Foucault's Subject: An Ontological Reading

Author(s): Neve Gordon

Source: Polity, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Spring, 1999), pp. 395-414
Published by: Palgrave Macmillan Journals
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Foucault'sSubject:
An OntologicalReading*
Neve Gordon
University of Notre Dame

From the mid-1970s until his death, Michel Foucault sought to develop an
account of the subject that would avoid both regardingthe subject as merely
the passive product of power relations and regardingit as entirelyself-
creating.Following Foucault'sfinal cuesfocused on his discussion of the
ethics of the self and rooted in a conception offreedom as an ontological
condition of possibility rather than as humanwill drawnmainlyfrom
Heidegger,I argue that Foucault sought to develop an account of humansas
beings-in-the-worldsituated withinan existing web of relations occurring
within a context of backgroundpractices, all the while possessing an
ontologicalfreedom that is not molded by power relations but is instead the
condition of possibility of power itself In this way, Foucault sought to
achieve a balance between activity and passivity, agency and structurein
his account of the subject.

Neve Gordonis a Ph.D. Candidatein the Departmentof Government,

Universityof Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN.

In "The Subject and Power" Foucault reformulatesthe Kantian question

"Whatis man?,"to give it a historical slant. "Who are we?" Foucault asks;
"What are we in our actuality?"'These questions are intimately related to
Foucault'spoignantcritiqueof the "humanist"traditionof "Man"2and to his
refusal to privilege an a priori conception of the subject. Foucault does not

*I would like to thankFred Dallmayr,John Reiger, and Polity's anonymousreviewers for

their comments and suggestions. In addition, I wish to acknowledge the financial supportpro-
vided duringthe summerof 1997 by the Universityof Notre Dame's Departmentof Government
and InternationalStudies.
1. Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," appearedas an Afterword in Hubert L.
Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow,Michel Foucault Beyond Structuralismand Hermeneutics(Chicago:
Universityof Chicago Press, 1983), 212 (emphasisadded).
2. ParticularlyMichel Foucault, The Order to Things, (New York:Vintage, 1994). Also
interestingis James Berauer's interpretationof Foucaulton this issue, Michel Foucault's Force
of Flight (London:HumanitiesPress International,1990).

Number 33
XXXI, Number Spring 1999
Polity
Polity Volume XXXI, Spring 1999
396 Foucault'sSubject

subscribeto an ideal humannatureand introducesthe idea that the subjectis

producedby power.When discussing the Foucauldiansubjectmost commen-
tatorsrecountthis idea and thus accentuatethe subject'spassivity.
Although Foucaultnever developed a general theory of the subject (such
a theory would be antitheticalto his project),in what follows I arguethat in
his later work Foucault strove to resituate the subject, seeking a balance
between agency and structure,activity and passivity.3While scholars tend to
discuss his philosophy via the concepts of power and truth, I follow Fou-
cault's final cue and proceedthroughan analysis of the subjectand freedom.4
I adoptArnoldDavidson's differentiationbetween threeperiodsin Foucault's
thought5-archaeology, genealogy and ethics-to suggest that an ontological
reading clarifies a number of claims Foucault advanced during his ethical
period and to a certainextent even his genealogical period.
I begin by highlighting the structuralmotif in Foucault's work and the
ubiquitousnatureof power, both of which underliethe conceptionof the pas-
sive subject. I then discuss Foucault's notion of freedom, first, by outlining
some of the scholarlyinterpretationsof Foucault'sunderstandingof freedom,
and second, by presentingan alternativereadingwhich emphasizes the onto-
logical elements in his laterwork and accentuatesthe idea thatfreedomis the
conditionof possibility of power. It is in this context that I attemptto unravel
the idea of care of one's self which Foucaultdiscussed in considerablelength
duringthe last years of his life. I arguethat Heidegger's ontological concep-
tion of freedom is compatiblewith Foucault's notion of care of the self and
enables us to articulatea cogent idea of agency. I conclude by suggesting that
it is untenableto conceive of the Foucauldiansubjectas an artifactproduced
by power, and that an ontological readingof Foucaultcan sustain a constant
tension between agency and power.Thus, the analysis indicateshow the sub-
ject can maintainagency within a structurethat not only restricts,constrains
and delimits action, but also produces modes of behavior,fabricatesobjects

3. Thomas McCarthyalso claims thatFoucault'sconceptionof the subjectchanged,yet he

concludes that Foucaultends with a self-constitutingsubject,ratherthana middle notion balanc-
ing agency and structure."The Critiqueof ImpureReason, Foucaultand the FrankfurtSchool,"
Political Theory 18 (August 1990): 437-69.
4. Michel Foucault,"TheEthic of Care for the Self as a Practiceof Freedom"in TheFinal
Foucault, ed. James Berauer and David Rasmussen(Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 1988).
5. Arnold I. Davidson, "Archaeology,Genealogy,Ethics,"in Foucault,A CriticalReader,
ed. David Couzens Hoy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 221-34. As I understandit, the first
period-archaeology-ends with TheArchaeology of Knowledge, around 1969, and the second
period-genealogy-ends following the publicationof the first volume of The History of Sexu-
ality, in the late 1970s. Davidson's differentiationbetween the periodscorrespondswith the three
axes Foucaultmentionsin the introductionto the Second Volumeof the History of Sexuality:the
formationof sciences (savoirs), systems of power, and forms with which individualsrecognize
themselves as subjects. The History of Sexuality,Vol.2 (New York:Vintage, 1990), 5.
 Neve Gordon 397

of knowledge, and constructsreality.It shows how the tension between struc-

ture and agency can be preservedwithout one underminingthe other.

I. The Passive Subject

Most scholars emphasize the contrastbetween Foucault'srelationalcon-

ception of power and the more prevalentunderstandingof power as a prop-
erty which can be possessed. They stress his sensitivity to the fluctuatingnet-
work of power relations, his development of the "capillary"conception of
power-a micro-powerwhich permeatesall social strataproducingand thus
constrainingsubjectivity-and his notion of bio-power, which he considered
to be an indispensableelement in the developmentof capitalism.Some under-
score his constantendeavorto problematizethe "normal,"praisingFoucault's
success in showing that phenomena which society deems permanent,
inevitable, and universal, are but a specific period's fabrication.Moreover,
commentatorstend to agree that Foucault has opened a new path of critical
inquiry.
Debates concerningFoucault'swork emerge, not as a consequenceof his
disclosure that social practices pertainingto the insane or criminals are his-
torically contingent and arbitrary,nor as a direct result of his critiqueof the
human sciences' on-going productionof "normalcy."Rather,nearly all dis-
agreementsrevolve around his analysis of backgroundpractices and, more
particularly,addresshis conception of both truthand power, and the difficul-
ties arising from the relationshipbetween the two. Despite the plethora of
diverse views advancedon both sides of these debates,6the majorityof schol-
ars agree that, accordingto Foucault,subjects are producedby power.7

