CIVIL LAW REVIEW PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

CASE DIGESTS COMPILATION

1. MONTANEZ vs. CIPRIANO
G.R No. 181089
October 22, 2012
DOCTRINE: The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
would not change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the
subsistence of the first marriage.
FACTS:
Cipriano married Socrates on 1976 in Aklan. On 1983, Cipriano married
Silverio Cipriano during the subsistence of the first marriage. Respondent then
filed a Petition for Annulment of her first marriage with Socrates on the grounds
of psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code. Such marriage
was then declared null and void.
Montanez, Silverio’s daughter from a previous marriage, filed a case for
Bigamy against Cipriano. This was with an affidavit stating that respondent
failed to reveal to Silverio that she was still married to Socrates. Cipriano then
alleged that her marriage with Socrates had already been declared void and
thus there was no more marriage to speak of.
ISSUES:
1. WON – the declaration of nullity of respondent’s first marriage justifies
the dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against respondent. NO
2. WON – the RTC erred in stating that the jurisprudence prior to the Family
Code and in Wiegel regarding the necessity of a declaration of nullity is
ambivalent such that a person was allowed to enter a subsequent
marriage without annulment of the first, without incurring criminal
liability. NO
HELD:
1. Respondent is liable for bigamy.
The elements of bigamy are that:
a) offender has been legally married
b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or in case
his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could
not yet be presumed dead
c) he contracts a subsequent marriage, and
d) the subsequent marriage has all the requisites for
validity.
It is consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage. What
is essential for the prosecution of bigamy is that the alleged second
marriage, having all the requirements, would be valid were it not for the
subsistence of the first marriage.
In this case, when respondent contracted the 2nd marriage with Silverio,
her 1st marriage was still subsisting and had not been declared annulled
or void. Thus all elements of bigamy were alleged in the Information.
Based on the Information, the annulment of the 1st marriage was only
declared in 2003.
In several cases, it was held that the subsequent judicial declaration of
nullity of the 1st marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration,
the bigamy had already been consummated. Even if the accused
eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab
initio, the point is, the first and second marriage were subsisting. The
moment the accused contracted a 2nd marriage without the previous one
being judicially declared null and void, bigamy was already
consummated. Here, at the time of the 2nd marriage, the first was still
subsisting. Thus bigamy was properly charge to her.
Respondent claims that the legal basis is not applicable since the
declaration of nullity came before the filing of information. But what
makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a 2 nd
marriage during the subsistence of the first.
2. In this case, respondent wants to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of
the first marriage and invoke it to prevent prosecution for bigamy. Such
is not possible. A party may enter into a marriage license and thereafter
contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity
of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void.
2. CASTILLO v. CASTILLO
G.R No. 189607
April18, 2016
DOCTRINE: The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined
in accordance with the law in effect at the time of its celebration
Note: The marriages in this case BOTH took place prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code.
FACTS:
On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin
Bautista (Bautista). On 6 January 1979, respondent married herein petitioner
Renato A. Castillo (Renato).
On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to
her subsisting marriage to Bautista. Respondent opposed the Petition, and
contended that her marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had not
secured any license therefor, and neither of them was a member of the
denomination to which the solemnizing officer belonged.
ISSUE:
WON judicial declaration is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage. NO
HELD:
The Court held that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view
of the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a
marriage license. That there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage
was void ab initio before the second marriage was contracted is immaterial as
this is not a requirement under the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent
Decision of the RTC declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves to
strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.
The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in
accordance with the law in effect at the time of its celebration. In this case,
the law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil Code.
The children of the parties were also born while the Civil Code was in effect i.e.
in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve this case using the
provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles 80, 81,
82, and 83 (first paragraph); and those on voidable marriages are Articles 83
(second paragraph), 85 and 86.
Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in
the following ways:
a) a void marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage from
the beginning - while in a voidable marriage, the marriage is valid
until annulled by a competent court;
b) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable marriage can
be ratified by cohabitation;
c) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be collaterally attacked,
while a voidable marriage cannot be collaterally attacked;
d) in a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and the
offspring are natural children by legal fiction, while in voidable
marriage there is conjugal partnership and the children conceived
before the decree of annulment are considered legitimate; and
e) "In a void marriage no judicial decree to establish the
invalidity is necessary," while in a voidable marriage there
must be a judicial decree.
Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases of People v.
Mendoza, People v. Aragon, and Odayat v. Amante, that the Civil Code
contains no express provision on the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity
of a void marriage.
It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered
the rulings in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon inapplicable to marriages
celebrated after 3 August 1988. A judicial declaration of absolute nullity

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
of marriage is now expressly required where the nullity of a previous
marriage is invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage. A
second marriage contracted prior to the issuance of this declaration of
nullity is thus considered bigamous and void.
3. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ODTUHAN
G.R No. 191566
July 17, 2013
FACTS:
On July 2, 1980, respondent Edgardo Odtuhan married Jasmin Modina. On
October 28, 1993, he also married Eleanor Alagon. He later filed a petition for
annulment of his marriage with Modina. The RTC granted respondent’s petition
and declared his first marriage void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license.
On November 10, 2003, Alagon died. In the meantime, private complainant
Evelyn Alagon learned of respondent’s previous marriage with Modina and
thus filed a Complaint-Affidavit charging respondent with Bigamy.
Respondent moved to quash the information on two grounds: (1) that the facts
do not charge the offense of bigamy; and (2) that the criminal action or liability
has been extinguished.
The RTC held that the facts constitute the crime of bigamy. There was a valid
marriage between respondent and Modina and without such marriage having
been dissolved, respondent contracted a second marriage with Alagon. It
further held that neither can the information be quashed on the ground that
criminal liability has been extinguished, because the declaration of nullity of the
first marriage is not one of the modes of extinguishing criminal liability.
Respondent appealed to the CA on certiorari and it concluded that the RTC
gravely abused its discretion in denying respondent’s motion to quash the
information, considering that the facts alleged in the information do not charge
an offense.
ISSUES:
1. WON the motion to quash by respondent is proper. NO
2. WON the court’s judgment declaring respondent’s first marriage void ab
initio extinguished respondent’s criminal liability. NO
HELD:
1. A motion to quash information is the mode by which an accused assails
the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against him for
insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent
in the face of the information. In this case however, there is sufficiency
of the allegations in the information to constitute the crime of bigamy. It
contained all the elements of the crime as provided for in Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code: (1) that respondent is legally married to
Modina; (2) that without such marriage having been legally dissolved; (3)
that respondent willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously contracted a second
marriage with Alagon; and (4) that the second marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.
2
Respondent’s evidence showing the court’s declaration that his marriage
to Modina is null and void from the beginning should not be considered
because matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash. It is
not proper, therefore, to resolve the charges at the very outset without
the benefit of a full blown trial.
2. Respondent’s claim that there are more reasons to quash the
information against him because he obtained the declaration of nullity of
marriage before the filing of the complaint for bigamy against him is
without merit. Criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the
commission of the offense and from that instant, there is already liability.
The time of filing of the criminal complaint or information is material only
for determining prescription.
It has been held in a number of cases that a judicial declaration of nullity
is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.
The petition on review on certiorari is granted. The CA’s decision is set
aside and the case is remanded to the RTC.
4. GARCIA-QUIAZON vs. BELEN
G.R No. 189121
July 31, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner Elise Quiazon is the daughter of Eliseo Quiazon and Ma. Lourdes
Belen, who are common-law partners. When Eliseo died intestate, Elise
through her mother filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the RTC,
claiming that she is a natural child of Eliseo having conceived at the time when
her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Filiation was proven by
her Birth Certificate signed by Eliseo. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo
and Lourdes, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia Garcia-
Quiazon by claiming it was bigamous.
Respondent Amelia opposed the issuance of the letters of administration
asserting that the venue of the petition was improperly laid. However, the RTC
rendered its decision in favor of Elise. On appeal, the decision was affirmed.
Hence, the petition was filed before the SC raising the argument that Elise has
not shown any interest in the petition for letters of administration and that the
CA erred in declaring that Eliseo and Amelia were no legally married because
Elise has no cause of action on it.
ISSUE:
WON Elise has a cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage despite
the death of his father, hence cannot be deemed as an interested party. YES
RULING:
The Court ruled that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it
cannot be the source of right, such that any interested party may attack the
Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even
beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. Having successional rights
that would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, Elise may without
a doubt impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of her
father. The said marriage may be questioned by filing an action attaching its
validity, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of the deceased spouse. As a compulsory heir, Elise has a cause
of action for the declaration of nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia.
Likewise, Elise who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate
is deemed to be an interested part. An interested party is one who would be
benefited in the estate. Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s
estate, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party.
5. AURELIO vs. AURELIO
G.R No. 175367
June 06, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were
married on March 23, 1988.
On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the RTC of Quezon City a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. In her petition, respondent alleged that both
she and petitioner were psychologically incapacitated of performing and
complying with their respective essential marital obligations. In addition,
respondent alleged that such state of psychological incapacity was present
prior and even during the time of the marriage ceremony. Hence, respondent
prays that her marriage be declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code. It alleged among others that said psychological incapacity was
manifested by lack of financial support from the husband; his lack of drive and
incapacity to discern the plight of his working wife. The husband exhibited
consistent jealousy and distrust towards his wife. His moods alternated
between hostile defiance and contrition. He refused to assist in the
maintenance of the family.
On the side of the wife on the other hand, is effusive and displays her feelings
openly and freely. Her feelings change very quickly – from joy to fury to misery
to despair, depending on her day-to-day experiences. Her tolerance for
boredom was very low. She was emotionally immature; she cannot stand
frustration or disappointment. She cannot delay to gratify her needs. She gets
upset when she cannot get what she wants. Self-indulgence lifts her spirits
immensely. Their hostility towards each other distorted their relationship. Their
incapacity to accept and fulfill the essential obligations of marital life led to the
breakdown of their marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage should be declared null and void by reason of
psychological incapacity? YES
HELD:
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First, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of
psychological incapacity was stated and alleged in the complaint. We agree
with the manifestation of respondent that the family backgrounds of both
petitioner and respondent were discussed in the complaint as the root causes
of their psychological incapacity. Moreover, a competent and expert
psychologist clinically identified the same as the root causes.
Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such
grave a nature as to bring about a disability for them to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. The psychologist reported that respondent suffers from
Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic Features. Petitioner, on the
other hand, allegedly suffers from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic)
Personality Disorder. The incapacity of both parties to perform their marital
obligations was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and incurable.
Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital obligations that were not
complied with were alleged in the petition. As can be easily gleaned from the
totality of the petition, respondent’s allegations fall under Article 68 of the
Family Code which states that “the husband and the wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support.”
6. REPUBLIC vs. GALANG
G.R. No. 168335
June 6, 2011
DOCTRINE:
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical
antecedence; and (c) incurability. The defect should refer to “no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage.”
FACTS:
In March 1994, Nestor and Juvy contracted marriage in Pampanga and
thereafter they resided in the house of the Nestor’s father. Nestor worked as
an artist-illustrator while Juvy stayed at home. They had one child, Christopher.
In August 1999, Nestor filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage with Juvy, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended.
He alleged that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the
essential obligations of marriage, as she was a kleptomaniac and a swindler;
that Juvy suffers from “mental deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted
discernment and total lack of care, love and affection [towards him and their]
child.” He posited that Juvy’s incapacity was “extremely serious” and “appears
to be incurable.”
Having found no collusion between the parties, the case was set for trial. In his
testimony, Nestor alleged that he was the one who prepared their breakfast
because Juvy did not want to wake up early; Juvy often left their child to their
neighbors’ care; and Christopher almost got lost in the market when Juvy
brought him there. He added that Juvy stole his ATM card and falsified his
3
signature to encash the check representing Nestor’s father’s pension. He,
likewise, stated that he caught Juvy playing “mahjong” and “kuwaho” three (3)
times. Finally, he testified that Juvy borrowed money from their relatives on the
pretense that their son was confined in a hospital.
Nestor presented Anna Liza Guiang, a psychologist, who testified that she
conducted a psychological test on Nestor. In her Psychological Report, the
psychologist made the following findings:
Psychological Test conducted on client Nestor Galang resembles
an emotionally-matured individual. He is well-adjusted to the
problem he meets, and enable to throw-off major irritations but
manifest[s] a very low frustration tolerance which means he has a
little ability to endure anxiety and the client manifests suppressed
feelings and emotions which resulted to unbearable emotional
pain, depression and lack of self-esteem and gained emotional
tensions caused by his wife’s behavior.
The incapacity of the defendant is manifested [in] such a manner that the
defendant-wife: (1) being very irresponsible and very lazy and doesn’t manifest
any sense of responsibility; (2) her involvement in gambling activities such as
mahjong and kuwaho; (3) being an estafador which exhibits her behavioral and
personality disorders; (4) her neglect and show no care attitude towards her
husband and child; (5) her immature and rigid behavior; (6) her lack of initiative
to change and above all, the fact that she is unable to perform her marital
obligations as a loving, responsible and caring wife to her family. There are just
few reasons to believe that the defendant is suffering from incapacitated mind
and such incapacity appears to be incorrigible.
The RTC nullified the parties’ marriage in its decision of January 22, 2001. The
RTC Judge, relying on the Santos Case, stated in the decision that the
psychological incapacity of respondent to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage can be characterized by (a) gravity because the subject
cannot carry out the normal and ordinary duties of marriage and family
shouldered by any average couple existing under ordinary circumstances of
life and work; (b) antecedence, because the root cause of the trouble can be
traced to the history of the subject before marriage although its overt
manifestations appear over after the wedding; and (c) incurability, if treatments
required exceed the ordinary means or subject, or involve time and expense
beyond the reach of the subject – are all obtaining in this case.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
ISSUE:
Whether there is basis to nullify the respondent’s marriage to Juvy on the
ground that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, Juvy suffered from
psychological incapacity that prevented her from complying with her essential
marital obligations. NONE
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the totality of Nestor’s evidence – his testimonies
and the psychologist, and the psychological report and evaluation – insufficient
to prove Juvy’s psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical
antecedence; and (c) incurability. The defect should refer to “no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage.” It must be confined to “the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. [Louel
Santos vs. CA]
It is not absolutely necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under
Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological
incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be
duly established. [Brenda Marcos vs. Marcos]
Instead of serving as a guideline, Molina Doctrine unintentionally became a
straightjacket; it forced all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into
and be bound by it. [Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te]
In Ting vs. Velez-Ting, far from abandoning Molina, the Ngo Te case simply
suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements; the Ngo Te case merely
stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity.
In the present case, the psychologist did not even identify the types of
psychological tests which she administered on Nestor and the root cause of
Juvy’s psychological condition. There was no showing that any mental disorder
existed at the inception of the marriage. The report failed to prove the gravity
or severity of Juvy’s alleged condition, specifically, why and to what extent the
disorder is serious, and how it incapacitated her to comply with her marital
duties; the report did not even categorically state the particular type of
personality disorder found. The report failed to establish the incurability of
Juvy’s condition. The report’s pronouncements that Juvy “lacks the initiative to
change” and that her mental incapacity “appears incorrigible” are insufficient to
prove that her mental condition could not be treated, or if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond her means to undertake.
Petition was granted. Galang’s petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Juvy Salazar under Article 36 of the Family Code was dismissed.
7. REPUBLIC vs. ENCELAN
G.R. No. 170022
January 9, 2013
FACTS:
On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita. To support his family, Cesar went
to work in Saudi Arabia. While still in Saudi Arabia, Cesar learned that Lolita
had been having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez. Lolita allegedly left the
conjugal home with her children and lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and
Lolita had been separated.
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On June 16, 1995, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for the
declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolita’s psychological
incapacity.
Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin, she contended that Alvin used
to be an associate in her promotions business. She insisted that she is not
psychologically incapacitated and that she left their home because of
irreconcilable differences with her mother-in-law.
Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report prepared by Dr. Fareda
Fatima Flores who found that Lolita was "not suffering from any form of major
psychiatric illness," but had been "unable to provide the expectations expected
of her for a good and lasting marital relationship"; also, her "transferring from
one job to the other depicts some interpersonal problems with co-workers".
RTC declared Cesar’s marriage to Lolita void. The CA originally set aside the
RTC’s verdict but later on affirmed the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE:
Is Cesar and Lolita’s marriage void ab initio on the ground of Lolita’s
psychological incapacity? NO
HELD:
In interpreting Article 36 of the Family Code, we have repeatedly stressed that
psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations"; not merely the
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.
Sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not
necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for
legal separation. To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that
the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered
personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the
essential marital obligations.
Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation report on Lolita, in fact, established that
Lolita did not suffer from any major psychiatric illness. Dr. Flores’ observation
on Lolita’s interpersonal problems with co-workers cannot simply be equated
with a wife’s psychological fitness as a spouse. Workplace obligations and
responsibilities are poles apart from their marital counterparts.
8. CAMACHO- REYES vs. REYES
G.R. No. 185286
August 18, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at
the University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when they were both
nineteen (19) years old. The casual acquaintanceship quickly developed into
a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship.
4
At that time, respondent held a job in the family business,
the Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioner’s good impression of the respondent was
not diminished by the latter’s habit of cutting classes, not even by her discovery
that respondent was taking marijuana.
Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university studies, obtaining a degree
in AB Sociology from the UP. By 1974, respondent had dropped out of school
on his third year, and just continued to work for the Aristocrat Restaurant.
In 1976, the year following petitioner’s graduation and her father’s death,
petitioner and respondent got married. At that time, petitioner was already five
(5) months pregnant and employed at the Population Center
Foundation. Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the respondent’s family in
Mandaluyong City. All living expenses were shouldered by respondent’s
parents, and the couple’s respective salaries were spent solely for their
personal needs. Initially, respondent gave petitioner a monthly allowance of
P1,500.00 from his salary. When their first child was born on March 22, 1977,
financial difficulties started. Rearing a child entailed expenses. A year into their
marriage, the monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from respondent stopped.
Further, respondent no longer handed his salary to petitioner. When petitioner
mustered enough courage to ask the respondent about this, the latter told her
that he had resigned due to slow advancement within the family business.
Respondent’s game plan was to venture into trading seafood in the province,
supplying hotels and restaurants, including the Aristocrat Restaurant.
However, this new business took respondent away from his young family for
days on end without any communication. Petitioner simply endured the setup,
hoping that the situation will change. To prod respondent into assuming more
responsibility, petitioner suggested that they live separately from her in-laws.
However, the new living arrangement engendered further financial difficulty.
While petitioner struggled to make ends meet as the single-income earner of
the household, respondent’s business floundered. Thereafter, another attempt
at business, a fishpond in Mindoro, was similarly unsuccessful. Respondent
gave money to petitioner sporadically. Compounding the family’s financial
woes and further straining the parties’ relationship was the indifferent attitude
of respondent towards his family. That his business took him away from his
family did not seem to bother respondent; he did not exert any effort to remain
in touch with them while he was away in Mindoro.
After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence and, this
time, moved in with petitioner’s mother. But the new set up did not end their
marital difficulties. In fact, the parties became more estranged. Petitioner
continued to carry the burden of supporting a family not just financially, but in
most aspects as well.
In 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered a miscarriage, gave birth to
their third son. At that time, respondent was in Mindoro and he did not even
inquire on the health of either the petitioner or the newborn. A week later,
respondent arrived in Manila, acting nonchalantly while playing with the baby,
with nary an attempt to find out how the hospital bills were settled.
In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondent’s fishpond business stopped
operations. Although without any means to support his family, respondent
Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
refused to go back to work for the family business. Not surprisingly, the
relationship of the parties deteriorated.
Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-
marital affair. Petitioner soon realized that respondent was not only unable to
provide financially for their family, but he was, more importantly, remiss in his
obligation to remain faithful to her and their family.
One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties’ marriage was a
surgical operation on petitioner for the removal of a cyst. Although his wife was
about to be operated on, respondent remained unconcerned and inattentive;
and simply read the newspaper, and played dumb when petitioner requested
that he accompany her as she was wheeled into the operating room. After the
operation, petitioner felt that she had had enough of respondent’s lack of
concern, and asked her mother to order respondent to leave the recovery
room.
Adolfo Reyes, respondent’s elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina,
members of a marriage encounter group, invited and sponsored the parties to
join the group. The elder couple scheduled counseling sessions with
petitioner and respondent, but these did not improve the parties’ relationship
as respondent remained uncooperative.
In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a
psychological assessment to “determine benchmarks of current psychological
functioning.” As with all other attempts to help him, respondent resisted and
did not continue with the clinical psychologist’s recommendation to undergo
psychotherapy. At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of
respondent’s siblings, told respondent to move out of their house. Respondent
acquiesced to give space to petitioner. With the de facto separation, the
relationship still did not improve. Neither did respondent’s relationship with his
children.
Finally, in 2001, petitioner filed (before the RTC) a petition for the declaration
of nullity of her marriage with the respondent, alleging the latter’s psychological
incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioner’s allegations that he was
psychologically incapacitated. After trial (where the testimonies of two clinical
psychologists, Dr. Dayan and Dr. Estrella Magno, and a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia
Villegas, were presented in evidence), the RTC granted the petition and
declared the marriage between the parties null and void on the ground of their
psychological incapacity. The CA reversed. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
1. WON the respondent is suffering from psychological incapacity. YES
2. WON the marriage should be declared null and void under Art. 36. YES
HELD:
1. Taking into consideration the explicit guidelines in the determination of
psychological incapacity in conjunction to the totality of the evidence
presented, with emphasis on the pervasive pattern of behaviors of the
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- Newt Gingrich
 respondent and outcome of the assessment/diagnosis of expert
witnesses, Dra. Dayan, Dra. Mango and Dra. Villegas on the
psychological condition of the respondent, the Court finds that the
marriage between the parties from its inception has a congenital
infirmity termed “psychological incapacity” which pertains to the inability
of the parties to effectively function emotionally, intellectually and
socially towards each other in relation to their essential duties to
mutually observe love, fidelity and respect as well as to mutually render
help and support, (Art. 68 Family Code). In short, there was already a
fixed niche in the psychological constellation of respondent which
created the death of his marriage. There is no reason to entertain any
slightest doubt on the truthfulness of the personality disorder of the
respondent.
The three expert witnesses have spoken. They were unanimous in their
findings that respondent is suffering from personality disorder which
psychologically incapacitated him to fulfill his basic duties to the
marriage.
This psychological incapacity of the respondent, in the uniform words of
said three (3) expert witnesses, is serious, incurable and exists before
his marriage and renders him a helpless victim of his structural
constellation. It is beyond the respondent’s impulse control. In short, he
is weaponless or powerless to restrain himself from his
consistent behaviors simply because he did not consider the same as
wrongful. This is clearly manifested from his assertion that nothing was
wrong in his marriage with the petitioner and considered their
relationship as a normal one.
9. DIÑO vs. DIÑO
G.R. No. 178044
January 19, 2011
DOCTRINE:
Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared
void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared
void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties. In this
case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36
of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the
liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are
the rules on co-ownership.
FACTS:
Alain M. Diño and Ma. Caridad L. Diño got married on 14 January
1998 before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City.
was incurable and deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative
years.
The trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
at the time of the celebration of the marriage and declared their marriage void
ab initio. It ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be
issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Trial court, upon motion for partial reconsideration of petitioner, modified its
decision holding that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued
after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article
147 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
WON the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the
parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. YES
HELD:
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in a void marriage, regardless of its
cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of
the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the
Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be
present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each
other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife;
and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their
marriage is void.
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article
147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and
respondent.
The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage
shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis
because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under
Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule
applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final
judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of
the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio
under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without
waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either
by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains unless the
parties agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage settlement
entered into before the marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is
governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains,
there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a
decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is
governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under
Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what
governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and
respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the
property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period
of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses
should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-
ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, “partition may be made
by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x.” It is not
necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding
for declaration of nullity of marriage.

On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage Sec. 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a decision
against respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the
Family Code. decree of absolute nullity or decree
of annulment shall be issued by the court only
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag) submitted a psychological report establishing after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family
that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation,
Partition and Distribution of Properties.

