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Chapter-II

Anthropocentrism

The term anthropocentrism comes from the Greek words ‘anthropos’ and

‘kentron’. ‘Anthropos’ means ‘human being’ and ‘kentron’ means ‘center’. So,

etymologically, anthropocentrism means humancentredness. It thus refers to the

belief or world-view that humans are at the center of the universe.

Anthropocentrism is often identified as the (theoretical) root-cause of present-day

eco-crisis, human overpopulation, and the extinctions of many non-human species.

It is believed to be the central problematique of contemporary environmental

philosophy. It is used to draw attention to a systematic bias in traditional Western

attitudes to the non-human world. This anthropocentrism may be understood from

different perspectives, and as such, we may start our discussion by taking into

account different types of anthropocentrism: ontological anthropocentrism,

cosmological anthropocentrism, epistemological anthropocentrism, teleological

anthropocentrism, and, of course, moral anthropocentrism.

Ontological Anthropocentrism

Ontological anthropocentrism represents the position that man is the sole object or

perspective of philosophical or metaphysical knowledge, flourished mainly in the

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nineteenth century and twentieth century continental philosophy, known as

existentialism, hermeneutics, etc. Søren Kierkegaard, a Danish existentialist (who

is regarded as the father of existentialism), iterates that the most authentic being is

concrete human existence. Friedrich Nietzsche argued that man does not depend

absolutely upon anyone, not even upon God. Wilhelm Dilthey thought of man as

an individual who is not only involved in history, but is the central point of history.

For Ludwig Feuerbach, too, man is the most perfect product of nature, and culture

is the projection of men. Max Scheler is regarded as the propounder of

philosophical anthropocentrism, most typical of the twentieth century. In his The

Place of Man in Nature Scheler depicts man as a spiritual personality who turns

toward himself, and also transcends the world.

The concrete character of philosophical analysis distinguishes this style of

philosophy from the philosophy of the subject (like that of Kant or Hegel).

Existentialism aims at an ontology of the concrete human person who bears the

unrepeatable mark of individuality. However, the anthropocentric character of this

philosophy is varied among the existentialists because of different types of analysis

of human existence. It reflects differences in their conception of existential

experiences and their evaluation of authentic beinghood. According to Martin

Heidegger, human being is ontologically prior to anything else. He begins his

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analysis of being by pointing to the fact that man often loses this consciousness of

his own existence and responsibility for it. For Jean-Paul Sartre, the starting point

is a distinction between conscious human existence (being-for-itself) and the

existence of things lacking consciousness (being-in-itself), and the main thesis of

the system is the aspiration to separate man from the world of unconscious things,

the world of nature.

Ontological anthropocentrism is also evident in the thoughts of certain

natural scientists with philosophical orientation, viz. in the thoughts of Pierre

Teilhard de Chardin, M. Bonen, N. M. Bollem, T. H. Huxley, among others.1 For

example, Teilhard de Chardin advocates for cosmic evolution, his theory is all-

embracing and characterizes much more than living things. It may be seen as the

result of a reaction to the view of naive anthropocentrism that man is the center of

the world in view of the central position of the earth, which was dominant till the

sixteenth or seventeenth century. On the other hand, it may be read as a reaction to

an incomplete conception of man, since only his or her individuality was given

importance, and the ‘human phenomenon’ was overlooked. In such a vision of

man, an individual’s nature is parcelled and his integrity is thus lost. Some thinkers

considered man in the bodily aspect, others in the spiritual aspect. The integral man

as object and subject, according to this type of anthropocentrism, holds a polar

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position in the world and marks the major axis of the world, gives meaning to

history, and is the only absolute index of evolution.

It is often reminded that man is the last link of the evolution of nature.

Man’s ability to direct the world and the course of evolution according to a

preconceived end results from his exceptional position in evolutionary

development. Teilhard de Chardin, in particular, develops this thought and

contends that man is the center of the universe, he perceives himself in everything,

and in terms of his being he stands at the summit of the universe, he is an ‘arrow in

flight’ which by the development of its psyche affirms reality and gives meaning to

the sublimation of consciousness. Man’s capacity for self-conscious thought and

the production of cultures has added a new ‘layer’ to the earth’s surface, which

Teilhard calls the ‘noosphere’ (i.e., the thinking layer) distinct from, yet

superimposed on the biosphere. The noosphere forms the unique environment of

man, marking him off from all other animals.2

Epistemological Anthropocentrism

Epistemological anthropocentrism is the position, according to which any

discussion of knowledge begins from an analysis of consciousness, a position

whose starting point is the human consciousness as the sole subject and object of

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philosophical analysis. On this view, it is only human being in reference to which

we can speak of knowledge. Epistemological anthropocentrism is visible in the

history of modern philosophy, namely in Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, Berkeley, and

Hume, and it is characteristic of the philosophy of Kant. Kant, e.g., seeks in the

subject the meaning of that which is, and argues that the truth of judgments does

not consist in a correspondence of their contents with an affirmed or denied state-

of-affairs that objectively exists, but has its foundation in internal subjective

relations. According to Kant, man is a conscious being for whom there is nothing

except wonder and astonishment on account of his superiority over all concrete

ends that motivate him to act or not to act. Hence the human reason is the object of

philosophy, for the knowledge of one’s own self is a condition for understanding

the world. Fichte followed Kant and attempted to analyze human consciousness as

autonomous and independent of the influence of natural conditions. Knowledge of

this consciousness is supposed to be knowledge of man as a free being. According

to Fichte, man is responsible not only for himself but for all the domains of his

activity, for the entire environment. The starting point in this philosophy was the

understanding of man as a free being and the explanation of his relation with the

external world. In Hegel’s approach, nature exists only to produce man who

produces history; only man has the awareness of freedom and wants to make the

world his property, to know it and dominate it. The Cartesian project of philosophy
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as thought turned toward oneself finds implications also in phenomenological

philosophy which was a reflection of cognition, an attempt to reach at the

transcendental subject hidden from natural consciousness as the principle

(‘source’) of phenomena, reducing all reality to absolute subjectivity. For Husserl

man is the only rational subject who comprehends himself adequately in cognition.

