CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Criminal Law Review (2nd BATCH)
1. GABRIEL CAPILI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL. Exh. "A" came from a brooch owned by her mother. The chain with medal of our Lady
G.R. No. 139250 August 15, 2000
FACTS: Gabriel Capili y Recto (GABRIEL) together with his wife Ferma Capili y Inot
were charged with violation of Presidential Decree 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-
Fencing Law, in an information that reads: "That on or about November 5, 1993, in
the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping each other. With intent to gain for themselves or for
another, did then and there willfully and knowingly receive, possess, keep, acquire
and sell or dispose of the following, to wit: Assorted pieces of jewelry, Several pieces
of old coins (U.S. dollar) all valued at P3,000,000.00, which they knew or should have
known to have been derived from the proceeds of a (sic) crime of theft. Contrary to
law."3
Christine Diokno testified that at 4:00 P.M. on November 4, 1993, when she went
home from her office, she discovered that some of her (sic) items at (sic) her closet
and the jewelries (sic) and money at (sic) her mother’s room were taken. Upon call,
two Makati police responded and surveyed the room where the robbery took place.
The police officer took her statement and then investigated the theft case. Police
prepared the police report and concluded that Michael Manzo, her former houseboy,
committed the offense so a case against Manzo was filed. She described all the
properties that were taken as those reflected in the police report because according
to her she gave the police a list of the items and is part of her statement. Allegedly
the value is about 3 Million pesos, some were of 20 years and some were of 30 years
vintage, acquired by her parents since their wedding in 1945. Some from abroad,
States or Hongkong acquired during trips. On November 27, 1993, Quiapo sub-
station informed her that Michael Manzo was there. She talked to Michael Manzo who
admitted the commission of the stealing and that he sold the items to Gabriel Capili
and his wife for P50,000.00. Likewise Michael Manzo admitted that on two occasions
Gabriel Capili returned some of the items, the fancy ones were returned to him.
Manzo informed her that he sold those items returned to other buyers, near Claro M.
Recto, who paid P1,500.00 and P1,000.00 for the ring which police officer (sic) failed
to recover because the stand was no longer there. She was shown by the police
officer the items recovered from Gabriel Capili and his wife which she identified as
her property. Shown with Exhs. "A", "B", "C", she said those are her properties and
that the coins (sic) were acquired during the trips to the States. She kept John F.
Kennedy dollar coins contained in a small box. She further relayed that the coins,
was bought by her mother and was given to her together with other belongings.
To support the allegation in the Information Michael Manzo testified that after he
asked his friend Emilio Benitez where he can sell his jewelries (sic) he was brought
to Boy Recto’s (accused) house at 1260 Carola St., Sampaloc, Manila, to whom he
gave one bag of jewelries (sic) with the information that he stole them while he was a
house boy. Recto agreed to pay him P50,000.00. He left and went back after a week
or on November 5, as he needed the money. He was paid P1,500.00. He left again
and went back after two weeks and was paid again P6,000.00. He left again but in
his return he was not paid anymore. When he visited his friend Emilio Benitez at the
precinct, having been charged with vagrancy, he was caught by the police asking him
where he brought the jewelries (sic), so he pointed to Boy Recto, who was picked-up
and brought to the station and investigated. During the frisking and searching at the
station, police officers found pearls and old coins from Gabriel Capili. The following
day, Mrs. Ferma Capili was investigated at sub-station 3, Quiapo, WPD. He identified
the pearl earring with copper (sic) with diamond (Exh. "A"). He likewise identified the
old coin 4 pieces of dollars marked as Exhs. "B-1", "B-2", "B-3" and "B-4"; "B-1", "B-
2" dimes, "B-3" and "B-4" quarter cents; pendant with inscription Boy Recto, Exh. "C".
He admitted that the statement marked as Exh. "D" and sub-markings is his.
Recto gave the instruction that he can come back within two weeks because Boy
Recto will pay. The witness admitted that he is facing a charge of Qualified Theft in
Makati pending before a court where he posted his bail. That he is testifying before
this Court out of his own volition. He explained that they went to Isabela per instruction
of Gabriel Capili that they should lie low because the police were hunting for them
and that Emilio Benitez is from Roxas, Isabela.
After more or less two weeks when (sic) they arrived from Isabela, he was requested
by Boy Recto (Gabriel Capili) to sign a blank document somewhere at Espana
(Document Exh. "3" to "3-A"). He was not, however, forced. That upon arrival from
Isabela, they went to the house of the accused then proceeded to wait at a hotel in
Sta. Cruz. After three hours of waiting, the accused arrived and gave him P6,000.00
in the presence of Emilio Benitez without receipt. He declared that he himself is not
sure whether all the jewelries (sic) inside the bag are (sic) genuine or not. Having
admitted to the police that he is Michael Manzo, he was asked where he brought the
jewelries (sic) so he pointed to Boy Recto. He admitted to have signed a blank
document, Exhibit "4" and "3", his signature, Exh. "4-1" and Exh."3-A", but do (sic) not
know where the originals were, but later said that the originals are in the hands of the
police officers.
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SPO1 Beinvenido Inot testified that he is a member of the National Police Force of
Precinct 1, Olongapo City and that the accused Ferma Capili, wife of Gabriel, is his
sister. He was asked by his sister to testify about the pair of earring (sic) that he gave
Ferma on June 24, 1990, a U. S. Fancy jewel which was given by her sister from
abroad. It has brillantitos which is the same as a base of the glass. The same was
confiscated from Ferma by the police. The last time he saw the pair of earring was on
the date his sister celebrated her birthday. Showing all the exhibits of the prosecution
to the witness, at first he answered "There are no brillantitos pair of earrings, sir.".
And later witness answered: "Ay ito pala.". He later claimed that the pair of earrings
is actually for his wife sent by her sister abroad to Olongapo. He cannot remember
having seen Ferma Capili on December 1993 to September 9, 1994, they saw each
other two times and that they talked about those jewelries (sic) thru the phone at that
time when the accused was apprehended and incarcerated. However, despite the
information of Ferma Capili that she was apprehended because of the pair of earrings
he did not do anything because allegedly he was too busy and they have operation.
He admitted that this is the first time he declared that the earrings came from him
without executing any written statement.
RTC acquitted Ferma Capili but finding the accused, Gabriel Capili, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime. Considering that there is no evidence to show
complicity and/or that Ferma Capili conspired and confederated with her husband
Gabriel Capili, she is hereby acquitted from the offense charged in the Information.
GABRIEL appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Motion for reconsideration was denied8 , hence this appeal where the accused
assigns the following error:
ISSUE: Whether the value of the stolen property is determinative of the guilt of the
accused and is an element of the crime
RULING: NO. Fencing is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or
for another, shall buy receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or
shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything
of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.12 The essential elements of the crime of
fencing are:
"1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused, who is not a principal or an accomplice in the commission
of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in
any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from
the proceeds of the said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item,
object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime
of robbery or theft; and
4. There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for
another."
All these elements are present in the case at bench.
The first element or the fact of theft was proved by prosecution witness, Christine
Diokno (DIOKNO) who testified that several pieces of jewelry, watches and money
were stolen from her mother’s bedroom. She reported the theft to the police who after
conducting an investigation, concluded that her houseboy, Michael Manzo (MANZO),
committed the offense. Consequently, a criminal case was filed against MANZO. In
her testimony, DIOKNO stated that the major items that were taken consisted of two
diamond rings each having a diamond solitaire of three (3) carats each, a pair of
diamond earrings each having a diamond solitaire of two point five (2.5) carats, a
diamond cross with twelve (12) half (1/2) carat diamond, her mother’s wedding band,
an emerald set consisting of an emerald ring set with diamonds with a pair of matching
earrings, a sapphire set consisting of two sapphire rings set with diamonds and
matching earrings, a South Sea pearl set consisting of a ring and two pairs of
matching earrings also set with diamonds, three cultured pearl necklaces with
matching cultured pearl earrings set with diamonds, a topaz set consisting of two rings
with diamonds and one with rubies with a set of matching earrings, a cameo set
consisting of a ring, matching earrings and a brooch all set with diamonds and four
solid gold watches, a Rolex, Piaget, Universal Geneve and a Gabriel Peregaux. She
alleged that the total value of the items amounted to approximately three million
(P3,000,000.00) pesos. In court, DIOKNO identified some of the recovered stolen
items consisting of a set of pearl earrings with two small diamonds (Exhibit "A"), a
gold chain with pendant (Exhibit "B") and old United States dollar coins (Exhibit "C").
DIOKNO’s testimony is corroborated by MANZO, who admitted that he stole the
jewelry from DIOKNO. And that after stealing the jewelry, he delivered them to the
petitioner, GABRIEL with the information that the jewelry was stolen and for the
purpose of selling the same. He identified GABRIEL in court as the person to whom
he delivered the stolen jewelry. MANZO testified that GABRIEL was not a participant
in the theft of the jewelry and that he told GABRIEL that the jewelry was stolen. He
also established the fact that the petitioner agreed to pay fifty thousand (P50,000.00)
pesos for the stolen jewelry which clearly manifests intent to gain on the part of the
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petitioner. Consequently, MANZO’s testimony proves the second, third and fourth
elements of the crime of fencing.
At any rate, the law does not require proof of purchase of the stolen articles by the
accused as mere possession thereof is enough to give rise to a presumption of
fencing. GABRIEL, who was in possession of at least two of the stolen items, has not
rebutted this presumption.
We also disagree with the petitioner that the prosecution failed to prove the value of
the stolen items.
Although DIOKNO’s testimony is hearsay and is inadmissible for purposes of
determining the value of the stolen items inasmuch as her testimony was not based
on her own personal knowledge but on the appraisals made by jewelers and what her
mother told her, MANZO’s testimony remains unrebutted. MANZO established that
he sold the stolen items to GABRIEL for P50,000.00 and in the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, said amount is presumed to be the value thereof as it is the
only value established by the prosecution. Besides, the valuation of the stolen items
made by the trial court is a factual issue and factual findings of the trial court especially
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals are entitled to great weight and generally
should not be disturbed on appeal.
2. RODOLFO CAOILI vs. CA
Petitioner Rodolfo Caoili seeks a reconsideration of the Courts 18th June 1997
resolution dismissing his petition for review on certiorari. The petition assails the
resolution, dated 14 January 1997, of the Court of Appeals finding no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court in refusing to exclude petitioner from a pending
criminal case and to correspondingly amend the information theretofore filed with it.
FACTS: An Information was filed on 15 March 1995 with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 51 (Criminal Case No. 95-141750), petitioner, Rodolfo Rudy
Caoili, was charged, along with a certain Tony Yip, with violation of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1612. On 24 March 1995, petitioner sought a review by the
Secretary of Justice of the resolution, dated 16 February 1995, of Assistant
Prosecutor Antonio R. Rebagay that had found a prima facie case against petitioner
that served as the basis for the information. In his ruling, dated 18 August 1995, the
Secretary of Justice directed the exclusion of petitioner Rodolfo Caoili from the
Information. The Secretary opined:
The only issue posed in the petition is
whether or not there is sufficient evidence to indict
Caoili. To be liable for violation of P.D. 1612, Section 2
thereof requires that the offender buys or otherwise
acquires and then sells or disposes of any object of value
which he knows or should be known to him to have been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
The allegations of Atule and Azuela do not indicate that
respondent Caoili acquired the skiving machines in
question knowing that the same were stolen property. The
prima facie presumption of fencing from possession
of stolen property does not apply to Caoili as
complainant reacquired the subject skiving machines
not from respondent Caoili but from Yip. It is difficult to
give credence to the claim of Atule and Azuela that
respondent Caoili told them that he purchased the stolen
skiving machines which he in turn sold to Yip. It is simply
contrary to common human behavior that a person
would intimate to another or others an unlawful act,
that he purchased stolen items and then dispose of it
at a profit. Evidence to be believed must not only proceed
from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible
in itself such as the common experience and observation
of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances.
