Case digests
This means
LEVISTE VS. CA
FACTS:
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was
convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide
and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day
of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed
an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age
and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his
part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for bail. It invoked the
bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend
bail during the course of appeal should be exercised “with grave caution and only for
strong reasons.”
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
Petitioner quotes Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present.
Petitioner’s theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than
six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail
should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?
HELD:
Petitioner’s stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and
substantive rules.
Petitioner actually failed to establish that the Court of Appeals indeed acted with
grave abuse of discretion. He simply relies on his claim that the Court of Appeals
should have granted bail in view of the absence of any of the circumstances
enumerated in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
We disagree.
Pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
expressly declared to be discretionary.
Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in
remedial law, is of the same thinking:
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the
offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
On the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of
discretion.
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6)
years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated
circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be
denied. (emphasis supplied)
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion.
that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule
114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a
more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the
enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option
except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending
appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of
discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any of the
circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will
establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent
discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of
discretion stage where, assuming the appellant’s case falls within the first scenario
allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all
relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section
5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may
either allow or disallow bail.
A finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically
result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less
stringent sound discretion approach.
However, judicial discretion has been defined as “choice.” Choice occurs
where, between “two alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of options),”
there is “more than one possible outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to the
decision maker.” On the other hand, the establishment of a clearly defined rule of
action is the end of discretion. Thus, by severely clipping the appellate
court’s discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in
applications for bail pending appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed by the
trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioner’s theory
effectively renders nugatory the provision that “upon conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.”
The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114 of
the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure. They were modified in 1988 to read as follows:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody, shall before final
conviction be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital
offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the
time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of
guilt is strong.
Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as well
as pending cases before the trial courts, this Court en banc lays down the following
policies concerning theeffectivity of the bail of the accused, to wit:
2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which
under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is
punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the
trial court of a lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or information, the
same rule set forth in the preceding paragraph shall be applied;
Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No. 12-94
dated August 16, 1994 which brought about important changes in the said rules as
follows:
 SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent
Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life judge. Hence, this instant petition.
imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail.
Denial of bail pending appeal is “a matter of wise discretion.”
Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides: Issue
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,
WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail
be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided
by law. x x x (emphasis supplied)
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates Ruling
and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is
subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be
exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Ratio Decidendi
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG VS. OLALIA
Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
Facts
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is
nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest
right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
were issued and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was
upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition for the
extradition of the private respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed
the private respondent. under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a
harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.
The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting
the same in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high “flight risk”. Private In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42,
judge subject to the following conditions: and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007, that
the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings, the
same being available only in criminal proceedings. The Court took cognizance of the
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby
following trends in international law:
undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings
(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international;
and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will
further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be
forfeited in favor of the government; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own
motion for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if
they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they
further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real
and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused
flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and
that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in
fulfilling their treaty obligations; and
(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental
law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given to
the worth of the individual and the sanctity of human rights, the Court departed from
the ruling in Purganan, and held that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.
PADERANGA VS. CA
Facts: Petitioner was belatedly charged in an amended information as a co-
conspirator in the crime of multiple murder in the Regional Trial Court for the killing of
members of the Bucag family sometime in 1984 in Gingoog City of which petitioner
was the mayor at the time.
The trial of the base was all set to start with the issuance of an arrest warrant for
petitioner’s apprehension but, before it could be served on him, petitioner through
counsel, a motion for admission to bail with the trial court which set the same for
hearing.
As petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital, his
counsel manifested that they were submitting custody over the person of their client
to the local chapter president of the integrated Bar of the Philippines and that, for
purposes of said hearing of his bail application, he considered being in the custody of
the law.
The prosecution was neither supporting nor opposing the application for bail and that
they were submitting the same to the sound discretion of the trail judge
Upon further inquiries from the trial court, Prosecutor Abejo announced that he was
waiving any further presentation of evidence. On that note and in a resolution, the trial
court admitted petitioner to bail in the amount of P200,000.00
Issue: Whether or not the grant of bail was tainted with grave abuse of discretion
Held: None.
