's Economic Tragedy Visualized." The Money Project. September 05, 2017.
Accessed April 28, 2019. http://money.visualcapitalist.com/richer-poorer-venezuela-economic-tragedy/.
40
Ciccariello-Maher, George. "The Fourth World War Started in Venezuela." CounterPunch.org. February 04, 2016. Accessed April
29, 2019. https://www.counterpunch.org/2007/03/03/the-fourth-world-war-started-in-venezuela/.
helped create. He certainly challenged the ability of the former ruling class to maintain the power

of governance, making the early opposition to Chávez uniquely unsympathetic and transparent.

Most important of all was Chávez’s singular ability to balance, at least for some time, a vision

for socialism, participatory democracy, party bureaucracy, the military, the opposition and older

bourgeoisie, and militant leftists. This was both Chávez’s greatest strength and weakness; with

his death is 2013, the suture came undone. He was the center of everything and once removed,

his replacement, the uncharismatic and blustering Nicolás Maduro, immediately began to fail the

legacy. The change is leadership (from the balanced Chávez to factional Maduro) was

“tremendous”.41

The very acknowledgement of grassroots democratic organs in Chavismo and the critique

of their growing impotence tends to be solely of leftist origin. For their part, mainstream US

media always tended to paint Chávez as some brutal tyrant, although democracy for the poor was

certainly not the center of the opposition’s interests (as made clear throughout the 2000s). Only

recently have popular sectors’ allegiance begun to waver.42 Whereas before, the opposition was

clearly fighting for a maintenance of the bourgeoisie and ruling elite against popular mobility,

the mass immiseration of the Venezuelan people has modified this relationship slightly.

Former Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva once observed, “They’re always

having elections in Venezuela, and when they don’t have an election, Chávez invents one.”43 The

basis of Chavismo was electoral and democratic legitimacy.44 His attempts at the

democratization of the economy through the encouragement of worker’s control, business co-

41
Velasco, Alejandro. "Behind the News, 5/3/18." Interview by Doug Henwood. Jacobin Magazine, May 3, 2018.
42
"Venezuela." Interview by A. Velasco and Daniel Denvir. The Dig, by Jacobin Magazine and Verso Books, February 1, 2019.
43
Ponceleón, Temir Porras. "Venezuela's Crazy Economics." Le Monde Diplomatique. December 01, 2018. Accessed April 28,
2019. https://mondediplo.com/2018/12/07venezuela.
44
Hetland, Gabriel. "The Truth About Chávez." Jacobin. September 20, 2017. Accessed April 30, 2019.
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/09/Chávez-venezuela-bolívarian-revolution-bernie.
management, and participatory communes - i.e. the real “socialist” aspect of his legacy and

economic thinking - are woefully under-discussed outside socialist circles in lieu of the popular

definition of socialism as “when government does stuff”. This leads to the much easier

ideological path of painting Chávez as the archetypal “communist dictator” in order to concern-

troll American progressives like Bernie Sanders.

After Chávez, the commitment to electoral legitimacy deteriorated right along with the

economy and the Venezuelan government, along with Chávez’s socialist party (PSUV), finally

caught up to the criticism they had received for years. In 2015, the opposition won a majority in

the National Assembly. In 2017, Maduro stripped them of power using a pro-Maduro Supreme

Court and eventually created a National Constituent Assembly, packed with his own supporters,

creating a constitutional crisis and contending dual legislature.45 This brought on a wave of US

sanctions and condemnation which continue to cripple to nation. The political crisis only hurt the

country’s economic prospects. One of the major effects of this process, and perhaps the most

unfortunate given Chávez’s intentions, has been the alienation of much of the Venezuelan people

from government. The latest presidential election was boycotted by the opposition, though most

international organizations found the election to be unfair at the least. Though Election Day itself

is clean and open, it is far from fair.46 Maduro is extremely unpopular, but the opposition still has

a ways to go in order to shake off their violent history as saboteurs. Maduro’s antics, were not

enough to cause the populace or military to revolt, as Juan Guaidó had promised the US State

Department they would after declaring himself interim president in February 2019. As it turns

out, in the mind of Venezuelans, the only thing worse than Maduro (who boasts an 80%