6. Foucault'scritics include CharlesTaylor,"Foucaulton FreedomandTruth,"in Couzens

Hoy, Foucault, A Critical Reader, 69-102; Edward Said, "Foucault and the Imagination of
Power,"in Couzens Hoy, ed. Foucault, A Critical Reader: 149-156; Nancy Fraser,"Foucaulton
Modem Power:EmpiricalInsightsand NormativeConfusion,"Praxis International(1981): 272-
87; and Harold Weiss "The Genealogy of Justice and the Justice of Genealogy: Chomsky and
Said vs. Foucaultand Bove," Philosophy Today,(Spring 1989): 73-94. For Foucault'sdefenders,
consult William Connolly, "Taylor, Foucault, and Otheress," Political Theory 13 (August
(1985): 365-76; Paul Patton,"Taylorand Foucaulton Power and Freedom,"Political Studies,37
(1989): 260-76; Thomas Dumm, Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom (ThousandOaks,
CA: Sage, 1996); Andrew Lamb, "Freedom,the Self, and Ethical PracticeAccording to Michel
Foucault,"International Philosophical Quarterly 35 (December 1995): 449-67; and Brent L.
Picket, "Foucaultand the Politics of Resistance,"Polity, 27 (Summer 1996): 445-66.
7. CharlesTaylor,for example, says that "Foucaultwants to explain the modem notion of
individuality as one of [technology's] products," in "Foucault on Freedom and Truth,"75.
WilliamConnolly states thatFoucault's"Powerproducesthe subjectthatbecomes not a mere fic-
tion of theory and law, but a real artifact,"in "Taylor,Foucault, and Otherness,"371. Leslie
Thiele states that in Foucault's opinion "power traversesand produces subjects"in "Foucault's
398 Foucault'sSubject

The scholarly consensus that Foucault regards subjects as an effect of

power can be tracedto his rejectionof the constitutingsubject.In the Archae-
ology of Knowledge,he tells his readersthat"theauthorityof the creativesub-
ject, as the raison d'etre of an ceuvreand the principle of its unity, is quite
alien to [archaeology]."A few years later,in a more emphatictone, he states
that "one has to dispense with the constitutingsubject, to get rid of the sub-
ject itself, that's to say, to arriveat an analysis which can accountfor the con-
stitutionof the subject within a historicalframework."8HubertDreyfus and
Paul Rabinow point out that Foucault's criticism of the constitutingsubject
was triggeredby what he believed to be an unworkableKantianidea which
attributesto man sovereigntyin spite of his being enslaved.9
Foucault's disavowal of the constitutingsubject is also at the core of the
criticismhe directs againstphenomenologyand existentialism.Claimingthat
humanbeings are always throwninto an existing web of constraints,Foucault
denounces both the idea that the subject is the sovereign of power and the
notion that one is nothingbut what one makes of oneself. This standpointhas
been noticed by practicallyall critics and has frequentlybeen linked to the
influence of structuralism.When mentioningthe Foucauldiansubject,'0com-
mentatorsoften evoke passages in which Foucaultsuggests that"the individ-
ual, with his identity and characteristics,is the productof a relationof power
exercised over bodies, multiplicities,movements,desires, forces";or "Disci-
pline 'makes' individuals;it is the specific techniqueof a power that regards
individualsboth as objects and instrumentsof its exercise.""The Foucauldian

Triple Murderand the Modem Development of Power " CanadianJournal of Political Science
19 (June, 1986) 257. HaroldWeiss points out that"Foucaultviews the subjector 'humannature'
as constituted,whetherdiscursively,institutionally,or autonomically,"in "TheGenealogy of Jus-
tice and the Justiceof Genealogy,"77. Paul Pattonclaims that"it has been one of Foucault'scon-
stanttheses since Discipline and Punish, thatpower createssubjects,"in "Taylorand Foucaulton
Power and Freedom,"264. In Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom,Thomas Dumm says
thatFoucaultexposes the "techniquesthroughwhich individualsareproduced,"71, see also 101.
8. Michel Foucault,TheArchaeologyof Knowledge(New York:Barnesand Noble, 1993),
139. Michel Foucault,Power/Knowledge,ed. Colin Gordon(New York:Vintage, 1980), 117.
9. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault Beyond Structuralismand
Hermeneutics,31, suggest that, accordingto Foucault,the Kantianunderstandingof the human
subject creates three major paradoxes:Man is considered"1) as a fact among other facts to be
studiedempirically,and yet as the transcendentalconditionof the possibility of all knowledge;2)
as surroundedby what he cannot get clear about (the unthought)and yet as a potentially lucid
cogito, sourceof all intelligibility;and 3) as the productof a long historywhose beginninghe can
never reach and yet, paradoxically,as the source of that very history."
10. One should note that often Foucaultdoes not distinguishclearly between the concepts
individualand subject,and uses them alternately.Unless I am quotingFoucaultor one of his com-
mentatorsI will restrictmyself to the term "subject."
11. Foucault, PowerlKnowledge,74; Michel Foucault,Discipline and Punish (New York:
Vintage, 1979), 170.
 Neve Gordon 399

subject has no inherent characteristics,and seems to gain meaning only

throughits relationshipswith otherunits in the structure.In otherwords, sub-
jects acquire identity as a result of the interplay of power relations taking
place within the system.
A paradigmaticexample of this idea is Foucault'streatmentof the panop-
ticon "architecturalfigure" designed by Jeremy Bentham.'2The perpetual
"gaze" of an unverifiable observer situated inside the panoptic tower acts
directly on prisonerswithout the necessity of physical instruments.The con-
straintsand norms which this "gaze"projectsupon the personsitting in a cell,
permanentlyvisible, rendera prisonerdocile.'3Moreover,the prisonerinter-
nalizes the disciplinaryrequirements.This becomes even clearerthroughthe
analysis of the confession practice,in which Foucaultillustratesthat not only
exteriorrelationshipsimpose an objective mold upon the subject;it is as if the
"gaze"penetratesthe subject, ensuringthat the "soul"conforms to the exist-
ing rules, codes, and mores, which are considered to correspondwith the
soul's "essence."
In "The Subjectand Power"Foucaultstates thathe has studiedthe differ-
ent dimensions of power in order to understandhow the subject is objec-
tivized. We read thatthe "formof power applies itself to immediateeveryday
life which categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality,
attacheshim to his own identity,imposes a law of truthon him which he must
recognize and which others have to recognize in him."'4
This idea is discussed in greatdetail in Discipline and Punish, where Fou-
cault analyzes not only surveillancebut othertechniquesby which the subject
is constituted-e.g., "normalization"and "examination."The power of nor-
malizationdeterminesthe "acceptable"limits of behaviorby demarcatingthe
normaland "respectable."Normalization"imposeshomogeneity"on the sub-
ject both in thought and comportment;but at the same time it individualizes
the subject"by makingit possible to measuregaps, to determinelevels, to fix
specialties, and to render the differences useful by fitting them one to
another."Examination"establishesover individualsa visibility throughwhich
one differentiatesthem andjudges them."It enables the teacher,for example,
to transmitspecific informationand "to transformhis pupils into a whole field
of knowledge,"while each individual"receives as his statushis own individ-
uality" thus markinghim as a case. Foucaultconcludes that a new modality