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5
Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
10. YU vs. JUDGE REYES-CARPIO AND YU
G.R. No. 189207
June 15, 2011
DOCTRINE:
It is more proper to rule first on the declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of each party’s psychological incapacity to perform their respective
marital obligations. If the Court eventually finds that the parties’ respective
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage is indeed meritorious on the basis
of either or both of the parties’ psychological incapacity, then the parties
shall proceed to comply with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code before a
final decree of absolute nullity of marriage can be issued. Pending such ruling
on the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage, the Court finds no legal
ground, at this stage, to proceed with the reception of evidence in regard the
issues on custody and property relations, since these are mere incidents of the
nullity of the parties’ marriage.
FACTS:
Eric Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Caroline T.
Yu with the RTC of Pasig. Judge Suarez on May 30, 2006 issued an order
stating that Eric’s partial offer of evidence dated April 18, 2006 would be
submitted for resolution after certain exhibits have been remarked. But the
exhibits were only relative to the issue of the nullity of the marriage of Eric
and Caroline. On September 12, 2006, Caroline moved to submit the case for
resolution, considering that the incidents on custody, support, and property
relations (incidental issues) were mere consequences of the declaration of
nullity of the parties’ marriage.
Eric opposed this motion saying that the incident on declaration of nullity
cannot be resolved without presentation of evidence for the incidents on
custody, support, and property relations. Eric added that the incidental issues
and the issue on declaration of nullity can both proceed and be simultaneously
resolved. RTC ruled in favor of Eric’s opposition.
Caroline caused the inhibition of Judge Suarez, so that the case was re-raffled
to another branch presided by Judge Reyes-Carpio. While the case was being
tried by Judge Reyes-Carpio, Caroline filed an Omnibus Motion seeking the
strict observation by the said judge of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriage as codified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, and that the case
on the declaration on nullity be already submitted for resolution ahead of the
incidental issues, and not simultaneously. Eric opposed this motion.
Judge Reyes-Carpio granted the Omnibus Motion, saying that the main cause
of action is the declaration of nullity of the marriage and the incidental issues
are merely ancillary incidents thereto. Eric moved for reconsideration, which
was denied by Judge Reyes-Carpio. Eric then filed for certiorari with the CA
under Rule 65. CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether the main issue of nullity of marriage must be submitted for resolution
first before the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property
relations (incidental issues). NO
6
HELD:
It appears in the records that the Orders in question, or what are alleged to
have been exercised with grave abuse of discretion, are interlocutory orders.
An interlocutory order is one which “does not finally dispose of the case, and
does not end the Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and
determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously
indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court. Eric Yu to prove
that the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion and that
those were patently erroneous. Considering that the requisites that would
justify certiorari as an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order have
not been complied with, the proper recourse for petitioner should have been
an appeal in due course of the judgment of the trial court on the merits,
incorporating the grounds for assailing the interlocutory orders.
It must be noted that Judge Reyes-Carpio did not disallow the presentation of
evidence on the incidents on custody, support, and property relations. It is clear
in the assailed orders that the trial court judge merely deferred the reception of
evidence relating to custody, support, and property relations. And the trial
judge’s decision was not without basis. Judge Reyes-Carpio finds support in
the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages. Particularly, Secs. 19 and 21 of the Rule clearly allow the reception
of evidence on custody, support, and property relations after the trial court
renders a decision granting the petition, or upon entry of judgment granting the
petition:
Section 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a
decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein
that the decree of absolute nullity or decree
of annulment shall be issued by the court only after
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family
Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation,
Partition and Distribution of Properties.
Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution,
custody, support of common children and delivery of
their presumptive legitimes. – Upon entry of the
judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal,
upon receipt of the entry of judgment of
the appellate court granting the petition, the Family
Court, on motion of either party, shall proceed with
the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, including custody, support
of common children and delivery of their presumptive
legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family
Code unless such matters had been adjudicated in
previous judicial proceedings.
Evidently, Judge Reyes-Carpio did not deny the reception of evidence on
custody, support, and property relations but merely deferred it, based on the
existing rules issued by this Court, to a time when a decision granting the
petition is already at hand and before a final decree is issued. Conversely, the
trial court, or more particularly the family court, shall proceed with the
liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children, and
Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
delivery of their presumptive legitimes upon entry of judgment granting the
petition. And following the pertinent provisions of the Court En Banc Resolution
in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, this act is undoubtedly consistent with Articles 50
and 51 of the Family Code, contrary to what petitioner asserts. Particularly,
Arts. 50 and 51 of the Family Code state:
Article 50. The final judgment in such cases shall
provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses, the custody and
support of the common children, and the delivery of
their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had
been adjudicated in the previous judicial proceedings.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the
presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of the final judgment of the
trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or
sound securities, unless the parties, by
mutual agreement judicially approved, had already
provided for such matters.
Also, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly allows the deferment of the reception of
evidence on custody, support, and property relations. Conversely, the trial
court may receive evidence on the subject incidents after a judgment granting
the petition but before the decree of nullity or annulment of marriage is issued.
And this is what Judge Reyes-Carpio sought to comply with in issuing the
assailed orders. As correctly pointed out by the CA, Eric Yu’s assertion that
ruling the main issue without receiving evidence on the subject incidents would
result in an ambiguous and fragmentary judgment is certainly speculative and,
hence, contravenes the legal presumption that a trial judge can fairly weigh
and appraise the evidence submitted by the parties.
Therefore, it cannot be said at all that Judge Reyes-Carpio acted in a
capricious and whimsical manner, much less in a way that is patently gross
and erroneous, when she issued the assailed orders deferring the reception of
evidence on custody, support, and property relations. To reiterate, this decision
is left to the trial court’s wisdom and legal soundness. Consequently, therefore,
the CA cannot likewise be said to have committed grave abuse of discretion in
upholding the Orders of Judge Reyes-Carpio and in ultimately finding an
absence of grave abuse of discretion on her part.
11. REPUBLIC vs. NARCEDA
G.R No. 182760
April 10, 2013
FACTS:
Robert and Marina Narceda got married on July 22, 1987. Marina went to
Singapore in 1994 and never returned. Robert tried to look for her but he could
not find her. It was after several years that he was informed by a town mate
who came home from Singapore that his wife was already living with a
Singaporean husband.
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- Newt Gingrich
In view of his wife’s absence and his desire to remarry, Robert filed with the
RTC a petition for a declaration of presumptive death and/or absence of
Marina. The court then approved the petition. Petitioner appealed and claimed
that the respondent failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with
diligence required by law. The CA dismissed the appeal on the ground that the
judgment of the court in the summary proceeding is immediately final and
executory. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition. NO
2. Was respondent able to establish a well-founded belief that his absente
spouse is dead?
HELD:
1. By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a
summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As
a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court’s
judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes
without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for
certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with
the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court’s
original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs
and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not
sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the
decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the
Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may commit
in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the
proper subject of an appeal.
2. In this case, the OSG filed its notice of appeal under Article 42, but it
availed itself of the wrong remedy. As a result, the running of the period
for the filing of a Petition for Certiorari continued to run and was not
tolled. Upon the lapse of the period, the Decision of the RTC could no
longer be questioned. Consequently, petitioner’s contention that
respondent failed to establish a well-founded belief that his absentee
spouse is dead may no longer be entertained by this Court.
12. REPUBLIC vs. JOSE SARENOGON, JR.
G.R. No. 199194
Feb 10, 2016
FACTS:
On November 4, 2008, the respondent, Jose Sareñogon, filed a petition
before the RTC of Ozamiz to declare the presumptive death of his wife
Netchie Sareñogon. The petitioner testified that they got married and had
lived together as husband and wife for a month only because he left to
work as a seaman, while his wife, Netchie, went to Hongkong as a
domestic helper. For 3 months, he did not receive any communication
7
from Netchie and likewise had no idea about her whereabouts. While still
abroad, he tried to contact Netchie’s parents, but failed. He returned
home after his contract expired, then inquired from Netchie’s relatives
and friends about her whereabouts but they also did not know where she
was. Because of these, he had to presume that his wife, Netchie was
already dead. He filed the Petition before the RTC so he could contract
another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code.
Jose’s testimony was corroborated by his older brother Joel Sareñogon,
and by Netchie’s aunt, Consuelo Sande. These two witnesses testified
that Jose and Netchie lived together as husband and wife only for one
month prior to their leaving the Philippines for separate destinations
abroad and added that they had no information regarding Netchie’s
location.
On January 31, 2011, in the RTC’s decision found that Netchie had
disappeared for more than four years, reason enough for Jose to
conclude that his wife was indeed already dead.
The OSG questioned the RTC ruling via Rule 65 before the CA for the
RTC’s error in its misappreciation of evidence. The CA saw no error in
the RTC judgment and further held that Rule 65 is the wrong recourse in
elevating a declaration of presumptive death judgment from the RTC.
ISSUE:
WON the “well-founded belief” requisite under Article 41 (FC) was complied
with. NO
HELD:
This requisite needs the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was
the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the
absent spouse and that based upon these efforts and inquiries, he/she
believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already
dead. It requires exertion of active effort.
At the case at bar, the respondent, Jose Sareñogon, failed to satisfy the
required “well-founded belief” standard.
The respondent’s pathetically anemic efforts to locate the missing Netchie
are notches below the required degree of stringent diligence prescribed
by jurisprudence. For, aside from his bare claims that he had inquired form
alleged friends and relatives as to Netchie’s whereabouts, Jose
Sareñogon did not call to the witness stand specific individuals or persons
whom he allegedly saw or met in the course of his search or quest for the
allegedly missing Netchie. Neither did he prove that he sought the
assistance of the pertinent government agencies as well as the media.
Nor did he show that he undertook a thorough, determined, and unflagging
search for Netchie, say for at least two years, and naming the particular
places, provinces, cities, barangays, or municipalities that he visited, or
went to, and identifying the specific persons he interviewed or talked to in
the course of his search.
Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
13. REPUBLIC vs. TAMPUS
G.R. No. 214243
March 16, 2016
DOCTRINE:
The "well-founded belief' in the absentee's death requires the present spouse
to prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to
locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she
believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It
necessitates exertion of active effort, not a passive one. As such, the mere
absence of the spouse for such periods prescribed under the law, lack of any
news that such absentee spouse is still alive, failure to communicate, or
general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice.
FACTS:
Respondent Nilda was married to Dante on November 29, 1975 in Cordova,
Cebu. The marriage ceremony was solemnized by Municipal Judge Julian B.
Pogoy of Cordova, Cebu. Three days thereafter, or on December 2, 1975,
Dante, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), left
respondent, and went to Jolo, Sulu where he was assigned. The couple had
no children.
Since then, Nilda heard no news from Dante. She tried everything to locate·
him, but her efforts proved futile. Thus, on April 14, 2009, she filed before the
RTC a petition to declare Dante as presumptively dead for the purpose of
remarriage, alleging that after the lapse of thirty-three (33) years without any
kind of communication from him, she firmly believes that he is already dead.
RTC granted Nilda's petition. It found that Dante left the conjugal dwelling
sometime in 1975 and from then on, Nilda never heard from him again despite
diligent efforts to locate him. In this light, she believes that he had passed away
especially since his last assignment was a combat mission. Moreover, the RTC
found that the absence of thirty-three (33) years was sufficient to give rise to
the presumption of death. CA affirmed the RTC Decision.
ISSUE:
WON Dante has been correctly declared as presumptively dead. NO
HELD:
In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's disappearance, she tried to locate
him by making inquiries with his parents, relatives, and neighbors as to his
whereabouts, but unfortunately, they also did not know where to find him. Other
than making said inquiries, however, Nilda made no further efforts to find her
husband. She could have called or proceeded to the AFP headquarters to
request information about her husband, but failed to do so. She did not even
seek the help of the authorities or the AFP itself in finding him. She could have
inquired from the AFP on the status of the said mission, or from the members
of the AFP who were assigned thereto.
To the Court's mind, therefore, Nilda failed to actively look for her missing
husband, and her purported earnest efforts to find him by asking Dante's
parents, relatives, and friends did not satisfy the strict standard and degree of
diligence required to create a "well-founded belief' of his death.
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- Newt Gingrich
Furthermore, Nilda did not present Dante's family, relatives, or neighbors as
witnesses who could have corroborated her asseverations that she earnestly
looked for Dante. These resource persons were not even named.
Finally, other than Nilda's bare testimony, no other corroborative evidence had
been offered to support her allegation that she exerted efforts to find him but
was unsuccessful. What appears from the facts as. established in this case
was that Nilda simply allowed the passage of time without actively and
diligently searching for her husband, which the Court cannot accept as
constituting a "well-founded belief' that her husband is dead.
Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of
the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent
spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by the present spouse.
NOTE: The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all
the foregoing requisites under Article 41 of the Family Code exist. He who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence.
14. KALAW VS. HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 166357
September 19, 2011
FACTS:
Tyrone Kalaw and respondent Malyn Fernandez met in 1973 and eventually
married in Hong Kong in 1976. They have 4 children. Tyron had an affair with
Jocelyn Quejano, who gave birth to a son in 1983. In 1985, Malyn left
the conjugal home and her 4 children with Tyrone. Then Tyrone started living
with Jocelyn, who bore him 4more children.
Nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36. Tyrone presented a
psychologist, Dr. Gates, and a Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Healy, to testify
on Malyn’s psychological incapacity. Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the
factual allegations regarding Malyn’s behavior – her sexual infidelity, habitual
mahjong playing, and her frequent nights-out with friends – may reflect a
narcissistic personality disorder (NPD). Malyn’s NPD is manifest in her utter
neglect of her duties as a mother. Dr. Gates based her diagnosis on the facts
revealed by her interviews with Tyrone, Trinidad Kalaw (Tyrone’s sister-in-law),
and their son. Fr. Healy characterized Malyn’s psychological incapacity
as grave and incurable. He based his opinion on his interview with Tyrone, the
trial transcripts, as well as the report of Dr. Dayan, Malyn’s expert witness. He
clarified that he did not verify the truthfulness of the factual allegations
regarding Malyn’s “habits” because he believed it is the court’s duty to do so.
ISSUE:
Whether Tyrone has sufficiently proven that Malyn suffers from psychological
incapacity. NO
8
HELD:
The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff. The plaintiff
must prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or
behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that completely disables him
or her from understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the
marital state. The psychological problem must be grave, must have existed at
the time of marriage, and must be incurable.
Petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological
incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses
who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the
conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior
of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven.
Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s
constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends,
adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that
respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of
quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute
a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.
But petitioner’s allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises
of the conclusions of his experts, were not actually proven. In fact, respondent
presented contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the petitioner. What
transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may
have constrained them from dedicating the best of themselves to each other
and to their children. There may be grounds for legal separation, but
certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a marriage.
15. CARMEN LAPUZ SY vs. EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO
G.R. No. L-30977
January 31, 1972
FACTS:
On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation
against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging, in the main, that they were married civilly
on 21 September 1934; that they had lived together as husband and wife until
1943 when her husband abandoned her and discovered her husband
cohabiting with woman. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal
separation, which, would order that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should
be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.
In his answer respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio alleged affirmative and special
defenses.
Issues having been joined, trial proceeded and the parties adduced their
respective evidence. But before the trial could be completed, petitioner Carmen
O. Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular accident on 31 May 1969.
On 9 June 1969, respondent Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for legal
separation"1 contending that the death of Carmen had abated the action for
legal separation.
Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
On 29 July 1969, the court issued the order under review, dismissing the case.
Petitioner's moved to reconsider but the motion was denied.
The petitioner filed the present petition on 14 October 1969. The same was
given due course and answer thereto was filed by respondent, who prayed for
the affirmance of the said order.
ISSUE:
1. WON the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal
separation, abate the action? YES.
2. If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights?
YES.
RULING:
1. An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-
and-board separation of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in
this jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines
recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse
(and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by
providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the
proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already
rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one
party to the action causes the death of the action itself — actio personalis
moritur cum persona.
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death
of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are
mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself;
without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before
the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation.
2. A review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses
shows that they are solely the effect of the decree of legal separation;
hence, they cannot survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to
the decree. On the point, Article 106 of the Civil Code provides:
… the offending spouse shall have no
right to any share of the profits earned by
the partnership or community, without
prejudice to the provisions of article 176;
(4) The offending spouse shall be
disqualified from inheriting from the
innocent spouse by intestate succession.
xxx
From this article it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains (or of the absolute community of property),
the loss of right by the offending spouse to any share of the profits
earned by the partnership or community, or his disqualification to inherit
by intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of
testamentary provisions in favor of the offending spouse made by the
innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that, by the very terms of the
Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses;
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 and by their nature and intent, such claims and disabilities are difficult to
conceive as assignable or transmissible. Hence, a claim to said rights is
not a claim that "is not thereby extinguished" after a party dies.
16. SOCORRO MATUBIS vs. ZOILO PRAXEDES
G.R. No. L-11766
October 25, 1960
FACTS:
Alleging abandonment and concubinage, plaintiff filed a complaint for legal
Separation against her husband defendant Zoilo Praxedes. Defendant spouse,
who interposed the defense that it was plaintiff who left the conjugal home,
denied the allegations in the complaint.
The following facts were established:
Plaintiff and defendant were legally married on January 10, 1943. For failure to
agree on how they should live as husband and wife, the couple, on May 30,
1944, agreed to live separately from each other, which status remained
unchanged until the present. On April 3, 1948, plaintiff and defendant entered
into an agreement (Exhibit B), the significant portions of which are hereunder
reproduced.
. . . (a) That both of us relinquish our right over the other as legal
husband and wife.
(b) That both without any interference by any of us, nor either of
us can prosecute the other for adultery or concubinage or any
other crime or suit arising from our separation.
6(b) That both of us are free to get any mate and live with as
husband and wife without any interference by any of us, nor either
of us can prosecute the other for adultery.
In January, 1955, defendant began cohabiting with one Asuncion Rebulado. It
was shown also that defendant and Asuncion deported themselves as husband
and wife and were generally reputed as such in the community.
After the trial, without the defendant adducing any evidence, the court a
quo rendered judgment dismissing the complaint and simultaneously ruled that
the acts of defendant constituted concubinage, a ground for legal separation.
The above decision is now before us for review, plaintiff- appellant claiming
that it was error for the lower court to have considered that there was consent
on the part of the plaintiff to the concubinage and that the action has
prescribed.
ISSUE:
WON legal separation can prosper. NO
RULING:
Article 102 of the new Civil Code provides:
An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one
year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became
cognizant of the cause and within five years from after the date
when cause occurred.
9
The complaint was filed outside the periods provided for by the above Article.
By the very admission of plaintiff, she came to know the ground (concubinage)
for the legal separation in January, 1955. She instituted the complaint only on
April 24, 1956.
The very wording of the agreement gives no room for interpretation other than
that given by the trial judge. Condonation and consent on the part of plaintiff
are necessarily the import of paragraph 6(b) of the agreement. The
condonation and consent here are not only implied but expressed. The law
(Art. 100 Civil Code), specifically provides that legal separation may be claimed
only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or
consent to the adultery or concubinage. Having condoned and/or consented in
writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of the court's sympathy.
17. BENJAMIN BUGAYONG vs. LEONILA GINEZ
G.R. No. L-10033
December 28, 1956
FACTS:
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was married to
defendant Leonila Ginez on August 27, 1949. Immediately after their marriage,
the couple lived with their sisters who later moved to Sampaloc, Manila. After
some time, Leonila Ginez left and later moved to Dagupan City to study in a
local college there.
As early as July, 1951, Benjamin Bugayong began receiving letters from
Valeriana Polangco (plaintiff's sister-in-law) and some from anonymous
writers(which were not produced at the hearing) informing him of alleged acts
of infidelity of his wife. On cross-examination, plaintiff admitted that his wife
also informed him by letter, which she claims to have destroyed, that a certain
"Eliong" kissed her. All these communications prompted him in to seek advice
as to the propriety of a legal separation between him and his wife on account
of the latter's alleged acts of infidelity.
In August, 1952, plaintiff went to Asingan, Pangasinan, and sought for his wife.
She came along with him and both proceeded to the house of a cousin of the
plaintiff-husband, where they stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as
husband and wife. Then they repaired to the plaintiff's house and again passed
the night therein as husband and wife. On the second day, Benjamin Bugayong
tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received that she had
committed adultery but Leonila, instead of answering his query, merely packed
up and left, which he took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on
her. After that and despite such belief, plaintiff exerted efforts to locate her and
failing to find her, he went to Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, "to soothe his wounded
feelings".
On November 18, 1952, Benjamin Bugayong filed in the Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan a complaint for legal separation against his wife, Leonila Ginez,
who timely filed an answer vehemently denying the averments of the complaint
and setting up affirmative defenses. After plaintiff-husband finished testifying
Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
in his favor, counsel for the defendant orally moved for the dismissal of the
complaint.
The motion to dismiss was predicted on the assumption that the act charged
have been condoned by the plaintiff-husband.
The Court ordered the dismissal of the action. After the motion for
reconsideration was denied, plaintiff took the case to the SC
ISSUE:
WON condonation was effective so as to bar the action for legal separation.
YES
RULING:
The Civil Code provides:
ART. 100. The legal separation may be claimed
only by the innocent spouse, provided there has
been no condonation of or consent to the adultery
or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders,
a legal separation cannot by either of them.
Collusion between the parties to obtain legal
separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition.
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for
legal separation or, as stated in I Bouver's Law Dictionary, p. 585, condonation
is the "conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or wife of a
matrimonial offense which the latter has committed".
In this case, we have to consider plaintiff's line of conduct under the
assumption that he really believed his wife guilty of adultery. What did he do in
such state of mind. In August, 1952, he went to Pangasinan and looked for his
wife and after finding her they lived together as husband and wife for 2 nights
and 1 day. Now, do the husband's attitude of sleeping with his wife for 2 nights
despite his alleged belief that she was unfaithful to him, amount to a
condonation of her previous and supposed adulterous acts?
Although no acts of infidelity might have been committed by the wife, We agree
with the trial judge that the conduct of the plaintiff-husband above narrated
despite his belief that his wife was unfaithful, deprives him, as alleged the
offended spouse, of any action for legal separation against the offending wife,
because his said conduct comes within the restriction of Article 100 of the Civil
Code.
The only general rule in American jurisprudence is that any cohabitation with
the guilty party, after the commission of the offense, and with the knowledge
or belief on the part of the injured party of its commission, will amount to
conclusive evidence of condonation; but this presumption may be rebutted by
evidence.
There is no ruling on this matter in our jurisprudence but we have no reason to
depart from the doctrines laid down in the decisions of the various supreme
courts of the United States.
18. WILLIAM H. BROWN vs. JUANITA YAMBAO
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- Newt Gingrich
 G.R. No. L-10699
October 18, 1957
FACTS:
On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of
Manila to obtain legal separation from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He
alleged under oath that while interned by the Japanese invaders, from 1942 to
1945, at the University of Sto. Tomas internment camp, his wife engaged in
adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby girl that
Brown learned of his wife’s misconduct only in 1945, upon his release from
internment; that thereafter the spouse lived separately and later executed a
document liquidating their conjugal partnership and assigning certain
properties to the erring wife as her share. The complaint prayed for
confirmation of the liquidation agreement.
The court subsequently declared the wife in default for failure to answer in due
time despite service of summons and directed the City Fiscal to investigate, in
accordance with Article 101 of the Civil Code, to determine whether or not
collusion exists between the parties.
As ordered, Assistant City Fiscal Rafael Jose appeared at the trial, and cross-
examined plaintiff Brown. His questions elicited, that after the liberation, Brown
had lived maritally with another woman and begot a child. Thereafter, the trial
court rendered judgment denying the legal separation on the ground that, while
the wife's adultery was established, Brown had incurred a misconduct of similar
nature that barred his right of action under Article 100 of the new Civil Code,
providing:
ART. 100. The legal separation may be claimed only
by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation or of consent to the adultery or
concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a
legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them.
Collusion between the parties to obtain legal
separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner can be considered as an innocent spouse to avail the
remedy of legal separation. NO
RULING:
Collusion in matrimonial cases being "the act of married persons in procuring
a divorce by mutual consent, whether by preconcerted commission by one of
a matrimonial offense, or by failure, in pursuance of agreement to defend
divorce proceedings" (Cyclopedia Law Dictionary; Nelson, Divorce and
Separation, Section 500), it was legitimate for the Fiscal to bring to light any
circumstances that could give rise to the inference that the wife's default was
calculated, or agreed upon, to enable appellant to obtain the decree of legal
separation that he sought without regard to the legal merits of his case. One
such circumstance is obviously the fact of Brown's cohabitation with a woman
other than his wife, since it bars him from claiming legal separation by express
provision of Article 100 of the new Civil Code. Wherefore, such evidence of
such misconduct, were proper subject of inquiry as they may justifiably be
considered circumstantial evidence of collusion between the spouses.
10
19. ARABELLE J. MENDOZA vs. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 157649
November 12, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioner and Dominic met in 1989 upon his return to the country from his
employment in Papua New Guinea. They had been next-door neighbors in the
appartelle they were renting while they were still in college – she, at
Assumption College while he, at San Beda College taking a business
management course. After a month of courtship, they became intimate and led
to her pregnancy. They got married on June 24, 1991, after which they moved
to her place.
When petitioner delivered their daughter, the spouses scrambled to find money
for support of the family.
On his part, however, Dominic spent some of his salary on celebratory bashes
with his friends inasmuch as petitioner shouldered all the household expenses
and their child’s schooling because Dominic’s irregular income could not be
depended upon. In September 1994, she discovered his illicit relationship with
Zaida, his co-employee at Toyota Motors. Eventually, communication between
them became rare until they started to sleep in separate rooms, thereby
affecting their sexual relationship.
In November 1995, Dominic gave her a Daihatsu Charade car as a birthday
present. Later on, he asked her to issue two blank checks that he claimed
would be for the car’s insurance coverage. She soon found out, however, that
the checks were not paid for the car’s insurance coverage but for his personal
needs. Worse, she also found out that he did not pay for the car itself, forcing
her to rely on her father-in-law to pay part of the cost of the car, leaving her to
bear the balance of P120,000.00.
To make matters worse, Dominic was fired from his employment after he ran
away with P164,000.00 belonging to his employer. He was criminally charged
with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa, for which he was arrested
and incarcerated.
On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal abode because
petitioner asked him for "time and space to think things over." A month later,
she refused his attempt at reconciliation, causing him to threaten to commit
suicide. At that, she and her family immediately left the house to live in another
place concealed from him.
On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for the declaration
of the nullity of her marriage with Dominic based on his psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) opposed the petition.
On August 18, 2000, the RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and
Dominic an absolute nullity.
Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
The RTC found that all the characteristics of psychological incapacity, i.e.,
gravity, antecedence and incurability, as set forth in Republic v. Court of
Appeals (Molina), were attendant, establishing Dominic’s psychological
incapacity.
All told, the callous and irresponsible ways of respondent show that he does
not possess the proper outlook, disposition and temperament necessary for
marriage. Indeed, this ultimate recourse of nullity is the only way by which
petitioner can be delivered from the bondage of a union that only proved to be
a mockery and brought pain and dishonor to petitioner.
The Republic appealed to the CA, arguing that there was no showing that
Dominic’s personality traits either constituted psychological incapacity existing
at the time of the marriage or were of the nature contemplated by Article 36 of
the Family Code; that the testimony of the expert witness, while persuasive,
was not conclusive upon the court; and that the real reason for the parties’
separation had been their frequent quarrels over financial matters and the
criminal cases brought against Dominic.
On March 19, 2003 the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the
judgment of the RTC. Specifically, it refused to be bound by the findings and
conclusions of petitioner’s expert witness.
ISSUE:
WON the husband is psychologically incapacitated to appreciate the legal
union. NO
RULING:
The CA correctly indicated that the ill-feelings that she harbored towards
Dominic, which she admitted during her consultation with Dr. Samson,
furnished the basis to doubt the findings of her expert witness.
The failure to examine and interview Dominic himself naturally cast serious
doubt on Dr. Samson’s findings. The CA rightly refused to accord probative
value to the testimony of such expert for being avowedly given to show
compliance with the requirements set in Santos and Molina for the
establishment of Dominic’s psychological incapacity.
The CA’s reliance on Dagdag, Hernandez and Pesca was not misplaced.
Apparent from the aforecited pronouncements is that it was not the absence of
the medical expert’s testimony alone that was crucial but rather petitioners’
failure to satisfactorily discharge the burden of showing the existence of
psychological incapacity at the inception of the marriage. In other words, the
totality of the evidence proving such incapacity at and prior to the time of the
marriage was the crucial consideration.
In Ting v. Velez-Ting:
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical
and understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by
psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to
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- Newt Gingrich
determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the
psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are
not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not
indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case
presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the expert
opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced
in the course of the proceedings.
If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.
We find the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioner insufficient to prove
that Dominic was psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him
as a husband, and that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of
the date of the marriage. Accordingly, the CA did not err in dismissing the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
If at all, they would constitute a ground only for an action for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code.
20. MARIANO B. ARROYO vs. DOLORES C. VASQUEZ DE
ARROYO
G.R. No. L-17014
August 11, 1921
FACTS:
Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C. Vasquez de Arroyo were united in the year
1910, and since that date, they have lived together as man and wife in the city
of Iloilo until July 4, 1920, when the wife went away from their common home
with the intention of living thenceforth separate from her husband. After efforts
had been made by the husband without avail to induce her to resume marital
relations, this action was initiated by him to compel her to return to the
matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife.
In answer, defendant, admitted the fact of marriage, but she averred by way of
defense and cross-complaint that she had been compelled to leave by cruel
treatment on the part of her husband.
Upon hearing the case the lower court gave judgment in favor of the defendant,
authorizing her to live apart from her husband, granting her alimony at the rate
of P400 per month. The plaintiff thereupon appealed to this court.
ISSUE:
1. WON wife is entitled to alimony. NO
2. WON wife can be compelled to return. NO
RULING:
11
The evidence shows that the wife is afflicted with a disposition of jealousy
towards her husband in an aggravated degree; and to his cause are chiefly
traceable without a doubt the many miseries that have attended their married
life. The tales of cruelty on the part of the husband towards the wife, which are
the basis of the cross-action, are in our opinion no more than highly colored
versions of personal wrangles in which the spouses have allowed themselves
from time to time to become involved and would have little significance apart
from the morbid condition exhibited by the wife. The judgment must therefore
be recorded that the abandonment by her of the marital home was without
sufficient justification in fact.
Alimony
To begin with, the obligation which the law imposes on the
husband to maintain the wife is a duty universally recognized in civil society
and is clearly expressed in articles 142 and 143 of the Civil code. The
enforcement of this obligation by the wife against the husband is not
conditioned upon the procurement of a divorce by her, nor even upon the
existence of a cause for divorce. Accordingly it had been determined that
where the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial abode and to live apart from
her husband, she can, in this jurisdiction, compel him to make provision for her
separate maintenance; and he may be required to pay the expenses, including
attorney's fees, necessarily incurred in enforcing such obligation.
Nevertheless, the interests of both parties as well as of society at large require
that the courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the
separate maintenance of the wife, for this step involves a recognition of the de
facto separation of the spouses — a state which is abnormal and fraught with
grave danger to all concerned. From this consideration it follows that provision
should not be made for separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it
appears that the continued cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and
separation necessary from the fault of the husband.
In the light of the considerations stated, it is obvious that the cross-complaint
is not well founded and none of the relief sought therein can be granted.
Mandatory injunction to compel wife to return
The same considerations that require the dismissal of the cross-
complaint conclusively prove that the plaintiff, Mariano B. Arroyo, has done
nothing to forfeit his right to the marital society of his wife and that she is under
an obligation, both moral and legal, to return to the common home and cohabit
with him. The only question which here arises is as to the character and extent
of the relief which may be properly conceded to him by judicial decree.
The action is one by which the plaintiff seeks the restitution of conjugal rights;
and it is supposed in the petitory part of the complaint that he is entitled to a
permanent mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to return to the
conjugal home and live with him as a wife according to the precepts of law and
morality. Of course if such a decree were entered, in unqualified terms, the
defendant would be liable to attachment for contempt, in case she should
refuse to obey it; and, so far as the present writer is aware, the question is
raised for the first time in this jurisdiction whether it is competent for the court
to make such an order.
Upon examination of the authorities we are convinced that it is not within the
province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses
Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the
property rights of one of the pair are invaled, an action for restitution of such
rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that
an order, enforceable by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the
restitution of the purely personal rights of consortium. At best such an order
can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under
the same roof; and the experience of these countries where the court of justice
have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the
policy of the practice is extremely questionable.
(Omitted citations of foreign tribunal showing failed results in compelling return
because wife would be cited in contempt…something like that )
We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is entitled
to the unconditional and absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital
domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the complaint; though he is,
without doubt, entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has presented
herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return.
It is declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself from the
marital home without sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty
to return.
21. ILUSORIO vs. BILDNER
(2000)
FACTS:
Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio.
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property
valued at millions of pesos.
On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony
and lived together for a period of thirty (30) years. In 1972, they separated from
bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta
Condominium, Ayala Ave., Makati City when he was in Manila and at Ilusorio
Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other
hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.
On December 30, 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from the United States, he
stayed with Erlinda for about five (5) months in Antipolo City. The children,
Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin), alleged that during this time, their mother gave
Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant
drug prescribed by his doctor in New York, U.S.A. As a consequence,
Potenciano’s health deteriorated.
On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City
a petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano Ilusorio
due to the latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired
judgment.
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On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City,
Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at
Cleveland Condominium, Makati.
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas
corpus to have the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that
respondents (children) refused petitioner’s demands to see and visit her
husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband
to live with her. NO
RULING:
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into
all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal.
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must
be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or
deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s liberty that would justify the
issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years
of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition
but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.
As to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s mental state, the Court of Appeals observed
that he was of sound and alert mind, having answered all the relevant
questions to the satisfaction of the court.
Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices.
In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his residence and the people he
opts to see or live with. The choices he made may not appeal to some of his
family members but these are choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano.
He made it clear before the Court of Appeals that he was not prevented from
leaving his house or seeing people. With that declaration, and absent any true
restraint on his liberty, we have no reason to reverse the findings of the Court
of Appeals.
With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano
Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice.
Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless to say, this will
run against his fundamental constitutional right.
The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of
a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case
the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so
without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with
his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas
12
corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter
beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice.
(2001) MFR Denied
On October 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio filed with the Supreme Court an
appeal via certiorari pursuing her desire to have custody of her husband
Potenciano Ilusorio.
The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. The sanction therefor is the
"spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order" to enforce consortium.
Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and
Potenciano, having separated from bed and board since 1972. We
defined empathy as a shared feeling between husband and wife experienced
not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual
communion. Marital union is a two-way process.
Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with "amor
gignit amorem" respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to
togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
22. SSS vs. GLORIA DE LOS SANTOS
(2008)
FACTS:
Antonio de los Santos and respondent Gloria de los Santos, both Filipinos,
were married on April 29, 1964 in Manila. Less than one (1) year after, in
February 1965, Gloria left Antonio and contracted another marriage with a
certain Domingo Talens in Nueva Ecija. Sometime in 1969, Gloria went back
to Antonio and lived with him until 1983. They had three children.
In 1983, Gloria left Antonio and went to the United States (US). On May 8,
1986, she filed for divorce against Antonio with the Superior Court of Orange,
Sta. Ana, California. On May 21, 1983, she executed a document waiving all
her rights to their conjugal properties and other matters. The divorce was
granted on November 5, 1986.
On May 23, 1987, Antonio married Cirila de los Santos in Camalig, Albay. On
her part, Gloria married Larry Thomas Constant, an American citizen, on July
11, 1987, in the US.
On May 15, 1989, Antonio amended his records at the Social Security System
(SSS). He changed his beneficiaries from Mrs. Margarita de los Santos to Cirila
de los Santos; from Gloria de los Santos to May-Ann de los Santos; and from
Erlinda de los Santos to Armine de los Santos.
Antonio retired from his employment on March 1, 1996, and from then on
began receiving monthly pension. He died on May 15, 1999. Upon his death,
Cirila applied for and began receiving his SSS pension benefit, beginning
December 1999.
Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
On December 21, 1999, Gloria filed a claim for Antonio’s death benefits with
SSS. Her claim was denied because she was not a qualified beneficiary of
Antonio.
The SSC deemed that Gloria abandoned Antonio when she obtained a divorce
against him abroad and subsequently married another man. She thus failed to
satisfy the requirement of dependency required of primary beneficiaries under
the law. The Commission likewise rejected her efforts to use the invalidity of
the divorce, which she herself obtained, to claim benefits from the SSS for her
personal profit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gloria qualifies as a dependent of Antonio. NO
RULING:
We find that she is still disqualified to be his primary beneficiary under the SS
Law. She fails to fulfill the requirement of dependency upon her deceased
husband Antonio.
Social Security System v. Aguas is instructive in determining the extent of the
required "dependency" under the SS Law. In Aguas, the Court ruled that
although a husband and wife are obliged to support each other, whether one
is actually dependent for support upon the other cannot be presumed from the
fact of marriage alone.
Further, Aguas pointed out that a wife who left her family until her husband died
and lived with other men, was not dependent upon her husband for support,
financial or otherwise, during the entire period.
Respondent herself admits that she left the conjugal abode on two (2) separate
occasions, to live with two different men. The first was in 1965, less than one
year after their marriage, when she contracted a second marriage to Domingo
Talens. The second time she left Antonio was in 1983 when she went to the
US, obtained a divorce, and later married an American citizen.
In fine, these uncontroverted facts remove her from qualifying as a primary
beneficiary of her deceased husband.
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23. REPUBLIC vs. CA and MOLINA
FACTS:
August 16, 1990, respondent Roridel O. Molina filed a verified petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the
petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at
the San Agustin Church in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that
after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and
irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more
time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he
depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with
his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them;
that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila,
and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in
October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their
relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job
in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks
later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned
them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of
complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and
habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be
served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage
declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an
incompatible marriage from the start.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage is null and void under Art. 36 of the Family Code.
NO
RULING:
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals this Court ruled that "psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . .
and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition
must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." "The psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the
psychological defect spoken of is incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a
"difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and
"conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is
not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her
husband could not get along with each other. There had been no showing of
the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability.
The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but
only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity.
13
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits
were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage
celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to
fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's
part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such
failure of expectation is not indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity.
If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes
of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the
facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty
of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts
interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae,
namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, a member of the Family Code
Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of
the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral
argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written
memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code
are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not
physical. Although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, were mentally or physically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of
the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition.
24. VALENCIA vs. LOCQUIAO
(2003)
FACTS:
On May 22, 1944, Herminigildo and Raymunda Locquiao executed a deed of
donation propter nuptias which was written in the Ilocano dialect, denominated
as Inventario Ti Sagut in favor of their son, respondent Benito Locquiao
(hereafter, respondent Benito) and his prospective bride, respondent Tomasa
Mara (hereafter, respondent Tomasa). By the terms of the deed, the donees
were gifted with four (4) parcels of land, including a parcel of land consisting of
4,876 square meters situated in Urdaneta, Pangasinan which was originally
owned by the spouses, as well as a male cow and one-third (1/3) portion of the
conjugal house of the donor parents, in consideration of the impending
marriage of the donees.
The donees took their marriage vows on June 4, 1944 and the fact of their
marriage was inscribed at the back of O.C.T. No. 18383.
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Herminigildo and Raymunda died on December 15, 1962 and January 9, 1968,
respectively, leaving as heirs their six (6) children including respondent Benito
and petitioner Romana. With the permission of respondents Benito and
Tomasa, petitioner Romana Valencia (hereinafter, Romana) took possession
and cultivated the subject land. When respondent Romana’s husband got sick
sometime in 1977, her daughter petitioner Constancia Valencia (hereafter,
petitioner Constancia) took over, and since then, has been in possession of the
land.
Meanwhile, respondents Benito and Tomasa registered the Inventario Ti
Sagut with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan on May 15, 1970.
In due course, the original title was cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 84897 was issued in the name of the respondents Benito
and Tomasa.
On March 18, 1973, the heirs of the Locquiao spouses, including respondent
Benito and petitioner Romana, executed a Deed of Partition with Recognition
of Rights, wherein they distributed among only three (3) of them, the twelve
(12) parcels of land left by their common progenitors, excluding the land in
question and other lots disposed of by the Locquiao spouses earlier.
Later on, disagreements among five (5) heirs or groups of heirs, including
petitioner Romana, concerning the distribution of two (2) of the lots covered by
the deed of partition which are Lots No. 2467 and 5567 of the Urdaneta
Cadastral Survey surfaced. It was later on settled.
Sometime in 1983, the apparent calm pervading among the heirs was
disturbed when petitioner Constancia filed an action for annulment of title
against the respondents before the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan,
questioning the validity of the donation because it was not accepted by the
donees in a public instrument.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation propter nuptias is valid.
RULING:
Unlike ordinary donations, donations propter nuptias or donations by reason of
marriage are those "made before its celebration, in consideration of the same
and in favor of one or both of the future spouses." The distinction is crucial
because the two classes of donations are not governed by exactly the same
rules, especially as regards the formal essential requisites.
Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made in a public
instrument in which the property donated must be specifically described.
However, Article 1330 of the same Code provides that "acceptance is not
necessary to the validity of such gifts". In other words, the celebration of
the marriage between the beneficiary couple, in tandem with compliance with
the prescribed form, was enough to effectuate the donation propter nuptias
under the Old Civil Code.
Under the New Civil Code, the rules are different. Article 127 thereof provides
that the form of donations propter nuptias are regulated by the Statute of
Frauds. Article 1403, paragraph 2, which contains the Statute of Frauds
requires that the contracts mentioned thereunder need be in writing only to be
14
enforceable. However, as provided in Article 129, express acceptance "is not
necessary for the validity of these donations." Thus, implied acceptance is
sufficient.
The pivotal question, therefore, is which formal requirements should be applied
with respect to the donation propter nuptias at hand. Those under the Old Civil
Code or the New Civil Code?
It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are
applicable thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are specifically
intended to have retroactive effect. Consequently, it is the Old Civil Code which
applies in this case since the donation propter nuptias was executed in 1944
and the New Civil Code took effect only on August 30, 1950. As a
consequence, applying Article 1330 of the Old Civil Code in the determination
of the validity of the questioned donation, it does not matter whether or not the
donees had accepted the donation. The validity of the donation is unaffected
in either case.
Even if the provisions of the New Civil Code were to be applied, the case of the
petitioners would collapse just the same. As earlier shown, even implied
acceptance of a donation propter nuptias suffices under the New Civil Code.
25. SOLIS vs. BARROSO
(1928)
FACTS:
The spouses Juan Lambino and Maria A. Barroso begot three children named
Alejo, Eugenia and Marciana Lambino. On June 2, 1919 said spouses made a
donation of propter nuptias of the lands described in the complaint in favor of
their son Alejo Lambino and Fortunata Solis in a private document in
consideration of the marriage which the latter were about to enter into. One of
the conditions of this donation is that in case of the death of one of the donees,
one-half of these lands thus donated would revert to the donors while the
surviving donee would retain the other half.
On the 8th of the said month of June 1919, Alejo Lambino and Fortunata Solis
were married and immediately thereafter the donors delivered the possession
of the donated lands to them. On August 3, 1919 donee Alejo Lambino died.
In the same year donor Juan Lambino also died. After the latter's death, his
wife, Maxima Barroso, recovered possession of the donated lands.
The surviving donee Fortunata Solis filed the action, which is the subject matter
of this appeal, against the surviving donor Maxima Barroso and the heirs of the
deceased donor Juan Lambino, with their respective husbands, demanding of
the defendants the execution of the proper deed of donation according to law,
transferring one-half of the donated property, and moreover, to proceed to the
partition of the donated property and its fruits.
The court rendered judgment based upon article 1279 of the Civil Code
granting plaintiff's prayer and ordering the defendants to execute a deed of
donation in favor of the plaintiff, adequate in form and substance to transfer to
the latter the legal title to the part of the donated lands assigned to her in the
original donation.
Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation propter nuptias is valid. NO (note the year of the
case)
RULING:
We are of the opinion that article 1279 of the Civil Code, relating to contracts,
is not applicable to the present case.
We are concerned with a donation propter nuptias, which, according to article
1328 of the Civil Code, must be governed by the rules established in Title II,
Book III of this Code, on donations (articles 618 to 656), Article 633 provides
that in order that a donation of real property may be valid, it must be made in
a public instrument. This is the article applicable to donation propter nuptias in
so far as its formal validity is concerned. The only exceptions to this rule are
onerous and remuneratory donations, in so far as they do not exceed the value
of the charge imposed, which are then governed by the rules on contracts (art.
622), and those which are to take effect upon the donor's death, which are
governed by the rules established for testamentary successions (art. 620).
We have, therefore, a donation propter nuptias which is not valid and did not
create any right, since it was not made in a public instrument, and hence, article
1279 of the Civil Code which the lower court applied is not applicable thereto.
The last named article provides that, should the law require the execution of
an instrument or any other special form in order to make the obligations of a
contract effective, the contracting parties may compel each other to comply
with such formality from the moment that consent has been given, and the
other requirements for the validity of the contract exist. Suffice it to state that
this article refers to contracts and is inapplicable to the donation in question
which must be governed by the rules on donations. It may further be noted, at
first sight, that this article presupposes the existence of a valid contract and
cannot possibly refer to the form required in order to make it valid, which it
already has, but rather to that required simply to make it effective, and for this
reason, it would, at all events, be inapplicable to the donation in question,
wherein the form is required precisely to make it valid.
But the lower court states in its judgment that the present donation is onerous,
and pursuant to article 622 of the Civil Code must be governed by the rules on
contracts. This opinion is not well founded. Donations for valuable
consideration, as may be inferred from article 619 of the Civil Code, are such
as compensate services which constitute debts recoverable from the donor, or
which impose a charge equal to the amount of the donation upon the donee,
neither of which is true of the present donation, which was made only in
consideration of marriage. The lower court insists that, by the fact that this is a
donation propter nuptias, it is based upon the marriage as a consideration, and
must be considered onerous. Neither is this opinion well founded. In
donations propter nuptias, the marriage is really a consideration, but not in the
sense of being necessary to give birth to the obligation. This may be clearly
inferred from article 1333, which makes the fact that the marriage did not take
place a cause for the revocation of such donations, thus taking it for granted
that there may be a valid donation propter nuptias, even without marriage,
since that which has not existed cannot be revoked. And such a valid donation
would be forever valid, even if the marriage never took place, if the proper
action for revocation were not instituted, or if it were instituted after the lapse
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of the statutory period of prescription. This is, so because the marriage in a
donation propter nuptias is rather a resolutory condition which, as such,
presupposes the existence of the obligation which may be resolved or revoked,
and it is not a condition necessary for the birth of the obligation.
26. MATEO VS. LAGUA
(1969)
FACTS:
Cipriano Lagua was the original registered owner of 3 parcels of land situated
in Asingan, Pangasinan, referred to as Lot No. 998, with an area of 11,080
sq.m., more or less; Lot No. 6541, with an area of 808 sq.m., more or less; and
Lot No. 5106, with an area of 3,303 sq.m. Sometime in 1917, Lagua and his
wife Alejandra Dumlao, in a public instrument, donated Lots 998 and 6541 to
their son Alejandro Lagua, in consideration of the latter's marriage to Bonifacia
Mateo. The marriage was celebrated on 15 May 1917, and thereafter, the
couple took possession of the properties, but the Certificates of Title remained
in the donor's name.
In 1923, the son, Alejandro, died. His widow, Bonifacia Mateo, and her infant
daughter lived with her father-in-law, Cipriano Lagua, who then undertook the
farming of the donated lots.
On 31 July 1941, Cipriano Lagua, executed a deed of sale of the same two
parcels of land in favor of his younger son, Gervasio. This sale notwithstanding,
Bonifacia Mateo was continuously given the owner's share of the harvest until
1956, when it was altogether stopped. It was only then that Bonifacia Mateo
learned of the sale of the lots to her brother-in-law, who had the sale in his
favor registered only on 22 September 1955.
On 18 August 1957, an action was filed, this time by Gervasio Lagua and
Cipriano Lagua, for annulment of the donation of the two lots, insofar as one-
half portion thereof was concerned (civil Case No. T-442). It was their claim
that in donating the two lots, which allegedly were all that plaintiff Cipriano
Lagua owned, said plaintiff not only neglected leaving something for his own
support but also prejudiced the legitime of his forced heir, plaintiff Gervasio
Lagua.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation should be annulled or merely reduced. (Reduce if
found inofficious)
RULING:
We are in accord with the Court of Appeals that Civil Case No. 442 is not one
exclusively for annulment or revocation of the entire donation, but of merely
that portion thereof allegedly trenching on the legitime of respondent Gervasio
Lagua; that the cause of action to enforce Gervasio's legitime, having accrued
only upon the death of his father on 12 November 1958, the dispute has to be
governed by the pertinent provisions of the new Civil Code; and that a
donation proper nuptias property may be reduced for being inofficious.
Contrary to the views of appellants (petitioners), donations proper nuptias (by
reason of marriage) are without onerous consideration, the marriage being
15
merely the occasion or motive for the donation, not its causa. Being liberalities,
they remain subject to reduction for inofficiousness upon the donor's death, if
they should infringe the legitime of a forced heir.
It is to be noted, however, that in rendering the judgment under review, the
Court of Appeals acted on several unsupported assumptions: that the three (3)
lots mentioned in the decision (Nos. 998, 5106 and 6541) were
the only properties composing the net hereditary estate of the deceased
Cipriano Lagua; that Alejandro Lagua and Gervasio Lagua were his only legal
heirs; that the deceased left no unpaid debts, charges, taxes, etc., for which
the estate would be answerable.3 In the computation of the heirs' legitime, the
Court of Appeals also considered only the area, not the value, of the properties.
The infirmity in the above course of action lies in the fact that in its Article 908
the new Civil Code specifically provides as follows:
ART. 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the
property left at the death of the testator shall be
considered, deducting all debts, and charges, which
shall not include those imposed in the will.
To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be
added the value of all donations by the testator that
are subject to collation, at the time he made them.
In other words, before any conclusion about the legal share due to a
compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken
first. The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting an
payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the
deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would
be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitimes of the
compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only thereafter can it be
ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes. Certainly,
in order that a donation may be reduced for being inofficious, there must be
proof that the value of the donated property exceeds that of the disposable free
portion plus the donee's share as legitime in the properties of the donor. In the
present case, it can hardly be said that, with the evidence then before the court,
it was in any position to rule on the inofficiousness of the donation involved
here, and to order its reduction and reconveyance of the deducted portion to
the respondents.
27. CORNELIA MATABUENA vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES
G.R. No. L-28771
March 31, 1971
DOCTRINE:
While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a "donation between the
spouses during the marriage", policy considerations of the most exigent
character as well as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition
should apply to a common-law relationship.
FACTS:
The plaintiff, now appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a sister of the deceased Felix
Matabuena, maintains that a donation made while he was living maritally
Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
without benefit of marriage to defendant, now appellee Petronila Cervantes,
was void. Defendant would uphold its validity. The lower court, after noting
that it was made at a time before defendant was married to the donor,
sustained the latter's stand. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ban on a donation between the spouses during a marriage
applies to a common-law relationship. YES
RULING:
Art. 133 of the Civil Code provides: "Every donation between the spouses
during the marriage shall be void. This prohibition does not apply when the
donation takes effect after the death of the donor. Neither does this prohibition
apply to moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion
of any family rejoicing."
If the policy of the law is, in the language of the opinion of the then Justice J.
B. L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort
and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and
influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; then
there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living
together as husband and wife without benefit of nuptials. The questioned
donation is declared void, with the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro
indiviso heirs to the property in question recognized.
28. NENITA BIENVENIDO vs. CA and LUISITA CAMACHO
G.R. No. 111717
October 24, 1994
DOCTRINE:
An action for declaration of the nullity of such donations, on the principle
embodied in Art. 739(1) of the Civil Code which declares donations made
between persons who are guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the
donation to be void, can only be brought by the innocent spouse, perhaps in
this case by the first wife, but certainly not by Luisita whose marriage to Aurelio
is itself void.
FACTS:
Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on October 3, 1942.
On February 6, 1962, without his marriage to Consejo Velasco being dissolved,
Aurelio P. Camacho contracted another marriage with respondent Luisita C.
Camacho (Luisita) with whom he had been living since 1953 and by whom he
begot a child, respondent Aurelio Luis Faustino C. Camacho (Chito) born on
May 22, 1961. The marriage was solemnized in Tokyo, Japan where Aurelio
and Luisita had been living since 1958.
In 1967 Aurelio met petitioner Nenita T. Bienvenido, who had been estranged
from her husband, Luis Rivera. Aurelio courted her and apparently won her
heart because from June 1968 until Aurelio's death on May 28, 1988, he lived
with her, the last time in a duplex apartment on 84 Scout Delgado Street,
Quezon City.
Aurelio bought the house and the lot on Delgado Street and executed a deed
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of sale of the property in favor of petitioner Nenita in consideration of the sum
of P250,000.00. When Aurelio died, Luisita was granted with the death benefits
by the Armed Forces of the Philippines as the surviving spouse of Aurelio.
Soon she also claimed ownership of the house and lot on Scout Delgado Street
in which Nenita had been living. The two met at a barangay conciliation
meeting but efforts to settle their dispute failed.
Luisita sought the annulment of the sale of the property to petitioner and the
payment to them of damages. She alleged that the deed of sale was a forgery
and that in any event it was executed in fraud of her as the legitimate wife of
Aurelio. The trial court upheld the validity of the sale. The appellate court
reversed the decision of the lower court. Hence, this petition. The resolution of
this case hinges on the validity of Aurelio's marriage to respondent Luisita. If
that marriage was valid then the property was property of their conjugal
partnership and Luisita is the proper party to question the validity of the sale to
Nenita. Otherwise, if the marriage is not valid, Luisita cannot bring this suit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage of Aurelio and Luisita is valid. NO
RULING:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the
lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first
spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) the first spouse had been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the
absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he
has been absent for less than seven years, is
generally considered as dead and believed to be so
by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed
dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage
so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases
until declared null and void by a competent court.
What applies in this case, therefore, is the general rule, i.e., since Aurelio had
a valid, subsisting marriage to Consejo Velaso, his subsequent marriage to
respondent Luisita was void for being bigamous.
Consequently, there is no basis for holding that the property in question was
property of the conjugal partnership of Luisita and the late Aurelio because
there was no such partnership in the first place.
29. EMILIE T. SUMBAD vs. CA
G.R. No. 106060
June 21, 1999
DOCTRINE:
Time and again, this Court has ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue for the
first time on appeal as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and
justice.
16
FACTS:
After the death of his wife, Agata B. Tait, in 1936, George K. Tait, Sr. lived in
common-law relationship with Maria F. Tait to whom on April 2, 1974 he
donated a certain parcel of unregistered land in Sitio Sum-at, Bontoc. When
George died, Maria sold the lots included within the Sum-at property in favor
of private respondents, who purchased the lots on the strength of a Tax
Declaration over the Sum-at property showing the seller, Maria F. Tait, to be
the owner of the property in question and thereafter planted different kinds of
fruit trees and plants on the lots purchased by them.
On July 24, 1989, petitioners Emilie T. Sumbad and Beatrice B. Tait brought
an action for quieting of title, nullification of deeds of sale, and recovery of
possession with damages against private respondents. The trial court
dismissed the complaint. The CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation is valid. YES
RULING:
Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect
between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts
which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing.
The prohibition shall apply to persons living together as husband and wife
without a valid marriage.
This point is being raised for the first time in this Court. The records show that
in the trial court, petitioners attack on the validity of the deed of donation
centered solely on the allegation that George K. Tait, Sr.s signature had been
forged and that the person who notarized the deed had no authority to do so.
But petitioners never invoked Art. 133 of the Civil Code as a ground to
invalidate the deed of donation.
Even assuming that they are not thus precluded, petitioners were unable to
present evidence in support of such a claim. The evidence on record does not
show whether George K. Tait, Sr. was married to Maria F. Tait and, if so, when
the marriage took place. If, as petitioners claim, Maria F. Tait was not married
to their father, evidence should have been presented to show that at the time
the deed of donation was executed, their father and Maria F. Tait were still
maintaining common-law relations. Beatrice Taits testimony is only to the effect
that in 1941 Maria F. Tait became their stepmother. There is no evidence on
record that George K. Tait, Sr. and Maria F. Tait continuously maintained
common-law relations until April 2, 1974 when the donation was made.
30. SSS vs. CANDELARIA D. DAVAC
G.R. No. L-21642
July 30, 1966
DOCTRINE:
If there is a named beneficiary and the designation is not invalid (as it is not so
in this case), it is not the heirs of the employee who are entitled to receive the
benefits (unless they are the designated beneficiaries themselves). It is only
when there is no designated beneficiary or when the designation is void, that
Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
the laws of succession are applicable. And we have already held that the Social
Security Act is not a law of succession.
FACTS:
The late Petronilo Davac, a former employee of Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc.
became a member of the Social Security System (SSS for short) on September
1, 1957. In the Member's Record which he accomplished and filed with the
SSS on November 21, 1957, he designated respondent Candelaria Davac as
his beneficiary and indicated his relationship to her as that of "wife". He died
on April 5, 1959 and, thereupon, each of the respondents (Candelaria Davac
and Lourdes Tuplano) filed their claims for death benefit with the SSS.
It appears from their respective claims and the documents submitted in support
thereof, that the deceased contracted two marriages, the first, with claimant
Lourdes Tuplano on August 29, 1946, who bore him a child, Romeo Davac,
and the second, with Candelaria Davac on January 18, 1949, with whom he
had a minor daughter Elizabeth Davac. Due to their conflicting claims, the
processing thereof was held in abeyance, whereupon the SSS filed this petition
praying that respondents be required to interpose and litigate between
themselves their conflicting claims over the death benefits in question.
The resolution of the Social Security Commission declared respondent
Candelaria Davac as the person entitled to receive the death benefits payable
for the death of Petronilo Davac.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Social Security Commission acted correctly in declaring
respondent Candelaria Davac as the person entitled to receive the death
benefits in question. YES
RULING:
Section 13, Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by Republic Act No. 1792, in
force at the time Petronilo Davac's death on April 5, 1959, provides:
1. SEC. 13. Upon the covered employee's death or
total and permanent disability under such conditions
as the Commission may define, before becoming
eligible for retirement and if either such death or
disability is not compensable under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, he or, in case of his death, his
beneficiaries, as recorded by his employer shall be
entitled to the following…
Under this provision, the beneficiary "as recorded" by the employee's employer
is the one entitled to the death benefits. In the case of Tecson vs. Social
Security System, this Court, construing said Section 13, said:
It may be true that the purpose of the coverage under the Social Security
System is protection of the employee as well as of his family, but this purpose
or intention of the law cannot be enforced to the extent of contradicting the very
provisions of said law as contained in Section 13, thereof. When the provisions
of a law are clear and explicit, the courts can do nothing but apply its clear and
explicit provisions.
31. CIRILA ARCABA vs. ERLINDA TABANCURA vda. DE
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 2018-2019
- Newt Gingrich
 BATOCAEL
G.R. No. 146683
November 22, 2001
DOCTRINE:
Cohabitation, of course, means more than sexual intercourse, especially when
one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex. At the
very least, cohabitation is public assumption by a man and a woman of the
marital relation, and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding
themselves out to the public as such.
FACTS:
Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered
owners of Lot No. 437-A located at the corner of Calle Santa Rosa (now
Balintawak Street) and Calle Rosario (now Rizal Avenue) in Dipolog City,
Zamboanga del Norte. After the death of Zosima on October 3, 1980, Francisco
and his mother-in-law, Juliana Bustalino Montallana, executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her share
consisting of one-fourth (1/4) of the property to Francisco.5 On June 27, 1916,
Francisco registered the lot in his name with the Registry of Deeds. A few
months before his death, Francisco executed an instrument denominated
"Deed of Donation Inter Vivos," made in consideration of "the faithful services
[Cirila Arcaba] had rendered over the past ten (10) years." in which he ceded
a portion of Lot 437-A, consisting of 150 square meters, together with his
house, to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same instrument.
Respondents filed a complaint against petitioner 'for declaration of nullity of a
deed of donation inter vivos, recovery of possession, and damages.
Respondents, who are the decedent's nephews and nieces and his heirs by
intestate succession, alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco
and the donation inter vivos made by Francisco in her favor is void under Article
87 of the Family Code. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of
respondents. The CA affirmed the lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied Art. 87 of the Family
Code to the circumstances of this case. YES
RULING:
Article 87 of the Family Code provides:
Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage,
direct or indirect, between the spouses during the
marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which
the spouses may give each other on the occasion of
any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply
to persons living together as husband and wife
without a valid marriage.
Cirila admitted that she and Francisco resided under one roof for a long time,
It is very possible that the two consummated their relationship, since Cirila gave
Francisco therapeutic massage and Leticia said they slept in the same
bedroom. At the very least, their public conduct indicated that theirs was not
just a relationship of caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive partners akin
to husband and wife.
17
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and
Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the
inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila
is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
32. MARIA B. CHING vs. JOSEPH C. GOYANKO
G.R. No. 165879
November 10, 2006
DOCTRINE:
We find that the contract of sale was null and void for being contrary to morals
and public policy. The sale was made by a husband in favor of a concubine
after he had abandoned his family and left the conjugal home where his wife
and children lived and from whence they derived their support. The sale was
subversive of the stability of the family, a basic social institution which public
policy cherishes and protects.
FACTS:
On December 30, 1947, Joseph Goyanko (Goyanko) and Epifania dela Cruz
(Epifania) were married. Out of the union were born respondents Joseph, Jr.,
Evelyn, Jerry, Imelda, Julius, Mary Ellen and Jess, all surnamed Goyanko.
Respondents claim that in 1961, their parents acquired a 661 square meter
property located at 29 F. Cabahug St., Cebu City but that as they (the parents)
were Chinese citizens at the time, the property was registered in the name of
their aunt, Sulpicia Ventura (Sulpicia). Sulpicia executed a deed of sale over
the property in favor of respondents’ father Goyanko. In turn, Goyanko
executed on October 12, 1993 a deed of sale over the property in favor of his
common-law-wife-herein petitioner Maria B. Ching.
Respondents thus filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a complaint
for recovery of property and damages against petitioner, praying for the
nullification of the deed of sale and of TCT No. 138405 and the issuance of a
new one in favor of their father Goyanko. The trial court dismissed the
complaint against petitioner. The appellate court reversed that of the trial court
and declared null and void the questioned deed of sale.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract of sale was null and void. YES
RULING:
Article 1409 of the Civil Code states inter alia that: contracts whose cause,
object, or purposes is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy are void and inexistent from the very beginning.
Article 1352 also provides that: "Contracts without cause, or with unlawful
cause, produce no effect whatsoever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy."
Additionally, the law emphatically prohibits the spouses from selling property
to each other subject to certain exceptions. Similarly, donations between
Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
spouses during marriage are prohibited. And this is so because if transfers or
conveyances between spouses were allowed during marriage, that would
destroy the system of conjugal partnership, a basic policy in civil law. It was
also designed to prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over
the other, as well as to protect the institution of marriage, which is the
cornerstone of family law. The prohibitions apply to a couple living as husband
and wife without benefit of marriage, otherwise, "the condition of those who
incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union."
33. IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY ELENA
BUENAVENTURA MULLER vs. HELMUT MULLER
G.R. No. 149615
August 29, 2006
DOCTRINE:
It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that
to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly.
He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come
with clean hands. The latter is a frequently stated maxim which is also
expressed in the principle that he who has done inequity shall not have equity.
It signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground
that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or
deceitful as to the controversy in issue.
Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the
ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the
property despite the constitutional prohibition.
FACTS:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were
married in Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in
Germany at a house owned by respondent’s parents but decided to move and
reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent had
inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the
proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of
P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting to P2,300,000.00. The
Antipolo property was registered in the name of petitioner under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 219438 5 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro
Manila.
Due to incompatibilities and respondent’s alleged womanizing, drinking, and
maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated. On September 26, 1994,
respondent filed a petition 6 for separation of properties before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City.
On August 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision which terminated the
regime of absolute community of property between the petitioner and
respondent. It also decreed the separation of properties between them and
ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the country,
excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to
the Antipolo property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal
funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover his
funds because the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII
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of the Constitution.
Respondent claims that he is not praying for transfer of ownership of the
Antipolo property but merely reimbursement; that the funds paid by him for the
said property were in consideration of his marriage to petitioner; that the funds
were given to petitioner in trust; and that equity demands that respondent
should be reimbursed of his personal funds.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for
the acquisition of the Antipolo property. NO
RULING:
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly admitted
his knowledge thereof to this Court. He declared that he had the Antipolo
property titled in the name of petitioner because of the said prohibition. His
attempt at subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the said property
cannot be sustained. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust
was created and resulted by operation of law in view of petitioner’s marriage to
respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession,
respondent’s disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute.
Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is
made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision,
no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. To hold
otherwise would allow circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
34. PACIFIC ACE FINANCE LTD. vs. EIJI YANAGISAWA G.R. No.
175303
April 11, 2012
DOCTRINE:
An undertaking not to dispose of a property pending litigation, made in open
court and embodied in a court order, and duly annotated on the title of the said
property, creates a right in favor of the person relying thereon. The latter may
seek the annulment of actions that are done in violation of such undertaking.
FACTS:
Respondent Eiji Yanagisawa (Eiji), a Japanese national, and Evelyn F.
Castañeda (Evelyn), a Filipina, contracted marriage on July 12, 1989 in the
City Hall of Manila. On August 23, 1995, Evelyn purchased a 152 square-meter
townhouse unit located at Bo. Sto. Niño, Parañaque, Metro Manila (Parañaque
townhouse unit). In 1996, Eiji filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage with Evelyn on the ground of bigamy (nullity of marriage case).
During the pendency of the case, Eiji asked that Evelyn be enjoined from
disposing or encumbering all of the properties registered in her name. At the
hearing on the said motion, Evelyn and her lawyer voluntarily undertook not to
dispose of the properties registered in her name during the pendency of the
18
case, thus rendering Eiji’s application and motion moot.
Sometime in March 1997, Evelyn obtained a loan of ₱500,000.00 from
petitioner Pacific Ace Finance Ltd. (PAFIN) which she secured by real estate
mortgage (REM) over the Parañaque townhouse unit covered by TCT No.
99791. At the time of the mortgage, Eiji’s appeal in the nullity of marriage case
was pending before the CA. Upon learning so, Eiji filed a complaint for the
annulment of REM (annulment of mortgage case) against Evelyn and PAFIN.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Eiji has a cause of action against the defendants and is entitled
to the reliefs prayed for despite the fact that he is not the registered owner of
the property being a Japanese national. YES
RULING:
The issue of ownership and liquidation of properties acquired during the
cohabitation of Eiji and Evelyn has been submitted for the resolution of the
Makati RTC, and is pending appeal before the CA. The doctrine of judicial
stability or non-interference dictates that the assumption by the Makati RTC
over the issue operates as an "insurmountable barrier" to the subsequent
assumption by the Parañaque RTC. By insisting on ruling on the same issue,
the Parañaque RTC effectively interfered with the Makati RTC’s resolution of
the issue and created the possibility of conflicting decisions. It has been held
that "even in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, it is, also, axiomatic that the court
first acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other courts."
The October 2, 1996 Order, embodying Evelyn’s commitment not to dispose
of or encumber the property, is akin to an injunction order against the
disposition or encumbrance of the property. Jurisprudence holds that all acts
done in violation of a standing injunction order are voidable as to the party
enjoined and third parties who are not in good faith. The party, in whose favor
the injunction is issued, has a cause of action to seek the annulment of the
offending actions.
35. WILLEM BEUMER vs. AVELINA AMORES
G.R. No. 195670
December 3, 2012
DOCTRINE:
In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant
reimbursement to petitioner given that he acquired no right whatsoever over
the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is well-
established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be
done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly.
FACTS:
Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, married in March 29,
1980. After several years, the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 32, declared the
nullity of their marriage in the Decision dated November 10, 2000 on the basis
of the former’s psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of the
Family Code. He then filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership
dated December 14, 2000 praying for the distribution properties claimed to
Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
have been acquired during the subsistence of their marriage. Petitioner
testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the name of
respondent, these properties were acquired with the money he received from
the Dutch government as his disability benefit since respondent did not have
sufficient income to pay for their acquisition.
The trial court ruled that, regardless of the source of funds for the acquisition
of Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4, petitioner could not have acquired any right
whatsoever over these properties as petitioner still attempted to acquire them
notwithstanding his knowledge of the constitutional prohibition against foreign
ownership of private lands. The CA affirmed in toto the lower court’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has acquired any right over the properties in question.
NO
RULING:
Under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which reads:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred
or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the above-cited
constitutional prohibition" and even asseverated that, because of such
prohibition, he and respondent registered the subject properties in the latter’s
name. Clearly, petitioner’s actuations showed his palpable intent to skirt the
constitutional prohibition. On the basis of such admission, the Court finds no
reason why it should not apply the Muller ruling and accordingly, deny
petitioner’s claim for reimbursement. Thus, as petitioner has come before the
Court with unclean hands, he is now precluded from seeking any equitable
refuge.
36. SPS. ABRENICA vs. LAW FIRM OF ABRENICA
G.R. No. 180572
June 18, 2012
DOCTRINE:
The rules of procedure were formulated to achieve the ends of justice, not to
thwart them. It is true that the Rules should be interpreted so as to give litigants
ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and that a possible denial of
substantial justice due to legal technicalities should be avoided. But it is equally
true that an appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing party must
strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. In other
words, he who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must play by the rules.
FACTS:
Petitioner Atty. Erlando A. Abrenica was a partner of individual respondents,
Attys. Danilo N. Tungol and Abelardo M. Tibayan, in the Law Firm of Abrenica,
Tungol and Tibayan ("the firm"). In 1998, respondents filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) two cases against petitioner. The SEC
initially heard the cases but they were later transferred to the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City pursuant to Republic Act No. 8799, which transferred
jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies from the SEC to the courts. We
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note that petitioners were married on 28 May 1998. The cases filed with the
SEC on 6 May 1998 and 15 October 1998 were filed against petitioner Erlando
only. It was with the filing of CA-G.R. SP No. 98679 on 24 April 2007 that Joena
joined Erlando as a co-petitioner.
While the 28 August 2007 motion was pending, on 13 September 2007,
petitioner Erlando filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion13 with Branch 226, alleging
that the sheriff had levied on properties belonging to his children and petitioner
Joena. In addition, Erlando alleged that the trial court still had to determine the
manner of distribution of the firm’s assets and the value of the levied properties.
On the same day, Joena filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim14 also with
Branch 226 of the RTC of Quezon City, alleging that she and her stepchildren
owned a number of the personal properties sought to be levied. She also
insisted that she owned half of the two (2) motor vehicles as well as the house
and lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 216818, which formed
part of the absolute community of property. She likewise alleged that the real
property, being a family home, and the furniture and the utensils necessary for
housekeeping having a depreciated combined value of one hundred thousand
pesos (₱ 100,000) were exempt from execution pursuant to Rule 39, Section
13 of the Rules of Court. Thus, she sought their discharge and release and
likewise the immediate remittance to her of half of the proceeds, if any.
However, petitioner Erlando moved to withdraw his motion on account of
ongoing negotiations with respondents. Petitioners alleged that because they
were denied due process when the CA rejected their second attempt at the
annulment of the Decision of the RTC and their Humble Motion for
Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in denying the petition. NO
RULING:
Petitioners may not defy the pronouncement of this Court in G.R. No. 169420
by pursuing remedies that are no longer available to them. Twice, the CA
correctly ruled that the remedy of annulment of judgment was no longer
available to them, because they had already filed an appeal under Rule 41.
Due to their own actions, that appeal was dismissed.
With regard to the allegation of petitioner Joena that her right to due process
was violated, it must be recalled that after she filed her Affidavit of Third Party
Claim on 13 September 2007 and petitioner Erlando filed his Urgent Omnibus
Motion raising the same issues contained in that third-party claim, he
subsequently filed two Motions withdrawing his Urgent Omnibus Motion.
Petitioner Joena, meanwhile, no longer pursued her third-party claim or any
other remedy available to her. Her failure to act gives this Court the impression
that she was no longer interested in her case. Thus, it was through her own
fault that she was not able to ventilate her claim.
37. FRANCISCO MUÑOZ, JR. vs. ERLINDA RAMIREZ
G.R. No. 156125
August 25, 2010
DOCTRINE:
19
Article 120 of the Family Code, which supersedes Article 158 of the Civil Code,
provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that
are made on the separate property of the spouses, at the expense of the
partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses. Under this
provision, when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in
value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement,
the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal
partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-
spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be
retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement
of the cost of the improvement
FACTS:
The residential lot in the subject property was previously covered by TCT No.
1427, in the name of Erlinda Ramirez, married to Eliseo Carlos. On April 6,
1989, Eliseo, a Bureau of Internal Revenue employee, mortgaged TCT No.
1427, with Erlinda’s consent, to the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) to secure a ₱136,500.00 housing loan, payable within twenty (20)
years, through monthly salary deductions of ₱1,687.66.8 The respondents
then constructed a thirty-six (36)-square meter, two-story residential house on
the lot.
On July 14, 1993, the title to the subject property was transferred to the
petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, dated April 30, 1992, executed
by Erlinda, for herself and as attorney-in-fact of Eliseo, for a stated
consideration of ₱602,000.00. The respondents filed a complaint with the RTC
for the nullification of the deed of absolute sale, claiming that there was no sale
but only a mortgage transaction, and the documents transferring the title to the
petitioner’s name were falsified. The petitioner, on the other hand, introduced
evidence on the paraphernal nature of the subject property since it was
registered in Erlinda’s name. The RTC dismissed the complaint. The CA
declared void the deed of absolute sale, and set aside the RTC decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the subject property is paraphernal or conjugal. PARAPHERNAL
RULING:
As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the
acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name
of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is
proved.
In the present case, clear evidence that Erlinda inherited the residential lot from
her father has sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal ownership.
Pursuant to Articles 9236 and 10937 of the Family Code, properties acquired
by gratuitous title by either spouse, during the marriage, shall be excluded from
the community property and be the exclusive property of each spouse. The
residential lot, therefore, is Erlinda’s exclusive paraphernal property. The CA
misapplied Article 158 of the Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas. Thus, in
determining the nature of the subject property, we refer to the provisions of the
Family Code, and not the Civil Code, except with respect to rights then already
vested.
In the present case, we find that Eliseo paid a portion only of the GSIS loan
Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
through monthly salary deductions. From April 6, 1989 to April 30, 1992, Eliseo
paid about ₱60,755.76,44 not the entire amount of the GSIS housing loan plus
interest, since the petitioner advanced the ₱176,445.2745 paid by Erlinda to
cancel the mortgage in 1992. Considering the ₱136,500.00 amount of the
GSIS housing loan, it is fairly reasonable to assume that the value of the
residential lot is considerably more than the ₱60,755.76 amount paid by Eliseo
through monthly salary deductions. Thus, the subject property remained the
exclusive paraphernal property of Erlinda at the time she contracted with the
petitioner; the written consent of Eliseo to the transaction was not necessary.
The NBI finding that Eliseo’s signatures in the special power of attorney and
affidavit were forgeries was immaterial.
38. SPS. ROBERTO BUADO and VENUS BUADO vs. CA
G.R. No. 145222
April 24, 2009
DOCTRINE:
To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation
contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have
accrued to the conjugal partnership.
FACTS:
Spouses Roberto and Venus Buado filed a complaint for damages against
Erlinda Nicol (Erlinda) which action originated from Erlinda’s civil liability arising
from the criminal offense of slander filed against her by petitioners. Finding
Erlinda Nicol’s personal properties insufficient to satisfy the judgment, the
Deputy Sheriff issued a notice of levy on real property on execution addressed
to the Register of Deeds of Cavite. The auction sale proceeded with petitioners
as the highest bidder.
Romulo Nicol (respondent), the husband of Erlinda Nicol, filed a complaint for
annulment of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunction
against petitioners and the deputy sheriff. Respondent, as plaintiff therein,
alleged that the defendants, now petitioners, connived and directly levied upon
and execute his real property without exhausting the personal properties of
Erlinda Nicol. RTC dismissed the complaint. On appeal, CA reversed the
RTC’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the husband of the judgment debtor may file an independent
action to protect the conjugal property subject to execution. YES
RULING:
In determining whether the husband is a stranger to the suit, the character of
the property must be taken into account. In Mariano v. Court of Appeals, which
was later adopted in Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that
the husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a "stranger" to the case
prosecuted and adjudged against his wife for an obligation that has redounded
to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. On the other hand, in Naguit v. Court
of Appeals and Sy v. Discaya, the Court stated that a spouse is deemed a
stranger to the action wherein the writ of execution was issued and is therefore
justified in bringing an independent action to vindicate her right of ownership
over his exclusive or paraphernal property.
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There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122 of
the Family Code explicitly provides that payment of personal debts contracted
by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged
to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of
the family. To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal
obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is
shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership.
Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either
spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute
community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property
of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of
conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to
make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse.
39. SPS. DAR vs. HON. ROSE MARIE ALONZO-LEGASTO
G.R. No. 143016
August 30, 2000
DOCTRINE:
Circular No. 28-91 was designed to serve as an instrument to promote and
facilitate the orderly administration of justice and should not be interpreted with
such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective
or the goal of all rules of procedure - which is to achieve substantial justice as
expeditiously as possible.
FACTS:
Nenita Co Bautista filed a case for unlawful detainer against herein petitioners.
They were sued as Mr. and Mrs. in the said case. Petitioners now contend that
since what is involved in the instant case is their common rights and interest to
abode under the system of absolute community of property, either of the
spouses can sign the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition is dismissible when the spouses of petitioners failed
to sign the Certificate of Non-forum Shopping. NO
RULING:
Revised Circular No. 28-91, dated February 8, 1994 applies to and governs the
filing of petitions in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and is intended
to prevent the multiple filing of petitions or complaints involving the same issues
in other tribunals or agencies as a form of forum shopping.
With respect to the contents of the certification which the pleader may prepare,
the rule of substantial compliance may be availed of. While this section requires
that it be strictly complied with, it merely underscores its mandatory nature in
that it cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely
disregarded but it does not thereby prevent substantial compliance on this
aspect of its provisions under justifiable circumstances.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals should have taken into consideration
the fact that the petitioners were sued jointly, or as Mr. and Mrs. over a property
20
in which they have a common interest. Such being the case, the signing of one
of them in the certification substantially complies with the rule on certification
of non-forum shopping.
40. PHILIP MATTHEWS vs. BENJAMIN A. TAYLOR
G.R. No. 164584
June 22, 2009
DOCTRINE:
The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire
public or private lands in the Philippines, save only in constitutionally
recognized exceptions.
FACTS:
On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (Benjamin), a British
subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor (Joselyn), a 17-year old Filipina. On June 9,
1989, while their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought from Diosa M. Martin
a 1,294 square-meter lot (Boracay property) situated at Manoc-Manoc,
Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, for and in consideration of ₱129,000.00. The
sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin. Joselyn and Benjamin, also using
the latter’s funds, constructed improvements thereon and eventually converted
the property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow
Inn.
However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with
Kim Philippsen. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed an SPA in favor of
Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and
otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their Boracay
property. On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews
as lessee, entered into an Agreement of Lease involving the Boracay property
for a period of 25 years, with an annual rental of ₱12,000.00. The agreement
was signed by the parties and executed before a Notary Public. Petitioner
thereafter took possession of the property and renamed the resort as Music
Garden Resort.
Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by
Joselyn without his (Benjamin’s) consent, Benjamin instituted an action for
Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages against Joselyn
and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the acquisition
and improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he
was Joselyn’s husband, any transaction involving said property required his
consent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the consent of the foreign spouse is indispensable for the
validity of the agreement. NO
RULING:
The trial and appellate courts both focused on the property relations of
petitioner and respondent in light of the Civil Code and Family Code provisions.
They, however, failed to observe the applicable constitutional principles, which,
in fact, are the more decisive.
Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
There is no rule more settled than this constitutional prohibition, as more and
more aliens attempt to circumvent the provision by trying to own lands through
another. In a long line of cases, we have settled issues that directly or indirectly
involve the constitutional provision. We had cases where aliens wanted that a
particular property be declared as part of their father’s estate; that they be
reimbursed the funds used in purchasing a property titled in the name of
another; that an implied trust be declared in their (aliens’) favor; and that a
contract of sale be nullified for their lack of consent.
Thus, Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn
and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring
private and public lands in the Philippines. In any event, he had and has no
capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay
property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising
the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such
a theory would countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional
prohibition.
41. HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. vs. ESTER SERVACIO
G.R. No. 157537
September 7, 2011
FACTS:
In 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land to Protacio B. Go, Jr.
(Protacio, Jr.). Twenty three years later, or on March 29, 1999, Protacio, Jr.
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver, whereby he affirmed under
oath that it was his father, Protacio Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who had
purchased the two parcels of land.
In 1987, Marta Barola Go died. She was the wife of Protacio, Sr. and mother
of the petitioners. On December 28, 1999, Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go
sold a portion of the property to Ester L. Servacio. In 2001, the petitioners
demanded the return of the property, but Servacio refused to heed their
demand. The petitioners averred that following Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation, the
property became conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to
Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property between
Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void.
Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had exclusively owned the
property because he had purchased it with his own money.
Servacio and Rito both argue that Article 130 of the Family Code was
inapplicable; that the want of the liquidation prior to the sale did not render the
sale invalid, because the sale was valid to the extent of the portion that was
finally allotted to the vendors as his share; and that the sale did not also
prejudice any rights of the petitioners as heirs, considering that what the sale
disposed of was within the aliquot portion of the property that the vendors were
entitled to as heirs.
ISSUE:
W/N the sale of the property to Servacio is void? NO
HELD:
Article 130 of the Family Code reads:
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 Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by
death, the conjugal partnership property shall be
liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the
surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal
partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially
within one year from the death of the deceased
spouse. If upon the lapse of the six month period no
liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance
involving the conjugal partnership property of the
terminated marriage shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent
marriage without compliance with the foregoing
requirements, a mandatory regime of complete
separation of property shall govern the property
relations of the subsequent marriage.
Article 130 is to be read in consonance with Article 105 of the Family Code,
viz:
Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the
marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains shall govern their property
relations during marriage, the provisions in this
Chapter shall be of supplementary application.
Before applying such rules, however, the conjugal partnership of gains must
be subsisting at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code. There being no
dispute that Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988, their property relation was properly
characterized as one of conjugal partnership governed by the Civil Code. Upon
Marta’s death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to
Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued
among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in
the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following its
liquidation. The ensuing implied ordinary co-ownership was governed by
Article 493 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full
ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights
are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in
the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of
Marta’s share in the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to
any specific portion of Marta’s share without an actual partition of the property
21
being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he
had was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta’s share. Nonetheless, a co-owner
could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell
and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-
owners. Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without
the consent of the other co-owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of
the selling co-owners were thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer
(Servacio) a co-owner of Marta’s share. This result conforms to the well-
established principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as
far as it is legally possible to do so (quando res non valet ut ago, valeat
quantum valere potest).
Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the applicability
of the rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is "without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
This provision gives another reason not to declare the sale as entirely void.
Indeed, such a declaration prejudices the rights of Servacio who had already
acquired the shares of Protacio, Sr. and Rito in the property subject of the sale.
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell
his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the
consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of
the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of
the property.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for
the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third person
who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the
PARTITION of the common property under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
42. UGALDE vs. YSASI
G.R. No. 130623
February 29, 2008
FACTS:
In 1951, Lorea de Ugalde (petitioner) and Jon de Ysasi (respondent) got
married. Petitioner and respondent separated sometime in April 1957. On 26
May 1964, respondent allegedly contracted another marriage with Victoria
Eleanor Smith (Smith) before Judge Lucio M. Tanco of Pasay City. Petitioner
further alleged that respondent and Smith had been acquiring and disposing of
real and personal properties to her prejudice as the lawful wife. Petitioner
alleged that she had been defrauded of rental income, profits, and fruits of their
conjugal properties.
In 1984, petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
gains against respondent. Petitioner also prayed for a monthly support
of P5,000 to be deducted from her share in the conjugal partnership; the
appointment of a receiver during the pendency of the litigation; the annulment
of all contracts, agreements, and documents signed and ratified by respondent
with third persons without her consent.
Respondent countered that on 2 June 1961, he and petitioner entered into an
agreement which provided, among others, that their conjugal partnership of
Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
gains shall be deemed dissolved as of 15 April 1957. In its Order dated 6 June
1961, the CFI approved the Amicable Settlement.
ISSUE:
WON the conjugal partnership of gains between the spouses was already
dissolved when the Amicable Settlement was approved by the CFI? YES
HELD:
Petitioner and respondent were married on 15 February 1951. The applicable
law at the time of their marriage was Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known
as the Civil Code. Pursuant to Article 119 of the Civil Code, the property regime
of petitioner and respondent was conjugal partnership of gains.
Article 142 of the Civil Code defines conjugal partnership of gains, as follows:
Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of
gains the husband and wife place in a common fund
the fruits of their separate property and the income
from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon
the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership,
the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by
either spouse during the marriage.
Under Article 175 of the Civil Code, the judicial separation of property results
in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains:
Art. 175. The conjugal partnership of gains
terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under
Article 191.
The finality of the 6 June 1961 Order in Civil Case No. 4791 approving the
parties' separation of property resulted in the termination of the conjugal
partnership of gains in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code.
43. QUIAO vs. QUIAO
G.R. No. 176556
July 04, 2012
FACTS:
Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner
Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal
separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in favor of
Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally between the spouses
subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the
unpaid conjugal liabilities.
Brigido’s share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership
is forfeited in favor of the common children because Brigido is the offending
spouse.
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period
270 days later or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the
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Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking
the RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned.”
RTC held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes “the remainder of
the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of
the] spouse and the debts.” It further held that after determining the remainder
of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because
the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits
earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.
3.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129
of the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article
102 applies because there is no other provision under the Family Code which
defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Art. 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on
dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is applicable in this case.
ART. 129 WILL GOVERN.
2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights over ½ of the
properties in the conjugal partnership. NO
3. Is the computation of “net profits” earned in the conjugal partnership of
gains the same with the computation of “net profits” earned in the
absolute community? NO
HELD:
1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the
current family code, the default rule is that In the absence of marriage
settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code,
shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses’ marriage
the operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the
instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of
the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.
2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the
spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains
under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of
the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article
143 of the Civil Code, which provides: “All property of the conjugal
partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife.”
While one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the
same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and
jurisprudence.
44.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due
process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her
complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact,
22
in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the
community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as
circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory
of all the community properties of the parties. Second, when the
decision for legal separation was promulgated, the petitioner never
questioned the trial court’s ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed
as “net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the
petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process.
When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the
husband and the wife become joint owners of all the properties of the
marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and
those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under
Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple’s
properties. And when the couple’s marriage or community is dissolved,
that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective
heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established,
irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned.
In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has
been established that the spouses have no separate properties, what
will be divided equally between them is simply the “net profits.” And
since the legal separation ½ share decision of Brigido states that the in
the net profits shall be awarded to the children, Brigido will still be left
with nothing.
On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal
partnership of gains under Article142 of the Civil Code, “the husband
and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property
and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the
dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or
benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the
marriage.” From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and
her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture
or merger of those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it
establishes a complete separation of capitals.
In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court
that the spouses have no separate properties, there is nothing to return
to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of the
conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed
properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their
respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the
guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is
forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of
the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute
community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the
conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate property
which may be accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.
ALAIN M. DIÑO vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO
G.R. No. 178044
January 19, 2011
Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
FACTS:
Alain M. Diño and Ma. Caridad L. Diño were childhood friends and sweethearts
and married in 1998.
In 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give
love and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family,
choosing instead to go on shopping sprees.
The Trial Court decided that the DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of
the Family Code.
Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and
distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages does not apply
to Article 147 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
W/N Art 50 and 51 need to be complied first with respect to marriages declared
void under Art 36? NO
HELD:
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in a void marriage, regardless of its
cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of
the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the
Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be
present:
1) The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry
each other;
2) They live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife; and
3) Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their
marriage is void.
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article
147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and
respondent.
We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and
distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The
ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases
governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the
Rule provides:
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 Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision
granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the
decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall
be issued by the court only after compliance with
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented
under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and
Distribution of Properties.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule
applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final
judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50
of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab
initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void
without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or
bigamous marriage was contracted. Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other
hand, refers to voidable marriages, meaning, marriages which are valid until
they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for
annulment. In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are
governed either by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of
gains unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property in a
marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the property
relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of property or
conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and
distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is
not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code
because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under
Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what
governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and
respondent are the rules on co-ownership.
45. YU vs. JUDGE REYES-CARPIO and YU
G.R. No. 189207,
June 15, 2011
DOCTRINE:
It is more proper to rule first on the declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of each party’s psychological incapacity to perform their respective
marital obligations. If the Court eventually finds that the parties’ respective
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage is indeed meritorious on the basis
of either or both of the parties’ psychological incapacity, then the parties shall
proceed to comply with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code before a final
decree of absolute nullity of marriage can be issued. Pending such ruling on
the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage, the Court finds no legal
ground, at this stage, to proceed with the reception of evidence in regard the
issues on custody and property relations, since these are mere incidents of the
nullity of the parties’ marriage.
FACTS:
23
Eric Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Caroline T.
Yu with the RTC of Pasig. Judge Suarez on May 30, 2006 issued an order
stating that Eric’s partial offer of evidence dated April 18, 2006 would be
submitted for resolution after certain exhibits have been remarked. But the
exhibits were only relative to the issue of the nullity of the marriage of Eric and
Caroline. On September 12, 2006, Caroline moved to submit the case for
resolution, considering that the incidents on custody, support, and property
relations (incidental issues) were mere consequences of the declaration of
nullity of the parties’ marriage.
Eric opposed this motion saying that the incident on declaration of nullity
cannot be resolved without presentation of evidence for the incidents on
custody, support, and property relations. Eric added that the incidental issues
and the issue on declaration of nullity can both proceed and be simultaneously
resolved. RTC ruled in favor of Eric’s opposition.
Caroline caused the inhibition of Judge Suarez, so that the case was re-raffled
to another branch presided by Judge Reyes-Carpio. While the case was being
tried by Judge Reyes-Carpio, Caroline filed an Omnibus Motion seeking the
strict observation by the said judge of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriage as codified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, and that the case
on the declaration on nullity be already submitted for resolution ahead of the
incidental issues, and not simultaneously. Eric opposed this motion.
Judge Reyes-Carpio granted the Omnibus Motion, saying that the main cause
of action is the declaration of nullity of the marriage and the incidental issues
are merely ancillary incidents thereto. Eric moved for reconsideration, which
was denied by Judge Reyes-Carpio. Eric then filed for certiorari with the CA
under Rule 65. CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether the main issue of nullity of marriage must be submitted for resolution
first before the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property
relations (incidental issues). NO
HELD:
It appears in the records that the Orders in question, or what are alleged to
have been exercised with grave abuse of discretion, are interlocutory orders.
An interlocutory order is one which “does not finally dispose of the case, and
does not end the Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and
determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously
indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court. Eric Yu to prove
that the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion and that
those were patently erroneous. Considering that the requisites that would
justify certiorari as an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order have
not been complied with, the proper recourse for petitioner should have been
an appeal in due course of the judgment of the trial court on the merits,
incorporating the grounds for assailing the interlocutory orders.
It must be noted that Judge Reyes-Carpio did not disallow the presentation of
evidence on the incidents on custody, support, and property relations. It is clear
in the assailed orders that the trial court judge merely deferred the reception of
evidence relating to custody, support, and property relations. And the trial
judge’s decision was not without basis. Judge Reyes-Carpio finds support in
Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages. Particularly, Secs. 19 and 21 of the Rule clearly allow the reception
of evidence on custody, support, and property relations after the trial court
renders a decision granting the petition, or upon entry of judgment granting the
petition:
Section 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a
decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein
that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of
annulment shall be issued by the court only after
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family
Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation,
Partition and Distribution of Properties.
Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution,
custody, support of common children and delivery of
their presumptive legitimes. – Upon entry of the
judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal,
upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate
court granting the petition, the Family Court, on
motion of either party, shall proceed with the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties
of the spouses, including custody, support of common
children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes
pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code
unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous
judicial proceedings.
Evidently, Judge Reyes-Carpio did not deny the reception of evidence on
custody, support, and property relations but merely deferred it, based on the
existing rules issued by this Court, to a time when a decision granting the
petition is already at hand and before a final decree is issued. Conversely, the
trial court, or more particularly the family court, shall proceed with the
liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children, and
delivery of their presumptive legitimes upon entry of judgment granting the
petition. And following the pertinent provisions of the Court En Banc Resolution
in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, this act is undoubtedly consistent with Articles 50
and 51 of the Family Code, contrary to what petitioner asserts. Particularly,
Arts. 50 and 51 of the Family Code state:
Article 50. The final judgment in such cases shall
provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses, the custody and
support of the common children, and the delivery of
their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had
been adjudicated in the previous judicial proceedings.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the
presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of the final judgment of the
trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or
sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual
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 agreement judicially approved, had already provided
for such matters.
Also, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly allows the deferment of the reception of
evidence on custody, support, and property relations. Conversely, the trial
court may receive evidence on the subject incidents after a judgment granting
the petition but before the decree of nullity or annulment of marriage is issued.
And this is what Judge Reyes-Carpio sought to comply with in issuing the
assailed orders. As correctly pointed out by the CA, Eric Yu’s assertion that
ruling the main issue without receiving evidence on the subject incidents would
result in an ambiguous and fragmentary judgment is certainly speculative and,
hence, contravenes the legal presumption that a trial judge can fairly weigh
and appraise the evidence submitted by the parties.
Therefore, it cannot be said at all that Judge Reyes-Carpio acted in a
capricious and whimsical manner, much less in a way that is patently gross
and erroneous, when she issued the assailed orders deferring the reception of
evidence on custody, support, and property relations. To reiterate, this decision
is left to the trial court’s wisdom and legal soundness. Consequently, therefore,
the CA cannot likewise be said to have committed grave abuse of discretion in
upholding the Orders of Judge Reyes-Carpio and in ultimately finding an
absence of grave abuse of discretion on her part.
46. (Same as #43)
______________________________________________________
47. ESTRELLA ORPIANO vs. SPS. TOMAS
G.R. No. 178611
January 14, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner Estrella Orpiano is the widow of Alejandro Orpiano. Part of their
conjugal estate is an 809.5-square meter lot in Quezon City. In 1979, a
Decision was rendered by the defunct Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
(JDRC) of Quezon City declaring Estrella an absent/absentee spouse and
granting Alejandro the authority to sell the lot. On March 1996, Alejandro sold
the lot on installment basis to respondent spouses Antonio and Myrna Tomas
and were given until December of that same year to complete their payment.
On October 1996, Alejandro filed a Civil Case (the collection case), seeking
collection of the balance supposedly left unpaid by the Tomas spouses.
During the pendency of the collection case, Alejandro passed away. His heirs,
Estrella included, were substituted in his stead in the collection case. Estrella
moved to amend the Complaint to one for rescission/annulment of sale and
cancellation of title, but the court denied her motion. She next moved to be
dropped as party plaintiff but was again rebuffed.
Hence, Estrella filed a Civil Case (the annulment case) for
rescission/annulment of sale and cancellation of title against the Tomas
spouses claiming that the Declaration of Absence and Alejandro’s authority to
sell the lot are null and void. That on account of the repeated denials of the
collection court, she was left with no other alternative but to institute the
24
annulment case to seek annulment of the sale and recover her conjugal share.
The Tomas spouses prayed for the dismissal thereof on the ground of forum
shopping, arguing that the annulment case is Estrella’s attempt at securing a
remedy which she could not obtain in the collection case.
ISSUE:
WON there is forum shopping. YES
HELD:
Although the Court believes that Estrella was not prompted by a desire to trifle
with judicial processes, and was acting in good faith in initiating the annulment
case, still the said case should be dismissed because it produces the same
effect which the rule on forum shopping was fashioned to preclude.
As plaintiff in the collection case, Estrella – though merely succeeding to
Alejandro’s rights – was an indispensable party, or one without whom no final
determination can be had in the collection case. Strictly, she may not be
dropped from the case. However, because of her dual identity, first as heir and
second as owner of her conjugal share, she has been placed in the unique
position where she has to succeed to her husband’s rights, even as she must
protect her separate conjugal share from Alejandro’s perceived undue
disposition. She may not seek to amend the cause of action in the collection
case to one for annulment of sale, because this adversely affects the interests
of her co-heirs, which is precisely to obtain payment of the supposed balance
of the sale price.
Nor may Estrella simultaneously maintain the two actions in both capacities,
as heir in the collection case and as separate owner of her conjugal share in
the annulment case. This may not be done, because, as was earlier on
declared, this amounts to simultaneously accepting and rejecting the same
deed of sale. Nor is it possible to prosecute the annulment case simultaneously
with the collection case, on the premise that what is merely being annulled is
the sale by Alejandro of Estrella’s conjugal share. To repeat, the absence of
the consent of one spouse to a sale renders the entire sale null and void,
including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who
contracted the sale.
Undoubtedly, Estrella had the right to maintain the annulment case as a
measure of protecting her conjugal share.
Nonetheless, while Estrella correctly made use of the remedies available to her
– amending the Complaint and filing a motion to drop her as a party – she
committed a mistake in proceeding to file the annulment case directly after
these remedies were denied her by the collection court without first questioning
or addressing the propriety of these denials. While she may have been
frustrated by the collection court’s repeated rejection of her motions and its
apparent inability to appreciate her plight, her proper recourse nevertheless
should have been to file a petition for certiorari or otherwise question the trial
court’s denial of her motion to be dropped as plaintiff, citing just reasons which
call for a ruling to the contrary. Issues arising from joinder or misjoinder of
parties are the proper subject of certiorari.
Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
48. TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION vs. MANUEL A.
DAVID, SR.
G.R. No. 169548
March 15, 2010
FACTS:
Manuel A. David, Sr. and Martha S. David were married on March 25, 1957. In
1970, the spouses acquired a 602 square meter lot located at White Plains,
Quezon City, which was registered in the name of "MARTHA S. DAVID, of legal
age, Filipino, married to Manuel A. David". In 1976, the spouses separated de
facto, and no longer communicated with each other. Sometime in March 1995,
Manuel discovered that Martha had previously sold the property to Titan
Construction Corporation (Titan) for ₱1,500,000.00 through a Deed of Sale8
dated April 24, 1995.
Thus, on March 13, 1996, Manuel filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract
and Recovenyance against Titan on the ground that the sale executed by
Martha in favor of Titan was without his knowledge and consent, and therefore
void. On the other hand, Titan claimed that it was a buyer in good faith and for
value because it relied on a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated January 4,
1995 signed by Manuel which authorized Martha to dispose of the property on
behalf of the spouses. However, Manuel claimed that the SPA was spurious,
and that the signature purporting to be his was a forgery; hence, Martha was
wholly without authority to sell the property.
RTC ruled that the property was conjugal in character since it was purchased
by Manuel and Martha with conjugal funds during their marriage. The fact that
TCT No. 156043 was registered in the name of "MARTHA S. DAVID x x x
married to Manuel A. David" did not negate the property’s conjugal nature.
Moreover, the SPA professing to authorize Martha to sell the property on behalf
of the spouses was spurious, and did not bear Manuel’s genuine signature.
This was the subject of expert testimony, which Titan failed to rebut. On appeal
to the CA, it affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUES:
1. WON the property is part of the spouses’ conjugal partnership. YES
2. WON the sale is void. YES
HELD:
1. The Civil Code of the Philippines, the law in force at the time of the
celebration of the marriage between Martha and Manuel in 1957,
provides:
Article 160. All property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or
to the wife.
Article 153. The following are conjugal partnership
property:
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the
marriage at the expense of the common fund,
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 whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for
only one of the spouses;
xxxx
These provisions were carried over to the Family Code.
Art. 117. The following are conjugal partnership
properties:
(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the
marriage at the expense of the common fund,
whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for
only one of the spouses;
xxxx
Article 116 of the Family Code is even more unequivocal in that "[a]ll property
acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been
made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is
presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved."
Titan failed to overturn the presumption that the property, purchased during the
spouses’ marriage, was part of the conjugal partnership. We are not persuaded
by Titan’s arguments that the property was Martha’s exclusive property
because Manuel failed to present before the RTC any proof of his income in
1970, hence he could not have had the financial capacity to contribute to the
purchase of the property in 1970.
In consonance with our ruling in Spouses Castro v. Miat, Manuel was not
required to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership.
Rather, the presumption applies even when the manner in which the property
was acquired does not appear.
2. Since the property was undoubtedly part of the conjugal partnership,
the sale to Titan required the consent of both spouses. Article 165 of
the Civil Code expressly provides that "the husband is the administrator
of the conjugal partnership". Likewise, Article 172 of the Civil Code
ordains that "(t)he wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the
husband’s consent, except in cases provided by law". Similarly, Article
124 of the Family Code requires that any disposition or encumbrance
of conjugal property must have the written consent of the other spouse,
otherwise, such disposition is void.
The RTC ruled that the SPA was spurious and therefore void. The ruling
was based not only on the testimony of Manuel’s expert witness finding
that there were significant differences between the standard
handwriting of Manuel and the signature found on the SPA, but also on
Manuel’s categorical denial that he ever signed any document
authorizing or ratifying the Deed of Sale to Titan. Hence, in the absence
of Manuel’s consent, the Deed of Sale is void.
49. EVANGELINE D. IMANI vs. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST
COMPANY
G.R. No. 187023
November 17, 2010
25
FACTS:
On August 28, 1981, Evangeline D. Imani signed a Continuing Suretyship
Agreement in favor of respondent Metrobank, with her other co-sureties. They
bound themselves to pay Metrobank whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo
Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs. Later, CPDTI obtained loans. CPDTI defaulted
in the payment of its loans. Metrobank made several demands for payment
upon CPDTI, but to no avail. This prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit
against CPDTI and its sureties, including herein petitioner.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Metrobank. On appeal, CA affirmed.
Metrobank then filed a motion for execution, which was granted. The sheriff
levied on a property covered by TCT No. T-27957 and registered in the name
of petitioner. A public auction was conducted and the property was awarded to
Metrobank, as the highest bidder.
Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Cancel and Nullify the Levy on Execution,
the Auction Sale and Certificate of Sale Over TCT No. T-27957. She argued
that the subject property belongs to the conjugal partnership; as such, it cannot
be held answerable for the liabilities incurred by CPDTI to Metrobank.
ISSUE:
WON the property belonged to the conjugal partnership. NO
HELD:
Article 160 provides that, all property of the marriage is presumed to be
conjugal. However, for this presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must
first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of
acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non to the operation of
the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. Thus, the time when the
property was acquired is material.
To support her assertion that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership,
petitioner submitted the Affidavit of Crisanto Origen, the former owner of the
property, attesting that petitioner and her husband were the vendees of the
subject property, and the photocopies of the checks allegedly issued by Sina
Imani as payment for the subject property. Unfortunately, the said Affidavit can
hardly be considered sufficient evidence to prove her claim that the property is
conjugal. As correctly pointed out by Metrobank, the said Affidavit has no
evidentiary weight because Crisanto Origen was not presented in the RTC to
affirm the veracity of his Affidavit. In the same vein, the photocopies of the
checks cannot be given any probative value. In Concepcion v. Atty. Fandiño,
Jr. and Intestate Estate of the Late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v. Court
of Appeals, we held that a photocopy of a document has no probative value
and is inadmissible in evidence. Similarly, the certificate of title could not
support petitioner’s assertion. As aptly ruled by the CA, the fact that the land
was registered in the name of Evangelina Dazo-Imani married to Sina Imani is
no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses’ coverture.
Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled
that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing.
Indubitably, petitioner utterly failed to substantiate her claim that the property
belongs to the conjugal partnership.
Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
50. ELENITA M. DEWARA vs. SPOUSES LAMELA and STENILE
ALVERO
G.R. No. 179010
April 11, 2011
FACTS:
Eduardo Dewara and petitioner Elenita Magallanes Dewara were married
before the enactment of the Family Code. They were separated-in-fact
because Elenita went to work in California, United States of America, while
Eduardo stayed in Bacolod City.
Eduardo, while driving a private jeep registered in the name of Elenita, hit
respondent Ronnie Lamela. Ronnie filed a criminal case for serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence against Eduardo. The MTCC found
Eduardo guilty of the charge and was ordered to pay civil indemnity of
₱62,598.70 as actual damages and ₱10,000.00 as moral damages. The writ
of execution on the civil liability was served on Eduardo, but it was returned
unsatisfied because he had no property in his name. Upon request of Ronnie,
the City Sheriff levied Lot No. 234-C under TCT No. T-80054, in the name of
"ELENITA M. DEWARA, of legal age, Filipino, married to Eduardo Dewara,
and resident of Bacolod City," to satisfy the judgment on the civil liability of
Eduardo.
The levy on execution, public auction, issuance of certificate of sale, and
cancellation of title of the lot in the name of Elenita were done while Elenita
was working in California. Thus, Elenita, represented by her attorney-in-fact,
filed a case for annulment of sale and for damages against respondent
spouses and the sheriff on the ground that the said property was her
paraphernal or exclusive property and could not be made to answer for the
personal liability of her husband.
The RTC declared that said property was paraphernal in nature. It gave
credence to the testimony of Elenita on the circumstances surrounding the sale
of the property. First, it was sold to her by her father and her aunt so that the
family would remain on the lot. Second, the minimal and inadequate
consideration for the 1,440 sq. m property was for the purpose of helping her
expand her capital in her business at the time. Thus, the sale was essentially
a donation and was therefore gratuitous in character. On appeal, CA reversed
the prior decision.
ISSUE:
WON the subject property is the paraphernal/exclusive property of Elenita. NO
HELD:
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Registration in the name of the husband or the wife alone does not destroy this
presumption. The separation-in-fact between the husband and the wife without
judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its
conjugal nature. Moreover, the presumption of conjugal ownership applies
even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear.
The use of the conjugal funds is not an essential requirement for the
presumption to arise.
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There is no dispute that the subject property was acquired by spouses Elenita
and Eduardo during their marriage. It is also undisputed that their marital
relations are governed by the conjugal partnership of gains, since they were
married before the enactment of the Family Code and they did not execute any
prenuptial agreement as to their property relations. Thus, the legal presumption
of the conjugal nature of the property applies to the lot in question. The
presumption that the property is conjugal property may be rebutted only by
strong, clear, categorical, and convincing evidence—there must be strict proof
of the exclusive ownership of one of the spouses, and the burden of proof rests
upon the party asserting it.
Aside from the assertions of Elenita that the sale of the property by her father
and her aunt was in the nature of a donation because of the alleged gross
disparity between the actual value of the property and the monetary
consideration for the sale, there is no other evidence that would convince this
Court of the paraphernal character of the property. Elenita proffered no
evidence of the market value or assessed value of the subject property in 1975.
Thus, we agree with the CA that Elenita has not sufficiently proven that the
prices involved in the sales in question were so inadequate for the Court to
reach a conclusion that the transfers were in the nature of a donation rather
than a sale. Hence, the property belongs to the conjugal partnership.
51. ANTONIA R. DELA PEÑA and ALVIN JOHN B. DELA PEÑA vs.
GEMMA REMILYN C. AVILA and FAR EAST BANK & TRUST
CO.
G.R. No. 187490
February 8, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioner Antonia Dela Pena obtained from A.C.Aguila & Sons, Co. a loan.
She executed a promissory note and a notarized Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over a 277 square meter parcel of residential land, registered in the
name of petitioner “Antonia R. Dela Peña, married to Antegono A. Dela Peña.
Antonia thereafter executed a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale over the same
property in favor of respondent Gemma Avila. Utilizing the document, Gemma
caused the issuance of a new naming her as the owner of the subject realty.
After which, Gemma also constituted a real estate mortgage over said parcel
in favor of respondent FEBTC-BPI, to secure a loan facility.
Petitioner Antonia filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina an Affidavit of
Adverse Claim that she was the true and lawful owner of the property and that
the Deed of Absolute Sale Gemma utilized in procuring her title was simulated.
On May 1998, Antonia and her son, Alvin John B. Dela Peña, filed against
Gemma the complaint for annulment of deed of sale. Claiming that the subject
realty was conjugal property, the Dela Peñas alleged, among other matters,
that the 7 May 1996 Deed of Real Estate Mortgage Antonia executed in favor
of Aguila was not consented to by Antegono who had, by then, already died.
On the other hand, Gemma maintained that the realty was the exclusive
property of Antonia who misrepresented that her husband was still alive.
On December 2007, the RTC went on to render a Decision finding that the
subject property was conjugal in nature and that the Deed of Absolute Sale
Antonia executed in favor of Gemma was void as a disposition without the
26
liquidation required under Article 130 of the Family Code. However on appeal,
CA reversed the RTC decision, upon the following findings and conclusions:
(a) the property was paraphernal in nature for failure of the Dela Peñas to prove
that the same was acquired during Antonia’s marriage to Antegono; (b) having
misled Gemma into believing that the property was exclusively hers, Antonia is
barred from seeking the annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale.
ISSUE:
WON the property belongs to the conjugal partnership of spouses Antegono
and Antonia Dela Peña. NO
HELD:
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." However, the party who
invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a
condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the
conjugal partnership. The party who asserts this presumption must first prove
said time element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the property
acquired during the marriage and does not operate when there is no showing
as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, this
presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and
convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one
of the spouses.
As the parties invoking the presumption of conjugality under Article 160 of the
Civil Code, the Dela Peñas did not even come close to proving that the subject
property was acquired during the marriage between Antonia and Antegono.
Beyond Antonia’s bare and uncorroborated assertion that the property was
purchased when she was already married, the record is bereft of any evidence
from which the actual date of acquisition of the realty can be ascertained. When
queried about the matter during his cross-examination, even Alvin (son of
spouses) admitted that his sole basis for saying that the property was owned
by his parents was Antonia’s unilateral pronouncement to the effect.
Considering that the presumption of conjugality does not operate if there is no
showing of when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired, the realty
in litigation was Antonia’s exclusive property.
The Dela Peñas insist that the registration thereof in the name of "Antonia R.
Dela Peña, of legal age, Filipino, married to Antegono A. Dela Peña" should
have already sufficiently established its conjugal nature. Confronted with the
same issue in the case Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled, however,
that the phrase "married to" is merely descriptive of the civil status of the wife
and cannot be interpreted to mean that the husband is also a registered owner.
Because it is likewise possible that the property was acquired by the wife while
she was still single and registered only after her marriage, neither would
registration thereof in said manner constitute proof that the same was acquired
during the marriage and, for said reason, to be presumed conjugal in nature.
"Since there is no showing as to when the property in question was acquired,
the fact that the title is in the name of the wife alone is determinative of its
nature as paraphernal, i.e., belonging exclusively to said spouse."
Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
52. PROCOPIO VILLANUEVA vs. CA
G.R. No. 143286
April 14, 2004
FACTS:
Plaintiff Eusebia Napisa Retuya, is the legal wife of defendant Nicolas Retuya,
having been married to the latter on October 7, 1926. During their marriage
they have acquired several properties. In 1945, defendant Nicolas Retuya no
longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited with petitioner, Pacita
Villanueva, wherein co-petitioner, Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate son.
Several properties are the subject of dispute between the parties. Petitioner is
contending that the subject properties are not part of the conjugal partnership
of Nicolas and his legal wife, Eusebia, but under the regime of co-ownership
between Nicolas and petitioner’s mother, Pacita.
The RTC ruled that the properties are conjugal properties of Nicolas and
Eusebia in accordance with Article 116 of the FC. That the documents and
other evidence Eusebia presented constitute "solid evidence" which proved
that the subject properties were acquired during her marriage with Nicolas. On
the other hand, the trial court found that petitioners failed to meet the standard
of proof required to maintain their claim that the subject properties are
paraphernal properties of Nicolas. The trial court added that Pacita presented
no "factual solidity" to support her claim that she bought Lot No. 152 exclusively
with her own money. On appeal, the CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
WON the subject properties are conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia.
YES
HELD:
The tax declarations covering the subject properties, along with the unrebutted
testimony of Eusebia’s witnesses, establish the fact that the properties are
conjugal. Moreover, on whether Lot No. 152 is conjugal or not, the answer
came from petitioners themselves. Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7
October 1926. Nicolas and Pacita started cohabiting in 1936. Eusebia died on
23 November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas were married on 16 December 1996.
Petitioners themselves admit that Lot No. 152 was purchased on 4 October
1957. The date of acquisition of Lot No. 152 is clearly during the marriage of
Nicolas and Eusebia.
Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were acquired during the
marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia, the presumption under Article 116 of the
Family Code is that all these are conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia.
The burden is on petitioners to prove that the subject properties are not
conjugal. Petitioners failed to meet this standard.
Petitioner’s argument that since Nicolas and Pacita were already cohabiting
when Lot No. 152 was acquired, the lot cannot be deemed conjugal property
of Nicolas and Eusebia, is flawed.
The cohabitation of a spouse with another person, even for a long period, does
not sever the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. The marriage of Nicolas
and Eusebia continued to exist regardless of the fact that Nicolas was already
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living with Pacita. Hence, all property acquired from 7 October 1926, the date
of Nicolas and Eusebia’s marriage, until 23 November 1996, the date of
Eusebia’s death, are still presumed conjugal. Petitioners have neither claimed
nor proved that any of the subject properties was acquired outside or beyond
this period.
Finally, petitioners’ reliance on Article 148 of the Family Code is misplaced.
Proof of actual contribution by both parties is required; otherwise there is no
co-ownership and no presumption of equal sharing. Petitioners failed to prove
that Pacita bought Lot No. 152 with her own money, or that she actually
contributed her own money to acquire it.
53. MENDOZA vs. REYES
124 SCRA 154
FACTS:
Ponciano and Julia were married in 1915. The properties in question consisting
of Lots 5 and 6, were bought on installment basis. Thus, the spouses jointly
obtained a loan to pay their balance. The corresponding deed of absolute sale
was executed where the vendee named is 'Julia de Reyes'. Her signatures
appear over the caption vendee and those of Ponciano under the phrase: 'with
my marital consent. As a result of these sales, TCTs were issued in the name
of "JULIA REYES married to PONCIANO REYES."
While Ponciano was absent attending his farm in Pampanga, Julia sold
absolutely the lots in question Efren V. Mendoza and Inocencia R. De
Mendoza, as vendees, without the knowledge and consent of Ponciano. At the
same time the spouses were living separately and were not in speaking terms.
Ponciano filed a complaint for the annulment of a deed of sale of two parcels
of land contending that said properties were conjugal properties of himself and
his wife and that she had sold them to petitioners "all by herself" and without
his knowledge or consent.
Petitioner Mendozas alleged that the properties were paraphernal properties
of Julia and that they had purchased the same in good faith and for adequate
consideration. Julia testified that she bought the two parcels of land on
installment basis and that the first payment came from her personal funds. The
CFI declared the properties exclusive and paraphernal properties of Julia and
ruled that she could validly dispose of the same without the consent of her
husband.
ISSUE:
WON the disputed properties are conjugal properties. YES
HELD:
The deed of sale is declared null and void with respect to one- half share of
Ponciano.
Article 153 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 153. The following are conjugal partnership
property:
27
That which is acquired by onerous title during the
marriage at the expense of the common fund,
whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or
for only one of the spouses;
It is sufficient to prove that the property was acquired during the marriage in
order that the same may be deemed conjugal property. There is no question
that the disputed property was acquired by onerous title during the marriage.
Records show that the funds came from loans obtained by the spouses. Under
Article 161 of the Civil Code, all debts and obligations contracted by the
husband and the wife for the benefit of the conjugal partnership are liabilities
of the partnership.
Julia’s claim of exclusive ownership is belied by the Income Tax Returns which
she herself prepared and filed in behalf of the conjugal partnership wherein she
made the statement that the rentals paid to her were income of the conjugal
partnership, and she made to appear the properties in question as capital
assets of the conjugal partnership.
Property acquired during a marriage is presumed to be conjugal and the fact
that the land is later registered in the name of only one of the spouses does
not destroy its conjugal nature. If the fact that property acquired during
marriage was registered in the name of the husband alone does not affect its
conjugal nature, neither does registration in the name of the wife.
54. JOE A. ROS vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK - LAOAG
BRANCH
G.R. No. 170166
April 6, 2011
(Note: Wrong case title in the syllabus)
DOCTRINE:
Article 161 of the Civil Code enumerated the instances of which the spouses-
conjugal partnership shall be liable and paragraph (1) one of the said provision
states “all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same
purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership”.
FACTS:
Joe Ros obtained a loan of P115,000.00 from PNB Laoag Branch on October
14, 1974 and as security for the loan, petitioner, Ros, executed a real estate
mortgage involving a parcel of land with all the. Upon maturity, the loan
remained outstanding. As a result, PNB instituted extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale, a
Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB, Laoag as the highest bidder.
After the lapse of one (1) year without the property being redeemed, the
property was consolidated and registered in the name of PNB, Laoag Branch
on August 10, 1978.
Estrella Agueta, wife of Joe Ros claims that she has no knowledge of the loan
obtained by her husband nor she consented to the mortgage instituted on the
conjugal property. On January 13, 1983, spouses Ros and Agueta filed to
Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and consolidation of
the property – interposing the defense that her signatures affixed on the
documents were forged and that the loan did not redound to the benefit of the
family. PNB seeks for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action,
and insists that it was petitioners’ own acts of omission that bar them from
recovering the subject property on the ground of estoppel, laches,
abandonment and prescription.
The Trial Court ruled in favor of the petitioners declaring deed of real estate
mortgage Null and Void and ordered the Register of Deeds to rename the title
of the lot to the petitioners. Upon PNB’s appeal, the Appellate Court reversed
the decision of the Trial Court and dismissed the complaint of the petitioners.
The Petitioner’s then petitioned for review to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the debt/loan was chargeable to the conjugal property. YES
RULING:
At the time of the mortgage the Civil Code was the applicable law. Article 161
of the Civil Code enumerated the instances of which the spouses-conjugal
partnership shall be liable and paragraph (1) one of the said provision states
“all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same
purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership”. The loan
was used for additional working capital for their family business hence, it is
considered that such loan was acquired for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership and not merely for the benefit of Ros.
55. ANTONIA R. DELA PEÑA vs GEMMA REMILYN C. AVILA
G.R. No. 187490
February 8, 2012
DOCTRINE:
Although it is not necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds
of the partnership, proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential
condition for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership.
FACTS:
A parcel of residential land, together with the improvements in Marikina City
was previously registered in the name of petitioner Antonia R. Dela Peña
(Antonia), “married to Antegono A. Dela Peña” (Antegono). On 7 May 1996,
Antonia obtained from A.C. Aguila & Sons, Co. (Aguila) a loan in the sum of
P250,000.00 secured by a Promissory Note and notarized Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over the property.
On 4 November 1997, Antonia executed a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale
over the property to Gemma Remilyn C. Avila (Gemma with that it resulted to
naming Gemma as the owner of the subject realty on the Registry of Deeds.
On 26 November 1997, Gemma also constituted a real estate mortgage over
said parcel to Far East Bank and Trust Company [now Bank of the Philippine
Islands] (FEBTC-BPI), to secure a loan facility evidenced by the Promissory
Notes
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On 3 March 1998, in the meantime, Antonia filed with the Register of Deeds of
Marikina an Affidavit of Adverse Claim that she was the true and lawful owner
of the property which had been titled in the name of Gemma. Gemma failed to
pay the principal as well as the accumulated interest and penalties on the loans
she obtained hence, FEBTC-BPI caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
real estate mortgage constituted over the property. FEBTC-BPI later
consolidated its ownership over the realty and caused the same to be titled in
its name.