Accordingly, our consciousness in its mode of pure, intentional subjectivity

gives meaning to the world. Husserl comes to the point of saying that nothing

is, except by proper achievement of consciousness, whether actual or

potential. He reiterates that the task of philosophy is to understand being, and

as such, it must find a method that could penetrate into the depth of

subjectivity wherein being has its source. Such a method would explain the

constitution of being by the transcendental subjectivity.3

Cosmological Anthropocentrism

Cosmological anthropocentrism is the theory, according to which humans occupy a

privileged place in this cosmos, in this natural order. In astrophysics and

cosmology this theory refers to the philosophical argument that observations of the

physical universe must be compatible with conscious human life that observes it,

that means, there must be humans for the physical universe to exist meaningfully.

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Some proponents of the argument contend that it explains why the universe has the

age and the fundamental physical elements necessary to accommodate conscious

life. As a result, they believe in the fact that the universe's fundamental constants

happen to fall within the narrow range of thought to allow life. And thus humans

are at the centre of the cosmos.

The strong version of cosmological anthropocentrism states that this is all

the case because the universe is compelled, in some sense, to have conscious life

eventually to emerge. On the other hand, in a sufficiently large universe, some

worlds might evolve conscious life regardless of adverse conditions. Douglas

Adams used the metaphor of a living puddle examining its own shape, since, to

those living creatures, the universe may appear to fit them perfectly (while, in fact,

they simply fit the universe perfectly).4 Critics argue in favor of a weak version,

similar to the one defined by Brandon Carter, which states that the universe’s

ostensible fine tuning is the result of selection bias, i.e. in the long term, only

survivors can observe and report their location in time and space.5

Cosmological anthropocentrism is formulated as a response to a series of

observations that the laws of nature and parameters of the universe take on values

that are consistent with conditions for life as we know it rather than a set of values

that would not be consistent with life as observed on the earth. This view of natural
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order states that this phenomenon is a necessity because living observers would not

be able to exist, and hence, observe the universe, were these laws and constants not

constituted in this way. As a matter-of-fact, this view first appeared in Brandon

Carter’s contribution to a 1973 Krakow Symposium honouring Copernicus’s 500th

birthday. Carter, a theoretical astrophysicist, articulated the Anthropocentric

Principle in reaction to the Copernican Principle, which states that humans do not

occupy a privileged position in the universe. As Carter said, “Although our

situation is not necessarily central, it is inevitably privileged to some extent.”6

Specifically, Carter disagrees with the effort to use the Copernican principle to

justify the Perfect Cosmological Principle, which states that all large regions and

times in the universe must be statistically identical. Carter defined two forms of the

this principle, a ‘weak’ one which refers only to anthropocentric selection of

privileged space-time locations in the universe, and a more controversial ‘strong’

form which addresses the values of the fundamental constants of physics.7

Teleological Anthropocentrism

‘Telos’ means goal, and, as such, teleology signifies goal-directedness or

purposefulness. Thus, etymologically, teleological anthropocentrism is the view

that everything is made for the sake of humanity, and evolution of animals and

plants for the benefit of humans only. Teleological activity, as against mechanical
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activity, is purposive in which it is controlled, goal-directed. A teleological order

is that which introduces the notion of processes and structures being fitted to serve

some purpose. From living organisms onwards the whole universe aims at some

such end. The supporters of teleological anthropocentrism uphold that the world

owes its existence to human beings who operate in accordance with a plan, the

intelligibility of human mind.

Ignoring the chauvinistic perspective embedded herein, there are valid

reasons why the human species has a place of some importance, at least in what Sri

Aurobindo terms the ‘terrestrial evolution’.8 Teleologically and esoterically, we

can indeed speak of a ‘human kingdom’.9 The reason for the uniqueness of the

human species and kingdom is something like this: In terms of mental

development and capabilities, the human species has the greatest intellectual

capacity. The dolphin might have a larger brain to body-weight ratio. But

dolphins and whales do not have civilization, as men have. The human kingdom,

which is sometimes called ‘noosphere’10, exists alongside, but it modifies the

geosphere and biosphere. The human kingdom will eventually go into space,

populate the universe, and seed other worlds with life and biospheres, thus

completing Gaia's development as a fully living super-organism.11

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Moral Anthropocentrism

Although we speak of different versions of anthropocentrism, it is moral

anthropocentrism that actually concerns us in environmental ethics and philosophy.

As a moral view-point, anthropocentrism takes only human interests to be

intrinsically valuable, and upholds that only human interests are truly worthy of

moral considerations. According to this view-point, the non-human world acquires

value in so far as it serves human purposes. In this way, anthropocentrism makes

ethics solely a human enterprise. In environmental philosophy it stands for the

attitudes, values or practices which promote human interests, even at the expense

of the basic, crucial needs and interests of other species or the nature in general. To

illustrate, if I hit a man or woman without sufficient provocation, my conduct

would be judged as morally wrong. But our behaviour would not likewise be

condemned wrong if I kill a goat for flesh!

We may, however, start our discussion by distinguishing between two forms of

moral anthropocentrism: absolute moral anthropocentrism and relative moral

anthropocentrism: i) The anthropocentric view which suggests that only humans

have intrinsic value and assigns absolutely no value for non-human species is what

we call anthropocentrism in an absolutist sense. Obviously, this view of absolute

anthropocentrism permits us any kind of treatment for non-human animals and the

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nature in general. ii) The anthropocentric view which suggests that humans have

greater intrinsic value than any other species is characterized as relative

anthropocentrism. We may claim, for example, that humans are superior because

they, through culture, ‘realize a greater range of values’ than members of non-

human species, or we might claim that humans are superior in virtue of their

‘unprecedented capacity to create ethical system that imparts worth to other life-

forms.’

Anyhow, one of the first extended philosophical essays addressing

environmental ethics, John Passmore’s Man's Responsibility for Nature, has been

repeatedly criticised by defenders of contemporary environmentalism because of

its anthropocentrism, often claimed to be constitutive of traditional western moral

thought. To put the matter in some different terminology, traditional

anthropocentrism has expressed itself in two main forms: Dominionism and

Stewardism.

Dominionism

The main theses of dominionism are two i) humans are masters of nature, which

exists to serve only human needs; and ii) the nature is a limitless resource to which

we can do anything. As a matter-of-fact, in the West our moral values are largely

devised by the Christian tradition. Irrespective of individual religious affiliations,


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the Christian ethics permeates the fabric of the moral life and history of the West.