12. Foucault,Discipline and Punish, 200ff.

13. C. Colwell points out that the flaw of the panopticonmodel is that the gaze is central-
ized, while in the ideal structurethe gaze is fragmented.Power, according to Foucault, is not
located in one identifiable site. "The Retreatof the Subject in the Late Foucault,"Philosophy
Today(Spring 1994): 56-69.
14. Foucault,"The Subject and Power,"212.
400 Foucault'sSubject

of power is introducedthroughdiscipline whose proceduresand techniques

"constitutethe individualas an effect and object of power,as effect and object
of knowledge."'5
So it seems that power makes humanbeings into objects by giving them
identitiesto which a set of categoriesare attached:woman/passive/lack,crim-
inal/illicit/dangerous,and sane/reason/normal.The categoriesor attributesare
concatenatedto the subject and are conceived of as natural,normal and/or
essential;they become the standardsof the existing social practices.The "nor-
malization"of attributespermeatessocial practicesvia a complex networkof
power relations,which in his lateryears Foucaultalso describedvia the term
"games of truth."Scientific models, medical and legal discourses, economic
institutions,etc. are constitutedby games of truth.
It is precisely the vivid images which depict the subject as an effect that
have led many scholars to recite Foucault's claim that power produces the
subject. This claim postulates a passive subject and accentuates the struc-
turalistmotif in Foucault'sthought.'6Yet it raises a seriousquestion.If power
is the conditionof possibility of the subject,if it precedesand createsthe exis-
tence of subjects, how can we explain the escape of a subject from a given
system of power relations,not in the sense of mere difference-being a delin-
quent or insane-but ratheropening a new directionthat is not within the set
binaries and definitions integral to that system? Thomas Flynn recounts the
occasion on which Sartreremindedthe Marxisteconomists thatFlaubertmay
be a petit bourgeois, but not all petit bourgeois are Flauberts.'7

II. Foucault's Notion of Freedom?

The question we need to addressis whetherFoucaultactually conceives the

subjectas an object which power has engendered.WilliamConnolly seems to
believe that he does. He says: "Powerproducesthe subjectthat becomes not

15. Foucault,Discipline and Punish, 184, 186, 192.

16. One commentatorsuggests that, according to The Order of Things, "the class of sen-
tences thatcan be utteredin a specified time and place is not determinedby the conscious wishes
of the speakers.The possibility of being true-or-falsedoes not reside in a person'sdesire to com-
municate.Hence the authorhimself is irrelevantto the analysis of the conditions of possibility."
Ian Hacking,"TheArchaeologyof Foucault,"in Couzens Hoy, Foucault,A CriticalReader, 32.
17. Thomas Flynn, "Foucaultas Parrhesiast,"in Bemaueret al., The Final Foucault, 114.
John Rajchman,Michel Foucault: The Freedomof Philosophy (New York:ColumbiaUniversity
Press, 1985), 10, points out that Flaubert"perhapsfirst exemplifies the 'antibourgeois'aims of
modernistliteraryculture,for he envisaged a new aristocracyof lettersopposed to the 'revolt of
the masses' and to the idea of progress, to the journalism, sentimentalmagazines, and middle
brow culture which was ruiningthe language and keeping the great writerfrom his sovereignty
over it."
 Neve Gordon401

a merefictionof theoryandlaw,buta realartifact." By imposing"anartifi-

cialrealityon materialnotdesignedto receiveit,"powercreatesartifacts,i.e.,
criminals,homosexuals, academics,etc.Thismaterial,accordingto Connolly,
is theselfandpowertransforms theself intoa subject.Theself is notdesigned
to receivethe artificialrealitybecauseit is recalcitrant, whichexplainswhy
power is oftenan act of ConnollypersuasivelyarguesthatFou-
imposition.'8
caultunderstands thesubjectto be embodied,andthat"bodiesandpleasures"
canresistpower.'9 Nonetheless,Connolly'ssuggestionthatthe self is a recal-
citrantmaterialseemsto be foreignto Foucault'sthoughtand,furthermore,
createsa problematic subject/selfbinary.
Moreimportantly, Connolly'sanalysisdoes not seemto concurwiththe
thoughts Foucault advanced duringhis "ethical"period,anddoes notenable
us to relateto the issuesaddressedduringthoseyears,particularly the ideaof
"careof theself."20 By leavingthenotionof recalcitrant materialopaque,Con-
nolly'sdescription doesnothelpanswerthebasicguidingquestionposedear-
lier:how does Foucault'sanalysisof the subjectdifferfroma rigidformof
structuralism whereone can accountonly for differenceswithinthe existing
system?In a lateinterview,Foucaultasserts:"Inmy booksI havereallytried
to analyzechanges,notin orderto findthematerialcausesbutto showall the
factorsthatinteracted andthereactionsof people.I believein thefreedomof
people.To the samesituation,peoplereactin verydifferentways."2'
Foucault'seuvreis notonly an analysisof historicalchange,as he states
in the interview,for it hasalso helpedcreatetheconditionsneededfor trans-
formationandalteration.In this way he is a followerof the earlyMarxwho
pointedoutthatpovertyis notnatural(it is nota resultof scarcitybutof vio-
lenceandviolation)andsuggestedthatthemechanisms whichproduceit can
andshouldbe resisted.Foucaulthas also attempted to undermine notionsof
necessity and naturalness which have permeated our social practices.His
underlying assumption, as thepassageabove indicates,is thatpeoplearefree.
This point has been discussedby severalcommentators, the majorityof
whom,I believe,misconstrue whatFoucaultmeanswhenhe saysthatthesub-
ject is free.
ThomasDumm,forexample,discussesFoucault'sideaof freedomexten-
sively.HeusesIsaiahBerlin'sTwoConceptsof Libertyas a pointof reference,

18. Connolly,"Taylor,Foucault,and Otherness,"371.

19. Michel Foucault,The History of Sexuality,Vol. 1 (New York:Vintage, 1990), 157.
20. In his recent book The Ethos of Pluralization (Minnesota: University of Minnesota
Press, 1995), Connolly promotesan ontological readingof Foucaultwhich stresses the notion of
care . I take up this treatmentlater.
21. Michel Foucault, "Truth,Power, Self: An Interview with Michel Foucault,"in Tech-
nologies of the Self, ed. LutherH. Martin,Huck Gutman,and PatrickH. Hutton(Amherst:The
Universityof MassachusettsPress, 1988), 14.
402 Foucault'sSubject

to which he contrasts and opposes Foucault's notion of freedom.22Dumm

begins by underscoringthe differences between Berlin and Foucaultregard-
ing their conception of space, and its relationto freedom. Dumm points out
thatBerlin startsfrom the liberalnotion of neutralspace which can be divided
into public and private, and from the idea that humanbeings embody a "nat-
ural 'status."Berlin then cultivates a notion of normalcy vis-d-vis "neutral
space" and the "naturalstatus of humanity."Foucault,Dumm says, exposes
the contingentand open characterof both agents and the space they inhabit,
while showing how the "qualityof imaginationin a given society is intimately
related to the external organizationof that society's space."23I agree with
Dumm's critiqueof Berlin and appreciatehis attemptto highlight Foucault's
notion of space. Nonetheless, I find his interpretationof Foucault'sfreedom
misleading and ultimatelyflawed.
Dumm tells his readersthat"Disciplineand Punish is at root a book about
the practicesof freedom and the conditions that bear upon those practicesin
the moder era ... a book that sets an agenda for uncovering not only the
terms of our imprisonmentbut the conditions of our freedom" (emphasis
added). Quoting Foucault, he claims that mechanismsof power create "nor-
malization,"24but suggests that disciplinary order is, nonetheless, always
incomplete.Precisely because discipline is always incompletethe existence of
freedom is not in question (an idea reminiscent of Berlin's negative free-
dom).25For Dumm, then, freedom is dependenton the incompletenessof dis-
cipline, and identified with the lack of discipline.26
Paul Patton, who also analyzes Foucault vis-a-vis Berlin, provides the
readerwith a much more nuancedargument.He avers that it is insufficientto
represent"Foucault'swork as concernedwith expandingthe sphereof nega-
tive freedomopen to individuals";ratherit is directedat enlarginga sphereof
positive freedom.Positive freedomattainsa differentmeaningin this context,
for Pattonequates positive freedom with "the existence of a humancapacity