In declining to grant the corresponding motion of the prosecutor to exclude petitioner
from the information in consonance with the ruling of the Secretary of Justice, the trial
court ratiocinated:
Considering the records of this case and it
appearing that the Information was already filed in Court,
the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused
is now with this Court and the prosecution may no longer
interfere with the judges disposition of the case.
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The accused has to prove his allegations when
his turn to present defense evidence comes because these
allegations are matters of defense to be proven in Court.
It is also noted that the Prosecutor has
conducted the necessary preliminary investigation in this
case; examined the complaining witnesses; and there is a
reasonable ground to believe that the offense charged has
been committed and accused are probably guilty thereof.
In fact accused Rodolfo Caoili filed his counter-affidavit
before the Investigating Prosecutor during the Preliminary
Investigation of this case.
Petitioner now insists, following the rebuff by the Court of Appeals, that the
determination of a prima facie case of an investigating prosecutor after the
examination of declarants and his evaluation of the evidence cannot be considered
as attaining finality while still subject to review by the Secretary of Justice who retains
the power and authority to either affirm or reverse the findings of subordinate
prosecutors. That prerogative, petitioner contends, is all up to the Secretary of Justice
to take up so long as the accused has not yet been arraigned. Petitioner concludes
that respondent Court of Appeals has erred in affirming the trial court in its questioned
order considering that the rule laid down in Crespo vs. Mogul has already been
abandoned by the pronouncements in Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals and Roberts, Jr.,
et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
ISSUE: Whether the prima facie presumption of fencing from possession of stolen
property applies.
RULING: No. Substantially, to reiterate, the allegations of Atule and Azuela do not
indicate that respondent Caoili acquired the skiving machines in question knowing
that the same were stolen property. The prima facie presumption of fencing from
possession of stolen property does not apply to Caoili as complainant
reacquired the subject skiving machines not from respondent Caoili but from
Yip. It is difficult to give credence to the claim of Atule and Azuela that
respondent Caoili told them that he purchased the stolen skiving machines
which he in turn sold to Yip. It is simply contrary to common human behavior
that a person would intimate to another or others an unlawful act, that he
purchased stolen items and then dispose of it at a profit.
Procedurally, it is too much of an exaggeration to say that Crespo vs. Mogul
no longer holds. The Solicitor General correctly points out that Roberts did not
overturn or abandon but simply sustained the authority of the Secretary of Justice,
recognized under Rule 112, Section 4, of the Rules of Court, to review resolutions of
provincial or city prosecutors or the Chief State Prosecutor upon petition by a proper
party even while the criminal case is already pending with the courts. It did,
understandably, caution the Secretary of Justice from being indiscriminate on this
matter; thus, reiterating Marcelo, the Court has said:
Nothing in the said ruling forecloses the power
or authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions
of his subordinates in criminal cases. The Secretary of
Justice is only enjoined to refrain as far as practicable from
entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action
of the prosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in
court. In any case, the grant of a motion to dismiss, which
the prosecution may file after the Secretary of Justice
reverses an appealed resolution, is subject to the
discretion of the court.
Roberts went on to quote with approval the Crespo rule in explaining the doctrine;
thus:
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once
a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition
of the case as [to] its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal
of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is
already in court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial
court. The court is the best and sole judge on what to
do with the case before it. The determination of the
case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and
competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the
fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option
to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done
before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the
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motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions
of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.
Evidently then, the appellate court viewed and appreciated correctly the now
prevailing Crespo-Marcelo-Roberts rule.
Needless to say, the holding of this Court, or of the appellate court, in this instance is
not to be taken as having any bearing on the ultimate disposition by the trial court of
the case on its merits.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner is DENIED WITH
FINALITY.
3. JAIME ONG VS PEOPLE (PROOF OF LEGITIMATE TRANSACTION)
GR NO. 190475, April 10, 2013
FACTS: Ong was charged in an Information dated 25 May 1995 as follows: That on
or about February 17, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines. the said accused, with
intent of gain for himself or for another. did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously receive and acquire from unknown person involving thirteen (13) truck tires
worth P65, 975.00, belonging to FRANCISCO AZAJAR Y LEE, and thereafter selling
One (1) truck tire knowing the same to have been derived from the crime of robbery.
Private complainant was the owner of forty-four (44) Firestone truck tires, described
as T494 1100 by 20 by 14. He acquired the same for the total amount of P223,401.81
from Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation, a domestic corporation engaged in the
manufacturing and marketing of Firestone tires. Private complainant's acquisition was
evidenced by Sales Invoice No. 4565 dated November 10, 1994 and an Inventory List
acknowledging receipt of the tires specifically described by their serial numbers.
Private complainant marked the tires using a piece of chalk before storing them inside
the warehouse in 720 San Jose St., corner Sta. Catalina St., Barangay San Antonio
Valley 1, Sucat, Parañaque, owned by his relative Teody Guano. Jose Cabal,
Guano's caretaker of the warehouse, was in charge of the tires. After appellant sold
six (6) tires sometime in January 1995, thirty-eight (38) tires remained inside the
warehouse.
Private complainant learned from caretaker Jose Cabal that all thirty-eight (38)
truck tires were stolen from the warehouse, the gate of which was forcibly
opened. Private complainant, together with caretaker Cabal, reported the
robbery to the Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio.
Private complainant canvassed from numerous business establishments in an
attempt to locate the stolen tires. On February 24, 1995, private complainant chanced
upon Jong's Marketing, a store selling tires in Paco, Manila, owned and operated by
appellant. Private complainant inquired if appellant was selling any Model T494 1100
by 20 by 14 ply Firestone tires, to which the latter replied in the affirmative. Appellant
brought out a tire fitting the description, which private complainant recognized as one
of the tires stolen from his warehouse, based on the chalk marking and the serial
number thereon. Private complainant asked appellant if he had any more of such tires
in stock, which was again answered in the affirmative. Private complainant then left
the store and reported the matter to Chief Inspector Mariano Fegarido of the Southern
Police District.
The Southern Police District formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation on
appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The team was composed of six (6) members, led
by SPO3 Oscar Guerrero and supervised by Senior Inspector Noel Tan. Private
complainant's companion Tito Atienza was appointed as the poseur-buyer.
The buy-bust team, in coordination with the Western Police District, proceeded to
appellant's store in Paco, Manila.The team arrived thereat at around 3:00 in the
afternoon. Poseur-buyer Tito Atienza proceeded to the store while the rest of the team
posted themselves across the street. Atienza asked appellant if he had any T494
1100 by 20 by 14 Firestone truck tires available. The latter immediately produced one
tire from his display, which Atienza bought for P5,000.00. Atienza asked appellant if
he had any more in stock.
Appellant then instructed his helpers to bring out twelve (12) more tires from his
warehouse, which was located beside his store. After the twelve (12) truck tires were
brought in, private complainant entered the store, inspected them and found that they
were the same tires which were stolen from him, based on their serial numbers.
Private complainant then gave the prearranged signal to the buy-bust team confirming
that the tires in appellant's shop were the same tires stolen from the warehouse.
DEFENSE OF ONG: Ong solely testified in his defense, alleging that he had been
engaged in the business of buying and selling tires for twenty-four (24) years and
denying that he had any knowledge that he was selling stolen tires in Jong Marketing.
He further averred that on 18 February 1995, a certain Ramon Go (Go) offered to sell
thirteen (13) Firestone truck tires allegedly from Dagat-dagatan, Caloocan City,
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for P3,500 each. Ong bought all the tires for P45,500, for which he was issued a Sales
Invoice dated 18 February 1995 and with the letterhead Gold Link Hardware &
General Merchandise (Gold Link).
Ong displayed one (1) of the tires in his store and kept all the twelve (12) others in his
bodega. The poseur-buyer bought the displayed tire in his store and came back to
ask for more tires. Ten minutes later, policemen went inside the store, confiscated the
tires, arrested Ong and told him that those items were stolen tires.
RTC: found that the prosecution had sufficiently established that all thirteen (13) tires
found in the possession of Ong constituted a prima facie evidence of fencing. Having
failed to overcome the presumption by mere denials, he was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. 1612.
CA: affirmed the RTC’s findings with modification by reducing the minimum penalty
from ten (10) years and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correcional.
ISSUE: Whether Ong can be held criminally liable for Anti-Fencing Law.
RULING: Yes. Fencing is defined in Section 2(a) of P.D. 1612 as the "act of any
person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess,
keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal
in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known
to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows:
(1) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
(2) the accused, who is not a principal or on accomplice in the commission of the
crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells
or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or
anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery
or theft;
(3) the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft;
and
(4) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another.
The prosecution has met the requisite quantum of evidence in proving that all the
elements of fencing are present in this case. First, the owner of the tires, private
complainant Francisco Azajar (Azajar), whose testimony was corroborated by Jose
Cabal - the caretaker of the warehouse where the thirty-eight (38) tires were stolen –
testified that the crime of robbery had been committed on 17 February 1995. Azajar
was able to prove ownership of the tires through Sales Invoice No. 4565dated 10
November 1994 and an Inventory List. Witnesses for the prosecution likewise testified
that robbery was reported as evidenced by their Sinumpaang Salaysaytaken at the
Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio. The report led to the conduct of a buy-bust
operation at Jong Markerting, Paco, Manila on 27 February 1995.
Second, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the perpetrator of the robbery,
he never denied the fact that thirteen (13) tires of Azajar were caught in his
possession. The facts do not establish that Ong was neither a principal nor an
accomplice in the crime of robbery, but thirteen (13) out of thirty-eight (38) missing
tires were found in his possession. This Court finds that the serial numbers of stolen
tires corresponds to those found in Ong’s possession. Ong likewise admitted that he
bought the said tires from Go of Gold Link in the total amount of ₱45,500 where he
was issued Sales Invoice No. 980.
Third, the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
The words "should know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and
intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or would
govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. Ong, who was in the
business of buy and sell of tires for the past twenty-four (24) years, ought to have
known the ordinary course of business in purchasing from an unknown seller.
Admittedly, Go approached Ong and offered to sell the thirteen (13) tires and he did
not even ask for proof of ownership of the tires. The entire transaction, from the
proposal to buy until the delivery of tires happened in just one day. His experience
from the business should have given him doubt as to the legitimate ownership of the
tires considering that it was his first time to transact with Go and the manner it was
sold is as if Go was just peddling the thirteen (13) tires in the streets.
Moreover, Ong knew the requirement of the law in selling second hand tires. Section
6 of P.D. 1612 requires stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buying
and selling of any good, article, item, object or anything else of value obtained
from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof to secure the necessary clearance
or permit from the station commander of the Integrated National Police in the
town or city where that store, establishment or entity is located before offering
the item for sale to the public. In fact, Ong has practiced the procedure of obtaining
clearances from the police station for some used tires he wanted to resell but, in this
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particular transaction, he was remiss in his duty as a diligent businessman who should
have exercised prudence.
Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. 1612 creates a prima facie presumption of
fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object
or anything of value, which has been the subject of robbery or theft; and prescribes a
higher penalty based on the value of the property.
4. JUAN PONCE ENRILE vs. JUDGE OMAR AMIN
FACTS: Together with the filing of an information charging Senator Juan Ponce
Enrile as having committed rebellion complexed with murder 1 with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, government prosecutors filed another information charging him
for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with the Regional Trial Court of Makati
for unlawfully, feloniously, willfully and knowingly obstruct, impede, frustrate or delay
the apprehension of said Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan by harboring or
concealing him in his house.
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion, but respondent denied the same on the basis of
a finding that "there (was) probable cause to hold the accused Juan Ponce Enrile
liable for violation of PD No. 1829."
The Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that the pending
charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder against him as
alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan, on the basis of their alleged meeting on
December 1, 1989 preclude the prosecution of the Petitioner for harboring or
concealing the Colonel on the same occasion under PD 1829.