On 18 May 1998, Antonia and her son filed against Gemma the complaint for
annulment of deed, claiming that the subject realty was conjugal property.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Antonia to
Gemma is null and void.

2. Whether or not the FEBTC-BPI is a mortgagee/purchaser in bad faith.

RULING:
NO, Pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, all property of
the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Although it is
not necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the
partnership, proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition
for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.

As the parties invoking the presumption of conjugality under Article 160 of the
Civil Code, the Dela Peñas did not even come close to proving that the subject
property was acquired during the marriage between Antonia and Antegono.
Beyond Antonia’s bare and uncorroborated assertion that the property was
purchased when she was already married, the record is bereft of any evidence
from which the actual date of acquisition of the realty can be ascertained. When
queried about the matter during his cross-examination, even Alvin admitted
that his sole basis for saying that the property was owned by his parents was
Antonia’s unilateral pronouncement to the effect. Considering that the
presumption of conjugality does not operate if there is no showing of when the
property alleged to be conjugal was acquired, we find that the CA cannot be
faulted for ruling that the realty in litigation was Antonia’s exclusive property.

Since foreclosure of the mortgage is but the necessary consequence of non-

payment of the mortgage debt, FEBTC-BPI was, likewise, acting well within its
rights as mortgagee when it foreclosed the real estate mortgage on the
property upon Gemma’s failure to pay the loans secured thereby.

56.
57.
58.
59.

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
60. AMALIA PLATA vs. HON. NICASIO YATCO Saldaña came from common or conjugal funds (Civ. Code, Art 153). The deed
G.R. No. L-20825 of mortgage in favor of respondents Villanueva actually recites that the
December 28, 1964 petitioner was the owner of the tenement in question and so does the
conveyance of it by Saldaña to her.
DOCTRINE:
The circumstance of the husband signing the mortgage as a co-mortgagor by It is true that Gaudencio Begosa signed the mortgage as a co-mortgagor; but
itself alone would not suffice to convert the land into conjugal property, by itself alone that circumstance would not suffice to convert the land into
considering that the property was paraphernal in origin. conjugal property, considering that it was paraphernal in origin. This is
particularly the case where the addition of Begosa as co-mortgagor was clearly
FACTS: an afterthought, the text of the deed showing that Plata was the sole mortgagor.
In 1954, Amalia Plata purchased a parcel of land in Caloocan, Rizal, for which
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25855 in her name was issued. It was also
indicated therein that she was single, and a Filipino citizen. On February 13,
1958, she sold the property to Celso Saldaña who obtained a new TCT
therefor; but seven months afterwards, Saldaña resold the same property to
Amalia Plata, married to Gaudencio Begosa, and a new certificate of Title was
issued to the vendee, Amalia Plata.

On the same date, 24 September 1958, "Amalia Plata of legal age, Filipino,
married to Gaudencio Begosa," in consideration of a loan of P3,000,
mortgaged to Cesarea Villanueva married to Gregorio Leaño, the same
property and its improvements" of which the mortgagor declares to be hers as
the absolute owner thereof." The mortgage was also signed by Gaudencio
Begosa, as co-mortgagor.

For failure to pay the mortgage, the same was extrajudicially foreclosed and
sold on 12 April 1960 to the mortgagee as the highest bidder. On May 12,
1961, the Sheriff issued a final deed of sale on the strength of which the
Register of Deeds issued the buyer a new TCT. Subsequently, the respondent,
Villanueva, sued Gaudencio Begosa alone for illegal detainer and obtained
judgment against him in the court of first instance, which became final. A writ
of execution was duly issued, but Amalia Plata resisted all efforts to eject her
from the property, and she filed a third party claim, averring ownership of the
property. Upon motion of the judgment creditors, the court below cited both
Begosa and Plata for contempt, and, finding her explanation unsatisfactory,
found her guilty.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property is the exclusive property of Amalia Plata.
YES

RULING:
Granting that the evidence before us against the marriage of petitioner Amalia
Plata to Gaudencio Begosa is weak, considering the admissions of married
status in public documents; the well-known presumption that persons openly
living together as husband and wife are legally married to each other, and that
the prior marriage of Begosa to someone else does not necessarily exclude
the possibility of a valid subsequent marriage to herein petitioner; still the
respondents Villanueva could not ignore the paraphernal character of the
property in question, which had been unquestionably acquired by Plata while
still single, as shown by the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25855 of Rizal. The
subsequent conveyance thereof to Celso Saldaña, and the reconveyance to
her several months afterward of the same property, did not transform it from
paraphernal to conjugal property, there being no proof that the money paid to

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- Newt Gingrich
61. TERESITA C. FRANCISCO vs. CA and CONCHITA
EVANGELISTA
G.R. No. 102330
November 25, 1998
DOCTRINE:
Property already owned by a spouse prior to the marriage, and brought to the
marriage, is considered his or her separate property. Acquisitions by lucrative
title refer to properties acquired gratuitously and include those acquired by
either spouse during the marriage by inheritance, devise, legacy, or donation.
Hence, even if it be assumed that Eusebio’s acquisition by succession of the
land took place during his second marriage, the land would still be his
“exclusive property” because it was acquired by him, “during the marriage, by
lucrative title.”
FACTS:
Petitioner is the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio Francisco by his
second marriage. Private respondents Conchita Evangelista, Araceli F. Marilla
and Antonio Francisco are children of Eusebio by his first marriage. Petitioner
alleges that since their marriage on February 10, 1962, she and Eusebio have
acquired the following: (1) a sari sari store, a residential house and lot, and an
apartment house, all situated at Col. S. Cruz St., Barangay Balite, Rodriguez
(formerly Montalban), Rizal, and; (2) a house and lot at Barrio San Isidro,
Rodriguez, Rizal. Petitioner further avers that these properties were
administered by Eusebio until he was invalidated on account of tuberculosis,
heart disease and cancer, thereby, rendering him unfit to administer them.
Petitioner also claims that private respondents succeeded in convincing their
father to sign a general power of attorney which authorized Conchita
Evangelista to administer the house and lot together with the apartments
situated in Rodriguez, Rizal.
On August 31, 1988, petitioner filed a suit for damages and for annulment of
said general power of attorney, and thereby enjoining its enforcement.
Petitioner also sought to be declared as the administratrix of the properties in
dispute. In due course, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of private
respondents. It held that the petitioner failed to adduce proof that said
properties were acquired during the existence of the second conjugal
partnership, or that they pertained exclusively to the petitioner. Hence, the
court ruled that those properties belong exclusively to Eusebio, and that he has
the capacity to administer them.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the properties, subject matter of controversy, are not conjugal but the
capital properties of Eusebio exclusively. YES
RULING:
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that “all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” However, the party who
invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was
30
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a “Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco,” is no proof that the
condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the property was acquired during the spouses’ coverture.
conjugal partnership. This presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but
only with strong, clear and convincing evidence. There must be a strict proof
of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses. In this case, petitioner failed to
adduce ample evidence to show that the properties which she claimed to be
conjugal were acquired during her marriage with Eusebio.
With respect to the land at Col. Cruz St., Balite, Rodriguez, Rizal, petitioner
failed to refute the testimony of Eusebio that he inherited the same from his
parents. Whether Eusebio succeeded to the property prior or subsequent to
his second marriage is inconsequential. The property should be regarded as
his own exclusively, as a matter of law, pursuant to Article 14816 of the New
Civil Code.
Essentially, property already owned by a spouse prior to the marriage, and
brought to the marriage, is considered his or her separate property.
Acquisitions by lucrative title refers to properties acquired gratuitously and
include those acquired by either spouse during the marriage by inheritance,
devise, legacy, or donation. Hence, even if it be assumed that Eusebio’s
acquisition by succession of the land took place during his second marriage,
the land would still be his “exclusive property” because it was acquired by him,
“during the marriage, by lucrative title.”
As regards the house, apartment and sari-sari store, private respondents aver
that these properties were either constructed or established by their father
during his first marriage. On the other hand, petitioner insists that the said
assets belong to conjugal partnership. In support of her claim, petitioner relied
on the building permits for the house and the apartment, with her as the
applicant although in the name of Eusebio. She also invoked the business
license for the sari-sari store issued in her name alone.
It must be emphasized that the aforementioned documents in no way prove
that the improvements were acquired during the second marriage. And the fact
that one is the applicant or licensee is not determinative of the issue as to
whether or not the property is conjugal or not.
Neither is it plausible to argue that the sari-sari store constructed on the land
of Eusebio Francisco has thereby become conjugal for want of evidence to
sustain the proposition that it was constructed at the expense of their
partnership. Normally, this absence of evidence on the source of funding will
call for the application of the presumption under Article 160 of the New Civil
Code that the store is really conjugal but it cannot be so in this particular case
again, by reason of the dearth in proof that it was erected during the alleged
second marriage.
Regarding the property at San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal, private respondents
assert that their father purchased it during the lifetime of their mother. In
contrast, petitioner claims ownership over said property inasmuch as the title
thereto is registered in the name of “Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita
Francisco.”
It must be stressed that the certificate of title upon which petitioner anchors her
claim is inadequate. The fact that the land was registered in the name of
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62. MARIANO VELOSO vs. LUCIA MARTINEZ husband, without her consent, and without compliance with the provisions of
G.R. No. L-8715 the Civil Code above cited. The judgment of the lower court is therefore
October 24, 1914 affirmed, with costs.

FACTS:
On the 1st day of July, 1911, the plaintiff commenced an action in the Court of
First Instance of the Province of Cebu to recover from the defendant the
possession of a certain parcel of land together with the sum of P125 per month,
from the 1st day of June, 1911. The defendant presented a demurrer to said
complaint, which was overruled. Later the defendant answered, setting up a
general denial and a special defense of a counterclaim in the sum of P18,500
and for the recovery of certain jewelry, of the value of P6,000, alleged to be in
the possession of the plaintiff.

During the trial, plaintiff attempted to show that the jewels in question were
pawned to him by Domingo Franco, with the full knowledge and consent of the
defendant and that after the death of Domingo Franco, the defendant promised
to pay the amount for which, the said jewels were pawned. The defendant
positively denies all allegations. The CFI rendered a decision in favor of the
plaintiff, as to the recovery of the parcel of land. However, the court finds that
the defendant was entitled to the possession of said jewelry, and ordered the
plaintiff to return the same to her because it was established that after the death
of Domingo Franco, it appears that said jewelry was found in the same "caja"
(box) and that the key was in the possession of the defendant. It is very
doubtful, indeed, under the facts, whether the plaintiff ever obtained the actual
possession of the jewelry. Aggrieved, Plaintiff appealed such decision.

ISSUE:
Who is entitled with the ownership and right of possession of said jewelry?
LUCIA MARTINEZ

RULING:
In this case, it was admitted that the jewels in question, before the possession
of the same was given to the plaintiff, belonged to the defendant personally
and that she had inherited the same from her mother. The defendant is the
widow of Domingo Franco and was appointed as administratrix of his estate.
The record further shows that a short time before the death of Domingo Franco
he borrowed from the plaintiff the sum of P4,500 and gave as security for the
payment of said sum the jewelry described in the complaint. It is not clear
whether or not the jewelry, at the time of the execution of said document, was
in fact delivered to the plaintiff.

In view of the fact, however, that the record shows that the jewels were the
sole and separate property of the wife, acquired from her mother, and in the
absence of further proof, we must presume that they constituted a part of her
paraphernal property. As such paraphernal property she exercised dominion
over the same. (Article 1382, Civil Code.) She had the exclusive control and
management of the same, until and unless she had delivered it to her husband,
before a notary public, with the intent that the husband might administer it
properly. (Article 1384, Civil Code.) There is no proof in the record that she had
ever delivered the same to her husband, in any manner, or for any purpose.
That being true, she could not be deprived of the same by any act of her

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
63. SPS. RICKY WONG vs. IAC and ROMARICO HENSON Furthermore, under the Civil Code (before the effectivity of the Family Code
G.R. No. 70082 on August 3, 1988), a wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she
August 19, 1991 purchases things necessary for the support of the family or when she borrows
money for the purpose of purchasing things necessary for the support of the
FACTS: family if the husband fails to deliver the proper sum; when the administration
Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda on January 6, 1964. They have of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts or by the
three children but even during the early years of their marriage, Romarico and husband and when the wife gives moderate donations for charity. Having failed
Katrina had been most of the time living separately. During the marriage or on to establish that any of these circumstances occurred, the Wongs may not bind
January 6, 1971, Romarico bought a 1,787 square-meter parcel of land in the conjugal assets to answer for Katrina's personal obligation to them.
Angeles City for P11,492 from his father, Dr. Celestino L. Henson with money
borrowed from an officemate. Meanwhile, in Hongkong sometime in June
1972, Katrina entered into an agreement with Anita Chan whereby the latter
consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale valued at 199,895 Hongkong
dollars or P321,830.95.4 When Katrina failed to return the pieces of jewelry
within the 20-day period agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded payment of their
value.

On September 18, 1972, Katrina issued in favor of Anita Chan a check for
P55,000 which, however, was dishonored for lack of funds. Hence, Katrina was
charged with estafa before the then CFI of Pampanga but the action was
dismissed on the ground that Katrina's liability was not criminal but civil in
nature, as no estafa was committed by the issuance of the check in payment
of a pre-existing obligation. Eventually, Anita Chan and her husband Ricky
Wong filed against Katrina and her husband Romarico Henson, an action for
collection of a sum of money also in the same court. After trial, the court
promulgated a decision in favor of the Wongs. A writ of execution was
thereafter issued. Levied upon were four lots in Angeles City, including the lots
bought by Romarico. Thereafter, a public auction sale ensued and later in the
property covered by said title was extrajudicially foreclosed.

About a month before such redemption or on August 8, 1 978, Romarico filed

an action for the annulment of the lower court alleging that he was "not given
his day in court" because he was not represented by counsel as Attys. Albino
and Yumul, as the 2 appeared solely for Katrina. The lower court favored
Romarico. The defendants appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court
but the said court affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE:
WON the execution of a decision in an action for collection of sum of money
may be nullified on the ground that the real properties levied upon and sold at
public auction are the alleged exclusive properties of a husband, who did not
participate in his wife's business transactions. YES

RULING:
On the matter of ownership of the properties involved, however, the Court
disagrees with the appellate court that the said properties are exclusively
owned by Romarico. Having been acquired during the marriage, they are still
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership even though Romarico and
Katrina had been living separately. The presumption of the conjugal nature of
the properties subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing
evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the properties are
exclusively owned by Romarico.

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- Newt Gingrich
64. WILHELMINA JOVELLANOS vs. CA and ANNETTE H.
JOVELLANOS
G.R. No. 100728
June 18, 1992
FACTS:
On September 2, 1955, Daniel Jovellanos and Philippine American Life
Insurance Company (Philamlife) entered into a contract denominated as a
lease and conditional sale agreement over Lot 8, Block 3 of the latter's Quezon
City Community Development Project, including a bungalow thereon, located
at and known as No. 55 South Maya Drive, Philamlife Homes, Quezon City. At
that time, Daniel Jovellanos was married to Leonor Dizon, with whom he had
three children, the petitioners herein. Leonor Dizon died on January 2, 1959.
On May 30, 1967, Daniel married private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos
with whom he begot two children, her herein co-respondents.
On December 18, 1971, petitioner Mercy Jovellanos married Gil Martinez and,
at the behest of Daniel Jovellanos, they built a house on the back portion of
the premises. On January 8, 1975, with the lease amounts having been paid,
Philamlife executed to Daniel Jovellanos a deed of absolute sale and, on the
next day, the latter donated to herein petitioners all his rights, title and interests
over the lot and bungalow thereon. On September 8, 1985, Daniel Jovellanos
died and his death spawned the present controversy.
Annette H. Jovellanos claimed in the lower court that the aforestated property
was acquired by her deceased husband while their marriage was still
subsisting, by virtue of the deed of absolute sale dated January 8,
1975 executed by Philamlife in favor of her husband, Daniel Jovellanos.
Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the property, specifically the lot
and the bungalow erected thereon, as well as the beneficial and equitable title
thereto, were acquired by their parents during the existence of the first
marriage under their lease and conditional sale agreement with Philamlife on
September 2, 1955.
The court rendered a decision: 1) ordering the liquidation of the partnership of
the 2nd marriage and directing the reimbursement of the amount advanced in
the partnership of the 1st marriage as well as the late Daniel Jovellanos and
defendants Sps. Gil and Mercy Martinez, in the acquisition of the lot and
bungalow described in the Lease and Conditional Sale, 2) awarding one-half
(1/2) of the subject property therein to private respondent Annette H.
Jovellanos and one-sixth (1/6) each of the other half of said property to the
three private respondents, all as pro indiviso owners of their aforesaid
respective portions, 3) Gil and Mercy is awarded all rights over the bungalow
erected thereon. The decision is based under Article 118 of the FC.
Petitioners now seek this review, invoking that the lower court erred in holding
that the provisions of the Family Code are applicable in resolving the rights of
the parties herein, as this would impair their vested rights over the properties
involved in this litigation, which they have acquired long before the Family Code
took effect.
ISSUE:
What Law shall be applicable to resolve the property rights of the parties in this
case? FAMILY CODE
33
RULING:
To arrive at the applicable law, it would accordingly be best to look into the
nature of the contract entered into by the contracting parties. As appositely
observed by respondent court, the so-called lease agreement is, therefore,
very much in issue. Its provisions are binding not only upon them but also upon
their heirs and assigns.
The contract entered into by the late Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife is
specifically denominated as a "Lease and Conditional Sale Agreement" over
the property involved with a lease period of twenty years at a monthly rental of
P288.87. It is specifically provided, however, that "(i)f, at the expiration of the
lease period herein agreed upon, the LESSEE-VENDEE shall have fully
faithfully complied with all his obligations herein stipulated, the LESSOR-
VENDOR shall immediately sell, transfer and convey to the LESSEE-VENDEE
the property. Thus, the conditional sale agreement in said contract is, therefore,
also in the nature of a contract to sell, as distinguished from a contract of sale.
In a contract to sell or a conditional sale, ownership is not transferred upon
delivery of the property but upon full payment of the purchase price. Generally,
ownership is transferred upon delivery, but even if delivered, the ownership
may still be with the seller until full payment of the price is made, if there is
stipulation to this effect. The stipulation is usually known as a pactum reservati
dominii, or contractual reservation of title, and is common in sales on the
installment plan. Compliance with the stipulated payments is a suspensive
condition. The failure of which prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey
title from acquiring binding force.
In the present case, we find no legal impediment to the application in this case
of the rule of retroactivity provided in the Family Code to the effect that —
Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired nights in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws.
The right of Daniel Jovellanos to the property under the contract with Philamlife
was merely an inchoate and expectant right which would ripen into a vested
right only upon his acquisition of ownership which, as aforestated, was
contingent upon his full payment of the rentals and compliance with all his
contractual obligations thereunder. A vested right as an immediate fixed right
of present and future enjoyment. It is to be distinguished from a right that is
expectant or contingent.
We have earlier underscored that the deed of absolute sale was executed in
1975 by Philamlife, pursuant to the basic contract between the parties, only
after full payment of the rentals. Upon the execution of said deed of absolute
sale, full ownership was vested in Daniel Jovellanos. Since, as early as 1967,
he was already married to Annette H. Jovellanos, this property necessarily
belonged to his conjugal partnership with his said second wife. Therefore, the
petitioners has no vested right over the said properties.
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65. TARROSA vs. DE LEON
G.R. No. 185063
July 23, 2009

FACTS:
On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio De Leon, then single, and the People’s Homesite
and Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell
for the purchase on installment of a lot situated in Quezon City. On April 24,
1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon. They had two children, Danilo and
Vilma. On June 22, 1970, PHHC executed a Final Deed of Sale in favor of
Bonifacio upon full payment of the price of the lot. TCT was issued on February
24, 1972 in the name of Bonifacio, “single.” On January 12, 1974, Bonifacio
sold the lot to his sister, Lita, and her husband, Felix Tarrosa. The Deed of Sale
did not bear the written consent and signature of Anita. On February 29, 1996,
Bonifacio died.

Three months later, Tarrosa spouses registered the Deed of Sale. Anita,
Danilo, and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit allegeing that Bonifacio was still
the owner of the lands. Tarrosa spouses averred that the lot Bonifacio sold to
them was his exclusive property because he was still single when he acquired
it from PHHC. They further alleged that they were not aware of the marriage
between Bonifacio and Anita at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale.

ISSUE:
WON the property that Bonifacio has purchased on installment before the
marriage although some installments were paid during the marriage would be
considered conjugal property. YES

HELD:
The subject lot which was once owned by PHHC and covered by the
Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred during the marriage of
Bonifacio and Anita. The title to the property was only passed to Bonifacio after
he had fully paid the purchase price on June 22, 1970. This full payment was
made more than 2 years after his marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968. In effect,
the property was acquired during the existence of the marriage. Hence,
ownership to the property is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership.

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
66. AYALA INVESTMENTS vs. CA
GR No. 118305
February 12, 1998

FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner
Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo
Ching, EVP of PBM, executed security agreements on December 1980 and
March 1981 making him jointly and severally answerable with PBM’s
indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan hence filing of complaint
against PBM and Ching. The RTC rendered judgment ordering PBM and
Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount with interests.
Pending the appeal of the judgment, RTC issued writ of execution. Thereafter,
Magsajo, appointed deputy sheriff, caused the issuance and service upon
respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their conjugal properties
on May 1982. Respondent spouses filed injunction against petitioners on the
ground that subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal
partnership. CA issued a TRP enjoining lower court from enforcing its order
paving way for the scheduled auction sale of respondent spouses conjugal
properties. A certificate of sale was issued to AIDC, being the only bidder and
was registered on July 1982.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is
considered “for the benefit of the conjugal partnership” and is it chargeable.
NO

HELD:
The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of PBM
and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching. Furthermore, AIDC
failed to prove that Ching contracted the debt for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains. PBM has a personality distinct and separate from the
family of Ching despite the fact that they happened to be stockholders of said
corporate entity. Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt and right of recourse
to Ching as surety is only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings.

Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, “if the money or
services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as
a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as
falling within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership”. The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the
principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. Ching only signed as a
surety for the loan contracted with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a surety
is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession, it is not embarking in
a business. Hence, the conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the
surety agreement which was clearly for the benefit of PBM.

The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a benefit for the
family may have resulted when the guarantee was in favor of Ching’s
employment (prolonged tenure, appreciation of shares of stocks, prestige
enhanced) since the benefits contemplated in Art. 161 of the Civil Code must
be one directly resulting from the loan. It must not be a mere by product or a
spin off of the loan itself.

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
67. AYALA INVESTMENT vs. CA
G.R. No. 118305
February 12, 1988
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50,300,000 loan from petitioner
Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo
Ching made himself jointly answerable to the debt as added security. Upon
PBM’s failure to pay the loan, AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM
and respondent Ching in the CFI of Pasig.
After trial, the court rendered decision in favor of AIDC ordering PBM and
Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount of the
loan with interests. Pending the appeal of the judgment, RTC issued a writ of
execution and thereafter, the deputy sheriff caused the issuance and service
upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on three of their conjugal
properties.
Respondent spouses then filed an injunction contending that subject loan did
not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Nevertheless, a
certificate of sale was issued to AIDC, being the only bidder for the property.
ISSUE:
WON the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is considered
“for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” NO
HELD:
The loan obtained by the husband from AIDC was for the benefit of PBM and
not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching.
conjugal partnership.” Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding
to the conjugal partnership.
Alfredo Ching signed as surety for the P50M loan contracted on behalf of PBM.
Petitioner should have adduced evidence to prove that Alfredo Ching’s acting
as surety redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
The petitioner claims that the benefits were: employment of Ching would be
prolonged, his shares would appreciate, and it would enhance his career.
However, these are not the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the Civil
Code. The benefits must be one directly resulting from the loan. It cannot
merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself.
Petitioner also advances the view that acting as surety is part of the business
or profession of the husband. Signing as a surety is certainly not an
exercise of an industry or profession. No matter how often an executive
acted or was persuaded to act, as a surety for his own employer, this should
not be taken to mean that he had thereby embarked in the business of
suretyship or guaranty.
There is no difference between the terms “redounded to the benefit of” or
“benefited from” on the one hand; and “for the benefit of” on the other. They
mean one and the same thing. Article 161 (1) of the Civil Code and Article 121
(2) of the Family Code are similarly worded, i.e., both use the term “for the
benefit of.” On the other hand, Article 122 of the Family Code provides that
“The payment of personal debts by the husband or the wife before or during
the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as
they redounded to the benefit of the family.” As can be seen, the terms are
used interchangeably.

PBM has a personality which is distinct from that of Ching’s family despite their
being stockholders of the said company. The debt incurred by Ching is a
corporate debt and the right of recourse to respondent as surety is only to the
extent of his corporate stocks.

If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly
received the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his
own profession, that contract falls within the term “obligations for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership.” It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent
at the time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract
of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services
to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if
in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated,
where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the
law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of
the conjugal partnership.

On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or
entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract
cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of
“obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” The contract of loan or
services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety
or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters into
a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is “for the benefit of the

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
68. CHING vs. CA
423 SCRA 356
February 23, 2004
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained two loans from the
Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). (PBMCI) Executive Vice-President Alfredo
Ching executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC for the payment of the said
loan. The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans so ABC filed a
complaint for sum of money against the PBMCI, and Alfredo Ching in his
capacity as surety of PBMCI.
Trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment against Alfredo Ching, and
the deputy sheriff levied on attachment 100,000 common shares of Citycorp
stocks in the name of Alfredo Ching.
Encarnacion T. Ching, wife of Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the
levy on attachment alleging that the 100,000 shares of stocks levied on by the
sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their marriage out of
conjugal funds. Furthermore, the indebtedness covered by the continuing
guaranty/comprehensive suretyship contract executed by Alfredo Ching for the
account of PBMCI did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
The CA ruled that the presumption in Article 160 of the New Civil Code shall
not apply where, as in this case, the petitioner-spouses failed to prove the
source of the money used to acquire the shares of stock. It held that the levied
shares of stocks belonged to Alfredo Ching, as evidenced by the fact that the
said shares were registered in the corporate books of Citycorp solely under his
name.
2)
The spouses aver that the source of funds in the acquisition of the levied shares
of stocks is not the controlling factor when invoking the presumption of the
conjugal nature of stocks under Art. 121 and that such presumption subsists
even if the property is registered only in the name of one of the spouses, in this
case, petitioner Alfredo Ching. According to the petitioners, the suretyship
obligation was not contracted in the pursuit of the petitioner-husband’s
profession or business.
ISSUES:
1. WON the 100,000 shares belong to the conjugal partnership of the
spouses. YES
2. WON the conjugal partnership is liable for the continuing guaranty
entered into by Ching in behalf of PBMCI. NO
HELD:
1) Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties
acquired during the marriage are presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband, or to the wife.
It is not even necessary to prove that the properties were acquired with
funds of the partnership. As long as the properties were acquired by the
parties during the marriage, they are presumed to be conjugal in nature.
37
In fact, even when the manner in which the properties were acquired unit. The husband, therefore, is denied the power to assume
does not appear, the presumption will still apply, and the properties will unnecessary and unwarranted risks to the financial stability of the
still be considered conjugal. The presumption of the conjugal nature of conjugal partnership.
the properties acquired during the marriage subsists in the absence of
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome the same. In this case, the ABC failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the
petitioners was benefited by the husband’s act of executing a continuing
In this case, the evidence adduced by the petitioners is that the 100,000 guaranty and suretyship agreement with ABC for and in behalf of PBMCI.
shares of stocks in the Citycorp were issued to and registered in its The contract of loan was between ABC and the PBMCI, solely for the
corporate books in the name of the husband when the said corporation benefit of the latter. No presumption can be inferred from the fact that
was incorporated on May 14, 1979. This was done during the when the husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a
subsistence of the marriage of the petitioner-spouses. contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited.
ABC was burdened to establish that such benefit redounded to the
The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership conjugal partnership.
property of the petitioners. ABC failed to adduce evidence that the
husband acquired the stocks with his exclusive money. The barefaced
fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the corporate books of
Citycorp solely in the name of the husband does not constitute proof that
only the husband, not the conjugal partnership, owned the same.
He who claims that property acquired by the spouses during their
marriage is not conjugal partnership property but belongs to one of them
as his personal property is burdened to prove the source of the money
utilized to purchase the same. In this case, ABC claimed that the
petitioner-husband acquired the shares of stocks from the Citycorp
Investment Philippines in his own name as the owner thereof. It was,
thus, the burden of ABC to prove that the source of the money utilized in
the acquisition of the shares of stocks was that of the petitioner-husband
alone. As held by the trial court, the private respondent failed to adduce
evidence to prove this assertion.
Article 121 provides:
The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) All debts and
obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the
same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the
partnership.
The petitioner-husband signed the continuing guaranty and suretyship
agreement as security for the payment of the loan obtained by the
PBMCI from ABC. However, this is different from a situation where the
husband borrows money or receives services to be used for his own
business or profession (where in such case, the conjugal partnership is
liable). Here, the signing as surety is certainly not an exercise of an
industry or profession. It is not embarking in a business. No matter how
often an executive acted on or was persuaded to act as surety for his
own employer, this should not be taken to mean that he thereby
embarked in the business of suretyship or guaranty.
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should
appertain to the husband alone, there must be a showing that some
advantages accrued to the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal
partnership responsible for a liability that should appertain alone to one
of the spouses is to frustrate the objective of the New Civil Code to show
the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 2018-2019
Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
69. HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C.
DAILO
G.R. No. 153802
March 11, 2005
FACTS:
Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr were married on August 8, 1967. During
their marriage the spouses purchased a house and lot situated at San Pablo
City from a certain Dalida. The subject property was declared for tax
assessment purposes The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was
executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to
the exclusion of his wife.
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed an SPA in favor of one Gesmundo, authorizing
the latter to obtain a loan from Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be
secured by the spouses Dailo’s house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to
the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan from Homeowners. As security therefor,
Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on
the subject property in favor of petitioner. The abovementioned transactions,
including the execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took
place without the knowledge and consent of respondent-wife.
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property, with
petitioner as the highest bidder. Petitioner consolidated the ownership thereof
by executing an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute
Sale.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration
of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include the powers of disposition
or encumbrance which must have the authority of
the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent,
the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence
of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion
of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale.
Respondent and Marcelino were married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of
a marriage settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains governed the property relations between respondent
and her husband. With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988,
the Family Code was made applicable to conjugal partnership of
gains already established before its effectivity unless vested rights have
already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of
respondent and the late Marcelino even in a suppletory manner. The regime
of conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of partnership, where
the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits
and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both
spouses through their efforts or by chance.
2. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, “[T]he conjugal partnership shall
be liable for: . . .
(1) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without
the consent of the other to the extent that the family may
have been benefited...”
Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should
appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective
of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-
being of the family as a unit.
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Ei
incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who denies,
must prove). Petitioner’s sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the
late Marcelino to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt
redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does
not persuade. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for
the payment of the principal obligation.

In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died. In one of her visits to the subject
property, Miguela learned that petitioner had already employed a certain Brion
to clean its premises and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion
allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject
property, which was conjugal in nature, she instituted with the RTC a case
for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Reconveyance against petitioner.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the
property in question was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership
apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by
the rules on contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is
expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by
the spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus, the property relations of
respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4
on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the
rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former
prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only when the
Family Code is silent on the matter.

ISSUE:
1. WON the mortgage constituted by Marcelino Dailo on the subject
property as co-owner thereof is valid as to his undivided share. NO
2. WON the conjugal partnership is liable for the payment of the loan
obtained by Marcelino Dailo, the same having redounded to the benefit
of the family. NO
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge
and consent of his wife, Marcelino constituted a real estate mortgage on the
subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express
provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority
or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the
conjugal property shall be void.

HELD:
1. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. . . .
The provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who
makes the disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-
ownership under Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Where the law does not
distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, the real estate mortgage on
the subject property for lack of respondent’s consent is null and void in its
entirety.

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
70. ANDO vs. CAMPO
G.R. No. 184007
February 16, 2011

FACTS:
Paquito Ando was the president of Premier Allied and Contracting Services,
Inc. (PACSI), an independent labor contractor. Andresito Campo and the other
respondents were hired by PACSI as pilers or haulers. Respondents were
dismissed from employment, consequently filing a case for illegal dismissal and
some money claims with the NLRC.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in respondents’ favor. PACSI and Ando were directed
to pay a total of P422,702.28 (for separation pay and award of attorney’s fees).

To answer for the reward, the NLRC acting sheriff issued a Notice of Sale on
Execution of Personal Property over a property in the name of “Paquito V. Ando
xxx married to Erlinda S. Ando,” prompting Ando to file an action for prohibition
before the RTC. Ando claims that the property belonged to him and his wife in
their personal capacity, and not the corporation, and hence, could not be the
subject of the execution sale. Since he was sued in a representative capacity,
and not in his personal capacity, the property could not be made to answer for
the judgment obligation of the corporation.

ISSUE:
WON the property owned by Ando and his wife could be levied for reason of a
debt incurred by him, in his representative capacity and his company, PACSI.
NO

HELD:
The TCT of the property bears out that, indeed, it belongs to petitioner and his
wife. Thus, even if we consider petitioner as an agent of the corporation and,
therefore, not a stranger to the case such that the provision on third-party
claims will not apply to him, the property was registered not only in the name
of petitioner but also of his wife. She stands to lose the property subject of
execution without ever being a party to the case. This will be tantamount to
deprivation of property without due process.

The power of the NLRC to execute its judgment extends only to properties
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. Thus, a sheriff has
no authority to attach the property of any person except that of the judgment
debtor. The property in question belongs not only to Ando, but his wife as well.

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
71. SECURITY BANK vs. MAR TIERRA CORP latter’s benefit. Petitioner had the burden of proving that the conjugal
508 SCRA 419 partnership of the spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction, but it failed
November 29, 2006 to discharge that burden.

FACTS:
Respondent Mar Tierra Corporation (MTC), through its president, Wilfrido C.
Martinez, applied for a P12,000,000 credit accommodation with petitioner
Security Bank and Trust Company (SBTC). SBTC approved the application
and entered into a credit line agreement with MTC. It was secured by an
indemnity agreement executed by individual respondents Wilfrido C. Martinez,
Miguel J. Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound themselves jointly and
severally with MTC for the payment of the loan.

MTC was not able to pay all its debt balance as it suffered business reversals,
eventually ceasing operations. Petitioner filed a complaint against MTC and
the individual respondents.

RTC issued a writ of attachment on all real and personal properties of MTC
and respondent Martinez including the conjugal house and lot of the spouses
but it found that it did not redound to the benefit of his family, hence, it ordered
the lifting of the attachment on the conjugal house and lot of the spouses
Martinez.

ISSUE:
WON the conjugal partnership may be held liable for an indemnity agreement
entered into by the husband to accommodate a third party. NO

HELD:
Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for “all
debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.”

The court ruled in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. de Garcia that, in acting as a
guarantor or surety for another, the husband does not act for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership as the benefit is clearly intended for a third party.

In Ayala Investment and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, it was

ruled that, if the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., the
direct recipient of the money and services to be used in or for his own business
or profession, the transaction falls within the term “obligations for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership.” In other words, where the husband contracts an
obligation on behalf of the family business, there is a legal presumption that
such obligation redounds to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or
entity and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, the transaction
cannot by itself be deemed an obligation for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. It is for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or
his family.

In the case at bar, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between
petitioner and MTC, was solely for the benefit of the latter. The accessory
contract (the indemnity agreement) under which individual respondent
Martinez assumed the obligation of a surety for MTC was similarly for the

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
72. ATROCINIA RAVINA v. MARY ANN P. VILLA-ABRILLE
GR No. 160708
October 16, 2009
DOCTRINE:
Sale of one spouse of conjugal property without the knowledge of the spouse
– sale is null and void;
Sale of one spouse of conjugal property with knowledge but without consent of
the other spouse – sale is annullable, within five years, by the non-consenting
spouse.
FACTS:
Mary Ann and Pedro Villa-Abrille were husband and wife. They had four
children. The properties involved in this case are:
 Lot 7 – acquired by the spouses during their marriage
(1982);
 Lot 8 – acquired by Pedro when he was still single;
 House built on lot 7 and 8 – built from their joint efforts and
the proceeds of a loan from DBP.
(1991) Pedro got a mistress. He offered to sell the house and two lots to
petitioners Ravina. Mary Ann objected, but Pedro still sold the properties
without her consent. Pedro, with the connivance of Ravina and some Civilian
Armed Forces (CAFGU) transferred all the belongings from the house to an
apartment and prevented Mary Ann and the kids from entering the house.
Thus, Mary Ann and the children filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale,
Specific Performance and Damages before RTC Davao. During the trial,
Pedro declared that the house was built with his own money. Ravina testified
that they bought the house and lot from Pedro upon examination of the title.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether Lot 7 is an exclusive property of Pedro or conjugal property.
CONJUGAL
(2) Whether sale of Lot 7 by Pedro was valid considering the absence of
Mary Ann’s consent. ANNULLABLE WITHIN 5 YEARS
HELD:
(1) Petitioner Ravina asserts that Lot 7 was exclusive property of Pedro, it
being acquired by Pedro thru barter or exchange with his another
exclusive property.
But no evidence was adduced to show that the subject property was
acquired through exchange or barter. The presumption of the conjugal
nature of the property subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the
subject property is exclusively owned by Pedro.
The fact is, Lot 7 was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and
Mary Ann. Likewise, the house built thereon is conjugal property, having
been constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had even
obtained a loan from DBP to construct the house. Article 160 of the New
Civil Code provides, "All property of the marriage is presumed to belong
41
to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife."
(2) Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after
the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by
Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a disposition to be
void if done (a) without the consent of both the husband and the wife, or
(b) in case of one spouse’s inability, the authority of the court. Article 124
of the Family Code, the governing law at the time the assailed sale was
contracted, is explicit:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse
to the court by the wife for proper remedy which must
be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration
of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These powers
do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition
or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer
on the part of the consenting spouse and the third
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract
upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors.
The particular provision in the New Civil Code giving the wife ten (10) years to
annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code.
It is thus clear that alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal partnership
property by the husband without the consent of the wife is null and void.
Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the husband,
without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal property, such sale
is void. If the sale was with the knowledge but without the approval of the wife,
thereby resulting in a disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance of
the wife who is given five (5) years from the date the contract implementing the
decision of the husband to institute the case.
Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of sale within
five (5) years from the date of sale and execution of the deed. However, her
action to annul the sale pertains only to the conjugal house and lot (Lot 7) and
does not include Lot 8, a property exclusively belonging to Pedro and which he
can dispose of freely without Mary Ann’s consent.
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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
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73. HEIRS OF DOMINGO HERNANDEZ vs. MINGOA

FACTS:
The subject matter of the action is a parcel of land with an area of 520.50
square meters situated in Diliman, Quezon City registered in the name of
Domingo B. Hernandez, Sr. married to Sergia V. Hernandez. Later, the TCT
issued to the spouses was cancelled and a new one was issued in favor of
Melanie Mingoa.

Domingo apparently owned the property from an award by the Philippine

Homesite and Housing Corporation in 1958. Title to the property was only
issued in 1966 after Domingo paid in full to PHHC. However, Domingo never
took possession of the property. Respondents took possession of the property
since 1966. A Deed of Transfer of Rights was executed by Domingo in favor of
Dolores Camisura, expressly stating that the former, in consideration of the
amount of PHP6,500.00, transfers his rights over the subject property to the
latter.

Although entitled as an SPA, this was in reality an alienation of the subject

property. It is now being questioned by petitioners on whether the sale was
valid since the property, being conjugal in nature, the consent of the wife Sergia
must be obtained first. However, the wife’s signature on the SPA was falsified.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale of the property was valid despite the falsity of the wife’s
signature in the SPA. YES

RULING:
Sergia’s lack of consent to the sale did not render the transfer of her share
invalid.

The husband’s first act of disposition of the subject property occurred in 1963
when he executed the SPA and the Deed of Transfer of Rights in favor of
Dolores Camisura. Thus, the right of action of the petitioners accrued in 1963,
as Article 173 of the Civil Code provides that the wife may file for annulment of
a contract entered into by the husband without her consent within ten (10)
years from the transaction questioned.

Petitioners filed the action for reconveyance in 1995. Even if we were to

consider that their right of action arose when they learned of the cancellation
of TCT No. 107534 and the issuance of TCT No. 290121 in Melanie Mingoa’s
name in 1993, still, twelve (12) years have lapsed since such discovery, and
they filed the petition beyond the period allowed by law. Moreover, when Sergia
Hernandez, together with her children, filed the action for reconveyance, the
conjugal partnership of property with Hernandez, Sr. had already been
terminated by virtue of the latter’s death on April 16, 1983. Clearly, therefore,
petitioners’ action has prescribed.

The failure of Sergia Hernandez to file with the courts an action for annulment
of the contract during the marriage and within ten (10) years from the
transaction necessarily barred her from questioning the sale of the subject
property to third persons.

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
74. FUENTES vs. ROCA
FACTS:
On, Oct 11, 1982, Tarciano Roca bought a 358-square meter lot in Zambales
from his mother. Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to the
petitioners Fuentes spouses through the help of Atty. Plagata who would
prepare the documents and requirements to complete the sale. In the
agreement between Tarciano and Fuentes spouses there will be a Php 60,000
down payment and Php 140,000 will be paid upon the removal of Tarciano of
certain structures on the land and after the consent of the estranged wife of
Tarciano, Rosario, would be attained. Atty. Plagata went to Manila to get the
signature of Rosario but notarized the document at Zamboanga . The deed of
sale was executed January 11, 1989.
contract is equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil
effects. It cannot be validated either by ratification or prescription.
But, although a void contract has no legal effects even if no action is
taken to set it aside, when any of its terms have been performed, an
action to declare its inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what
has been given under it. This action, according to Article 1410 of the Civil
Code does not prescribe.
Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for
annulment of sale and reconveyance of the real property that Tarciano
sold without their mothers (his wife’s) written consent. The passage of
time did not erode the right to bring such an action.

As time passed, Tarciano and Rosario died while the Fuentes spouses and
possession and control over the lot. Eight years later in 1997, the children of
Tarciano and Rosario filed a case to annul the sale and reconvey the property
on the ground that the sale was void since the consent of Rosario was not
attained and that Rosarios’ signature was a mere forgery. The Fuentes
spouses claim that the action has prescribed since an action to annul a sale on
the ground of fraud is 4 years from discovery. The RTC ruled in favor of the
Fuentes spouses. CA reversed this ruling stating that the action has not
prescribed since the applicable law is the 1950 Civil Code which provided that
the sale of Conjugal Property without the consent of the other spouse is
voidable and the action must be brought within 10 years. Given that the
transaction was in 1989 and the action was brought in 1997 hence it was well
within the prescriptive period.
2. The answer is no. As stated above, that sale was void from the
beginning. Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano
and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the
ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas. As lawful
owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to
exclude any person from its enjoyment and disposal.
In fairness to the Fuentes spouses, however, they should be entitled,
among other things, to recover from Tarcianos heirs, the Rocas, the
P200,000.00 that they paid him, with legal interest until fully paid,
chargeable against his estate.

ISSUES:
1. WON the action by the Rocas to declare the nullity of the sale to the
spouses has already prescribed. NO
2. Whether only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring
the action to annul the sale. NO
HELD:
(*Side issue on the wife’s signature being forged, the SC ruled that Rosario’s
signature on the affidavit appears heavy, deliberate and forced. This according
to the SC makes the signatures of Rosario on the affidavit a forgery.)

1. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this
case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and
Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the
Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family
Code took effect on August 3, 1988.

In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code
does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent
may assail her husband’s sale of the real property. It simply provides that
without the other spouses written consent or a court order allowing the
sale, the same would be void. Under the provisions of the Civil Code
governing contracts, a void or inexistent contract has no force and effect
from the very beginning. And this rule applies to contracts that are
declared void by positive provision of law, as in the case of a sale of
conjugal property without the other spouses written consent. A void

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- Newt Gingrich
75. AGUETE vs. PNB Ros’ loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Hence, the debt is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.
FACTS:
Spouses Jose Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a complaint for annulment against
PNB before the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

Jose Ros previously obtained a loan in the amount of P115,000.00 from PNB
and as security, a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land with TCT. No. T-
9646 was executed. Upon maturity, the loan remained unpaid and an
extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding on the mortgaged property was instituted
by PNB. After the lapse of a year, the property was consolidated and registered
in the name of PNB.

Estrella Aguete, claiming she had no knowledge of the said loan nor the
mortgage constituted on the land which is part of their conjugal property,
contested the transactions and filed for an annulment of the proceedings. She
interposed in her defense that the signatures affixed on the documents were
forged and that the proceeds of the loan did not redound to the benefit of the
family.

RTC ruled for the spouses, stating that Aguete may during their marriage and
within ten years from the transaction mentioned, may ask the court for an
annulment of the case. On notice of appeal by PNB, Court of Appeals reversed
this ruling and found for PNB, stating that forgery was concluded without
adequate proof. It also found that the loan was used in the expansion of the
family business.

ISSUE:
WON the loan contracted redounded to the benefit of the family making it
binding upon the conjugal property. YES

HELD:
The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without
the consent, express or implied, of the wife.
Should the husband do so, then the contract is voidable. Article 173 of the Civil
Code allows Aguete to question Ros’ encumbrance of the subject property.
However, the same article does not guarantee that the courts will declare the
annulment of the contract. Annulment will be declared only upon a finding that
the wife did not give her consent. Even as Aguete disavows the documents
supposedly acknowledged before the notary public, the document carries the
evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution.
Moreover, petitioners did not present any corroborating witness, such as a
handwriting expert, who could authoritatively declare that Aguete’s signatures
were really forged.

It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the
contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family
stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the
business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his
business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the
husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law
presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
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76. PANA vs. HEIRS OF JUANITE

FACTS:
Petitioner Efren Pana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others were accused of
murder. Efren was acquitted but Melecia and another person was found guilty
and was sentenced to the penalty of death and to pay each of the heirs of the
victims, jointly and severally for civil indemnity and damages.

Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the
issuance of the writ, resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the
names of Efren and Melecia. Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of
sale on execution were issued.

Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution,
claiming that the levied properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal
assets of Melecia.

ISSUE:
WON conjugal properties of Sps. Efren and Melecia can be levied and
executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case.
YES

HELD:
Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted
by the husband or the wife before or during the
marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
properties partnership except insofar as they
redounded to the benefit of the family.

Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities

imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.

The payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon

the spouses may be enforced against the partnership
assets if the spouse who is bound should have no
exclusive property or if it should be insufficient.

Since Efren does not dispute the RTC’s finding that Melecia has no exclusive
property of her own, the above applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in
the murder case imposed on her may be enforced against their conjugal assets
after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have
been covered.

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77. HOMEOWNER SAVINGS vs. DAILO
FACTS:
Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr were married on August 8, 1967. During
their marriage the spouses purchased a house and lot situated at San Pablo
City from a certain Dalida. The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was
executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to
the exclusion of his wife.
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of
one Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner
Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailo’s
house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a
loan from petitioner. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the same
day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of
petitioner. The abovementioned transactions, including the execution of the
SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took place without the knowledge and consent of
respondent. Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result,
petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged
property.
In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died. In one of her visits to the subject
property, Miguela learned that petitioner had already employed a certain Brion
to clean its premises and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion
allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject
property, which was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with the RTC San
Pablo City a Civil Case for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of
Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance
with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner. In the
latter’s Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that the property in question was the exclusive
property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
ISSUES:
1. WON the mortgage constituted by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. on the
subject property as co-owner thereof is valid as to his undivided share.
NO
2. WON the conjugal partnership is liable for the payment of the loan
obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. The same having redounded to
the benefit of the family. NO
HELD:
1. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. . . .
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration
of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These
46
powers do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In
the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. . . .
In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the
absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void,
including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband
who contracted the sale.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the
knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino constituted a real estate
mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their conjugal
partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in
the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse,
any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.
2. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, “[T]he conjugal partnership shall
be liable for: . . .
(1) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the
consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been
benefited; . . . .”
Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that
should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the
avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for
the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming
as such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts,
not he who denies, must prove). Petitioner’s sweeping conclusion that
the loan obtained by the late Marcelino to finance the construction of
housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family,
without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the
payment of the principal obligation.
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78. SPS. ONISEFORO & ROSARIO ALINAS vs. SPS. VICTOR &
ELENA ALINAS

FACTS:
Spouses Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas (petitioners) separated sometime in
1982. They left behind two lots identified, one with a bodega standing on it and
the other with petitioners' house. Respondent Victor Alinas is the brother of
petitioner. Petitioners alleged that they entrusted their properties to
respondents. Sometime in 1993, petitioners discovered that their two lots were
already titled in the name of the respondent spouses. Onesiforo’s signature
appeared in an Absolute Deed of Sale selling one of the lots to respondent
spouses. Records also show a notarized document whereby petitioner
acknowledged that his brother used his own money to redeem one of the lots
mortgaged and foreclosed and thus his brother became the owner. Petitioners
filed with the RTC a complaint for the recovery of possession and ownership
of their conjugal properties with damages against respondent spouses.

ISSUE:
WON the sale of conjugal property by the husband petitioner to respondent
spouses is valid despite the lack of consent on the part of the wife. NO

HELD:
Pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code and jurisprudence, the sale of
petitioners' conjugal property made by petitioner Onesiforo alone is void in its
entirety. It should be noted that respondent spouses were well aware that the
property is a conjugal property of petitioners. They also knew that the
disposition being made by Onesiforo is without the consent of his wife, as they
knew that petitioners had separated, and, the sale documents do not bear the
signature of petitioner Rosario. The fact that Onesiforo had to execute the
Absolute Deed of Sale and a notarized Agreement reveals that they had full
knowledge of the severe infirmities of the sale. Such being the case, no
injustice is being foisted on respondent spouses as they risked transacting with
Onesiforo alone despite their knowledge that the subject property is a conjugal
property.

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79. ANTONIO DOCENA vs. HON. RICARDO P. LAPESURA G.R.
No. 140153
March 28, 2001
It has been our previous ruling that the certificate of non-forum
shopping should be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case, and that
the signing by only one of them is insufficient. To merit the Courts
consideration, petitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to personally
sign the certification.
FACTS:
On June 1, 1977, private respondent Casiano Hombria filed a Complaint for
the recovery of a parcel of land against his lessees, petitioner-spouses Antonio
and Alfreda Docena. The petitioners claimed ownership of the land based on
occupation since time immemorial. A certain Guillermo Abuda intervened in the
case. In a Decision dated November 24, 1989, the trial court ruled in favor of
the petitioners and the intervenor Abuda. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed the judgment of the trial court and ordered the petitioners to vacate
the land they have leased from respondent Hombria, excluding the portion
which the petitioners reclaimed from the sea and forms part of the shore, as
shown in the Commissioners Report, and to pay the plaintiff-appellant the
agreed rental of P1.00 per year from the date of the filing of the Complaint until
they shall have actually vacated the premises. The Complaint in Intervention
of Abuda was dismissed.
On May 22, 1995, private respondent Hombria filed a Motion for Execution of
the above decision, which was granted. A Writ of Execution was issued
therefore, however, the public respondent sheriff subsequently filed a
Manifestation requesting that he be clarified in the determination of that
particular portion which is sought to be excluded because of some defects in
the Commissioners Report and the Sketches attached thereto. The public
respondent judge ruled that no attempt should be made to alter or modify the
decision of CA, thus pursuant to the Resolution, the public respondent sheriff
issued an alias Writ of Demolition. The petitioners filed a Motion to set aside
such Resolution, but it was denied.
the petition. To merit the Courts consideration, petitioners must show
reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification.
In the case at bar, however, we hold that the subject Certificate of Non-Forum
Shopping signed by the petitioner Antonio Docena alone should be deemed to
constitute substantial compliance with the rules. The property subject of the
original action for recovery is conjugal. Whether it is conjugal under the New
Civil Code or the Family Code, a fact that cannot be determined from the
records before us, it is believed that the certificate on non-forum shopping filed
in the Court of Appeals constitutes sufficient compliance with the rules on
forum-shopping.
Under the New Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal
partnership. In fact, he is the sole administrator, and the wife is not entitled as
a matter of right to join him in this endeavor. The husband may defend the
conjugal partnership in a suit or action without being joined by the wife.
Under the Family Code, each spouse may validly exercise full power of
management alone, subject to the intervention of the court in proper cases as
provided under Article 124 of the Family Code. It is believed that even under
the provisions of the Family Code, the husband alone could have filed the
petition for certiorari and prohibition to contest the writs of demolition issued
against the conjugal property with the Court of Appeals without being joined by
his wife. The signing of the attached certificate of non-forum shopping only by
the husband is not a fatal defect. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is hereby GRANTED.