22. "Two Concepts of Liberty,"in Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford:Oxford
UniversityPress, 1969), 118-72.
23. Dumm, Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom,41.
24. Dumm, Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom,78, 101-02.
25. Dumm, Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom, 108.
26. For example, Dumm suggests that accordingto society the delinquent"comes close to
being the emblematicfigure of freedom"which "putsthe most elementalaspectof freedomon the
marginsof a social orderthatclaims freedomas its most importantvalue."This, he says, contributes
to an "impoverishedpolitical imaginationconcerningfreedom"for it marginalizesand segregates
the most free elementsin society (MichelFoucault and the Politics of Freedom, 111-112).Rajch-
man,who also wroteon this issue, disagrees.He says: "Foucaultadvancesa new ethic:not the ethic
of transgression,but the ethic of constantdisengagementfrom constitutedforms of experience,of
freeing oneself for the inventionsof new forms of life" (MichelFoucault: The Freedomof Philos-
ophy, 37). The subtledifferencebetweenthe two commentatorsis, of course,crucial.
 Neve Gordon 403

for active self transformation"and gives it the name "powerto." Contraryto

Dumm, Pattonbelieves that "powerto" is the condition of possibility of dis-
cipline, which he regardsas a specific form of "powerover,"the power that
confines and produces human beings. "Power to" is later renamed "force,"
meaning the "capacityto act and be acted upon." While I willingly follow
Patton's interpretationthis far, his notion that "force,""powerto," or "posi-
tive freedom"can be increasedleads me to suspect thathe too conceives free-
dom as a humanproperty.27
Both commentatorsmake interestingobservations,yet fail to disclose the
fundamentaldifferencebetween Foucaultand Berlin. Unlike Foucault,Berlin
treatsfreedom as a subject'swill, that is, a propertywhich can either be con-
strained(negative freedom) or amplified (positive freedom).28To make sense
of Foucault'slater writings, the period Davidson calls "ethics,"it is advanta-
geous to read Foucault througha Heideggerian,29 and to a lesser extent Sar-

27. Patton,"Taylorand Foucaulton Power and Freedom,"266, 276.

28. Foucault would have probablysaid that by using the word "liberty"in the title of both
the chapterand the book, Berlin assumes some kind of essential naturewhich needs to be liber-
ated. Foucault,"The Ethics of the Care of the Self as a Practiceof Freedom,"in Berauer et al.,
Final Foucault, 2-3.
29. I do not claim that Foucaultbecame a Heideggerianin his final years; he had his own
agenda,insights and innovations.However, I do thinkthatreadingFoucault'slaterwork through
Heidegger helps make his claims more coherent.One should note that in his last interview Fou-
cault claimed: "Forme Heidegger has always been the essential philosopher."A numberof sen-
tences later he adds: "My entire philosophical development was determinedby my reading of
Heidegger. I neverthelessrecognized that Nietzsche outweighed him" (interview with Foucault
conductedby Gilles Barbedetteand Andre Scala in Michel Foucault,Michel Foucault: Politics,
Philosophy, Culture,ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman[New York:Routledge, 1990], 250). There is a
considerable literaturediscussing the relation between Foucault's and Heidegger's work. Neil
Levy points out that most of this literaturefocuses on Foucault's critique of Heidegger in The
Orderof Things, and his relationshipto the early Heidegger in "The Prehistoryof Archaeology:
Heidegger and the Early Foucault,"Journal of the British Societyfor Phenomenology,27, (May
1996), 158. Some claim that the relationship between Foucault and Heidegger is lax, most
notably Jacques Derrida,who accuses Foucaultof having "neverconfronted[Heidegger]and, if
one may say so, never explainedhimself on his relationto him,"in "Desistence,"which appeared
in P. Lacoue-Labarthe,Typography:Mimesis, Philosophy,Politics (Cambridge:HarvardUniver-
sity Press, 1989), 17; quoted from Levy, "The Prehistoryof Archaeology: Heidegger and the
Early Foucault."Paul Rabinow asserts that Heidegger is concernedwith truthas being and truth
as destiny, while Foucault is concerned with truthas techne and truthas presence, in "Moder
and countermoder: Ethos and epoch in Heideggerand Foucault,"in The CambridgeCompanion
to Foucault, ed. GaryGutting(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1994). On the other side
of this debate are scholars like Rajchmanwho claims that Heidegger "is surely the centralphilo-
sophical influence" on Foucault, in Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philosophy, 18. In the
aforementionedarticle Neil Levy illustratesthat Foucault'scriticism of objectificationand sub-
jectification is rooted in his readingof Heidegger,and HubertDreyfus discusses the relationship
between Heidegger's Being and Foucault's power, in "Being and Power: Heidegger and Fou-
cault,"InternationalJournal of Philosophical Studies, 4 (1996): 1-16.
404 Foucault'sSubject

in his laterwritings,doesnotcon-
trian,lens.Foucault,I believe,particularly
ceive freedomas a propertythatcanbe expropriated fromhumanbeings,but
ratheras theconditionof possibilityof humanbeings.

III. Foucault'sFreedom:An OntologicalReading

Examiningthe similaritiesbetweenthe Foucauldiansubjectand a few of

Sartre'sontologicalinsightsproveshelpful.Inhis famouslectureExistential-
ism and Humanism,Sartrepointsout thatunlikeotherbeings-in-the-world
whoseessenceprecedestheirexistence,the existenceof humanbeingspre-
cedestheiressence.Theexistenceof a tableis precededby theformandqual-
ity whichmadeits production anddefinitionpossible.Theessenceof human
beings, on the other is
hand, dependenton theirexistence:"manfirstof all
exists,encounters himself,surgesupin theworld-and defineshimselfafter-
wards."30Since existenceprecedesessence,one cannotexplainone's action
by referringto someideaof humannature.Man,accordingto Sartre,is free-
dom. Sartregoes on to explainthatbecausehumanbeingsdo not have a
natureeachpersonis whathe makesof him/herself.Sartreis awareof exter-
nal andinternalconstraintson the subject,yet he thinksthatultimatelythe
subjecthasthecapacityto overcomethemandlive authentically, i.e., to relate
to him/herselfas free.
Foucault,I believe,wouldsubscribeto the "existenceprecedesessence"
formulawith two majorqualifications. First,FoucaultwouldrejectSartre's
claimthathumansareresponsibleforwhattheyare.3'Thesecond,andsurely
moreimportant qualification,relatesto thestatusornotionof "existence." We
haveseenthatFoucaultbelievesthathumanbeingsarefree.YetFoucault,in
my opinion,wouldattributea differentsenseto freedom.WhileSartresays
thathumanexistenceis freedom,Foucault,as I will explainmomentarily,
seemsto considerfreedomto be the conditionof possibilityof humanexis-
tence. The majordisagreementbetweenFoucaultand Sartreis ultimately
relatedto theirdifferentconceptionsof Being,a topicwhichis beyondthe
scopeof thispaper.32Hereit is sufficientto saythatFoucault'sideasappearto
correlatemorewithHeidegger'spositionthanwithSartre's.
Heideggersuggeststhathumanbeingsarethrownintothe worldandthat