Respondent denied the MR. Respondent Judge Amin sustained the charge of
violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case filed against the petitioner
on the theory that the former involves a special law while the latter is based on the
Revised Penal Code or a general law.
The petitioner comes to this Court on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the respondent court in
refusing to quash/ dismiss the information.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner could be separately charged for violation of PD No.
1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against him.
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondents from conducting further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90-777 until
otherwise directed by this Court.
Hernandez case remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of
rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a
means to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that
commutes rebellion.
If a person cannot be charged with the complex crime of rebellion for the greater
penalty to be applied, neither can he be charged separately for two (2) different
offenses where one is a constitutive or component element or committed in
furtherance of rebellion.
The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with the fugitive Col.
Gringo Honasan. Necessarily, being in conspiracy with Honasan, petitioners alleged
act of harboring or concealing was for no other purpose but in furtherance of the crime
of rebellion thus constitute a component thereof. It was motivated by the single intent
or resolution to commit the crime of rebellion. Jurisprudence tells us that acts
committed in furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed
absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion.
In this case, the act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere
component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the
rebellion. It cannot therefore be made the basis of a separate charge.
In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the prosecution's theory must fail. The rationale
remains the same. All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law,
which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof,
become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged as
separate crimes in themselves.
Clearly, the petitioner's alleged act of harboring or concealing which was based on
his acts of conspiring with Honasan was committed in connection with or in
furtherance of rebellion and must now be deemed as absorbed by, merged in, and
Identified with the crime of rebellion punished in Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC.
In view of the foregoing, the petitioner cannot be tried separately under PD 1829
in addition to his being prosecuted in the rebellion case.
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5. ROGER POSADAS, ROSARIO TORRES-YU, and MARICHU LAMBINO
v. THE HON. OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 131492 September 29, 2000
FACTS: Dennis Venturina (Venturina), a member of Sigma Rho at the University of
the Philippines (UP), was killed in a rumble between his fraternity and another
fraternity. Petitioner Roger Posadas, then Chancellor of UP Diliman, asked the
Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for assistance in determining
the persons responsible for the crime. In response to the request, respondent Orlando
V. Dizon (Dizon), Chief of the Special Operations Group of the NBI, and his men went
to UP and, on the basis of the supposed positive identification of two alleged
eyewitnesses, attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan (Taparan) and Raymundo
Narag (Narag), officers/members of the Scintilla Juris Fraternity, as suspects in the
killing of Venturina.
Petitioners Posadas, Marichu Lambino (Lambino), and Rosario Torres-Yu (Torrres-
Yu), also of UP, and a certain Atty. Villamor, counsel for the suspects, objected on
the ground that the NBI did not have warrants of arrest with them. Posadas and Atty.
Villamor promised to take the suspects to the NBI Office the next day. As a result of
their intervention, Taparan and Narag were not arrested by the NBI agents.
Dizon then filed a complaint in the Office of the Special Prosecutor, charging
petitioners with violation of PD 1829, which makes it unlawful for anyone to obstruct
the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders.
On motion of petitioners, the Special Prosecutor's Office recommended the dismissal
of the case. But the recommendation was disapproved. The Office of the Ombudsman
directed the Special Prosecutor to proceed with the prosecution of petitioners in the
Sandiganbayan. Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the
resolution of the Ombudsman's office ordering the prosecution of petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether there was probable cause for prosecuting petitioners for violation of
PD No. 1829
HELD: No. There is no probable cause to charge petitioners of violating PD 1829.
Probable cause is defined as "sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that
a crime cognizable by the court has been committed and that the respondents are
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial" (Section 1, Rule 112, Rules of
Court). The absence of an arrest warrant, the absence of knowledge or reasonable
ground on the part of the accused to believe that the students had committed a crime,
the absence of any law punishing refusal to attend an investigation at the NBI, all
show that there is no sufficient ground to charge the accused with Obstruction of
Justice. On the contrary, the circumstances show that the accused, in safeguarding
the rights of students, were acting within the bounds of law.
The rule is that a criminal prosecution cannot be enjoined. But as has been held,
"[i]nfinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal
procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and
punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution." In this case,
petitioners' objection to the arrest of the students cannot be construed as a violation
of PD 1829. Petitioners had a right to prevent the arrest of Taparan and Narag at the
time because their attempted arrest was illegal.
6. PRUDENTE SOLLER
FACTS: Prudente Soller (municipal mayor), Preciosa Soller (municipal health officer),
Mario Matining (SPO II), Rommel Luarca (PO1), Rodolfo Salcedo (Sanitary Inspector)
and Josie Morada (Midwife) were charged with the offense of Obstruction of
Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders as defined and penalized
under Section 1, paragraph b of P.D. 1829. Two Informations were filed before the
Sandiganbayan stating that they were guilty of:
1. Altering and suppressing the gunshot wound and concealing the brain of
Jerry Macabael with intent to impair its authenticity and availability as
evidence in the investigation of the criminal case against Vincent Soller (son
of Prudente and Preciosa Soller); and
2. Giving false and fabricated information in the autopsy and police report by
reporting that there were several gunshot wounds in the body of Jerry
Macabael and that there was no tattooing (blackening) around the wound
of the victim
Prudente Soller et al. filed a Motion to Quash on the ground that the Sandiganbayan
has no jurisdiction over the offenses charged. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion.
Prudente Soller et al. filed the present Petition for Certiorari before the SC claiming
that for an offense to fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the offense
must have been committed by the officials in relation to their office and should have
been perpetrated while the offender was in the performance of his official functions.
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ISSUE: Whether the offenses charged may be considered as committed “in relation
to their office” thus within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
HELD: No. The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the offenses charged.
What determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is the specific factual
allegation in the information that would indicate close intimacy between the discharge
of the accused’s official duties and the commission of the offense charged in order to
qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.
It must be emphasized that the offenses defined in P.D. 1829 may be
committed by any person whether a public officer or a private citizen, and accordingly
public office is not an element of the offense. The two Informations filed before the
Sandiganbayan failed to allege that Prudente Soller et al. had committed the offenses
charged in relation to their offices. The Spouses Soller probably acted as the parents
of the alleged assailant, Vicente Soller, and was motivated by personal reasons rather
than official duty.
Thus, for failing to show that the offenses charged were intimately
connected with the discharge of the official functions of Mayor Soller, the offenses
charged in the criminal cases fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC,
not the Sandiganbayan.
7. JUDGE ADORACION ANGELES vs. GAITE
FACTS: Petitioner [Judge Adoracion G. Angeles] was the foster mother of her
fourteen (14) year-old grandniece Maria Mercedes Vistan who was entrusted to the
care of the former by the girls grandmother and petitioners sister Leonila Angeles
Vda. de Vistan when the child was orphaned at the tender age of four.
Petitioners love for the child extended to her siblings, particularly her half-brother
respondent Michael Vistan, a former drug-addict, and the latters family who were
regular beneficiaries of the undersigneds generosity. Michael would frequently run to
the undersigned for his variety of needs ranging from day to day subsistence to the
medical and hospital expenses of his children.
Michael Vistan had a falling out with petitioner for his failure to do a very important
errand for which he was severely reprimanded over the phone. He was told that from
then on, no assistance of any kind would be extended to him and that he was no
longer welcome at petitioners residence. he, in conspiracy with his co-horts inducing
his half-sister, Maria Mercedes, to leave petitioners custody. Michael used to have
free access to the undersigneds house and he took the girl away while petitioner was
at her office.
Petitioner, accompanied by her friend Ines Francisco, sought Michael Vistan in his
residence in Sta. Cruz, Guiguinto, Bulacan to confront him about the whereabouts of
his half-sister. He disclosed that he brought the girl to the residence of her maternal
relatives in Sta. Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan. Petitioner then reported the matter and
requested for the assistance of the 303rd Criminal Investigation and Detective Group
Field Office in Malolos, Bulacan to locate the girl.
The group failed to find the girl. Instead, they were given the run-around as the
spouses Ruben and Lourdes Tolentino and spouses Gabriel and Olympia Nazareno
misled them with the false information that Maria Mercedes was already brought by
their brother Carmelito Guevarra and the latters wife Camilia to Casiguran, Quezon
Province.
Petitioner filed a complaint for Kidnapping under Article 271 of the Revised Penal
Code (Inducing a Minor to Abandon His Home) against Michael Vistan, the Tolentino
spouses, the Nazareno spouses and Guevarra spouses, all maternal relatives of
Maria Mercedes Vistan.
Michael Vistan, with his little sister in tow, shuttled back and forth from Guiguinto to
Hagonoy, Bulacan as well as in Manila and Quezon City, living the life of a fugitive
from justice. He eventually brought the girl to ABS-CBN in Quezon City where he
made her recite a concocted tale of child abuse against herein petitioner hoping that
this would compel the latter to withdraw the kidnapping charge which she earlier filed,
Michael Vistan brought Maria Mercedes to the DSWD after he felt himself cornered
by the police dragnet laid for him.
Prompted by his overwhelming desire to retaliate against petitioner and get himself
off the hook from the kidnapping charge, Michael Vistan had deliberately, maliciously,
selfishly and insensitively caused undue physical, emotional and psychological
sufferings to Maria Mercedes Vistan, all of which were greatly prejudicial to her well-
being and development.
petitioner filed a complaint against Michael Vistan for five counts of Violation of
Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7610, otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act, and
for four counts of Violation of Sec. 1 (e) of PD 1829. She likewise filed a complaint for
Libel against Maria Cristina Vistan, aunt of Michael and Maria Mercedes. Provincial
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Prosecutor Amando C. Vicente denied the recommendation of the Investigating
Prosecutor that Michael Vistan be indicted for Violation RA 7610. He also approved
the recommendation for the dismissal of the charge for Violation of PD 1829.
Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review before the Department of Justice denied the
petition for review. the undersigned filed a Petition for Review before the Office of
President. The petition was dismissed the CA ruled that the facts of the case as
portrayed by petitioner do not warrant the filing of a separate Information for violation
of Section 1(e) of PD No. 1829.[12] Lastly, the CA ruled that the DOJ did not err when
it dismissed the complaint for violation for RA No. 7610 as the same was not attended
by grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE:
WON THE CA erred in upholding the dismissal by the DOJ secretary of the complaint
of violation of obstruction of justice against private respondent Michael Vistan.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
DISMISSAL BY THE DOJ SECRETARY OF THE COMPLAINT OF VIOLATION OF
SECTION 1(E). P.D. 1829 (OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE) AGAINST PRIVATE
RESPONDENT MICHAEL VISTAN.
HELD: NO. Petitioner argues that the evasion of arrest constitutes a violation of
Section 1(e) of PD No. 1829, the same is quoted hereunder as follows: (e) Delaying
the prosecution of criminal case by obstructing the service of processes or court
orders or disturbing proceedings in the fiscals' offices in Tanodbayan, or in the courts.
Specifically, petitioner contends that respondent's act of going underground
obstructed the service of a court process, particularly the warrant of arrest
This Court does not agree.
The CA ruled that the position taken by petitioner was contrary to the spirit of the law
on "obstruction of justice, in the wise:
It is a surprise to hear from petitioner who is a member of the bench to argue that
unserved warrants are tantamount to another violation of the law re: "obstruction of
justice." Petitioner is like saying that every accused in a criminal case is committing
another offense of obstruction of justice if and when the warrant of arrest issued for
the former offense/ charge is unserved during its life or returned unserved after its life
and that the accused should be charged therewith re: "obstruction of justice." What if
the warrant of arrest for the latter charge ("obstruction of justice") is again unserved
during its life or returned unserved? To follow the line of thinking of petitioner, another
or a second charge of "obstruction of justice" should be filed against the accused. And
if the warrant of arrest issued on this second charge is not served, again, a third
charge of "obstruction of justice" is warranted or should be filed against the accused.