The Christian attitude towards nature is explained either in terms of Dominionism

or in terms of Stewardism. The former view, in which nature is regarded as

something to be exploited for its materials, as a source of knowledge leading to

power and control over it, is typical of the modern scientific attitude. In pagan

religions the natural world is seen as surrounded by spirits or gods, and as such, it

is to be approached with awe. By contrast, the mainstream Christian view regards

nature as created by God. This provides the ground for natural science and

technology to control and dominate nature. Nature is there solely for man’s use.

Human needs and wants are of paramount importance, and nature, in one way or

other, exists to satisfy them. This is a classic formulation of what is frequently

termed as ‘strong anthropocentrism’ or dominionism. In this context the story of

Genesis is often referred to:

God created men in his own image, and blessed them, and told them to have

‘domination over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over

the cattle, and over all the earth and over every creeping thing that creepeth

upon the earth.12

This has been interpreted as men’s charter, granting them the right to subdue

the earth and all its inhabitants, not only by the Jews but also by the Christians and

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Muslims. And here we find God issuing a mandate to us: ‘Be fruitful and multiply

and replenish the earth and subdue it’.13 So Genesis clearly tells men not only what

they can do, but what they should do–multiply and replenish and subdue the planet.

God is represented, no doubt, as issuing these instructions before the Fall.

But the Fall did not, according to the Genesis story, substantially affect men’s

duties. What it did, rather, was to make the performance of those duties more

arduous. After the Flood –men’s position in the intervening period is more than a

little vague –God still urged Noah in this direction: ‘Be fruitful, and multiply, and

replenish the earth.’ But then he made two significant stipulations. The first

stipulation made it clear that men should not expect to subdue the earth either by

love or by the exercise of natural authority, as distinct from force: ‘And the fear of

you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every

fowl of the air, upon all that moveth upon the earth and upon all the fishes of the

sea: into your hand are they delivered.’14 The second stipulation—‘every moving

thing that liveth shall be meat for you’15—permitted men to eat the flesh of

animals. In the Garden of Eden, Adam, along with the beasts, had been a

vegetarian, whose diet was limited to ‘every herb bearing seed …and every tree, in

that which is the fruit of a tree yielding seed’.16 Now, in contrast, not only the

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‘green herb’ but all living things were handed over to Adam and his descendants as

their food. All these integrate absolute anthropocentrism.

The critics of western civilization, according to Passmore, are to this extent

justified in their historical diagnosis, as there is evidently a strong Western

tradition that man is free to deal with nature as he pleases, since it exists only for

him. But, Passmore contends, they are not totally correct in tracing this attitude

back to Genesis.17 Genesis, and after it, the Old Testament generally, certainly

portrays man to be master of the earth and all it contains. But at the same time it

insists that the world was good before man was created, and that it exists to glorify

God rather than to serve man. It is only as a result of Greek influence that Christian

theology was led to think of nature as nothing but a system of resources, man’s

relationships with which are in no respect subject to moral censure. Passmore

criticises much of the western philosophical and religious traditions for

encouraging man to think of himself as nature’s absolute master, for whom

everything that exists was designed. Let me quote him: “It is one thing to say,

following Genesis, that man has dominion over nature in the sense that he has the

right to make use of it: quite another to say… that nature exists only in order to
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serve his interests.” Nevertheless, his interpretation could not rise above

anthropocentrism: the natural world has no value in its own right; it is valuable

because humans care for it, love it, and find it beautiful. We have responsibilities
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regarding the natural world, but the basis of these responsibilities lies in human

interests.

Stewardism

Dominionism openly supports exploitation of natural resources in whatever way

man pleases. It says nothing about respecting or caring for the nature or for other

creatures. It has no thought about the negative consequences of human actions.

But, Stewardism, on the other hand, upholds that humans are the care-takers for the

inherently valuable nature. As a matter-of-fact, stewardism is based mainly on

these two tenets: i) humans are caretakers of nature in that we look after it in some

way; and ii) humans are important, but other creatures also have value.

Some people of Christian faith claim that nature exists for God, and it is the

role of humans to ensure that His works continue by acting as His stewards. A

secular view of stewardism is that we should look after nature for future human

generations to use. Stewardism appeals to the nature conservationists also. This

alternative view of stewardship has coexisted with the first view of dominionism

and is rooted in a different reading of the book of Genesis. But the main issue here

is not about the correct reading the Bible, but we are to see which attitude has been

dominant. Many contemporary environmental thinkers argue forcefully that

Christianity in practice has been committed to exploitative attitude, sowing the

seeds of the contemporary environmental crisis.


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But the alternative reading of the story of Genesis has now come to the fore,

and its insight has much to offer to contemporary thinking. Robin Attfield, for

example, argues that the Christian tradition should be viewed as one in which

domination of the natural world implies not a predatory attitude towards it, but the

contrary. It implies that we should have dominion in the sense of being a steward

appointed by God to look after and cherish both the garden he has given us to

cultivate and the creatures that live in it. We do not unconditionally own parts of

the earth, but hold them on trust.19 Such a view may lead us to an ethic of

environmental concern. It may be environmentally superior to a view in which

property rights are held to be absolute, in which all parts of the natural world are

held to be merely means to human ends, and where we have a right to do exactly

what we want with our property even at the expense of those who come after us.

The theory of stewardship may be regarded an example of weak or relative

anthropocentrism.