A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by the petitioners with the
Court of Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court
judge in issuing the Orders, the same was dismissed as the petition was filed
beyond the 60-day period provided under Section 4 of Rule 65 of ROC and
that the petition filed along with the mandatory Certificate of Non Forum
Shopping was filed without the consent of Antonio’s wife. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
WON Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition. YES

RULING:
It has been our previous ruling that the certificate of non-forum shopping should
be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case, and that the signing by
only one of them is insufficient. In the case of Efren Loquias vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, we held that the signing of the Verification and the Certification
on Non-Forum Shopping by only one of the petitioners constitutes a defect in

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80. SPS. AGGABAO vs. DIONISIO Z. PARULAN, JR.
G.R. No. 165803
September 1, 2010
Article 124 of the Family Code categorically requires the consent
of both spouses before the conjugal property may be disposed of by sale,
mortgage, or other modes of disposition
FACTS:
Involved in this action are two parcels of land and their improvements BF
Homes, Paranaque City in the name of respondents Spouses Maria Elena A.
Parulan (Ma. Elena) and Dionisio Z. Parulan, Jr. (Dionisio), who have been
estranged from one another. The herein petitioners were offered by real estate
broker Marta K. Atanacio to buy the subject properties. Thereafter, Elena
showed to petitioners the OCT of the property and a copy of the special power
of attorney purported to be executed by Dionisio authorizing her to sell the
property. Petitioners delivered the final amount of P700,000.00 to Ma. Elena,
who executed a deed of absolute sale in their favor. However, Ma. Elena did
not turn over the owners duplicate copy of TCT claiming that said copy was in
the possession of a relative who was then in Hongkong. In due time, the
petitioners learned that the duplicate owners copy of TCT had been all along
in the custody of the respondent Atty. Jeremy Z. Parulan, brother of Dionisio,
who appeared to hold an SPA executed by Dionisio, authorizing him to sell
both lots.
Thus Petitioners filed an action praying for the declaration of the nullity of the
deed of absolute sale executed by Ma. Elena, and the cancellation of the title
issued to the petitioners by virtue thereof. RTC rendered a decision in against
the Petitioners as they were not buyers in good faith, because they did not
exercise the necessary prudence to inquire into the wife’s authority to sell. The
CA also affirmed the RTC decision. Hence, the petitioners appeal by petition
for review on certiorari, seeking to reverse the decision of the CA.
ISSUE:
WON the sale of the subject properties executed by Ma. Elena is valid. NO
RULING:
The sale was not valid. Consequently, the TCT cannot be cancelled in favor of
the Petitioners as they were not buyers in Good Faith.
To start with, the sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988,
the effectivity of the Family Code. The proper law to apply is, therefore, Article
124 of the Family Code, for it is settled that any alienation or encumbrance of
conjugal property made during the effectivity of the Family Code is governed
by Article 124 of the Family Code.
Article 124. The administration and enjoyment of
the conjugal partnership property shall belong to
both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse
to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which
must be availed of within five years from the date of
the contract implementing such decision.
49
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration
of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include disposition or encumbrance
without authority of the court or the written consent
of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority
or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
and the third person, and may be perfected as a
binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer
is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
Article 124 of the Family Code categorically requires the consent of both
spouses before the conjugal property may be disposed of by sale, mortgage,
or other modes of disposition. In Bautista v. Silva, the Court erected a standard
to determine the good faith of the buyers dealing with a seller who had title to
and possession of the land but whose capacity to sell was restricted, in that the
consent of the other spouse was required before the conveyance, declaring
that in order to prove good faith in such a situation, the buyers must show that
they inquired not only into the title of the seller but also into the sellers capacity
to sell. Thus, the buyers of conjugal property must observe two kinds of
requisite diligence, namely: (a) the diligence in verifying the validity of the title
covering the property; and (b) the diligence in inquiring into the authority of the
transacting spouse to sell conjugal property in behalf of the other spouse.
In the present case, the unquestioning reliance by the petitioners on Ma.
Elena’s SPA without first taking precautions to verify its authenticity was not a
prudent buyer’s move. They should have done everything within their means
and power to ascertain whether the SPA had been genuine and authentic.
WHEREFORE, we deny the petition for review on certiorari.
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81. ARTURO SARTE FLORES vs. SPOUSES LINDO
G.R. No. 183984
April 13, 2011
Article 124 of the Family Code which applies to conjugal
partnership property, is a reproduction of Article 96 of the Family Code which
applies to community property. Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family
Code provide that the powers do not include disposition or encumbrance
without the written consent of the other spouse. Any disposition or
encumbrance without the written consent shall be void. However, both
provisions also state that "the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse x x x
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors."
FACTS:
On 31 October 1995, Edna Lindo obtained a loan from Arturo Flores (petitioner)
amounting to ₱400,000 payable on installment basis. To secure the loan, Edna
executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage covering a property in the name of
the respondents. Edna issued three checks as partial payments for the loan.
All checks were dishonored for insufficiency of funds, prompting petitioner to
file a Complaint for Foreclosure of Mortgage with Damages against
respondents. The RTC ruled that petitioner was not entitled to judicial
foreclosure of the mortgage as the Deed was executed by Edna without the
consent and authority of Enrico. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
but was denied.
On 8 September 2004, petitioner filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with
Damages against respondents. The latter also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
grounds of res judicata and lack of cause of action. The RTC denied the motion
to dismiss as res judicata will not apply to rights, claims or demands which,
although growing out of the same subject matter, constitute separate or distinct
causes of action and were not put in issue in the former action. Respondents
filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order before the Court of Appeals.
CA reversed the 2 earlier decisions for having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
ISSUE:
WON the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in dismissing the
complaint due to multiplicity of suits. YES
RULING:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse
to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must
be availed of within five years from the date of
contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration
50
of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These powers
do not include disposition or encumbrance without
authority of the court or the written consent of the
other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
and the third person, and may be perfected as a
binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer
is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
Article 124 of the Family Code of which applies to conjugal partnership
property, is a reproduction of Article 96 of the Family Code which applies to
community property. Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family Code provide
that the powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without the written
consent of the other spouse. Any disposition or encumbrance without the
written consent shall be void. However, both provisions also state that "the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse x x x before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors."
In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage were
executed on 31 October 1995. The Special Power of Attorney was executed
on 4 November 1995. The execution of the SPA is the acceptance by the other
spouse that perfected the continuing offer as a binding contract between the
parties, making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract.
However, as the Court of Appeals noted, petitioner allowed the decisions of the
2 RTCs has become final and executory without asking the courts for an
alternative relief. The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment
is to prevent one from enriching himself at the expense of another without just
cause or consideration. The principle is applicable in this case considering that
Edna admitted obtaining a loan from petitioners, and the same has not been
fully paid without just cause. The Deed was declared void erroneously at the
instance of Edna, first when she raised it as a defense before the RTC, Branch
33 and second, when she filed an action for declaratory relief before the RTC,
Branch 93. Petitioner could not be expected to ask the RTC, Branch 33 for an
alternative remedy, as what the Court of Appeals ruled that he should have
done, because the RTC, Branch 33 already stated that it had no jurisdiction
over any personal action that petitioner might have against Edna.
Considering the circumstances of this case, the principle against unjust
enrichment, being a substantive law, should prevail over the procedural rule on
multiplicity of suits. The Court of Appeals, in the assailed decision, found that
Edna admitted the loan, except that she claimed it only amounted to ₱340,000.
Edna should not be allowed to unjustly enrich herself because of the erroneous
decisions of the two trial courts when she questioned the validity of the Deed.
WHEREFORE, the Decisions of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE.
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82. SPS. UY and GILDA L. JARDELEZA vs. CA
G.R. No. 109557
November 29, 2000
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable
to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse
may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the
powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However,
the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
FACTS:
This case is a dispute between Teodoro L. Jardeleza (herein respondent)
against his mother Gilda L. Jardeleza, and sister and brother-in-law, the
spouses Jose Uy and Glenda Jardeleza (herein petitioners). The controversy
came about as a result of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.s suffering of a stroke on
March 25, 1991, which left him comatose and bereft of any motor or mental
faculties. Said Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. is the father of herein respondent
Teodoro Jardeleza and husband of herein private respondent Gilda Jardeleza.
Upon learning that one piece of real property belonging to the senior Jardeleza
spouses was about to be sold, petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza, on June 6, 1991,
filed before RTC in Iloilo, a petition guardianship of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.
It was prayed therein that Letters of Guardianship be issued in favor of herein
private respondent Gilda Ledesma Jardeleza and that no encumbrance, sale
or any disposition shall be made over the said property. A few days later, or on
June 13, 1991, respondent Gilda L. Jardeleza herself filed a petition for
declaration of incapacity of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and for assumption of sole
powers of administration of conjugal properties, and authorization to sell the
same. The RTC Br. 32 rendered decision in favor of Gilda. On June 24, 1991,
herein petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza filed his Opposition, which was denied. He
then filed a motion for reconsideration of the judgment.
While the MFR was still pending, Gilda Jardeleza disposed the subject property
thru an absolute sale to her daughter, Ma. Glenda Jardeleza Uy, for
P8,000,000.00, thereafter, Gilda Jardeleza filed an urgent ex-parte motion for
approval of the deed of absolute sale. The RTC Br. 32 denied herein petitioners
MFR and approving respondent Jardeleza’s motion for approval of the deed of
absolute sale. On December 9, 1992, the Court of Appeals reversed the earlier
RTC decision as the approval of deed of sale was void. Hence, this appeal by
petitioner.
ISSUE:
WON Gilda may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property
under Article 124 of the FC. YES, subject to certain limitations
RULING:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
51
husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse
to the court by the wife for a proper remedy which
must be availed of within five years from the date of
the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration.
These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the
authority of the court or the written consent of the
other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. However, the transaction shall be construed as
a continuing offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as
a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer
is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the Family
Code govern the proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code. The
situation contemplated is one where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact
or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained. Such
rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated
or incompetent to give consent. In this case, the trial court found that the
subject spouse "is an incompetent" who was in comatose or semi-comatose
condition, a victim of stroke, cerebrovascular accident, without motor and
mental faculties, and with a diagnosis of brain stem infarct. In such case, the
proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the
1964 Revised Rules of Court.
Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial proceedings under the
Family Code may apply to the wife's administration of the conjugal property,
the law provides that the wife who assumes sole powers of administration has
the same powers and duties as a guardian under the Rules of Court.
Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator
of the conjugal property must observe the procedure for the sale of the wards
estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95, 1964 Revised Rules of
Court, not the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code.
In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the procedure under the
Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, the trial court did not even observe the
requirements of the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code.
Thus, the trial court did not serve notice of the petition to the incapacitated
spouse; it did not require him to show cause why the petition should not be
granted. Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that absent an opportunity
to be heard, the decision rendered by the trial court is void for lack of due
process. WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of
Appeals, in toto.
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83. THOMAS C. CHEESMAN vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE An equally decisive consideration is that Estelita Padilla is a purchaser in good
COURT faith, both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court having found that
G.R. No. 74833 Cheesman's own conduct had led her to believe the property to be exclusive
January 21, 1991 property of the latter's wife, freely disposable by her without his consent or
intervention. An innocent buyer for value, she is entitled to the protection of the
The fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. law in her purchase, particularly as against Cheesman, who would assert rights
Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases of to the property denied him by both letter and spirit of the Constitution itself.
hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except
to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands
of the public domain."

FACTS:
Thomas Cheesman and Criselda P. Cheesman were married on December 4,
1970 but have been separated since February 15, 1981. On June 4, 1974, a
"Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights" was executed by Armando
Altares conveying a parcel of unregistered land and a house in Olongapo City
in favor of Criselda. On July 1, 1981, Criselda sold the same property to Estelita
M. Padilla, without the knowledge and consent of Thomas. Thereafter, he filed
a suit in the CFI at Olongapo City against his wife, Criselda, and Padilla,
praying for the annulment of the sale on the ground that the transaction had
been executed without his knowledge and consent.

The CFI declared that the sale was void ab initio as the subject property was a
conjugal partnership property, and the consent of Thomas was not duly
obtained. Estelita Padilla filed a petition for relief as she was deceived by
Criselda as to her authority to sell the said the conjugal property. The IAC
granted it thus, aggrieved, Thomas appealed the decision.

ISSUE:
WON the sale of the subject property was valid. PARTLY YES

RULING:
The sale was valid in relation to Criselda but null and void in relation to Thomas.

The fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14,
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain." Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with
knowledge of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the
lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatever
over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right
or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the
Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void. In any event, he had and
has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same
property by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the
prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a
theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If
the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien
husband a not insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would then have
a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the
Constitution does not permit him to have.

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52
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- Newt Gingrich
84. ALFRED FRITZ FRENZEL vs. EDERLINA P. CATITO
G.R. No. 143958
July 11, 2003
Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provides, as
follows: Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands in the public domain.
FACTS:
Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of German descent. He
works as a Pilot in Papua New Guinea. He arrived in the Philippines in 1974,
started engaging in business in the country two years thereafter, and married
Teresita Santos, a Filipino citizen. In 1981, Alfred and Teresita separated from
bed and board without obtaining a divorce. Sometime in February 1983, Alfred
arrived in Sydney, Australia Ederlina Catito, a Filipina. Unknown to Alfred, she
was married to Klaus Muller in Germany. She just tried her luck to earn more
money in Australia.
When Alfred went back to the Philippines, eventually Ederlina went back to
Philippines also and stayed together with Alfred. In the course of their
relationship, Alfred bought several real properties within the Philippines and
also offered to fund a parlor business for Ederlina. All of these are registered
in the name of Ederlina. On July 28, 1984, while Alfred was in Papua New
Guinea, he received a Letter dated December 7, 1983 from Klaus Muller who
was then residing in Berlin, Germany. Klaus informed Alfred that he and
Ederlina had been married on October 16, 1978 and had a blissful married life
until Alfred intruded therein. Ederlina assured Alfred that she will divorce Klaus.
However her petition for divorce was denied because Klaus opposed the same.
Klaus starts to threaten them that he would file a bigamy case against the 2 of
them if Ederlina will continue her amorous relationship with Alfred.
Thus, Alfred and Ederlina’s relationship started deteriorating.
Ederlina had not been able to secure a divorce from Klaus. To avoid
complications, Alfred decided to live separately from Ederlina and cut off all
contacts with her. Shortly thereafter, Alfred filed a Complaint against Ederlina,
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, for recovery of real and personal
properties located in Quezon City and Manila. In the meantime, on November
7, 1985, Alfred also filed a complaint against Ederlina with the Regional Trial
Court, Davao City, for specific performance, declaration of ownership of real
and personal properties, sum of money, and damages.
The trial court ruled that based on documentary evidence, the
purchaser of the three parcels of land subject of the complaint was Ederlina.
The court further stated that even if Alfred was the buyer of the properties, he
had no cause of action against Ederlina for the recovery of the same because
as an alien, he was disqualified from acquiring and owning lands in the
Philippines. The sale of the three parcels of land to the petitioner was null and
void ab initio. Applying the pari delicto doctrine, the petitioner was precluded
from recovering the properties from the respondent. Alfred appealed the
decision to the Court of Appeals, however it affirmed in toto the decision of the
RTC. Hence, the petition at bar.
ISSUE:
53
Who is the rightful owner of the several properties involved in the case, Alfred
Frenzel or Ederlina Muller? EDERLINA MULLER
RULING:
Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provides, as follows:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
land shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands in the public domain.
Lands of the public domain, which include private lands, may be transferred or
conveyed only to individuals or entities qualified to acquire or hold private lands
or lands of the public domain. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have
been disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, they have
also been disqualified from acquiring private lands.
Even if, as claimed by the petitioner, the sales in question were entered into by
him as the real vendee, the said transactions are in violation of the Constitution;
hence, are null and void ab initio.
The petitioner cannot find solace in Article 1416 of the New Civil Code which
reads:
Art. 1416. When the agreement is not illegal per se
but is merely prohibited, and the prohibition by the law
is designed for the protection of the plaintiff, he may,
if public policy is thereby enhanced, recover what he
has paid or delivered.
The provision applies only to those contracts which are merely prohibited, in
order to benefit private interests. It does not apply to contracts void ab initio.
The sale of three parcels of land in favor of the petitioner who is a foreigner is
illegal per se. The transactions are void ab initio because they were entered
into in violation of the Constitution. Thus, to allow the petitioner to recover the
properties or the money used in the purchase of the parcels of land would be
subversive of public policy. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition
is DISMISSED.
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85. MARIO SIOCHI vs. ALFREDO GOZON
G.R. No. 169900
INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC. vs. MARIO SIOCHI,
ELVIRA GOZON, et. al.
G.R. No. 169977
March 18, 2010
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable
to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse
may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the
powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However,
the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
FACTS:
This case involves a 30,000 sq.m. parcel of land in Malabon, Metro Manila and
is registered in the name of Alfredo Gozon (Alfredo), married to Elvira Gozon
(Elvira). On 23 December 1991, Elvira filed with the Cavite City Regional Trial
Court (Cavite RTC) a Petition for Legal Separation against her husband
Alfredo.
On 2 January 1992, Elvira filed a notice of lis pendens, which was then
annotated on TCT. On 31 august 1993, while the legal separation case was
still pending, Alfredo and Mario Siochi (Mario) entered into an agreement to
buy and sell involving the property for the price of P18 million. Among the
stipulations in the agreement were that Alfredo would: (1) secure an affidavit
from Elvira that the property is Alfredo’s exclusive property and to annotate the
agreement at the back of TCT no. 5357; (2) secure the approval of the Cavite
RTC to exclude the property from the legal separation case; and (3) secure the
removal of the notice of lis pendens pertaining to the said case and annotated
on TCT no. 5357. However, despite repeated demands from Mario, Alfredo
failed to comply with these stipulations. After paying the Php 5 million earnest
money as partial payment of the purchase price, Mario took possession of the
property in September 1993. On 6 September 1993, the agreement was
annotated on TCT No. 5357.
Meanwhile, the legal separation action was granted by RTC Cavite thus the
conjugal partnership of gains of the spouses is hereby declared dissolved and
liquidated. Being the offending spouse (Alfredo), respondent is deprived of his
share in the net profits and the same is awarded to their child Winifred R.
Gozon whose custody is awarded to petitioner. On 22 August 1994, Alfredo
executed a Deed of Donation over the property in favor of their daughter,
Winifred Gozon without annotating the agreement and the notice of lis
pendens. On 26 October 1994, Alfredo, by virtue of a spa executed in his favor
by Winifred, sold the property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. (IDRI) for P18
million. IDRI paid Alfredo P18 million, representing full payment for the
property.
54
Mario then filed with the Malabon Regional Trial Court a Complaint for Specific
Performance and Damages, Annulment of Donation and Sale, with Preliminary
Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of Mario. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the Malabon RTC’s decision. With modifications, stating that the sale
of the subject land by defendant Alfredo Gozon to plaintiff-appellant Siochi is
declared null and void for conveyance was done without the consent of
defendant-appellee Elvira Gozon.
Only Mario and IDRI appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals. In his
petition, Mario alleges that the agreement should be treated as a continuing
offer which may be perfected by the acceptance of the other spouse before the
offer is withdrawn. Since Elvira’s conduct signified her acquiescence to the
sale, Mario prays for the court to direct Alfredo and Elvira to execute a Deed of
Absolute Sale over the property upon his payment of P9 million to Elvira. On
the other hand, IDRI alleges that it is a buyer in good faith and for value. Thus,
IDRI prays that the court should uphold the validity of Idris TCT no. M-10976
over the property.
ISSUES:
1. WON the sale is valid. NO
2. WON IDRI is a buyer in good faith. NO
RULING:
1. This case involves the conjugal property of Alfredo and Elvira. Since the
disposition of the property occurred after the effectivity of the family
code, the applicable law is the family code. Article 124 of the family code
provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to the
recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy,
which must be availed of within five years from the
date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration
of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These powers
do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition
or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer
on the part of the consenting spouse and the third
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract
upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors.
Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
In this case, Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because
Elvira, with whom Alfredo was separated in fact, was unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal property. However, as
sole administrator of the property, Alfredo still cannot sell the property
without the written consent of Elvira or the authority of the court. Without
such consent or authority, the sale is void. The absence of the consent
of one of the spouse renders the entire sale void, including the portion of
the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale.
Even if the other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale
of the property, that other spouses written consent to the sale is still
required by law for its validity.
However, we disagree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the
one-half undivided share of Alfredo in the property was already forfeited
in favor of his daughter Winifred, based on the ruling of the Cavite RTC
in the legal separation case. The Court of Appeals misconstrued the
ruling of the Cavite RTC that Alfredo, being the offending spouse, is
deprived of his share in the net profits and the same is awarded to
Winifred. Thus, among the effects of the decree of legal separation is
that the conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the
offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits
earned by the conjugal partnership. It is only Alfredo's share in the net
profits which is forfeited in favor of Winifred. Clearly, what is forfeited in
favor of Winifred is not Alfredo’s share in the conjugal partnership
property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property.
2. IDRI is not a buyer in good faith.
With regard to IDRI, we agree with the court of appeals in holding that
IDRI is not a buyer in good faith. As found by the RTC Malabon and the
court of appeals, IDRI had actual knowledge of facts and circumstances
which should impel a reasonably cautious person to make further
inquiries about the vendors title to the property. The representative of
IDRI testified that he knew about the existence of the notice of lis
pendens on TCT No. 5357 and the legal separation case filed before the
Cavite RTC. Thus, IDRI could not feign ignorance of the Cavite RTC
decision declaring the property as conjugal.
Besides, had IDRI been more prudent before buying the property, it
would have discovered that Alfredo’s donation of the property to Winifred
was without the consent of Elvira. Under Article 125 of the Family Code,
a conjugal property cannot be donated by one spouse without the
consent of the other spouse. Clearly, IDRI was not a buyer in good faith.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitions.
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86. PATROCINIA RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA vs. MARY
ANN P. VILLA ABRILLE
G.R. No. 160708
October 16, 2009
The particular provision in the New Civil Code (Art. 124) giving the
wife ten (10) years to annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried over
to the Family Code. It is thus clear that alienation or encumbrance of the
conjugal partnership property by the husband without the consent of the wife
is null and void.
FACTS:
Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband
and wife. They have four children, who are also parties to the instant case and
are represented by their mother, Mary Ann.
In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-square meter parcel of land denominated
as Lot 7, located at Kamuning Street, Juna Subdivision, Matina, Davao City,
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-88674 in their names.
Said lot is adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he was still
single and which is registered solely in his name under TCT No. T-26471.
Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP), the spouses built a house on Lot 7 and Pedro’s
lot. The house was finished in the early 1980s but the spouses continuously
made improvements, including a poultry house and an annex.
In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family. Mary Ann was
forced to sell or mortgage their movables to support the family and the studies
of her children. By himself, Pedro offered to sell the house and the two lots to
herein petitioners, Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected and
notified the petitioners of her objections, but Pedro nonetheless sold the house
and the two lots without Mary Ann’s consent, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale.
On July 5, 1991 while Mary Ann was outside the house and the four children
were in school, Pedro together with armed members of the Civilian Armed
Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) and acting in connivance with petitioners
began transferring all their belongings from the house to an apartment.
Thereafter, Mary Ann and her children filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale,
Specific Performance, Damages and Attorney’s Fees with Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction against Pedro and herein petitioners in the RTC of Davao
City. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Respondents as the ½ of
property sold to the Ravinas is owned by Mary Ann. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals modified the decision, but still, it ruled that some of the properties
involved in the sale to the Ravinas are null and void. Their Motion for
Reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the sale to the Ravinas by Pedro is null and void for being a part of
conjugal property of the latter and Mary Ann. YES
RULING:
55
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides, All property of the marriage is (5) years from the date of sale and execution of the deed. However, her action
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it to annul the sale pertains only to the conjugal house and lot and does not
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. include the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, a property exclusively belonging
to Pedro and which he can dispose of freely without Mary Ann’s consent.
There is no issue with regard to the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, which
was an exclusive property of Pedro, having been acquired by him before his WHEREFORE, we deny the instant petition for lack of merit.
marriage to Mary Ann. However, the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was
acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann. No evidence was
adduced to show that the subject property was acquired through exchange or
barter. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the
absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said
presumption or to prove that the subject property is exclusively owned by
Pedro. Petitioner’s bare assertion would not suffice to overcome the
presumption that TCT No. T-88674, acquired during the marriage of Pedro and
Mary Ann, is conjugal. Likewise, the house built thereon is conjugal property,
having been constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had even
obtained a loan from DBP to construct the house.
Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of
the same Code that now treats such a disposition to be void if done (a) without
the consent of both the husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouses
inability, the authority of the court. Article 124 of the Family Code, the governing
law at the time the assailed sale was contracted, is explicit:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse
to the court by the wife for proper remedy which must
be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These powers
do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition
or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on
the part of the consenting spouse and the third
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract
upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors.
The particular provision in the New Civil Code giving the wife ten (10) years to
annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code.
It is thus clear that alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal partnership
property by the husband without the consent of the wife is null and void. Here,
respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of sale within five
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87. MANUEL and LETICIA FUENTES vs. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
G.R. No. 178902
April 21, 2010
In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family
Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent
may assail her husband’s sale of the real property. It simply provides that
without the other spouses written consent or a court order allowing the sale,
the same would be void.
FACTS:
Sabina Tarroza owned a titled 358-square meter lot in Canelar, Zamboanga
City. On October 11, 1982 she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca under a
deed of absolute sale. But Tarciano did not for the meantime have the
registered title transferred to his name. Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered
to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel and Leticia Fuentes. In order for the sale to
ensue, Tarciano must clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the
consent of his estranged wife, Rosario Gabriel Roca to the sale. Upon
Tarciano’s compliance with these conditions, the sale finally commenced.
Eight years later in 1997, the respondents filed an action for annulment of sale
and reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses before the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City as the sale to the spouses was void
since Tarciano's wife, Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her signature on
the affidavit of consent had been forged. The spouses denied the Rocas
allegations.
Both the Rocas and the Fuentes spouses presented handwriting experts at the
trial. On February 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, dismissing the case. It
ruled that the action had already prescribed since under Article 1391 of the
Civil Code. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision. The
CA found sufficient evidence of forgery and did not give credence to Atty.
Plagata's testimony that he saw Rosario sign the document in Quezon City.
Unsatisfied with the CA decision, the Fuentes spouses came to this court by
petition for review.
ISSUE:
WON Rosario's signature on the document of consent to her husband
Tarciano's sale of their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged. YES
(editor’s note: not a legal issue?)
RULING:
The Court agrees with the CA’s observation that Rosario’s signature strokes
on the affidavit appear heavy, deliberate, and forced. Her specimen signatures,
on the other hand, are consistently of a lighter stroke and more fluid. The way
the letters R and s were written is also remarkably different. The variance is
obvious even to the untrained eye.
Significantly, Rosario’s specimen signatures were made at about the time that
she signed the supposed affidavit of consent. They were, therefore, reliable
standards for comparison. The Fuentes spouses presented no evidence that
Rosario suffered from any illness or disease that accounted for the variance in
her signature when she signed the affidavit of consent. Notably, Rosario had
56
been living separately from Tarciano for 30 years since 1958. And she resided
so far away in Manila. It would have been quite tempting for Tarciano to just
forge her signature and avoid the risk that she would not give her consent to
the sale or demand a stiff price for it.
Furthermore, In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the
Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no
consent may assail her husband’s sale of the real property. It simply provides
that without the other spouses written consent or a court order allowing the
sale, the same would be void. Article 124 thus provides:
Art. 124. x x x In the event that one spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration.
These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the
authority of the court or the written consent of the
other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. x x x
Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or inexistent
contract has no force and effect from the very beginning. And this rule applies
to contracts that are declared void by positive provision of law, as in the case
of a sale of conjugal property without the other spouses written consent. A void
contract is equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil effects. It
cannot be validated either by ratification or prescription. But, although a void
contract has no legal effects even if no action is taken to set it aside, when any
of its terms have been performed, an action to declare its inexistence is
necessary to allow restitution of what has been given under it. This action,
according to Article 1410 of the Civil Code does not prescribe. Here, the Rocas
filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for annulment of sale and
reconveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold without their mothers (his
wife’s) written consent. The passage of time did not erode the right to bring
such an action. WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS
WITH MODIFICATION.
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88. JOE A. ROS and ESTRELLA AGUETE vs. PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK
G.R. No. 170166
April 6, 2011
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years
from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any
contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent
is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or
impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to
exercise this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage may
demand the value of the property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
FACTS:
On January 13, 1983, spouses Jose A. Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a
complaint for the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and all legal
proceedings taken thereunder against PNB, Laoag Branch before the Court of
First Instance, Ilocos Norte. The averments in the complaint disclosed that
plaintiff-appellee Joe A. Ros obtained a loan of ₱115,000.00 from PNB Laoag
Branch on October 14, 1974 and as security for the loan, plaintiff-appellee Ros
executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, PNB instituted
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. Claiming that
she (plaintiff-appellee Estrella Aguete) has no knowledge of the loan obtained
by her husband nor she consented to the mortgage instituted on the conjugal
property, hence the filing of the action. In its answer, PNB prays for the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action, and insists that it was
plaintiffs-appellees’ own acts of omission/connivance that bar them from
recovering the subject property on the ground of estoppel, laches,
abandonment and prescription.
On 29 June 2001, the trial court rendered its Decision in favor of petitioners.
The trial court declared that Aguete did not sign the loan documents, did not
appear before the Notary Public to acknowledge the execution of the loan
documents, did not receive the loan proceeds from PNB. PNB filed its Notice
of Appeal of the trial court’s decision. Petitioners filed on the same date a
motion for execution pending appeal, which PNB opposed. In an Order12
dated 8 May 2002, the trial court found petitioners’ motion for execution
pending appeal improper because petitioners have made it clear that they were
willing to wait for the appellate court’s decision. On 17 October 2005, the CA
rendered its Decision and granted PNB’s appeal. The appellate court reversed
the trial court’s decision, and dismissed petitioners’ complaint because the trial
court concluded forgery without adequate proof. Petitioners filed the present
petition for review
ISSUE:
WON the loan obtained by the Petitioners was null and void, as it was executed
by the one spouse without the consent of the other spouse. NO
RULING:
The loan was valid. The Civil Code was the applicable law at the time of the
mortgage. The subject property is thus considered part of the conjugal
partnership of gains. The pertinent articles of the Civil Code provide:
57
Art. 153. The following are conjugal partnership
property:
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title
during the marriage at the expense of the
common fund, whether the acquisition
be for the partnership, or for only one of
the spouses;
(2) That which is obtained by the industry, or
work or as salary of the spouses, or of
either of them;
(3) The fruits, rents or interest received or
due during the marriage, coming from
the common property or from the
exclusive property of each spouse.
Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or
to the wife.
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by
the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership, and those
contracted by the wife, also for the same
purpose, in the cases where she may
legally bind the partnership;
(2) Arrears or income due, during the
marriage, from obligations which
constitute a charge upon property of
either spouse or of the partnership;
(3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation
made during the marriage upon the
separate property of either the husband
or the wife; major repairs shall not be
charged to the partnership;
(4) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal
partnership property;
(5) The maintenance of the family and the
education of the children of both
husband and wife, and of legitimate
children of one of the spouses;
(6) Expenses to permit the spouses to
complete a professional, vocational or
other course.
Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non
compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil
interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the
husband cannot alienate or encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s
consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her
consent, the court may compel her to grant the same.
Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and
within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask
the courts for the annulment of any contract of the
husband entered into without her consent, when such
consent is required, or any act or contract of the
husband which tends to defraud her or impair her
interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should
the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs after
the dissolution of the marriage may demand the value
of the property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
In this case, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real
property without the consent, express or implied, of the wife. Should the
husband do so, then the contract is voidable. Article 173 of the Civil Code
allows Aguete to question Ros’ encumbrance of the subject property. However,
the same article does not guarantee that the courts will declare the annulment
of the contract. Annulment will be declared only upon a finding that the wife did
not give her consent. In the present case, we follow the conclusion of the
appellate court and rule that Aguete gave her consent to Ros’ encumbrance of
the subject property. The documents disavowed by Aguete are acknowledged
before a notary public, hence they are public documents. Every instrument duly
acknowledged and certified as provided by law may be presented in evidence
without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie
evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved.
The application for loan shows that the loan would be used exclusively "for
additional working [capital] of buy & sell of garlic & Virginia tobacco. In her
testimony, Aguete confirmed that Ros engaged in such business, but claimed
to be unaware whether it prospered. Aguete was also aware of loans
contracted by Ros, but did not know where he "wasted the money." Debts
contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or profession
by which he contributes to the support of the family cannot be deemed to be
his exclusive and private debts. For this reason, we rule that Ros’ loan from
PNB redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence, the debt is
chargeable to the conjugal partnership. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition.
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89. PRIMA PARTOSA-JO vs. CA and HO HANG
G.R. No. 82606 (216 SCRA 692)
December 18, 1992
DOCTRINE:
Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent never
to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and without in the
meantime providing in the least for one’s family although able to do so. There
must be absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the
intention of perpetual separation. In this case, the physical separation of the
parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to
the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial
separation of their conjugal property.
FACTS:
The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the legal wife of Jose Jo, herein private
respondent. The latter admitted to have cohabited with 3 women and fathered
15 children. Prima filed a complaint against the husband for judicial separation
of conjugal property in addition to an earlier action for support which was
consolidated. RTC decision was a definite disposition of the complaint for
support but none of that for the judicial separation of conjugal property. Jose
elevated the decision to CA which affirmed rulings of the trial court. The
complaint on the separation of property was dismissed for lack of cause of
action on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered in Art. 178
of the Civil Code. Prima contested that the agreement between her and Jose
was for her to temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her
pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. They never agreed to be
separated permanently. She even returned to him but the latter refused to
accept her.
ISSUE:
WON there is abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to warrant judicial
separation of conjugal property. YES
RULING:
The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
separation of the parties was due to their agreement and not because of
abandonment. The respondent court relied mainly on the testimony of the
petitioner, who declared under oath that she left Dumaguete City, where she
and Jo were living together “because that was our agreement.” It held that an
agreement to live separately without just cause was void under Article 221 of
the Civil Code and could not sustain any claim of abandonment by the
aggrieved spouse.
Under Article 128 of the Family Code, the aggrieved spouse may petition for
judicial separation on either of these grounds:
1) Abandonment by a spouse of the other without just cause;
and
2) Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations
to the family without just cause, even if she said spouse
does not leave the other spouse.
Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent never
to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and without in the
meantime providing in the least for one’s family although able to do so. There
58
must be absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the
intention of perpetual separation.
The private respondent had already rejected the petitioner, whom he denied
admission to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City when she returned from
Zamboanguita. The fact that she was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too
clearly that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship.
Moreover, the private respondent refused to give financial support to the
petitioner. The physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by
the private respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute
abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property.
In addition, the petitioner may also invoke the second ground allowed by Article
128, for the fact is that he has failed without just cause to comply with his
obligations to the family as husband or parent. Apart from refusing to admit his
lawful wife to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City, Jo has freely admitted to
cohabiting with other women and siring many children by them. It was his
refusal to provide for the petitioner and their daughter that prompted her to file
the actions against him for support and later for separation of the conjugal
property, in which actions, significantly, he even denied being married to her.
The private respondent has not established any just cause for his refusal to
comply with his obligations to his wife as dutiful husband.
Their separation thus falls also squarely under Article 135 of the Family Code,
providing as follows:
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be
considered sufficient cause for judicial
separation of property:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) That at the time of the
petition, the spouses have been
separated in fact for at least one year and
reconciliation is highly improbable.
The petition is GRANTED and the conjugal property of the petitioner and the
private respondent is ordered divided between them, share and share alike
after determination of all the properties pertaining to the said conjugal
partnership, including those that may have been illegally registered in the name
of the persons by the trial court.
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90. SPS. LITA DE LEON and FELIX RIO TARROSA vs. ANITA B.
DE LEON, et. al.
G.R. No. 185063
July 23, 2009
DOCTRINE:
A property bought in installment, if not proven to be bought solely
by exclusive funds, is not exclusive property if ownership was vested during
marriage.
The sale of one half of the conjugal property without liquidation of
partnership is void as the interest during marriage is merely inchoate and will
only be realized upon liquidation. The interest of the husband and wife is limited
to the net remainder (remanente liquido) resulting from the liquidation after
dissolution. Thus, their right will only be determined by the net assets left after
settlement of obligations which can be divided by the spouses or their heirs.
FACTS:
On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio De Leon, then single, and People’s Homesite and
Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the
purchase on installment of a lot in Quezon City. On 4, 1968, he married Anita
de Leon in civil rites. They had two children, Danilo and Vilma.
At the full payment of the cost price, PHHC executed a final deed of sale in
favor of Bonifacio. A transfer certificate of title was issued in Bonifacio’s name
on June 22, 1970, where it was stated therein that he was "single." In 1974, he
sold the lot to petitioners, Lita and her husband Rio Tarrosa, however, Anita
De Leon was not a signatory to the Deed of Sale executed.
On May 8, 1996, after Bonifacio died on February 29 of the same year, Sps.
Tarrosa registered their Deed of Sale and had the first TCT canceled. Another
TCT was issued in their names but on May 19, 2003 Daniel and Vilma De Leon
filed a Notice of Adverse Claim to protect their rights over the property.
Subsequently, Anita, Danilo and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit before the
RTC and alleged that fraud attended the execution of Deed of Sale to the
Tarrosas and that Bonifacio was still the owner of the property by his
subsequent acts, i.e. Bonifacio has executed a real estate mortgage over the
same property in favor of Spr. Diankinay.
The Tarrosas answered that the property was Bonifacio's exclusive property
as he was single when he acquired it from the PHHC and that they were not
aware of the supposed marriage at the time of the execution of Deed of Sale
The RTC ruled that the lot was conjugal property of Bonifacio and Anita and
declared the subsequent deed of sale and TCT void ab initio and awarded
damages to Anita and her children
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed RTC’s decision except the grant of
damages. Just like the RTC, the CA held that the Tarrosas failed to overthrow
the legal presumption that the parcel of land in dispute was conjugal. The
appellate court held further that the cases they cited were inapplicable. The
Tarrosas moved but was denied reconsideration by the CA in its equally
assailed resolution of October 20, 2008. Hence, they filed this petition.
59
2. Sale of one-half of the conjugal property without liquidation of the
ISSUES: partnership is void.
1. Whether the property purchased on installment by Boni before marriage
although some installments were paid during the marriage is conjugal Prior to liquidation, right of the husband or wife in the conjugal assets is
and not his exclusive property. YES inchoate (mere expectancy) and does not ripen into a title until it
2. Whether 1/2 of the conjugal assets do not vest to Bonifacio because of appears that there are assets in the community as a result of the
the absence of liquidation. YES liquidation and settlement. Their interest is limited to the net remainder
(remanente liquido) resulting from the liquidation after dissolution. Thus,
HELD: their right will only be determined by the net assets left after settlement
1. The full payment of the conditional contract was during marriage, thus of obligations which can be divided by the spouses or their heirs.
ownership was transferred only during the marriage.
Nevertheless, because the Tarrosas paid a valuable consideration for
Article 160 of the New Civil Code, the governing provision at the time of the property in question. As a matter of fairness and equity, the share of
Boni and Anita’s marriage, provides that properties acquired during Bonifacio after the liquidation of the partnership should be liable to
marriage are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is reimburse the amount paid by the Tarrosas. The basis grant is based on
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife. It is not the prohibition against unjust enrichment.
even necessary to prove that the property was acquired with the funds
of the partnership, for only proof of acquisition during the marriage is
needed to raise the presumption that the property is conjugal. Even
when the manner in which the properties were acquired does not appear,
the presumption will apply.
In this case, ownership over what was once a PHHC lot and covered by
the PHHC-Bonifacio Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred
during the marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. Conditional sale is akin, if not
equivalent to a contract to sell in that ownership is retained by the seller
and is not passed to the buyer until full payment of the price, unlike in a
contract of sale where title passes upon delivery of the thing sold. The
efficacy or obligatory force of the vendor's obligation to transfer title is
conditioned upon full payment; if the condition has not been fulfilled, the
conditional obligation would stand as it had never existed.
Evidently, title to the property in question only passed to Bonifacio after
he had fully paid the purchase price on June 22, 1970. This full payment
was made more than two (2) years after his marriage to Anita on April
24, 1968. In net effect, the property was acquired during the existence
of the marriage. As such, ownership to the property is, by law, presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership.
It is not exclusive just because it was registered solely in his name. The
mere registration of a property in the name of one spouse does not
destroy its conjugal nature. What is material is the time when the
property was acquired. Thus, they were not able to overthrow the
presumption of the conjugal nature of the property as no evidence was
brought forth to prove that the source of funding solely came from
Bonifacio.
Further, the deed of sale is also void ab initio for not having marital
consent from Anita as provided by NCC 166. Since Art. 166 of the Code
requires the consent of the wife before the husband may alienate or
encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership, it follows that
the acts or transactions executed against this mandatory provision are
void except when the law itself authorized their validity.
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91. AMPARO ROBLES CABREZA vs. CEFERINO S. CABREZA,
JR.
G.R. No. 171260
September 11, 2009
DOCTRINE:
Article 129 (9), Family Code is applicable only when the spouses had other
assets to be divided between them. Article 129(9) refers to "partition of the
properties". (In this case, though, the primary reason why petition was not
granted was because the RTC judgment has already become final and
executory.)
FACTS:
Ceferino Cabreza Jr (respondent) filed a petition of nullity of his marriage to
Amparo Robles Cabreza (petitioner) with the RTC. RTC granted this petition
and ordered the dissolution and liquidation of conjugal partnership in
accordance with Article 129 of the Family Code, without prejudice to creditors.
Ceferino then filed for a motion of execution ordering the Dissolution of
conjugal partnership. He sought liquidation of their conjugal home to be sold
and for the proceeds to be divided accordingly. The RTC issued an order
granting this petition and another one allowing prospective buyers to inspect
the property. Amparo filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied.
The RTC issued an order granting a writ of possession to the buyer of the
property, BJD Holdings Corporation. A notice to vacate was then given to
Amparo.
albeit of legal age, have chosen to live with her. This cannot be permitted
because it is not in accordance with the decree of the final judgment which
specifically and plainly directed that the property was to be sold and the
proceeds of the sale was divided and distributed.
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was however denied.
Petitioner argues in the main that the order of possession, writ of possession
and notice to vacate vary the terms of the dispositive portion of the January 3,
2001 RTC Decision, because the same authorize the sale of the family home.
Specifically, petitioner anchors her petition on Article 129 (9) of the Civil Code,
which states that: In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and
lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the
majority of the common children choose to remain.
Petitioner also argues against the contention of respondent that article 129(9)
does not apply because of the lack of other properties. She points out that there
is another property, the same covered by TCT No. 17461, which she alleges
was presented and forms part of the record.
Respondent, for his part, contends that the petition must be dismissed because
the same raises a question of fact, and it raises an issue that has already been
resolved with finality.
ISSUE:
WON Article 129 (9) may still be applied even after the RTC Decision ordering
the sale of the conjugal property has become final and executory. NO
the said order should be considered final and executory, as petitioners’ attempt
to question the same has already been denied by this Court.
Anent petitioner’s allegation that there is another conjugal property other than
that covered by TCT No. 17460, the same is a question of fact which should
not be the proper subject of a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Supreme held that it is not a trier of facts. It is not its function to examine
and determine the weight of the evidence supporting the assailed decision.
In the case at bar, the RTC in its August 4, 2004 Order found:
x x x In the instant case, there is only one (1) piece of
property involved which is the real property covered by TCT No.
17460 located at No. 20 United St., Bo. Capitolyo, Pasig City. x x
x
Likewise, the CA in its December 7, 2005 Decision found:
x x x It is not disputed that the conjugal dwelling in
question (Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17460) was the only
asset of the conjugal partnership that was the subject of partition
between the spouses.
Based on the foregoing, this Court finds no reason to reverse the findings of
fact made by the CA, more so, since the same is in accordance with the
findings of fact of the RTC.

Amparo filed a motion to hold in abeyance the writ of possession and notice to
vacate arguing that FC Article 129 (9) states that the conjugal dwelling shall be
adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the children choose to
remain. She asserted that the family home should be given to her. This was
dismissed because the decision had long become final and executory. RTC
said that FC Article 129(9) presupposes a situation where there are properties
aside from the conjugal dwelling.
To salvage her case, she filed new ones questioning the validity of sale. When
this case was filed with the Supreme Court, there were 3 more filed with the
Court of Appeals questioning the validity of the deed of sale between Ceferino
and BJD Holdings Corporation because she did not give consent. The CA
granted these and remanded them to RTC. But the RTC had already rendered
judgment as final and executory (to sell the family dwelling).
The CA considered the contention of the respondent husband, that Art. 129
(9), Family Code, supra, is applicable only when the spouses had other assets
to be divided between them, to be correct. Indeed Art. 129(9), Family Code
obviously refers to "partition of the properties". Hence, the respondent Judge
was not guilty of any arbitrariness, whimsicality or capriciousness in issuing the
assailed orders and writ. It is not disputed that the conjugal dwelling in question
(TCT No. 17460) was the only asset of the conjugal partnership that was the
subject of partition between the spouses.
The more decisive fact, according to the CA, is the finality of the RTC judgment
dated May 26, 2003. The petitioner insisted that the conjugal dwelling should
be awarded exclusively to her because the common children of the spouses,
RULING:
In summary, the three cases including herein petition, are the following:
 G.R. No. 162745, Amparo R. Cabreza v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
questioning the May 26, 2003 RTC Order granting respondent’s
motion to sell the family home. Said petition was denied by this
Court and an Entry of Judgment was issued on July 23, 2004.
 G.R. No. 171260, Amparo R. Cabreza v. Ceferino Cabreza et al.,
herein petition, questioning the writ of execution/possession and
notice to vacate because they allegedly varied the terms of the
dispositive portion of the January 3, 2001 judgment of the RTC.
 CA-GR. CV No. 86511, Amparo R. Cabreza v. Ceferino S.
Cabreza, et al., questioning the Deed of Sale between respondent
and BJD Holdings Corporation, allegedly because of petitioners
lack of consent thereto. The petition was granted by the CA, which
ordered for the remand of the case to the RTC for further
proceedings.
Based on the foregoing, herein petition must fail.
Petitioner cannot hide from the fact that the May 26, 2003 Order of the RTC is
already final and executory as a necessary consequence of the Entry of
Judgment dated July 23, 2004. Said Order categorically authorized the sale of
the family home. Although the CA may have mistakenly denominated the May
26, 2003 Order as a "judgment", the same does not detract from the fact that

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
92. THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. vs. ESTER L. SERVACIO
and RITO B. GO
G.R. No. 157537
September 7, 2011
DOCTRINE:
The disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal property by the surviving
spouse without the prior liquidation mandated by Article 130 of the Family
Code is not necessarily void if said portion has not yet been allocated by
judicial or extrajudicial partition to another heir of the deceased spouse. At any
rate, the requirement of prior liquidation does not prejudice vested rights.
FACTS:
On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land (17,140
SQ.M.) to Protacio B. Go, Jr. Twenty three years later, Protacio, Jr. executed
an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver, whereby he affirmed under oath that
it was his father, Protacio Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who had purchased
the two parcels of land (the property).
In 1987, Marta Barola Go died. She was the wife of Protacio, Sr. and mother
of the petitioners.
On December 28, 1999, Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go, joined by Rito’s
wife Dina B. Go) sold a portion of the property (5,560 SQM) to Ester L. Servacio
(Servacio).
On March 2, 2001, the petitioners demanded the return of the property, but
Servacio refused to heed their demand. They sued Servacio and Rito for the
annulment of the sale of the property.
The petitioners contended that following Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation, the
property became conjugal property and that the sale of the property to Servacio
without the prior liquidation of the community property between Protacio, Sr.
and Marta was null and void.
Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had exclusively owned the
property because he had purchased it with his own money.
The RTC ruled affirming the validity of the sale. However, it declared that the
property was the conjugal property and not the exclusive property of Protacio,
Sr., because there were three vendors in the sale to Servacio, namely,
Protacio, Sr., Rito, and Dina.
It held that the participation of Rito and Dina as vendors had been by virtue of
their being heirs of the late Marta.
Under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the law in effect when the property was
acquired, all property acquired by either spouse during the marriage was
conjugal unless there was proof that the property thus acquired pertained
exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale by Protacio, Sr. to Servacio was void for being made
without prior liquidation. NO
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rights of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively transferred, making the
RULING: buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Marta’s share.
Article 130 of the Family Code reads:
Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRM the
conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in decision of the Regional Trial Court.
the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the
surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal
partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially
within one year from the death of the deceased
spouse. If upon the lapse of the six month period no
liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance
involving the conjugal partnership property of the
terminated marriage shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent
marriage without compliance with the foregoing
requirements, a mandatory regime of complete
separation of property shall govern the property
relations of the subsequent marriage.
Article 130 is to be read in consonance with Article 105 of the Family Code:
Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the
marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains shall govern their property
relations during marriage, the provisions in this
Chapter shall be of supplementary application.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to
conjugal partnerships of gains already established
between spouses before the effectivity of this Code,
without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as
provided in Article 256. (n)
The CPG established before and after the effectivity of the Family Code are
governed by the Family Code. Hence, any disposition of the conjugal property
after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made only after the
liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void.
However, the CPG must be subsisting at the time of the effectivity of the Family
Code. Upon Marta’s death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was
dissolved, pursuant to Article 175(1) of the Civil Code, and an implied
ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of
Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership
pending a liquidation following its liquidation.
Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share. Hence, Protacio, Sr.
had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the
interest of his co-owners. The sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners
without the consent of the other co-owners was not necessarily void, for the
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93. LOREA DE UGALDE vs. JON DE YSASI
G.R. No. 130623
February 29, 2008
DOCTRINE:
The finality of the Amicable Settlement approving the parties' separation of
property resulted in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains in
accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code. Hence, when the trial court
decided on the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains (S.P.
No 3330), the conjugal partnership between petitioner and respondent was
already dissolved.
FACTS:
Lorea Ugalde and Jon de Ysasi got married before Municipal Judge Remigio
Peña of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental and on March 1, 1951, Rev. Msgr.
Flaviano Arriola solemnized their church wedding at the San Sebastian
Cathedral in Bacolod City. Petitioner and respondent did not execute any ante-
nuptial agreement. They had a son named Jon de Ysasi III.
Later on, they separated and the respondent contracted another marriage with
Victoria Eleanor Smith. Petitioner alleged that respondent and Smith had been
acquiring and disposing of real and personal properties to her prejudice as the
lawful wife and that she had been defrauded of rental income, profits, and fruits
of their conjugal properties.
Petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains
against respondent before the RTC of Negros Occidental.
Thereafter, respondent contended that he and the petitioner entered into an
agreement which provides that their conjugal partnership shall be deemed
dissolved. Pursuant to this, an Amicable Settlement was submitted to the CFI
of Negros Occidental. CFI approved the Amicable Settlement.
Respondent likewise alleged that petitioner already obtained a divorce from
him before the Supreme Court of Mexico. Petitioner then contracted a second
marriage with Richard Galoway and upon the latter’s death, she contracted a
third marriage with Frank Scholey.
Respondent moved for the dismissal of the petition for dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains on the grounds of estoppel, laches, and res
judicata. Further, respondent alleged that their marriage was void because it
was executed without the benefit of a marriage license.
The Trial Court ruled that there was no conjugal partnership of gains and that
since they entered into an amicable settlement which was later on approved,
the petitioner may no longer repudiate it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the Trial Court's Decision which
dismissed the action for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains? NO
RULING:
Petitioner and respondent were married on 15 February 1951. Thus, the
applicable law is the Civil Code (RA 386).
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Under Article 175 of the Civil Code, the judicial separation of property results
in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains:
Art. 175. The conjugal partnership of gains
terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property
under Article 191.
The finality of the Amicable Settlement approving the parties' separation of
property resulted in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains in
accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code. Hence, when the trial court
decided on the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains (S.P.
No 3330), the conjugal partnership between petitioner and respondent was
already dissolved.
The Amicable Settlement had become final as between petitioner and
respondent when it was approved by the CFI on June 6, 1961. The CFI's
approval of the Compromise Agreement resulted in the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and respondent on even date.
*OTHER ISSUE:
Whether or not the TC exceeded its jurisdiction in ruling on the validity of the
petitioner and respondent’s marriage? YES
The trial court then proceeded to rule on the validity of petitioner
and respondent's marriage. The trial court ruled that it was shown by
competent evidence that petitioner and respondent failed to obtain a marriage
license. Hence, the marriage between petitioner and respondent was null and
void, and no community of property was formed between them.
The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in ruling on the validity of
petitioner and respondent's marriage, which was only raised by respondent as
a defense to the action for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains. The
validity of petitioner and respondent's marriage was the subject of another
action, Civil Case No. 430 for Judicial Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage before RTC of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental. In 1995, the said
court ruled that the marriage was null and void for failure to comply with the
formal and essential requirements of the law.
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94. ALAIN M. DIÑO vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO
G.R. No. 178044
January 19, 2011
DOCTRINE:
Property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation
are governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules
on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated
in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article
496 of the Civil Code, “partition may be made by agreement between the
parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x.” It is not necessary to liquidate the
properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
FACTS:
Alain M. Diño and Ma. Caridad L. Diño got married on 14 January 1998 before
Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
against respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag) submitted a psychological report establishing
that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was
incurable and deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative years.
The trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
at the time of the celebration of the marriage and declared their marriage void
ab initio. It ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be
issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Trial court, upon motion for partial reconsideration of petitioner, modified its
decision holding that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued
after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article
147 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity
of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of
the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. YES
RULING:
A decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the
trial court’s decision without waiting for the liquidation, partition, and distribution
of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in a void marriage, regardless of its
cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of
the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the
Court.
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properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be marriage.
present:
(1) The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each
other;
(2) They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife;
and
(3) Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their
marriage is void.
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article
147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and
respondent.
The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage
shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis
because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under
Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a
decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein
that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of
annulment shall be issued by the court only after
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family
Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation,
Partition and Distribution of Properties.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule
applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final
judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of
the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio
under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without
waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either
by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains unless the
parties agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage settlement
entered into before the marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is
governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains,
there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a
decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is
governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under
Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what
governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and
respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the
property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation
are governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules
on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated
in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article
496 of the Civil Code, “partition may be made by agreement between the
parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x.” It is not necessary to liquidate the
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95. YU vs. JUDGE REYES-CARPIO and YU
G.R. No. 189207
June 15, 2011
DOCTRINE:
It is more proper to rule first on the declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of each party’s psychological incapacity to perform their respective
marital obligations. If the Court eventually finds that the parties’ respective
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage is indeed meritorious on the basis
of either or both of the parties’ psychological incapacity, then the parties shall
proceed to comply with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code before a final
decree of absolute nullity of marriage can be issued. Pending such ruling on
the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage, the Court finds no legal
ground, at this stage, to proceed with the reception of evidence in regard the
issues on custody and property relations, since these are mere incidents of the
nullity of the parties’ marriage.
FACTS:
Eric Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Caroline T.
Yu with the RTC of Pasig. Judge Suarez on May 30, 2006 issued an order
stating that Eric’s partial offer of evidence dated April 18, 2006 would be
submitted for resolution after certain exhibits have been remarked. But the
exhibits were only relative to the issue of the nullity of the marriage of Eric and
Caroline. On September 12, 2006, Caroline moved to submit the case for
resolution, considering that the incidents on custody, support, and property
relations (incidental issues) were mere consequences of the declaration of
nullity of the parties’ marriage.
Eric opposed this motion saying that the incident on declaration of nullity
cannot be resolved without presentation of evidence for the incidents on
custody, support, and property relations. Eric added that the incidental issues
and the issue on declaration of nullity can both proceed and be simultaneously
resolved. RTC ruled in favor of Eric’s opposition.
Caroline caused the inhibition of Judge Suarez, so that the case was re-raffled
to another branch presided by Judge Reyes-Carpio. While the case was being
tried by Judge Reyes-Carpio, Caroline filed an Omnibus Motion seeking the
strict observation by the said judge of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriage as codified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, and that the case
on the declaration on nullity be already submitted for resolution ahead of the
incidental issues, and not simultaneously. Eric opposed this motion.
Judge Reyes-Carpio granted the Omnibus Motion, saying that the main cause
of action is the declaration of nullity of the marriage and the incidental issues
are merely ancillary incidents thereto. Eric moved for reconsideration, which
was denied by Judge Reyes-Carpio. Eric then filed for certiorari with the CA
under Rule 65. CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether the main issue of nullity of marriage must be submitted for resolution
first before the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property
relations (incidental issues). NO
HELD:
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It appears in the records that the Orders in question, or what are alleged to
have been exercised with grave abuse of discretion, are interlocutory orders.
An interlocutory order is one which “does not finally dispose of the case, and
does not end the Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and
determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously
indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court. Eric Yu to prove
that the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion and that
those were patently erroneous. Considering that the requisites that would
justify certiorari as an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order have
not been complied with, the proper recourse for petitioner should have been
an appeal in due course of the judgment of the trial court on the merits,
incorporating the grounds for assailing the interlocutory orders.
It must be noted that Judge Reyes-Carpio did not disallow the presentation of
evidence on the incidents on custody, support, and property relations. It is clear
in the assailed orders that the trial court judge merely deferred the reception of
evidence relating to custody, support, and property relations. And the trial
judge’s decision was not without basis. Judge Reyes-Carpio finds support in
the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages. Particularly, Secs. 19 and 21 of the Rule clearly allow the reception
of evidence on custody, support, and property relations after the trial court
renders a decision granting the petition, or upon entry of judgment granting the
petition:
Section 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a
decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein
that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of
annulment shall be issued by the court only after
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family
Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation,
Partition and Distribution of Properties.
Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution,
custody, support of common children and delivery of
their presumptive legitimes. – Upon entry of the
judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal,
upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate
court granting the petition, the Family Court, on
motion of either party, shall proceed with the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties
of the spouses, including custody, support of common
children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes
pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code
unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous
judicial proceedings.
Evidently, Judge Reyes-Carpio did not deny the reception of evidence on
custody, support, and property relations but merely deferred it, based on the
existing rules issued by this Court, to a time when a decision granting the
petition is already at hand and before a final decree is issued. Conversely, the
trial court, or more particularly the family court, shall proceed with the
liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children, and
delivery of their presumptive legitimes upon entry of judgment granting the
Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
petition. And following the pertinent provisions of the Court En Banc Resolution
in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, this act is undoubtedly consistent with Articles 50
and 51 of the Family Code, contrary to what petitioner asserts. Particularly,
Arts. 50 and 51 of the Family Code state:
Article 50. The final judgment in such cases shall
provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses, the custody and
support of the common children, and the delivery of
their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had
been adjudicated in the previous judicial proceedings.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the
presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of the final judgment of the
trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or
sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual
agreement judicially approved, had already provided
for such matters.
Also, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly allows the deferment of the reception of
evidence on custody, support, and property relations. Conversely, the trial
court may receive evidence on the subject incidents after a judgment granting
the petition but before the decree of nullity or annulment of marriage is issued.
And this is what Judge Reyes-Carpio sought to comply with in issuing the
assailed orders. As correctly pointed out by the CA, Eric Yu’s assertion that
ruling the main issue without receiving evidence on the subject incidents would
result in an ambiguous and fragmentary judgment is certainly speculative and,
hence, contravenes the legal presumption that a trial judge can fairly weigh
and appraise the evidence submitted by the parties.
Therefore, it cannot be said at all that Judge Reyes-Carpio acted in a
capricious and whimsical manner, much less in a way that is patently gross
and erroneous, when she issued the assailed orders deferring the reception of
evidence on custody, support, and property relations. To reiterate, this decision
is left to the trial court’s wisdom and legal soundness. Consequently, therefore,
the CA cannot likewise be said to have committed grave abuse of discretion in
upholding the Orders of Judge Reyes-Carpio and in ultimately finding an
absence of grave abuse of discretion on her part.
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96. QUIAO vs. QUIAO
G.R. No 176556
July 04, 2012
FACTS:
Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner
Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal
separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in favor of
Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally between the spouses
subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the
unpaid conjugal liabilities.
Brigido’s share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership
is forfeited in favor of the common children because Brigido is the offending
spouse.
case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129
of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.
2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the
spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains
under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of
the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article
143 of the Civil Code, which provides: “All property of
the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband
and wife.”
While one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the
same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and
jurisprudence.
mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the spouses.
Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.
In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that
the spouses have no separate properties, there is nothing to return to
any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of
the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-
listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or
their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner
the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership
is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of
the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in
the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty
party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate
property which may be accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.

Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the
period 270 days later or after more than nine months from the promulgation of
the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification,
asking the RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned.”
RTC held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes “the remainder of
the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of
the] spouse and the debts.” It further held that after determining the remainder
of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because
the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits
earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due
process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her
complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact, in
his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide
the community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as
circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory
of all the community properties of the parties. Second, when the
decision for legal separation was promulgated, the petitioner never
questioned the trial court’s ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as
“net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the
petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process.

The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129
of the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article
102 applies because there is no other provision under the Family Code which
defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on
dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is applicable in this case.
ART 129. WILL GOVERN
3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the
husband and the wife become joint owners of all the properties of the
marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and
those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article
92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple’s
properties. And when the couple’s marriage or community is dissolved,
that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective
heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established,
irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned.

2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights over ½ of the
properties in the conjugal partnership. NO
3. Is the computation of “net profits” earned in the conjugal partnership of
gains the same with the computation of “net profits” earned in
the absolute community? NO
In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has
been established that the spouses have no separate properties, what
will be divided equally between them is simply the “net profits.” And since
the legal separation½share decision of Brigido states that the in the net
profits shall be awarded to the children, Brigido will still be left with
nothing.

RATIO: On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime

1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the
current family code, the default rule is that In the absence of marriage
settlements, or when the same are void, the system of
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in
this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses’ marriage the
operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant
of conjugal partnership of gains under Article142 of the Civil Code,
“the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their
separate property and income from their work or industry, and divide
equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the
net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during
the marriage.” From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his
and her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a

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65
Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
97. UGALDE vs. YSASI
G.R. No. 130623
February 29, 2008
FACTS:
Lorea Ugalde and Jon de Ysasi got married before Municipal Judge Remigio
Peña of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental and on March 1, 1951, Rev. Msgr.
Flaviano Arriola solemnized their church wedding at the San Sebastian
Cathedral in Bacolod City. Petitioner and respondent did not execute any ante-
nuptial agreement. They had a son named Jon de Ysasi III.
Later on, they separated and the respondent contracted another marriage with
Victoria Eleanor Smith. Petitioner alleged that respondent and Smith had been
acquiring and disposing of real and personal properties to her prejudice as the
lawful wife and that she had been defrauded of rental income, profits, and fruits
of their conjugal properties.
Petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains
against respondent before the RTC of Negros Occidental.
2.
Thereafter, respondent contended that he and the petitioner entered into an
agreement which provides that their conjugal partnership shall be deemed
dissolved. Pursuant to this, an Amicable Settlement was submitted to the CFI
of Negros Occidental. CFI approved the Amicable Settlement.
Respondent likewise alleged that petitioner already obtained a divorce from
him before the Supreme Court of Mexico. Petitioner then contracted a second
marriage with Richard Galoway and upon the latter’s death, she contracted a
third marriage with Frank Scholey. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the
petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains on the grounds of
estoppel, laches, and res judicata. Further, respondent alleged that their
marriage was void because it was executed without the benefit of a marriage
license.
TC- ruled that there was no conjugal partnership of gains and that since they
entered into an amicable settlement which was later on approved, the petitioner
may no longer repudiate it.
ISSUES:
1. WON the CA erred in affirming the Trial Court's Decision which
dismissed the action for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains? NO
2. WON the TC exceeded its jurisdiction in ruling on the validity of the
petitioner and respondent’s marriage? YES
HELD:
1. Petitioner and respondent were married on 15 February 1951. Thus, the
applicable law is the Civil Code (RA 386).
Under Article 175 of the Civil Code, the judicial separation of property
results in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains:
Art. 175. The conjugal partnership of
gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
66
(2) When there is a decree of legal
separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of
property under Article 191.
The finality of the Amicable Settlement approving the parties' separation
of property resulted in the termination of the conjugal partnership of
gains in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code. Hence, when
the trial court decided on the petition for dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains (S.P. No 3330), the conjugal partnership between
petitioner and respondent was already dissolved.
The Amicable Settlement had become final as between petitioner and
respondent when it was approved by the CFI on June 6, 1961. The CFI's
approval of the Compromise Agreement resulted in the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and respondent on
even date.
The trial court then proceeded to rule on the validity of petitioner and
respondent's marriage. The trial court ruled that it was shown by
competent evidence that petitioner and respondent failed to obtain a
marriage license. Hence, the marriage between petitioner and
respondent was null and void, and no community of property was formed
between them.
The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in ruling on the validity of
petitioner and respondent's marriage, which was only raised by
respondent as a defense to the action for dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains. The validity of petitioner and respondent's marriage
was the subject of another action, Civil Case No. 430 for Judicial
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage before RTC of Himamaylan,
Negros Occidental. In 1995, the said court ruled that the marriage was
null and void for failure to comply with the formal and essential
requirements of the law.
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98. VALDES vs. QUEZON CITY RTC
July 31, 1996
DOCTRINE:
In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of
the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of
Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code.
FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971. They begot 5
children. In 1992, Valdez filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. The trial court granted the
petition, thereby declaring their marriage null and void. It also directed the
parties to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as
defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions
of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision. She asserted that
the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation
of common property in "unions without marriage.
In an Order, the trial court made the following clarification: "Consequently,
considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the
property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to
the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of
the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant
will own their 'family home' and all their other properties for that matter in equal
shares. In the liquidation and partition of the properties owned in common by
the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil
Code shall apply."
Valdes moved for reconsideration of the Order which was denied. Valdes
appealed, arguing that: (1) Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to
cases where the parties are psychological incapacitated; (2) Articles 50, 51 and
52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition
of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio,
including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity
of the spouses; (3) Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages
declared void ab initio on the ground of the psychological incapacity of a
spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129.
ISSUE:
Whether Art. 147 FC is the correct law governing the disposition of property in
the case at bar. YES
HELD:
In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of
the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of
Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code.
Article 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment
to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a
void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. Under this property regime,
property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be
67
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during
the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall
be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the
conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are
not included in the co-ownership.
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or
when they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only
the property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to
their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares,
however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is
married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the
party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her
share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed.
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the
parties' common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor
precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity
must be deemed likewise clothed in authority to resolve incidental and
consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that
petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common
property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and
partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-
ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles
102 and 129, 12 of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to
govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable
marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the
liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses.
The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2),
(3), (4) and 95) of Article 43, 13 relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable
marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 14 of the
Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a
spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void.
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99. SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO vs. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO
G.R. No. 132529
February 2, 2001
FACTS:
SPO4 Santiago Carino contracted 2 marriages during his lifetime. The first was
on June 20, 1969 with Susan Nicdao-Carino, the petitioner of the case at bar
with whom he had 2 children and the second was on November 10, 1992 with
Susan Yee-Carino, the respondent, with whom he had no children. Santiago
has been cohabiting with Susan Yee since 1983 but became bedridden in 1988
and died 13 days after the second wedding.
Both Susans filed for monetary benefits and financial assistance. Nicdao was
able to collect 146K while Yee was able to collect 21K. On December 14, 1993,
Yee filed an instant case for collection of sum of money against Nicdao. Yee
wanted at least half of the 146K. Nicdao failed to file her answer and was
declared in default. Yee admitted that her marriage to Santiago took place
during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of
nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however,
claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she
became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met
petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased.
however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared
void ab initio, the “death benefits” would now be awarded to Yee. As stated
earlier, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party
can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also
be void. Considering then that the marriage of Yee and the deceased is a
bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a
previous marriage then presumed to be valid, the application of Article 148 is
therefore in order. As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and
the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs as they were both legally
capacitated. The difference bet 147 and 148 is that wages and salaries earned
by either party during the cohabitation period will be split equally between them
even if only one party contributed in 147, whereas in 148 wages and salaries
earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. So under Art 147, Susan
Nicdao is entitled to half of the remunerations and the other half belong to the
legal heirs of Santiago, who are in this case, the children of Susan Nicdao.

To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended

that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the
same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In support
thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and
the petitioner which bears no marriage license number and 2) a certification
dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila,
which summarily stated that there was no record of a marriage license. The
trial court ruled in favor of Susan Yee. CA affirmed the decision of the trial court

ISSUE:
WON the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to settle claims to death
benefits.