45
Robins-Early, Nick. "A Timeline Of Venezuela's Months Of Protests And Political Crisis." HuffPost. August 07, 2017. Accessed
April 30, 2019. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/venezuela-crisis-timeline_n_5987330ae4b0cb15b1bf1b99.
46
"Venezuela." Interview by A. Velasco and Daniel Denvir. The Dig, by Jacobin Magazine and Verso Books, February 1, 2019.
disapproval rating), is US intervention.47 In the end, Juan Guaidó’s coup attempt has only

bolstered Maduro’s position - a total foreign policy failure that only the International Contact

Group seemed to see coming, having called for open elections.48 Even conservative governments

in the area, like Columbia, discouraged Trump’s “military option.”49 The result, leading us into

the present moment, is amplified polarization.

US Imperialism (Here’s where I get Marxist)

Both the US and Venezuela have reason to be concerned with one another given their

ideology and rational self-interest. Chávez’s challenge to neoliberal hegemony and the

Washington consensus in Latin America, constituting the Pink Tide of social democratic

governments, was a genuine threat. When Chávez created a solidarity network in Latin America,

paying off other countries’ debt (Argentina 2.5bn)50 and subsidizing oil (parts of Brazil), the US

knew this would potentially build an unfavorable international current. A resistance to neoliberal

hyper-exploitation in the Global South would spell bad news for the first world. Similarly, any

Latin American leftist movement knows that the US can and will resort to any means necessary

to break even the most democratic movements as in Guatemala in 1954, Chile in 1973, and

Nicaragua in the 1980s. Chávez surely had the Iraqi and Iranian coups (in 1953 and 1954) in

mind as well, both of which were encouraged by the US in response to oil nationalization. After

the US backed coup attempt of 2002, following oil lockout, and US invasion of Iraq, Chávez

never had good reason to trust the US; many of the more “authoritarian” moves Chávez made

47
"Venezuelans Want President Maduro Out, but Most Would Oppose Foreign Military Intervention to Remove Him." Public Radio
International. January 8, 2019. Accessed April 30, 2019. https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-01-08/venezuelans-want-president-
maduro-out-most-would-oppose-foreign-military.
48
International Contact Group. Delegation of the European Union to Russia. "International Contact Group on Venezuela." News
release, February 4, 2019. Eeas.europa.eu. https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/57639/international-contact-group-
venezuela_en.
49
Lambert, Renaud. "Venezuela's Last Chance." Le Monde Diplomatique. September 01, 2017. Accessed April 30, 2019.
https://mondediplo.com/2017/09/06Venezuela.
50
Forero, Juan. "Chávez Using Oil Money to Buy Influence Abroad." The New York Times. April 04, 2006. Accessed April 30, 2019.
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/04/world/americas/04iht-venezuela.html.
can be understood with regards to the psychology of siege (including the eventually excruciating

foreign exchange rate). These acts of US chauvinism all occurred long before Chávez’s ‘socialist

turn’ in 2005 and his use of oil rents for popular programs.51

The Trump-issued August 2017 sanctions cut Venezuela out of US financial markets.

This harmed Venezuela's ability to raise credit. The sanctions in January of 2019 cut Venezuela

out of US oil markets. The result made Venezuelan recovery impossible:

..the sanctions have inflicted … very serious harm to human life and health, including an

estimated more than 40,000 deaths from 2017–2018; and that these sanctions would fit the definition

of collective punishment of the civilian population as described in both the Geneva and Hague

international conventions, to which the US is a signatory. They are also illegal under international law

and treaties which the US has signed, and would appear to violate US law as well.52

The US, in other words, helped create the unstable system, ensuring the impossibility of

recovery, to then only offer condemnation (a fact rarely acknowledged in US media).53 For

comparison regarding how US media has treated Chávez and Venezuela, one must only look at

the most recent election of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil who was praised (consciously despite his

open fascistic adulation of the tortuous military dictatorship)54 for his pro-business attitude