To gather more insight, let us again refer to the key biblical passage of

Genesis in which man was commanded to multiply and replenish the earth and

subdue it and have dominion over every living thing that moveth upon the earth,

and fly in the sky, 20 and that man was put ‘into the garden of Eden to dress it and

to keep it’.21 There is no gain denying that human beings are permitted here to use

nature. But it is not sufficiently clear that they have been granted an unlimited right
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of exploitation, such that they have no duties towards the natural world. A word,

like ‘dominion’, needs to be considered carefully: ‘man’s ‘dominion’ should

perhaps be interpreted as the granting of trust to humans, giving them stewardship

to look after nature on behalf of God. It should not be thought of as justifying

despotism or tyranny, but as the responsible exercise of a trust. The tradition of

stewardship derives from this interpretation. Human beings, although they have a

privileged place in nature, are strongly persuaded to act responsibly and with

consideration towards the natural world.22

In this connection it may be noted that the World Council of Churches

commented recently that creation of man in God’s image meant that humans

should be seen as ‘reflecting God’s creating and sustaining love’ and that ‘any

claim to the possession and mastery of the world is idolatrous’. In the light of this,

domination refers specifically to the task of upholding God’s purposes in creation

rather than imposing humanity’s self-serving ends’. Thus the symbolism of the

garden is important: humanity’s role is to tend and keep the garden which god has

granted it dominion over; the injunction to replenish implies that it should be kept

fertile and not overworked. The concept of stewardship has thus moved to the

centre of modern Christian thinking. According to Watson and Sharpe,

“Stewardship is today the generally accepted understanding within

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Christianity…of the role given to humanity in creation, in its relations with the rest

of nature. This can be interpreted as co-worker with God in creation, but in no

sense as co-equal. For it signifies that humanity’s position is that it is tenant and

not owner, that it holds the earth in trust, for God and for the rest of creation,

present and to come. The principles of stewardship include responsibility for the

whole Earth; solidarity of all people; the need to take a long-term view. As such,

they offer a critique of existing capitalist relations, and are congruent with broad

principles of sustainable development.” 23

Whatever interpretation of the story of Genesis is made, none of it can rise

above humancentredness in environmental matters. Some critics have opined that

the wrapper of stewardship does not help us to transcend speciesist

anthropocentrism; it works like a sugar-coat for bitter quinine! Another part of the

problem of the stewardship position is by no means adequately characterized

anywhere, especially when the religious backdrop is removed, e.g., who is the man

the steward for and responsible to?

Anyhow, there are a number of important implications of an anthropocentric

view, which strongly influence the ways in which humans interpret their

relationships with other species and with nature and ecosystems. Some of these are

stated below:

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i) The anthropocentric view, whatever form it assumes, minimally suggests that

humans have greater intrinsic value than other species. A result of this attitude is

that any species that are of potential use to humans can be a ‘resource’ to be

exploited. This use may occur in an unsustainable fashion that results in

degradation, sometimes to the point of extinction of the biological resource, as has

occurred with the species, like dodo, great auk, and other animals.

ii) The view that humans have greater intrinsic value than other species also

influences ethical judgments about interactions with other organisms. These ethics

are often used to legitimize treating other species in ways that would be considered

morally unacceptable if humans were similarly treated. For example, animals are

often treated very cruelly during the normal course of events in medical research

and agriculture. But if someone treats a human being in such a way, he or she is

punished.

iii) Another implication of the anthropocentric view is the belief that humans rank

at the acme of the natural evolutionary progression of species and of life. This

belief is in contrast to the modern biological interpretation of evolution, which

suggests that no species are ‘higher’ than any others, although some clearly have a

more ancient evolutionary lineage, or may occur as relatively simple life forms.

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It is, however, true that the individual, cultural, and technological skills of

humans are among the attributes that make their species, Homo sapiens, special

and different. The qualities of humans have empowered their species to a degree

that no other species has achieved during the history of life on earth, through the

development of social systems and technologies that make possible an intense

exploitation and management of the environment. This power has allowed humans

to become the most successful species on earth. This success is indicated by the

population of humans that is now being maintained, the explosive growth of those

numbers, and the increasing amounts of earth's biological and environmental

resources that are being appropriated to sustain the human species. Anyhow,

traditional justifications for anthropocentrism are associated with emphasizing

some distinctive characteristics of humans—such as having an immortal soul or

mind, rationality, or sophisticated language—that set them apart from the rest of

nature including animals, and thus making ethics exclusively an human affair. To

put in other words, traditional philosophers have emphasized upon some very

distinctive characteristics of humans, such as rationality, capacity of using

sophisticated language, and the like, which set them apart from non-human nature.

(Consequently, it has made ethics exclusively a human affair.) This is called

‘human exceptionalism’, to which we now turn on.

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Human Exceptionalism

It refers to a belief that human beings have special status in the course of nature

based on unique capacities. This belief is the grounding for some naturalistic

concepts of human rights. Religious proponents of human exceptionalism base the

belief on the same religious texts, such as the verse 1:26 of the Bible in the Book of

Genesis. We have already quoted it, and seen how God is said to create men in his

own image, and to give them ‘domination’ over everything upon the earth. 24

Some secular proponents of human exceptionalism point to evidence of

unusual rapid evolution of the brain and the emergence of exceptional aptitudes.

As one commentator has put it, ‘Over the course of human history, we have been

successful in cultivating our faculties, shaping our development, and impacting

upon the wider world in a deliberate fashion, quite distinct from evolutionary

processes.’25

The defenders of human exceptionalism argue that it is the necessary basic

premise to defend universal human rights, since what matters morally is simply

being human. For example, Mortimer J. Adler, a noted philosopher, wrote, “Those

who oppose injurious discrimination on the moral ground that all human beings,

being equal in their humanity, should be treated equally in all those respects that

concern their common humanity, would have no solid basis in fact to support their
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normative principle.”26 Adler thus holds that denying what is now called human

exceptionalism could lead to tyranny, writing that if we ever came to believe that

humans do not possess a unique moral status, the intellectual foundation of our

liberties collapses: “Why, then, should not groups of superior men be able to

justify their enslavement, exploitation, or even genocide of inferior human groups

on factual and moral grounds akin to those we now rely on to justify our treatment

of the animals we harness as beasts of burden, that we butcher for food and

clothing, or that we destroy as disease-bearing pests or as dangerous predators?”27

Wesley J. Smith, an important defender of human exceptionalism, has

written in A Rat is a Pig is a Dog is a Boy that human exceptionalism is what gives

rise to human duties to each other, the natural world and to treat animals humanely.

He writes, “Because we are unquestionably a unique species--the only species of

even contemplating ethical issues and assuming responsibilities--we uniquely are

capable of apprehending the difference between right and wrong, good and evil,

proper and improper conduct toward animals. Or to put it more succinctly, if being

human isn't what requires us to treat animals humanely, what in the world does?”28

Nevertheless, the true measure of evolutionary success, in contrast to

temporary empowerment and intensity of resource exploitation, is related to the

length of time that a species remains powerful—the sustainability of its enterprise.