30. Jean-PaulSartre,Existentialism& Humanism(London:Eyre MethuenLtd., 1973), 28.

31. Sartre,Existentialism& Humanism,29
32. In his critiqueof Sartre,Heideggerclaims thata reversalof the relationbetweenessence
and existence still conceives being in its traditionalsense, as presence. Heidegger wants to dis-
tinguish between beings as presence and Being. See MartinHeidegger,"Letteron Humanism,"
in Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings,ed. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: HarperCollins,
1993), 213-66.
 Neve Gordon 405

theircondition of possibility is freedom.Freedomis used here in the ontolog-

ical sense and not as free will. In The Question ConcerningTechnology,Hei-
degger says that the "essence of freedom is originally not connected with the
will or even with the causalityof humanwilling."33Heideggerarguesthat"the
and that freedom is
essence of the being-in-itself of all beings is freedom,"34
actualizedthroughthe engagement in the disclosure of beings; "man should
be understood,within the question of being, as the site which being requires
in orderto disclose itself."' In his discussion on Schelling's Treatiseon the
Essence of HumanFreedom, Heidegger writes:

Schelling finds it remarkablethatKantrealizedin his practicalphiloso-

phy that the essence of the "ego" is freedom and thus determinedthe
essence of this being in itself in its own being, but then declaredon top
of this in the Critiqueof Pure Reason that the essence of the thing-in-
itself is unknowable. Only one step was necessary, to carry over the
insight about man's being-in-itselfto the being-in-itselfof all beings in
general and thus to make freedom into a positive and completely uni-
versal determinationof the "in-itself' in general.36

Elsewhere Heidegger explains that "Freedomis the comprehensiveand

pervasive dimension of being in whose ambiance man becomes man in the
first place. This means: the essence of man is groundedin freedom;freedom
itself, however, is a category transcendinghumanDasein, that is, a category
of authentic being as such." In Schelling's TreatiseHeidegger stresses that
ontological freedom is not "freedomas a propertyof man; but the reverse:
man as the possibility of freedom. Human freedom is a freedom which
invades and sustainsman, therebyrenderingman possible."3Heidegger,Fred
Dallmayrexplains, conceives freedomof will to be "basedon humanDasein
construedas freedomor a mode of 'being free', and not vice versa. Viewed as
Dasein's ontological core, 'being free' is neither imposed on as an external
fate or destiny,nor can it arbitrarilybe chosen or discarded."38
As is all too evident, the Foucauldiansubjectis a being-in-the-world,and

"TheQuestionConcerning
33. MartinHeidegger, Technology," 330.
inKrell,BasicWritings,
34. MartinHeidegger, Schelling's Treatiseon the Essence of Human Freedom, trans.Joan
Stambaugh(Athens:Universityof OhioPress,1985),93.
35. MartinHeidegger, toMetaphysics,
AnIntroduction trans.RalphManheim(NewHaven:
YaleUniversityPress,1987),205.
36. Heidegger,Schelling's Treatiseon the Essence of HumanFreedom, 93.
37. Martin Heidegger, Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit: Einleitung in die Philosophie,
vol. 31), ed. Hartmut
(Gesamtausgabe 1982),303. This
Klostermann,
Tietjen(Frankfurt-Main:
is
passage quotedin Fred Dallmayr,Polis andPraxis MA:
(Cambridge, MITPress,1984),121.
Heidegger,Schelling'sTreatiseon the Essence of HumanFreedom,9, translationslightly altered.
38. Dallmayr,Polis and Praxis, 114.
406 Foucault'sSubject

not an autonomous rationalbeingset againstthe worldas Berlinwouldhave

us think.Moreover,Foucault'slaterworkrevealsan understanding of free-
domsimilarto Heidegger's.Twoconditionsof possibilityarenecessary,Fou-
caultsays, for a powerrelationship to exist:"Thatthe 'other'(theone over
whompoweris exercised)be thoroughlyrecognizedandmaintainedto the
veryendas a personwho acts;andthat,facedwitha relationship of power,a
wholefield of responses,reactions,results,andpossibleinventionsmaybe
opened."Poweris characterized as an actionwhichmodifiesthe actionsof
others,and"is exercisedonly overfreesubjects,andonly insofaras theyare
free."A few pageslater,he adds:"For,if it is truethatat the heartof power
relationsandas a permanent conditionof theirexistencethereis an insubor-
dinationanda certainessentialobstinacyon thepartof theprinciplesof free-
dom,thenthereis no possibilityof powerwithoutthemeansof escapeorpos-
sible flight."39
Thus,it seemsthatfreedomis the conditionof possibilityof
power. Power does not act on objectslike chairs,butonly on humanbeings,
andonly insofaras theirconditionof possibilityis freedom.
In the final yearsof his life, Foucaultreiteratedthatthe possibilityof
escapefromthe constraintsof poweris power'sconditionfor existence.In
one of his lastinterviews,he says:"Onemustobservealso thattherecannot
be relationsof powerunlessthesubjectis free.... [I]ntherelationsof power,
thereis necessarilythe possibilityof resistance,for if therewereno possibil-
ity of resistance-of violentresistance,of escape,of ruse,of strategiesthat
reversethe situation-therewouldbe no relationsof power."40 So one could
say thatthe subject,construedas thatwhoseconditionof possibilityis free-
dom,is the conditionof possibilityof power.Thisamountsto a new reading
of the earlierassumption thatpowerproducessubjects.
Following such a line of thinkinga few scholarshave claimedthatthe
laterFoucaultreversedhis conceptionof the subject,transforming it, as it
were,fromabsolutepassivityto absoluteactivity.4' If oneacceptsthata rever-