Thus, petitioner is effectively saying that the number of charges for "obstruction of
justice" is counting and/or countless, unless and until the accused is either arrested
or voluntarily surrendered. We, therefore, find the position taken by petitioner as
contrary to the intent and spirit of the law on "obstruction of justice."
As correctly observed by the CA, the facts of the case, as portrayed by petitioner, do
not warrant the filing of a separate information for violation of Section 1(e) of PD No.
1829. This Court agrees with the CA that based on the evidence presented by
petitioner, the failure on the part of the arresting officer/s to arrest the person of the
accused makes the latter a fugitive from justice and is not equivalent to a commission
of another offense of obstruction of justice.
8. JACKSON PADIERNOS vs. PEOPLE
9. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NANG KAY alias SY KEE
G.R. No. L-3565 April 20, 1951
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Topic: Indeterminate Sentence Law )ISLAW
FACTS: In the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Nang Kay alias Sy Kee was charged
with illegal possession of firearms in that in his possession were found three grease
guns and two Thompson Submachine guns, and empty magazines, without the
necessary license. In court he appeared without counsel and upon being arraigned,
he pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to imprisonment for five (5) years and one (1)
day, with the accessories of the law, and to pay costs. The firearms and ammunition
in question were ordered confiscated in favor of the Government. He now appeals to
this Court on the ground that the trial court failed to inform him at the arraignment of
his right to be assisted by counsel. The Solicitor General also questions the
correctness of the penalty imposed, expressing the opinion and making the
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recommendation that the law on indeterminate sentence should have been
applied.
Counsel for the appellant makes citations of authorities to the effect that it is the duty
of the court to inform the defendant in a criminal case of his right to have counsel, and
that should the court fail to do so, its action constitutes a reversible error.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the accused was informed of his right to counsel.
Main Issue: whether the ISLAW should be applied.
RULING:
1. Whether the accused was informed of his right to counsel.
Yes.
In this, we agree with the said counsel. However, contrary to the claim of said counsel
that the record in this case shows that the court failed to inform the appellant of his
right to have counsel, we believe that the record merely fails to show that the court
complied with this duty. In other words, the record of the case is silent on this point.
Both the minutes of the court session during which appellant was arraigned as well
as the certificate of arraignment signed by the Clerk of Court merely show that the
case was called for arraignment, the accused appeared without counsel, and that
upon being arraigned, he pleaded guilty to the charge. The transcript of the
stenographic notes taken down by the stenographer further states that the court
instructed the Clerk of Court to read the information which was translated to the
accused after which, the court asked the defendant for his plea. The accused then
pleaded guilty.
As we have already stated, the record of the case does not show whether or not the
court informed the appellant of his right to have counsel, but of course this cannot be
interpreted in the sense that the court failed to so inform him of such right. On the
contrary, because of the presumption that the law has been complied with, it is
to be presumed in this case that the court has complied with its duty and that
it has informed the appellant that he may have counsel, even a counsel de
oficio if he wanted to.
Main Issue: whether the ISLAW should be applied.
Yes. ISLAW is applicable but the trial court judge was correct in the penalty
imposed.
As to the application of the law on indeterminate sentence, the Solicitor General
merely says that the trial court failed to apply said law, and he recommends that it be
applied, without giving his reasons for said recommendation. We agree with the
Solicitor General that the letter of the law on indeterminate sentence (Act No. 4103)
as amended by Act No. 4225, particularly the latter part of section 1 thereof, supports
his contention, the offense in the present case being penalized by special
law. Said legal provision states that:
. . . and if the offense is punished by any other law (not the Revised Penal
Code or its amendments), the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than
the minimum term prescribed by the same.
Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Act
56 and Republic Act No. 4 penalizes the criminal act of the appellant with
imprisonment of not less than five (5) years nor more than ten (10)years. So, if we
applied the law on indeterminate sentence, the penalty as recommended by the
Solicitor General would be not less than five (5) years and not more than a period
exceeding ten (10) years. That penalty could hardly be regarded as favorable to
the accused, considering his plea of guilty. We should not lose sight of the fact
that the law on indeterminate sentence as a rule is intended to favor the
defendant in a criminal case particularly to shorten his term of imprisonment,
depending upon his behavior and his physical, mental, and moral record as a
prisoner, to be determined by the Board of Indeterminate Sentence. Upon
favorable recommendation by that Board, the prisoner may be released on parole
upon the expiration of his minimum sentence. In fact the Governor General in his
message published in 31 Off. Gaz., No. 92, August 3, 1933, issued in connection with
the promulgation of the present law on indeterminate sentence, said that one of the
purposes of the law was to prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of
personal liberty and economic usefulness.
Under the special law on illegal possession of firearms applicable to this case, already
referred to, if we had no law on indeterminate sentence in this jurisdiction, considering
the plea of guilty entered by the appellant, the trial court could well and lawfully have
given him a prison sentence of five (5) years. If we are now to apply the law on
indeterminate sentence in the instant case, the prison term would to be more than
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five (5) years for the reason that the minimum could not be less than five (5) years
and the maximum necessarily would have to be more than five (5) years but not more
than ten (10) years. That would certainly be not in accordance with the purpose of the
law on indeterminate sentence; in fact it would run counter to its spirit.
Moreover, there are authorities to the effect that where the statute under which an
accused was convicted fixes the maximum and minimum punishment, or either of
them, it has been held that it is not necessary, under the indeterminate sentence law,
for the court to specify in the sentence such maximum and minimum punishment. . .
. (24 C. J. S. p. 109, Sec. 1582). Besides, it has also been held that the law on
indeterminate sentence being penal in character must receive a strict
construction in favor of the one to whom the penalty is exacted. (24 C. J. S. p.
1219, Sec. 1993).
We are, therefore, of the opinion and hold that in cases where the application of the
law on indeterminate sentence would be unfavorable to the accused, resulting in the
lengthening of his prison sentence, said law on indeterminate sentence should not be
applied. Under this opinion, it is obvious that the trial court did not err in sentencing
the appellant to imprisonment for five (5) years and one (1) day.
10. BATISTIS vs. PEOPLE
FACTS: Allied Domecq Philippines, Inc., a Philippine corporation exclusively
authorized to distribute Fundador brandy products imported from Spain wholly in
finished form, initiated this case against Batistis. Upon its request, agents of the NBI
conducted a test-buy in the premises of Batistis, and thereby confirmed that he was
actively engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of
counterfeit Fundador brandy products.
Upon application of the NBI agents based on the positive results of the test-buy,
Judge Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr. of the Manila RTC issued a search warrant. The
search yielded 20 empty Carlos I bottles, 10 empty bottles of Black Label whiskey,
two empty bottles of Johnny Walker Swing, an empty bottle of Remy Martin XO, an
empty bottle of Chabot, 241 empty Fundador bottles, 163 boxes of Fundador, a half
sack of Fundador plastic caps, two filled bottles of Fundador brandy, and eight
cartons of empty Jose Cuervo bottles.
RTC Manila convicted Juno Batistis for infringement of trademark and unfair
competition under the Intellectual Property Code. The CA affirmed the conviction
for infringement of trademark, but reversed the conviction for unfair competition.
Hence, this petition for review to challenge the CAs affirmance of his conviction
for infringement of trademark.
ISSUE: WON BATISTIS IS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
RULING: The SC affirmed the conviction, but modified the penalty by imposing an
indeterminate sentence, conformably with the Indeterminate Sentence Law and
pertinent jurisprudence. Section 170 of the Intellectual Property Code provides the
penalty for infringement of trademark, to wit: Section 170. Penalties. - Independent
of the civil and administrative sanctions imposed by law, a criminal penalty of
imprisonment from two (2) years to five (5) years.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC imposing the the penalty of imprisonment
of TWO (2) YEARS and to pay a fine of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS.
We rule that the penalty thus fixed was contrary to the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
We modify the penalty.
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended, provides: “and if the
offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to
an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the
minimum term prescribed by the same.”
The straight penalty the CA imposed was contrary to the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, whose Section 1 requires that the penalty of imprisonment should be an
indeterminate sentence. According to Spouses Bacar v. Judge de Guzman,Jr., the
imposition of an indeterminate sentence with maximum and minimum periods in
criminal cases not excepted from the coverage of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law pursuant to its Section 2 is mandatory, viz: “The requirement of imposing an
indeterminate sentence in all criminal offenses whether punishable by
the Revised Penal Code or by special laws, with definite minimum and
maximum terms, as the Court deems proper within the legal range of the
penalty specified by the law must, therefore, be deemed mandatory.”
We are aware that an exception was enunciated in People v. Nang Kay, where the
Court sustained the straight penalty of five years and one day imposed by the trial
court (Court of First Instance of Rizal) because the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law would be unfavorable to the accused by lengthening his prison
sentence.
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Yet, we cannot apply the Nang Kay exception herein, even if this case was a
prosecution under a special law because there was the mitigating circumstance of his
voluntary plea of guilty in Nang Kay, but, herein, both the trial court and the CA did
not have a similar circumstance to justify the lenity towards the accused. Secondly,
the large number of Fundador articles confiscated from his house (namely, 241 empty
bottles of Fundador, 163 Fundador boxes, a half sack full of Fundador plastic caps,
and two filled bottles of Fundador Brandy) clearly demonstrated that Batistis had been
committing a grave economic offense over a period of time, thereby deserving for him
the indeterminate, rather than the straight and lower, penalty.
ACCORDINGLY, we affirm the decision rendered by CA but modify the penalty to
imprisonment ranging from two years, as minimum, to three years, as maximum, and
a fine of P50,000.00.
11. PEOPLE vs. JARANILLA
Although recidivists, appellants Suyo and Brillantes are not habitual delinquents. They
are entitled to an indeterminate sentence.
FACTS: Accused Gorriceta was driving a Ford pickup truck belonging to his sister,
Remia Valencia. While he was in front of the Elizalde Building on J. M. Basa Street,
he saw Suyo, Jaranilla and Brillantes. They hailed Gorriceta who stopped the truck.
Jaranilla requested to bring them to Mandurriao, a district in another part of the city to
which Gorriceta refused as was on his way home. Jaranilla prevailed upon Gorriceta
to take them to Mandurriao because Jaranilla ostensibly had to get something from
his uncle's place and then drove to Mandurriao. Upon reaching Mandurriao, Gorriceta
parked the truck at a distance of about fifty to seventy meters from the provincial
hospital. Jaranilla instructed Gorriceta to wait for them. The trio walked in the direction
of the plaza. After about ten to twenty minutes, they reappeared, each of them was
carrying two fighting cocks and ran to the truck. Jaranilla directed Gorriceta to start
the truck because they were being chased. Gorriceta drove the truck to Jaro (another
district of the city) on the same route that they had taken in going to Mandurriao.
It is important to note the positions of Gorriceta and his three companions on the front
seat of the track. Gorriceta the driver, was on the extreme left. Next to him on his right
was Suyo. Next to Suyo was Brillantes. On the extreme right was Jaranilla.
While the truck was traversing the detour road near the Mandurriao airport, then under
construction, Gorriceta saw in the middle of the road Patrolmen Ramonito Jabatan
and Benjamin Castro running towards them. Gorriceta slowed down the truck after
Patrolman Jabatan had fired a warning shot and was signalling with his flashlight that
the truck should stop, Gorriceta then stopped the truck near the policeman. Jabatan
approached the right side of the truck near Jaranilla and ordered all the occupants of
the truck to go down. They did not heed the injunction of the policeman.
Brillantes pulled his revolver but did not fire i, while Jaranilla, all of a sudden, shot
Patrolman Jabatan. The shooting frightened Gorriceta and immediately started the
motor of the truck and drove straight home to La Paz, another district of the city.
Jaranilla kept on firing towards Jabatan. Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes alighted in front
of Gorriceta's house wo then parked the truck inside the garage. Jaranilla warned
Gorriceta not to tell anybody about the incident. Gorriceta went up to his room and,
after a while, heard policemen shouting his name and asking him to come down.