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There are clear signals that the intense exploitation of the environment by humans

is causing widespread ecological degradation and a diminished carrying capacity to

sustain people, numerous other species, and many types of natural ecosystems. If

this environmental deterioration proves to be truly alarming, and there are many

indications that it will, then the recent centuries of unparalleled success of the

human species will turn out to be a short-term phenomenon, and will not represent

evolutionary success. This will be a clear demonstration of the fact that humans

have always, and will always, require access to a continued flow of ecological

goods and services to sustain themselves and their societies.

Anyhow, according to this theory of exceptionalism, all and only humans

have moral standing or intrinsic value. This can be illustrated if someone argues

that he has no interest in preserving penguins for their own sake. Penguins may

only be important when we people like to enjoy seeing them walk on rocks. The

moral implications of this theory are as follows: i) Non-humans are mere

instruments to human benefits and survival, they are mere means to human ends.

The whole earth then turns out to be human resource. ii) We have no direct duties

to non-humans, but only duties to other humans pertaining to non-humans. iii) It

may support an environmental ethics and speak of protecting the environment for

the sake of humans (and not for its own sake).

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Anyhow, it should be kept in mind that anthropocentric arguments as such

need not always be selfish. For instance, worrying about lead poisoning since it

kills black children disproportionately—a problem of environmental justice—is

human-centered but not selfish. Again, anthropocentric reasons may sometimes be

good reasons for protecting nature. What is controversial is the view that they are

the only good reasons. Why do we not argue for environmental protection using

both non-anthropocentric and anthropocentric reasons?

Similarly, it should be noted that anthropocentrism are not always

‘unenlightened’, it can be ‘enlightened’ as well. Unenlightened anthropocentrism

may ignore future and non-consumptive human interests and focus on immediate

preference satisfaction, on more consumer goods now. Enlightened

anthropocentrism, on the other hand, takes seriously the interests of future humans

and understands the significant tangible benefits (e.g., cancer cures, recreational

opportunities) and intangible benefits (aesthetic and spiritual enrichment) and

services (oxygen production, etc.) the natural world provides for humans. A

section of environmental thinkers holds that anthropocentrism can ground

environmental protection policies, as because human welfare depends on the sound

functioning of natural systems. But how strong these environmental policies will

be depends on (i) how closely human and non-human welfare is tied together, and

(ii) to what extent humans can modify natural systems while insuring that they
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continue to provide life-support for humans. Some think it politically effective, as

appeals to self-interest and fear of harm to humans are often very effective.

If we take a historical look, we would find that we are habituated to think in

anthropocentric terms. One enduring source of support for this view is the great

Chain of Being that can be traced from Plato and Aristotle through Plotinus to

Aquinas, who ordered types of being according to their degree of perfection,

descending from God, through the angels to humans, with animals and plants

below them. The ethical corollary of it is that less perfect beings may be

subordinated to more perfect ones. And from the very ancient period (western)

moral thinkers have been thinking that humans have a prerogative to use or rule

over other creatures and the rest of nature as they see fit for their own purpose.

As already hinted, religious sources underpinned this anthropocentric idea. In

particular, the Judaic-Christian doctrine of creation has fostered the belief that

humans were made in the image of God and they share in God’s transcendence of

nature and that the whole natural order was created for their sake. Such religious

views have tended to emphasize upon the uniqueness of human beings because

they believe in that image of God, in the story of Genesis. Anyhow, the use of the

word ‘dominion’ in Genesis, where God purportedly gives man dominion over all

creatures is controversial. Environmental philosopher Stephen Schwarzschild has


46
observed that the Christian theory of creation does not teach us to love and care for

the Nature, rather indirectly direct us to hate and dominate over the non-human

world. Some consider this to be a flawed translation of a word meaning

‘stewardship’, but it persists as the most common translation. In the 1985 CBC

series ‘A Planet for the Taking’, Dr. David Suzuki explored the Old Testament

roots of anthropocentrism and how it shaped how we view non-human animals.

Again, in his book Pale Book Dot author Dr. Carl Sagan also reflects on what he

perceives to be the conceitedness and pettiness of anthropocentrism, specifically

associating the doctrine with religious belief.29

There are also secular sources of anthropocentric thought, to which we now

turn. Protagoras, an ancient Greek philosopher, declared: ‘Man is the measure of

all things’. In the present context this relativism can be taken to refer to mean that

whatever truths—scientific or moral—we acquire are valid for humans only.

Sophocles in his tragedy Antigone proclaimed, ‘Wonders are many on earth, and

the greatest of these is man…He is the lord of all things living; birds of the air,

beast of the field, all creatures of sea and land.’30

The crucial argument is that only humans participate in ethical deliberations.

Whether or not this is due to man’s unique capacity for moral agency, the fact

remains that saying of other creatures as having any moral obligation, either
47
towards one another or towards humans, does not really make sense. It makes little

sense to say that a cat does moral wrong in tormenting a mouse, since we do not

suppose that a cat has a moral sense. Since only humans are moral agents, having

moral obligations, and non-humans have no moral sense, it is hardly possible to

evoke the Golden Rule—‘Do unto others as you have them do unto you.’

Mutuality is absent in the rule, and the other party is so constitutionally different as

to render the necessary comparison impossible. Because of this radical asymmetry,

it is argued, anthropocentrism is justified.

As already noted, someone may think that it is only the unenlightened or less-

enlightened ancient thinkers who held this view-point. But a comprehensive

scrutiny shows that such a thought is not correct; even the so called enlightened,

modern thinkers not only subscribed to this view, some of them have come out to

adduce arguments in favour of anthropocentrism.

Renaissance thinkers upheld such moral humancentredness. M. Ficino, one

of the greatest Italian authors, proclaimed: ‘Man not only makes use of the

elements, but also adorn them…man who provides generally for all things, both

living and lifeless, is a kind of God’.31 Manetti in his The Dignity and Excellence

of Man stated: ‘Nothing in the world can be found that is worthy of more

admiration than man.’ Most of the modern thinkers, including philosophers, upheld
48
the same anthropocentric position. The list of philosophers, who upheld this view,

ranges from Kant to Nietzsche through Marx. Immanuel Kant suggested, ‘Man is

the ultimate purpose of creation here on Earth’.32 Marx proposed that ‘The whole

of what world history is is nothing but the creation of man by human labour.’33

Marx upheld this position and argued that what distinguishes the worst architect

from the best of bees is that the architect raises its structure in imagination before

he erects it in reality. Nietzsche said that humanity was near ‘perfect’ and that the

position of humanity with regard to other animals has to be reconsidered.34

Nevertheless, anthropocentrism is human chauvinism, underpinning the

human relationship with the natural world. Such an intellectual mind-set leads to a

moral discourse that initiates and creates preferences, and cements attitudes, and if

this is misplaced, then the entire intellectual and moral pursuit becomes

problematic.