HELD:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. However, for purposes other
than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties
thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said
marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such
instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove
the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute
nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
declaring such previous marriage void.

Presumed validity of Nicdao’s marriage w/ the deceased cannot stand as there

is no marriage license, burden of proof of validity was w/ her. It does not follow

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100. GONZALES vs. GONZALES
G.R. No. 159521
December 16, 2005

FACTS:
After two years of living together, Francisco and Erminda got married in 1979.
Four children were born from this union. During the time they lived together,
they acquired properties, and Erlinda managed their pizza business.

In 1992, she prays for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage based on
Mario's alleged psychological incapacity, and for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains. During the time they lived together, they acquired
properties. She managed their pizza business and worked hard for its
development. Mario denied she was the one who managed the pizza business
and claimed that he exclusively owns the properties "existing during their
marriage."

In 1997 the trial court rendered its judgment and ordered the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains and divided the conjugal properties between
Francisco and Erminda. Not satisfied with the manner their properties were
divided, Francisco appealed to the CA, which in turn affirmed the trial court
decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Fransisco exclusively own the properties existing during their
marriage. NO

RULING:
SC held that the Francisco and Erminda are co-owners of the properties in
question. The marriage of Fransisco and Erminda is declared void ab initio by
the trial court which was later affirmed by the CA. Consequently, their
properties shall be governed by the provisions of Article 147 of the Family
Code.

These provisions enumerate the two instances when the property relations
between spouses shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. These are:
(1) when a man and woman capacitated to marry each other live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage; and (2)
when a man and woman live together under a void marriage.

Under this property regime of co-ownership, properties acquired by both

parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed
to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned
by them in equal shares.

Article 147 creates a presumption that properties acquired during the

cohabitation of the parties have been acquired through their joint efforts, work
or industry and shall be owned by them in equal shares. It further provides
that a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof
if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
of the household.

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101. DIÑO vs. DIÑO
(supra)
Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which
are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should
be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the
parties. In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void
under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what
governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and
respondent are the rules on co-ownership.
FACTS:
Alain M. Diño and Ma. Caridad L. Diño got married on 14 January 1998 before
Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
against respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag) submitted a psychological report establishing
that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which
was incurable and deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative
years.
The trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
at the time of the celebration of the marriage and declared their marriage void
ab initio. It ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be
issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Trial court, upon motion for partial reconsideration of petitioner, modified its
decision holding that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued
after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article
147 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity
of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of
the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. YES
HELD:
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in a void marriage, regardless of its
cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of
the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case before
the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be
present:
(1) The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each
other;
70
(2) They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife;
and
(3) Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their
marriage is void.
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article
147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and
respondent.
The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage
shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has
no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed
under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule
provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a
decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein
that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of
annulment shall be issued by the court only after
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family
Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation,
Partition and Distribution of Properties.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the
Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by
final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50
of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab
initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void
without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either
by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains unless the
parties agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage settlement
entered into before the marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is
governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains,
there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a
decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is
governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under
Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what
governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and
respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the
property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period
of cohabitation are governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses
should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-
ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, “[p]artition may be made by
agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x.” It is not
necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding
for declaration of nullity of marriage.
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102. BARRIDO vs. NONATO
FACTS:
In the course of the marriage of respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner
Marietta N. Barrido, they were able to acquire a property situated in Eroreco,
Bacolod City, consisting of a house and lot, covered by TCT No. T-140361. On
March 15, 1996, their marriage was declared void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Since there was no more reason to maintain their co-
ownership over the property, Nonato asked Barrido for partition, but the latter
refused. Thus, on January 29, 2003, Nonato filed a Complaint for partition
before the MTCC of Bacolod City, Branch 3.
Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense, that the subject property had
already been sold to their children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo. She
likewise moved for the dismissal of the complaint because the MTCC lacked
jurisdiction, the partition case being an action incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
The Bacolod MTCC rendered a Decision dated September 17, 2003, applying
Article 129 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
WON Art. 129 is applicable. NO
RULING:
The records reveal that Nonato and Barrido’s marriage had been declared void
for psychological incapacity under Article 3610 of the Family Code. During their
marriage, however, the conjugal partnership regime governed their property
relations. Although Article 12911 provides for the procedure in case of
dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, Article 147 specifically covers
the effects of void marriages on the spouses’ property relations. Article 147
reads:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and
the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties
acquired while they lived together shall be presumed
to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly
in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
and of the household.
71
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter
vivos of his or her share in the property acquired
during cohabitation and owned in common, without
the consent of the other, until after the termination of
their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in
good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-
ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all
of the common children or their descendants, each
vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such
share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases,
the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman,
suffering no legal impediment to marry each other, exclusively live together as
husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. It
is clear, therefore, that for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1)
must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other
as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or
their marriage is void. Here, all these elements are present. The term
"capacitated" in the first paragraph of the provision pertains to the legal
capacity of a party to contract marriage. Any impediment to marry has not been
shown to have existed on the part of either Nonato or Barrido. They lived
exclusively with each other as husband and wife. However, their marriage was
found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Here, the former spouses both agree that they acquired the subject property
during the subsistence of their marriage. Thus, it shall be presumed to have
been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned
by them in equal shares. Barrido, however, claims that the ownership over the
property in question is already vested on their children, by virtue of a Deed of
Sale. But aside from the title to the property still being registered in the names
of the former spouses, said document of safe does not bear a notarization of a
notary public. It must be noted that without the notarial seal, a document
remains to be private and cannot be converted into a public document, making
it inadmissible in evidence unless properly authenticated. Unfortunately,
Barrido failed to prove its due execution and authenticity. In fact, she merely
annexed said Deed of Sale to her position paper. Therefore, the subject
property remains to be owned in common by Nonato and Barrido, which should
be divided in accordance with the rules on co-ownership.
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103. OCAMPO vs. OCAMPO
From the foregoing, property acquired by both spouses through their work and
FACTS: industry should, therefore, be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership.
On Sept 10, 1990, petitioner filed a petition for Declaration of Nullity of her Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
marriage with Deogracio Ocampo before RTC on the ground of psychological obtained through their joint efforts.
incapacity.
Thus, the trial court and the appellate court correctly held that the parties will
The decision became final, since no party appealed the judgment annulling the share on equal shares considering that Virginia failed to prove that the
marriage. properties were acquired solely on her own efforts.

On March 31, 1999, the trial court directed the parties to submit a project of We note that the former spouses both substantially agree that they acquired
partition of their inventoried properties, and if they failed to do so, a hearing will the subject properties during the subsistence of their marriage. The certificates
be held on the factual issues with regard to said properties. Having failed to of titles and tax declarations are not sufficient proof to overcome the
agree on a project of partition of their conjugal properties, hearing ensued presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code. All properties acquired by
where the parties adduced evidence in support of their respective stand. the spouses during the marriage, regardless in whose name the properties are
registered, are presumed conjugal unless proved otherwise. The presumption
On January 13, 2004, the trial court rendered the assailed order stating that is not rebutted by the mere fact that the certificate of title of the property or the
the properties declared by the parties belong to them on a 50-50 sharing. tax declaration is in the name of one of the spouses only. Article 116 expressly
provides that the presumption remains even if the property is "registered in the
ISSUE: name of one or both of the spouses." Thus, the failure of Virginia to rebut this
Whether respondent should be deprived of his share in the conjugal presumption, said properties were obtained by the spouses' joint efforts, work
partnership of gains by reason of bad faith and psychological capacity. NO or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares. Accordingly,
the partition of the former spouses' properties on the basis of co-ownership, as
RULING: ordered by the RTC and the appellate court, should be affirmed, and not on the
The Court held that in a void marriage, as in those declared void under Article regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
3610 of the Family Code, the property relations of the parties during the period
of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code.11 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in this case. Article 147 of the Family
Code provides:
xxx In the absence of proof to the contrary,
properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts,
work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal
shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did
not participate in the acquisition by the other party of
any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
and of the household. xxx

This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman,

suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, exclusively live together
as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage.
It is clear, therefore, that for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman:
(1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other
as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or
their marriage is void, as in the instant case. The term "capacitated" in the first
paragraph of the provision pertains to the legal capacity of a party to contract
marriage. Any impediment to marry has not been shown to have existed on the
part of either Virginia or Deogracio. They lived exclusively with each other as
husband and wife. However, their marriage was found to be void under Article
36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.

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104. BELCODERO vs. CA valid marriage. But the provisions can‘t apply to this case without
interdicting prior vested rights, so the provisions don‘t apply.
FACTS:
Alayo Bosing married Juliana Oday in 1927 and they had 3 children. In 1946
he abandoned them and lived with Josefa Rivera (whom he acknowledged as
common law wife Josefa Bosing). They had one child, Josephine Bosing, now
Josephine Belcodero.

He married Josefa Bosing in 1958, while still married to Juliana.

Alayo purchased parcel of land on installment basis in 1949 and his deed he
named Josefina Bosing as his wife and transferred lot in her name. Final deed
executed in 1959.

Alayo died March 1967. In 1970 Josefa and Josephine executed a document
of extra-judicial partition and sale of the lot, which was described as conjugal
property. Josefa‘s share went to Josephine for P10,000, so Josephine
Belcodero had full ownership. Notice was published.

In October 1980 Juliana (real widow) and 3 children filed for reconveyance of
property. Trial Curt and Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Juliana.

ISSUES:
1. The husband acquired ownership while living with a paramour, after
deserting his wife. Property bought prior to effectivity of 1950 Civil Code
but the final deed was ensued after and the Family Code took effect
1988.

2. Whether the property was acquired in 1949 when he first started paying
installment or in1959 when the deed was finalized, result is the same.
Property belongs to conjugal partnership of Alayo and legal wife Juliana.

HELD:
1. Under old and new Civil Code ―all property is presumed to belong to
conjugal partnership unless it is provided that it is exclusive to either
spouse

Property acquired by Alayo, he merely had the title transferred to

Josefa‘s name. She implicitly recognized Alayo‘s ownership when she
and Josephine filed extrajudicial partition of the said property — the
partition would have conformed with partition in intestacy had they been
sole and legitimate heirs of Alayo.

2. Common law spouses.

In Art 144 and in Maxey v. CA the co-ownership rule had been

repudiated when either of the spouses had impediments to marry.

Art 147 and 148 of Family Code did not deviate from old rules. Art 148
says that: when one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her
share of the co-ownership shall accrue to the conjugal property of the

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
105. AGAPAY vs. AGAPAY contribution isn’t proven, there will be no co- ownership and no
287 SCRA 340 presumption of equal shares.

DOCTRINE:
Art. 148: only properties acquired by both through actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common, in proportion
to their respective contributions. If a party’s contribution isn’t proven, there will
be no co- ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
FACTS:
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage in 1949 with Carlina/Cornelia
Vallesterol. A few months later, Miguel left to work in Hawaii. In 1954, Miguel
returned for a vacation but never stayed with his wife and child. In 1957, Miguel
had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned to the
Philippines in 1972 for good, he refused to live with Carlina and his son.
2. Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the
business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to show that
she actually contributed money to buy the riceland. On the date of
conveyance, she was only around 20 years old and Miguel was already
64 and a pensioner of the U.S. Government. It is unrealistic to conclude
that she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of
property. She now claims that the riceland was bought 2 months. before
they actually cohabited. She intended to exclude their case from the
operation of Article 148. No proof that the riceland was purchased even
before they started living together. Even assuming that the property was
bought before cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would still apply
and proof of actual contribution would still be essential.

In 1973, Miguel (63 years old) contracted a second marriage with Erlinda
Agapay (19 years old). Two months before said marriage, Miguel and Erlinda
jointly purchased a piece of agricultural land. In September 1975, a house and
lot was purchased by Erlinda allegedly as sole vendee.
In October 1975, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form
of compromise agreement to settle case previously filed by Carlina. In said
document, the parties agreed to donate their conjugal property to their only
child, Herminia. Miguel and Erlinda had a son, Kristopher, born 1977. Erlinda
and Miguel were convicted of concubinage in 1979.
3. Erlinda allegedly bought it for PhP20,000, but the notary public testified
that Miguel provided the money and simply asked that Erlinda alone be
placed as vendee. This makes it a donation, which is void under Art. 739
of the Civil Code since it was made by persons guilty of concubinage.
Art. 87 also expressly provides that donations between spouses now
also applies to donations between those who cohabitate as spouses.

In 1981, Miguel died, and Carlina and Herminia filed an action for recovery of
ownership and possession of riceland and house and lot that were allegedly
purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with Erlinda. Erlinda alleged that
she had already donated her half of the riceland property to Kristopher, and
that the house and lot is her sole property having bought it with her own money.

RTC ruled in favor of 2nd wife Erlinda. CA ruled in favor of 1st wife Carlina.

ISSUE:
WON the properties in dispute (“piece of agricultural land” and house and lot)
belong to the conjugal property of Miguel and Carlina (1st wife) and is therefore
subject to reconveyance? YES

RULING:
The properties in dispute belong to the conjugal property.

1. The deeds of sale of the properties should go to Carlina and Herminia.

Deeds of conveyance were valid. Applicable provision of law is Art. 148

of the Family Code: property regime for when a man and a woman who
aren’t capacitated to marry cohabitate or live under a void marriage.
Miguel and Erlinda married in 1973, but their union was void because
Miguel was still married to Carlina.

Art. 148: only properties acquired by both through actual joint

contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common, in proportion to their respective contributions. If a party’s

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- Newt Gingrich
106. TUMLOS vs. FERNANDEZ
GR No. 137650
April 12, 2000

DOCTRINE:
Art. 148: only properties acquired by both through actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common, in proportion
to their respective contributions. If a party’s contribution isn’t proven, there will
be no co- ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

FACTS:
Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were plaintiffs in an action for ejectment filed
against Guillerma, Gina and Toto Tumlos. In the complaint, spouses
Fernandez alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment building
that through their tolerance they allowed the Tumlos’ to occupy the apartment
for the last 7 years without payment of any rent. It was agreed that Guillerma
will pay 1,600 a month while the other defendants promised to pay 1,000 a
month which was not complied with. Demand was made several times for the
defendants to vacate the premises as they are in need of the property for the
construction of a new building.

Defendants appealed to RTC that Mario and Guillerma had an amorous

relationship and that they acquired the property in question as their love nest.
It was likewise alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building
with their 2 children for about 10 years and that Gullerma administered the
property by collecting rentals from the lessees until she discovered that Mario
deceived her as to the annulment of their marriage.

ISSUE:
WON Guillerma is a co-owner of the said apartment under Article 148.

RULING:
SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were co-owners of the subject
property. The claim was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma since there were
no other evidence presented to validate it except for the said affidavit. Even if
the allegations of having cohabited with Mario and that she bore him two
children were true, the claim of co-ownership still cannot be accepted. Mario
is validly married with Lourdes hence Guillerma and Mario are not capacitated
to marry each other. The property relation governing their supposed
cohabitation is under Article 148 of the Family Code. Actual contribution is
required by the said provision in contrast to Art 147 which states that efforts in
the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as
contributions to the acquisitions of common property by one who has no salary,
income, work or industry. Such is not included in Art 148. If actual contribution
is not proven then there can be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal
shares.

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
107. ATIENZA vs. DE CASTRO
G.R. No. 1695698
Nov. 29, 2006

DOCTRINE:
Art. 148: only properties acquired by both through actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common, in proportion
to their respective contributions. If a party’s contribution isn’t proven, there will
be no co- ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

FACTS:
Lupo Atienza hired Yolanda De Castro as accountant for his two corporations
(Enrico Shipping Corporation and Eurasian Maritime Corporation) in 1983.

Then their relationship became intimate despite Lupo being a married man!
They lived together in the later part of 1983. They had 2 children, after the
second child they parted ways. Then Lupo filed a complaint against Yolanda
for a judicial partition of a land between them in the Bel-Air subdivision.

Lupo alleged that Yolanda bought the said property with his own funds.
Yolanda on the other hand said she bought it with her own funds.

Trial Court said that the contested property is owned common by him and
Yolanda and ordered the partition into two equal parts.

CA reversed the TC! Saying that it was the exclusive property of Yolanda.

ISSUE:
WON the disputed property is the exclusive property of Yolanda. YES

RULING:
Since they are not capacitated to marry each other in their cohabitation, FC
148 applies. Under this regime only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in
proportion to their contributions. Absent of proof of contribution, it shall be
presumed to be equal. He did not show any evidence that he contributed in the
parcel of land while the accountant showed bank accounts which apparently
shows that she was capacitated to buy the said land.

Evidence of De Castro was her job as accountant and businesswoman

engaged in foreign currency trading, money lending, and jewelry retail,
promissory notes of dealings with clients, bank account statements, and
business transactions proves that she had financial capacity on the other hand
Atienza merely provided evidence that Yolanda had no such sufficient funds
and didn‘t provide for evidence regarding his own capacity to pay for such
property.

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
108. SIGNEY vs. SSS (1) The legal spouse entitled by law to
GR No. 173582 receive support from the member;
January 28, 2008 (2) The legitimate, legitimated, or legally
adopted, and illegitimate child who is
DOCTRINE: unmarried, not gainfully employed and
Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish has not reached twenty-one years (21) of
his or her right thereto by substantial evidence. age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of
age, he is congenitally or while still a
FACTS: minor has been permanently
Rodolfo Signey Jr. a member of the SSS, died on May 21, 2001. In his incapacitated and incapable of self-
member’s records, he had designated petitioner Yolanda Signey as primary support, physically or mentally;
beneficiary and his four children with her as secondary beneficiaries. Petitioner
filed a claim for death benefits with the public respondent SSS. She revealed Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish
in her SSS claim that the deceased had a common-law wife, Gina Servano, his or her right thereto by substantial evidence. Since petitioner is disqualified
with whom he had two minor children. to be a beneficiary and because the deceased has no legitimate child, it follows
that the dependent illegitimate minor children of the deceased shall be entitled
Petitioner’s declaration was confirmed when Gina herself filed a claim for the to the death benefits as primary beneficiaries. The SSS Law is clear that for a
same death benefits which she also declared that both she and petitioner were minor child to qualify as a “dependent” the only requirements are that he/she
common-law wives of the deceased and that Editha Espinosa was the legal must be below 21 years of age, not married nor gainfully employed.
wife. In addition, in October 2001, Editha also filed an application for death
benefits with the SSS stating that she was the legal wife of the deceased. In this case, the minor illegitimate children Ginalyn and Rodelyn were born on
13 April 1996 and 20 April 2000, respectively. Had the legitimate child of the
SSS denied the death benefit claim of the petitioner and found that the deceased and Editha survived and qualified as a dependent under the SSS
marriage between the deceased and the petitioner is null and void because of Law, Ginalyn and Rodelyn would have been entitled to a share equivalent to
a prior subsisting marriage contracted between the deceased and Editha as only 50% of the share of the said legitimate child. Since the legitimate child of
confirmed by the local civil registry of Cebu. However, it recognized Ginalyn the deceased predeceased him, Ginalyn and Rodelyn, as the only qualified
and Rodelyn, the minor children of the deceased with Gina, as the primary primary beneficiaries of the deceased, are entitled to 100% of the benefits.
beneficiaries under the SSS Law.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition with the SSC in which she attached a
waiver of rights executed by Editha whereby the latter waived any/all claims
from Social Security System (SSS), among others due to the deceased
Rodolfo Signey Sr. SSC affirmed the decision of the SSS. The SSC gave more
weight to the SSS field investigation and the confirmed certification of marriage
showing that the deceased was married to Editha, than to the aforestated
declarations of Editha in her waiver of rights.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has a superior legal right over the SSS benefits as
against the illegitimate minor children of the deceased?

RULING:
As to the issue of who has the better right over the SSS death benefits, Section
8(e) and (k) of R. A. No. 8282 is very clear. Hence, we need only apply the law.

Section 8(e) and (k) of R.A. No. 8282 provides:

SEC. 8. Terms Defined.— For the purposes of this

Act, the following terms shall, unless the context
indicates otherwise, have the following meanings:
xxx

(e) Dependents — The dependent shall be the

following:

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
109. CAMILLO BORROMEO vs. ANTONIETTA DESCALLAR exists between the parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to
G.R. No. 159310 prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order
February 24, 2009 to able to lay claim to any portion of it. (Article 148 CC)

DOCTRINE: 2. It is settled rule that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It

Art. 148: only properties acquired by both through actual joint contribution of is only a means of confirming the existence with notice to the world at
money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common, in proportion large. The mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner
to their respective contributions. If a party’s contribution isn’t proven, there will of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the
be no co- ownership and no presumption of equal shares. disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and
absolutely make her the owner.
FACTS:
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, met respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar.
They fell in love and live together. They bought a house and lot and an Absolute
Deed of Sale was issued in their names. However, when the Deed of Absolute
Sale was presented for registration, it was refused on the ground that Jambrich
was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain.
Consequently, his name was erased but his signature remained and the
property was issued on the name of the Respondent alone. However their
relationship did not last long and they found new love.

Jambrich met petitioner Camila Boromeo who was engaged in business.

Jambrich indebted the petitioner for a sum of money and to pay his debt, he
sold some of his properties to the petitioner and a Deed of Absolute
Sale/Assignment was issued in his favor. However, when the Petitioner sought
to register the deed of assignment it found out that said land was registered in
the name of Respondent. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for
recovery of real property.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Jambrich has no title to the properties in question and
may not transfer and assign any rights and interest in favor of the
petitioner?

(2) Whether or not the registration of the properties in the name of

respondents make his the owner thereof.

RULING:
1. The evidence clearly shows that as between respondent and Jambrich,
it was Jambrich who possesses the financial capacity to acquire the
properties in dispute. At the time of the acquisition of the properties,
Jamrich was the source of funds used to purchase the three parcels of
land, and to construct the house. Jambrich was the owner of the
properties in question, but his name was deleted in the Deed of Absolute
Sale because of legal constraints. Nevertheless, his signature remained
in the deed of sale where he signed as a buyer. Thus, Jambrich has all
authority to transfer all his rights, interest and participation over the
subject properties to petitioner by virtue of Deed of Assignment.
Furthermore, the fact that the disputed properties were acquired during
the couple’s cohabitation does not help the respondent. The rule of co-
ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but otherwise
capacitated to marry each other does not apply. At the case at bar,
respondent was still legally married to another when she and Jambrich
lived together. In such an adulterous relationship and no co-ownership

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
110. HEIRS OF LORETO MARAMAG vs. MARAMAG
G.R. No. 181132
June 5, 2009
DOCTRINE:
Sec. 53 of the Insurance Code states: proceeds shall be applied
exclusively to the proper interest of the person in whose name or for
whose benefit it is made, unless otherwise specified in the policy.
Article 2012. Any person who is forbidden from receiving any donation
under article 739 cannot be named beneficiary of a life insurance policy
by the person who cannot make any donation to him, according to said
article. (n)
Article 739.The following donations shall be void:
1. Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery
or concubinage at the time of the donation;
2. Those made between persons found guilty of the same
criminal offense, in consideration thereof;
3. Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and
ascendants, by reason of his office.
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may
be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the
donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the
same action.
FACTS:
Petitioners were the legitimate wife and children of Loreto Maramag (Loreto),
while respondents were Loreto’s illegitimate family. Loreto designated
respondents as beneficiaries in his life insurance policies from Insular Life and
Great Pacific Life (Grepalife).
Petitioners instituted in the RTC a petition for revocation and/or reduction of
insurance proceeds for being void and/or inofficious, with prayer for a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction. They
claim that Eva de Guzman Maramag (Eva) was a concubine of Loreto and a
suspect in the killing of the latter, thus, she is disqualified to receive any
proceeds from his insurance policies; the illegitimate children of Loreto were
entitled only to one-half of the legitime of the legitimate children, thus, the
proceeds released to them were inofficious and should be reduced; and
petitioners could not be deprived of their legitimes, which should be satisfied
first.
Petitioners allege that the designation of a beneficiary is an act of liberality or
a donation and, therefore, subject to the provisions of Articles 752[8] and 772[9]
of the Civil Code.
The trial court held that the petitioners cannot invoke the law on donations or
the rules on testamentary succession in order to defeat the right of herein
defendants to collect the insurance indemnity. The beneficiary in a contract of
insurance is not the donee spoken in the law of donation. The rules on
testamentary succession cannot apply here, for the insurance indemnity does
not partake of a donation.
79
It also stated that the proceeds to the Life Insurance Policy belong exclusively
to the defendant as his individual and separate property, and not to the estate
of the person whose life was insured.
The RTC disqualified Loreto’s concubine, Eva, from being a beneficiary
pursuant to Art. 2012: Any person who is forbidden from receiving any
donation under Article 739 cannot be named beneficiary of a life insurance
policy of the person who cannot make any donation to him, but stated that the
insurance contract will still remain valid, but the indemnity must go to the legal
heirs and not to the concubine, for evidently, what is prohibited under Art. 2012
is the naming of the improper beneficiary.
ISSUE:
Are the members of the legitimate family entitled to the proceeds of the
insurance for the concubine? NO
RULING:
Sec. 53 of the Insurance Code states: proceeds shall be applied exclusively to
the proper interest of the person in whose name or for whose benefit it is made,
unless otherwise specified in the policy.
Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only persons entitled to claim the
insurance proceeds are either the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the
insured is already deceased, upon the maturation of the policy. The exception
to this rule is a situation where the insurance contract was intended to benefit
third persons who are not parties to the same in the form of favorable
stipulations or indemnity. In such a case, third parties may directly sue and
claim from the insurer.
Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular and
Grepalife and, thus, are not entitled to the proceeds thereof.
The revocation of Eva as a beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification as
such in another are of no moment considering that the designation of the
illegitimate children as beneficiaries in Loreto’s insurance policies remains
valid. Because no legal proscription exists in naming as beneficiaries the
children of illicit relationships by the insured, the shares of Eva in the insurance
proceeds must be awarded to the said illegitimate children, the designated
beneficiaries, to the exclusion of petitioners. It is only in cases where the
insured has not designated any beneficiary, or when the designated beneficiary
is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds, that the insurance policy
proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured.
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111. BETTY B. LACBAYAN vs. BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR.
G.R. No. 165427
March 21, 2011

DOCTRINE:
While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is
premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the
parties.

FACTS:
During Betty Lacbayan and Bayani Samoy’s illicit relationship, they, together
with three more incorporators, were able to establish a manpower services
company, by which they acquired 5 parcels of land, registered in their names,
ostensibly as husband and wife.

Having parted ways eventually, both of them agreed to divide the said
properties and terminate their business partnership by executing a Partition
Agreement. Initially, Samoy agreed to Lacbayan's proposal that the properties
in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter, while the
ownership over the three other properties will go to Samoy. However, when
Lacbayan wanted additional demands, Samoy refused.

Thus, Lacbayan filed a complaint for judicial partition of the said properties
before the Quezon City RTC. In his Answer, however, Samoy denied
Lacbayan's claim of cohabitation and said that the properties were acquired
out of his own personal funds without any contribution from her.

ISSUE:
Does an action for partition preclude a settlement on the issue of ownership?
NO

RULING:
While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is
premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the
parties. Petitioner insists she is a co-owner pro indiviso of the five real estate
properties based on the TCTs covering the subject properties. Respondent
maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of co-
ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a
partition of the disputed properties. More importantly, the complaint will not
even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even have any
rightful interest over the subject properties.

A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement indicates

that the document involves matters which necessitate prior settlement of
questions of law, basic of which is a determination as to whether the parties
have the right to freely divide among themselves the subject properties.
Moreover, to follow petitioner's argument would be to allow respondent not only
to admit against his own interest but that of his legal spouse as well, who may
also be lawfully entitled co-ownership over the said properties. Respondent is
not allowed by law to waive whatever share his lawful spouse may have on the
disputed properties. Petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to the
Partition Agreement after seeing the need to amend the same to include other
matters. Petitioner does not have any right to insist on the contents of an
agreement she intentionally refused to sign.

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- Newt Gingrich
112. VENTURA JR. vs. SPS. PAULINO and EVANGELINE ABUDA
G.R. NO: 202932
DOCTRINE:
While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is
premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the
parties.
FACTS:
Socorro Torres and Esteban Abletes were married and both of them had
children from prior marriages. Esteban had a daughter named Evangeline
Abuda and Socorro had a son, who was the father of Edilberto U. Ventura, Jr.
the petitioner in this case. In 1978, Evangeline and Esteban operated small
business establishments located at Delpan Street, Tondo, Manila.
Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of her father, and the parties
intended that the Delpan property would be owned by and registered under the
name of Esteban. During trial, the Abuda spouses presented receipts
evidencing payments of the amortizations for the Delpan property. On the other
hand, Edilberto failed to show any evidence showing Socorro s alleged
monetary contributions. As correctly pointed out by the
CA: settled is the rule that in civil cases x x x the burden of proof rests upon
the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts
the affirmative of an issue. x x x. Here it is Appellant who is duty bound to prove
the allegations in the complaint which undoubtedly, he miserably failed to do
so.

In 1997, Esteban sold the Vitas and Delpan properties to Evangeline and her
husband, Paulino Abuda. According to Edilberto, when Esteban was
diagnosed with colon cancer sometime in 1993, he decided to sell the Delpan
and Vitas properties to Evangeline. Evangeline continued paying the
amortizations on the two (2) properties situated in Delpan Street.

Esteban passed away on 11 September 1997, while Socorro passed away on

31 July 1999. Leonora Urquila, the mother of Edilberto, discovered the sale.
Edilberto filed a Petition for Annulment of Deeds of Sale before the RTC-
Manila.

Edilberto alleged that the sale of the properties was fraudulent because
Esteban’s signature on the deeds of sale was forged. Respondents, on the
other hand, argued that because of Socorro’s prior marriage to Crispin, her
subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and void. Thus, neither Socorro nor
her heirs can claim any right or interest over the properties purchased by
Esteban and respondents.

ISSUE:
WON there was actual contribution from Esteban in the Delpan property.

RULING:
Edilberto claims that Esteban’s actual contribution to the purchase of the
Delpan property was not sufficiently proven since Evangeline shouldered some
of the amortizations. Thus, the law presumes that Esteban and Socorro jointly
contributed to the acquisition of the Delpan property. We cannot sustain
Edilberto’s claim. Both the RTC-Manila and the CA found that the Delpan
property was acquired prior to the marriage of Esteban and Socorro.
Furthermore, even if payment of the purchase price of the Delpan property was
made by Evangeline, such payment was made on behalf of her father. Article
1238 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1238. Payment made by a third person who does

not intend to be reimbursed by the debtor is deemed
to be a donation, which requires the debtor’s consent.
But the payment is in any case valid as to the creditor
who has accepted it.

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
113. EDWIN N. TRIBIANA vs. LOURDES M. TRIBIANA
September 13, 2004

DOCTRINE:
Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it
should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward
a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown
that no such efforts were in fact made, the same case must be dismissed.
This rules shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise
under the Civil Code.

FACTS:
Edwin and Lourdes are husband and wife who have lived together since 1996,
but formalized their union on October 28, 1997. On April 30, 1998, Lourdes
filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC, claiming Edwin left their
conjugal home with their daughter, Khriza Mae Tribiana. Edwin deprived
Lourdes of lawful custody of Khriza, who was 1 year and 4 months old. Later,
it was found that Khriza was with Rosalina Tribiana, Edwin’s mother.

Edwin moved to dismiss Lourdes’ petition on the ground that it did not allege
that earnest efforts at a compromise were made before its filing, following FC
151. On May 20, 1998, Lourdes filed her opposition to Edwin’s motion by
stating that there were prior failed efforts at a compromise. Attached to
Lourdes’ opposition was a copy of the Certification to File Action from their
barangay, dated May 1, 1998. On May 18, 1998, the RTC denied Edwin’s
motion to dismiss and reiterated a previous order requiring Edwin and Rosalina
to bring Khriza to the RTC. Upon denial of his motion for reconsideration, Edwin
filed with the CA a petition for prohibition and certiorari, which was denied on
July 2, 1998. Edwin’s motion for reconsideration was also denied by the CA.

ISSUE:
WON the trial and appellate courts should have dismissed the petition for
habeas corpus on the ground of failure to comply with the condition precedent
under FC 151.

RULING:
The trial and appellate courts’ resolutions were affirmed. The petition for
habeas corpus filed by Lourdes indeed failed to allege that she resorted to
compromise proceedings before filing the petition. However, in her opposition
to Edwin’s motion to dismiss, she attached a Barangay Certification to File
Action. As Edwin did not dispute the authenticity of the Barangay Certification
and its contents, this established that the parties tried to compromise, but were
unsuccessful.

Lourdes has complied with the condition precedent under FC 151. A dismissal
under Rule 16, Section 1 (j) is warranted only if there is a failure to comply with
a condition precedent. Given that the alleged defect is a mere failure to allege
compliance with a condition precedent, the proper solution is not an outright
dismissal of the action, but an amendment under Rule 10, Section 1 of the
1997 Rules of Procedure.

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114. HIYAS SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, INC. vs. ACUÑA
G.R. NO. 154132

DOCTRINE:
Art. 150. Family relations include those:
1. Between husband and wife;
2. Between parents and children;
3. Among other ascendants and descendants; and
4. Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.

Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it
should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward
a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown
that no such efforts were in fact made, the same case must be dismissed.
This rules shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise
under the Civil Code.

FACTS:
On November 24, 2000, Alberto Moreno (private respondent) filed with the
RTC of Caloocan City a complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc.
(petitioner), his wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe and Maria Owe and the
Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for cancellation of mortgage contending
that he did not secure any loan from petitioner, nor did he sign or execute any
contract of mortgage in its favor; that his wife, acting in conspiracy with Hiyas
and the spouses Owe, who were the ones that benefited from the loan, made
it appear that he signed the contract of mortgage; that he could not have
executed the said contract because he was then working abroad.

ISSUE:
WON HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC. can invoke Article 151 of the
Family Code. NO

RULING:
The Court has ruled that the requirement under Article 151 of the Family Code
is applicable only in cases which are exclusively between or among members
of the same family, it necessarily follows that the same may be invoked only by
a party who is a member of that same family, as provided for by Article 150 of
the Family Code.

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
115. PATRICIO vs. DARIO
G.R. No. 170829

DOCTRINE:
Article 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are:
The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family;
and Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the
relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and
who depend upon the head of the family for legal support.

Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both
spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for
as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same
unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply
regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.

FACTS:
On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife,
petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and
private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he left was a
parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building.

Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent

of their intention to partition the subject property and terminate the co-
ownership. Private respondent refused to partition the property hence
petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-
01-44038 and raffled to Branch 78.

Private respondent claims that the subject property which is the family home
duly constituted by spouses Marcelino and Perla Dario cannot be partitioned
while a minor beneficiary is still living therein namely, his 12-year-old son, who
is the grandson of the decedent.

ISSUE:
WON the family home cannot be partitioned on the grounds that a minor-
beneficiary is still residing therein. NO

RULING:
Three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the
benefits of Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family
Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3) they are dependent for legal
support upon the head of the family.

Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV satisfied the first two requisites. However, on

the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from
his paternal grandmother. Thus, the obligation to support under Art. 199 which
outlines the order of liability for support is imposed first upon the shoulders of
the closer relatives and only in their default is the obligation moved to the next
nearer relatives and so on. It is his father whom he is dependent on legal
support, and who must now establish his own family home separate and
distinct from that of his parents, being of legal age.

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
116. ARRIOLA vs. ARRIOLA
G.R. No. 177703 Applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion of
28 January 2008 the subject land on which it stands is deemed constituted as a family home by
the deceased and the petitioner Vilma from the moment that began occupying
DOCTRINE: the same as a family residence 20 years back. Therefor the house cannot be
Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife forced to sale by the respondent because family home is exempt on such sale.
or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their
family reside, and the land on which it is situated.

Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from
the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution
and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home
continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.

Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both
spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for
as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same
unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply
regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.

FACTS:
Fidel Arriola who married twice died and is survived by his legal heirs: John
Nabor Arriola (respondent), his son with his first wife, and Vilma G. Arriola, his
second wife and his other son, Anthony Ronald Arriola (petitioners). On
February 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision ordering the partition of the
parcel of land left by the decedent Fidel S. Arriola by and among his heir John,
Vilma and Anthony in equal shares of one-third each without prejudice to the
rights of creditors or mortgagees thereon, if any. However, the parties failed to
agree on how to divide the property and so the respondent proposed to sell it
through public auction. The petitioners initially agreed but refused to include in
the auction the house standing on the subject land because it is a family home.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject house is a family home. YES

RULING:
The subject house is a family home that it cannot be sold through public
auction.

Based on Article 152, the Family Home, constituted jointly by the husband and
wife or any an unmarried head of the family is the dwelling house where they
and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated.

Article 153, the Family Home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from
the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution
and so long as any beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home
continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.

Article 159, the Family Home shall continue despite the death of one or both
spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for
as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same
unless the court finds compelling reason.

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
117. MONDEQUILLO vs. BREVA
GR. No. 86355
May 31, 1990

DOCTRINE:
Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife
or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their
family reside, and the land on which it is situated.

Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from
the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution
and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home
continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.

FACTS:
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag,
Davao del Sur on July 1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and
a parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao de
Sur also registered in the latter’s name. A motion to quash was filed by the
petitioner alleging that the residential land is where the family home is built
since 1969 prior the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for
liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment sought to be
enforced against the family home is not one of those enumerated. With regard
to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of the public land and the
transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a member
of a cultural minority. The residential house in the present case became a
family home by operation of law under Article 153.

ISSUE:
WON the subject property is deemed to be a family home.

RULING:
The petitioner’s contention that it should be considered a family home from the
time it was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken.
Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it provides that the provisions of this
Chapter shall govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are
applicable. It does not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a retroactive
effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been
constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code and are exempt from the execution for payment of
obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Code. The said article simply
means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the
Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to
the benefits accorded to a family home under the FC. The debt and liability
which was the basis of the judgment was incurred prior the effectivity of the
Family Code. This does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided
in the FC.

As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made
shall be on whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land. Petition was
dismissed.

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
118. CABANG vs. BASAY
G.R. No. 180587

DOCTRINE:
A family home cannot be established on property held in co-ownership with
third persons. The family home must be established on the properties of (a) the
absolute community, or (b) the conjugal partnership, or (c) the exclusive
property of either spouse with the consent of the other.

FACTS:
In this case, Cabang has been occupying the Lot 7777owned by Basay.
Cabang believed that the said property is Lot 7778 that they rightfully owned.
SC ruled in favor Basay filed a complaint for recovery of the said lot. RTC ruled
in favor of Cabang. CA ruled in favor of Basay. Case was elevated to the SC.
Cabang argued that the said lot cannot be subject of Motion for Execution as
it is a family home. However, the SC held that it is not a family home but a
residential house because a family home cannot be established on property
held in co-ownership with third persons. It must be established on the
properties of ACP, CPG, or exclusive property of either spouse.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellate tribunal erred in reversing the judgment of the trial
court. NO

RULING:
The CA did not err in reversing RTC’s dismissal of the Motion for Execution.

Under Article 153 of the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on
a house and a lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is
no need to constitute the same judicially or extra-judicially. There can be no
question that a family home is generally exempt from execution, provided it
was duly constituted as such.

However, a family home cannot be established on property held in

co-ownership with third persons. The family home must be established on the
properties of (a) the absolute community, or (b) the conjugal partnership, or (c)
the exclusive property of either spouse with the consent of the other. In this
case, the said property on which their alleged family home stands is owned by
respondents. Therefore, it cannot be considered a family home but merely
residential.

“The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the

repository of cherished memories that last during one’s lifetime. It is the
dwelling house where the husband and wife, or an unmarried head of a family
reside, including the land on which it is situated. It is constituted jointly by the
husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family.”

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
119. RAMOS vs. PANGILINAN
G.R. No. 185920
July 20, 2010

DOCTRINE:
For family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extra judicially or judicially, and
the exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as
any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually resides therein.

FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos
Electric, Inc., a company owned by Ernesto M. Ramos. The decision ruled in
favor of the respondents and became final and executory so a writ of execution
was issued which the Deputy Sheriff of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) implemented by levying a property in Ramos’ name
situated in Pandacan.

Alleging that the property situated at Pandacan was the family home, hence,
exempt from execution to satisfy the judgment award. Respondents argued
that it is not the family home there being another one in Antipolo and that the
Pandacan address is actually the business address.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the levy upon the property situated in Pandacan was valid. YES

RULING:
If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or
before August 3, 1988, then it must have been constituted either judicially or
extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil
Code. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by Articles 240 to 242.
On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extra judicially
or judicially, and the exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and
lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually resides therein.
Moreover, the family home should belong to the absolute community
or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must
have been with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain
amounts depending upon the area where it is located.

The family home was constituted prior to August 3, 1988, or as early as 1944,
they must comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code. There being
absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or extra judicially
constituted as the Ramos’ family home, the law protecting the family home
cannot apply thereby making the levy upon the Pandacan property valid.

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
120. EQUITABLE PCI BANK vs. OJ-MARK TRADING
G.R. No. 165950
August 11, 2010
DOCTRINE:
Article 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except:
 For nonpayment of taxes;
 For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
 For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after
such constitution; and
 For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders,
materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished
material for the construction of the building.
FACTS:
Respondent-spouses Oscar and Evangeline Martinez obtained loans from
petitioner Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. in the aggregate amount of Four Million
Forty-Eight Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (P4,048,800.00). As security for
the said amount, a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) was executed over a
condominium unit in San Miguel Court, Valle Verde 5, Pasig City, Metro Manila
where the spouses are residing. Respondent Oscar Martinez signed the REM
both as principal debtor and as President of the registered owner and third-
party mortgagor, respondent OJ-Mark Trading, Inc. The REM was annotated
on Condominium Certificate of Title No. PT-21363 of the Registry of Deeds of
Pasig City.
The Spouses defaulted in the payment of their outstanding loan obligation. In
a letter, they offered to settle their indebtedness “with the assignment to the
Bank of a commercial lot of corresponding value” and also requested for
recomputation at a lower interest rate and condonation of penalties. While the
Bank’s officers held a meeting with Mr. Martinez, he failed to submit the
required documents such as certificates of title and tax declarations so that the
bank can evaluate his proposal to pay the mortgage debt via dacion en pago.
The Spouses on the other hand claims that the said unit being a Family Home
is exempt from foreclosure as provided under Art. 153 of the Family Code and
that if the injunctive relief would not be granted, they will suffer an irreparable
injury, as well as their children. It is alleged by the petitioner Equitable Bank
that while the condominium unit is supposedly a family home, it is admittedly
owned by the corporation and not by the conjugal partnership or absolute
community of the Spouses and that even assuming that OJ-Mark Trading, Inc.
is a family corporation, the Spouses’ stance contravenes the established rule
that properties registered in the name of the corporation are owned by it as an
entity separate and distinct from its members or stockholders.
The RTC granted the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. The CA
affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents have shown a clear legal right to enjoin the
foreclosure and public auction of the third-party mortgagor’s property (which is
being used as family home) while the case for annulment of REM on said
property is being tried. NO
RULING:
The claim of exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code, thereby raising
issue on the mortgaged condominium unit being a family home and not
corporate property, is entirely inconsistent with the clear contractual agreement
of the REM. Assuming arguendo that the mortgaged condominium unit
constitutes respondents’ family home, the same will not exempt it from
foreclosure as Article 155 (3) of the same Code allows the execution or forced
sale of a family home “for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before
or after such constitution.”
The Spouses failed to show that they have a right to be protected and that the
acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of their rights under
Art. 153 of the Family Code.

Consequently, the Bank initiated the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate
Mortgage. The Spouses filed a civil action for “Temporary Restraining Order
(‘TRO’), Injunction and Annulment of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale” in the RTC
of Pasig City, which the RTC granted by issuing a TRO for 20 days.

In their Complaint With Application for Temporary Restraining Order,

respondents sought to enjoin the impending foreclosure sale alleging that the
same was hasty, premature, unreasonable and unwarranted, and also claiming
defects in the execution of the REM. Respondents imputed bad faith on the
part of petitioner who did not officially inform them of the denial or disapproval
of their proposal to settle the loan obligation by "dacion via assignment of a
commercial property." Respondents maintained that aside from the REM being
illegally notarized, incomplete and unenforceable, the obligation subject
thereof had been extinguished by the dacion proposal considering that the
value of the property offered was more than sufficient to pay for the mortgage
debt. It was further averred that the subject property is being used and
occupied by respondent-spouses as a family home.

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
121. SPS. DE MESA vs. SPS. ACERO must be constituted as a family home either judicially or extra judicially in
G.R. No. 185064 accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from
January 16, 2012 execution;

DOCTRINE:
For family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extra judicially or judicially, and
the exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as
any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually resides therein.
FACTS:
The petitioners jointly purchased a parcel of land situated at No. 3 Forbes
Street, Mount Carmel Homes Subdivision, Iba, Meycauayan, Bulacan, which
was formerly covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-76.725 (M)
issued by the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan and registered under
Araceli’s name, on April 17, 1984 while they were still merely cohabiting before
their marriage.
A house was later constructed on the subject property, which the petitioners
thereafter occupied as their family home after they got married sometime in
January 1987.Sometime in September 1988, De Mesa obtained a loan from
Claudio D. Acero, Jr. worth P100,000.00, which was secured by a mortgage
over the subject property.
Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family
Codeon August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be family homes and thus
exempt from execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as
any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein;
Third, family residences which were not judicially or extra judicially constituted
as a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing
thereafter, are considered as family homes by operation of law and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the
Family Code. Also, Section 30 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that
“A redemptioner must produce to the officer, or person from whom he seeks to
redeem, and serve with his notice to the officer a copy of the judgment or final
order under which he claims the right to redeem, certified by the clerk of the
court wherein the judgment or final order is entered, or, if he redeems upon a
mortgage or other lien, a memorandum of the record thereof, certified by the
registrar of deeds, or an original or certified copy of any assignment necessary
to establish his claim; and an affidavit executed by him or his agent, showing
the amount then actually due on the lien.”

Due to failure of payment, Acero filed a complaint and was granted. On March
15, 1993, a writ of execution was issued and Sheriff Samonte levied upon the
property by selling it on public auction. The certificate of sale was issued to
Claudio, and was leased on the petitioners and a certain Juanito Oliva.

They then defaulted on the payment again so Acero filed a complaint for
ejectment. On July 1999, MTC rendered a decision favoring the Acero’s and
ordering the petitioners to vacate the property. On October 29, 1999, the
petitioners filed against the respondents a complaint to nullify TCT No. T-
221755 (M) and other documents with damages with the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan. Therein, the petitioners asserted that the subject property is a family
home, which is exempt from execution under the Family Code and, thus, could
not have been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying the March 15, 1993
writ of execution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower courts erred in refusing to cancel Claudio’s Torrens
title TCT No. T-221755 (M) over the subject property. NO

RULING:
The court finds that the CA did not err in dismissing the petitioners’ complaint
for nullification of TCT No. T-221755 (M). The subject property is a family
home, however the family home’s exemption from execution must be set up
and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. It is
evident that appellants did not assert their claim of exemption within a
reasonable time.

The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption

from execution, could be summarized as follows: First, family residences
constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
122. FORTALEZA vs. LAPITAN
G.R. NO. 178288
August 15, 2012
DOCTRINE:
Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from
the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution
and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home
continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
FACTS:
Sps. Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza obtained a loan from Sps. Rolando and
Amparo Lapitan in the amount of P1.2M subject to 34% interest per annum. As
security, Sps. Fortaleza executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over their
residential house & lot in Barrio Anos, Los Baños, Laguna. When Sps.
Fortaleza failed to pay their indebtedness including interests and penalties, the
creditors Lapitan applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the Real Estate
Mortgage before the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of
Calamba City.
At the auction sale, the creditor’s son Dr. Raul Lapitan and his wife Rona
emerged as the highest bidders at the amount of P2.5M. They were then
issued a Certificate of Sale registered with the Registry of Deeds of Calamba
City and annotated at the back of the TCT. The one-year redemption period
expired without the spouses Fortaleza redeeming the mortgage. Spouses Raul
and Rona Lapitan executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership and
caused the cancellation of the TCT held by Sps. Fortaleza and the registration
of the subject property in their names under a new TCT. Despite the foregoing,
Sps. Fortaleza refused the Sps. Lapitan’s formal demand to vacate and
surrender possession of the property.
Sps. Lapitan filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of writ of possession
with RTC, Br35 of Calamva City, alleging that as new registered owners of the
subject property, they were entitled to its possession. Sps. Fortaleza
questioned the validity of the real estate mortgage and the foreclosure sale.
They argued that the mortgage was void because the creditors bloated the
principal amount by the imposition of exorbitant interest.
voluntarily executed on January 28, 1998 a deed of Real Estate Mortgage over
the subject property which was even notarized by their original counsel of
record. And assuming that the property is exempt from forced sale, spouses
Fortaleza did not set up and prove to the Sheriff such exemption from forced
sale before it was sold at the public auction. As elucidated in Honrado v. Court
of Appeals:
While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the
time it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced
sale under Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be
set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction.
Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption.
Certainly, reasonable time for purposes of the law on exemption does not mean
a time after the expiration of the one-year period for a judgment debtor to
redeem the property.
The spouses Fortaleza neither filed an action nor made a formal offer to
redeem the subject property accompanied by an actual and simultaneous
tender of payment. It is also undisputed that they allowed the one-year period
to lapse from the registration of the certificate of sale without redeeming the
mortgage. For all intents and purposes, spouses Fortaleza have waived or
abandoned their right of redemption. Although the rule on redemption is
liberally interpreted in favor of the original owner of the property, we cannot
apply the privilege of liberality to accommodate the Sps. Fortaleza due to their
negligence or omission to exercise the right of redemption within the prescribed
period without justifiable cause.

RTC: Ordered issuance of a writ of possession ministerial duty of the court

since the redemption period had expired & a new title had already been issued
in the name of Sps. Lapitan

Sps. Fortaleza’s MR: Subject property is their family home and is exempt from
foreclosure sale. MR denied. CA: Dismissed the appeal and affirmed RTC
Ruling.

ISSUE:
W/N the subject property is a family home exempt from forced sale. NO

RULING:
As a rule, the family home is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment.
However, Article 155(3) of the Family Code explicitly allows the forced sale of
a family home “for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after
such constitution.” In this case, there is no doubt that spouses Fortaleza

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
123. EULOGIO vs. BELL
G.R. No. 186322
July 08, 2015
DOCTRINE:
Respondents' family home cannot be sold on execution under Article 160 of
the Family Code. The family home is a real right that is gratuitous, inalienable
and free from attachment. The great controlling purpose and policy of the
Constitution is the protection or the preservation of the homestead - the
dwelling place.
FACTS:
Respondents the Bell siblings are the unmarried children of respondent
Spouses Paterno C. Bell and Rogelia Calingasan-Bell (Sps. Bell). In 1995, the
Bell siblings lodged a Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 4581 at the (RTC)
of Batangas City for annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting of title
and damages against petitioners Enrico S. Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio (the
Eulogios). The Complaint sought the annulment of the contract of sale
executed by Spouses Bell over their residential house and lot, as well as the
cancellation of the title obtained by petitioners by virtue of the Deed.
The RTC granted respondents' prayers and ordered the Register of Deeds of
Batangas City to cancel TCT in the name of defendants the Eulogios and to
reconstitute TCT as "family home" of the plaintiffs the Bell siblings and Sps.
Bell.
However RTC declared Spouses Bell liable to petitioners in the amount of PI
million plus 12% interest per annum. On 9 June 2004 the RTC issued a Writ of
Execution, as a result of which respondents' property covered by the newly
reconstituted TCT was levied on execution. Upon motion by respondents, the
trial court, on 31 August 2004, ordered the lifting of the writ of execution on the
ground that the property was a family home.
RTC issued on 25 November 2004 an Order directing the issuance of a writ of
execution. Consequently, respondents filed before the CA a Supplemental
Petition with an urgent prayer for a temporary restraining order.
Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Injunction before the CA
docketed as 87531. CA eventually enjoined the execution. On 09 February
2009, the CA denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this
Petition.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether petitioners are guilty of forum-shopping. NO
(2) Whether a hearing to determine the value of respondents' family home
for purposes of execution under Article 160 of the Family Code is barred
under the principle of res judicata; YES
(3) Whether respondents' family home may be sold on execution under
Article 160 of the Family Code. NO
RULING:
92
(1) Petitioners are not guilty of forum-shopping. The essence of forum
shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the
purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment through means other than by
appeal or certiorari. Forum shopping does not apply to cases that arise
from an initiatory or original action that has been elevated by way of
appeal or certiorari to higher or appellate courts or authorities. Recall
that although the trial court had nullified the Deed of Sale over
respondents' family home, it still declared Spouses Bell liable to
petitioners in the amount of PI million plus 12% interest per annum.
Petitioners' bid to satisfy the above judgment cannot be considered an
act of forum shopping. Seeking a reversal of an adverse judgment order
by appeal or certiorari does not constitute forum shopping. Such
remedies are sanctioned and provided for by the rules.
(2) Re-litigating the issue of the value of respondents' family home is barred
by res judicata. Res judicata (meaning, a "matter adjudged") is a
fundamental principle of law that precludes parties from re-litigating
issues actually litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment.
Res judicata applies, considering that the parties are litigating over the
same property. Moreover, the same contentions and evidence advanced
by the petitioners to substantiate their claim over respondents' family
home have already been used to support their arguments in the main
proceedings.
(3) Respondents' family home cannot be sold on execution under Article 160
of the Family Code. The family home is a real right that is gratuitous,
inalienable and free from attachment. The great controlling purpose and
policy of the Constitution is the protection or the preservation of the
homestead - the dwelling place.
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124. ARBOLARIO vs. CA
G.R. No. 129163

DOCTRINE:
Article 163
The filiation of children may be by nature or by adoption. Natural filiation may
be legitimate or illegitimate. (n)

Article 992
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives
inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.

FACTS:
The petitioners claim that they are the legitimate half-brothers and half-sisters
of the deceased, hence they are qualified to inherit from the latter. However,
the birth dates of the petitioner were earlier than the death of the original wife
of their father.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are legitimate half-brothers and half-sisters of
the deceased. NO

RULING:
The petitioners were born before 1951. Therefore, in the absence of any fact
that would show that conjugal union of Juan Arbolario and Catalina Baloyo had
been judicially annulled before 1951, or before Juan Arbolario cohabited with
Francisca Malvas, it would only be reasonable to conclude that the foregoing
union which resulted in the birth of the [Arbolarios] was extra-marital. And
consequently, Voltaire Arbolario, et al., are illegitimate children of Juan
Arbolario.

As held by the appellate court, without proof that Catalina died in 1903, her
marriage to Juan is presumed to have continued. Even where there is actual
severance of the filial companionship between spouses, their marriage
subsists, and either spouse’s cohabitation with any third party cannot be
presumed to be between “husband and wife.”

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125. TAN vs. TROCIO
92 SCRA 764
DOCTRINE:
Article 164
Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the
sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children
of the husband and his wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified
such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before
the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry
together with the birth certificate of the child.
FACTS:
Tan filed a disbarment case against Atty. Trocio for allegedly raping her and as
a result, she bore a son named Jewel. She gave birth to Jewel during her
marriage with Tal Lee Pok.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jewel is the illegitimate son of Atty. Trocio.
RULING:
Jewel Tan was born during the wedlock of Complainant and her husband and
the presumption should be in favor of legitimacy unless physical access
between the couple was impossible. From the evidence on hand, the
presumption has not been overcome by adequate and convincing proof. In fact,
Jewel was registered in his birth certificate as the legitimate child of the
Felicidad and her husband, Tan Le Pok.
126. ANGELES vs. MAGLAYA
469 SCRA 363
FACTS:
Petitioner is the wife of the deceased while the respondent is the child of the
deceased in his first wife. Respondent seeks administration of the estate of the
deceased but opposed by the surviving wife (2nd wife) alleging that the
respondent is an illegitimate child of the deceased.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is illegitimate precluding her to become the
administratrix. NO
RULING:
Respondent is not illegitimate. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more
emphatic on the matter: “Children conceived or born during the marriage of the
parents are legitimate.”
The issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
94
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. It bears stressing that under Article 164 of
established by any of the following: the Family Code, children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents
1. The record of birth appearing in are legitimate.
the civil register or a final
judgments; or Jeylnn’s claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate which bears
2. An admission of legitimate filiation the signature of Pablo. Petitioner was able to authenticate the certification from
in a public document or a private the Civil Registry showing that she was born on October 29, 1991. The records
handwritten instrument and signed also show that Rosanna and Pablo were married on December 4, 1977 and
by the parent concerned. the marriage subsisted until the latter’s death on December 8, 1996. It is
therefore evident that Jeylnn was born during Rosanna and Pablo’s marriage.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by: Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband
1. The open and continuous or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. In this case, there is no showing that Pablo
possession of the status of a challenged the legitimacy of Jeylnn during his lifetime.
legitimate child; or
2. Any other means allowed by the The presumption that Jeylnn is a legitimate child is buttressed by her birth
Rules of Court and special laws. certificate bearing Pablo’s signature, which was verified from his specimen
signature on file with petitioner. A birth certificate signed by the father is a
competent evidence of paternity.
127. SSS vs. AGUAS
G.R. No. 165546 For Rosanna, to qualify as a primary beneficiary, she must establish 2
February 27, 2006 qualifying factors: (1) that she is the legitimate spouse, and (2) that she is
dependent upon the member for support.
DOCTRINE:
Article 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are A wife who is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to
legitimate. be "dependent for support" upon the husband, absent any showing to the
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the contrary. If it is proved that the were till living together at the time of his death,
sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children it is presumed that she was dependent on the husband for support, unless it is
of the husband and his wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified shown that she is capable of providing for herself.
such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before
the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry Only Jeylnn is entitled to the SSS death benefits as it was established that she
together with the birth certificate of the child. is his legitimate child. Records show that Janet was merely "adopted" by the
spouses, but there are no legal papers to prove it. Rosanna was the legitimate
FACTS: wife of Pablo, she is likewise not qualified as a primary beneficiary since she
Pablo Aguas, a member and pensioner of the SSS died. Pablo’s surviving failed to present any proof to show that at the time of his death, she was still
spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits on dependent on him for support even if they were already living separately.
indicating in her claim that Pablo was survived by his minor child, Jeylnn. Her NOTE: Legitimacy cannot be extended to other siblings.
claim for monthly pension was settled.
SSS received a sworn from Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac, Pablo’s sister,
contesting Rosanna’s claim for death benefits. She alleged that Rosanna
abandoned the family abode approximately more than 6 years before, and lived
with another man on whom she has been dependent for support. She further
averred that Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna.
The SSC ruled that Rosanna was no longer qualified as primary beneficiary.
CA reversed the SSC deicision and favored the respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rosanna, Jeylnn and Janet are entitled to the SSS death
benefits accruing from the death of Pablo.
RULING:
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128. RIVERA vs. HEIRS OF VILLANUEVA the extrajudicial partition which she executed with Villanueva on August 8,
G.R. No. 141501 1980 was invalid.
July 21, 2006

DOCTRINE:
It is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima face
evidence of the facts contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the
truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested parties.

FACTS:
Petitioners are allegedly the half-brothers, the half-sister-in-law, and the
children of a half-brother of the deceased Pacita Gonzales. Respondents are
heirs of Villanueva and are represented by Melchor. The remaining
respondents, Angelina Villanueva and husband Victoriano de Luna, are
allegedly the daughter and the son-in-law, respectively, of the late Villanueva.

From 1927 until her death in 1980, Gonzales cohabited with Villanueva without
the benefit of marriage because the latter was married to one Amanda Musngi
who died on April 20, 1963. In the course of their cohabitation, they acquired
several properties including the properties contested in this case. Gonzales
died on July 3, 1980 without leaving a will. On August 8, 1980, Villanueva
and respondent Angelina executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with sale,
that is, an extrajudicial settlement of Gonzales’ estate comprising a number of
the aforementioned properties. In this document, Villanueva, for the amount of
P30,000, conveyed his interests in the estate to Angelina. Petitioners filed a
case for partition of Gonzales’ estate and annulment of titles and damages,
with the RTC.

In dismissing the complaint, the RTC made two findings: (1) Gonzales was
never married to Villanueva and (2) respondent Angelina was her illegitimate
child by Villanueva and therefore her sole heir, to the exclusion of petitioners.
The CA ruled that respondent Angelina was the illegitimate daughter of the
decedent, based solely on her birth certificate.

ISSUE:
WON Angelina is an illegitimate child of the deceased Villanueva. NO

RULING:
The mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the
supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the
status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts
to simulation of the child’s birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate,
which is a public document. Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth
is merely a prima face evidence of the facts contained therein. It is not
conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the
interested parties.

Following the logic of Benitez case, respondent Angelina and her co-
defendants in SD-857 should have adduced evidence of her adoption, in view
of the contents of her birth certificate. The records, however, are bereft of any
such evidence. Under the circumstances, the Court ruled that it was not
sufficiently established that respondent Angelina was Gonzales’ biological
daughter, nor even her adopted daughter. Thus, she cannot inherit from
Gonzales. Since she could not have validly participated in Gonzales’ estate,

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129. SUNTAY vs. SUNTAY
FACTS:
Petitioner Federico is the oppositor to respondent Isabel’s Petition for Letters
of Administration over the estate of Cristina A. Suntay who had died without
leaving a will. The decedent is the wife of Federico and the grandmother of
Isabel. Isabel’s father Emilio, had predeceased his mother Cristina.
same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are
also called natural children by legal fiction. In view thereof, the status of Isabel
would be covered by the second paragraph of Article 89 of the Civil Code which
provides that “children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of
annulment shall be considered legitimate.”

The marriage of Isabel’s parents had previously been declared by the CFI as
“null and void.” Federico anchors his opposition on this fact, alleging based on
Art. 992 of the CC, that Isabel has no right to succeed by right of representation
as she is an illegitimate child. The trial court had denied Federico’s Motion to
Dismiss, hence this petition for certiorari. Federico contends that, inter alia, that
the dispositive portion of the decision declaring the marriage of Isabel’s parents
“null and void” be upheld.

ISSUES:
1. In case of conflict between the body of the decision and the dispositive
portion thereof, which should prevail? Related thereto, was the marriage
of Isabel’s parents a case of a void or voidable marriage?

2. Whether or not Isabel is a legitimate child?

RULING:
Petition dismissed Art. 10 of the Civil Code states that in case of doubt in the
interpretation and application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail. This is also applicable and binding upon
courts in relation to its judgment. While the dispositive portion of the CFI
decision states that the marriage be “declared null and void,” the body had
shown that the legal basis was par. 3 Art. 85 of the Civil Code, which was in
effect at the time. Art. 85 enumerates the causes for which a marriage may be
annulled.

As such the conflict between the body and the dispositive portion of the
decision may be reconcilable as noted by the Supreme Court. The fundamental
distinction between void and voidable marriages is that void marriage is
deemed never to have taken place at all. The effects of void marriages, with
respect to property relations of the spouses are provided for under Article 144
of the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages who are called natural
children by legal fiction have the same status, rights and obligations as
acknowledged natural children under Article 89 irrespective of whether or not
the parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith. On the other
hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects,
until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for
annulment.

Juridically, the annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it

had never been entered into but the law makes express provisions to prevent
the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out. The status of children
born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89
which provides that:

Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall

be considered legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the

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130. SUNTAY vs. COJUANGCO-SUNTAY
G.R. No. 132254
29 December 1998.

FACTS:
The ratio decidendi points as the legal basis for setting aside the marriage is
paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code, the law in force prior to the
enactment of the Family Code, on voidable marriages.

The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, the marriage celebrated between Emilio

Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay on July 9, 1958
is hereby declared null and void and of no effect as between the
parties. xxx”

The conflict lies on the legal connotation and implications of the terms
“voidable” and “null and void”.

ISSUE:
Which should prevail between the ratio decidendi and the fallo in this case?
RATIO DECIDENDI

RULING:
It is an elementary principle of procedure that the resolution of the court in a
given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of a decision or order is the
controlling factor as to settlement of rights of the parties and the questions
presented, notwithstanding statement in the body of the decision or order which
may be somewhat confusing, the same is not without qualification. The
foregoing rule holds true only when the dispositive part of a final decision or
order is definite, clear and unequivocal and can be wholly given effect without
need of interpretation or construction which usually is the case where the order
or decision in question is that of a court not of record which is not
constitutionally required to state the facts and the law on which the judgment
is based.

Assuming that a doubt or uncertainty exists between the dispositive portion

and the body of the decision, effort must be made to harmonize the whole body
of the decision in order to give effect to the intention, purpose and judgment of
the court.

Thus, a reading of the pertinent portions of the decision xxx shows that the
marriage is voidable.