Instead of doing so, he hid in the ceiling. It was only at about eight o'clock in the
morning of the following day that he decided to come down. His uncle had counselled
him to surrender to the police and the policemen took Gorriceta to their headquarters.
Victorino Trespeces, whose house was located opposite the house of Valentin Baylon
on Taft Street in Mandurriao, testified that before midnight of January 9, 1966, he
drove a friend to the housing project in the vicinity of the provincial hospital at
Mandurriao. As he neared his residence, he saw three men emerging from the canal
on Taft Street in front of Baylon's house and he noticed a red Ford pickup truck parked
about fifty yards from the place where he saw the three men. Shortly thereafter, he
saw the three men carrying roosters. He immediately went to the police station at
Mandurriao and reported to Patrolmen Jabatan and Castro what he had just
witnessed. The two policemen requested him to take them in his car to the place
where he saw the three suspicious-looking men. Upon arrival, however, the men and
the truck were not there anymore.
Trespeces and the policemen followed the truck speeding towards Jaro. Upon
reaching the detour road leading to the airport, the policemen left the car and crossed
the runway which was a shortcut to intercept the truck. Trespeces then turned his car
around in order to return to Mandurriao. At that moment he heard gunshots. He
stopped and again turned his car in the direction where shots had emanated. A few
moments later, Patrolman Castro came into view. The latter then asked Trespeces
for help because Jabatan, his comrade, was wounded.
Doctor Raymundo L. Torres, the chief medico-legal officer of the Iloilo City police
department, conducted an autopsy and declared that the cause of death is shock,
hemorrhage, secondary to bullet wound.
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Valentin Baylon, the owner of the fighting cocks, returned home at about six o'clock
in the morning and discovered that the door of one of his cock pens or chicken coops
was broken. He found that six of his fighting cocks were missing. Each coop contained
six cocks. The coop was made of bamboo and wood with nipa roofing. The coops
were located at the side of his house, about two meters therefrom.
Baylon reported the loss to the police at Mandurriao. At about ten o'clock, a group of
detectives came to his house together with the police photographer who took pictures
of the chicken coops. The six roosters were valued at one hundred pesos each. Two
days later, he was summoned to the police station at Mandurriao to identify a rooster
which was recovered somewhere at the airport. He readily identified it as one of the
six roosters which was stolen from his chicken coop.
Gorriceta, Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes were charged with robo con homicidio with
the aggravating circumstances of use of a motor vehicle, nocturnity, band, contempt
of or with insult to the public authorities and recidivism. The fiscal utilized Gorriceta
as a state witness. Hence, the case was dismissed as to him. However, after the
prosecution had rested its case and before the defense had commenced the
presentation of its evidence, Jaranilla escaped from the provincial jail. There was no
promulgation of the judgment as to Jaranilla, who, as already stated, escaped from
jail.
In convicting Suyo, Jaranilla and Brillantes of robo con homicidio, the trial court
assumed that the taking of the six fighting cocks was robbery and that Patrolman
Jabatan was killed "by reason or on the occasion of the robbery" within the purview
of article 294 of the Revised Penal Code.
In this appeal the appellants contend that the taking of roosters was theft and,
alternatively, that, if it was robbery, the crime could not be robbery with homicide
because the robbery was already consummated when Jabatan was killed.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused are guilty of robbery.
HELD: Yes
ART. 302. Robbery in an uninhabited place or in private building.—Any robbery
committed in an uninhabited place or in a building other than those mentioned in the
first paragraph of article 299, if the value of the property exceeds 250 pesos, shall be
punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods provided that
any of the following circumstances is present:
1. If the entrance has been effected through any opening not intended for
entrance or egress.
2. If any wall, roof, floor or outside door or window has been broken.
3. If the entrance has been effected through the use of false keys, picklocks
or other similar tools.
4. If any door, wardrobe, chest, or any sealed or closed furniture or
receptacle has been broken.
5. If any closed or sealed receptacle, as mentioned in the preceding
paragraph, has been removed, even if the same be broken open elsewhere.
xxx xxx xxx
In this connection, it is relevant to note that there is an inaccuracy in the English
translation of article 302. The controlling Spanish original reads:
ART. 302. Robo en lugar no habitado o edificio particular.—El robo cometido en un
lugar no habitado o en un edificio que no sea de los comprendidos en el parrafo
primero del articulo 299
The term "lugar no habitado" is erroneously translated. as "uninhabited place", a term
which may be confounded with the expression "uninhabited place" in articles 295 and
300 of the Revised Penal Code, which is the translation of despoblado and which is
different from the term lugar no habitado in article 302. The term lugar no habitado is
the antonym of casa habitada (inhabited house) in article 299.
One essential requisite of robbery with force upon things under Articles 299 and 302
is that the malefactor should enter the building or dependency, where the object to be
taken is found. Articles 299 and 302 clearly contemplate that the malefactor should
enter the building (casa habitada o lugar no habitado o edificio). If the culprit did not
enter the building, there would be no robbery with force upon things.
Thus, where the accused broke the show-window of the Bombay Palace Bazar at
Rizal Avenue, Manila and removed forty watches therefrom, the crime was theft and
not robbery because he did not enter the building. The show-window was outside the
store.
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In the instant case, the chicken coop where the six roosters were taken cannot be
considered a building within the meaning of article 302. Not being a building, it cannot
be said that the accused entered the same in order to commit the robbery by means
of any of the five circumstances enumerated in article 302.
The term "building" in article 302, formerly 512 of the old Penal Code, was construed
as embracing any structure not mentioned in article 299 (meaning not an "inhabited
house or public building or edifice devoted to worship" or any dependency thereof)
used for storage and safekeeping of personal property. As thus construed, a freight
car used for the shipment of sugar was considered a private building. The unnailing
of a strip of cloth nailed over the door, the customary manner of sealing a freight car,
was held to constitute breaking by force within the meaning of article 512, now article
302. (U.S. vs. Magsino, 2 Phil. 710).
Baylon's coop is about five yards long, one yard wide and one yard high. It has
wooden stilts and bamboo strips as bars. The coop barely reaches the shoulder of a
person of average height like Baylon. It is divided into six compartments or cages. A
compartment has an area of less than one cubic yard. A person cannot be
accommodated inside the cage or compartment. It was not intended that a person
should go inside that compartment. The taking was effected by forcibly opening the
cage and putting the hands inside it to get the roosters.
Therefore, the taking of the six roosters from their coop should be characterized as
theft and not robbery. The assumption is that the accused were animated by single
criminal impulse. The conduct of the accused reveals that they conspired to steal the
roosters. The taking is punishable as a single offense of theft. Thus, it was held that
the taking of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion cannot give
rise to two crimes of theft.
Nocturnity and use of a motor vehicle are aggravating. Those circumstances
facilitated the commission of the theft. The accused intentionally sought the cover of
night and used a motor vehicle so as to insure the success of their nefarious
enterprise.
Also to be appreciated against appellants Suyo and Brillantes is the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism which was alleged in the information. They admitted their
previous convictions for theft.
The theft of six roosters valued at six hundred pesos is punishable by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods. That penalty should be imposed in
its maximum period because only aggravating circumstances are present.
Although recidivists, appellants Suyo and Brillantes are not habitual delinquents. They
are entitled to an indeterminate sentence.
With respect to the killing of Patrolman Jabatan, it has already been noted that the
evidence for the prosecution points to Jaranilla as the malefactor who shot that
unfortunate peace officer. The killing was homicide because it was made on the spur
of the moment. The treacherous mode of attack was not consciously or deliberately
adopted by the offender.
The twenty-four year old Jabatan was an agent of authority on night duty at the time
of the shooting. He was wearing his uniform. The killing should be characterized as a
direct assault (atentado) upon an agent of authority complexed with homicide. The
two offenses resulted from a single act.
The evidence for the prosecution does not prove any conspiracy on the part of
appellants Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes to kill Jabatan. They conspired to steal the
fighting cocks. The conspiracy is shown by the manner in which they perpetrated the
theft. They went to the scene of the crime together. They left the yard of Baylon's
residence, each carrying two roosters. They all boarded the getaway truck driven by
Gorriceta.
The theft was consummated when the culprits were able to take possession of the
roosters. It is not an indispenable element of theft that the thief carry, more or less far
away, the thing taken by him from its owner.
The situation in this case bears some analogy to that found in the People vs. Basisten,
where the homicide committed by a member of the band was not a part of the common
plan to commit robbery. Hence, only the person who perpetrated the killing was liable
for robbery with homicide. The others were convicted of robbery only.
As co-principals with Elias Jaranilla in the theft of the six fighting cocks, they are (a)
each sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor as
minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum
and (b) ordered to indemnify solidarily the complainant, Valentin Baylon, in the sum
of five hundred pesos (P500). Each appellant should pay one-third of the costs.
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12. PEOPLE vs. MARTINADO
FACTS: RTC --At about 6:15 o'clock in the afternoon of November 14, 1986,
Margarita Padrinao, a maid, was watching television at the house of her master, Juan
Matias. She then entered the sari-sari store of her master which is three arms' length
away from the place where she was watching television in order to feed the pigs. She
saw Juan Matias tending the sari-sari store. She also saw two customers drinking
softdrinks outside the window grills of the store. She identified them as Eliseo and
Hermogenes Martinado.
Elizabeth Carillo, a neighbor and a government employee (sic), passed by the same
sari-sari store on her way to make a phone call at a house located at nearby Villa
Maria Subdivision. She saw Juan Matias attending to three customers drinking
softdrinks at the sari-sari store. She identified them as Eliseo Martinado, Hermogenes
Martinado and "Rolly". Margarita who had just feed the pigs heard a loud snore
coming from the store. She hurriedly went back to the store she saw Eliseo and
Hermogenes helping one another in stabbing Juan Matias. The two accused were
armed with pointed, thin instruments which each used in the stabbing. The stabbing
took place inside the store near the place where rice was being kept. Margarita then
shouted in a loud voice, "Tulungan ninyo po kami." Accused fled thru the gate at the
fence of the house. After she shouted, some people approached the store but
Hermogenes and Eliseo Martinado had already fled. Eliseo was seen holding
something in his bloodied hand and Hermogenes was also seen holding something
in his hand which was bloodied. Elizabeth then entered the sari-sari store and she
saw Juan Matias lying down, face upward, inside the sari-sari store and had (sic) stab
wounds on (sic) his bloodied neck. He was still snorting, so Elizabeth called for help
to bring Juan to the hospital. Juan was brought to the Quezon City General Hospital
where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
Angel Nieto, the Tanod executive officer of the Barangay also heard people shouting
"Harangin, harangin." He went out of the house into the street and he was able to see
three men coming from the direction of the house of Juan Matias and being chased
by the residents. He was able to observe two of the said three men. These two men
had bloodied hands and bloodied clothes. He then asked the residents why they were
chasing the three men and they replied that these men had just stabbed Juan Matias.
The trial court concluded that the accused “conspired together and mutually helping
with one another, with intent of (sic) gain and with intent to kill, by means of violence
and intimidation employed upon the person of JUAN MATIAS y REYES that is by
attacking and stabbing the latter with a sharp pointed instrument, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away Seiko men's watch (5)
worth — P 800.00, Men's ring worth — P1,800.00, wallet containing cash in the
amount of — P2,500.00 belonging to Juan Matias y Reyes.. Under the circumstances
above narrated, the special complex crime of robbery with homicide penalized under
paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code was committed. The motive of
the accused was to rob Juan Matias.
The accused through counsel filed a Notice of Appeal on 2 March 1989. Despite the
trial court's order to forward the records of the case to this Court, the clerk of court of
the court a quo erroneously transmitted the same to the Court of Appeals on 19
February 1990. The latter subsequently forwarded the records to this Court on 22
February 1990.