39. Foucault,"The Subjectand Power,"220, 221, 225. Alreadyin The Historyof Sexuality,
Vol. 1, he suggests that "wherethere is power, there is resistance."See 95.
40. Foucault,"The Ethics of the Care of the Self as a Practiceof Freedom,"in Bernaueret
al., Final Foucault, 12.
41. JiirgenHabermasmakes a similar claim in his essay "TakingAim at the Heart of the
Present," in Couzens Hoy, ed. Foucault a Critical Reader, 103-08. A number of years later
Thomas McCarthyreaches the same conclusion. He says: "Viewedfrom the perspectiveof criti-
cal social theory,Foucault's later frameworkof interpretationlies in the opposite extreme from
his earlier social ontology of power. Then everything was a function of context, of impersonal
forces and fields, from which there was no escape-the end of man. Now, the focus is on those
'intentionaland voluntaryactions by which men not only set themselves rules of conductbut also
seek to transformthemselves .. . and to make their life into an oeuvre"-with scant regardfor
social, political and economic context. In "The Critique of ImpureReason, Foucault and the
FrankfurtSchool," 463.
 Neve Gordon 407

sal actually occurred,one must conclude that an irreconcilablefissure exists

between the first two periods in Foucault'soeuvre and the last. To reveal the
shortcomingof such an interpretation,while strivingto attaina bettergraspof
Foucault'sposition concerningfreedom and the subject,I turnto other works
he producedduringhis last period.
In The Use of Pleasure, the Second Volume of The History of Sexuality,
Foucault discloses similarities between antiquityand Christianityregarding
which sexual activity was sanctionedand prohibited,while arguingthat the
Greeks recognized and organized sexuality differently.Already in classical
Greek thought sexual practices were considered to be part of an ethical
domain. This ethical domain, however, was not governed by rules or univer-
sal interdictionsregardingthe use of pleasure as it subsequentlydid in the
Christianmorality of sexual behavior.Nor did the Greeks think that desires
lay "hiddenin the mysteries of the heart"waiting to be deciphered.Antiq-
uity's ethical domain of pleasure was not determined by codes and/or a
hermeneuticalapproachwhich assumes a well defined yet concealed mean-
ing, essence, or nature,that needs to be revealed. Rather,sexual moderation
was consideredto be an exercise of freedomand individualswere expected to
master themselves according to need, time, and status, so as to create and
recreatethe rule of the self over self. When Foucaulttells us that mastering
the use of pleasurewas characterizedas an "activefreedom,a freedomwhich
was indissociable from a structural,instrumental,and ontological relation to
truth,"we notice that his assumptionsare beginning to change-the struc-
ture/agencyrelationshipis broughtto the fore and renegotiated.42
This change, however, does not constitute a reversal of his earlier posi-
tion; it is an elaboration.In a seminargiven at the Universityof Vermont,Fou-
cault begins to develop what he called the technology of the self, suggesting
that in his earlier works he had over-emphasizedthe technology of domina-
tion and power. In his analysis of technologies of the self, he finds that the
notion of care of the self, which had been prominentin antiquity,had been
obscured by the Delphic principle "know thyself." Foucault claims that
"know thyself' became dominantfor two major reasons. On the one hand,
"our morality,a moralityof asceticism, insists that the self is that which one
can reject,"while on the otherhand, since Descartes,philosophershave con-
sidered the thinking subject to be the cornerstoneof epistemology, and con-
sequently emphasized the scrutiny of the self. Both observationsare firmly
linked to his prior work. As I have already suggested, Foucault argues that
human beings do not have a nature that can be rejected, liberated, or
renounced (as some Christianteachings would have us think). At the same

42. Foucault, The History of Sexuality,Vol.2, 93.

408 Foucault'sSubject

time,as mentionedat the outset,he claimsthatthe self cannotbe simultane-

conditionof possibilityof knowledgeandan object
ouslythe transcendental
of empiricalinquiry.
Thedominanceof "knowthyself' is an inversionof the hierarchyof the
two principlesof antiquity,he says,andsetsoutto disclosetheancientunder-
of
standing taking care of the self. He turnsto Plato'sAlcibiadesand
Socrates'sApologyandfindsthe notionthatto takecareof the self, one has
to takecareof one's activities,andnot overthe soul-as-substance. Foucault
takesgreatpainsto emphasizethatcareof the self is not a turninsideone's
self, it is by no meansa call for quietism,for if it is a call for anythingit is a
callforaction.Takingcareof one'sself, as opposedto "knowthyself,"accen-
tuatesan ontologicalnotionof freedom,wherefreedomis not a propertyof
theself.Onlybecausecareof one'sself assumesthatfreedomis thecondition
of possibilityof beinghuman,andnothumanwill, canit coherentlystressthe
ideaof improvingone'sself andtranscending one'sownlimits.43
This is the majorthemein the thirdvolumeof TheHistoryof Sexuality,
whichis titledTheCareof theSelf.Foucaultpointsoutthatin Hellenisticand
Romanthoughtattentivenessto one's self was problematized even further.
Whilefor the Greeksthe careof the self was an ethicsthatpertainedto free
menandwasfirmlylinkedto theirstatusin society,in theselatererasthecare
of the self couldno longeraccordwithone'sstatus.FoucaultquotesSeneca44
sayingthatmanneedsto seekhis own soul,a soul thatis upright,good,and
great."Whatelse," Senecasays, "shouldyou call such a soul thana god
dwellingas a guestin a humanbody.A soul like this may descendinto a
Romanknightjustas well as intoa freedman's sonora slave."45 Foucaultcon-

43. Foucault,"Technologies of theSelf,"in Martinet al., Technologies

of theSelf,22, 25.
44. It is interesting
to notethatHeideggermentionsSenecain his discussionof the onto-
logicalhistoryof care.He quotesSenecasayingthatthegoodof humanbeingsis fulfilledby
care.YetHeideggeralsoassertsthatif "onewereto constructtheexpression'careforoneself'
... thiswouldbe a tautology." Care,he says,"cannotstandforsomespecialattitudetowardsthe
Self."Unfortunately, I cannot,in thiscontext,discussthe differencebetweenHeidegger'sand
Foucault'snotionsof care.MartinHeidegger, BeingandTime(Oxford:BasilBlackwell,1988),
243 and237,respectively.
45. Foucault'sdiscussionof Senecais problematic. Senecaasksus to seekoursoul,a soul
thatis upright,goodandgreat.Yet,we haveseenthatFoucaultrejectsthenotionthattakingcare
of theselfamountsto takingcareof one'ssoul,particularly a soul-as-substance.
Another, perhaps
greater,problemis thatin his discussionconcerning thecareof theself FoucaultusestheStoics
as his majorreference.HannahArendthaspointedoutthatStoicismrepresents "anescapefrom
theworldintotheself which,it is hoped,will be ableto sustainitselfin sovereignindependence
of theoutsideworld"inMeninDarkTimes(SanDiego:Harcourt Brace,1993),9. WhileArendt's
assessmentof Stoicismis probablyover-conclusive, it wouldhavebeenbeneficialif Foucault,
whorejectsquietismor anyformof escapism,hadaddressed thisdisturbing
aspectof Stoicism.
Oneshould,however,remember thatTheCareof theSelfwaspartof a workin progresscutoff
by Foucault's premature death.
 Neve Gordon409