Evolutionary theory throws humans into a tizzy. Driven by the need to

amass knowledge, we find ourselves surging forward into the exploration of a story

where the more we know, the less we can feature ourselves. Eminent evolutionary

biologist Ernst Mayr contends that anthropocentrism and belief in evolution by

natural selection are mutually exclusive.35 In other words, the Darwinian theory of

biological evolution rejects the notion of progress and replaces it with directionless
49
change, thereby subverting the conception of human superiority on a biological

scale toward perfection. Evolution by natural selection undermines the idea that

humans are the culmination and ultimate beneficiaries of all nature. However, to

say that anthropocentrism necessarily dissolves in the rising tide of evolutionary

theory is to ignore the ways in which man-centered humanness plays an intriguing

role in evolution.

In his article, ‘Anthropocentrism: A Modern Version’, W.H. Murdy

integrates these two conflicting phenomena by tracking the evolution of

anthropocentrism itself and proposing that Darwinian theory marks the shift from

an old version of anthropocentrism to a new, modern version. This modern

reconceptualization is able to situate human centered thinking within the story of

evolution, but it also elucidates a complex and uniquely human crisis in which

anthropocentrism becomes self-destructive.

Anyhow, if we try to put the matter of development of anthropocentrism in

thematic terms, we would find more or less five strands of thought that have

consolidated such a view-point.36 These are:

(i) the distinction between the mental and the physical,

(ii) the individual nature of existence,

(iii) the dichotomy between humanity and nature,


50
(iv)the use and value of nature, and

(v) the domination over nature.

Let us now see how these strands of thought have been instrumental in

integrating anthropocentricity.

(i)The distinction between the physical and the mental: The early rationalists, such

as Plato and Pythagoras, laid the foundation of the distinction between the physical

and the mental via two belief systems. First, they believed in the separation of the

immortal soul from the mortal body. Second, Pythagoras and Plato did not give

much importance on sensation or empirical observation as a source of knowledge.

They took abstract reason as the source of knowledge. This is just the opposite

position taken by philosophers, like Aristotle and Kant, who valued both the

importance of reason and the senses, along with the reality of empirical world.

Plato thought that the soul or the mental is distinct from the physical. And it is this

Platonic view of physical world stemming from the separation between the

spiritual world and the material world came to be dominant in early western

society after the birth of Christ.

Later in the seventeenth century, Rene Descartes, who is regarded as the

father of modern philosophy, divided reality into two different substances: mind

and matter,5 and argued for a complete dualism of mind and body, and with this the

dichotomy between the mental and the physical was completely cemented. With
51
his method of doubt, he established his own identity from his ability to think: ‘I

think, therefore I am’ (cogito ergo sum). Everything outside this cogito is seen as

having only a questionable existence. This has put the natural order distinct from

the human realm that enjoys spiritual or mental existence. Descartes believed that

nature consists of only tangible qualities, like size and weight, and so does not

have any intrinsic/inherent value.

(ii)The individual nature of existence: A corollary that comes out from the

Cartesian philosophy is: existence means only distinctive individual existence. Of

course, this idea has its old root in ancient Greece. Pythagoras held that all things

are composed of numbers. Democritus and other atomists further contend that not

only are all things composed by numbers, all of them are isolated, individual units.

They thought that everything was made of atoms, which are solid and insular. This

thinking was repeated in Greek and Roman periods of Stoicism.

The concept of atomic individualism assumed larger relevance with the

general percepts of Christianity. It repeated itself again with a religious emphasis

during the Reformation. Later this idea of abstract individualism spilled into other

aspects of social and scientific discourse. In the discipline of sociology Thomas

Hobbes picked up this idea and argued that society is nothing more than self-

interested atomistic individuals.37 This idea creeps into science through great
52
scientists, like Isaac Newton and Galileo Galilei, Their quantitative approach

towards nature, in other words, their mathematization of nature, has influenced

integrating individualism. Galileo postulated that studies should be restricted to the

essential properties of shapes, numbers, and movements which could be measured

and thus quantified as irreducible and stubborn facts. Newton also proposed such a

theory to explain the motion of the planets, the moon, and comets down to the

smallest detail, as well as the flow of tides and other phenomena related to gravity.

Descartes gives a philosophic validation to this metaphysics of individualism

through his philosophical method and ontological assumptions. This notion of

individualism continued through philosophers like Locke, Rousseau, and Leibniz.

Locke interpreted natural law as a claim on indefeasible rights inherent in each

individual. Rousseau depended heavily upon this systematic individualism

preached by Locke. Leibniz’s ontology of monads is also an extreme version of

individualism.

The importance of the individual continued to remain on the centre-stage in

liberalist thinking. Both in French and Scottish Enlightenment it became a central

feature; it dominated the eighteenth century England, the American Constitution,

and the French encyclopedists. Individualism was supported by philosophers such

as Hegel, Kant, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, and some contemporary liberal


53
philosophers, such as John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and Robert Nozick. All this

integrates the ontology of individual nature, just in opposition to the ecological

principle of interdependence.

(iii)The dichotomy between humanity and nature: The distinction between

humanity and Nature has been based on humanity’s unique characteristics, like

rationality. Linked to the assertion that only humans are rational is the assumption

that only humans can communicate. This dualistic principle has been put forward

by many philosophers, such as Aristotle, Aquinas, Locke, Kant, Descartes, Hegel,

Nietszche.38

Another justification for the distinction between humanity and the rest of the

natural world, including animals, is the discourse of moral behaviuor. Humans see

the behaviour of beasts as predominantly instinctive, irrational, and violent, which

humans resemble when they are wicked. Socrates argued that the most virtuous

human being is one who most fully transcends their animal and vegetative nature.