ISSUES:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED HERMOGENES
MARTINADO AND ELISEO MARTINADO ARE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
HERMOGENES MARTINADO AND ELISEO MARTINADO CONSPIRED WITH A
CERTAIN "ROLLY" TO COMMIT THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE.
RULING: The court observed that only two (2) days after the alleged killing that the
loss of the victim's personal belongings was reported to the police authorities. They
then suggest that "[t]he wristwatch and the money contained in the wallet could have
been stolen when the cadaver was already in the Hospital or probably in the
Morgue;" that Elizabeth Carillo's declaration on the witness stand that she saw a
certain "Rolly" return and pick up a watch as he, together with the accused, were
fleeing from the victim's house, is not sufficient to support the conclusion that a
robbery was committed as the watch could have been Rolly's; and that the loss of
money was not proven and the witness who claims to have seen the alleged killing,
Margarita Padrinao, did not testify on the actual taking of property. However, the crime
of robbery was not proven to have been committed. No conclusive evidence proving
the physical act of asportation thereof by the accused themselves was presented by
the prosecution. This Court takes note of the fact that the original information filed
three (3) days after the incident in question was for Murder and no hint whatsoever of
robbery was made therein. The evidence further discloses that it was only at around
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10:30 o'clock in the evening of 16 November 1986 that the widow of Juan Matias
reported to the Investigation Division of the Kalookan City Police Station that "they
found out that the Seiko wristwatch worth P800.00; GOLD ring worth P1,800.00 and
the amount of P2,500.00 contained in the wallet of his (sic) slain husband, JUAN
MATIAS were missing presumably (sic) taken by suspects (sic)."
It is settled that in order to sustain a conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide,
it is imperative that the robbery itself be proven as conclusively as any other essential
element of a crime. In the absence of such proof, the killing of the victim would only
be simple homicide or murder, depending on the absence or presence of qualifying
circumstances. There is also the testimony of the victim's son, Nicanor Matias, a
substantial part of which is hearsay as he constantly alluded to the information his
mother had given him. It is pparent that nobody was able to observe that immediately
before the incident, Juan Matias was wearing a wristwatch and a gold ring and had a
wallet in his pocket which contained money; moreover, nobody witnessed the actual
taking by the accused of Juan Matias' personal belongings
For the second error, the accused capitalize on the Medico-Legal Officer's statement
that "the wounds would have been inflicted by one person because of the nature of
the wounds." The accused would attempt to mislead this Court by such conclusion
because they deliberately omitted the phrase immediately preceding the quoted
declaration — "It is possible.Thus, all that the said witness did was to suggest that
there could have been one (1) assailant. It was only the accused who made the
categorical declaration to that effect. Alibi is at best a weak defense and easy of
fabrication. It cannot prevail over a positive identification made by a prosecution
witness. For such a defense to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused
was somewhere else when the crime was committed but that he must also
demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime. 49
As found by the trial court, both accused were apprehended in the vicinity of the crime
scene shortly after the felony was committed. While Hermogenes was found trembling
under the lavatory in Rolly's house, Eliseo was accosted in the premises of the
Visayan Auto Repair Shop in the act of packing his clothes. Such deportment on the
part of the two accused displays guilty consciences. On the part of Eliseo Martinado,
such a conclusion is even bolstered by the fact that the escape from the Kalookan
City Jail on 6 August 1988. 50 Flight of the accused is an indication of his guilt or of a
guilty mind. 51
Conspiracy to exists does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to
the occurrence; it exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused
had the same purpose and were united in its execution. Direct proof of previous
agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It may be deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated, 55 or inferred from acts of the accused
themselves when such point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest. Conspiracy having been adequately established by the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses, all the conspirators — the accused herein —
are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective
individual participation for in contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all.
However, the finding that robbery was committed on the occasion of the killing cannot
be sustained. Hence, the accused are liable only for homicide. The court appreciates
against both accused the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength which although not alleged in the second amended information, was duly
proven by the prosecution and may therefore be properly taken into
consideration. The victim, Juan Matias, a septuagenarian, was unarmed at the time
he was assaulted; Eliseo Martinado was about 21 years old while Hermogenes
Martinado was only 28 years old. They both ganged up on the old man who never
had the slightest inkling that the accused, who pretended to be his customers, would
attack him simultaneously with bladed instruments. It is obvious that they took
advantage of their individual and collective strength. The penalty then for the crime of
homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code must be imposed in its
maximum period pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 64 of said Code.
The two accused are found guilty of the crime of Homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. In view of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength, and the absence of any mitigating circumstance to offset it, and applying the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Hermogenes Martinado y Aguillon is
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from Ten (10) years and
One (1) day of prision mayor maximum as minimum to Seventeen (17) years, Four
(4) months and One (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum as maximum.
Accused Eliseo Martinado, however, shall not be entitled to the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law as he had escaped from confinement. 62 Accordingly,
he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Seventeen (17) years,
Four (4) months and One (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum.
13. PEOPLE vs. GARDON
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FACTS: AA testified that in March 1995, she and her younger brother AA lived in the
house of their maternal grandparents, BB and accused Celestino Gardon, in xxx,
Sorsogon. At about 6:00 oclock one night, while her grandmother was at the town
proper purchasing some goods and AA was sleeping in the other room, her
grandfather, Gardon, accosted her with a knife and ordered her to lie down. Gardon
then undressed her and took off his pair of shorts. He threatened to kill her if she told
anyone what happened. He then held her breast and inserted his penis into her
vagina. She felt pain in her vaginal area during the intercourse. She struggled to no
avail because Gardon pointed a knife to her chest. When she stood up, she noticed
blood oozing from her genitals to the floor. She did not tell her grandmother what
happened for fear that Gardon might make good his threat of harming her and her
brother.
The incident was repeated three (3) more times but AAA could only remember that
the fourth abuse happened at around 6:00 in the evening of August 29, 1997. AAAs
grandmother was at the town proper and she was left home with Gardon. That night,
AAA was washing the dishes when Gardon held her hand and pulled her towards a
room. He pointed a knife to her chest, told her to lie down and undress herself, and
took off his pair of shorts. He then inserted his penis into her vagina. Again, she felt
pain. She did not tell her grandmother about the incident but confided in her sister,
CC.
Dr. Nerissa B. Tagum (Dr. Tagum), the resident physician of Irosin District Hospital
who examined AAA, explained that she found old lacerations on the latters hymen
which could have been caused by the insertion of an instrument. She also mentioned
that AAAs vagina can admit two (2) fingers which is not normal for a 14-year old girl.
AAAs sister, CC, was also presented in court. She recounted that in September 1997,
AAA left their grandparents house in xxx and came to live with her in xxx. When she
told AAA to go back to xxx, AAA refused and told her that their grandfather, Gardon,
raped her four (4) times since March 1995. The sisters reported the matter to their
stepmother, DD. Afterwards, they went to the xxx police to lodge a complaint against
Gardon.
AAA narrated in agonizing detail punctuated by unfeigned tears that her own
grandfather, Gardon, had carnal knowledge of her through force and intimidation on
four different occasions although she remembered only those that happened in March
1995 and on August 29, 1997. She described how Gardon held a knife to her chest,
undressed her and succeeded to consummate his revolting lust. AAA attempted to
resist her grandfathers sexual assault, but the latters physical superiority, aided by
his knife-brandishing and clear moral ascendancy, prevailed.
The foregoing excerpt from AAAs account of the first incident of rape in March 1995
is plain and forthright. Her testimony regarding the August 29, 1997 rape is similarly
candid. The trial court, which had the unique opportunity to assess the truthfulness of
her narration, was thoroughly convinced of her credibility.
ISSUE:
WON Gardon is entitled to parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
HELD:
Gardon shall not be entitled to parole in view of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346,
Sec. 3 of which states that [p]ersons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion
perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this
Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
We should point out that the benefit of parole cannot be extended to Gardon even if
he committed the crimes for which he is now convicted prior to the effectivity of R.A.
No. 9346. Sec. 2 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the law shall not
apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life-
imprisonment. Although the law makes no reference to persons convicted to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua such as Gardon, the Court has consistently held
that the Indeterminate Sentence Law likewise does not apply to persons sentenced
to reclusion perpetua.
in People v. Asturias, Serrano v. Court of Appeals, People v. Lampaza and People
v. Tan, to name a few cases, we in effect equated the penalty of reclusion perpetua
as synonymous to life-imprisonment for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
and ruled that the latter law does not apply to persons convicted of offenses
punishable with the said penalty. Consequently, we affirm the Court of Appeals in not
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in imposing upon appellants the
penalty of reclusion perpetua instead.[36]
Reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty without a minimum or maximum period.
Parole, on the other hand, is extended only to those sentenced to divisible penalties
as is evident from Sec. 5 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, which provides that it is
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only after any prisoner shall have served the minimum penalty imposed on him that
the Board of Indeterminate Sentence may consider whether such prisoner may be
granted parole.
14. ZAFRA vs. PEOPLE
15. PEOPLE vs. RICKY LADIANA AND MANUEL UY
[G.R. No. 174660; May 30, 2011]
FACTS: Appellant Antonio Manuel Uy was one of the maintenance crew of the
Jeepney Shopping Center (JSC) in Pasay City, owned by Mr. Jerry Limpe. His co-
employees requested that he be ordered to leave the quarters and transfer to another
place. Hence, he was forced to rent a house. Cecilio Aranez, also a maintenance
crew, heard him saying, “Balang araw, gaganti ako.” Uy’s co-employees then had a
drinking spree that lasted until 3 in the morning, and they noticed that two persons
outside the guardhouse of the Jeepney Shopping Center were peeping inside. One
of them was appellant who later on left with his companion. In the morning of June
26, 2001, Uy sent a text message to their Supervisior that he was not feeling well and
would not be able to report for work. In the evening of the same day, a security guard
of Chang Juat Ltd. Company, saw Uy and his companion standing at the gate of JSC.
The following morning, Carpio Bahatan, a stay-in employee discovered the lifeless
bodies of Felix Aranez and Delfin Biniahin at the 2nd and 3rd floor of the main building.
Another employee, Rico Arbas, discovered the dead body of the security guard,
Gilbert Esmaquilan, lying near the guard house which was inside JSC compound.
A piece of wood with blood stains was found about three to five meters from the body
of Gilbert Esmaquilan. Another blood-stained piece of wood was found in the locker
room within the compound but outside the main building of the Jeepney Shopping
Center. At the opening leading to the comfort room in the ground floor of the main
building, there were found pieces of jalousie slabs and frames scattered on the
ground. At the second floor, the lifeless body of Felix Aranez was found, lying face
down and with feet and hands tied with yellow plastic straw. A piece of cloth was stuck
in his mouth and his nape had an incise wound. A bunch of keys was found inside the
display cabinet which was in disarray. It was discovered that some pieces of jewelry
inside the display cabinet were missing. At the third floor, the dead body of Delfin
Biniahan was found lying on a folding bed between two glass cabinets. He sustained
injuries on the upper part of his body. The glass cabinets were splattered with blood.
The door of the Administrative Office had been destroyed and bore some traces of
blood.
At 8:57 in the morning of of June 28, 2001, Uy sent a text message to their supervisor,
which read, “Boss, Gud morning. Bukas na ako papasok o kaya Lune ang sama
talaga ng trangkaso naba K C ako ng ulan nong Martes pag deliver naming.” At 9:57,
he sent another text message to Roger Tan, which read, "Boss, balita daw na ako
ang suspek sa nangyari dyan boss matagal na ako sa companya kahit alam kong
inaapi ako nyo wala akong ginawa na masama sa trabaho ko."
In the morning of June 29 2001, Uy called up Richlie, his girlfriend and sister of Ricky,
and asked her to drop by the house of the latter in Antipolo City where he was. When
she arrived, Uy handed to her something wrapped in a newspaper. When she opened
the newspaper to look what was inside, she saw 4 pairs of earrings, a pairless earring,
and 5 ladies’ rings.