cludesthatduringthis periodthe exerciseof powerwas relativizedin two

ways.First,whilepoliticalactivitywas considereda life commitment, it was
no longerobviousthatonehadto acceptthisresponsibility as followingfrom
theparticular statusone heldat birth-one's placein the socialstructure was
no longerconsideredto be a causalforceleavingno roomfor recourse.We
notice that,accordingto Foucault'sreading,the subjectis not an effect of
externalconstraints, buthas the opportunity to act andif needbe defy these
constraints.Second, and more important in this context,the Hellenisticand
Romanthinkersrecognized thatone exercises poweralreadywithinanexist-
ingfieldof complexrelations,whichentailsthatoneis simultaneously always
rulerandruled.Artistides,Foucaultsays, sees the principleof goodgovern-
ment"inthefactthata manis one andtheotherat the sametime,throughan
interplayof directionssentandreceived,of checks,of appeals,of decisions
taken."46 This,I think,is exactlythe balanceFoucaultwas lookingfor in the
lastyearsof his life, andI will discussits implicationsin thefinalsection.
In a lateinterview,Foucaultcharacterizes thecareof theself as thedelib-
eratepracticeof freedom.Careof theself meansfirstandforemostrelatingto
one'sself as a non-slave,as free,which,in turn,is a carefortheother.Tojus-
tifythelatterclaim,FoucaultmentionstheGreeks'conceptionof thetyrantas
a personwhois evil towardshis subjectsbecausehe is a slaveto his appetites;
his immoralcomportment towardsothersis a consequenceof neglectingself
care.47 In anotherinterviewfromthe sameperiod,Foucaultassertsthatthe
careof theself is the"elaboration of one'slife as a personalworkof art."'4
Sartre,towards theend of ExistentialismandHumanism, strivesto answer
the accusationthatexistentialism amountsto nihilismandvoluntarism. "The
he "is
moralchoice," says, comparable to the constructionof a work of art."
Thereis no a prioricode or rulewhich human beings must follow, "there is
no pre-definedpicturefor [humans]to make."49 Sartrehas one guideline to
offerbasedon his conceptionof humanontology:humansshouldrelateto
themselvesand othersas free. This advice,includingthe metaphorof the
workof art,resemblesFoucault'sunderstanding of theethicof thecareof the
self as a practiceof freedom.
Thisconclusiondoesnotindicatethatin his lateryearsFoucaultespoused
a constituting subject,a sovereign.Considerfora momenttheintroduction of
the secondvolumeof theHistoryof Sexuality,whereFoucaultexplainswhy
the publicationof the bookwas delayed.The initialplanwas to publishsix

Vol.3 (NewYork:Vintage,1990),86, 87-88.

46. MichelFoucault,TheHistoryof Sexuality,
in Bernauer
47. Foucault,"TheEthicsof theCareof theSelf as a Practiceof Freedom," et
al., Final Foucault, 10-14. See also Foucault, The History of Sexuality,Vol.2, 80-81.
in Kritzman,
48. Foucault,"AnAestheticsof Existence," Culture,49.
Politics,Philosophy,
49. Sartre,Existentialism& Humanism,48-49.
410 Foucault'sSubject

volumes which dealt with the history of the experience of sexuality, "where
experience is understood as the correlation between fields of knowledge,
types of normativity,and forms of subjectivityin a particularculture."After
completingthe first volume, Foucaultrealizedthatin orderto accomplishthis
objective, he had to analyze the interrelationsalong the three axes that con-
stitute it: "1) the formationsof sciences (savoirs) that refer to it, 2) the sys-
tems of power that regulateits practice, 3) the forms within which individu-
als are able, are obliged, to recognize themselves as subjectsof this sexuality."
Foucaulttells the readerthathe had masteredthe tools to analyzethe first two
axes in his earlierwork, and that the delay occurredbecause he had to under-
take a "shift"so he could understandthe third. "I felt obliged," he says, "to
study the games of truthin the relationshipof self with self and the forming
of oneself as a subject,taking as my domainof referenceand field of investi-
gation what might be called 'the history of desiring man."'50
Along the same lines, Foucault answers an interviewer who asks him
whether in the second and third volumes of the History of Sexualityhe had
changeddirection.

Yes, I have changed direction.When I was dealing with madness I set

out from the "problem"that it may have constitutedin a certainsocial,
political, and epistemological context: the problemthat madnessposes
for others. [In the History of Sexuality,volumes two and three]I set out
from the problemthatsexual behaviormight pose for individualsthem-
selves (or at least to men in Antiquity).In the first case, I had to find out
how madmenwere "controlled";in the second, how one "controls"one-
self ... Here I would like to show how self control is integratedinto
the practiceof controllingothers.They are, in short,two opposite ways
of approachingthe same question: how is an "experience"formed in
which the relationship to oneself and the relationship to others are
linked together.

Foucaultconceived his later work not as a reversalor rejectionof an ear-

lier position, but as an attemptto approachthe same problematicin a new and
refreshing manner.To be sure, it was a change in direction, a shift which
inevitably became a self-critiqueof precedingwork. Yet he did not abandon
the notion of power, the idea that humans are always within a web of con-
straints,but ratherstrove to enrich and go beyond his earlierwork in orderto
solve some of the problemsarisingfrom it. Foucaulttells us that accentuating
the care of the self complementshis previous endeavors. His late work is, I
believe, an attemptto rethinkand consequentlyresituatethe subjectvis-d-vis

50. Foucault,The History of Sexuality,Vol.2, 5-6.

 Neve Gordon 411

power relations,which, in turn,is a rethinkingof the capacityof power itself.

So while I disagree with the so-called reversalclaim, I also thinkthat it is
erroneousto suggest that Foucault considers the subject to be an artifactof
power. Already in Discipline and Punish he insinuates that discipline is
dependenton indiscipline, while in The History of Sexuality VolumeOne he
suggests that power is dependent on resistance.5 Considering that the two
subsequentvolumes of The History of Sexualityand other late writingscom-
plement Foucault'searlierwork, and taking into account that duringthe later
period there is a strong accent on agency and thathe states clearly thatpower
is dependenton freedom, it does not make sense to continuereadingFoucault
as if he considers the subjectas a mere effect. A coherentaccountof Foucault
must thereforemake room for both the notion of power and a certaindegree
of agency. The ontological reading presentedhere can reveal, I believe, the
mannerby which some kind of balance between the two may be attained.

IV. Power and Agency

The late Foucault'semphasis of care alongside his effort to resituateagency

vis-a-vis power, point to a tangible, and to my mind worthy, ethical stance
which strives to identify a path between the passivity characteristicof rigid
structuralismand the self-creating subject. By accentuatingcare, Foucault
enables the subject to assume responsibility without violating the other's
integrity. Interestingly,William Connolly reaches a similar conclusion. He
says thatthe ethic of care "acknowledgesthe need to limit its own self-asser-
tion so thatotherfaiths can count for somethingtoo." While I appreciateCon-
nolly's endeavor to articulatean ethics that promotesrespect for the other, I
believe thathe bases Foucault'sethics of care on a mistakenontologicalread-
ing. Connolly claims that accordingto Foucault"Nothingis fundamental....
Thereforealmost everythingcounts for something.""
This reading, as I understandit, is based on Foucault's insistence that
power is not merely a negative, but a constitutiveforce. "Wemust cease once
and for all," he tells us, "to describe the effects of power in negative terms:it
'excludes', it 'represses', it 'censors', it 'abstracts',it 'masks', it 'conceals'.
In fact, power produces;it produces reality; it produces domains of objects
and ritualsof truth.The individualand the knowledge that may be gained of
him belong to this production.""3 While this conception of power indeed