(which notably comes at the cost of war on the indigenous population). 55

51
Velasco, Alejandro. "Behind the News, 5/3/18." Interview by Doug Henwood. Jacobin Magazine, May 3, 2018.
52
Weisbrot, Mark, and Jeffrey Sachs. Economic Sanctions as Collective Punishment: The Case of Venezuela. Report. Center for
Economic and Policy Research. April 2019. http://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/venezuela-sanctions-2019-
04.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1DxifneIeSHYiMwPbPLfwSW-xhHB7zMq4s_TWAWqLQZdYSCZvgw7Vstoc.
53
One of the only examples that comes to mind is a surprising interview with Chris Cuomo in which he condemns the US’s process
of starving countries of support, stirring forces on the ground, and then watching it blow up.
54
Timsit, Annabelle. "Brazil Elected Far-right Populist Jair Bolsonaro, and the Markets Love It." Quartz. October 29, 2018. Accessed
April 30, 2019. https://qz.com/1441430/jair-bolsonaros-election-in-brazil-is-pushing-markets-higher/.
55
Phillips, Dom. "Jair Bolsonaro Launches Assault on Amazon Rainforest Protections." The Guardian. January 02, 2019. Accessed
April 30, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/02/brazil-jair-bolsonaro-amazon-rainforest-protections.
Inflation to hyperinflation

“You have money, it just doesn’t do anything” 56 - Alejandro Velasco

Inflation is the process in which a currency’s purchasing power is reduced and the price

of goods is raised. Hyperinflation is when the monthly rate of inflation is at 50% or above. Brief

episodes of inflation rates above 50% occurred in the fall of 2013 and between 2014 and 2015. In

October of 2016 hyperinflation was let loose.57

The IMF’s annual inflation rate projection for this year is 1,000,000.58 Inflation has long

been a problem in Venezuela, which, as Reinhart and Rogoff point out in This Time It’s

56
Velasco, Alejandro. Telephone interview by author. April 30, 2019.
57
Hanke, Steve H. "Venezuela Enters the Record Book, Officially Hyperinflates." Cato Institute. December 12, 2016. Accessed
April 30, 2019. https://www.cato.org/blog/venezuela-enters-record-book-officially-hyperinflates.
58
Graham-Harrison, Emma, Patricia Torres, and Joe Parkin Daniels. "Barter and Dollars the New Reality as Venezuela Battles
Hyperinflation." The Guardian. March 14, 2019. Accessed April 30, 2019.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/13/venezuela-hyperinflation-bolívar-banknotes-dollars.
Different, can be hard to get rid of without help and patience.59 Dollarization is a lasting effect;

“weakening of the government's currency monopoly can also take a long time to outgrow.”60

The inflation which occurred before the oil price collapse was a result of 1) deliberate

bolívar devaluation to pay off debt garnered during the oil boom and 2) forex controls. Printing

more money during brie commodity can, in the short term help, get through a slump, but the oil

prices continued to fall, kicking the process into hyperdrive.61 Economist Mark Weisbrot

describes the forex controls leading to shortages: “In the fall of 2012, and again in February

2013, the government sharply reduced the availability of foreign exchange. It was during this

time that shortages of basic goods accelerated, along with inflation and the black market price of

the dollar.” Then the process further worsened:

...when inflation goes up, more people want to buy dollars, because they see the dollar as

something secure that won’t lose value to inflation. But this drives the price of the dollar up on the

parallel market, which increases inflation even more. This cycle continues, causing an “inflation-

depreciation” spiral. In October of 2012, inflation was at 18 percent, and the parallel market rate was

at 13. By the end of 2015, annual inflation was at 180 percent and the parallel market rate was at 833.

The shortages of consumer and other goods also contribute to this spiral, and they have increased with

it.62

The Venezuelan people have no reason to trust the bolívar and stores often use dollars

and euros. Maduro’s scheme to fix hyperinflation (in the spring of 2018) was to tie a petrodollar

currency to material oil reserves through a new bolívar soberano which essentially chopped zeros