Uy confessed to Eduardo dela Cruz, that he and Ricky entered a place in Pasay City
and they killed two persons and seriously wounded another whom they left fighting
for his life. Appellant also told Eduardo about the vault which contained money and
that if "he can open the vault, and even if they die their family will live comfortably."
Further, appellant told Eduardo that nothing will be traced to him because his hands
were wrapped such that no fingerprints would be recovered from the crime scene.
The inventory conducted the accounting clerk of JSC revealed that 191 pieces of
jewelry in the amount of P304,140.00 and 2 imported bags worth P23,250.00 were
stolen. The stolen items had a total value of P327,390.00.
The RTC convicted Uy of robbery with homicide and imposed the penalty of death.
The CA affirmed the decision with modification of the penalty to Reclusion Perpetua.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
a) Whether the trial court erred in convicting Uy of the crime charged
b) Assuming that he is guilty, whether the penalty imposed by the trial
court was proper
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RULING:
a) NO. Robbery with homicide exists when a homicide is committed either by reason,
or on occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the
prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property is
committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property belongs to
another; (3) the taking is animo lucrandi or with intent to gain; and (4) on the occasion
or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in the generic sense, was
committed. A conviction needs certainty that the robbery is the central purpose and
objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The
intent to rob must precede the taking of human life, but the killing may occur before,
during or after the robbery.
In this case, we find that the evidence presented by the prosecution had established
beyond reasonable doubt that the crime of robbery with homicide was indeed
committed. As the CA correctly observed:
x x x The removal of the jalousies in the restroom of the Jeepney Shopping Center to
gain entrance, the destruction of the display cabinet where the items were kept, the
destruction of the lock leading to the cashier's office on the third floor of the building;
and the inventory of missing items makes the situation possess the first essential
element as stated above. In robbery by the taking of the property through intimidation
or violence, it is not necessary that the person unlawfully divested of the personal
property be the owner thereof, robbery may be committed against a bailee or a person
who himself stole it. As long as the taker of the personal property is not the owner,
the second element exists. The third element is animus lucrandi or intent to gain which
is defined by the Supreme Court as "an internal act which can be established through
the overt acts of the offender, and it may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful
property pertaining to another, unless special circumstance reveal a different intent
on the part of the perpetrator."
The Court also agrees with the finding of the Trial Court that: “the intent to steal was
likewise proven from accused's statement to Eduardo dela Cruz to the effect that if
they were able to open the vault, their families would have lived a good life even if
they die in the process." On the other hand, the accused was proven to be a friend
of, and was with, Ricky Ladiana right after the commission of the crime as testified to
by Richlie Ladiana, his lover. Being so when the firearm of the fallen guard was found
from the abandoned house of Ricky, the conclusion is that Ricky and Antonio Uy have
been together at the shopping center and presumed the taker of a thing taken or doer
in the doing of a recent wrongful act. In the instant case, no special circumstance was
present to belie the presumption of the intent to gain of the accused-appellant. The
existence of the fourth element is incontestable. The homicide preceded the robbery
but committed on the occasion thereof, the purpose is to eliminate an obstacle to the
commission of robbery. The grudge of the appellant against his former co-workers
Felix Aranez and Delfin Biniahan is not sufficient to overcome the presumption and
evidence of intent to gain, it is clear that the victims were killed on the occasion of
robbery and to commit robbery. Essential in robbery with homicide is that there is a
nexus, an intimate connection between the robbery and the killing, whether the latter
be prior or subsequent to the former or whether both crimes are committed at the
same time.”
b) NO. The Court agrees with the CA that the RTC erred in appreciating the
aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and treachery when they were not
specifically alleged in the information. Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the 2000
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which became effective on December 1, 2000,
provides that aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the information,
otherwise, they cannot be considered against the accused even if they are proven
during the trial.
The special complex crime of robbery with homicide is punishable under Article 294,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, by
reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
states that when the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two (2) indivisible
penalties, and the crime is neither attended by mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances, the lesser penalty shall be imposed. Considering that there was no
modifying circumstance which attended the commission of the crime, the CA correctly
modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua.
16. PEOPLE vs. CONRADO LAOG
FACTS: AAA testified that she and her friend were walking on their way to apply.
Suddenly, appellant, who was holding an ice pick and a lead pipe, waylaid them and
forcibly brought them to a grassy area.Without warning, appellant struck AAA in the
head with the lead pipe causing her to feel dizzy and to fall down. When Jennifer saw
this, she cried out for help but appellant also hit her on the head with the lead pipe,
knocking her down. Appellant stabbed Jennifer several times with the ice pick and
thereafter covered her body with thick grass. Appellant then turned to AAA. He hit
AAA in the head several times more with the lead pipe and stabbed her on the face.
While AAA was in such defenseless position, appellant pulled down her jogging pants,
removed her panty, and pulled up her blouse and bra. He then went on top of her,
sucked her breasts and inserted his penis into her vagina. After raping AAA, appellant
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also covered her with grass. At that point, AAA passed out. When AAA regained
consciousness, it was nighttime and raining hard. She crawled until she reached her
uncle’s farm at daybreak.When she saw him, she waved at him for help. Her uncle,
BBB, and a certain Nano then brought her to Hospital. She later learned that Jennifer
had died.
Appellant, on the other hand, denied the charges against him. Appellant testified that
he was at home cooking dinner around the time the crimes were committed. With
him were his children, Ronnie, Jay, Oliver and Conrado, Jr. and his nephew, Rey
Laog. At around seven o’clock, he was arrested by the police officers of San Rafael,
Bulacan. He learned that his wife had reported him to the police after he “went wild”
that same night and struck with a lead pipe a man whom he saw talking to his wife
inside their house. When he was already incarcerated, he learned that he was being
charged with murder and rape.
The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes rape and
murder. The CA affirmed with modification for damages.
ISSUE: Whether the accused-appellant is guilty of the crimes charged despite failure
of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
RULING: It must be underscored that the foremost consideration in the prosecution
of rape is the victim’s testimony and not the findings of the medico-legal officer. In
fact, a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape;
the victim’s testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict. Thus we have ruled
that a medical examination of the victim, as well as the medical certificate, is merely
corroborative in character and is not an indispensable element for conviction in rape.
What is important is that the testimony of private complainant about the incident is
clear, unequivocal and credible.
In People v. Larrañaga, this Court explained the concept of a special complex crime,
as follows:
A discussion on the nature of special complex crime is imperative. Where the law
provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is
called a special complex crime. Some of the special complex crimes under the
Revised Penal Code are (1) robbery with homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3)
kidnapping with serious physical injuries, (4) kidnapping with murder or homicide, and
(5) rape with homicide. In a special complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily
prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that would be
necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints. As earlier
mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding
thereto this provision: “When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed;” and that this provision gives rise to a special complex
crime. In the cases at bar, the Information specifically alleges that the victim Marijoy
was raped “on the occasion and in connection” with her detention and was killed
“subsequent thereto and on the occasion thereof.” Considering that the prosecution
was able to prove each of the component offenses, appellants should be convicted of
the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide
and rape.
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides only a single
penalty for the composite acts of rape and the killing committed by reason or
on the occasion of the rape.
ART. 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding
article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two
or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become
insane, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on
the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the
penalty shall be death.
Considering that the prosecution in this case was able to prove both the rape of AAA
and the killing of Jennifer both perpetrated by appellant, he is liable for rape with
homicide under the above provision. There is no doubt that appellant killed Jennifer
to prevent her from aiding AAA or calling for help once she is able to run away, and
also to silence her completely so she may not witness the rape of AAA, the original
intent of appellant. His carnal desire having been satiated, appellant purposely
covered AAA’s body with grass, as he did earlier with Jennifer’s body, so that it may
not be easily noticed or seen by passersby. Appellant indeed thought that the savage
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blows he had inflicted on AAA were enough to cause her death as with Jennifer. But
AAA survived and appellant’s barbaric deeds were soon enough discovered.
The facts established showed that the constitutive elements of rape with homicide
were consummated, and it is immaterial that the person killed in this case is someone
other than the woman victim of the rape. An analogy may be drawn from our rulings
in cases of robbery with homicide, where the component acts of homicide, physical
injuries and other offenses have been committed by reason or on the occasion of
robbery.
In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term “homicide” is to be
understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries
committed by reason or on occasion of the rape. Hence, even if any or all of the
circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation)
alleged in the information have been duly established by the prosecution, the same
would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime committed by appellant is still
rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with homicide, the aggravating
circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance
only.
In this case, as personally witnessed by AAA, appellant struck Jennifer in the head
with a lead pipe then stabbed her repeatedly until she was dead. Clearly, the manner
by which appellant had brutally slain Jennifer with a lethal weapon, by first hitting her
in the head with a lead pipe to render her defenseless and vulnerable before stabbing
her repeatedly, unmistakably showed that appellant intentionally used excessive
force out of proportion to the means of defense available to his unarmed victim. As
aptly observed by the appellate court:
It has long been established that an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon
upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of
that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from
which the woman was unable to defend herself. Unlike in treachery, where the victim
is not given the opportunity to defend himself or repel the aggression, taking
advantage of superior strength does not mean that the victim was completely
defenseless. Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of the aggressor’s
natural strength over that of the victim, considering the momentary position of both
and the employment of means weakening the defense, although not annulling it. By
deliberately employing deadly weapons, an ice pick and a lead pipe, accused-
appellant clearly took advantage of the superiority which his strength, sex and weapon
gave him over his unarmed victim. The accused-appellant’s sudden attack caught
the victim off-guard rendering her defenseless.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accused-appellant
Conrado Laog y Ramin is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Rape
With Homicide under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
No. 8353, and is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
without eligibility for parole.
17. PEOPLE vs. CALABROSO
FACTS: Tranquilino Nacnac, a tricycle driver was found dead in Gabit, Barangay
Nuesa. He bore 22 stab wounds on the head, torso, and upper limbs. Upon
investigation, the sidecar of a motorcycle was spotted at the bottom of a 10-15 meter
deep ravine. It was confirmed to be the property of Nacnac as what was found with
the sidecar, were his wallet, his driver’s license, and his vehicle registration. It was
found out that the night before the death of Nacnac, 4 men boarded his tricycle. They
were, Johnny Calabroso, Sonny Matos, Richard Sata, and Leonardo Dumrique.
Before these men boarded the tricycle of Nacnac, they were supposed to board the
tricycle of Danilo Cerveza. However, they were not able to push through with the trip
as the passengers wanted to pay 35 pesos instead of the 40 pesos that Cerveza
asked them to pay. Thereafter, they flagged down the tricycle of Nacnac, and he
agreed to transport them to Gabit, Barangay Nuesa, Roxas, Isabela.
It was gathered from the suspects that they were on their way to a party when they
boarded the tricycle of Nacnac. When they arrived, Dumrique gave Nacnac 12 pesos
as he knew that the regular fare was 3 pesos per head. But Nacnac demanded 40
pesos. Dumrique refused to pay, so Nacnac boxed him 5 times on the neck which
caused him to fall to the ground. Matos pacified them but Nacnac simultaneously drew
a veinte nueve from his waist. Dumrique, who was still lying on the ground, saw
Nacnac near his feet. Taking advantage of the situation to disable Nacnac, Dumrique
kicked him at his sex organ. Nacnac doubled up in pain. Calabroso then grabbed the
knife from Nacnac. When Calabroso was about to step backwards, Nacnac held his
right elbow, so Calabroso stabbed Nacnac. For his part, Matos tried to stop Calabroso
but the latter kept on swinging the knife. Sata, seated inside the tricycle, was stunned.
Dumrique was not able to do anything because he was still reeling from the punches
he received from Nacnac.