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131. ARTURIO TRINIDAD vs. CA
G.R. No. 118904
April 20, 1998
FACTS:
Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of three (3) children,
namely, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. When Patricio died in 1940, survived by
the above named children, he left four (4) parcels of land, all situated at Barrio
Tigayon, Kalibo Aklan.
Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of the
late Inocentes Trinidad. Sometime after the marriage, he demanded from the
defendants to partition the land into three equal shares and to give him the
(1/3) individual share of his late father, but the defendants refused.
Arturio Trinidad filed an action for partition of four parcels of land. Defendants
denied that plaintiff was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants
contended that Inocentes was single when he died in 1941, before plaintiff’s
birth. Defendants also denied that plaintiff had lived with them, and claimed
that the parcels of land described in the complaint had been in their possession
since the death of their father in 1940 and that they had not given plaintiff a
share in the produce of the land.
Arturio presented witnesses to prove his position. Jovita Gerardo testified that
Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato are the parents of Arturio; that Felix
and Lourdes as the uncle and aunt of Arturio; and also identified pictures where
the respondents were with Arturio and his family.(At this stage of the trial, Felix
Trinidad [died] without issue and he was survived by his only sister, Lourdes
Trinidad.) Another witness, ISABEL MEREN, 72 years old and a widow testified
that she knows Inocentes Trinidad as the father of Arturio Trinidad; that she
knew Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato as the parents of Arturio and
that she was present when they were married in New Washington, Aklan, by a
protestant pastor by the name of Lauriano Lajaylajay. She further testified that
upon the death of Inocentes, Lourdes took Arturio and cared for him. ARTURIO
TRINIDAD, himself, was presented as witness. As proof that he is the son of
Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, he showed a certificate of baptism,
and a certificate of loss issued by the LCR that his birth certificate was burned
during World War 2. He also testified that he lived with Felix and Lourdes and
provided for his needs.
On the other hand, defendants presented Pedro Briones who testified that
Inocentes was not married when he died in 1940s. Lourdes Trinidad also
testified that she was not aware that his brother married anybody and denied
that Arturio lived with them. Beatriz Sayon also testified that Inocentes died in
1941, and that Felicidad Molato had never been married to Inocentes. The trial
court rendered a twenty-page decision in favor of Arturio. The CA reversed the
decision.
ISSUES:
Whether the petitioner presented sufficient evidence of his parent’s marriage
and his filiation. YES
RULING:
98
The partition of the late Patricio’s real properties requires preponderant proof
that petitioner is a co-owner or co-heir of the decedent’s estate. His right as a Doctrinally, a collateral attack on filiation is not permitted. Rather than rely on
co-owner would, in turn, depend on whether he was born during the existence this axiom, petitioner chose to present evidence of his filiation and of his
of a valid and subsisting marriage between his mother (Felicidad) and his parents’ marriage. Hence, there is no more need to rule on the application of
putative father (Inocentes). this doctrine to petitioners cause.
When the question of whether a marriage has been contracted arises in
litigation, said marriage may be proven by relevant evidence. To prove the fact
of marriage, the following would constitute competent evidence: the testimony
of a witness to the matrimony, the couple’s public and open cohabitation as
husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and the baptismal
certificates of children born during such union, and the mention of such nuptial
in subsequent documents.
In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification from the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Aklan that all records of births, deaths and marriages were lost,
burned or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of said municipality.
Although the marriage contract is considered the primary evidence of the
marital union, petitioner’s failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took
place, as other forms of relevant evidence may take its place. In place of a
marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel Meren
and Jovita Gerardo. It further gives rise to the disputable presumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage. Petitioner also presented his baptismal
certificate in which Inocentes and Felicidad were named as the child’s father
and mother, and family pictures.
Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof of filiation, it
is one of the other means allowed under the Rules of Court and special laws
to show pedigree.
Concededly, because Gerardo was not shown to be a member of the Trinidad
family by either consanguinity or affinity, her testimony does not constitute
family reputation regarding pedigree. Hence, it cannot, by itself, be used to
establish petitioner’s legitimacy.
Be that as it may, the totality of petitioner’s positive evidence clearly
preponderates over private respondent’s self-serving negations.
Furthermore, petitioner consistently used Inocentes surname (Trinidad)
without objection from private respondents -- a presumptive proof of his status
as Inocentes legitimate child.
Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by one
side outweighs that of the adverse party. Compared to the detailed (even if
awkwardly written) ruling of the trial court, Respondent Courts holding that
petitioner failed to prove his legitimate filiation to Inocentes is unconvincing. In
determining where the preponderance of evidence lies, a trial court may
consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, including the witnesses
manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing
the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts, the probability or
improbability of their testimony, their interest or want thereof, and their personal
credibility. Applying this rule, the trial court significantly and convincingly held
that the weight of evidence was in petitioners favor.
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132. DE JESUS vs. ESTATE OF JUAN GAMBOA
G.R. No. 142877
October 2, 2001

FACTS:
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married in August 1964. It
was during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de
Jesus, herein petitioners, were born. In a notarized document, dated June 7,
1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being
his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan died intestate in
March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock
in various corporations and some real property. It was on the strength of his
notarized acknowledgement that petitioners filed a complaint for “Partition with
Inventory and Accounting” of the Dizon estate with the RTC.

Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent,

including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought
the dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated
as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of
petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo and
Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus
and deceased Juan Dizon.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners are illegitimate children of decedent Juan Dizon entitled to
inherit from him. NO

RULING:
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the valid
marriage of their parents Danilo and Carolina. The certificates of birth also
identified Danilo de Jesus as their father. There is a presumption in law that
children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes
conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access
between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of
the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact the husband
and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not
possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents
sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set
forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which
took effect on August 3, 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child
would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption
becomes fixed and unassailable.

In an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan, petitioners,

in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo and
Carolina de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself
establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of
the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born
in wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional instances the latter’s heirs,
can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife.
Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned
that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.

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133. ESTATE OF ROGELIO ONG vs. JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ
G.R. No. 171713

FACTS:
The Estate of Rogelio Ong opposed on the CA order directing the Estate and
Joanne Rodgin Diaz for DNA analysis for determining the paternity of the minor
Joanne. Trial court formerly rendered a decision and declared the minor to be
the illegitimate child of Rogelio Ong with Jinky Diaz, and ordering him to
support the child until she reaches the age of majority. Rogelio died during the
pendency of the case with the CA. The Estate filed a motion for reconsideration
with the CA. They contended that a dead person cannot be subject to testing.
CA justified that "DNA paternity testing, as current jurisprudence affirms, would
be the most reliable and effective method of settling the present paternity
dispute."

ISSUE:
Whether DNA analysis can still be done despite the death of Rogelio. YES

RULING:
The death of Rogelio does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing
for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. New Rules
on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing by using biological
samples--organic material originating from the person's body, ie., blood, saliva,
other body fluids, tissues, hair, bones, even inorganic materials- that is
susceptible to DNA testing.

In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish

or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes
obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of
the long dead parent could be resorted to. (People vs Umanito, citing Tecson
vs Comelec 424 SCRA 277)

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134. LEE vs. CA
G.R. No. 177861
July 13, 2010

FACTS:
Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the
Philippines in the 1930s as immigrants from China. They had 11 children,
namely, Rita K. Lee, Leoncio K. Lee, Lucia K. Lee-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Martin
K. Lee, Rosa Lee-Vanderlek, Melody Lee-Chin, Henry K. Lee, Natividad Lee-
Miguel, Victoriano K. Lee, and Thomas K. Lee (collectively, the Lee-Keh
children).

In 1948, Lee brought from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu),
supposedly to serve as housemaid. The respondent Lee-Keh children believe
that Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved into another property of Lee
nearby, and had a relation with him.

Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tiu’s children
with Lee (collectively, the Lee’s other children) claimed that they, too, were
children of Lee and Keh. This prompted the Lee-Keh children to request the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate the matter.

ISSUE:
Whether the stepmother can properly invoke Section 25 Rule 30 of the Rules
of Court. NO

RULING:
No, the stepmother cannot invoke Section 25 Rule 30 of the Rules of Court
which reads:

SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege.- No person

may be compelled to testify against his parents, other
direct ascendants, children or other direct
descendants.

The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to “direct”
ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry.
A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother.

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
135. MAKATI SHANGRILA vs. HARPER
GR. No. 189998
August 29, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioner, the owner and operator of the 5-star Shangri-La Hotel in Makati City,
appeals the decision promulgated on October 21, 2009, whereby the Court of
Appeals affirmed with modification the judgment rendered on October 25, 2005
by the RTC in Quezon City holding petitioner liable for damages for the murder
of Christian Fredrik Harper, a Norwegian national. Respondents Ellen Johanne
Harper and Jonathan Christopher Harper are the widow and son of Christian
Harper, while respondent Rigoberto Gillera is their authorized representative
in the Philippines.
Under Art. 172 of the Family Code, the filiation of legitimate children shall be
proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, in
the absence of a record of birth or a parent’s admission of such legitimate
filiation in a public or private document duly signed by the parent. Such other
proof of one’s filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a
family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation
respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses
and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. By
analogy, this method of proving filiation may also be utilized in the instant case.

In the first week of November 1999, Christian Harper came to Manila on a

business trip as the Business Development Manager for Asia of ALSTOM
Power Norway AS, an engineering firm with worldwide operations. He checked
in at the Shangri-La Hotel and was billeted at Room 1428. He was due to check
out on November 6, 1999. In the early morning of that date, however, he was
murdered inside his hotel room. He was then 30 years old.

It was found that the murderer, a Caucasian male, was able to trespass into
the hotel room of the victim and was then able to murder and rob the victim.
The heirs of the victim blame the hotel's gross negligence in providing the most
basic security system of its guests.

ISSUE:
Whether the plaintiffs were able to prove that they are the widow and son of
Mr. Christian Harper. YES

RULING:
The Revised Rules of Court provides that public documents may be evidenced
by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record. The
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be
under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the
clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.

If the record is not kept in the Philippines, the attested copy must be
accompanied with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by
a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated
by the seal of his office.

The documents involved in this case are all kept in Norway. These documents
have been authenticated by the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
they bear the official seal of the Ministry and signature of one, Tanja Sorlie.
The documents are accompanied by an Authentication by the Consul,
Embassy of the Republic of the Philippines in Stockholm, Sweden to the effect
that, Tanja Sorlie is duly authorized to legalize official documents for the
Ministry.

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
136. SALAS vs. MATUSALEM
GR. No. 180284
April 10, 2013
FACTS:
On May 26, 1995, Annabelle Matusalem filed a complaint for
Support/Damages against Narciso Salas in the RTC of Cabanatuan City.
Respondent claimed that petitioner is the father of her son Christian Paulo
Salas who was born on December 28, 1994. Petitioner, already 56 years old
at the time, enticed her as she was then only 24 years old, making her believe
that he is a widower. Petitioner rented an apartment where respondent stayed
and shouldered all expenses in the delivery of their child, including the cost of
caesarian operation and hospital confinement.
Here, while the CA held that Christian Paulo Salas could not claim open and
continuous possession of status of an illegitimate child, it nevertheless
considered the testimonial evidence sufficient proof to establish his filiation to
petitioner.
An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," like his baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been
entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130
of the Rules of Court.38 Reviewing the records, we find the totality of
respondent’s evidence insufficient to establish that petitioner is the father of
Christian Paulo.

However, when respondent refused the offer of petitioner’s family to take the
child from her, petitioner abandoned respondent and her child and left them to
the mercy of relatives and friends. Respondent further alleged that she
attempted suicide due to depression but still petitioner refused to support her
and their child.

Respondent thus prayed for support pendente lite and monthly support in the
amount of ₱20,000.00, as well as actual, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees.

ISSUE:
Whether the filiation of Christian Paulo was duly established entitling him for
support from petitioner. YES

RULING:
Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate filiation may
be established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.

Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states:

The filiation of legitimate children is established by

any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a

public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the

legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of

Court and special laws.

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- Newt Gingrich
137. RODOLFO S. AGUILAR vs. EDNA G. SIASAT
G.R. No. 200169
January 28, 2015
FACTS:
Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the Aguilar spouses)
died, intestate and without debts, on August 26, 1983 and February 8, 1994,
respectively. Included in their estate are two parcels of land (herein subject
properties) covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896 and T-
(15462) 1070 of the Registries of Deeds of Bago and Bacolod (the subject
titles).
In June 1996, petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed with the Bacolod RTC a civil
case for mandatory injunction with damages against respondent Edna G.
Siasat. Docketed as Civil Case No. 96-9591 and assigned to Branch 49 of the
Bacolod RTC, the Complaint alleged that petitioner is the only son and sole
surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses; that he (petitioner) discovered that the
subject titles were missing, and thus he suspected that someone from the
Siasat clan could have stolen the same; that he executed affidavits of loss of
the subject titles and filed the same with the Registries of Deeds of Bacolod
and Bago; that on June 22, 1996, he filed before the Bacolod RTC a Petition
for the issuance of second owner’s copy of Certificate of Title No. T-
25896,which respondent opposed; and that during the hearing of the said
Petition, respondent presented the two missing owner’s duplicate copies of the
subject titles. Petitioner thus prayed for mandatory injunctive relief, in that
respondent be ordered to surrender to him the owner’s duplicate copies of the
subject titles in her possession; and that damages, attorney’s fees, and costs
of suit be awarded to him.
In her Answer, respondent claimed that petitioner is not the son and sole
surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses, but a mere stranger who was raised by
the Aguilar spouses out of generosity and kindness of heart; that petitioner is
not a natural or adopted child of the Aguilar spouses; that since Alfredo Aguilar
predeceased his wife, Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, the latter inherited the
conjugal share of the former; that upon the death of Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar,
her brothers and sisters inherited her estate as she had no issue; and that the
subject titles were not stolen, but entrusted to her for safekeeping by
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, who is her aunt. By way of counterclaim, respondent
prayed for an award of moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner was able to establish his filiation in relation to Article 172.
YES
RULING:
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1)
the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation
shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself,
a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action
104
is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for
compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not Article 3
require a separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for 1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by
recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
essential in order to establish the child’s acknowledgment.
It is thus "(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate
marriage of their parents. The certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo children x x x." Too, "(t)he State as parens patriae affords special protection to
de Jesus as being their father. There is perhaps no presumption of the law children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing development."
reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This
presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is
physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days
of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the
physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b)
the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that
sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which
absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration
of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the
Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the status
conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.27 (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, applying the foregoing pronouncement to the instant case, it must be
concluded that petitioner – who was born on March 5, 1945, or during the
marriage of Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar28 and before their
respective deaths – has sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate issue of the
Aguilar spouses. As petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-
1 (Exhibit "G") satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to
the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code; by itself, said
document constitutes an "admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned."
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the
following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the
acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an
admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of
evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict
compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by
the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other
relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of
filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by
the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such
other evidence. Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall
be the "paramount consideration" in resolving questions affecting
him. Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
a Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
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138. EUGENIO SAN JUAN GERONIMO vs. KAREN SANTOS
GR. No. 197099
September 28, 2015
FACTS:
On April 17, 2001, plaintiff Karen Santos, claiming to be the only child of
deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo filed a complaint for annulment of
document and recovery of possession against the defendants Eugenio and
Emiliano Geronimo who are the brothers of her father. She alleged that with
the death of her parents, the property consisting of one half of the parcel of
land located at San Jose, Paombong, Bulacan with Tax Declaration No. 99-
02017-00219 and belonging to her parents was passed on to her by the law on
intestacy; that lately, she discovered that defendants executed a document
entitled Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman declaring themselves as the only
heirs of spouses Rufino and Caridad and adjudicating to themselves the
property in question; and that consequently[,] they took possession and were
able to transfer the tax declaration of the subject property to their names. She
prayed that the document Exhibit C be annulled and the tax declaration of the
land transferred to her, and that the defendants vacate the property and pay
her damages.
In an amended answer, the defendants denied the allegation that plaintiff was
the only child and sole heir of their brother. They disclosed that the deceased
Rufino and Caridad Geronimo were childless and took in as their ward the
plaintiff who was in truth, the child of Caridad’s sister. They claimed that the
birth certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document. It was allegedly
impossible for Rufino and Caridad to have registered the plaintiff in Sta. Maria,
Ilocos Sur because they had never lived or sojourned in the place and Caridad,
who was an elementary teacher in Bulacan never filed any maternity leave
during the period of her service from August 1963 until October 1984.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner has the personality to impugn respondent’s legitimate
filiation. YES
RULING:
In the instant case, the filiation of a child – herein respondent – is not at issue.
Petitioner does not claim that respondent is not the legitimate child of his
deceased brother Rufino and his wife Caridad. What petitioner alleges is that
respondent is not the child of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad at all.
He proffers this allegation in his Amended Answer before the trial court by way
of defense that respondent is not an heir to his brother Rufino. When petitioner
alleged that respondent is not a child of the deceased spouses Rufino and
Caridad in the proceedings below, jurisprudence shows that the trial court was
correct in admitting and ruling on the secondary evidence of respondent – even
if such proof is similar to the evidence admissible under the second paragraph
of Article 172 and despite the instant case not being a direct action to prove
one’s filiation.
It is clear in the case at bar that the ruling of both courts a quo declaring
respondent as a legitimate child and sole heir of the deceased spouses Rufino
and Caridad is one based on a misapprehension of facts.
105
A mere cursory reading of the birth certificate of respondent would show that it supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the
was tampered specifically on the entries pertaining to the date of birth of status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts
respondent and the name of the informant. Using pentel ink, the date of birth to simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate,
of respondent – April 6, 1972 – and the name of the informant – Emma Daño which is a public document.(emphasis ours)
– were both superimposed on the document. Despite these glaring erasures,
the trial court still relied on the prima facie presumption of the veracity and Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie
regularity of the birth certificate for failure of petitioner to explain how the evidence of the facts contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the
erasures were done and if the alterations were due to the fault of respondent. truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested parties. Following
It thus ruled that respondent’s filiation was duly established by the birth the logic of Benitez, respondent Angelina and her codefendants in SD-857
certificate. The appellate court did not agree with this finding and instead ruled should have adduced evidence of her adoption, in view of the contents of her
that the birth certificate presented does not qualify as the valid registration of birth certificate. The records, however, are bereft of any such evidence.
birth in the civil register as envisioned by the law. We reiterate the relevant
pronouncement of the CA, viz.:
x x x The document in question was signed by one Emma Daño who was not
identified as either the parent of the plaintiff or the physician or midwife who
attended to her birth. Exhibit 14, legally, cannot be the birth certificate
envisioned by the law; otherwise, with an informant as shadowy as Emma
Daño, the floodgates to spurious filiations will be opened. Neither may the order
of the court Exhibit E be treated as the final judgment mentioned in Article 172
as another proof of filiation. The final judgment mentioned refers to a decision
of a competent court finding the child legitimate. Exhibit G is merely an order
granting letters of guardianship to the parent Caridad based on her
representations that she is the mother of the plaintiff.35
Nonetheless, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that respondent has
proven her filiation by showing that she has enjoyed that open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child of the deceased spouses Rufino
and Caridad, viz.:
x x x The evidence consists of the following: (1) the plaintiff was allowed by her
putative parents to bear their family name Geronimo; (2) they supported her
and sent her to school paying for her tuition fees and other school expenses;
(3) she was the beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad before the GSIS;
(4) after the death of Rufino, Caridad applied for and was appointed legal
guardian of the person and property of the plaintiff from the estate left by
Rufino; and (5) both Caridad and the plaintiff executed an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of Rufino on the basis of the fact that they are both the
legal heirs of the deceased.36
We do not agree with the conclusion of both courts a quo. The appellate court
itself ruled that the irregularities consisting of the superimposed entries on the
date of birth and the name of the informant made the document questionable.
The corroborating testimony of Arturo Reyes, a representative of the NSO,
further confirmed that the entries on the date of birth and the signature of the
informant are alterations on the birth certificate which rendered the document
questionable. To be sure, even the respondent herself did not offer any
evidence to explain such irregularities on her own birth certificate. These
irregularities and the totality of the following circumstances surrounding the
alleged birth of respondent are sufficient to overthrow the presumption of
regularity attached to respondent’s birth certificate.
In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, Marissa Benitez-Badua: But definitely,
the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the
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139. REYES vs. MAURICIO ISSUE:
GR. No. 175080 Whether petitioner can collaterally attack the filiation of herein respondent. NO
November 24, 2010
RULING:
FACTS: It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked. Well-known civilista
Eugenio Reyes was the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Turo, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino, in his book "Civil Code of the Philippines,
Bocaue, Bulacan, with an area of four thousand five hundred twenty-seven Commentaries and Jurisprudence," noted that the aforecited doctrine is rooted
(4,527) square meters, more or less, and covered by TCT No. 109456(M). Said from the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines. He explained thus:
title came from and cancelled TCT No. T-62290 registered in the name of
Eufracia and Susana Reyes, siblings of Eugenio. The subject property was
adjudicated to Eugenio by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement among the heirs The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a
following the death of his parents. collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an
independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed
The controversy stemmed from a complaint filed before the DARAB of Malolos, in the Mexican code (article 335) which provides: "The contest of the legitimacy
Bulacan by respondents Librada F. Mauricio, now deceased, and her alleged of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before
daughter Leonida F. Mauricio for annulment of contract denominated as the competent court; any contest made in any other way is void." This principle
Kasunduan and between Librada and Eugenio as parties. Respondents also applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this
prayed for maintenance of their peaceful possession with damages. view, because they refer to "the action to impugn the legitimacy." This action
can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in
Respondents alleged that they are the legal heirs of the late Godofredo the present articles.
Mauricio, who was the lawful and registered tenant of Eugenio through his
predecessors-in-interest to the subject land; that from 1936 until his death in
May 1994, Godofredo had been working on the subject land and introduced
improvements consisting of fruit-bearing trees, seasonal crops, a residential
house and other permanent improvements; that through fraud, deceit, strategy
and other unlawful means, Eugenio caused the preparation of a document
denominated as Kasunduan dated 28 September 1994 to eject respondents
from the subject property, and had the same notarized by Notary Public Ma.
Sarah G. Nicolas in Pasig, Metro Manila; that Librada never appeared before
the Notary Public; that Librada was illiterate and the contents of the Kasunduan
were not read nor explained to her; that Eugenio took undue advantage of the
weakness, age, illiteracy, ignorance, indigence and other handicaps of Librada
in the execution of the Kasunduan rendering it void for lack of consent; and
that Eugenio had been employing all illegal means to eject respondents from
the subject property. Respondents prayed for the declaration of nullity of the
Kasunduan and for an order for Eugenio to maintain and place them in peaceful
possession and cultivation of the subject property. Respondents likewise
demanded payment of damages. During trial, respondents presented a
leasehold contract executed between Susana and Godofredo to reaffirm the
existing tenancy agreement.

Eugenio averred that no tenancy relationship existed between him and

respondents. He clarified that Godofredo’s occupation of the subject premises
was based on the former’s mere tolerance and accommodation. Eugenio
denied signing a tenancy agreement, nor authorizing any person to sign such
an agreement. He maintained that Librada, accompanied by a relative,
voluntarily affixed her signature to the Kasunduan and that she was fully aware
of the contents of the document. Moreover, Librada received P50,000.00 from
Eugenio on the same day of the execution of the Kasunduan. Eugenio also
questioned the jurisdiction of the DARAB since the principal relief sought by
respondents is the annulment of the contract, over which jurisdiction is vested
on the regular courts. Eugenio also asserted that Leonida had no legal
personality to file the present suit.

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140. REPUBLIC vs. MAGPAYO
GR. 189476
Feb. 2, 2011
FACTS:
Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng
Magpayo (respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna
Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondent’s certificate of live
birth1 shows, contracted marriage on March 26, 1972.
Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent
filed on July 22, 2008 at the RTC of Quezon City a Petition to change his name
to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng.
and place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one’s civil status should
be filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or
corrected – that of Makati in the present case, and "all persons who have or
claim any interest which would be affected thereby" should be made parties to
the proceeding.

ISSUE:
Whether the deletion of the entry on the date and place of marriage of
respondent’s parents from his birth certificate has the effect of changing his
civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, hence, any change in civil status of a
person must be effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding.

RULING:
A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME)
using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change
results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will
avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a
sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in
good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was
for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public
interest.17 Respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be considered
as one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds, however.

Since respondent’s desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate, Rule 108 applies. It reads:

SECTION 1. Who may file petition. — Any person

interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified
petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the [RTC] of the province where
the corresponding civil registry is located.
xxx

SEC. 3. Parties. — When cancellation or correction

of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be
made parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication. – Upon the filing of

the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time

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141. ANDAL vs. MACARAIG

FACTS:
Mariano Andal, assisted by his mother Maria Dueñas, as guardian ad litem,
brought an action in the CIF of Camarines Sur for the recovery of the ownership
and possession of a parcel of land situated in Camarines Sur. The complaint
alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of Emiliano Andal and Maria
Dueñas and that Emiliano was the owner of the parcel of land in question
having acquired it from his mother Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of a donation
propter nuptias executed by the latter in favor of the former.

The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (a) declaring
Mariano Andal the legitimate son of Emiliano Andal and such entitled to inherit
the land in question; (b) declaring Mariano Andal owner of said land; and (c)
ordering the defendant to pay the costs of suit. Defendant took the case to this
Court upon the plea that only question of law are involved.

Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis. Sometime thereafter, his brother,

Felix, went to live in his house to help him work his house to help him work his
farm. His sickness became worse, he became so weak that he could hardly
move and get up from his bed. Maria Dueñas, his wife, eloped with Felix, and
both went to live in the house of Maria's father. Felix and Maria had sexual
intercourse and treated each other as husband and wife. Emiliano died without
the presence of his wife, who did not even attend his funeral. Maria Dueñas
gave birth to a boy, who was given the name of Mariano Andal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the child is considered as the legitimate son of Emiliano.

RULING:
Considering that Mariano was born on June 17, 1943 and Emiliano died
on January 1, 1943, the former is presumed to be a legitimate son of the latter
because he was born within 300 days following the dissolution of
the marriage. The fact that the husband was seriously sick is not sufficient to
overcome the presumption of legitimacy. This presumption can only be
rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had
access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 days next preceding the
birth of the child. Impossibility of access by husband to wife includes absence
during the initial period of conception, impotence which is patent, and
incurable; and imprisonment unless it can be shown that cohabitation took
place through corrupt violation of prison regulations. Maria’s illicit
intercourse with a man other than the husband during the initial period does
not preclude cohabitation between husband and wife. Hence, Mariano Andal
was considered a legitimate son of the deceased making him the owner of the
parcel land.

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142. CONCEPCION vs. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and Ma. Theresa Almonte were married on
December 29, 1989. They lived in Fairview, Quezon City and a year later on
December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo.
On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma.
Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy, alleging that her marriage with
Mario Gopiao on December 10, 198- was never annulled. Although Ma.
Theresa did not deny marrying Mario, she averred that the marriage was a
sham and that she have never lived with Mario at all.
The trial court said otherwise, and ruled that Ma. Theresa’s marriage to Mario
was valid and subsisting, thus declaring her marriage to Gerardo as void ab
initio. It deemed Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child and the custody was
awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Also, it
allowed the child to use the surname of his father.
Ma. Theresa appealed and pleaded for the reverse of the court’s decisions.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa
by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage considering the fact that the
second marriage was void from the beginning. Therefore, the child Jose
Gerardo – under the law – is the child of the legal and subsisting marriage
between Ma. Theresa and Mario Gopiao.
status and filiation of a child. Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of those
who may be so minded to exploit his defenselessness.
As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames
of his father Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions
of the Civil Code on surnames. Also, there being no such parent-child
relationship between the child and Gerardo, Gerardo has no legally
demandable right to visit the child.
The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development. It is
mandated to provide protection to those of tender years. Through its laws, the
State safeguards them from everyone, even their own parents, to the end that
their eventual development as responsible citizens and members of society
shall not be impeded, distracted or impaired by family acrimony. This is
especially significant where, as in this case, the issue concerns their filiation as
it strikes at their very identity and lineage. The child, by reason of his mental
and physical immaturity, needs special safeguard and care, including
appropriate legal protection before as well as after birth. In case of assault on
his rights by those who take advantage of his innocence and vulnerability, the
law will rise in his defense with the single-minded purpose of upholding only
his best interests.

Gerardo Concepcion moved for the reconsideration of the decision.

ISSUE:
Whether the child is the legitimate child of Ma. Theresa and Gopiao or the
illegitimate child of Ma. Theresa and Gerardo.

RULING:
The child, Jose Gerardo, is the legitimate child of Ma. Theresa and Mario
Gopiao.

The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised as per Art. 164 of the
Family Code which states, “A child who is conceived or born during the
marriage of his parents is legitimate.” It is fully supported by Art. 167 of the
Family Code which states, “The child shall be considered legitimate although
the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress.” The law requires that every reasonable
presumption be made in favor of the legitimacy. It is grounded on the policy to
protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.

Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very
beginning, he never became her husband and thus never acquired any right to
impugn the legitimacy of her child. The minor cannot be deprived of his/her
legitimate status on the bare declaration of the mother and/or even much less,
the supposed father. In fine, the law and only the law determines who are the
legitimate or illegitimate children for one’s legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever
be compromised. It should be what the law says and not what a parent says it
is. Additionally, public policy demands that there be no compromise on the

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
143. ESTATE OF ROGELIO ONG vs. JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ
GR No. 171713
December 17, 2007
FACTS:
A Complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending
litigation was filed by minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz represented by her mother and
guardian, Jinky C. Diaz, against Rogelio G. Ong before the RTC of Tarlac City.
As alleged by Jinky in her Complaint in November 1993 in Tarlac City, she and
Rogelio got acquainted. This developed into friendship and later blossomed
into love. At this time, Jinky was already married to a Japanese national,
Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil wedding solemnized on 19 February 1993 by
Municipal Trial Court Judge Panfilo V. Valdez.
From January 1994 to September 1998, Jinky and Rogelio cohabited and lived
together at Fairlane Subdivision, and later at Capitol Garden, Tarlac City, and
on Feb. 25, 1998, she conceived Joanne and later born at the Central Luzon
Doctors’ Hospital, Tarlac City.
Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne and Jinky home
after delivery. Rogelio paid all the hospital bills and the baptismal expenses
and provided for all of minor Joanne’s needs – recognizing the child as his.
In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and stopped
supporting minor Joanne, falsely alleging that he is not the father of the child.
Rogelio, despite Jinky’s demand, failed and refused and continued failing and
refusing to give support for the child and to acknowledge her as his daughter,
thus leading to the filing of the heretofore adverted complaint.
RTC in its decision dated April 23, 1999 ordered among others to recognize
plaintiff as his natural child.
In a MR filed by Rogelio, the RTC affirmed its decision stating that:
1. Since it was duly established that plaintiff’s mother Jinky Diaz was
married at the time of the birth of Joanne Rodjin Diaz, the law
presumes that Joanne is a legitimate child of the spouses
Hasegawa Katsuo and Jinky Diaz (Article 164, Family Code). The
child is still presumed legitimate even if the mother may have
declared against her legitimacy (Article 167).
2. The legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following
grounds provided for in Article 166 of the same Code. Paragraph
1 of the said Article provides that there must be physical
impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with the
wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days following the birth of
the child because of –
a) physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife;
b) husband and wife were living separately in such a
way that sexual intercourse was not possible;
c) serious illness of the husband which prevented
sexual intercourse.
110
3. It was established by evidence that the husband is a Japanese
national and that he was living outside of the country and he
comes home only once a year. Both evidence of the parties proved
that the husband was outside the country and no evidence was
shown that he ever arrived in the country in the year 1997
preceding the birth of plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz.
4. While it may also be argued that plaintiff Jinky had a relationship
with another man before she met the defendant, there is no
evidence that she also had sexual relations with other men on or
about the conception of Joanne Rodjin. Joanne Rodjin was her
second, so her first child, a certain Nicole (according to defendant)
must have a different father or may be the son of Hasegawa.
5. The defendant admitted having been the one who shouldered the
hospital bills representing the expenses in connection with the
birth of plaintiff. It is an evidence of admission that he is the real
father of plaintiff. Defendant also admitted that even when he
stopped going out with Jinky, he and Jinky used to go to motels
even after 1996. Defendant also admitted that on some instances,
he still used to see Jinky after the birth of Joanne Rodjin.
Defendant was even the one who fetched Jinky after she gave
birth to Joanne.
Rogelio appealed to the CA, and during the pendency of the appeal, his lawyer
filed a Notice of Substitution praying that Rogelio be replaced by the Estate of
Rogelio Ong.
The CA in its decision on Nov. 23, 2005 remanded the case to the RTC
directing the parties to make arrangements for DNA Analysis for the purpose
of determining the paternity of plaintiff minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz, upon
consultation and in coordination with laboratories and experts on the field of
DNA analysis.
ISSUE:
WON Joanna is the illegitimate child of Rogelio.
HELD:
The Court did not answer this conclusively, instead it remanded the case to the
RTC for the conduct of the DNA Analysis for the purpose of determining the
paternity of minor Joanne Diaz.
Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also
to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support
(as in the present case), or inheritance.
The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative
father is the biological father of the child. There are four significant procedural
aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties have to face:
a) a prima facie case,
b) affirmative defenses,
c) presumption of legitimacy, and
d) physical resemblance between the putative father and child.
Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed
legitimate. As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of
legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:
Article 167. The children shall be considered
legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as
an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of
legitimacy. We explained the rationale of this rule in the recent case of
Cabatania v. Court of Appeals:
a) The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a
declaration in the statute but is based on the broad
principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the
mother.
b) The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect the
innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and
consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article
255 of the New Civil Code provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and
eighty days following the celebration of the marriage,
and before three hundred days following its
dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be
presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the
physical impossibility of the husband’s having access to his wife within the first
one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of
the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in
such a way that access was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the
civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in
a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by
the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
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 (1) The open and continuous possession
of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws.

ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their

illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.

There had been divergent and incongruent statements and assertions bandied
about by the parties to the present petition. But with the advancement in the
field of genetics, and the availability of new technology, it can now be
determined with reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is the biological father
of the minor, through DNA testing.

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- Newt Gingrich
144. JESSE LUCAS vs. JESUS LUCAS
G.R. No. 190710
June 6, 2011
FACTS:
On July 26, 2007, petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish
Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing)
before the RTC of Valenzuela City.
Petitioner narrated that, sometime in 1967, his mother, Elsie Uy (Elsie),
migrated to Manila from Davao and stayed with a certain "Ate Belen (Belen)"
who worked in a prominent nightspot in Manila. Elsie would oftentimes
accompany Belen to work. On one occasion, Elsie got acquainted with
respondent, Jesus S. Lucas, at Belen’s workplace, and an intimate relationship
developed between the two. Elsie eventually got pregnant and, on March 11,
1969, she gave birth to petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas. The name of petitioner’s
father was not stated in petitioner’s certificate of live birth. However, Elsie later
on told petitioner that his father is respondent.
On August 1, 1969, petitioner was baptized at San Isidro Parish, Taft Avenue,
Pasay City. Respondent allegedly extended financial support to Elsie and
petitioner for a period of about two years. When the relationship of Elsie and
respondent ended, Elsie refused to accept respondent’s offer of support and
decided to raise petitioner on her own. While petitioner was growing up, Elsie
made several attempts to introduce petitioner to respondent, but all attempts
were in vain.
On July 30, 2008, the RTC, issued an Order dismissing the case. The court
remarked that, based on the case of Herrera v. Alba, there are four significant
procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which the parties have to
face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and
physical resemblance between the putative father and the child.
On MR, the RTC reversed its earlier ruling. Among others, the court also
dismissed respondent’s arguments that there is no basis for the taking of DNA
test, and that jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA
evidence. It noted that the new Rule on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of
DNA testing, whether at the court’s instance or upon application of any person
who has legal interest in the matter in litigation.
ISSUE:
WON the petition to establish illegitimate filiation with motion for submission of
parties to DNA testing should be granted? YES
HELD:
The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural
aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been
widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case.
A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when
the parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of
evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings,
when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed.
112
The CA’s observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case—the result would only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a
first procedural aspect in a paternity case—is therefore misplaced. A prima DNA testing.
facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere allegations in the
initiatory pleading.
Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss the lack of a prima
facie case vis-à-vis the motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet,
been presented by petitioner. More essentially, it is premature to discuss
whether, under the circumstances, a DNA testing order is warranted
considering that no such order has yet been issued by the trial court. In fact,
the latter has just set the said case for hearing.
At any rate, the CA’s view that it would be dangerous to allow a DNA testing
without corroborative proof is well taken and deserves the Court’s attention.
In light of this observation, we find that there is a need to supplement the Rule
on DNA Evidence to aid the courts in resolving motions for DNA testing order,
particularly in paternity and other filiation cases. We, thus, address the question
of whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA
testing order.
The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to:
(1) Guide the Bench and the Bar for the introduction and use of
DNA evidence in the judicial system.
(2) It provides the "prescribed parameters on the requisite
elements for reliability and validity (i.e., the proper
procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory reports, etc.),
the possible sources of error, the available objections to the
admission of DNA test results as evidence as well as the
probative value of DNA evidence."
(3) It seeks "to ensure that the evidence gathered, using
various methods of DNA analysis, is utilized effectively and
properly, [and] shall not be misused and/or abused and,
more importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA
analysis serves justice and protects, rather than prejudice
the public.
This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order,
at the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit
or proceeding is commenced.
To warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause
hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish
a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or "good cause" for
the holding of the test.
Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must
present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.
Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing
order remains discretionary upon the court. The court may, for example,
consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is
already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test
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145. PEOPLE vs. QUITORIANIO
GR No.: 118852
January 20, 1997

FACTS:
Private complainant Edna P. Pergis testified that in the evening of December
24, 1992, she was raped by Quitoriano while she was in the kitchen located at
the back of their house in Barangay Pakaskasan, Torrijos, Marinduque.

Thereafter, accused-appellant warned her not to tell anybody about the

incident, or else, he would kill her. Private complainant kept the incident to
herself. However, in June 1993, her aunt, Teresa Pergis, discovered that she
was pregnant. Thus, private complainant was forced to tell her aunt and her
parents about the sexual assault committed against her by accused-appellant
on December 24, 1992.

On August 2, 1993, private complainant filed a complaint for rape against

accused-appellant. Private complainant gave birth on October 31, 1993.

Quitoriano alleged that since private complainant gave birth more than ten
months after the alleged rape; therefore, the child could not have been his.

ISSUE:
WON the child could have been the accused’s child? YES

HELD:
The fact that private complainant gave birth more than ten months after the
alleged rape does not discredit her testimony.

Dr. Honesto Marquez, a physician from the Marinduque Provincial Hospital,

explained that the normal gestation period is 40 weeks or 280 days, but it can
also extend beyond 40 weeks if the woman is having her first pregnancy.

It is undisputed that the child delivered by private complainant on October 31,

1993 was her first.

Hence, it is not impossible that the child was conceived in December, 1992,
the date of the alleged rape.

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- Newt Gingrich
146. JOANIE SURPOSA UY vs. JOSE NGO CHUA (1) The civil status of persons;
G.R. No. 183965 (2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
September 18, 2009 (3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
FACTS: (5) The jurisdiction of courts;
Petitioner Joanie Surposa Uy filed on 27 October 2003 before the RTC a (6) Future legitime
Petition1 for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation against respondent.
Advincula v. Advincula has a factual background closely similar to the one at
Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that respondent, who was then married, had bar. Manuela Advincula (Manuela) filed, before the Court of First Instance (CFI)
an illicit relationship with Irene Surposa (Irene). Respondent and Irene had two of Iloilo, Civil Case No. 3553 for acknowledgment and support, against Manuel
children, namely, petitioner and her brother, Allan. Advincula (Manuel). On motion of both parties, said case was dismissed. Not
very long after, Manuela again instituted, before the same court, Civil Case No.
Respondent attended to Irene when the latter was giving birth to petitioner on 5659 for acknowledgment and support, against Manuel. This Court declared
27 April 1959, and instructed that petitioner’s birth certificate be filled out with that although Civil Case No. 3553 ended in a compromise, it did not bar the
the following names: "ALFREDO F. SURPOSA" as father and "IRENE subsequent filing by Manuela of Civil Case No. 5659, asking for the same relief
DUCAY" as mother. Actually, Alfredo F. Surposa was the name of Irene’s from Manuel. Civil Case No. 3553 was an action for acknowledgement,
father, and Ducay was the maiden surname of Irene’s mother. affecting a person’s civil status, which cannot be the subject of compromise.

Respondent financially supported petitioner and Allan. Respondent had
consistently and regularly given petitioner allowances before she got married.
He also provided her with employment.
When petitioner was still in high school, respondent required her to work at the
Cebu Liberty Lumber, a firm owned by his family. She was later on able to work
at the Gaisano- Borromeo Branch through respondent’s efforts.
Petitioner and Allan were introduced to each other and became known in the
Chinese community as respondent’s illegitimate children. During petitioner’s
wedding, respondent sent his brother Catalino Chua (Catalino) as his
representative, and it was the latter who acted as father of the bride.
Respondent’s relatives even attended the baptism of petitioner’s daughter
It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a child
cannot be compromised. Public policy demands that there be no compromise
on the status and filiation of a child. Paternity and filiation or the lack of the
same, is a relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the Court
to declare its existence or absence. stablished, and it is for the Court to declare
its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.
Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated 18
February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests
no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The void
agreement cannot be rendered operative even by the parties' alleged
performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations.

It turned out that prior to instituting Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB on 27

October 2003, petitioner had already filed a similar Petition for the issuance of
a decree of illegitimate affiliation against respondent. Petitioner and
respondent eventually entered into a Compromise Agreement in Special
Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, which was approved by RTC-Branch 9 in a
Decision6 dated 21 February 2000. The decision reads among others:

Petitioner JOANIE SURPOSA UY declares, admits and

acknowledges that there is no blood relationship or filiation
between petitioner and her brother Allan on one hand and [herein
respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA on the other. This declaration,
admission or acknowledgement is concurred with petitioner’s
brother Allan, who although not a party to the case, hereby affixes
his signature to this pleading and also abides by the declaration
herein.

ISSUE:
WON Respondent can make use of the compromise agreement dated Feb. 21,
2000 to prove that there is no filiation between him and the Petitioner? NO

HELD:
ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:

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147. MONTEFALCON vs. RONNIE S. VASQUEZ
GR No. 165016
June 17, 2008

FACTS:
Vasquez allegedly also refused to give him regular school allowance despite
repeated demands. Petitioner Dolores added that she and Vasquez are not
legally married, and that Vasquez has his own family.

Vasquez was declared in default for failure to answer the service of summons
(substituted). The court ordered Vasquez to acknowledge Laurence and to pay
P 5000 monthly.

In the same year, Vasquez surfaced. He filed notice of appeal to which

petitioners opposed.

The appeal was granted by the court. Before the appellate court, he argued
that the trial court erred in trying and deciding the case as it “never” acquired
jurisdiction over his person, as well as in awarding P5,000-per-month support,
which was allegedly “excessive and exorbitant.” The appellate court granted
Vasquez’s contention

ISSUE:
Whether he is obliged to give support to co-petitioner Laurence. YES

HELD:
Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines mandates that illegitimate
filiation may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children.

Under Article 172, appearing in the civil register or a final order; or (2) by
admission of filiation in a public document or private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned; or in default of these two, by open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child or by any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Laurence’s record of birth is an authentic, relevant and admissible piece of

evidence to prove paternity and filiation.

Vasquez did not deny that Laurence is his child with Dolores. He signed as
father in Laurence’s certificate of live birth, a public document. He supplied the
data entered in it. Thus, it is a competent evidence of filiation as he had a hand
in its preparation.

In fact, if the child had been recognized by any of the modes in the first
paragraph of Article 172, there is no further need to file any action for
acknowledgment because any of said modes is by itself a consummated act.
As filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation.
Petitioners were able to prove that.

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148. HEIRS OF MARAMAG vs. EVA VERNA DE GUZMAN
MARAMAG
G.R. No. 181132
June 5, 2009
FACTS:
The case stems from a petition filed against respondents with the RTC for
revocation and/or reduction of insurance proceeds for being void and/or
inofficious.
The petition alleged that:
(1) petitioners were the legitimate wife and children of Loreto
Maramag, while respondents were Loreto’s illegitimate
family;
(2) Eva de Guzman Maramag was a concubine of Loreto and a
suspect in the killing of the latter, thus, she is disqualified to
receive any proceeds from his insurance policies from
Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. and Great Pacific Life
Assurance Corporation
(3) the illegitimate children of Loreto—Odessa, Karl Brian, and
Trisha Angelie—were entitled only to one-half of the legitime
of the legitimate children, thus, the proceeds released to
Odessa and those to be released to Karl Brian and Trisha
Angelie were inofficious and should be reduced; and
(4) petitioners could not be deprived of their legitimes, which
should be satisfied first.
Insular admitted that Loreto misrepresented Eva as his legitimate wife and
Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie as his legitimate children, and that they
filed their claims for the insurance proceeds of the insurance policies; that when
it ascertained that Eva was not the legal wife of Loreto, it disqualified her as a
beneficiary and divided the proceeds among Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha
Angelie, as the remaining designated beneficiaries; and that it released
Odessa’s share as she was of age, but withheld the release of the shares of
minors Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie pending submission of letters of
guardianship.
Insular alleged that the complaint or petition failed to state a cause of action
insofar as it sought to declare as void the designation of Eva as beneficiary,
because Loreto revoked her designation as such in Policy No. A001544070
and it disqualified her in Policy No. A001693029; and insofar as it sought to
declare as inofficious the shares of Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie,
considering that no settlement of Loreto’s estate had been filed nor had the
respective shares of the heirs been determined.
Insular further claimed that it was bound to honor the insurance policies
designating the children of Loreto with Eva as beneficiaries pursuant to Section
53 of the Insurance Code.
Grepalife alleged that Eva was not designated as an insurance policy
beneficiary; that the claims filed by Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie
were denied because Loreto was ineligible for insurance due to a
misrepresentation in his application form that he was born on December 10,
1936 and, thus, not more than 65 years old when he signed it in September
116
2001; that the case was premature, there being no claim filed by the legitimate
family of Loreto; and that the law on succession does not apply where the
designation of insurance beneficiaries is clear.
ISSUE:
Whether or not illegitimate children can be beneficiaries in an insurance
contract. YES
HELD:
Section 53 of the Insurance Code states that the insurance proceeds shall be
applied exclusively to the proper interest of the person in whose name or for
whose benefit it is made unless otherwise specified in the policy.
Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only persons entitled to claim the
insurance proceeds are either the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the
insured is already deceased, upon the maturation of the policy.
The exception to this rule is a situation where the insurance contract was
intended to benefit third persons who are not parties to the same in the form of
favorable stipulations or indemnity. In such a case, third parties may directly
sue and claim from the insurer.
Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular and
Grepalife and, thus, are not entitled to the proceeds thereof. Accordingly,
respondents Insular and Grepalife have no legal obligation to turn over the
insurance proceeds to petitioners.
The revocation of Eva as a beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification as
such in another are of no moment considering that the designation of the
illegitimate children as beneficiaries in Loreto’s insurance policies remains
valid.
Because no legal proscription exists in naming as beneficiaries the children of
illicit relationships by the insured, the shares of Eva in the insurance proceeds,
whether forfeited by the court in view of the prohibition on donations under
Article 739 of the Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons based
on the insurance contracts, must be awarded to the said illegitimate children,
the designated beneficiaries, to the exclusion of petitioners.
It is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary,
or when the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the
proceeds, that the insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit
of the estate of the insured.
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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
149. DE LA CRUZ vs. GARCIA
G.R. No. 177728
FACTS:
Petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-year old Christian
Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage. They resided in the house of Dominiques
parents Domingo B. Aquino and Raquel Sto. Tomas Aquino at Pulang-lupa,
Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal.
On September 4, 2005, Dominique died. After almost two months, or on
November 2, 2005, Jenie, who continued to live with Dominiques parents, gave
birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child Christian Dela Cruz Aquino at the
Antipolo Doctors Hospital, Antipolo City.
Jenie applied for registration of the child’s birth, using Dominiques surname
Aquino, with the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of
which she submitted the child’s Certificate of Live Birth, Affidavit to Use the
Surname of the Father (AUSF) which she had executed and signed, and
Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by Dominiques father Domingo Butch
Aquino. Both affidavits attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime of Dominique,
he had continuously acknowledged his yet unborn child, and that his paternity
had never been questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a document entitled
AUTOBIOGRAPHY which Dominique, during his lifetime, wrote in his own
handwriting, the pertinent portions of which read:
AUTOBIOGRAPHY
IM CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE STO. TOMAS
AQUINO, 19 YEARS OF AGE TURNING 20 THIS
COMING OCTOBER 31, 2005. I RESIDE AT
PULANG-LUPA STREET BRGY. DULUMBAYAN,
TERESA, RIZAL. I AM THE YOUNGEST IN OUR
FAMILY. I HAVE ONE BROTHER NAMED JOSEPH
BUTCH STO. TOMAS AQUINO. MY FATHERS
NAME IS DOMINGO BUTCH AQUINO AND MY
MOTHERS NAME IS RAQUEL STO. TOMAS
AQUINO. x x x.
HELD:
A father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument
must affix his signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family
Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series of 2004, merely articulated
such requirement; it did not unduly expand the import of Article 176 as claimed
by petitioners.
In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that
Dominiques Autobiography, though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the
requirement of the law.
First, Dominique died about two months prior to the child’s birth. Second, the
relevant matters in the Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by
Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie
proffered.
Third, Jennies testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of
Dominiques father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch
Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the
questioned recognition of the child. These circumstances indicating
Dominiques paternity of the child give life to his statements in his
Autobiography that JENIE DELA CRUZ is MY WIFE as WE FELL IN LOVE
WITH EACH OTHER and NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE
LIVE TOGETHER.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in
Dominiques Autobiography have been made and written by him. Taken
together with the other relevant facts extant herein that Dominique, during his
lifetime, and Jenie were living together as common-law spouses for several
months in 2005 at his parents’ house in Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa,
Rizal; she was pregnant when Dominique died on September 4, 2005; and
about two months after his death, Jenie gave birth to the child they sufficiently
establish that the child of Jenie is Dominiques.
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the
following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the
acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an
admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:

AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED JENIE DELA 1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of
CRUZ. WE MET EACH OTHER IN OUR evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict
HOMETOWN, TEREZA RIZAL. AT FIRST WE compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by
BECAME GOOD FRIENDS, THEN WE FELL IN the acknowledging parent; and
LOVE WITH EACH OTHER, THEN WE BECAME
GOOD COUPLES. AND AS OF NOW SHE IS 2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other
PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of
IN OUR HOUSE NOW. THAT’S ALL. filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by
the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such
The City registrar denied the application for registration of the child’s name on other evidence.
the ground that the father failed to acknowledge his paternity.

ISSUE:
WON an unsigned autobiography is sufficient to prove that the father
acknowledged the paternity of the illegitimate child?

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
150. UY vs. CHUA
G.R. No. 183965
FACTS:
Petitioner Joanie Surposa Uy filed on 27 October 2003 before the RTC a
Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation against respondent.
The Complaint was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB, assigned
to RTC-Branch 24.
Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that respondent, who was then married, had
an illicit relationship with Irene Surposa (Irene). Respondent and Irene had two
children, namely, petitioner and her brother, Allan. Respondent attended to
Irene when the latter was giving birth to petitioner on 27 April 1959, and
instructed that petitioners birth certificate be filled out with the following names:
ALFREDO F. SURPOSA as father and IRENE DUCAY as mother. Actually,
Alfredo F. Surposa was the name of Irene’s father, and Ducay was the maiden
surname of Irene’s mother. Respondent financially supported petitioner and
Allan. Respondent had consistently and regularly given petitioner allowances
before she got married. He also provided her with employment. When
petitioner was still in high school, respondent required her to work at the Cebu
Liberty Lumber, a firm owned by his family. She was later on able to work at
the Gaisano- Borromeo Branch through respondents efforts. Petitioner and
Allan were introduced to each other and became known in the Chinese
community as respondent’s illegitimate children. During petitioners wedding,
respondent sent his brother Catalino Chua as his representative, and it was
the latter who acted as father of the bride. Respondent’s relatives even
attended the baptism of petitioner’s daughter.
In his Answer to the Complaint, filed on 9 December 2003, respondent denied
that he had an illicit relationship with Irene, and that petitioner was his daughter.
Hearings then ensued during which petitioner testified that respondent was the
only father she knew; that he took care of all her needs until she finished her
college education; and that he came to visit her on special family occasions.
She also presented documentary evidence to prove her claim of illegitimate
filiation. Subsequently, on 27 March 2008, respondent filed a Demurrer to
Evidence on the ground that the Decision dated 21 February 2000 of RTC-
Branch 9 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB had already been barred by res
judicata in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before RTC-Branch 24.
It turned out that prior to instituting Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB on 27
October 2003, petitioner had already filed a similar Petition for the issuance of
a decree of illegitimate affiliation against respondent. It was docketed as
Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, assigned to RTC-Branch 9. Petitioner and
respondent eventually entered into a Compromise Agreement in Special
Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, which was approved by RTC-Branch 9 in a
Decision dated 21 February 2000. The full contents of said Decision reads:
Under consideration is a Compromise Agreement filed by the parties on
February 18, 2000, praying that judgment be rendered in accordance
therewith, the terms and conditions of which follows:
1. Petitioner JOANIE SURPOSA UY declares, admits and
acknowledges that there is no blood relationship or filiation
between petitioner and her brother Allan on one hand and
JOSE NGO CHUA on the other. This declaration, admission
118
or acknowledgement is concurred with petitioner’s brother must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and public
Allan, who although not a party to the case, hereby affixes order. Any compromise agreement that is contrary to law or public policy is
his signature to this pleading and also abides by the null and void, and vests no rights in and holds no obligation for any party. It
declaration herein. produces no legal effect at all.
2. As a gesture of goodwill and by way of settling petitioner In connection with the foregoing, the Court calls attention to Article 2035 of the
and her brothers (Allan) civil, monetary and similar claims Civil Code, which states:
but without admitting any liability, JOSE NGO CHUA hereby
binds himself to pay the petitioner the sum of P2,000,000.00 ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following
and another (P2,000,000.00) to her brother, ALLAN questions shall be valid:
SURPOSA. Petitioner and her brother hereby acknowledge (1) The civil status of persons;
to have received in full the said compromise amount. (2) The validity of a marriage or a legal
separation;
3. Petitioner and her brother (Allan) hereby declare that they (3) Any ground for legal separation;
have absolutely no more claims, causes of action or (4) Future support;
demands against [respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA, his heirs, (5) The jurisdiction of courts;
successors and assigns and/or against the estate of (6) Future legitime.
Catalino Chua, his heirs, successors and assigns and/or
against all corporations, companies or business enterprises The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent, executed on
including Cebu Liberty Lumber and Joe Lino Realty 18 February 2000 and approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21
Investment and Development Corporation where defendant February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, obviously intended to
JOSE NGO CHUA or CATALINO NGO CHUA may have settle the question of petitioner’s status and filiation, i.e., whether she is an
interest or participation. illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange for petitioner and her brother Allan
acknowledging that they are not the children of respondent, respondent would
4. JOSE NGO CHUA hereby waives all counterclaim or pay petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00 each. Although unmentioned, it was a
counter-demand with respect to the subject matter of the necessary consequence of said Compromise Agreement that petitioner also
present petition. waived away her rights to future support and future legitime as an illegitimate
child of respondent. Evidently, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February
5. Pursuant to the foregoing, petitioner hereby asks for a 2000 between petitioner and respondent is covered by the prohibition under
judgment for the permanent dismissal with prejudice of the Article 2035 of the Civil Code.
captioned petition. [Respondent] also asks for a judgment
permanently dismissing with prejudice his counterclaim.
Finding the said compromise agreement to be in order, the Court hereby
approves the same. Judgment is rendered in accordance with the provisions
of the compromise agreement. The parties are enjoined to comply with their
respective undertakings embodied in the agreement.
ISSUE:
WON the Compromise Agreement entered into between petitioner and
respondent was valid. NO
HELD:
A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. In
Estate of the late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic, the Court pronounced that a
judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata. A judgment based on a
compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits.
It must be emphasized, though, that like any other contract, a compromise
agreement must comply with the requisites in Article 1318 of the Civil Code, to
wit: (a) consent of the contracting parties; (b) object certain that is the subject
matter of the contract; and (c) cause of the obligation that is established. And,
like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a compromise agreement
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- Newt Gingrich
151. MANUNGAS vs. LORETO
G.R. No. 193161
FACTS:
Engracia Manungas was the wife of Florentino Manungas. They had no
children. Instead, they adopted Samuel David Avila on August 12, 1968.
Florentino Manungas died intestate on May 29, 1977, while Avila predeceased
his adoptive mother. Avila was survived by his wife Sarah Abarte Vda. de
Manungas.
Thereafter, Engracia Manungas filed a Motion for Partition of Estate on March
31, 1980 in the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas, of which
she was the administratrix. There, she stated that there are no other legal and
compulsory heirs of Florentino Manungas except for herself, Avila and a
Ramon Manungas whom she acknowledged as the natural son of Florentino
Manungas. Meanwhile, Avilas widow executed a Waiver of Rights and
Participation on October 29, 1980, renouncing her rights over the separate
property of her husband in favor of Engracia Manungas. Thereafter, a Decree
of Final Distribution was issued in the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino
Manungas distributing the properties to Engracia Manungas and Ramon
Manungas, the surviving heirs.
On October 25, 1995, the RTC, Branch 4 in Panabo City, appointed Parreo,
the niece of Engracia Manungas, as the Judicial Guardian of the properties
and person of her incompetent aunt.
Engracia Manungas, through Parreo, then instituted Civil Case No. 5196-96
against the spouses Diosdado Salinas Manungas and Milagros Pacifico for
illegal detainer and damages with the (MTC) in Panabo City. In their answer,
the spouses Salinas claimed that Diosdado is the illegitimate son of Florentino
Manungas. However, the answer was filed beyond the reglementary period
and was not considered by the MTC. Thus, the MTC issued a summary
judgment in favor of Engracia Manungas, ordering the spouses to vacate the
premises and to restore possession to Engracia Manungas. The Decision was
appealed by the spouses Salinas to the RTC of Tagum, Davao City which
affirmed in toto the Decision of the MTC. On appeal to this Court, defendants
petition was denied for having been filed out of time in a Resolution which
became final on April 20, 1998.
Thereafter, on August 7, 1998, Diosdado instituted a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration over the Estate of Engracia Manungas in his favor
before the RTC, Branch 2 in Tagum City, Davao. He alleged that he, being an
illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas, is an heir of Engracia Manungas.
The petition was opposed by Margarita Avila Loreto and Parreo alleging that
Diosdado was incompetent as an administrator of the Estate of Manungas
claiming that he was not a Manungas, that he was not an heir of Engracia
Manungas, he was not a creditor of Engracia Manungas or her estate and that
he was in fact a debtor of the estate having been found liable to Engracia
Manungas for PhP 177,000 by virtue of a Decision issued by the MTC in Civil
Case No. 5196-96. On May 15, 2002, the RTC issued an Order appointing
Parreo as the administrator of the Estate of Manungas.
119
Diosdado filed a Motion for Reconsideration with a Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction.
In his motion, Diosdado argued that Parreos appointment as special
administrator of the Estate of Manungas was by virtue of her being the judicial
guardian of the latter but which relation ceased upon Engracia Manungas
death, concluding that her appointment as special administrator was without
basis. He added that Parreo was not fit to become a special administrator
having already been fined by the court for failing to render a timely accounting
of Engracia Manungas property as her judicial guardian. Diosdado also
reasoned that Parreo is a mere niece, a collateral relative, of Engracia
Manungas, while he is the illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas.
ISSUE:
WON the Court of Appeals erred in giving due course to the Oppositor’s
petition? NO
RULING:
The fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of Florentino Manungas does
not mean that he is entitled or even qualified to become the special
administrator of the Estate of Manungas.
Jurisprudence teaches us that the appointment of a special administrator lies
within the discretion of the court. In Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v.
Lacuata-Gabriel, it was stated that:
It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or
preferred right of certain persons to the appointment of
administrator under Section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory
provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or administrator
under section 653 of Act No. 190, now Section 2, Rule 83, do not
apply to the selection or removal of special administrator. x x x As
the law does not say who shall be appointed as special
administrator and the qualifications the appointee must have, the
judge or court has discretion in the selection of the person to be
appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical
or contrary to reason, justice or equity.
This principle was reiterated in the Ocampo case, where the Court ruled that:
While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of
kin to their deceased parents in their appointment as joint special
administrators, this is not a mandatory requirement for the
appointment. It has long been settled that the selection or removal
of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding
the selection or removal of regular administrators. The probate
court may appoint or remove special administrators based on
grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion,
such that the need to first pass upon and resolve the issues of
fitness or unfitness and the application of the order of preference
under Section 6 of Rule 78, as would be proper in the case of a
regular administrator, do not obtain. As long as the discretion is
exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity,
justice, and legal principles, interference by higher courts is
unwarranted.
Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
While the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a special
administrator of the estate, such discretion must be exercised with reason,
guided by the directives of equity, justice and legal principles. It may, therefore,
not be remiss to reiterate that the role of a special administrator is to preserve
the estate until a regular administrator is appointed. As stated in Sec. 2, Rule
80 of the Rules:
Section 2. Powers and duties of special
administrator. Such special administrator shall take
possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights,
credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve the
same for the executors or administrator afterwards
appointed, and for that purpose may commence and
maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such
perishable and other property as the court orders
sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay
any debts of the deceased unless so ordered by the
court.
Given this duty on the part of the special administrator, it would, therefore, be
prudent and reasonable to appoint someone interested in preserving the estate
for its eventual distribution to the heirs. Such choice would ensure that such
person would not expose the estate to losses that would effectively diminish
his or her share. While the court may use its discretion and depart from such
reasoning, still, there is no logical reason to appoint a person who is a debtor
of the estate and otherwise a stranger to the deceased. To do so would be
tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.
Hence, the CA ruled that the trial court erred in issuing the November 4, 2002
Order, acting with grave abuse of discretion in appointing Diosdado as the
special administrator of Engracia Manungas estate:
In any case, the trial court erred in revoking the appointment of
Florencia Avila Parreo as Special Administrator on the ground that
it found merit in Diosdados contention that he is the illegitimate
child of the late Florentino Manangus. The evidence on record
shows that Diosdado is not related to the late Engracia and so he
is not interested in preserving the latter’s estate. On the other
hand, Florencia, who is a former Judicial guardian of Engracia
when she was still alive and who is also the niece of the latter, is
interested in protecting and preserving the estate of her late aunt
Engracia, as by doing so she would reap the benefit of a wise
administration of the decedents estate. Hence, the Order of the
lower court revoking the appointment of Florencia Avila Parreo as
special administrator constitutes not only a reversible error, but
also a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. In the instant case, the lower court exercised its power
in a despotic, arbitrary or capricious manner, as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
To reiterate, the subject of the intestate proceedings is the estate of Engracia
Manungas. It must be remembered that the estate of Florentino Manungas was
already the subject of intestate proceedings that have long been terminated
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- Newt Gingrich
with the proceeds distributed to the heirs with the issuance of a Decree of Final
Distribution. With the termination of the intestate estate proceedings of
Florentino Manungas, Diosdado, as an illegitimate heir of Florentino
Manungas, is still not an heir of Engracia Manungas and is not entitled to
receive any part of the Estate of Manungas. In fact, Diosdado is a debtor of the
estate and would have no interest in preserving its value. There is no reason
to appoint him as its special administrator. The trial court acted with grave
abuse of discretion in appointing Diosdado as special administrator of the
Estate of Manungas. The CA correctly set aside the November 4, 2002 Order
of the RTC.

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- Newt Gingrich
152. GOTARDO vs. BULING
G.R. 165166 The petitioner’s denial cannot overcome the respondent’s clear and categorical
August 15, 2012 assertions. Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of
obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or
SUMMARY: illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance,
Single mother seeking child support through establishing filiation with ex- dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in
fiancée. keeping with the financial capacity of the family.

FACTS:
In 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the RTC for
compulsory recognition and support pendente lite, claiming that the petitioner
is the father of her child Gliffze, whose imputed paternity the petitioner denied.
Trial ensued. She met the petitioner in 1992 in a bank where they both worked.
They became sweethearts in the last week of January 1993. Sometime in
September 1993, the petitioner started intimate sexual relations with the
respondent in the former’s rented room in the boarding house managed by
Rodulfo, the respondent’s uncle.

The sexual encounters occurred twice a month and became more frequent in
June 1994; eventually, on August 8, 1994, the respondent found out that she
was pregnant. When told, the petitioner was happy and made plans to marry
the respondent but eventually backed out. The respondent gave birth to their
son Gliffze on March 9, 1995. When the petitioner did not show up and failed
to provide support to Gliffze, the respondent sent him a letter on demanding
recognition of and support for their child. When the petitioner did not answer
the demand, the respondent filed her complaint for compulsory recognition and
support pendente lite. The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for
himself. He denied the imputed paternity, claiming that he first had sexual
contact with the respondent in the first week of August 1994 and she could not
have been pregnant for 3 months when he was informed of the pregnancy on
September 1994. During the pendency of the case, the RTC, on the
respondent’s motion, granted a P2,000.00 monthly child support, retroactive
from March 1995. RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
The CA consequently set aside the RTC decision and ordered the petitioner to
recognize his minor son Gliffze. It also reinstated the RTC order for monthly
child support. The petitioner argues that the CA committed a reversible error in
rejecting the RTC’s ruling, and that the evidence on record is insufficient to
prove paternity.

ISSUE:
WON the CA committed a reversible error when it set aside the RTC’s findings
and ordered the petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to his minor
son?

HELD:
The Court DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the ruling of the CA, sustaining
the award of P2,000.00 monthly child support, not finding any reversible error
in the CA’s ruling. In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case
that the petitioner is the putative father of Gliffze through testimony that she
had been sexually involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her
conception. Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the
respondent had intimate relationship. However, the petitioner failed to
substantiate his allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His
allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence for lack of evidentiary support.

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
153. FRANCISCO L. JISON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
This is a case filed by one Monina Jison for recognition as an illegitimate child
of Francisco Jison who is married to Lilia Lopez Jison. MONINA alleged that
she is the daughter of FRANCISCO who impregnated her mother Esperanza
F. Amolar, who was then employed as the nanny of FRANCISCO's daughter.
She claims that she has openly and continuously possessed the status of an
illegitimate child of Francisco and that Francisco had also openly and
continuously recognized her as such. The trial court categorized Monina’s
many evidences as hearsay evidence, incredulous evidence, or self-serving
evidence and ruled against Monina while the Court of Appeals decided in favor
of Monina and declared her to be the illegitimate daughter of Francisco. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the testimonies of Monina’s witnesses were
sufficient to establish MONINA's filiation.

ISSUE:
WON Monina successfully established her filiation. YES

HELD:
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as MONINA's,
may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as that of
legitimate children. The Supreme Court sustained the findings of the CA that
Monina was able to prove her illegitimate filiation. For the success of an action
to establish illegitimate filiation under Article 172 par. 2, a "high standard of
proof" is required. To prove open and continuous possession of the status of
an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the
permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by
continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which
cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that
they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to
have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not
accidentally, but continuously. By "continuous" is meant uninterrupted and
consistent, but does not require any particular length of time.

In deciding paternity suits, the issue of whether sexual intercourse actually

occurred inevitably redounds to the victim's or mother's word, as against the
accused's or putative father's protestations. In the instant case, MONINA's
mother could no longer testify as to the fact of intercourse, as she had already
passed away. But the fact of Monina’s birth and her parentage may be
established by evidence other than the testimony of her mother.

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154. RIVERO vs. CA
G.R. No. 141273

FACTS:
In behalf of her minor child, Benedick Arevalo, her mother filed a complaint
against defendants for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate child of their
deceased father. During trial, Mary Jane Dy-Chiao De Guzman, one of the
sisters entered a compromised agreement with plaintiff whereby she is
acknowledging the petitioner as the illegitimate son of her father and pay
petitioner P6M as a share in the estate of their deceased father.