The ability to use tools or modify and change the environment also constitutes

another justification for this division between humanity and nature. Marx and

Engels contribute to this idea. Both argued that only man produces when he is free

from physical need. A group of thinkers has based the distinction between

54
humanity and animals on religious grounds. Aquinas, for example, argued that man

is created in the image of God. Descartes also said that man has an immortal soul.

(iv)The use and value of nature: The theory of social progress involving the use of

the natural world by humanity is the fourth factor in integrating the anthropocentric

position. This derives from the belief that labour is the only valuable factor in

production. Marxist philosophers propose that the purely natural stuff in which no

human labour is objectivised has no value. Likewise, a modern liberalist, John

Locke, suggests that in natural state, nature is almost worthless. There is no value

on raw land until it is improved, and that labour is the chief factor in any value

assignment. Adam Smith also proposed that labour is the real measure of the

exchangeable value of all commodities. Marxist and liberal views thus see nature

devoid of any inherent value, it has only instrumental value.

(v)The domination over nature: Another constitutive factor of anthropocentrism is

the notion of mastery of nature. This notion has developed from ancient time of

Greek philosophy. Aristotle, for example, suggested that nature has made all

animals for the sake of man. Cicero declared that the produce of the earth is

designed for those who make use of it, and though some beasts may rob us of a

small part, it does follow that the earth produced it also for them.

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Then, in the Enlightenment era of Industrial Revolution, Bacon comes out to

advocate this idea of domination. He said that our main object is to make Nature

serve the business and convenience of men. His basic argument is that scientific

knowledge is technological power over nature. He did not hesitate to declare that

in near future humanity would subdue ‘nature with all her children, to bind to

service, and to make her slave’.39 Kant’s view is not very new: as nature is not self-

conscious then it is merely a means to an end, and that end is humanity. Fichte put

the last nail on the coffin: ‘I will be the Lord of nature, and she shall be my

servant. I will influence her according to the measure of my capacity, but she will

have no influence on me.”40 This view of mastering the nature has been the

mainstream thought, including philosophy. Everything has thus been determined

from ‘unrestricted’ human interests. And the only aim left to humanity is to

conquer and dominate the nature!

These are five main strands of thought which have been instrumental in the

development of the anthropocentric position. A result of this attitude is that any

species that are of potential use to humans can be a ‘resource’ to be exploited. This

use often occurs in an unsustainable fashion that results in degradation, sometimes

to the point of extinction of the biological resource, as has occurred with the dodo,

great auk, and other animals.

56
However, contemporary environmental philosophy places the blame for

ecological deterioration on the domination of nature by human beings, which

meets some resistance from the ecofeminists who see the domination of both

nature and woman by man as the root cause of modern crisis. An environmental

philosophy that fails to attend to these important links will, accordingly, be

theoretically deficient. The ecofeminist attempts a synthesis between two struggles

previously thought to be separated, feminism and ecology. The goals of two

movements are mutually reinforcing. It aims to have feminism and ecology

mutually reinforcing one another, developing a feminism that is ecological and an

ecology that is feminist.

Ecofeminism is an academic theory, and also an ideology for praxis,

according to which there are important connections—historical, experiential,

symbolic, conceptual, theoretical, etc.—between the domination of women and the

domination of nature, an understanding of which is crucial to both feminism and

environmental ethics. It holds that both the exploitation of women and of nature

results from patriarchal oppressions, and further that women, due to their

distinctive biological and social roles, have an innate concern for nature which

could save the deteriorating earth.

57
Ecofeminism has its roots in the wide variety of feminisms, in different

feminist practices and philosophies. What makes it distinct is its insistence that

non-human nature and the domination of nature are both feminist issues. Anyhow,

what one takes to be a genuine ecofeminist position depends largely upon how one

conceptualizes both feminism and ecology. While feminists fail to agree about the

nature of, and solution to, the subordination of women, they all agree that the sexist

oppression exists, is wrong and must be abolished. On the other hand,

environmental degradation and exploitation of nature is feminist issue, as an

understanding of it contributes to an understanding of the oppression of women.

To put it more succinctly, ecofeminism asserts that all forms of oppression

are connected and that structures of oppression must be addressed in their totality.

Oppression of the natural world and of women by patriarchal power structures

must be examined together or neither can be confronted fully. These socially

constructed oppressions formed out of the power dynamics of patriarchical

systems. Ultimately they involve the development of worldviews and practices that

are not based on male-biased models of domination. It is contended that women

must see that there can be no liberation for them and no solution to the ecological

crisis within a society whose fundamental model of relationships continues to be

one of domination.

58
Anyhow, if we reflect a little, we would find that anthropocentrism in

general and androcentrism in particular are linked by the rationalist conception of

the human self as masculine and by the account of authentically human

characteristics as centred round rationality and the exclusion of its contrasts

(especially characteristics regarded as feminine, animal and natural) as less human.

It challenges us to understand the contribution of gender to the forms of culture

and economic rationality that bring contemporary societies into danger zones.

Some think that the central problem is androcentrism rather than anthropocentrism.

The effect of ecofeminism is not, of course, to absorb or sacrifice the critique of an

anthropocentrism, but to deepen and enrich it.

It may be noted that this domination over nature has been debated by the

ecofeminists in terms of engendered social structure of patriarchy. They argue that

the control of nature is the multifaceted dominance relationship that stems from

culturally embedded attitudes of masculine gender bias. The domination of the

male over the female and the dominance of human over the nature are entwined

processes, the inferiorising of the female taking reinforcement from the view that

women partake more fully of nature than man, and the degrading manipulation of

nature taking legitimacy from its characterization as women. The feminists identify

patriarchy as the most significant constraint upon the fulfillment of human

59
potential. Patriarchy is a gender-privileging system of power relations that is subtly

embedded within dominant social structures, at all social levels, across almost all

cultures, and sustained throughout history. The explanation for its tenacity is to be

found, not in overt discrimination, but within conceptual frameworks that

systematically deny access and justice to women.41

Anyhow, natural scientific findings of ecology has undermined man’s views

of himself as the centre of the universe—anthropocentrism—showing them instead

as a product of natural evolutionary process, having considerable affinities with

other creatures, and to have vulnerable dependence on ecological conditions of

existence. The human is seen as occupying no special position on this planet, and

this naturally calls into question his prerogative to use non-human resources

whatever they like. This also draws widespread moral intuitions that some higher

animals are somehow similar to humans and that other natural part of reality has

value in itself, that is, has intrinsic or inherent value.