Thereafter, Dumrique started the engine of the tricycle while Calabroso pulled Matos
and joined Sata inside the tricycle. All 4 companions fled to Kiangan, Ifugao, leaving
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the bloodied Nacnac behind. After removing the sidecar of the tricycle, they gathered
at the house of the former employer of Matos, with the motorcycle in tow. The other
three, decided to dispose of the motorcycle and left Matos behind. They came back
2 days later, the motorcycle was still in their possession. It was at that time, that they
were brought in to be questioned by the police.
They were charged with carnapping for taking away, in conspiracy with one another,
a TMX Honda motorized tricycle owned and driven by Tranquilino Nacnac, with intent
to gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation. They were also charged with
robbery with homicide for taking away on the same day 40 pesos belonging to
Nacnac, again in conspiracy with one another, also with intent to gain and by means
of violence and intimidation; and, on the occasion and by reason thereof, inflicted
upon Nacnac multiple stab wounds on different parts of his body which directly caused
his death.
The trial court appreciated the presence of conspiracy among the 4 accused in taking
away the tricycle of Nacnac as demonstrated by them when they all boarded the same
tricycle and sped away from the crime scene. As to the charge of robbery with
homicide, the trial court ruled that the claim that the victim was robbed of his money
was not duly established, but was nonetheless convinced that Calabroso and
Dumrique were responsible for his death. The court ratiocinated that since it was
already nighttime, Nacnac was justified in asking 40 pesos from the passengers; in
fact, it was the amount previously demanded by Cerveza. It further reasoned out that
Dumrique started the fight by refusing to pay the amount demanded by Nacnac while
Calabroso had no compelling reason to stab Nacnac, repeatedly at that, considering
that the latter had already been reportedly disarmed and was in fact alone.
Nevertheless, the lower court convicted Calabroso and Dumrique of robbery with
homicide, instead of homicide alone, and exonerated Sata and Matos since it was its
finding that Sata did not participate in the fight while Matos only attempted to pacify
the protagonists.
Accused-appellants Calabroso and Dumrique argued that the trial court erred in
convicting them of robbery with homicide since its discussion was clear that the
prosecution failed to establish the robbery. They also alleged that they did not
conspire in carnapping the tricycle. Moreover, they alleged that they used the tricycle
only as a getaway vehicle, without intent to gain, for when they reached Kiangan the
following morning they intended to surrender it, as they did, to the police.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in its conviction of the accused-appellants of
robbery with homicide, and carnapping (conspiracy)
HELD: (YES in part)
Robbery with homicide:
The trial court was categorical in its finding that "[n]obody declared that the victim was
robbed of anything."Yet it convicted Calabroso and Dumrique of robbery with
homicide. This is a glaring error. Where a complex crime is charged and the evidence
fails to support the charge as to one of the component offenses, the defendant can
be convicted only of the offense proved. To be specific, absent any evidence that the
accused indeed robbed the victim the special complex crime of robbery with homicide
cannot stand. Having ruled out robbery for want of evidence and satisfied of the equal
liability of Calabroso and Dumrique for the death of Nacnac, the trial court should
have convicted them only of homicide.
Dumrique did not actively participate in killing Nacnac nor did he join in any other
manner to further the objective of Calabroso. Conspiracy, which exists when two (2)
or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of the felony and
decide to commit it, was not established between Dumrique and Calabroso. The trial
court, while ruling out conspiracy between the 2 in the killing of Nacnac, erroneously
held that Dumrique was equally responsible with Calabroso for the victim's death;
hence, Dumrique must be acquitted.
Carnapping (conspiracy):
All the elements of carnapping were present in the instant case. After Nacnac was
fatally stabbed Dumrique started the engine of the tricycle, while Calabroso dragged
Matos into the tricycle to join Sata who was already seated inside. Intent to gain is
presumed when one takes a property belonging to another against his will. The intent
to gain became an established fact when accused-appellants remained in possession
of the motorcycle even after the lapse of 2 days from the commission of the crime.
To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be
shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy.
That overt act may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime
itself or moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the time of the
commission of the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-
conspirators moving them to execute or implement the conspiracy. When Calabroso,
Matos and Dumrique joined Sata inside the tricycle and fled towards Kiangan after
Nacnac was stabbed they performed well-coordinated acts indicating a common
purpose to steal the vehicle. Conspiracy is also inferred not only from their conduct
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before and during the commission of the crime but also thereafter, showing that they 19. PEOPLE vs. MERCADO
acted in unison with each other.

Penalty:
Theory of the Solicitor General:
The killing of Nacnac is deemed absorbed in the "graver offense of qualified
carnapping or carnapping in an aggravated from." The carnapping and killing can be
considered as a "single or indivisible crime" or "a special complex crime" which is not
covered by Art. 48 of the Penal Code. Hence, accused-appellants Dumrique and
20. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PABLO ESTACIO AND MARITESS
Calabroso should be held liable for qualified carnapping and penalized with reclusion
ANG
perpetua.
G.R. No. 171655, July 22, 2009
The Supreme Court disagreed:
There is no direct relation, a causal connection, between the carnapping and the
Kidnapping with murder
killing, i.e., whether the killing be prior or subsequent to the carnapping, or whether
both crimes be committed at the same time. Therefore, the penalty applicable is
FACTS: At around 10:00 in the evening of October 10, 1995, Maritess, together with
imprisonment of not less than fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and not more
Estacio and Sumipo, arrived at Casa Leonisa, a bar-restaurant at Examiner Street,
than seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, since the carnapping was committed
Quezon City where the three of them would meet with Charlie Mancilla Chua (the
without violence or intimidation of persons or force upon things. Applying the
victim). Maritess had earlier told Sumipo that she would settle her debt to the victim
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court may impose upon accused-appellants a
and then "deretsong dukot na rin x x x kay Charlie [the victim]." Sumipo assumed,
prison term of fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and ten (10) days as minimum,
however, that Maritess was just joking.
to fifteen (15) years, four (4) months and twenty (20) days as maximum.
As regards the homicide, accused-appellant Johnny Calabroso is guilty, the
imposable penalty under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal After the victim arrived past midnight and talked to Maritess for a short while, the
the range of which is twelve (12) years and one (1) one day to twenty (20) years. group boarded his car, Maritess taking the seat beside the victim who was driving, as
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court may impose upon accused- Estacio and Sumipo took the backseat.Not long after, Estacio pulled out a gun and
appellant a prison term of eight (8) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision ordered the victim to pull the car over. As the victim complied, Estacio, with a gun
mayor medium as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, ten (10) months and twenty (20) pointed at him, pulled him to the backseat as Maritess transferred to the backseat,
days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. sat beside the victim, tied the victim’s hands behind his back, and placed tape on his
mouth. While Sumipo tried to dissuade appellants from pursuing their plan, they
18. PEOPLE vs. LARRANAGA replied that they would kill the victim so that he would not take revenge. On Estacio’s
instruction, Sumipo drove towards San Jose del Monte, Bulacan and on reaching a
secluded place, Estacio ordered Sumipo to stop the car as he did. Maritess and
Estacio then brought the victim to a grassy place. Estacio with bloodied hands later
resurfaced.

The following morning, Estacio went to the residence of Sumipo where he called up
by telephone the victim’s mother and demanded a P15,000,000 ransom. The mother
replied, however, that she could not afford that amount. In the afternoon of the same
day, Maritess and Estacio went to Sumipo’s residence again where Estacio again
called up the victim’s mother, this time lowering the ransom demand to P10,000,000

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which she still found to be too steep. Sumipo expressed his misgivings about future
calls, as they might get caught, but Estacio and Maritess assured him that that call
would be the last.The victim’s mother having agreed to the demand, Maritess and
Estacio directed her to place the money in a garbage can near Pizza Hut in Greenhills
at 11:30 in the evening. Estacio and Sumipo later proceeded to Pizza Hut, and as
they were seated there, a patrol car passed by, drawing them to leave and part ways.
Sumipo soon learned that Maritess and Estacio sold Chua’s gun, watch, and necklace
from the proceeds of which he was given P7,000.
On May 16, 1996, Sumipo surrendered to the National Bureau of Investigation. On
May 23, 1996, Estacio surrendered to the police. The police then informed the victim’s
mother that Estacio had admitted having killed her son, and that he offered to
accompany them to the crime scene.
RTC found both Estacio and Maritess guilty of "kidnapping on the occasion of which
the victim was killed” (Kidnapping with Murder). CA affirmed, with modification, the
trial court’s decision.
ISSUE: Are the accused guilty of kidnapping with murder?
RULING: NO. The Court finds, however, that the offense of which appellants were
convicted was erroneously designated. Appellants were eventually charged with and
convicted of the special complex crime of kidnapping with murder, defined in the last
paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. In a special complex crime, the
prosecution must prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that
would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints.
In the case at bar, kidnapping was not sufficiently proven. Although appellants bound
and gagged Chua and transported him to Bulacan against his will, they did these acts
to facilitate his killing, not because they intended to detain or confine him. As soon as
they arrived at the locus criminis, appellants wasted no time in killing him. That
appellants’ intention from the beginning was to kill the victim is confirmed by the
conversation which Sumipo heard in the car in which Maritess said that a knife would
be used to kill him so that it would not create noise. The subsequent demand for
ransom was an afterthought which did not qualify appellants’ prior acts as kidnapping.
Where the evident purpose of taking the victims was to kill them, and from the acts of
the accused it cannot be inferred that the latter’s purpose was actually to detain or
deprive the victims of their liberty, the subsequent killing of the victims constitute the
crime of murder, hence the crime of kidnapping does not exist and cannot be
considered as a component felony to produce the complex crime of kidnapping with
murder. The crime committed was thus plain Murder. The killing was qualified by
treachery. The victim was gagged, bound, and taken from Quezon City to an isolated
place in Bulacan against his will to prevent him from defending himself and to facilitate
the killing.
People v. Padica instructs: We have consistently held that where the taking of the
victim was incidental to the basic purpose to kill, the crime is only murder, and this is
true even if, before the killing but for purposes thereof, the victim was taken from one
place to another. Thus, where the evident purpose of taking the victims was to kill
them, and from the acts of the accused it cannot be inferred that the latter’s purpose
was actually to detain or deprive the victims of their liberty, the subsequent killing of
the victims constitute the crime of murder, hence the crime of kidnapping does not
exist and cannot be considered as a component felony to produce the complex crime
of kidnapping with murder. In fact, as we held in the aforecited case of Masilang, et.
al., although the accused had planned to kidnap the victim for ransom but they first
killed him and it was only later that they demanded and obtained the money, such
demand for ransom did not convert the crime into kidnapping since no detention or
deprivation of liberty was involved, hence the crime committed was only murder.
That from the beginning of their criminal venture appellant and his brothers intended
to kill the victim can be readily deduced from the manner by which they swiftly and
cold-bloodedly snuffed out his life once they reached the isolated sugarcane
plantation in Calamba, Laguna. Furthermore, there was no evidence whatsoever to
show or from which it can be inferred that from the outset the killers of the victim
intended to exchange his freedom for ransom money. On the contrary, the demand
for ransom appears to have arisen and was consequently made as an afterthought,
as it was relayed to the victim’s family very much later that afternoon after a sufficient
interval for consultation and deliberation among the felons who had killed the victim
around five hours earlier.
x x x The fact alone that ransom money is demanded would not per se qualify the act
of preventing the liberty of movement of the victim into the crime of kidnapping, unless
the victim is actually restrained or deprived of his liberty for some appreciable period
of time or that such restraint was the basic intent of the accused. Absent such
determinant intent and duration of restraint, the mere curtailment of freedom of
movement would at most constitute coercion. (Underscoring supplied)
The crime committed was thus plain Murder. The killing was qualified by treachery.
The victim was gagged, bound, and taken from Quezon City to an isolated place in
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Bulacan against his will to prevent him from defending himself and to facilitate the
killing.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals of May 12, 2005 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. The Court finds appellants Maritess Ang and Pablo Estacio, Jr.
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder, with the generic aggravating circumstance
of use of motor vehicle. And in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 on
June 24, 2006, the penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole.

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