RTC granted the compromise agreement. Meanwhile, the Dy Chiao Brothers

represented by their uncle filed for annulment of judgment and TRO for the writ
of execution of judgment and motion to dismiss. CA directed Mary Jane on the
other hand to file a comment on the opposition of her uncle.

In her reply, she questioned assailed decision of RTC since the illegitimate
filiation of Benedick could not be the subject of a compromise agreement. She
further alleged that the parties thereunder did not recognize the validity of the
compromise agreement, as in fact she and the petitioners were exploring the
possibility of modifying their extrajudicial settlement.CA ruled in favor of the
defendants, hence a petition.

ISSUE:
W/N the compromise regarding filiation is valid? NO

HELD:
The ruling of RTC based on the compromise agreement executed by Mary
Jane is null and void. Article 2035(1) of the New Civil Code provides that no
compromise upon the civil status of persons shall be valid. As such, paternity
and filiation, or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially
established, and it is for the court to determine its existence or absence. It
cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Such recognition by Mary
Jane, however, is ineffectual, because under the law, the recognition must be
made personally by the putative parent and not by any brother, sister or
relative.

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155. IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA
DELGADO vs. HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE
DAMIAN
FACTS:
This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia
and Josefa Delgado. The main issue in this case is relatively simple: who,
between petitioners and respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents.
However, it is attended by several collateral issues that complicate its
resolution.
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be
divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of
her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and
grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his
sisters, his nephews and nieces, his illegitimate child, and the de facto adopted
child10 (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children
of their own, they took into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia
and Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the couple, were
what was known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan.
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an
illegitimate child, he intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo
Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his
daughter, his own flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and continuous
possession of that status from her birth in 1920 until her father’s demise. In
fact, Josefa Delgado’s obituary which was prepared by Guillermo Rustia,
named the intervenor-respondent as one of their children. Also, her report card
from the University of Santo Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as her
parent/guardian.
Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no
interest in the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly
acknowledged as an illegitimate child. They contend that her right to
compulsory acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo died in 1974 and
that she cannot claim voluntary acknowledgement since the documents she
presented were not the authentic writings prescribed by the new Civil Code.
More than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a
petition for the adoption of their ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He stated
under oath "[t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural
children or natural children by legal fiction." The petition was overtaken by his
death on February 28, 1974.
ISSUE:
WON Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia and therefore
entitled to successional rights?
HELD:
YES, however her claim to be acknowledged as an illegitimate child has
already prescribed.
124
Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the notice of death of
be entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or Josefa Delgado which was published in the Sunday Times on September 10,
recognition of paternity. She, however, claimed the status of an acknowledged 1972, that published obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by
illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the death of the latter on the law. What could have been admitted as an authentic writing was the original
February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new Civil Code that was in manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and
effect. signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the obituary. The failure to present
the original signed manuscript was fatal to intervenor’s claim.
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate
children absolutely had no hereditary rights. This draconian edict was, The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia,
however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code which granted certain who was never adopted in accordance with law. Although a petition for her
successional rights to illegitimate children but only on condition that they were adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to fruition and was
first recognized or acknowledged by the parent. dismissed upon the latter’s death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the deceased spouses
Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary. Recognition and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato.
is compulsory in any of the following cases:
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created] between two
period of the offense coincides more or less with that of persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and
the conception; filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this
child of the alleged father (or mother) by the direct acts jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To
of the latter or of his family; establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out,
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never
mother cohabited with the supposed father; presumed, but must be affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its
(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that existence.
the defendant is his father.
Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of
On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record Guillermo Rustia, namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-
of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic ampunan Guillermina Rustia, are not lawful heirs of the decedent. Under Article
writing. 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed
Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo
recognition through the open and continuous possession of the status of an Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters, nieces and
illegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition through authentic writing. nephews.
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate
child from her birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia.
However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which
she could have compelled acknowledgment through the courts. Furthermore,
any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the
lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative parent. On the death of
either, the action for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed. In this case,
intervenor Guillerma’s right to claim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed
upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillerma’s second ground) must likewise
fail. An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood
as a genuine or indubitable writing of the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia).
This includes a public instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to
be his. Did intervenor’s report card from the University of Santo Tomas and
Josefa Delgado’s obituary prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic
writings under the new Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card of
intervenor Guillerma did not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia. The fact
that his name appears there as intervenor’s parent/guardian holds no weight
since he had no participation in its preparation. Similarly, while witnesses
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156. HEIRS OF TEOFILO GABATAN vs. CA and LOURDES EVERO
PACANA
FACTS:
Subject of the present controversy is a 1.1062 hectare parcel of land situated
at Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. This lot was declared for taxation
in the name of Juan Gabatan. In the complaint before the RTC, respondent
alleged that she is the sole owner of Lot 3095 C-5, having inherited the same
from her deceased mother, Hermogena. Respondent further claimed that her
mother, Hermogena, is the only child of Juan Gabatan and his wife, Laureana
Clarito.
Petitioners denied that respondent’s mother Hermogena was the daughter of
Juan Gabatan with Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena or respondent is the
rightful heir of Juan Gabatan. Petitioners maintained that Juan Gabatan died
single in 1934 and without any issue and that Juan was survived by one brother
and two sisters, namely: Teofilo, Macaria and Justa.
ISSUE:
WON respondent is a lawful heir? NO
HELD:
Evidence presented: Certificate of Live Birth of plaintiff herein, Lourdes Evero
Pacana, which are Exhibit A for the plaintiff and Exhibit 1 for the defendants.
To begin with, Exhibit A, as the trial court noted, was an original typewritten
document, not a mere photocopy or facsimile. It uses a form of 1950s vintage,
but this Court is unable to concur in the trial courts finding that Exhibit 1 was of
a later vintage than Exhibit A which was one of the trial courts bases for
doubting the authenticity of Exhibit 1. On the contrary, the printed notation on
the upper left hand corner of Exhibit 1 states Municipal Form No. 102 which
makes it an older form than Exhibit A. Thus, the trial courts finding regarding
which form was of more recent vintage was manifestly contradicted by the
evidence on record. No actual signature appears on Exhibit A except that of a
certain Maximo P. Noriga, Deputy Local Civil Registrar of the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City, who purportedly certified on July 6,
1977 that Exhibit A was a true copy of respondent’s birth certificate. The names
of the attendant at birth (Petra Sambaan) and the local civil registrar (J.L.
Rivera) in 1950 were typewritten with the notation (Sgd.) also merely
typewritten beside their names. The words A certified true copy: July 6, 1977
above the signature of Maximo P. Noriga on Exhibit A appear to be inscribed
by the same typewriter as the very entries in Exhibit A. It would seem that
Exhibit A and the information stated therein were prepared and entered only in
1977. Significantly, Maximo P. Noriga was never presented as a witness to
identify Exhibit A. Said document and the signature of Maximo P. Noriga
therein were identified by respondent herself whose self-serving testimony
cannot be deemed sufficient authentication of her birth certificate.
Even assuming purely for the sake of argument that the birth certificate
presented by respondent (Exhibit A) is a reliable document, the same on its
face is insufficient to prove respondents filiation to her alleged grandfather,
Juan Gabatan. All that Exhibit A, if it had been credible and authentic, would
have proven was that respondent’s mother was a certain Hermogena Clarito
Gabatan. It does not prove that same Hermogena Clarito Gabatan is the
125
daughter of Juan Gabatan. Even the CA held that the conflicting certificates of
live birth of respondent submitted by the parties only proved the filiation of
respondent to Hermogena.
It was absolutely crucial to respondent’s cause of action that she convincingly
proves the filiation of her mother to Juan Gabatan. To reiterate, to prove the
relationship of respondents mother to Juan Gabatan, our laws dictate that the
best evidence of such familial tie was the record of birth appearing in the Civil
Register, or an authentic document or a final judgment. In the absence of
these, respondent should have presented proof that her mother enjoyed the
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Only in the absence
of these two classes of evidence is the respondent allowed to present other
proof admissible under the Rules of Court of her mother’s relationship to Juan
Gabatan.
However, respondents mothers (Hermogenas) birth certificate, which would
have been the best evidence of Hermogenas relationship to Juan Gabatan,
was never offered as evidence at the RTC. Neither did respondent present any
authentic document or final judgment categorically evidencing Hermogenas
relationship to Juan Gabatan.
Respondent relied on the testimony of her witnesses, Frisco Lawan, Felicisima
Nagac Pacana and Cecilia Nagac Villareal who testified that they personally
knew Hermogena (respondent’s mother) and/or Juan Gabatan, that they knew
Juan Gabatan was married to Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena was the
child of Juan and Laureana. However, none of these witnesses had personal
knowledge of the fact of marriage of Juan to Laureana or the fact of birth of
Hermogena to Juan and Laureana. They were not yet born or were very young
when Juan supposedly married Laureana or when Hermogena was born and
they all admitted that none of them were present at Juan and Laureanas
wedding or Hermogenas birth. These witnesses based their testimony on what
they had been told by, or heard from, others as young children. Their
testimonies were, in a word, hearsay.
All in all, this Court finds that respondent dismally failed to substantiate, with
convincing, credible and independently verifiable proof, her assertion that she
is the sole heir of Juan Gabatan and thus, entitled to the property under
litigation. Aggravating the weakness of her evidence were the circumstances
that (a) she did not come to court with clean hands for she presented a
tampered/altered, if not outright spurious, copy of her certificate of live birth
and (b) she unreasonably delayed the prosecution of her own cause of action.
If the Court cannot now affirm her claim, respondent has her own self to blame.
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157. JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ vs. RONALD PAUL GRACIA
G.R. No. 177728
July 31, 2009
FACTS:
For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela
Cruz and then 19-year old Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino lived
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Dominique died.
After almost two months, or on November 2, 2005, Jenie, who continued to live
with Dominiques parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child
Christian Dela Cruz Aquino. Jenie applied for registration of the child’s birth,
using Dominiques surname Aquino, with the Office of the City Civil
Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she submitted the
child’s Certificate of Live Birth, Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father
(AUSF) which she had executed and signed, and Affidavit of Acknowledgment
executed by Dominiques father Domingo Butch Aquino. Both affidavits
attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime of Dominique, he had continuously
acknowledged his yet unborn child, and that his paternity had never been
questioned.
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name
against respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City. The
complaint alleged that, inter alia, the denial of registration of the child’s name
is a violation of his right to use the surname of his deceased father
under Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9255, which provides:
Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the
surname and shall be under the parental authority of
their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate
children may use the surname of their father if their
filiation has been expressly recognized by the
father through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register, or when an admission in a public
document or private handwritten instrument is
made by the father. Provided, the father has the right
to institute an action before the regular courts to prove
non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the
legitime of a legitimate child.
Jenie testified on the circumstances of her common-law relationship with
Dominique and affirmed her declarations in her AUSF that during his lifetime,
he had acknowledged his yet unborn child. Trial court dismissed the complaint
for lack of cause of action as the Autobiography was unsigned, citing
paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 (Definition of Terms) of Administrative Order (A.O.)
No. 1, Series of 2004 (the Rules and Regulations Governing the
Implementation of R.A. 9255) which defines private handwritten document
through which a father may acknowledge an illegitimate child as follows:
2.2 Private handwritten instrument an instrument
executed in the handwriting of the father and duly
126
signed by him where he expressly recognizes
paternity to the child.
ISSUE:
WON the unsigned handwritten statement of the deceased father of minor
Christian Dela Cruz can be considered as a recognition of paternity in a private
handwritten instrument within the contemplation of Article 176 of the Family
Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, which entitles the said minor to use his
father’s surname? YES
RULING:
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an illegitimate
child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had previously recognized
him/her as his offspring through an admission made in a pubic of private
handwritten instrument.
Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that there must be a signature
by the putative father in the private handwritten instrument.
The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the
acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an
admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of
evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict
compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed
by the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other
relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of
filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten
by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of
such other evidence.
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the paramount
consideration in resolving questions affecting him. Article 3(1) of the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is
a signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether
undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or
legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall
be a primary consideration.
It is thus the policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation
of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children. The
State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development.
In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the stigma of
dishonor. It is to petitioner minor child’s best interests to allow him to bear the
surname of the now deceased Dominique and enter it in his birth certificate.
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158. JESSE U. LUCAS vs. JESUS S. LUCAS
G.R. No. 190710
June 6, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for
the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the RTC. Jesse alleged that
he is the son of his mother Elsie who got acquainted with respondent, Jesus
S. Lucas in Manila. He also submitted documents which include (a) petitioner’s
certificate of live birth; (b) petitioner’s baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner’s
college diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint Louis University in
Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of Graduation from
the same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from the University of the
Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of several articles from different
newspapers about petitioner, as a musical prodigy.
Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance and Comment
manifesting that the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons
should be served on him. Meanwhile, Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try
and Hear the Case which the RTC found to be sufficient in form and hence set
the case for hearing. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA
testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as
Jesse’s father.
Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and
held that Jesse failed to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects
for a paternity action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba namely,
a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and
physical resemblance between the putative father and the child.
This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC
granted. A new hearing was scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on the
grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant petition is premature
considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. Jesus filed a Motion
for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favor of Jesus, it
noted that Jesse failed to show that the four significant aspects of a traditional
paternity action had been met and held that DNA testing should not be
allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case.
ISSUE:
Whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA
testing order? YES
HELD:
Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis-à-vis the
motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by
petitioner.
The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural
aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been
widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by
these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have
presented their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot
be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to
127
establish filiation has been filed. The CA’s observation that petitioner failed to during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present
establish a prima facie case is therefore misplaced. A prima facie case prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.
is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory
pleading.
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are
aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. It states that
the appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of
any person, who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA
testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon
a showing of the following:
(1) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
(2) The biological sample:
a. was not previously subjected to the type of
DNA testing now requested; or
b. was previously subjected to DNA testing, but
the results may require confirmation for good
reasons;
(3) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(4) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new
information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the
case; and
(5) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may
consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of
the DNA testing.
This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order,
at the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit
or proceeding is commenced. This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing
order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the
said conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must
be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity
or “good cause” for the holding of the test. In these states, a court order
for blood testing is considered a “search,” which, under their Constitutions (as
in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid.
Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was
imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. Courts
in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which
are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a
preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order
compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a
preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for
compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a
reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which
paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily
undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the
court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a
prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order
for blood testing. The same condition precedent should be applied in our
jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus,
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159. CHARLES GOTARDO vs. DIVINA BULING
FACTS:
Charles Gotardo and Divina Buling became a couple in the last week of
January 1993. They started intimate sexual relations sometime in September
1993. By August 1994 Divina found out she was pregnant. The couple made
plans to marry but later on Charles backed out of the wedding plan. Divina filed
a complaint for damages against the petitioner for breach of promise to marry.
This was later on amicably settled.
Divina gave birth to Gliffze on March 1995. Charles failed to show up and
support the child. Divina sent him a demand letter on July 1995 demanding
recognition and support. When Charles did not answer, she filed her complaint
for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite. Charles denied the
imputed paternity.
RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence proving Gliffze’s
filiation. It found the respondent’s testimony inconsistent on the question of
when she had her first sexual contact with the petitioner, i.e., “September 1993”
in her direct testimony while “last week of January 1993” during her cross-
testimony, and her reason for engaging in sexual contact even after she had
refused the petitioner’s initial marriage proposal. It ordered the respondent to
return the amount of support pendente lite erroneously awarded, and to pay P
10,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
CA departed from the RTC’s appreciation of the respondent’s testimony,
concluding that the latter merely made an honest mistake in her understanding
of the questions of the petitioner’s counsel. It noted that the petitioner and the
respondent had sexual relationship even before August 1994; that the
respondent had only one boyfriend, the petitioner, from January 1993 to August
1994; and that the petitioner’s allegation that the respondent had previous
relationships with other men remained unsubstantiated. The CA consequently
set aside the RTC decision and ordered the petitioner to recognize his minor
son Gliffze. It also reinstated the RTC order granting a P 2,000.00 monthly child
support.
may be a “baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which his
name has been entered, common reputation respecting [his] pedigree,
admission by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and other kinds of proof
admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.”
In Herrera v. Alba, we stressed that there are four significant procedural
aspects of a traditional paternity action that parties have to face: a prima facie
case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical
resemblance between the putative father and the child. We explained that a
prima facie case exists if a woman declares — supported by corroborative
proof — that she had sexual relations with the putative father; at this point, the
burden of evidence shifts to the putative father. We explained further that the
two affirmative defenses available to the putative father are: (1) incapability of
sexual relations with the mother due to either physical absence or impotency,
or (2) that the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of
conception.
In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner
is the putative father of Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually
involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her conception.
Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the respondent had
intimate relationship.
On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had sexual encounters
with the respondent, only that it occurred on a much later date than the
respondent asserted, such that it was physically impossible for the respondent
to have been three (3) months pregnant already in September 1994 when he
was informed of the pregnancy. However, the petitioner failed to substantiate
his allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His allegations,
therefore, cannot be given credence for lack of evidentiary support. The
petitioner’s denial cannot overcome the respondent’s clear and categorical
assertions.

ISSUE:
Whether or not CA committed a reversible error in rejecting the RTC
appreciation of the respondent’s testimony, and that the evidence on record is
insufficient to prove paternity? NO

RULING:
The burden of proof in paternity cases is on the person alleging. Divina
established prima facie case against Charles through her testimony,
corroborated by Charles uncle (dorm owner), that she’s only been involved with
one man at the time of conception. Charles did not deny his sexual relations
with her, only that it occurred at a later date.

One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation
in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws. We have held that such other proof of one’s filiation

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128
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160. ANTONIO PERLA vs. MIRASOL BARING and RANDY PERLA Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
G.R. No. 172471 illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
November 12, 2012 evidence as legitimate children. x x x

FACTS: Respondents presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Randy identifying

Respondent Mirasol Baring and her then minor son, Randy filed before the
RTC a Complaint for support against Antonio.
They alleged in said Complaint that Mirasol and Antonio lived together as
common-law spouses for two years. As a result of said cohabitation, Randy
was born on November 11, 1983. However, when Antonio landed a job as
seaman, he abandoned them and failed to give any support to his son.
Respondents thus prayed that Antonio be ordered to support Randy.
In his Answer with Counterclaim, Antonio, who is now married and has a family
of his own, denied having fathered Randy. Although he admitted to having
known Mirasol, he averred that she never became his common-law wife nor
was she treated as such. And since Mirasol had been intimidating and
pestering him as early as 1992 with various suits by insisting that Randy is his
son, Antonio.
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision dated February 26, 2003 ordering
Antonio to support Randy.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals upheld Randy’s illegitimate filiation based on the
certified true copies of his birth certificate and of his baptismal certificate
identifying Antonio as his father.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents failed to establish Randy’s illegitimate filiation to
Antonio? YES
RULING:
Respondents failed to establish Randy’s illegitimate filiation to Antonio.
Antonio as the father. However, said certificate has no probative value to
establish Randy’s filiation to Antonio since the latter had not signed the same.
It is settled that "a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the
putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate." We also cannot
lend credence to Mirasol’s claim that Antonio supplied certain information
through Erlinda. Aside from Antonio’s denial in having any participation in the
preparation of the document as well as the absence of his signature thereon,
respondents did not present Erlinda to confirm that Antonio indeed supplied
certain entries in Randy’s birth certificate. Besides, the several unexplained
discrepancies in Antonio’s personal circumstances as reflected in the subject
birth certificate are manifestations of Antonio’s non-participation in its
preparation. Most important, it was Mirasol who signed as informant thereon
which she confirmed on the witness stand.
Neither does the testimony of Randy establish his illegitimate filiation. That
during their first encounter in 1994 Randy called Antonio "Papa" and kissed his
hand while Antonio hugged him and promised to support him; or that his Aunt
Lelita treated him as a relative and was good to him during his one-week stay
in her place, cannot be considered as indications of Randy’s open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child under the second
paragraph of Article 172(1). "[T]o prove open and continuous possession of the
status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of
the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by
continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which
cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that
they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to
have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not
accidentally, but continuously."

The rules for establishing filiation are found in Articles 172 and 175 of the
Family Code which provide as follows:
Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the
civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in
a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by
the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession
of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws.
Here, the single instance that Antonio allegedly hugged Randy and promised
to support him cannot be considered as proof of continuous possession of the
status of a child. To emphasize, "[t]he father’s conduct towards his son must
be spontaneous and uninterrupted for this ground to exist." Here, except for
that singular occasion in which they met, there are no other acts of Antonio
treating Randy as his son. Neither can Antonio’s paternity be deduced from
how his sister Lelita treated Randy. To this Court, Lelita’s actuations could have
been done due to charity or some other reasons.
All told, it is clear that respondents failed to establish Randy’s illegitimate
filiation to Antonio. Hence, the order for Antonio to support Randy has no basis.
161. (Same as #158)

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162. GRACE M. GRANDE vs. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO
FACTS:
Petitioner Grace Grande and respondent Patricio Antonio for a period of time
lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already
married to someone else.
Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis (on February 8,
1998) and Jerard Patrick (on October 13, 1999). The children were not
expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the
children in the Civil Registry. The parties’ relationship, however, eventually
turned sour, and Grande left for the United States with her two children in May
2007.
This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of
Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody,
Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri,
Cagayan (RTC), appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of
Paternity of the children.
RTC AND CA ruled in favour of the father. Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved
for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the father can compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate
children upon his recognition of their filiation? NO
RULE:
Central to the core issue is the application of Art. 176 of the Family Code,
phrased as follows:
Art. 176. – Illegitimate children shall use the surname
and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity
with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use
the surname of their father if their filiation has been
expressly recognized by their father through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when
an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father.
Provided, the father has the right to institute an action
before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during
his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall
consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition
of the filiation of the two children with the prayer for the correction or change of
the surname of the minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document
acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court15 is enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he wanted more:
a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official
declaration of his children’s surname as Antonio.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother;
hence, respondent’s prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is
given to the mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to the
mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.
Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate children. Is
there a legal basis for the court a quo to order the change of the surname
to that of respondent?
Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit
and unequivocal provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA
9255.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the
surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the
mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname
of their illegitimate children.
The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a person’s
name to his identity, his status in relation to his parents and his successional
rights as a legitimate or illegitimate child. For sure, these matters should not be
taken lightly as to deprive those who may, in any way, be affected by the right
to present evidence in favor of or against such change.
The clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176 rendering
the use of an illegitimate father’s surname discretionary controls, and
illegitimate children are given the choice on the surnames by which they will be
known.

From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an
illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception
provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by
the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by
the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the
father.

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163. PEOPLE vs. RAYMUNDO MAGTIBAY y BACHOCO
G.R. No. 142985
August 6, 2002

FACTS:
That on or about the 15th day of September, 1997, at 8:00 o’clock in the
evening, more or less, in Barangay Sagana, Municipality of Bongabong,
province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd and unchaste design,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
of one RACHELLE RECTO y Rafal, by means of force and threats to kill, to the
irreparable damage of the said Offended Party.

Rachelle’s mother, Gaudiosa Recto, testified that she only came to know about
the rape incident after Dr. Fetalberto required Rachelle to have an x-ray
examination at Bongabong Hospital. The results showed that Rachelle was
pregnant. She also testified that Rachelle refused to tell her about it because
accused-appellant threatened to kill her several times whenever he saw her.

ISSUE:
Can the accused in the crime of rape claim parental authority over the child
who is the result of committing such crime? NO

RULE:
With respect to the acknowledgment and support of the child born out of rape
our recent ruling in People v. Justiniano Glabo states:

Concerning the acknowledgment and support of the offspring of rape, Article

345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of civil liability that may
be imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgment of the
offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in every
case to support the offspring. With the passage of the Family Code, the
classification of acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal
fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the specie of illegitimate children.
Since parental authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon the
mother and considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua
automatically loses parental authority over his children, no "further positive act
is required of the parent as the law itself provides for the child’s status." Hence,
accused-appellant should only be ordered to indemnify and support the victim’s
child. However, the amount and terms of support shall be determined by the
trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance with Article 201 of the
Family Code.

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164. PEOPLE vs. MARLON BARSAGA ABELLA
G.R. No. 177295
January 6, 2010

FACTS:
Sometime on December 1999, in the afternoon, at Barangay San Vicente,
Municipality of Pamplona, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused MARLON BARSAGA
ABELLA, while armed with "Balisong" and under the influence of liquor, by
means of force and intimidation and with lewd design, did then and there
willfully and feloniously enter the house of herein complainant and then and
there have sexual intercourse with AAA, a woman of feeble mind, against her
will to her damage and prejudice. AAA was later on found out to be pregnant
due to the rape incident that happened.

ISSUE:
WON the accused can be compelled to acknowledge the child who is the result
from committing the crime of rape? YES

RULE:
In the case before us, the prosecution has established beyond reasonable
doubt that the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA, a demented
person, through force, threat or intimidation. AAA was psychiatrically evaluated
as an adult woman with the mental age of a 7 to 8-year old child and that she
gave birth to a child despite her mental inability to give her consent to a sexual
relationship. These facts support the allegation of sexual abuse. AAA also
identified without uncertainty the accused-appellant as her attacker and related
distinctly that he forcibly laid her down, held her at knifepoint, and sexually
abused her.

We also accord high respect to the ruling of the trial court, as well as to the
appellate court’s deference thereto, that the accused-appellant was the
biological father of the two-year old daughter of AAA as a result of the rape
incident and in view of their "striking facial similarities and features." The order
to acknowledge and support accused-appellant’s offspring is in accordance
with Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code.

Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of civil
liability that may be imposed on the offender:
a) indemnification,
b) acknowledgment of the offspring, unless the law
should prevent him from so doing, and
c) in every case to support the offspring.

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165. ABADILLA vs. TABILIRAN
249 SCRA 447

FACTS:
Ma. Blyth Abadilla, a Clerk of Court, filed a complaint against Judge Tabiliran
on the grounds of gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption
unbecoming of a judge. With respect to the charge on gross immorality, she
contended that the judge scandalously and publicly cohabited with Priscilla
Baybayan during subsistence of his marriage with Teresita Banzuela. Tabiliran
and Priscilla got married in May 1986. On the other hand, with respect to the
charge on deceitful conduct, petitioner claims that the judge caused his three
illegitimate children with Priscilla be registered as “legitimate” by falsely
executing separate affidavits stating the delayed registration was due to
inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight when in fact, he knew these
children cannot be legally registered as legitimate. The judge averred that 25
years had already elapsed since the disappearance of her wife in 1966 when
he married Priscilla hence the cohabitation was neither bigamous nor immoral.
However, as early as 1970, based on the record, Priscilla had begotten her
three children (1970, 1971 and 1975).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the three children can be considered legitimate? NO

HELD:
The three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered
legitimate since the time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage
between Tabiliran and Teresita. Only natural children can be legitimated.
Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception
of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are
natural.

Under Article 177 of the Family Code, only children conceived and born outside
of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were
not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated.
Reasons for this limitation:
1) The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed;
2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of
successional rights;
3) There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social
mores change;
4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to
adulterous children as it will destroy the sanctity of marriage;
5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry
many years after the birth of the child.

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166. RENATO LAZATIN vs. HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE C.
CAMPOS, JR.
G.R. No. L-43955-56
July 30, 1979
FACTS:
Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin died intestate by his wife, Margarita de Asis, and his
adopted twin daughters, respondent Nora L. de Leon, married to respondent
Bernardo de Leon, and respondent Irma Lazatin, married to Francisco Veloso.
Margarita de Asis, also died, leaving a & holographic will During her lifetime,
Margarita de Asis kept a safety deposit box at the People's Bank and Trust
Company, Roxas Boulevard branch, which either she or respondent Nora L.
de Leon could open. Five days after Margarita's death, respondent Nora L. de
Leon, accompanied by her husband, respondent Bernardo de Leon, opened
the safety deposit box and removed its contents.
Petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara filed a motion to intervene in
the estate of Margarita de Asis as an adopted child, on the basis of an affidavit
executed by Benjamin Lazatin, brother of the deceased Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin,
the petitioner was an "illegitimate son" of Dr. Lazatin and was later adopted by
him.
Respondent court heard petitioner's motion to intervene as an adopted son in
the estate of Margarita de Asis at which hearings petitioner presented no
decree of adoption in his, favor. Instead, petitioner attempted to prove, over
private respondents' objections, that he had recognized the deceased spouses
as his parents who had supported him. Petitioner filed a motion to declare as
established the fact of adoption in view of respondent Nora L. de Leon's refusal
to comply with the orders of respondent court to deposit the items she had
removed from the safety deposit box of Margarita de Asis.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Renato was able to establish his status of being an adopted
child? NO
RULING:
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two
persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and
filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the
procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this
jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To
establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out,
otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never
presumed, but must be affirmatively proved by the person claiming its
existence. The destruction by fire of a public building in which the adoption
papers would have been filed if existent does not give rise to a presumption of
adoption nor is the destruction of the records of an adoption proceeding to be
presumed. On the contrary, the absence of a record of adoption has been said
to evolve a presumption of its non-existence. Where, under the provisions of
the statute, an adoption is effected by a court order, the records of such court
constitute the evidence by which such adoption may be established.
Petitioner's flow of evidence in the case below does not lead us to any proof of
judicial adoption. We cannot pluck from his chain of evidence any link to the
real existence of a court decree of adoption in his favor. Petitioner's proofs do
not show or tend to show that at one time or another a specific court of
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competent jurisdiction rendered in an adoption proceeding initiated by the late in an estate proceeding, it is a requisite that he has an interest in the estate,
spouses an order approving his adoption as a child of the latter. No judicial either as one who would be benefited as an heir or one who has a claim against
records of such adoption or copies thereof are presented or attempted to be the estate like a creditor. A child by adoption cannot inherit from the parent
presented. Petitioner merely proceeds from a nebulous assumption that he creditor by adoption unless the act of adoption has been done in strict accord
was judicially adopted between the years 1928 and 1932. By what particular with the statue. Until this is done, no rights are acquired by the child and neither
court was the adoption decreed or by whom was the petition heard, petitioner the supposed adopting parent nor adopted child could be bound thereby. The
does not even manifest, much less show. There are no witnesses cited to that burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such
adoption proceeding or to the adoption decree. Apparently on the assumption relationship. He must prove compliance with the statutes relating to adoption
that the adoption was commenced in Manila, petitioner's counsel secured a in the jurisdiction where the adoption occurred. A fortiori if no hereditary
certification from the Court of first Instance of Manila which, however, interest in the estate can be gained by a claimant who failed to submit proof
negatively reported "(T)hat among the salvaged records now available in this thereof, whether the will is probated or not, intervention should be denied as it
Office, there has not been found, after a diligent search, any record regarding would merely result in unnecessary complication. To succeed, a child must be
the adoption of Mr. Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara. legitimate, legitimated, adopted, acknowledged illegitimate natural child or
natural child by legal fiction or recognized spurious child.
The absence of proof of such order of adoption by the court, as provided by
the statute, cannot be substituted by parol evidence that a child has lived with
a person, not his parent, and has been treated as a child to establish such
adoption. Even evidence of declaration of the deceased, made in his lifetime,
that he intended to adopt a child as his heir, and that he had adopted him, and
of the fact that the child resided with the deceased, as a member of his family,
from infancy until he attained his majority, is not sufficient to establish the fact
of adoption. Nor does the fact that the deceased spouses fed, clothed,
educated, recognized and referred to one like petitioner as an adopted child,
recognized and referred to one like petitioner as an adopted child, necessarily
establish adoption of the child. Withal, the attempts of petitioner to prove his
adoption by acts and declarations of the deceased do not discharge the
mandatory presentation of the judicial decree of adoption. The thrust of
petitioner's evidence is rather to establish his status as an admitted illegitimate
child, not an adopted child which status of an admitted illegitimate child was —
the very basis of his petitioner for intervention in the estate proceedings of the
late Dr. Lazatin, as above stated.
Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible where the records of adoption
proceedings were actually lost or destroyed. But, prior to the introduction of
such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence
of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: Existence; execution;
loss; contents; although this order may be changed if necessary in the
discretion of the court. The sufficiency of the proof offered as a predicate for
the admission of an alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discretion of the
trial court under all the circumstances of the particular case. As earlier pointed
out, petitioner failed to establish the former existence of the adoption paper
and its subsequent loss or destruction. Secondary proof may only be
introduced if it has first beer. established that such adoption paper really
existed and was lost. This is indispensable. Petitioner's supposed adoption
was only testified to by him and is allegedly to be testified to a brother of the
deceased Mariano M. Lazatin or others who have witnessed that the deceased
spouses treated petitioner as their child. If adoption was really made, the
records thereof should have existed and the same presented at the hearing or
subsequent thereto or a reasonable explanation of loss or destruction thereof,
if that be the case, adduced.
As a necessary consequence, petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta.
Clara cannot properly intervene in the settlement of the estate of Margarita de
Asis as an adopted child because of lack of proof thereof. For one to intervene
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167. CERVANTES v. FAJARDO
(1989)
FACTS:
Angelie Anne C. Cervantes was born on 14 February 1987 to respondents
Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are common-law husband and wife.
The child was then known as Angelie Anne Fajardo.
Respondents offered the child for adoption to Gina Carreon's sister and
brother-in-law, petitioners Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes,
who took care and custody of the child when she was barely two weeks old.
An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child by petitioners was also
executed by respondent Gina Carreon on 29 April 1987. The petition for
adoption was filed by petitioners over the child before the RTC of Rizal on 20
August 1987, which granted the petition.
The court ordered that the child be "freed from parental authority of her natural
parents as well as from legal obligation and maintenance to them and that from
now on shall be, for all legal intents and purposes, known as Angelie Anne
Cervantes, a child of herein petitioners and capable of inheriting their estate."
Petitioners received a letter from the respondents demanding to be paid the
amount of P150, 000.00; otherwise, they would get back their child.
While petitioners were out at work, the respondent Gina Carreon took the child
from her "yaya" at the petitioner's residence and brought the child to her house.
Petitioners demanded the return of the child, but Gina Carreon refused, saying
that she had no desire to give up her child for adoption and that the affidavit of
consent to the adoption she had executed was not fully explained to her. She
will, however, return the child to the petitioners if she were paid the amount.
Felisa Tansingco, the social worker who had conducted the case study on the
adoption and submitted a report thereon to the RTC of Rizal in the adoption
case, testified before the Executive Judge, RTC Pasig declaring that she had
interviewed respondent Gina Carreon and that respondent manifested to the
social worker her desire to have the child adopted by the petitioners.
ISSUE:
W/N the custody and care of minor Angelie Anne Cervantes should be granted
to the petitioners. YES
HELD/RATIO:
The Court affirmed the decision of RTC granting petitioners of custody and
care of minor Angelie Anne Cervantes and ruled that the petition for writ of
Habeas Corpus be granted. In all controversies regarding custody of minors,
the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child
concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as social
standing of the contending parents. Provision that no mother shall be
separated from a child under 5 years of age will not apply where the court finds
compelling reasons to rule otherwise. Petitioners who are legally married
appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting
the minor and giving her a future better than what the natural mother, who is
135
not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can
most likely give her. The minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the
full knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the
effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over
the adopted child. The adopting parents have the right to care and custody of
the adopted child (Art. 189(2) of Family Code) and exercise parental authority
and responsibility over him (Art 17, PD 603).
168. IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM
FACTS:
The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by profession.
On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor
children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain
Lucia Ayuban. Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim
registered the children to make it appear that they were the children’s parents.
The children were named Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim. Michelle
was barely eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was
born on 15 March 1977. Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him
to petitioner’s clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983.
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They
sent the children to exclusive schools. They used the surname Lim in all their
school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim
died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario, an American
citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty
given under RA 8552 to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child.
Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of
Michelle and Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos.
1258 and 1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for
adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was
18 years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by
their Affidavits of Consent. Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as
shown in his Affidavit of Consent. Petitioners husband Olario likewise executed
an Affidavit of Consent for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.
In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), Michelle was considered as an abandoned child
and the whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown. The DSWD issued
a similar Certification for Michael.
The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial court ruled
that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition
jointly with her new husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552
and Article 185 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt. NO
Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
HELD:
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner
had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined
by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial court’s
decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit.
Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:
xxx
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the
following cases:
1) if one spouse seeks to adopt the
legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
2) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own
illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
however, That the other spouse has
signified his/her consent thereto; or
3) if the spouses are legally separated from
each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse
adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint
parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
xxx
The use of the word shall in the above-quoted provision means that joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with
the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation.
As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but
natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony
between the spouses.
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried
at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the
petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her
husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption
on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in
Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of
petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate
children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated
from each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit
of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must
comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in
Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic
relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in
the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the
application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption
decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and
(5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopters country as the latter’s adopted
child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.
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These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to
adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or
adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity
of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of
petitioner.

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169. REPUBLIC vs. HONORABLE RODOLFO TOLEDANO
FACTS:
Spouses Clouse sought to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the
younger brother of private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse.
legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place, when private respondents
spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on
February 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a
Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a
citizen of the United States in 1988.

Alvin A. Clouse is a natural born citizen of the United States of America. He
married Evelyn, a Filipino on June 4, 1981 at Olongapo City. On August 19,
1988, Evelyn became a naturalized citizen of the United States of America in
Guam. They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable of
adopting Solomon, a 12 year old minor.
Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify
pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino
citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for
adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185
which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife.

Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the present, Solomon It reads:
Joseph Alcala was and has been under the care and custody of private Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt,
respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery except in the following cases:
Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his
to support and educate her son. own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the
Trial Court ruled in favor of the spouses and granted the petition for adoption. legitimate child of the other.

Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General appealed to us for relief, Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that
contending that the lower court erred in granting the petition for adoption of must be read along together with Article 184.
Alvin and Evelyn Clouse, because they are not qualified to adopt under
Philippine law.

ISSUE:
WON spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse who are aliens can adopt
under Philippine Law. NO

HELD:
Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise
known as "The Family Code of the Philippines", private respondents spouses
Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.
Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates
the persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz.:

(3) An alien, except:

(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to
adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate
child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen
and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her
spouse a relative by consanguinity of the
latter.

Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in
accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.

There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not

qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases
in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is not a former Filipino citizen
but a natural born citizen of the United States of America. In the second place,
Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
170. DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN vs. REPUBLIC
FACTS:
Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the USA, of Filipino parentage and a
resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon
Ramos who was born on August 31, 1986; Elma Dizon Ramos, who was born
on September 7, 1987; and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on August 5,
1989. The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioner’s
brother, and Amelia Ramos.
Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on May
19, 1990, the children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc
Ramos; their biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now
has two children by her second marriage and no longer communicated with her
children by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws from the time she left up to the
institution of the adoption; the minors are being financially supported by the
petitioner and her children, and relatives abroad; as Maria passed away on
November 23, 2000, petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors have
given their written consent to the adoption; she is qualified to adopt as shown
by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own who are
already married, gainfully employed and have their respective families; she
lives alone in her own home in Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship,
and works as a restaurant server. She came back to the Philippines to spend
time with the minors; her children gave their written consent to the adoption of
the minors. Petitioner’s brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial
income, signified his willingness and commitment to support the minors while
in petitioner’s custody.
Trial granted the petition for adoption. The OSG opposed contenting that, (1)
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION
DESPITE THE LACK OF CONSENT OF THE PROPOSED ADOPTEES
BIOLOGICAL MOTHER, and (2) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF THE WRITTEN
CONSENT OF THE PETITIONERS CHILDREN AS REQUIRED BY LAW.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written
consent of their biological mother, Amelia Ramos. NO
HELD:
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption
Act of 1998, provides:
Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the
Adoption. - After being properly counseled and
informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her
approval of the adoption, the written consent of the
following to the adoption is hereby required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or
over;
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if
known, or the legal guardian, or the
proper government instrumentality which
has legal custody of the child;
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(c) The legitimate and adopted
sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or
over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if
any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10)
years of age or over, of the adopter, if
living with said adopter and the latter’s
spouse, if any;
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person
adopting or to be adopted.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is
intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted
interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best
interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.
Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the
validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child
requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties
may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. In this case,
petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that she was able to interview
Amelia Ramos who arrived in the Philippines with her son, John Mario in May
2002. If said Amelia Ramos was in the Philippines and Pagbilao was able to
interview her, it is incredible that the latter would not require Amelia Ramos to
execute a Written Consent to the adoption of her minor children. Neither did
the petitioner bother to present Amelia Ramos as witness in support of the
petition.
Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the written consent of the biological mother
is no longer necessary because when Amelia’s husband died in 1990, she left
for Italy and never came back. The children were then left to the guidance and
care of their paternal grandmother. It is the paternal relatives, including
petitioner, who provided for the children’s financial needs. Hence, Amelia, the
biological mother, had effectively abandoned the children.
Petitioner’s contention must fail. When Amelia left for Italy, she had not
intended to abandon her children, or to permanently sever their mother-child
relationship. She was merely impelled to leave the country by financial
constraints. Yet, even while abroad, she did not surrender or relinquish entirely
her motherly obligations of rearing the children to her now deceased mother-
in-law, for, as claimed by Elaine herself, she consulted her mother, Amelia, for
serious personal problems. Likewise, Amelia continues to send financial
support to the children, though in minimal amounts as compared to what her
affluent in-laws provide.
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171. MACARIO TAMARGO vs. CA
G.R. No. 85044
June 3, 1992
FACTS:
Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with
an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. A civil complaint for
damages was filed by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent,
and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents
against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural
parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. A criminal
information or Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was also filed against
Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto was acquitted and exempted from criminal
liability on the ground that he had acted without discernment.
Prior to the incident, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition
to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc. This petition for adoption was granted
after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents,
reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they,
but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa
Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had
shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for
adoption was filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then
actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor
been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption.
The RTC dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent natural
parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for mandamus and
certiorari questioning the trial court's Decision. The Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their right to appeal. Hence, the
instant petition was filed.
ISSUES:
(1) WON respondent spouses Bundoc are the indispensable parties to the
action for damages caused by the acts of their minor child.
(2) WON the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned
may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the
indispensable parties in a damage case filed against their adopted child,
for acts committed by the latter, when actual custody was yet lodged with
the biological parents.
RULING:
(1) The shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occurred when
parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the
natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that the
natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are
the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
139
The Court is not persuaded. Under the Civil Code, the basis of parental
liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between
the parents and the minor child living with them and over whom, the law
presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control. Article 58 of the
Child and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted this rule:
Article 58. Torts — Parents and guardians are
responsible for the damage caused by the child under
their parental authority in accordance with the civil
Code.
Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines 9 has similarly insisted
upon the requisite that the child, doer of the tortious act, shall have beer
in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held liable for the
ensuing damage:
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising
parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries
and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their
unemancipated children living in their company and
under their parental authority subject to the
appropriate defenses provided by law.
(2) We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having
been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the
Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not
consider that retroactive effect may be giver to the decree of adoption so
as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when
adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted
child. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the
petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of
some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant
case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively
lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a
tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not
have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had
no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and
unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the
philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious
liability.
Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part
of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since
Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was
committed.
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172. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS OF MINOR ANGELIE ANNE C. CERVANTES vs.
GINA CARREON FAJARDO
G.R. No. 79955
January 27, 1989
FACTS:
The minor was born to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who
are common-law husband and wife. Respondents offered the child for adoption
to Gina Carreon's sister and brother-in-law, the herein petitioners Zenaida
Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes, spouses, who took care and
custody of the child when she was barely two (2) weeks old. An Affidavit of
Consent to the adoption of the child by herein petitioners, was also executed
by respondent Gina Carreon.
The appropriate petition for adoption (Sp. Proc. No. 057-B) was filed by herein
petitioners over the child. The Regional Trial Court of Rizal granted the petition.
The child was then known as Angelie Anne Fajardo. The court ordered that the
child be "freed from parental authority of her natural parents as well as from
legal obligation and maintenance to them and that from now on shall be, for all
legal intents and purposes, known as Angelie Anne Cervantes, a child of herein
petitioners and capable of inheriting their estate .
respondent Gina Carreon will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere
where she can grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded person.
Besides, respondent Gina Carreon had previously given birth to another child
by another married man with whom she lived for almost three (3) years but who
eventually left her and vanished. For a minor (like Angelie Anne C. Cervantes)
to grow up with a sister whose "father" is not her true father, could also affect
the moral outlook and values of said minor. Upon the other hand, petitioners
who are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and
socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future better than
what the natural mother (herein respondent Gina Carreon), who is not only
jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely
give her.
Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full
knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect,
among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the
adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural
parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall
be exercised jointly by both spouses. The adopting parents have the right to
the care and custody of the adopted child 8 and exercise parental authority and
responsibility over him.

The adoptive parents, herein petitioners Nelson and Zenaida Cervantes,

however, received a letter from the respondents demanding to be paid the
amount of P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners
refused to accede to the demand.

While petitioners were out at work, the respondent Gina Carreon took the child
from her "yaya" at the petitioners' residence in Angono, Rizal, on the pretext
that she was instructed to do so by her mother. Respondent Gina Carreon
brought the child to her house in Parañaque. Petitioners thereupon demanded
the return of the child, but Gina Carreon refused, saying that she had no desire
to give up her child for adoption and that the affidavit of consent to the adoption
she had executed was not fully explained to her. She sent word to the
petitioners that she will, however, return the child to the petitioners if she were
paid the amount of P150,000.00.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus should be granted. YES

RULING:
In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the
latter's welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated
from a child under five (5) years of age, will not apply where the Court finds
compelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all controversies regarding the
custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social
welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as
well as social standing of the contending parents. Never has this Court
deviated from this criterion.

It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a woman

other than respondent Gina Carreon, and his relationship with the latter is a
common-law husband and wife relationship. His open cohabitation with co-

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- Newt Gingrich
173. IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY
ASTORGA GARCIA
G.R. No. 148311
March 31, 2005

FACTS:
Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among
others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that her mother is Gemma
Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and
surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent.
He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her
mother’s surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig,"
his surname.

Finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. Stephanie Nathy

Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of obedience and
maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall
henceforth be the petitioner’s legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article
189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be known as
STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.

Petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that

Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother
(GARCIA) as her middle name.

The trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding that there
is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his
biological mother as his middle name.

ISSUE:
WON an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle
name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father. YES

RULING:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her
natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to
be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless
hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship with her
natural mother should be maintained.

Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of

her natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it
allows.

Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily
the surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code
and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that "the initial
or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the
father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the
mother.

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174. ISABELITA S. LAHOM vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO
G.R. No. 143989
July 14, 2003
FACTS:
For years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on legally adopting Jose Melvin. Finally,
in 1971, the couple decided to file a petition for adoption. On 05 May 1972, an
order granting the petition was issued that made all the more intense than
before the feeling of affection of the spouses for Melvin. In keeping with the
court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name "Jose Melvin
Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin Lahom."
A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, Mrs. Lahom
commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional
Trial Court of Naga City on the following grounds:
1. That x x x despite the proddings and pleadings of said spouses,
respondent refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom,
to the frustrations of petitioner particularly her husband until the
latter died, and even before his death he had made known his
desire to revoke respondent's adoption, but was prevented by
petitioner's supplication, however with his further request upon
petitioner to give to charity whatever properties or interest may
pertain to respondent in the future.
2. That respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to the utter
disregard of the feelings of herein petitioner, and his records with
the Professional Regulation Commission showed his name as
Jose Melvin M. Sibulo originally issued in 1978 until the present,
and in all his dealings and activities in connection with his practice
of his profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.
3. That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this city
with only her household helps to attend to her, has yearned for the
care and show of concern from a son, but respondent remained
indifferent and would only come to Naga to see her once a year.
4. That for the last three or four years, the medical check-up of
petitioner in Manila became more frequent in view of a leg ailment,
and those were the times when petitioner would need most the
care and support from a love one, but respondent all the more
remained callous and utterly indifferent towards petitioner which is
not expected of a son.
5. That herein respondent has recently been jealous of petitioner's
nephews and nieces whenever they would find time to visit her,
respondent alleging that they were only motivated by their desire
for some material benefits from petitioner.
6. That in view of respondent's insensible attitude resulting in a
strained and uncomfortable relationship between him and
petitioner, the latter has suffered wounded feelings, knowing that
after all respondent's only motive to his adoption is his expectancy
of his alleged rights over the properties of herein petitioner and her
142
late husband, clearly shown by his recent filing of Civil Case No.
99-4463 for partition against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her
love and affection towards respondent, rendering the decree of
adoption, considering respondent to be the child of petitioner, for
all legal purposes, has been negated for which reason there is no
more basis for its existence, hence this petition for revocation,"1
Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect.
The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree
of adoption.
Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally (a)
that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case and (b) that the petitioner
had no cause of action in view of the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 8552.
Petitioner asseverated, by way of opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No.
8552 should not retroactively apply, i.e., to cases where the ground for
rescission of the adoption vested under the regime of then Article 3482 of the
Civil Code and Article 1923 of the Family Code.
The trial court rendered a decision dismissing the petition. Hence, this instant
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
1. WON an adoption decreed on 05 May 1972, may still be revoked or
rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552? NO
2. WON the adopter's action has already prescribed? YES
RULING:
(1) It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner
filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then,
the new law, had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter
under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of
adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the Court should
now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having
been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no
longer could be pursued.
(2) An action to set aside the adoption is subject to the five-year bar rule
under the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to
revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise
of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill
the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. It must also be
acknowledged that a person has no vested right in statutory privileges.
While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a "right," the
privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather
a right merely created by statute. It is a privilege that is governed by the
state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and
welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal
of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to
regulation by the State. Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute
may be taken away at anytime before it has been exercised.
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175. SUSAN LIM-LUA vs. DANILO Y. LUA
G.R. Nos. 175279-80
June 5, 2013
FACTS:
On September 3, 2003, petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the
declaration of nullity of her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua.
In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children,
petitioner sought the amount of P500,000.00 as monthly support, citing
respondent's huge earnings from salaries and dividends in several companies
and businesses here and abroad.
After due hearing, Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. issued an Order granting
support pendente lite.
From the evidence already adduced by the parties, the amount of Two Hundred
Fifty (P250,000.00) Thousand Pesos would be sufficient to take care of the
needs of the plaintiff. This amount excludes the One hundred thirty-five
(P135,000.00) Thousand Pesos... for medical attendance expenses needed by
plaintiff for the operation of both her eye[s] which is demandable upon the
conduct of such operation. The amounts already extended to the two (2)
children, being a commendable act of defendant, should be continued by him
considering the vast financial resources at his disposal.
According to Art. 203 of the Family Code, support is demandable from the time
plaintiff needed the said support but is payable only from the date of judicial
demand.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting that petitioner is not
entitled to spousal support considering that she does not maintain for herself a
separate dwelling from their children and respondent has continued to support
the family for their sustenance and well-being in accordance with family's social
and financial standing.
As to the P250,000.00 granted by the trial court as monthly support pendente
lite, as well as the P1,750,000.00 retroactive support, respondent found it
unconscionable and beyond the intendment of the law for not having
considered the needs of the respondent.
His second motion for reconsideration having been denied, respondent filed a
petition for certiorari in the CA.
On April 12, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision nullified and set aside and
instead a new one is entered to pay private respondent a monthly support
pendente lite of P115,000.00.
ORDERING the deduction of the amount of PhP2,482,348.16 plus 946,465.64,
or a total of PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total support in arrears of Danilo
Y. Lua to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two (2) children;
The appellate court said that the trial court should not have completely
disregarded the expenses incurred by respondent consisting of the purchase
and maintenance of the two cars, payment of tuition fees, travel expenses, and
143
the credit card purchases involving groceries, dry goods and books, which Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such
certainly inured to the benefit not only of the two children, but their mother nature that its allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire period
(petitioner) as well. that a needy party is entitled to support, his or her alimony may be modified or
altered, in accordance with his increased or decreased needs, and with the
It also noted the lack of contribution from the petitioner in the joint obligation of means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final determination.
spouses to support their children.
The SC ordered the deduction of the amount of Php 648,102.29 from the
ISSUE: support pendente lite in arrears, and for Danilo Y. Lua to resume payment of
WON certain expenses already incurred by the respondent may be deducted his monthly support of ₱115,000.00 starting from the time payment of this
from the total support in arrears owing to petitioner and her children. NO amount was deferred by him subject to the deduction aforementioned.
RULING:
The CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by respondent to
be credited against the accrued support pendente lite. As earlier mentioned,
the monthly support pendente lite granted by the trial court was intended
primarily for food, household expenses such as salaries of drivers and house
helpers, and also petitioner’s scoliosis therapy sessions. Hence, the value of
two expensive cars bought by respondent for his children plus their
maintenance cost, travel expenses of petitioner and Angelli, purchases through
credit card of items other than groceries and dry goods (clothing) should have
been disallowed, as these bear no relation to the judgment awarding support
pendente lite. While it is true that the dispositive portion of the executory
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 ordered herein respondent to pay the
support in arrears "less than the amount supposedly given by petitioner to the
private respondent as her and their two (2) children monthly support," the
deductions should be limited to those basic needs and expenses considered
by the trial and appellate courts. The assailed ruling of the CA allowing huge
deductions from the accrued monthly support of petitioner and her children,
while correct insofar as it commends the generosity of the respondent to his
children, is clearly inconsistent with the executory decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
84740. More important, it completely ignores the unfair consequences to
petitioner whose sustenance and well-being, was given due regard by the trial
and appellate courts.
While there is evidence to the effect that defendant is giving some forms of
financial assistance to his two (2) children via their credit cards and paying for
their school expenses, the same is, however, devoid of any form of spousal
support to the plaintiff, for, at this point in time, while the action for nullity of
marriage is still to be heard, it is incumbent upon the defendant, considering
the physical and financial condition of the plaintiff and the overwhelming
capacity of defendant, to extend support unto the latter.
Accordingly, only the following expenses of respondent may be allowed as
deductions from the accrued support pendente lite for petitioner and her
children:
Medical expenses of Susan Lim-Lua Php 42,450.71
Dental Expenses of Daniel Ryan 11,500.00
Credit card purchases of Angelli 365,282.20
(Groceries and Dry Goods)
Credit Card purchases of Daniel Ryan 228,869.38
TOTAL Php 648,102.29
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176. ARTURO PELAYO vs. MARCELO LAURON
G.R. No. L-4089
January 12, 1909
FACTS:
Arturo Pelayo, a physician residing in Cebu, filed a complaint against Marcelo
Lauron and Juana Abella setting forth that on or about the 13th of October of
said year, at night, the plaintiff was called to the house of the defendants,
situated in San Nicolas, and that upon arrival he was requested by them to
render medical assistance to their daughter-in-law who was about to give birth
to a child; that therefore, and after consultation with the attending physician,
Dr. Escaño, it was found necessary, on account of the difficult birth, to remove
the fetus by means of forceps which operation was performed by the plaintiff,
who also had to remove the afterbirth, in which services he was occupied until
the following morning, and that afterwards, on the same day, he visited the
patient several times; that the just and equitable value of the services rendered
by him was P500, which the defendants refuse to pay without alleging any good
reason therefor; that for said reason he prayed that the judgment be entered in
his favor as against the defendants, or any of them, for the sum of P500 and
costs, together with any other relief that might be deemed proper.
Defendants denied all of the allegation therein contained and alleged as a
special defense, that their daughter-in-law had died in consequence of the said
childbirth, and that when she was alive she lived with her husband
independently and in a separate house without any relation whatever with
them, and that, if on the day when she gave birth she was in the house of the
defendants, her stay there was accidental and due to fortuitous circumstances;
therefore, he prayed that the defendants be absolved of the complaint with
costs against the plaintiff.
ISSUE:
WON the father and mother-in-law of the patient are bound to pay the bill
constituting as a fee for Dr. Pelayo’s professional service. NO
RULING:
The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the
mutual obligations to which the spouses are bound by way of mutual support.
(Arts. 142 and 143.)
It is unquestionable that the person bound to pay the fees due to the plaintiff
for the professional services that he rendered to the daughter-in-law of the
defendants during her childbirth, is the husband of the patient and not her
father and mother- in-law, the defendants herein. The fact that it was not the
husband who called the plaintiff and requested his assistance for his wife is no
bar to the fulfillment of the said obligation, as the defendants, in view of the
imminent danger, to which the life of the patient was at that moment exposed,
considered that medical assistance was urgently needed, and the obligation of
the husband to furnish his wife in the indispensable services of a physician at
such critical moments is specially established by the law, as has been seen,
and compliance therewith is unavoidable; therefore, the plaintiff, who believes
that he is entitled to recover his fees, must direct his action against the husband
144
who is under obligation to furnish medical assistance to his lawful wife in such
an emergency. SC ordered that Feliciano be given an opportunity to present evidence in
support of his defense against the application for support pendente lite.
From the foregoing it may readily be understood that it was improper to have
brought an action against the defendants simply because they were the parties
who called the plaintiff and requested him to assist the patient during her
difficult confinement, and also, possibly, because they were her father and
mother-in-law and the sickness occurred in their house. The defendants were
not, nor are they now, under any obligation by virtue of any legal provision, to
pay the fees claimed, nor in consequence of any contract entered into between
them and the plaintiff from which such obligation might have arisen.
177. SANCHEZ vs. ZULUETA
68 Phil 110
FACTS:
Josefa Diego and Mario Sanchez, plaintiffs, are the wife and child, respectively,
of the defendant, Feliciano Sanchez. The latter, since 1932, refused and still
refuses to support the plaintiff even though he receives from the United States
Army a monthly pension of P174.20. Defendant allegedly abandoned the
plaintiffs without any justifiable cause and now refuses to allow them to live
with him.
The defendant counters that the Josefa abandoned the conjugal home
because she committed adultery with Macario Sanchez, with whom she had,
as a result of the illicit relations, a child which is the other plaintiff Mario
Sanchez.
The plaintiffs asked the court to compel the defendant to give them, by way of
allowance pendente lite, the sum of P50 a month. The Feliciano opposed and
asked for an opportunity to adduce evidence in support of his defense. The
court, without acceding to Feliciano’s wish to present evidence, favorably acted
upon the application of the plaintiffs and ordered the former to pay a monthly
allowance pendente lite of P50 to the plaintiffs. This ordered was appealed to
the CA which also denied such petition.
ISSUE:
WON the CFI is correct in granting the plaintiffs’ application for support. NO
HELD:
The lower court and CA erred in not allowing Feliciano to present his evidence
for the purpose of determining whether it is sufficient prima facie to overcome
the application. Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense against an
action for support (Quintana vs. Lerma, 24 Phil, 285). Consequently, as to the
child, it is also a defense that it is the fruit of such adulterous relations, for in
that case, it would not be the child of the defendant and, hence, would not be
entitled to support as such. But as this defense should be established, and not
merely alleged, it would be unavailing if proof thereof is not permitted.
Although mere affidavits may satisfy the court to pass upon the application,
nevertheless, the failure to accompany the opposition therewith did not justify
the court in ignoring said opposition, just because of this omission, inasmuch
as an opportunity to present evidence has been asked. If the defendant has a
valid defense which calls for proof, and he asks for an opportunity to present
evidence, it is error to deny him this opportunity.
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178. DE ASIS vs. CA
G.R. No. 127578
February 15, 1999

FACTS:
Vircel Andres, as legal guardian of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, filed an action
in 1988 for maintenance and support against the alleged father Manuel De Asis
who failed to provide support and maintenance despite repeated demands.
Vircel later on withdrew the complaint in 1989 with the condition that Manuel
will not pursue his counter-claim.

In 1995, Vircel filed a similar complaint against Manuel, this time as the minor’s
legal guardian/mother. Manuel interposed res judicata for the dismissal of the
case. He maintained that since the obligation to give support is based on
existence of paternity between the child and putative parent, lack thereof
negates the right to claim support.

ISSUE:
WON the minor is barred from action for support. NO

HELD:
The right to give support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a
third person. The original agreement between the parties to dismiss the initial
complaint was in the nature of a compromise regarding future support which is
prohibited by law.

The existence of lack thereof of any filial relationship between parties was not
a matter which the parties must decide but should be decided by the Court
itself. While it is true that in order to claim support, filiation or paternity must be
first shown between the parties, but the presence or lack thereof must be
judicially established and declaration is vested in the Court. It cannot be left to
the will or agreement of the parties. Hence, the first dismissal cannot bar the
filing of another action asking for the same relief since, it being contrary to law,
had no force and effect. Furthermore, the defense of res judicata claimed by
Manuel was untenable since future support cannot be the subject of any
compromise or waiver.

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179. RONDINA vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 179059

FACTS:
Victor Rondina was accused of raping AAA, a 16-year old lass. (Details of
criminal case not discussed since topic is about support). As a result of such,
AAA gave birth to CCC. Victor pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Pre-trial
and trial thereafter ensued. Victor interposed the defense of denial and alibi.

The RTC did not believe Victors alibi. Hence, the dispositive portion of its
Judgment “After considering all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused
Victor Rondina GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape as
charged in the information and, accordingly, without any finding as to mitigating
and aggravating circumstances, hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment
of Forty (40) years reclusion perpetua, to pay the offended party the sum of
P75,000.00 as indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and costs; also to
acknowledge the offspring [CCC] and to give her support.”

ISSUE:
WON the RTC was correct in a ordering the accused to support offspring CCC.
YES

HELD:
Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three different kinds of civil
liability that may be imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b)
acknowledgement of the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so
doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring.

With the passage of the Family Code, the classification of acknowledged

natural children and natural children by legal fiction was eliminated and they
now fall under the specie of illegitimate children. Since parental authority is
vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother and considering that
an offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses the power to
exercise parental authority over his children, no further positive act is required
of the parent as the law itself provides for the child’s status. Hence, Victor
should only be ordered to indemnify and support the victim’s child. The amount
and terms of support shall be determined by the trial court after due notice and
hearing in accordance with Article 201 of the Family Code.

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180. GOTARDO vs. BULING
G.R. No. 165166
August 15, 2012

FACTS:
In 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the RTC for
compulsory recognition and support pendente lite, claiming that Charles
Gotardo, petitioner, is the father of her child Gliffze. They met in 1992 in a bank
where they both worked. They became sweethearts in the last week of January
1993. Sometime in September 1993, they started to have intimate sexual
relations. The sexual encounters occurred twice a month and became more
frequent in June 1994; eventually, on August 8, 1994, the respondent found
out that she was pregnant. When told, the petitioner was happy and made
plans to marry the respondent but eventually backed out.

Divina gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995. She sent Charles a
letter on demanding recognition of and support for their child. When the latter
did not answer the demand, Divina filed her complaint for compulsory
recognition and support pendente lite. Charles claimed that he first had sexual
contact with the Divina in the first week of August 1994 and she could not have
been pregnant for 3 months when he was informed of the pregnancy on
September 1994.

The RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The CA

consequently set aside the RTC decision and ordered the petitioner to
recognize his minor son Gliffze. It also reinstated the RTC order for monthly
child support. The petitioner argues that the CA committed a reversible error in
rejecting the RTC’s ruling, and that the evidence on record is insufficient to
prove paternity.

ISSUE:
WON the CA erred when it set aside the RTC’s findings and ordered Charles
to recognize and provide legal support to his minor son Gliffze. NO

HELD:
Divina established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the putative father
of Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually involved only with one
man, the petitioner, at the time of her conception. Rodulfo, owner of the hotel,
corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the respondent had intimate
relationship. Charles on the other hand failed to substantiate his allegations of
infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His allegations, therefore, cannot be
given credence for lack of evidentiary support.

The petitioner’s denial cannot overcome the respondent’s clear and categorical
assertions. Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of
obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family.

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181. PERLA vs. BARING
G.R. No. 172471
November 12, 2012

FACTS:
Respondent Mirasol Baring and petitioner Antonio Perla were allegedly
neighbors and became sweethearts. When Mirasol became pregnant, Antonio
allegedly assured her that he would support her. However, Antonio started to
evade her.

Mirasol and her then minor son, Randy Perla (Randy), filed before the RTC a
Complaint for support against Antonio. Mirasol and Randy thus prayed that
Antonio be ordered to support Randy. During the trial, Mirasol presented
Randy’s Certificate of Live Birth and Baptismal Certificate indicating her and
Antonio as parents of the child. Mirasol testified that she and Antonio supplied
the information in the said certificates. However, these evidence were not
signed by Antonio. The RTC rendered a decision ordering Antonio to support
Randy, which was affirmed by CA.

ISSUE:
WON respondents successfully proved Antonio’s filiation to Randy. NO

HELD:
For Randy to be entitled for support, his filiation must be established with
sufficient certainty. The Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required
to establish paternity and filiation. An order for support may create an
unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the
parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by
clear and convincing evidence.

Mirasol and Randy failed to establish Randy’s illegitimate filiation to Antonio.

The Certificate of Live Birth and baptismal certificate of Randy have no
probative value to establish Randy’s filiation to Antonio since the latter had not
signed the same. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the
putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. Also, while a
baptismal certificate may be considered a public document, it can only serve
as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but
not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child’s paternity. Thus,
baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation
and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the
same.

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182. CALDERON vs. ROXAS
G.R. No. 185595
January 9, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner Ma. Carminia C. Calderon and private respondent Jose Antonio F.
Roxas, were married on December 4, 1985 and their union produced four
children. On January 16, 1998, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
under Art. 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
action, and they are ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are
dependent upon the result of the main action.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65 provided that the interlocutory
order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. Having chosen the wrong remedy in questioning the subject
interlocutory orders of the RTC, petitioner's appeal was correctly dismissed by
the CA.

On May 19, 1998, the trial court issued an Order granting petitioner’s
application for support pendente lite. On motion of petitioner’s counsel, the trial
court issued an Order dated October 11, 2002 directing private respondent to
give support in the amount of P42,292.50 per month starting April 1, 1999
pursuant to the May 19, 1998 Order. On February 11, 2003, private respondent
filed a Motion to Reduce Support citing, among other grounds, that the
P42,292.50 monthly support for the children as fixed by the court was even
higher than his then P20,800.00 monthly salary as city councilor.

After hearing, the trial court issued an Order dated March 7, 2005 granting the
motion to reduce support and denying petitioner’s motion for spousal support,
increase of the children’s monthly support pendente lite and support-in-arrears.
On June 14, 2005, petitioner through counsel filed a Notice of Appeal from the
Orders dated March 7, 2005 and May 4, 2005. Petitioner pointed out that her
appeal is "from the RTC Order dated March 7, 2005, issued prior to the
rendition of the decision in the main case".