Actually, contemporary environmental philosophy is developed through

critiquing traditional anthropocentrism. The principled objections to

anthropocentrism find increasing applications in practice. Many human practices

are criticized on this ground, including those involve cruelty to animals,

destruction of habitats, endangering species, and disturbing ecosystemic balances.


60
Most environmentalists see anthropocentrism as human chauvinism, with

narrowness of sympathy that is comparable to sexual, racial or national

chauvinism. The paradigm in this context involves the core belief that underpins

the human relationship with the natural world.42 And many human practices appear

to be concerned only for human interests, and even for trivial, non-basic human

preferences, above any consideration of non-human interests, even of basic or

crucial ones. The most significant trend of present-day environmentalism is to rise

above this misguided view-point, and this means, among other things, focusing on

locus of intrinsic/inherent value other than on humans.

Notes and References:

1. Stanisław Zięba. “Anthropocentrism.” 28 April 2012


<http://peenef2.republika.pl/angielski/hasla/a/anthropocentrism.html>.
2. “Noosphere.” Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia. 12 April 2012
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noosphere>.
3. Edmund Husserl. Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. W.R. Boyce
Gibson. London: George Allen & Unwin, trans. 1931. (First original German edition,
1913). pp. 11-30. (Author’s Preface to the English Edition).
4. “Anthropic principle.” Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia. 18 March 2012
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropic_principle>.
5. Ibid.
6. B. Carter. “Large Number Coincidences and the Anthropic Principle in Cosmology.”
IAU Symposium 63: Confrontation of Cosmological Theories with Observational Data.
Dordrecht: Reidel. 1974. pp. 291–298. 18 March 2012
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropic_principle>.
61
7. “Anthropic principle.” op. cit.
8. M. Alan Kazlev. “Anthropocentrism.” 28 April 2012
<http://www.kheper.net/topics/worldviews/anthropocentrism.html>.
9. Ibid.
10. “Noosphere.” Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia. 19 March 2012
<en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noosphere>.
11. M. Alan Kazlev. “Anthropocentrism.” 7 Feb 2012
<www.kheper.net/topics/worldviews/anthropocentrism.html>.
12. The Holy Bible: The Revised Version with Revised Marginal References. Genesis 1:26.
London: Oxford University Press, 1884. p. 2.
13. The Holy Bible: The Revised Version with Revised Marginal References. Genesis 1:28.
op. cit., p. 2.
14. The Holy Bible: The Revised Version with Revised Marginal References. Genesis 9:2. op.
cit., p. 9.
15. The Holy Bible: The Revised Version with Revised Marginal References. Genesis 9:3. op.
cit., p. 9.
16. The Holy Bible: The Revised Version with Revised Marginal References. Genesis 1:29.
op. cit., p. 2.
17. Richard Routley and Val Routley. “Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics.”
quoted in D. S. Mannison, M. MacRobbie and R. Routley, eds. Environmental
Philosophy. Canberra: ANU Research School of Social Sciences, 1980. pp. 96-189.
18. Peter Hay. Main Currents in Western Environmental Thought. Bloomington, USA:
Indiana University Press, 2002. p. 105.
19. Cf: James Connelly & Graham Smith, eds. Politics and the Environment: From Theory to
Practice. London: Routledge, 1999. p. 18.
20. The Holy Bible: The Revised Version with Revised Marginal References. Genesis 1:28.
op. cit., p. 2.
21. The Holy Bible: The Revised Version with Revised Marginal References. Genesis 2:15.
op. cit., p. 3.

62
22. Cf: James Connelly & Graham Smith, eds. Politics and the Environment: From Theory
To Practice. London: Routledge, 1999. p. 18.
23. Ibid., p. 19.
24. Cf: The Holy Bible: The Revised Version with Revised Marginal References. Genesis
1:26. op. cit., p. 2.
25. Sandy Starr. “What Makes Us Exceptional?.” Spiked Science. London: Signet House,
2004. pp. 49-51. 19 March 2012 < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speciesism>.
26. Cf: Frederick J. Crosson, Human And Artificial Intelligence, New York: Meredith
Corporation, 1970. p. 246.
27. Mortimer J. Adler. The Difference of Man and the Difference It Makes. New York:
Fordham University Press, 1993. p. 264. 30 March 2012
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_exceptionalism>.
28. Wesley J. Smith. A Rat is a Pig is a Dog is a Boy: The Human Cost of the Animal Rights
Movement. New York: Encounter Books, 2010. pp. 243-44. 30 March 2012
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_exceptionalism>.
29. “Anthropocentrism.” 27 March 2012
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropocentrism#cite_note-8>.
30. Cf: Robin Sowerby. The Greeks: An Introduction to their Culture. Oxford: Routledge,
1995. p. 88.
31. Cf: Daniel N. Robinson. An Intellectual History of Psychology. 3rd ed. Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1930. p. 120.
32. Immanuel Kant. quoted in Alexander Gillespie. International Environmental Law: Policy
and Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. p. 4.
33. Karl Marx. quoted in Alexander Gillespie. International Environmental Law: Policy and
Ethics. op. cit., p. 4.
34. Cf: Alexander Gillespie. International Environmental Law: Policy and Ethics. op. cit.,
p. 4.
35. Mayr Ernst. “The Nature of the Darwinian Revolution.” Science. vol. 176, 1972. pp. 981-
989. 31 March 2012 <http://www.123helpme.com/preview.asp?id=24612>.
36. Alexander Gillespie. International Environmental Law: Policy and Ethics. op. cit., p. 5.

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37. Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan. quoted in Alexander Gillespie. International Environmental
Law: Policy and Ethics. op. cit., p. 7.
38. Alexander Gillespie. International Environmental Law: Policy and Ethics. op. cit., p. 10.
39. J. Spedding, ed. The Works of Francis Bacon. London: Oldham Press, 1857. vol. 4, p.
517.
40. J.G. Fichte. The Vocation of Man. London: Routledge, 1946. p. 29.
41. Peter Hay. Main Currents In Western Environmental Thought. op. cit., p. 73.
42. M. Fitzmaurice, David M. Ong & Panos Merkouris, eds. Research Handbook on
International Environmental Law. UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2010. p. 118.

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