59
Reinhart, Carmen, and Kenneth Rogoff. "INFLATION AND MODERN CURRENCY CRASHES." In This Time It's Different, 180-
97. Princeton University Press.
60
Ibid.
61
Carmody, Michelle. "What Caused Hyperinflation in Venezuela: A Rare Blend of Public Ineptitude and Private Enterprise." The
Conversation. March 28, 2019. Accessed May 01, 2019. https://theconversation.com/what-caused-hyperinflation-in-venezuela-a-
rare-blend-of-public-ineptitude-and-private-enterprise-102483.
62
Weisbrot, Mark. "Can the Venezuelan Economy Be Fixed? | Op-Eds & Columns." CEPR. October 23, 2016. Accessed April 30,
2019. http://cepr.net/publications/op-eds-columns/can-the-venezuelan-economy-be-fixed.
off of the previous bolívar fuerte. It was unsuccessful. In September of 2018, the government’s

money supply grew at 28% a week.63

Currency Exchange and Price Controls

The multiple currency exchange rate, one of the most consistently damaging features of

the Venezuelan economy, started rather early in Chávez’s government as a means of combating

capital flight after the 2002-2003 oil lockout.

The price of oil continued to rise, reaching $30 in 2003. The government had the resources to

implement social programmes that strengthened its popularity among the working class. Unable to

force Chávez out, the oligarchy decided to send their money elsewhere. Capital flight reached

alarming levels — more than $28bn in 2002, nearly 30% of total wealth generated in 2002.

As foreign currency reserves melted away, the government took the only action it could: in

February 2003 it introduced exchange rate controls and pegged the bolívar to the dollar. (Fixed

exchange rates had been abandoned in 1996.)64

The multiple exchange rate overstayed its welcome, but was glossed over by high oil

prices which kept the importers wealthy, shortages infrequent, and the poor subsidized. The

government attempted to contract the supply of dollars to reduce corruption, but it only raised

demand and created shortages.65 The oil crash only exacerbated these problems. Coupled with

gross mismanagement and an inability for long-term planning, by December of 2014, Scotch and

Barbie Dolls got a privileged exchange rate deal while milk and medical equipment went scarce

for much of the year.66 There are three rates representing the degree of importance of the

63
Ponceleón, Temir Porras. "Venezuela's Crazy Economics." Le Monde Diplomatique. December 01, 2018. Accessed April 28,
2019. https://mondediplo.com/2018/12/07venezuela.
64
Lambert, Renaud. "Venezuela's Economic Volcano Erupts." Le Monde Diplomatique. December 01, 2016. Accessed April 28,
2019. https://mondediplo.com/2016/12/05venezuela.
65
Torres, William Neuman and Patricia. "Venezuela's Economy Suffers as Import Schemes Siphon Billions." The New York Times.
December 21, 2017. Accessed April 28, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/06/world/americas/venezuelas-economy-suffers-
as-import-schemes-siphon-billions.html.
66
Ellsworth, Brian. "Venezuela Currency Controls Make Scotch Cheap as Milk, Syringes Go..." Reuters. December 23, 2014.
Accessed May 01, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/venezuela-economy/venezuela-currency-controls-make-scotch-cheap-as-
milk-syringes-go-short-idUSL1N0U70RP20141223.
commodities for which they are used; food and medicine gets the closest dollar to bolívar rate.

Import over-invoicing and fraud, as discussed earlier, allowed importers to make a ton of money

off of preferential dollars to both import and sell on the black market, or, worse, not sell at all.

Once commodities made it into the borders of Venezuela, the temptation to sell them at a better

black market deal, was irresistible. Some importers would “re-export” commodities to

neighboring countries without Venezuela’s subsidies.67 This process, repeated constantly, only

further dollarized the economy. The market, in other words, corrected itself as Temir Porras

states:

It isn’t a result of a conscious, rational program by the government, the government hasn’t decided to

stop funding this or that, but the lack of strategy to address the crisis has left the country in a situation

of chaotic or anarchic adjustment. The economy has “self-regulated,” if you will, so I don’t think that

there is a need for further adjustment, at least not in the neoliberal way, because people have suffered

enough.68

Proposals for Recovery

Any hope at economic reform and rehabilitation in Venezuela is impossible without

access to credit and the recapitalization of the oil sector, which impossible without the lifting of

US sanctions. The US has placed all their weight behind a coup led by Juan Guaidó. Therefore

only Civil War can lead to the political climate necessary for credit access now. If however, the