By Decision dated September 9, 2008, the CA dismissed the appeal noting

that petitioner failed to avail of the proper remedy to question an interlocutory
order.

ISSUE:
WON orders on the matter of support pendente lite are interlocutory or final.

HELD:
In this case, since the order was but an incident to the main action, it is
INTERLOCUTORY.

The assailed orders relative to the incident of support pendente lite and support
in arrears, as the term suggests, were issued pending the rendition of the
decision on the main action for declaration of nullity of marriage, and are
therefore interlocutory. They did not finally dispose of the case nor did they
consist of a final adjudication of the merits of petitioner’s claims as to the
ground of psychological incapacity and other incidents as child custody,
support and conjugal assets.

Provisional remedies are writs and processes available during the pendency
of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect
certain rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the
ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case. They are provisional because
they constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the

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183. LERMA vs. CA enjoined, without prejudice to such judgment as may be rendered in the
61 SCRA 440 (1974) pending action for legal separation between the parties.

DOCTRINE:
The loss of the substantive right to support in such a situation is incompatible
with any claim for support pendente lite.
FACTS:
Teodoro E. Lerma and Concepcion Diaz were married on May 19, 1951. On
August 22, 1969 the petitioner filed a complaint for adultery against the
respondent and a certain Teodoro Ramirez and on September 26, 1972 the
court of First Instance of Rizal decided the adultery case of the respondent and
found her and her co-accused, Teodoro Ramirez, guilty of the charge,
sentencing them to a term of imprisonment. During the pendency of the
adultery case against the respondent, wife On November 18, 1969 the
respondent filed with the lower court, a complaint against the petitioner for legal
separation and/or separation of properties, custody of their children and
support, with an urgent petition for support pendente lite for her and their
youngest son, Gregory, who was then and until now is in her custody. The
respondent's complaint for legal separation is based on two grounds:
concubinage and attempt against her life. The application for support pendente
lite was granted in an order dated December 24, 1969, which was amended in
an order dated February 15, 1970. The petitioner filed his opposition to the
respondent's application for support pendente lite, setting up as defense the
adultery charge he had filed against the respondent.
The right to separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal
partnership property, presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for the
spouse claiming such right to live separately. This is implicit in Article 104 of
the Civil Code, which states that after the filing of the petition for legal
separation the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other. A
petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one who is himself or herself guilty of
an act which constitutes a ground for legal separation at the instance of the
other spouse, cannot be considered as within the intendment of the law
granting separate support. In fact under Article 303 of the same Code the
obligation to give support shall cease "when the recipient, be he a forced heir
or not, has committed some act which gives rise to disinheritance;" and under
Article 921 one of the causes for disinheriting a spouse is "when the spouse
has given cause for legal separation." The loss of the substantive right to
support in such a situation is incompatible with any claim for support pendente
lite.

On March 12, 1970 the petitioner filed with respondent Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul the
aforementioned orders on the ground that they were issued with grave abuse
of discretion. The next day the respondent court gave due course to the petition
and issued a writ of preliminary injunction to stop Judge Luciano from enforcing
said orders.

The respondent court, in its decision of October 8, 1970, set aside the assailed
orders and granted the petitioner an opportunity to present evidence before the
lower court in support of his defense against the application for support
pendente lite.

The respondent moved to reconsider the decision on the ground that the
petitioner had not asked that he be allowed to present evidence in the lower
court. The respondent court, in its resolution of January 20, 1971, set aside the
decision of October 8 and rendered another, dismissing the petition. This is
now the subject of the instant proceeding for review.

ISSUE:
W/N the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the
respondent’s application for support pendente lite without giving the petitioner
an opportunity to present evidence in support of his defense against the said
application.

HELD:
Court of Appeals January 20, 1971 resolution and the orders of respondent
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court herein complained of, dated December
24, 1969 and February 15, 1970, all are set aside and their enforcement

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184. REYES vs. INES-LUCIANO the corporations controlled by Manuel have entered into multi-million
February 28, 1979 contracts in projects of the Ministry of Public Highways.

DOCTRINE:
Art. 61, FC. After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall
be entitled to live separately from each other. The Court, in absence of a written
agreement between the spouses, shall designate either of them or a third
person to administer the absolute community or conjugal partnership property.
The administrator appointed by the court shall have the same powers and
duties as those of a guardian under the Rules of Court.

Art. 62, FC. During the pendency of the action for legal separation, the
provisions of Article 49 shall likewise apply to the support of the spouses and
the custody and support of the common children.

The Court shall provide for the support of the spouses, the support and custody
of the common children. Paramount considerations = moral and material
welfare of the children, their choice of parent

FACTS:
Celia Ilustre-Reyes filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Quezon City a complaint against her husband Manuel J.C. Reyes for legal
separation on the ground that he had attempted to kill her: he punched her,
held her head, and bumped it several times against the cement floor. He also
pushed her at the stairway of 13 flights, and swung at her abdomen which got
her half-unconscious. It was her father who saved her; He doused her with
grape juice, kicked her several times, and was saved this time by her driver.
She filed for support pendente lite for her and her 3 children. Manuel
opposed this by saying that his wife committed adultery with her physician.

The RTC granted the support pendent lite of P5000 per month while the CA
dismissed Manuel’s petition for the annulment of the RTC order alleging that
Manuel appears to be financially capable of giving the support.

ISSUE:
(1) WON adultery can be used as a defense in an action for support. YES,
but not in this case

(2) WON in determining the amount of support it is enough that the Court
ascertain via affidavits or other documentary evidence. YES

HELD:
(1) The alleged adultery must be established by competent evidence.
Adultery is a good defense if properly proved. In the case at bar Manuel
did not present any evidence to prove his allegation. He still has the
opportunity to adduce evidence on this alleged adultery when the action
for legal separation is heard on the merits before the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of QC. However, it is doubtful whether adultery
will affect her right to alimony pendente lite – she is asking for support to
be taken from their conjugal property, not Manuel’s personal funds.

(2) Mere affidavits may satisfy the court to pass upon the application for
support pendent lite; it is enough that the facts be established by
affidavits/other documentary evidence. Celia submitted documents that

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185. MANGONON vs. CA
G.R. No. 125041
June 30, 2006
DOCTRINE:
Pending the litigation; support to provide for the lower income spouse as the
legal process moves ahead.
ART. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the
liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters.
FACTS:
On 16 February 1975, petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly
married by then City Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi City, Albay. At
that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent Federico was only
19 years old. As the marriage was solemnized without the required consent
per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was annulled on 11 August 1975 by the
Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. On 25 March 1976, or
within seven months after the annulment of their marriage, petitioner gave birth
to twins Rica and Rina. According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of her
second husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as private
respondents had totally abandoned them.
Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the United States of America
(USA) where petitioner, together with her daughters and second husband, had
moved to and finally settled in. Rica was admitted to the University of
Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was accepted by the Long Island
University and Western New England College. Despite their admissions to said
universities, Rica and Rina were, however, financially incapable of pursuing
collegiate education because of the following:
a) The average annual cost for college education in the US is about
US$22,000/year or a total of US$44,000.00, more or less, for both
Rica and Rina
b) Rica and Rina need general maintenance support each in the
amount of US$3,000.00 per year or a total of US$6,000 per year.
c) Unfortunately, petitioner’s monthly income from her 2 jobs is
merely US$1,200 after taxes which she can hardly give general
support to Rica and Rina, much less their required college
educational support.
d) Neither can petitioner’s present husband be compelled to share in
the general support and college education of Rica and Rina since
he has his own son with petitioner and own daughter (also in
college) to attend to.
e) Worse, Rica and Rina’s petitions for Federal Student Aid have
been rejected by the U.S. Department of Education.
152
On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her petitioner, respondent Francisco has the financial resources to pay this amount
then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and given his various business endeavors, thus the amount of support should be
Support, with application for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati. proportionate to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of
Petitioner averred that demands were made upon Federico and the latter’s the recipient.
father, Francisco, for general support and for the payment of the required
college education of Rica and Rina. The twin sisters even exerted efforts to The Decision of the Court of Appeals fixing the amount of support pendente
work out a settlement concerning these matters with respondent Federico and lite to P5,000.00 for Rebecca Angela and Regina Isabel, are hereby
respondent Francisco, the latter being generally known to be financially well- MODIFIED in that respondent Francisco Delgado is hereby held liable for
off. support pendente lite in the amount to be determined by the trial court pursuant
to this Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, respondent Francisco Delgado be held liable for her (Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have already been done with
granddaughter’s educational support. their education by the time of the promulgation of this decision, we deem it
proper to award support pendente lite in arrears to be computed from the time
HELD: they entered college until they had finished their respective studies. Also,
ART. 199. Whenever two or more persons are respondent Francisco is the majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board
obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon of Directors of Citadel Commercial, Incorporated, which owns and manages
the following persons in the order herein provided: twelve gasoline stations, substantial real estate, and is engaged in shipping,
(1) The spouse; brokerage and freight forwarding. He is also the majority stockholder and
(2) The descendants in the nearest Chairman of the Board of Directors of Citadel Shipping which does business
degree; with Hyundai of Korea. Apart from these, he also owns the Citadel Corporation
(3) The ascendants in the nearest which, in turn, owns real properties in different parts of the country. He is
degree; and likewise the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Isla Communication Co. and
(4) The brothers and sisters. he owns shares of stocks of Citadel Holdings. In addition, he owns real
properties here and abroad.)
There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent
Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and respondent Federico
are primarily charged to support their children’s college education but being
restricted by their financial income- respondent Francisco, as the next
immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his
granddaughters in default of their parents, it having been established that
respondent Francisco has the financial means to support his granddaughters’
education.
Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall
have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying
the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining
in the family dwelling the person who has a right to
receive support. The latter alternative cannot be
availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle
thereto.
The obligor is given the choice as to how he could dispense his obligation to
give support. Respondent Francisco and Federico’s claim that they have the
option under the law as to how they could perform their obligation to support
Rica and Rina, respondent Francisco insists that Rica and Rina should move
here to the Philippines to study in any of the local universities. Thus, he may
give the determined amount of support to the claimant or he may allow the
latter to stay in the family dwelling. This option cannot be availed of in this case
since there are circumstances, legal or moral, between respondent and
petitioner which should be considered.
Respondent Francisco is held liable for half of the amount of school expenses
incurred by Rica and Rina as support pendente lite. As established by
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186. SPOUSES LIM vs. LIM
G.R. No. 163209
October 30, 2009
DOCTRINE:
ART. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the
liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters.
Grandchildren cannot demand support directly from their grandparents if they
have parents (ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of supporting
them.
FACTS:
In 1979, Cheryl married Edward, son of petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three
children, respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl,
Edward and their children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park,
Makati City, together with Edward’s ailing grandmother, Chua Giak and her
husband Mariano Lim (Mariano). Edward’s family business, which provided
him with a monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl
had no steady source of income.
On October 14, 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing
the children with her (then all minors), after a violent confrontation with Edward
whom she caught with the in-house midwife of Chua Giak in what the trial court
described "a very compromising situation."
Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and
Mariano (defendants) in RTC for support. RTC ordered Edward to provide
monthly support of P6,000 pendente lite. On January 31, 1996, RTC rendered
judgment ordering Edward and petitioners to "jointly" provide P40,000 monthly
support to respondents, with Edward shouldering P6,000 and petitioners the
balance of P34,000 subject to Chua Giak’s subsidiary liability. The defendants
sought reconsideration, questioning their liability. RTC, while denying
reconsideration, clarified that petitioners and Chua Giak were held jointly liable
with Edward because of the latter’s “inability to give sufficient support”.
Petitioners appealed to the CA assailing, among others, their liability to support
respondents. Petitioners argued that while Edward’s income is insufficient, the
law itself sanctions its effects by providing that legal support should be "in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family" under Article 194 of the Civil
Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 209 (The Family Code of the
Philippines).
On April 28, 2003, CA affirmed RTC. Parents and their legitimate children are
obliged to mutually support one another and this obligation extends down to
the legitimate grandchildren and great grandchildren. Should the person
obliged to give support does not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the
other persons enumerated in Article 199 in its order shall provide the necessary
support. This is because the closer the relationship of the relatives, the stronger
the tie that binds them. Thus, the obligation to support is imposed first upon the
153
shoulders of the closer relatives and only in their default is the obligation moved
to the next nearer relatives and so on. CA denied motion for reconsideration. The persons entitled to receive support are petitioners’ grandchildren and
daughter-in-law. Granting petitioners the option in Article 204 will secure to the
ISSUE: grandchildren a well-provided future; however, it will also force Cheryl to return
WON petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to to the house which, for her, is the scene of her husband’s infidelity.
respondents. YES
HELD:
Petitioners are liable to provide support but only to their grandchildren. By
statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of ascendants to provide
legal support to their descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves
admit as much – they limit their petition to the narrow question of when their
liability is triggered, not if they are liable. Relying on provisions found in Title IX
of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners theorize that
their liability is activated only upon default of parental authority, conceivably
either by its termination or suspension during the children’s minority. Because
at the time respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised
parental authority over their children, petitioners submit that the obligation to
support the latter’s offspring ends with them.
Grandchildren cannot demand support directly from their grandparents if they
have parents (ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of supporting
them. This is so because we have to follow the order of support under Art. 199.
There is no showing that private respondent is without means to support his
son; neither is there any evidence to prove that petitioner, as the paternal
grandmother, was willing to voluntarily provide for her grandson's legal support.
There is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to provide
sufficient legal support to her children, then all school-bound. It is also
undisputed that the amount of support Edward is able to give to
respondents, P6,000 a month, is insufficient to meet respondents’ basic needs.
This inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts
a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the
paternal (petitioners) and maternal lines, following the ordering in Article 199.
Petitioners’ partial concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as
this word is commonly understood to refer to relatives, by blood of lower
degree. As petitioners’ grandchildren by blood, only respondents Lester
Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III belong to this category. Indeed,
Cheryl’s right to receive support from the Lim family extends only to her
husband Edward, arising from their marital bond. Cheryl’s share from the
amount of monthly support RTC awarded cannot be determined from the
records. Thus, we are constrained to remand the case to the trial court for this
limited purpose.
As an alternative proposition, petitioners wish to avail of the option in Article
204 of the Civil Code, as amended, and pray that they be allowed to fulfill their
obligation by maintaining respondents at petitioners’ Makati residence. The
option is unavailable to petitioners. The application of Article 204 which
provides that the person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill
the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and
maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive
support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is
a moral or legal obstacle thereto.
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187. GOTARDO vs. BULING
G.R. No. 165166
August 15, 2012
DOCTRINE:
Once filiation has been established and is beyond question, support follows as
a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
substantiate his allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His
allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence for lack of evidentiary support.
The petitioner’s denial cannot overcome the respondent’s clear and categorical
assertions. Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of
obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family.

FACTS:
In 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the RTC for
compulsory recognition and support pendente lite, claiming that the petitioner
is the father of her child Gliffze, whose imputed paternity the petitioner denied.
Trial ensued. She met the petitioner in 1992 in a bank where they both worked.
They became sweethearts in the last week of January 1993. Sometime in
September 1993, the petitioner started intimate sexual relations with the
respondent in the former’s rented room in the boarding house managed by
Rodulfo, the respondent’s uncle. The sexual encounters occurred twice a
month and became more frequent in June 1994; eventually, on August 8, 1994,
the respondent found out that she was pregnant. When told, the petitioner was
happy and made plans to marry the respondent but eventually backed out. The
respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995. When the
petitioner did not show up and failed to provide support to Gliffze, the
respondent sent him a letter on demanding recognition of and support for their
child. When the petitioner did not answer the demand, the respondent filed her
complaint for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite.

The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for himself. He denied the
imputed paternity, claiming that he first had sexual contact with the respondent
in the first week of August 1994 and she could not have been pregnant for 3
months when he was informed of the pregnancy on September 1994. During
the pendency of the case, the RTC, on the respondent’s motion, granted a
P2,000.00 monthly child support, retroactive from March 1995. RTC dismissed
the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The CA consequently set aside the
RTC decision and ordered the petitioner to recognize his minor son Gliffze. It
also reinstated the RTC order for monthly child support. The petitioner argues
that the CA committed a reversible error in rejecting the RTC’s ruling, and that
the evidence on record is insufficient to prove paternity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error when it set aside the RTC’s
findings and ordered the petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to
his minor son Gliffze.

HELD:
The Court DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the ruling of the CA, sustaining
the award of P2,000.00 monthly child support, not finding any reversible error
in the CA’s ruling. In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case
that the petitioner is the putative father of Gliffze through testimony that she
had been sexually involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her
conception. Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the
respondent had intimate relationship. However, the petitioner failed to

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- Newt Gingrich
188. MEDINA vs. MAKABALI and witness her irregular ménage a trois with Casero and the latter’s legitimate
G.R. No. L-26953 wife.
28 March 1969
There is an attempt to allege that Dra. Makabali refuses to surrender the boy
DOCTRINE: in order to coerce Zenaida to pay for the child’s expenses. Given Zenaida’s
The right of parents to the company and custody of their children is but ancillary meager resources, any expectation on Dra. Makabali’s part would be—direct
to the proper discharge of parental duties to provide the children with adequate quote from the Court—“illusory.”
support, education, moral intellectual and civic training and development, as
provided by Art. 356.

FACTS:
In 1961, petitioner Zenaida gave birth to a baby boy named Joseph Casero in
the Makabali Clinic in San Fernando, Pampanga, owned and operated by
respondent Dra. Makabali, an unmarried woman. Zenaida left the child with
Dra. Makabali from his birth, and the latter reared Joseph as her own son. She
had him treated for her expense for polio in Manila, nursed him until his
recovery, and sent him to school. From birth, Zenaida neither visited the child
nor paid for his expenses, until she filed a petition for habeas corpus before the
Pampanga CFI. At trial, it was found that Zenaida lived with a married man,
Feliciano Casero, and their two other children. This arrangement was
apparently at the tolerance of Casero’s lawful wife, who lived elsewhere.
Casero was a mechanic making P400/month, while Zenaida earns P4 to P5 a
day.

When Joseph was called to the witness stand in the presence of both parties,
the CFI found that he never knew his biological mother, Zenaida; the CFI had
to inform him. He repeatedly referred to Dra. Makabali as his “Mommy,” and
when asked with whom he would like to stay, Joseph pointed to the respondent
and said, “Mommy.” When further questioned why, Joseph said, “She is the
one rearing me.” Dra. Makabali promised the CFI that she would allow the
minor a free choice with whom to live upon reaching the age of 14. The CFI
then ruled that it was in the child’s best interest to be left with the respondent.
Zenaida then appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether Zenaida is entitled to custody of the child. — NO. The right to
custody entails the proper discharge of parental duties.

HELD:
Art. 363 of the Civil Code provides that “in all questions on the care, custody,
education, and property of children, the latter’s welfare shall be paramount.”
Further, for compelling reasons, even a child under seven years old may be
ordered separated from his mother. The law has thus created what the civilist
Peña calls “a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor.” Hence, the right of
parents to the company and custody of their children is but ancillary to
the proper discharge of parental duties to provide the children with
adequate support, education, moral intellectual, and civic training and
development, as provided by Art. 356.

As found by the Court, Zenaida was remiss in these duties. She not only failed
to provide the child with love and care: she actually deserted him, not even
visiting him in his tenderest years. No advantage could be derived from
coercing Joseph to leave Dra. Makabali’s care, in order to stay with Zenaida

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189. UNSON vs. NAVARRO
November 17, 1980
DOCTRINE:
It is axiomatic in our jurisprudence that in controversies regarding the custody
of minors the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, education, social
and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective
resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents.
 That Maria Teresa is almost nine (9) years old, born and reared
under the Roman Catholic faith, impressionable, and should not
be exposed to an environment alien to the Catholic way of life,
which is the upbringing and training petitioner, as her father is
committed to:
Upon the other hand, private respondent affirms, among others, that:
own uncle-in-law, the husband of her sister's mother, is hardly of any
consequence now that she has reached a perilous stage in her life. No
respectable father, properly concerned with the moral well-being of his child,
specially a girl, can be expected to have a different attitude than petitioner's in
this case. Under the circumstances thus shown in the record, the Court finds
no alternative than to grant private respondent no more than visitorial rights
over the child in question.

FACTS:
Petition for certiorari to have the order of respondent judge of December 28,
1979 ordering petitioner to produce the child, Maria Teresa Unson, his
daughter barely eight years of age, with private respondent Edita N. Araneta
and return her to the custody of the later, further obliging petitioner to "continue
his support of said daughter by providing for her education and medical needs,"
allegedly issued without a "hearing" and the reception of testimony in violation
of Section 6 of Rule 99. Petitioner and private respondent were married on April
19, 1971 and out of that marriage the child in question, Teresa, was born.
However, they executed an agreement for the separation of their properties
and to live separately, as they have in fact been living separately since June
1972. The agreement was approved by the Court. The parties are agreed that
no specific provision was contained in said agreement about the custody of the
child because the husband and wife would have their own private arrangement
in that respect.
Thus petitioner affirms, among others, that:
 That during the early part of 1978 petitioner personally acquired
knowledge that his wife Edita Araneta has been living with her
brother-in-law Agustin F. Reyes, in an apartment at C. Palma St.,
Makati, Metro Manila. and so petitioner tightened his custody over
his daughter, especially after:
a) he found out that Agustin F. Reyes was confined at
the Makati Medical Center from October 13 up to
December 3, 1977 for "Manic Depressive" disorder,
under the care of Dr. Baltazar Reyes;
b) he found out that his wife Edita Araneta delivered a
child fathered by Agustin F. Reyes on September 24,
1978.
c) he found out that Agustin F. Reyes had been confined
again for the same ailment at the Makati Medical
Center from June 27 up to August 29, 1978 under the
care of the same doctor.
 That on May 21, 1980 Edita Araneta delivered another child
fathered by Agustin F. Reyes.
 That aside from the foregoing circumstances, the following militate
against custody of Maria Teresa in favor of Edita Araneta:
a) Agustin F. Reyes is the child's
godfather/baptismal sponsor;
b) Agustin F. Reyes and Edita Araneta have left
the Roman Catholic Church and have
embraced a protestant sect.
 From 1972 to September, 1979, affiant and petitioner have always
had a cordial and amicable relationship. Even from 1973 when
affiant started living with her brother-in-law, Agustin F. Reyes at
San Lorenzo, Makati, affiant and petitioner retained a cordial
relationship. Petitioner, since 1973, always knew about affiant's
relationship with Agustin F. Reyes. In fact, petitioner would visit
Maria Teresa at affiant's home. Petitioner was always welcome to
pick up Maria Teresa at any time.
 Petitioner, his family, affiants family (Mr. and Mrs. Teodoro
Araneta), affiant's relatives and friends, since 1973, have long
known of and accepted the circumstances involving private
respondent and Agustin F. Reyes;
 Affiant admits that her present circumstances at first impression
might seem socially if not morally unacceptable; but in reality this
is not so. Maria Teresa has been reared and brought up in an
atmosphere of Christian love, affection and honesty to the import
of the situation. Further, the quality and capacity of affiant of being
a good mother has always remained.
The respondent judge ordered the petitioner to produce the child, Maria Teresa
Unson, his daughter barely eight years of age, with private respondent Edita
N. Araneta and return her to the custody of the later.
ISSUE:
Whether or not minor Maria Teresa should be under the custody of her mother.
NO
HELD:
It is axiomatic in our jurisprudence that in controversies regarding the custody
of minors the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, education, social
and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective
resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents. Never
has this Court diverted from that criterion.
With this premise in view, the Court finds no difficulty in this case in seeing that
it is in the best interest of the child Teresa to be freed from the obviously
unwholesome, not to say immoral influence, that the situation in which private
respondent has placed herself, as admitted by her, might create in the moral
and social outlook of Teresa who is now in her formative and most
impressionable stage in her life. The fact, that petitioner might have been
tolerant about her stay with her mother in the past when she was still too young
to distinguish between right and wrong and have her own correct impressions
or notions about the unusual and peculiar relationship of her mother with her

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- Newt Gingrich
190. SAGALA-ESLAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 116773
January 16, 1997

DOCTRINE:
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred
or renounced except in cases authorized by law.

FACTS:
Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married. After their
marriage, the couple stayed with Teresita Eslao, mother of Reynaldo. The
couple had two children namely Leslie and Angelica. Leslie was entrusted to
the care and custody of Maria's mother while Angelica was entrusted with her
parents at Teresita's house. Reynaldo died 4 years later. Maria
intended to bring Angelica to her mother's place but Teresita prevailed and
entrusted to the custody of Angelica. Maria returned to her mother's house and
stayed with Leslie. Years later, Maria married James Manabu-Ouye, a
Japanese-American orthodontist, and she migrated to US with him. A year after
the marriage, Maria returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her children
and bring them to US. Teresita, however, resisted by way of explaining that the
child was entrusted to her when she was 10 days old and accused Maria of
having abandoned Angelica. The trial court rendered a decision where Teresita
was directed to cause the immediate transfer of custody of the child to Maria.
CA affirmed with the lower court's decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Teresita has the right to the custody of the child?

HELD:
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred
or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental
authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority
only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or
an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another,
such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely
temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental
authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the
same.

The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children,
are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and company. In this
case, when Maria entrusted the custody of her minor child to Teresita, what
she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute
abandonment or renunciation of parental authority.

Thus, Teresita does not have the right to the custody of the child.

191. (Same as #189)

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192. REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG vs. CA and
TERESITA MASAUDING
G.R. No. 115640

March 15, 1995

DOCTRINE:
Tender Age Presumption; hence, in the case at bar, the children are now both
over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay
is clear from the record.

FACTS:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met in
Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation
and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital. Teresita left for Los
Angeles, California to work as a nurse. Reynaldo was sent by his employer,
the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison officer
and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship
of husband and wife. On 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born.
While they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita
got married, and upon their return to the United States, their second child, a
son, this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was born on 1988.

The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate.

Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by
Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California.
Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his
assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his
company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma
Layug and her family.

Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and filed the petition
for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over
the children, thus starting the whole proceedings now reaching this Court. The
trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It suspended Teresita's
parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have
sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon
by the parties and to be approved by the Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain custody over the
children be granted.

HELD:
The SC dismissed the writ of habeas corpus petition by the mother and retain
the custody of the children to the father. The illicit or immoral activities of the
mother had already caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and
exposure to conflicting moral values against the children.

The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with
whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications,
Reynaldo is a fit person. The children understand the unfortunate shortcomings
of their mother and have been affected in their emotional growth by her
behavior.

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193. SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 113054
March 16, 1995
DOCTRINE:
When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or
godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and
it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Only in case of the
parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be
exercised by the surviving grandparent.
FACTS:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by
profession, were married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union begot only one child,
Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born July 18, 1987. From the time the boy was
released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had been in the care
and custody of his maternal grandparents, private respondents herein,
Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
the minor. Private respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy,
notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over the grandparents.
The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no
proof that at the present time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy.
While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable, it cannot be construed as
abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision against him and his
efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as serious efforts
to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the
bond between parent and son. The Court also held that his being a soldier is
likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So many men in uniform,
who are assigned to different parts of the country in the service of the nation,
are still the natural guardians of their children.
Also, petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-
laws, though unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him.

On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia
household, where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents
contend that through deceit and false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy
and clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros
Oriental.

The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor
Ward Leouel Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with
Santos, Sr. as respondent. After an ex-parte hearing on October 8, 1990, the
trial court issued an order on the same day awarding custody of the child
Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. Petitioner
appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals. In its decision dated April 30,
1992, respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court's order.

Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court to
award custody of his minor son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the
ground that under Art. 214 of the Family Code, substitute parental authority of
the grandparents is proper only when both parents are dead, absent or
unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according to him, has not been successfully
shown by private respondents.

ISSUE:
Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.?

HELD:
The minor should be given to the legitimate father. When a parent entrusts the
custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a
document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute
a renunciation of parental authority. Only in case of the parents' death, absence
or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving
grandparent.

The court held the contentions of the grandparents are insufficient as to remove
petitioner's parental authority and the concomitant right to have custody over

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194. DAVID vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR. No. 111 180
November 16, 1995

DOCTRINE :
Under Article 213, FC, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise."
Rule 102, Sec. 1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is
separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that
of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole parental
authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child.

FACTS:
Daisie David had an intimate relationship with her boss Ramon Villar, who is
married, and a father of 4 children, all grown-up. They first had a son,
Christopher, who was eventually followed by 2 more girls, Christine and Cathy
Mae. The relationship became known to Villar’s wife when Daisie took
Christopher J, to his house and introduced him to Villar's wife. After this,
Daisie’s were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were even accepted
by his legal family.

Then Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then 6 years old, to go with
his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give
Christopher back and had enrolled him at the Holy Family Academy for the
next school year. Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of
Christopher J. which the RTC granted, giving custody to Daisie and ordering
Villar to give temporary support of P3K a month to the 3 kids and to pay the
costs of suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not custody should be given to Daisie. YES

HELD:
CA ruling reversed, custody granted to Daisie and Villar ordered to give
temporary support in the amount of Php 3,000, pending the fixing of the amount
of support in an appropriate action. Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since
at the time of his conception, his father Villar, was married to another woman
other than his mother.

As such, pursuant to Art. 176, FC, he is under the parental authority of his
mother, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody
of him. And because she has been deprived of her rightful custody of her child
by Villar, Daisie is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.

Rule 102, Sec. 1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is
separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that
of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole parental
authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child. The fact that Villar
has recognized the Christopher may be a ground for ordering him to give
support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Article
213, FC, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise."

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
195. BRIONES vs. MIGUEL
GR. No. 156343
October 18, 2004

DOCTRINE:
Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that
"illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this
Code." This is the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity.

FACTS:
On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus
to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda. The petitioner
alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with
respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996
as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now
married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan. The
petitioner prays that the custody of his son Michael Kevin Pineda be given to
him as his biological father and has demonstrated his capability to support and
educate him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the natural father may be denied the custody and parental care
of his own child in the absence of the mother who is away.

HELD:
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate
child of petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of
the Philippines explicitly provides that "illegitimate children shall use the
surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is the rule regardless of
whether the father admits paternity.

Parental authority over recognized natural children who were under the age of
majority was vested in the father or the mother recognizing them. If both
acknowledge the child, authority was to be exercised by the one to whom it
was awarded by the courts; if it was awarded to both, the rule as to legitimate
children applied. In other words, in the latter case, parental authority resided
jointly in the father and the mother.

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- Newt Gingrich
196. PABLO-GUALBERTO vs. GUALBERTO
G.R. No. 154994
June 28, 2005

DOCTRINE:
Article 213 of the Family Code provided: “Art 213. In case of separation of
parents parental authority shall be exercised by the parent des granted by the
court.

FACTS:
Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition for declaration
of nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn w/ an ancillary prayer for custody pendente
lite of their almost 4 year old son, Rafaello, whom her wife took away w/ her
from their conjugal home and his school when she left him.

The RTC granted the ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite, since the wife
failed to appear despite notice. A house helper of the spouses testified that the
mother does not care for the child as she very often goes out of the house and
even saw her slapping the child. Another witness testified that after surveillance
he found out that the wife is having lesbian relations.

The judge issued the assailed order reversing her previous order, and this time
awarded the custody of the child to the mother. Finding that the reason stated
by Crisanto not to be a compelling reason as provided in Art 213 of the Family
Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the custody of the minor child should be awarded to the mother.

HELD:
Article 213 of the Family Code provided: “Art 213. In case of separation of
parents parental authority shall be exercised by the parent des granted by the
court. The court shall take into account all relevant consideration, especially
the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is
unfit.” No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise,” This Court has
held that when the parents separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing
provision governs the custody of their child. Article 213 takes its bearing from
Article 363 of the Civil Code, which reads: “Art 363. In all question on the care,
custody, education and property pf children, the latter welfare shall be
paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of
age, unless the court finds compelling reason for such measure.”

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- Newt Gingrich
197. SALIENTES vs. ABANILLA alleges that at times when petitioner Marie Antonette is out of the country
GR No. 162734 as required of her job as an international flight stewardess, he, the father,
August 29, 2006 should have custody of their son and not the maternal grandparents.

DOCTRINE:
In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still
entitled to the custody of their child. Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code
deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for the
proper award of custody by the court.
FACTS:
Loran Abanilla and Marie Salientes are the parents of the minor, Lorenzo. They
loved with Marie's parents. Due to in-law problems, Abanilla suggested to his
wife that they transfer to their own house, but Salientes refused. Abanilla left
the house, and was thereafter prevented from seeing his son. Abanilla, in his
personal capacity and as a representative of his son, filed a petition for habeas
corpus and custody before the RTC of Muntinlupa City. The trial court ordered
the Salienteses to produce and bring before the court the body of Lorenzo, and
to show cause why the child should not be discharged from restraint.
Salienteses filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, but it was dismissed. CA
stated that the order of the trial court did not award custody but was simply a
standard order issued for the production of restrained persons. The trial court
was still about to conduct a full inquiry. A subsequent MR was likewise denied.
Salienteses filed the current appeal by certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari against the
trial court's order.
2. Whether the remedy of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is
available to the father
The CA was correct in holding that the order of the trial court did not
grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely directed
petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why they are
restraining his liberty. The assailed order was an interlocutory order
precedent to the trial court’s full inquiry into the issue of custody, which
was still pending before it.
2. Habeas corpus is available to the father.
Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is
withheld from a person entitled thereto. Under Article 211 of the Family
Code, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have joint
parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody.
Further, although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody
has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant
of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of
their child. In the present case, private respondent’s cause of action is
the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his petition.
Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him.
Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial
adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award
of custody by the court. Petitioners can raise it as a counter argument
for private respondent’s petition for custody. But it is not a basis for
preventing the father to see his own child. Nothing in the said provision
disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child under seven years of
age.

HELD:
1. The CA rightfully dismissed the petition for certiorari.

Salientes: the order is contrary to the Family Code which provides that
no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise even
assuming that there were compelling reasons, the proper remedy for
private respondent was simply an action for custody, but not habeas
corpus. Petitioners assert that habeas corpus is unavailable against the
mother who, under the law, has the right of custody of the minor. They
insist there was no illegal or involuntary restraint of the minor by his own
mother. There was no need for the mother to show cause and explain
the custody of her very own child.

Abanilla: the writ of habeas corpus is available against any person who
restrains the minor’s right to see his father and vice versa. He avers that
the instant petition is merely filed for delay, for had petitioners really
intended to bring the child before the court in accordance with the new
rules on custody of minors. Under the law, he and petitioner Marie
Antonette have shared custody and parental authority over their son. He

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
- Newt Gingrich
198. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AIDA MARQUEZ
(NOTE: Criminal case of kidnapping. Tried looking for another
cases pero mao jud ni ang mugawas based sa case citation as
provided for sa syllabus)
FACTS:
Marquez was charged with Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor under
Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code.
That on or about the 6th day of September, 1998, in the City of Makati,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being entrusted with the custody of a minor, JUSTINE
BERNADETTE C. MERANO, a three (3) month old baby girl, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously deliberately fail to restore the latter to her
parent, CAROLINA CUNANAN y MERANO.
After a trip to a beach in Laguna, Marquez allegedly borrowed Merano’s then
three-month old daughter Justine to buy her some clothes, milk and food.
Merano said she agreed because it was not unusual for Marquez to bring
Justine some things whenever she came to the parlor. When Marquez failed
to return Justine in the afternoon as promised, Merano went to her employers’
house to ask them for Marquez’s address. However, Merano said that her
employers just assured her that Justine will be returned to her soon.
Merano averred that she searched for her daughter but her efforts were
unsuccessful until she received a call from Marquez on November 11, 1998.
During that call, Marquez allegedly told Merano that she will return Justine to
Merano the following day and that she was not able to do so because her own
son was sick and was confined at the hospital. Marquez also allegedly asked
Merano for Fifty Thousand Pesos ₱50,000.00 for the expenses that she
incurred while Justine was with her. When the supposed return of Justine did
not happen, Merano claimed that she went to Marquez’s house, using the
sketch that she got from her employers’ driver, but Marquez was not home.
Upon talking to Marquez’s maid, Merano learned that Justine was there for only
a couple of days. Merano left a note for Marquez telling her that she will file a
case against Marquez if Justine is not returned to her.
To defend herself, Marquez proffered her own version of what had happened
during her testimony. Marquez said that she had only formally met Merano on
September 6, 1998 although she had known of her for some time already
because Merano worked as a beautician at the beauty parlor of Marquez’s
financier in her real estate business. Marquez alleged that on that day, Merano
offered Justine to her for adoption. Marquez told Merano that she was not
interested but she could refer her to her friend Modesto Castillo (Castillo). That
very same night, while Marquez was taking care of her son who was then
confined at the Makati Medical Center, Merano allegedly proceeded to
Marquez’s house in Laguna and left Justine with Marquez’s maid. The following
day, while Marquez was at the hospital again, Castillo, accompanied by his
mother, went to Marquez’s house to pick up Justine. Since Marquez was out,
she instructed her maid not to give Justine to Castillo for fear of possible
problems. However, she still found Justine gone upon her return home that
evening. Marquez allegedly learned of the encounter between the Castillos and
Merano when a San Pedro police officer called Marquez to tell her that Merano,
164
accompanied by two police officers, went to Castillo’s house to get Justine.
This was confirmed by Castillo who also called Marquez and told her that
Merano offered Justine to him for adoption.
ISSUE:
WON Marquez is guilty of the crime charged. YES
HELD:
A reading of the charge in the information shows that the act imputed to
Marquez was not the illegal detention of a person, but involves her deliberate
failure to restore a minor baby girl to her parent after being entrusted with said
baby’s custody.
This crime has two essential elements:
(1) The offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor
person; and
(2) The offender deliberately fails to restore the said minor to
his parents or guardians.
This Court, in elucidating on the elements of Article 270, stated that while one
of the essential elements of this crime is that the offender was entrusted with
the custody of the minor, what is actually being punished is not the kidnapping
but the deliberate failure of that person to restore the minor to his parents or
guardians.
It is clear from the records of the case that Marquez was entrusted with the
custody of Justine. Whether this is due to Merano’s version of Marquez
borrowing Justine for the day, or due to Marquez’s version that Merano left
Justine at her house, it is undeniable that in both versions, Marquez agreed to
the arrangement, i.e., to temporarily take custody of Justine. It does not matter,
for the first element to be present, how long said custody lasted as it cannot be
denied that Marquez was the one entrusted with the custody of the minor
Justine. Thus, the first element of the crime is satisfied.
As to the second element, neither party disputes that on September 6, 1998,
the custody of Justine was transferred or entrusted to Marquez. Whether this
lasted for months or only for a couple of days, the fact remains that Marquez
had, at one point in time, physical and actual custody of Justine. Marquez’s
deliberate failure to return Justine, a minor at that time, when demanded to do
so by the latter’s mother, shows that the second element is likewise
undoubtedly present in this case.
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199. BECKETT vs. SARMIENTO
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326
FACTS:
Geoffrey Beckett, an Australian national, was previously married to Eltesa
Densing Beckett, a Filipina. Out of the marriage was born on June 29, 2001,
Geoffrey Beckett, Jr. (Geoffrey, Jr.).
In his Complaint-Affidavit, Beckett alleged that their union was, from the start,
far from ideal. In fact, according to him, they eventually separated and, worse
still, they sued each other.
In 2006, Eltesa filed a case against Beckett for violation of R.A. 7610, otherwise
known as the Violence against Women and Children Act, followed by a suit for
the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Both cases ended in the sala of
Judge Olegario Sarmiento, Jr. For his part, Beckett commenced criminal
charges against Eltesa, one of which was for adultery.
The couple’s initial legal battle ended when Judge Sarmiento, on September
25, 2006, rendered judgment based on a compromise agreement in which
Eltesa and Beckett agreed and undertook, among others, to cause the
dismissal of all pending civil and criminal cases each may have filed against
the other. They categorically agreed too that Beckett shall have full and
permanent custody over Geoffrey, Jr., then five (5) years old, subject to the
visitorial rights of Eltesa.
Thereafter, Beckett left for Australia, taking Geoffrey, Jr. with him. As with his
three other children from previous relationships, so Beckett alleged, he cared
and provided well for Geoffrey, Jr. Moreover, as agreed upon, they would come
and see Eltesa in Cebu every Christmas.
In 2007, Beckett obtained a divorce from Eltesa in Australia. This
notwithstanding, the yearly Christmas visits continued. In the 2010 visit,
Beckett consented to have Geoffrey, Jr. stay with Eltesa even after the
holidays, provided she return the child on January 9, 2011. January 9 came
and went but Geoffrey, Jr. remained with Eltesa, prompting Beckett to file a
petition against Eltesa for violation of RA 7610. Docketed as Sp. Proc. No.
18182-CEB, this petition was again raffled to the sala of Judge Sarmiento. And
because Geoffrey remained in the meantime in the custody of Eltesa, Beckett
later applied in Sp. Proc. No. 18182-CEB for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus.
Beckett further relates that, during the March 1, 2011 conference on the
application for habeas corpus, Geoffrey, Jr., then nine (9) years old, displayed
inside the courtroom hysterical conduct, shouting and crying, not wanting to let
go of Eltesa and acting as though, he, the father, was a total stranger. Despite
Geoffrey Jr.’s outburst, Judge Sarmiento issued an Order5, dated March 1,
2011, directing inter alia the following: (1) Eltesa to return Geoffrey, Jr. to
Beckett; and (2) Beckett to bring the child in the pre-trial conference set for
March 15, 2001.
For some reason, the turnover of Geoffrey, Jr. to Beckett did not materialize.
165
Beckett also alleged that while waiting for the March 15, 2011 pre-trial
conference to start, he saw one Helen Sy, purportedly a close friend of Eltesa,
enter Judge Sarmiento’s chambers. Then, during the conference itself, Eltesa
moved for reconsideration of the court’s March 1, 2011 Order, praying that it
be set aside insofar as it directed her to return the custody of Geoffrey, Jr. to
Beckett. To this partial motion, Beckett requested, and was granted, a period
of five (5) days to file his comment/opposition. Additionally, Beckett sought the
immediate implementation of the said March 1, 2011 Order. But instead of
enforcing said order and/or waiting for Beckett’s comment, Judge Sarmiento,
in open court, issued another order giving Eltesa provisional custody over
Geoffrey, Jr. and at the same time directing the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD) to conduct a social case study on the child.
Hence petitioner filed a case for gross ignorance of the law against the judge
for granting provisional custody to the mother of the child.
ISSUE:
WON the Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law despite the existence of
a prior compromise agreement thus violating res judicata? NO
RULING:
Respondent judge, in granting provisional custody over Geoffrey, Jr. in favor
of his mother, Eltesa, did not disregard the res judicata rule. The more
appropriate description of the legal situation engendered by the March 15,
2011 Order issued amidst the persistent plea of the child not to be returned to
his father, is that respondent judge exhibited fidelity to jurisprudential command
to accord primacy to the welfare and interest of a minor child. As it were, the
matter of custody, to borrow from Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, "is not
permanent and unalterable and can always be re-examined and adjusted." And
as aptly observed in a separate opinion in Dacasin v. Dacasin, a custody
agreement can never be regarded as "permanent and unbending," the simple
reason being that the situation of the parents and even of the child can change,
such that sticking to the agreed arrangement would no longer be to the latter’s
best interest. In a very real sense, then, a judgment involving the custody of a
minor child cannot be accorded the force and effect of res judicata.
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200. VANCIL vs. BELMES
GR No. 132223
June 19, 2001

FACTS:
The RTC appointed Bonifacia Vancil, an American citizen, as legal and judicial
guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie and Vincent, the children of
her deceased son Reeder.

Helen Belmes, the natural mother of the minor children, instituted a motion for
removal of Guardianship and Appointment of Vancil, asserting that she is the
natural mother in custody of and exercising parental authority over the subject
minors.

Trial court rejected Belmes'petition. The CA reversed the RTC order.

Since Valerie had reached the age of majority at the time the case reached the
SC, the Court resolves to determine who between the mother and grandmother
of minor Vincent should be his guardian.

ISSUE:
Whether Helen Belmes is the sole guardian of the minor Vincent. YES

HELD:
Belmes, being the natural mother of Vincent, has the preferential right to be his
guardian.

Art. 211 of the FC states: "The father and the mother shall jointly exercise
parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of
disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order
to the contrary. xxx."

Vancil, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority

only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of Belmes.

Considering that Belmes is still alive and has exercised continuously parental
authority over Vincent, Vancil has to prove Belmes' unsuitability.

Assuming that Belmes is unfit as a guardian of Vincent, still Vancil cannot

qualify as a substitute guardian. She admitted in her petition that an expatriate
like her will find difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian.

As the Court held in Guerrero vs. Teran, the courts should not appoint persons
as guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of the courts as they will find it
difficult to protect the wards.

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201. ST. MARY’S vs. CARPITANOS the immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of SMA or the
G.R. No. 143363 reckless driving of James, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of
February 6, 2002 the jeep. Hence reliance on Art. 219, of the Family Code is unfounded.

FACTS:
Defendant-appellant St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an
enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment
campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were
studying. As a student of St. Mary’s Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of
the campaigning group.
Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school students
were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on
their way to Larayan Elementary School, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by
James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school. Allegedly,
the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned
turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the
accident. The parents of Sherwin filed a case against James Daniel II and his
parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio
Villanueva and St. Mary’s Academy before the RTC of Dipolog City and
claimed for damages.
Further, it was Ched the grandson of the vehicle owner Vivencio who allowed
the minor James to drive the jeep at the time of the accident. The school did
not allow James to drive the jeep. So whether the accident was caused by the
reckless driving of James or the mechanical detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep, the school could not be held liable since these are events
which it had no control. If the school may be considered negligent, it was only
the remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury,
there intervened the negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment of
the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
At any rate, since it is clear that the accident occurred because of
the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school but
the registered owner of the vehicle who should be held responsible for
damages for the death of Sherwin. Registered owner of any vehicle, even if not
used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third
persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the
highways or streets.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner St. Mary’s Academy is liable for damages for the
death of Sherwin Carpitanos.

RULING:
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental
authority over a minor child while under their supervision, instruction or
custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual,
entity or institution engaged in child care.

This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized

activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or
institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips,
excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school
premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.

Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor,
those exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable
for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor
while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.

However, for the school to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or
omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the death or
injury sustained. Injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate
consequence of the wrong done. Negligence, no matter in what it consists,
cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury
complained of. And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.

In this case, the parents of Sherwin failed to show that the proximate cause of
the accident was the negligence of the school authorities. They admitted that

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Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
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202. CHILD LEARNING CENTER INC. vs. SPS LIMON
G.R. No. 150920
November 25, 2005
FACTS:
Timothy Tagoria (Timothy) was a grade IV student at Marymount School, an
academic institution operated and maintained by Child Learning Center, Inc.
(CLC). One afternoon, he found himself locked inside the boy’s comfort room
in Marymount. He started to panic so he banged and kicked the door and yelled
for help. No help arrived. He then decided to open the window to call for help.
As he opened the window, Timothy went right through and fell down three
stories. Timothy was hospitalized and given medical treatment for serious
multiple physical injuries. He, assisted by his parents, filed a civil action against
the CLC, the members of its Board of Directors which includes the Spouses
Limon. They claim that the school was negligent for not installing iron grills at
the window of the boy’s comfort room. CLC, in its defense, maintained that
there was nothing defective about the locking mechanism of the door and that
the fall of Timothy was not due to its fault or negligence. CLC further maintained
that it had exercised the due care and diligence of a good father of a family to
ensure the safety, well-being and convenience of its students. The trial court
ruled in favor of the respondents. The respondents proceeded their appeal to
the Court of Appeals who affirmed the trial court’s ruling in toto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the school was negligent for the boy’s accidental fall. YES
RULING:
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove
by a preponderance of evidence:
(1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff;
(2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other
person for whose act he must respond;
(3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence and the damages incurred.
In this tort case, respondents contend that CLC failed to provide precautionary
measures to avoid harm and injury to its students in two instances:
(1) failure to fix a defective door knob despite having been
notified of the problem; and
(2) failure to install safety grills on the window where Timothy
fell from. During trial, it was found that the lock was
defective.
The architect witness testified that he did not verify if the doorknob at the
comfort room was actually put in place. Further, the fact that Timothy fell out
through the window shows that the door could not be opened from the inside.
That sufficiently points to the fact that something was wrong with the door, if
not the door knob, under the principle of res ipsa loquitor.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies where:
(1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an
inference that it would not have happened except for the
defendant’s negligence;
168
(2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive management or control
of the person charged with the negligence complained of;
and
(3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action
or contribution on the part of the person injured.
Petitioners are clearly answerable for failure to see to it that the doors of their
school toilets are at all times in working condition. The fact that a student had
to go through the window, instead of the door, shows that something was
wrong with the door. As to the absence of grills on the window, petitioners
contend that there was no such requirement under the Building Code.
Nevertheless, the fact is that such window, as petitioners themselves point
out, was approximately 1.5 meters from the floor, so that it was within reach of
a student who finds the regular exit, the door, not functioning.
Petitioners, with the due diligence of a good father of the family, should have
anticipated that a student, locked in the toilet by a non-working door, would
attempt to use the window to call for help or even to get out. Considering all
the circumstances, therefore, there is sufficient basis to sustain a finding of
liability on petitioners’ part.
Petitioners’ argument that CLC exercised the due diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and supervision of its employees is not decisive. Due
diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is applicable where the
employer is being held responsible for the acts or omissions of others under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. In this case, CLC’s liability is under Article 2176
of the Civil Code, premised on the fact of its own negligence in not ensuring
that all its doors are properly maintained. The Court’s pronouncement that
Timothy climbed out of the window because he could not get out using the
door, negates petitioners’ other contention that the proximate cause of the
accident was Timothy’s own negligence. The injuries he sustained from the fall
were the product of a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
intervening cause, which originated from CLC’s own negligence.
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203. SCHOOL OF THE HOLY SPIRIT OF QUEZON CITY and/or SR.
CRISPINA A. TOLENTINO vs. CORAZON P. TAGUIAM
G.R. No. 165565
July 14, 2008
DOCTRINE:
As a teacher who stands in loco parentis to her pupils, respondent should have
made sure that the children were protected from all harm while in her company.
In this case, respondent created an unsafe situation which exposed the lives
of all the pupils concerned to real danger. This is a clear violation not only of
the trust and confidence reposed on her by the parents of the pupils but of the
school itself, with damages going as far as claiming the life of a child, hence,
her dismissal was valid.
FACTS:
Respondent Taguiam was the class adviser of a Grade 5 class of petitioner
school. After obtaining permission from the principal, they were allowed to use
the school swimming pool for their year-end activity. With this, respondent
Taguiam distributed the parent’s/guardian’s permit forms to the students.
has allowed her to join it by personally bringing her to the school with her
packed lunch and swimsuit. Second, it was respondent’s responsibility as
Class Adviser to supervise her class in all activities sanctioned by the school.
Thus, she should have coordinated with the school to ensure that proper
safeguards, such as adequate first aid and sufficient adult personnel, were
present during their activity. She should have been mindful of the fact that with
the number of pupils involved, it would be impossible for her by herself alone
to keep an eye on each one of them.
As a teacher who stands in loco parentis to her pupils, respondent should have
made sure that the children were protected from all harm while in her company.
Respondent should have known that leaving the pupils in the swimming pool
area all by themselves may result in an accident. A simple reminder "not to go
to the deepest part of the pool" was insufficient to cast away all the serious
dangers that the situation presented to the children, especially when
respondent knew that Chiara Mae cannot swim. Dismally, respondent created
an unsafe situation which exposed the lives of all the pupils concerned to real
danger. This is a clear violation not only of the trust and confidence reposed
on her by the parents of the pupils but of the school itself.

The permit form of student Chiara Mae was unsigned. But because the mother Notably, respondent’s negligence, although gross, was not habitual. In view of
personally brought her to the school with her packed lunch and swimsuit, the considerable resultant damage, however, the SC agreed that the cause is
Taguiam concluded that the mother allowed her to join. Before the activity sufficient to dismiss respondent.
started, respondent warned the pupils who did not know how to swim to avoid
the deeper area. However, while the pupils were swimming, two of them Indeed, the sufficiency of the evidence as well as the resultant damage to the
sneaked out. employer should be considered in the dismissal of the employee. In this case,
the damage went as far as claiming the life of a child.
Respondent went after them to verify where they were going. Unfortunately,
while respondent was away, Chiara Mae drowned. When respondent returned,
the maintenance man was already administering cardiopulmonary
resuscitation on Chiara Mae. She was still alive when respondent rushed her
to the General Malvar Hospital where she was pronounced dead on arrival.

The petitioner school conducted a clarificatory hearing to which respondent

attended and submitted her Affidavit of Explanation. A month later, petitioner
school dismissed respondent on the ground of gross negligence resulting to
loss of trust and confidence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent’s dismissal on the ground of gross negligence
resulting to loss of trust and confidence was valid. YES

RULING:
Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, gross and habitual neglect of duties is a
valid ground for an employer to terminate an employee. Gross negligence
implies a want or absence of or a failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or
the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences
without exerting any effort to avoid them. Habitual neglect implies repeated
failure to perform one’s duties for a period of time, depending upon the
circumstances.

The SC concluded that respondent had been grossly negligent. First, it is

undisputed that Chiara Mae’s permit form was unsigned. Yet, respondent
allowed her to join the activity because she assumed that Chiara Mae’s mother

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204. AQUINAS SCHOOL vs. INTON

FACTS:
The Sps. Inton filed an action for damages and a criminal case on behalf of
their son Jose Luis where the latter was Sister Yamyamin, his religion teacher,
kicked him on the legs several times and shove his head on his classmate’s
seat for his behavior during class. Yamyamin plead guilty and was sentenced
accordingly.

The Intons sought to recover actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well
as attys fees for the hurt suffered by Jose Luis. Yamyamin was held liable to
him for moral damages of P25k, exemplary damages of P25k, and attys fees
of P10k.

Not satisfied with the award, the Intons elevated the case to the CA and asked
that the award be increased and hold Aquinas School solidarily liable with
Yamyamin. The CA found that the school is solidarily liable with Yamyamin.
Finding that there was an employer-employee relation existed between the
two.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Aquinas School is solidarily liable with Yamyamin. NO

HELD:
The Court has consistently applied the “four-fold test” to determine the
existence of an employer-employee relationship: the employer (a) selects and
engages the employee; (b) pays his wages; (c) has power to dismiss him; and
(d) has control over his work. Of these, the most crucial is the element of
control. Control refers to the right of the employer, whether actually exercised
or reserved, to control the work of the employee as well as the means and
methods by which he accomplishes the same.

In this case, the school directress testified that Aquinas had an agreement
with a congregation of sisters under which, in order to fulfill its ministry,
the congregation would send religion teachers to Aquinas to provide
catechesis to its students. Aquinas insists that it was not the school but
Yamyamin’s religious congregation that chose her for the task of catechizing
the school’s grade three students, much like the way bishops designate the
catechists who would teach religion in public schools. Under the
circumstances, it was quite evident that Aquinas did not have control over
Yamyamin’s teaching methods. The Intons had not refuted the school
directress testimony in this regard. Consequently, it was error for the CA to
hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin.

Regarding the Intons plea for an award of greater amounts of damages, the
Court finds no justification for this since they did not appeal from the decision
of the CA. The Intons prayed for the increase only in their comment to the
petition. They thus cannot obtain from this Court any affirmative relief other
than those that the CA already granted them in its decision.

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205. MARIA TERESA Y. CUADRA vs. ALFONSO MONFORT her suffering, the obligation has no legal sanction enforceable in court, but
G.R. No. L-24101 only the moral compulsion of good conscience.
September 30, 1970

FACTS:
Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates in
Grade Six at the Mabini Elementary School in Bacolod City. On July 9, 1962
their teacher assigned them, together with three other classmates, to weed the
grass in the school premises. While thus engaged, Monfort found a plastic
headband, an ornamental object commonly worn by young girls over their hair.

Jokingly she said aloud that she had found an earthworm and, evidently to
frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her. At that precise moment the
latter turned around to face her friend, and the object hit her right eye. Smarting
from the pain, she rubbed the injured part and treated it with some powder.

The next day, July 10, the eye became swollen and it was then that the girl
related the incident to her parents, who thereupon took her to a doctor for
treatment. She underwent surgical operation twice, first on July 20 and again
on August 4, 1962, and stayed in the hospital for a total of twenty-three days.
Despite the medical efforts, however, Maria Teresa Cuadra completely lost the
sight of her right eye.

ISSUE:
What is the liability of a parent for an act of his minor child which causes
damage to another?

HELD:
In this case, NONE.

What is the exact degree of diligence contemplated, and how does a parent
prove it in connection with a particular act or omission of a minor child,
especially when it takes place in his absence or outside his immediate
company? Obviously there can be no meticulously calibrated measure
applicable; and when the law simply refers to "all the diligence of a good father
of the family to prevent damage," it implies a consideration of the attendant
circumstances in every individual case, to determine whether or not by the
exercise of such diligence the damage could have been prevented.

In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the
defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care,
or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in
failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his
child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as
he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the
teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was
an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent,
however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard
against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the
child's character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for
which the blame could be attributed to her parents.

The victim, no doubt, deserves no little commiseration and sympathy for the
tragedy that befell her. But if the defendant is at all obligated to compensate

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- Newt Gingrich
206. REPUBLIC vs. NORA FE SAGUN
G.R. No. 187567
February 15, 2012

FACTS:
Nora Fe Sagun is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national,
and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in
Baguio City and did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority. In 2005, Sagun applied for a Philippine passport. Her application was
denied due to the citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on
her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently,
she sought a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship
averring that she was raised as a Filipino and she is a registered voter in
Baguio City and had voted in local and national elections as shown in the Voter
Certification. She asserted that by virtue of her positive acts, she has effectively
elected Philippine citizenship and such fact should be annotated on her record
of birth so as to entitle her to the issuance of a Philippine passport.

After hearing, the trial court granted the petition and declaring Sagun a Filipino
citizen. Petitioner, through the OSG, directly filed a petition for review on
certiorari, pointing out that Sagun failed to comply with the procedural
requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship.

ISSUE:
WON the respondent is a Filipino citizen. NO

HELD:
When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing charter was the
1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the
citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father
followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority,
the child elected Philippine citizenship.

Being a legitimate child, respondent’s citizenship followed that of her father

who is Chinese, unless upon reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine
citizenship. It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship
of the father and that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of
the mother and follow her nationality. An illegitimate child of Filipina need not
perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to
citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself. But in
the case of respondent, for her to be considered a Filipino citizen, she must
have validly elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority.However, Respondent failed to comply with the procedural
requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship.

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208. NERI vs. HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY
(2012)
FACTS:
During her lifetime, Anunciacion Neri (Anunciacion) had seven children, two (2)
from her first marriage with Gonzalo Illut (Gonzalo), namely: Eutropia and
Victoria, and five (5) from her second marriage with Enrique Neri (Enrique),
namely: Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and Rosa. Throughout the
marriage of spouses Enrique and Anunciacion, they acquired several
homestead properties with a total area of 296,555 square meters located in
Samal, Davao del Norte, embraced by Original Certificates of Title.
On September 21, 1977, Anunciacion died intestate. Her husband, Enrique, in
his personal capacity and as natural guardian of his minor children Rosa and
Douglas, together with Napoleon, Alicia, and Visminda executed an Extra-
Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale on July 7, 1979,
adjudicating among themselves the said homestead properties, and thereafter,
conveying them to the late spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy
(spouses Uy) for a consideration of ₱ 80,000.00.
On June 11, 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of
sale of the said homestead properties against spouses Uy (later substituted by
their heirs) before the RTC assailing the validity of the sale for having been
sold within the prohibited period. The complaint was later amended to include
Eutropia and Victoria as additional plaintiffs for having been excluded and
deprived of their legitimes as children of Anunciacion from her first marriage.
In their amended answer with counterclaim, the heirs of Uy countered that the
sale took place beyond the 5-year prohibitory period from the issuance of the
homestead patents. They also denied knowledge of Eutropia and Victoria’s
exclusion from the extrajudicial settlement and sale of the subject properties.
The RTC Ruling: It ruled that while the sale occurred beyond the 5-year
prohibitory period, the sale is still void because Eutropia and Victoria were
deprived of their hereditary rights and that Enrique had no judicial authority to
sell the shares of his minor children, Rosa and Douglas.
The CA Ruling: It held that, while Eutropia and Victoria had no knowledge of
the extrajudicial settlement and sale of the subject properties and as such,
were not bound by it, the CA found it unconscionable to permit the annulment
of the sale considering spouses Uy’s possession thereof for 17 years, and that
Eutropia and Victoria belatedly filed their action in 1997, or more than two years
from knowledge of their exclusion as heirs in 1994 when their stepfather died.
It, however, did not preclude the excluded heirs from recovering their legitimes
from their co-heirs.
Similarly, the CA declared the extrajudicial settlement and the subsequent sale
as valid and binding with respect to Enrique and his children, holding that as
co-owners, they have the right to dispose of their respective shares as they
consider necessary or fit. While recognizing Rosa and Douglas to be minors at
that time, they were deemed to have ratified the sale when they failed to
question it upon reaching the age of majority. It also found laches to have set
in because of their inaction for a long period of time.
174
ISSUE:
Whether or not the extrajudicial settlement and sale is valid and binding among
the minor heirs. VALID FOR ROSA DUE TO RATIFICATION, BUT NOT FOR
DOUGLAS
RULING:
All the petitioners herein are indisputably legitimate children of Anunciacion
from her first and second marriages with Gonzalo and Enrique, respectively,
and consequently, are entitled to inherit from her in equal shares, pursuant to
Articles 979 and 980 of the Civil Code.
As such, upon the death of Anunciacion on September 21, 1977, her children
and Enrique acquired their respective inheritances, entitling them to their pro
indiviso shares in her whole estate.
Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with
Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacion
should have participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were
admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly
represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them and
consequently, a total nullity.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by
agreement between heirs. – x x x
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or
administration shall be published in a newspaper of
general circulation in the manner provided in the
next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person who
has not participated therein or had no notice
thereof.
With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the execution
of the settlement and sale, their natural guardian and father, Enrique,
represented them in the transaction. However, on the basis of the laws
prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely clothed with powers of
administration and bereft of any authority to dispose of their 2/16 shares in the
estate of their mother, Anunciacion.
Articles 320 and 326 of the Civil Code, the laws in force at the time of the
execution of the settlement and sale, provide:
ART. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother,
is the legal administrator of the property pertaining
to the child under parental authority. If the property
is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father
or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval
of the Court of First Instance.
ART. 326. When the property of the child is worth
more than two thousand pesos, the father or
mother shall be considered a guardian of the child’s
Perseverance is the hard work you do after you get tired of doing the hard work you already did.
property, subject to the duties and obligations of
guardians under the Rules of Court.
Corollarily, Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court also provides:
SEC. 7. Parents as Guardians. – When the
property of the child under parental authority is
worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the
mother, without the necessity of court appointment,
shall be his legal guardian. When the property of
the child is worth more than two thousand pesos,
the father or the mother shall be considered
guardian of the child’s property, with the duties and
obligations of guardians under these Rules, and
shall file the petition required by Section 2 hereof.
For good reasons, the court may, however, appoint
another suitable person.
Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the
receipt of fruits according to the natural purpose of the thing. Any act of
disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the substance of the patrimony of
child, exceeds the limits of administration. Thus, a father or mother, as the
natural guardian of the minor under parental authority, does not have the power
to dispose or encumber the property of the latter. Such power is granted by law
only to a judicial guardian of the ward’s property and even then only with courts’
prior approval secured in accordance with the proceedings set forth by the
Rules of Court.
Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of his minor
children without the proper judicial authority, unless ratified by them upon
reaching the age of majority, is unenforceable in accordance with Articles 1317
and 1403(1) of the Civil Code which provide:
ART. 1317. No one may contract in the name of
another without being authorized by the latter or
unless he has by law a right to represent him.
A contract entered into in the name of another by
one who has no authority or legal representation,
or who has acted beyond his powers, shall be
unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or
impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has
been executed, before it is revoked by the other
contracting party.
ART. 1403. The following contracts are
unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into the name of another person
by one who has been given no authority or legal
representation, or who has acted beyond his
powers; xxx
Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily adopts and gives
sanction to some unauthorized act or defective proceeding, which without his
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- Newt Gingrich
sanction would not be binding on him. It is this voluntary choice, knowingly
made, which amounts to a ratification of what was theretofore unauthorized,
and becomes the authorized act of the party so making the ratification. Once
ratified, expressly or impliedly such as when the person knowingly received
benefits from it, the contract is cleansed from all its defects from the moment it
was constituted, as it has a retroactive effect.

Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial settlement of
the estate with absolute deed of sale. In Napoleon and Rosa’s Manifestation
before the RTC dated July 11, 1997, they stated:

"Concerning the sale of our parcel of land executed by our father, Enrique Neri
concurred in and conformed to by us and our other two sisters and brother (the
other plaintiffs), in favor of Hadji Yusop Uy and his spouse Hadja Julpa Uy on
July 7, 1979, we both confirmed that the same was voluntary and freely made
by all of us and therefore the sale was absolutely valid and enforceable as far
as we all plaintiffs in this case are concerned;"

In their June 30, 1997 Joint-Affidavit, Napoleon and Rosa also alleged:

"That we are surprised that our names are included in this case since we do
not have any intention to file a case against Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim
Uy and their family and we respect and acknowledge the validity of the Extra-
Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale dated July 7,
1979;"

Clearly, the foregoing statements constituted ratification of the settlement of

the estate and the subsequent sale, thus, purging all the defects existing at the
time of its execution and legitimizing the conveyance of Rosa’s 1/16 share in
the estate of Anunciacion to spouses Uy. The same, however, is not true with
respect to Douglas for lack of evidence showing ratification.

Considering, thus, that the extrajudicial settlement with sale is invalid and
therefore, not binding on Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, only the shares of
Enrique, Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda and Rosa in the homestead properties
have effectively been disposed in favor of spouses Uy. "A person can only sell
what he owns, or is authorized to sell and the buyer can as a consequence
acquire no more than what the seller can legally transfer." On this score, Article
493 of the Civil Code is relevant, which provides:

Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage
it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal
rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect
to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in
the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

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