51. Foucault,Discipline and Punish, 290; Foucault,TheHistory of Sexuality,Vol. 1, 95.

52. Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization, 40. The claim that "nothingis fundamental"is
takendirectlyfrom Foucault,who in an interviewcalled "Space,Knowledge, and Power,"states:
"Nothing is fundamental.That is what is interestingin the analysis of society ..." In The Fou-
cault Reader, ed, Paul Rabinow (New York:Pantheon,1984), 247.
53. Foucault,Discipline and Punish, 194.
412 Foucault'sSubject

entails that nothing is fundamental,it deemphasizesthe ontological perspec-

tive which highlights the subject's agency and the idea that freedom is the
condition of possibility of power.
By contrast,I have arguedthatFoucault'snotion of care of the self means
relatingto oneself as free, and it is precisely this way of relatingto one's self
- not merely a notion that nothing is fundamental-which spurs a care for
the other.Foucault'sexample of the tyrantwho is a slave to his appetitesand
thereforedoes not care for others is persuasive.This readingtakes into con-
siderationFoucault'swritingfrom the late 1970s, first, by pointingto the con-
dition of possibility of power:

there is no face to face confrontationof power and freedom which is

mutually exclusive (freedom disappears everywhere power is exer-
cised), but a much more complicated interplay.In this game freedom
may well appearas the conditionfor the exercise of power (at the same
time its precondition,since freedommust exist for power to be exerted,
and also its permanentsupport,since withoutthe possibility for recalci-
trance,power would be equivalentto a physical determination).54

Second, throughthe analysis of the care of the self, this readingstresses Fou-
cault's claim that each person has the possibility "to make his life into an
euvre."55
Yet, to be tenable, this reading would have to indicate how agency can
coexist with Foucault'snotion of power. Once more Heidegger's insights are
helpful. In Being and Time,he suggests thatDasein is "constantly'more' than
it factually is." Heidegger,as is well known, distinguishesbetween factuality
and facticity, where the former is some kind of inventory,a "list of contents
of its Being."Dasein can never be fully defined or capturedby factuality.Fac-
ticity, on the otherhand, has to do with Heidegger's depiction of Dasein as a
"thrownprojection,"a depiction which seems to reverberatein Foucault's
later understandingof the subject.
"As thrown," Heidegger explains, "Dasein is thrown into the kind of
Being we call 'projecting'."By "projecting"Heidegger does not mean that
Dasein is an autonomousbeing, totally free to choose or make plans into the
future in the sense of "arrangingits Being." Not only is Dasein invariably
more thanit factuallyis, but "Dasein always has understooditself and always
will understanditself in terms of possibilities." The emphasis here is on
understanding,where understanding,as potentiality-for-Being,"has itself

54. Foucault, "The Subject and Power," 221. As noted earlier, Foucault makes a similar
claim in the History of Sexuality,Vol. 1, 95-97.
55. Foucault,The History of Sexuality,Vol. 2, 139.
 Neve Gordon 413

possibilities, which are sketched out beforehandwithin the range of what is

essentially disclosable in it."56We see that Dasein is thrown into the world,
into an existing situationwhich alreadyhas concrete possibilities. These are
not logical possibilities as one might think of when discussing choices in an
abstractmanner;rather,as David Couzens Hoy points out, the possibilities
that Heidegger is referringto "come with limitations."7Heidegger defines
these concrete possibilities and limitationsas Dasein's facticity.Dasein, as a
thrownprojection,is always already"determinedby facticity,"he says. Yet,
even though Dasein is thrown into the world, into its facticity, it is thrown
concerfully, as care.
When asked, in January 1984, about his conception of human agency,
Foucaultattemptedto depict some kind of balancedrelationship:"I would say
that if now I am interested,in fact, in the way in which the subjectconstitutes
himself in an active fashion, by the practicesof self, these practicesare nev-
ertheless not something that the individualinvents by himself. They are pat-
terns that he finds in his culture and which are proposed, suggested and
imposed on him by his culture,his society and his social group."58 The Fou-
cauldiansubject has gained agency, yet at the same time it is always situated
within a web of constraints,and thereforecannot be conceived as an entity
autonomousof power relations and backgroundpractices.As seen from his
statementsconcerning freedom, the subject is no longer considered to be a
product of power relations in the sense that it is identical with what power
produces, an artifact.The subject always maintainsa difference. Not only in
the structuralsense where the difference is a consequence of its relation and
position vis-a-vis the other units within the structure,but also in an ontologi-
cal sense where the subject, whose condition of possibility is freedom, is
never fully determined.Similar to the depiction of Dasein as that which is
constantlymore thanit factuallyis, Foucaultno longer portraysthe subjectas
a mere effect of power, nor does he attributean essence to it, but rather
implies a repositioningof the subject within a never settled location situated
between passivity and activity.
Using Heidegger's ontology to read Foucault'slater work enables us to
make room for agency withoutrelinquishingFoucault'snotion of power.The
idea that the subjectcan never be fully determinedunderminesthe belief that

56. Elsewhere Heidegger says that "In its projection [Dasein] reveals itself as something
which has been thrown.It has been thrownlyabandonedto the 'world,' and falls into it concern-
fully."Being and Time, 185 and 458 respectively.
57. David Couzens Hoy, "Heidegger and the HermeneuticTurn,"in Guigon, The Cam-
bridge Companionto Heidegger, 179.
58. Foucault,"The Ethics of the Care of the Self as a Practiceof Freedom,"in Berauer et
al., Final Foucault, 11.
414 Foucault'sSubject

power, as both a constrainingand constitutingforce, is antitheticalto agency.

Examining the two philosopherstogether also contributes,I believe, to our
understandingof Heidegger.While it is beyondthe scope of this paperto show
the advantagesof readingHeideggerfrom Foucault'svantagepoint,it seems to
me thatseveralof Heidegger'sphilosophicalinsightsgainpoliticalconcreteness
when linked to Foucault'sempiricalanalysis.Foucault'sdepictionand investi-
gation of mechanismsof power-whether they be linguistic or physical-are
concretemanifestationsof what Heideggercalls Dasein's facticity.
By way of conclusion it is importantto note that this reading inevitably
changes our conceptionof the relationbetween ubiquitouspower and the sub-
ject, and calls for a reexaminationof the contestedpower-truthrelationship.It
also brings into relief statements that appeared to be contradictory.For
instance, in the History of Sexuality VolumeOne, Foucault states: one is not
"inside" power, while, within a few sentences he asserts that resistance can
exist only in the strategicfield of power relations.59 On the basis of our onto-
logical discussion such ostensible contradictionscan be resolved. Humansare
beings-in-the-world,beings that are always within an existing web of rela-
tions, within a context of backgroundpractices.Resistance to a given set of
constraintsor modes of productioncan occur only in the ambianceof power
and in this sense there is no exit from power. "Power is already there,"he
says, "one is never outside it, ... there are no 'margins'for those who break
from the system to gambol in."60From an ontological perspective,however,
humansare free, and this ontological freedom which can be construedas the
condition of possibility of the subject cannot be taken away by means of
power-it is not a propertythat can be limited, constrainedor molded by the
web of power relations. Rather,it is the condition of possibility of power
itself. Foucault, I believe, is referringto this ontological level when he says
that one should practicefreedom.

59. Foucault,TheHistory of Sexuality,Vol. 1, 95-96.

60. Foucault,Power/Knowledge,141.