International Contact Group was able to organize free and fair elections, this would be the most

ideal solution politically. Negotiation would need to take place between government and the

opposition. The most radical development at the moment would be the introduction of long-term

policy proposals, plans, and strategies (something both sides have neglected for short-term

67
Bird, Mike. "An Economist Just Explained Venezuela's Chronic Shortage of Toilet Paper." Business Insider. November 10, 2015.
Accessed May 01, 2019. https://www.businessinsider.com/why-venezuela-is-running-out-of-toilet-paper-2015-11.
68
Porras, Temir. ""Escalation Could Lead to a Catastrophic Outcome"." Jacobin. January 11, 2019. Accessed May 01, 2019.
https://jacobinmag.com/2019/01/venezuela-maduro-Chávez-military-intervention.
political gain).69 Free and fair elections would surely see Maduro gone and some form of

Chavismo on the table. Free and fair elections would require the US government to stay out of

the elections regardless of their own interests, including dangling bailouts over the heads of the

populace if they choose the right guy.70

If the government were to rectify their position it would require the de-conflation of the

protests between the right-wing bourgeois opposition and good-faith working class critique.71

Treating them as the same only further isolates the government’s ability to uphold Chávez’s

Three R’s: “Revision, Rectification, and Reactivate the revolution.”72 The hallmark of

government economic policy is that it is illogical and hardly ever reflects a firm plan. The

Venezuelan term for this racket is bochinche - a mess or fuss.73

On the purely economic front, Maduro has partially carried out the most important step:

the relaxation and removal of forex controls. Leftist economist Manuel Sutherland has stated that

the relaxation as of now is “an advance” but “still too timid”.74 Victor Alvarez has also called for

their total dismantling, referring to them as tools “instruments for domination”.75

Temir Porras and others recognize that an exit from the crisis would have to, in the short-

term, play into the petrostate model, ramping up oil production. This requires going to

international financial markets for investment. In order to win back international capital’s trust,

Venezuela would have to “buy back” their debt to avoid “the threat of a default.”76

69
Velasco, Alejandro. "Behind the News, 5/3/18." Interview by Doug Henwood. Jacobin Magazine, May 3, 2018.
70
The US has used methods of massive funding within “democracies” to ensure “their guy” wins in Russia and Nicaragua. There is
no better definition of Marx’s “dictatorship of the bourgeoisie”.
71
"Venezuela." Interview by A. Velasco and Daniel Denvir. The Dig, by Jacobin Magazine and Verso Books, February 1, 2019.
72
"Victor Alvarez: “Venezuela’s Currency Controls Are No Longer Justified, and Are Only Used as a Means of Political
Domination”." Interview by Mario Villegas. Venezuela Analysis, May 5, 2015.
73
Velasco, Alejandro. Telephone interview by author. April 30, 2019.
74
Dobson, Paul. "Venezuela Introduces 'Free Exchange' of Currency." Venezuelanalysis.com. September 28, 2018. Accessed May
01, 2019. https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/14042.
75
"Victor Alvarez: “Venezuela’s Currency Controls Are No Longer Justified, and Are Only Used as a Means of Political
Domination”." Interview by Mario Villegas. Venezuela Analysis, May 5, 2015.
76
Ibid.
 To the extent that Venezuela can remain at a distance from traditional sources of capital that the

IMF provides, that would be ideal [given accompanying loan-conditionalities], but for that to

happen it has to convince countries like China and capital markets (organized mainly in the US

and UK) to invest. These are challenges that require any administration in Venezuela to have very

clear strategic objectives, and in the short term this must be gaining access to capital, which, in

turn, suggests the need to reach some kind of negotiated settlement or compromise with

international stakeholders. I regret it, but I don’t see how Venezuela can self-engineer itself out of

the current crisis, at least from the economic point of view.77

Victor Alvarez mentions a number of prescriptions he would introduce, but singles out

the need of long-term planning and recognition of the real status of the economy. This

recognition would require a re-thinking of how the socialist project can unfold.

If the country needs anything, it’s an understanding between the public and private sectors. That

determination to destroy the capitalist economy without having created an alternative communal,

socialist, or even state economy, has been the quickest route to failures in production, scarcity,

hoarding and speculation. Private investment has been deactivated and the voids left behind have

not been filled or balanced out opportunely for the social and public economy, and what public

economy does exist is not working.78

Aside from the recapitalization of the PDVSA, macroeconomic stabilization funds like

the Norway Oil Fund would help avoid crashes like that of 2014.79 80 To combat hyperinflation,

along with collapse of forex controls, Victor Alvarez suggests to, “Reestablish the autonomy of

the Central Bank in its emitting of capital and the management of foreign reserves. Reforms have

77
Porras, Temir. ""Escalation Could Lead to a Catastrophic Outcome"." Jacobin. January 11, 2019. Accessed May 01, 2019.
https://jacobinmag.com/2019/01/venezuela-maduro-Chávez-military-intervention.
78
"Victor Alvarez: “Venezuela’s Currency Controls Are No Longer Justified, and Are Only Used as a Means of Political
Domination”." Interview by Mario Villegas. Venezuela Analysis, May 5, 2015.
79
Ibid.
80
Velasco, Alejandro. Lecture, UNC Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, March 25, 2019.
driven the bank to finance government projects without backing and with inflationary results.”81

Strategic nationalization and privatization, to combat corruption and profit-loss, would require

the government and opposition to challenge their main supporters (the Vz military and US

government respectively). For Maduro, the reduction of the military budget would be political

suicide but an economic savior. Domestic production and diversification would have to be a

feature of long-term recovery, not just in rhetoric but in hard policy. Raising revenue (in as

prices) and cutting some subsidies would have to be a part of the recovery. Temir Porras has

pointed out that much of the human cost of a hypothetical neoliberal debt restructuring has

already taken place.82

With regards to socialism, a renewed effort to train, educate, and sustain the comunas and

cooperative sector would both strengthen democracy and domestic employment. Participatory

democracy and the dream of the Estado Comunal was never fully achieved. Communal and

municipal organization and planning would hold corrupt actors within the government, military,

and private spheres accountable. Nothing short of a revolution within the revolution is necessary

for the leftist current within Venezuela to prevail outside of corruption and denialism. Neither

the IMF, Wall Street, US State Department, nor ‘bolibourgeois’ should determine Venezuela’s

future. It should be determined by the people through democratic comunas of production,

distribution, and governance; through strategic nationalizations; and through a rejection of short-

term expediency. These institutions should be defended not by a military, but by the armed

workers themselves.

81
"Victor Alvarez: “Venezuela’s Currency Controls Are No Longer Justified, and Are Only Used as a Means of Political
Domination”." Interview by Mario Villegas. Venezuela Analysis, May 5, 2015.
82
Porras, Temir. ""Escalation Could Lead to a Catastrophic Outcome"." Jacobin. January 11, 2019. Accessed May 01, 2019.
https://jacobinmag.com/2019/01/venezuela-maduro-Chávez-military-intervention.
Conclusion

Almost everything said about Venezuela is a little true. If you want to blame the situation

on Chávez, you can, and you can be partially correct as any event in Venezuela will be

somewhat tied to Chávez considering his leadership of 15 odd years. If you want to tie the crisis

to US imperialism or “doing a revolution halfway”, you can also pride yourself on being partially

correct (Trump’s appointment of Elliott Abrams does little to dismiss this theory). Most US

media sites will blame “socialism” for the crisis. The Venezuelan government blames the US.

Some blame oil. The truth is somewhere balanced between these. The most important thing for

Venezuela is to regain the sovereignty and hope Chávez once inspired. Neither Maduro nor the

US can do this. Free and fair elections must be central to the political economic development of

the nation. New parties must be established, strategies concocted, and honest debates had.

The mobsters and traitors who bleed the revolution they claim to represent have run out of time. Their

ability to bring people to hunger to pay for their corruption has been indescribable. Now comes a new stage where

the people’s war and its ability to displace the old and rotten Republic must open the way to a true self-governing

and socialist, productive Republic, made by the science of the people, that is based on a free knowledge that

completely confronts this modern capitalist civilization. We will continue pushing the sun even in the darkest of

nights.83 - Anonymous Venezuelan comrade

83
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