As a paramount requisite, only those persons who have either been arrested,
detained, or other wise deprived of their freedom will ever have occasion to seek the
protective mantle extended by the right to bail.
A person is considered to be in the custody of the law (a) when he is arrested
either by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued or by warrantless arrest or (b)
when he has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by
surrendering to the proper authorities.
In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that he had indeed filed his
motion for admission to bail before he was actually and physically placed under
arrest. He may, however, at that point and in the factual ambience therefore, be
considered as being constructively and legally under custody.
Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to physical and legal control over his
person.
Thus in the likewise peculiar circumstance which attended the filing of his bail
application with the trail court, for purposes of the hearing thereof he should be
deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the law and,
necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter granted bail as prayed
for. In fact, an arrest is made either by actual restraint of the arrestee or merely by his
submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. 19 The latter mode may
be exemplified by the so-called “house arrest” or, in case of military offenders, by
being “confined to quarters” or restricted to the military camp area
The general rule is that prior to conviction by the regional trial court of a criminal
offense, an accused is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right, the present
exceptions thereto being the instances where the accused is charged with a capital
offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment and the
evidence of guilt is strong. Under said general rule, upon proper application for
admission to bail, the court having custody of the accused should, as a matter of
course, grant the same after a hearing conducted to specifically determine the
conditions of the bail in accordance with Section 6 (now, Section 2) of Rule 114. On
the other hand, as the grant of bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion on the part
of the court under the exceptions to the rule, a hearing, mandatory in nature and
which should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court is required with
the participation of both the defense and a duly notified representative of the
prosecution, this time to ascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for the
provisional liberty of the applicant. Of course, the burden of proof is on the
prosecution to show that the evidence meets the required quantum.
MIRANDA vs TULIAO
FACTS:
March 08, 1996, 2 burnt cadavers were discovered I Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela.
September 1999, SP02 Mardeal was arrested. April 27, 2001, he executed a sworn
confession and identified petitioners Jose Miranda, SP03 Ocon, SP03 Dalmacio , a
certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the death of
Vicente Buazon and Elizar Tualiao. Judge 6, 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the
absence of petitioners and issued a Joint order denying said urgent motion on the
ground that, since the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion
cannot be properly heard by the Court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the
resolution of the State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of Justice.
DOCTRINES:
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest neither jurisdiction over the
person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.
CA Justice Oscar Herrerra:
Except in application for bail, it is not necessary for the Court of First Instance to first
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant the
relief. The outright dismissal of the case even before the Court acquires jurisdiction
over the person of the accused is authorized under Section 6 (a), Rule 112 Rule of
Court, Criminal Procedure.
SANTIAGO vs VASQUEZ
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction
over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as filing a
motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction
over, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail.
Santiago shows discretion but custody of law and jurisdiction over the person.
Custody of the law is required before the Court can act upon the application for bail,
but is not required for the adjudication of other relief sought by the dependant where
by mere application, thereof, constitutes a waiver of the defence of lack of jurisdiction
over the person accused.
EXCEPTION TO THE RULE that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes
voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of one’s person to the
jurisdiction of the Court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for
the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the Court, lead to special appearance. Failure to
file them is WAIVER OF DEFENCE
1. Civil cases, motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included.
2. Criminal cases, motion to quash a complaint on the ground of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused
3. Motion to Quash a warrant of arrest – Legality of Court process forcing the
submission of the person of the accused.
GENERAL RULE: One who seeks affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to
the Jurisdiction of the Court.
OBOSA VS. CA
FACTS:
While a fugitive from justice, petitioner committed other crimes including double
murder for which he was convicted only for double homicide. While he was appealing
his conviction therein, the convicting court allowed him to post bail notwithstanding
that he was already serving prison terms for prior offenses. Respondent court, in a
resolution, canceled petitioner’s bail bond, nullified the trial court’s order granting him
bail, and issued a warrant for his immediate arrest. It also denied petitioner’s twin
motion for reconsideration and quashal of warrant of arrest.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to bail pending appeal from judgment convicting
him of homicide though charged with murder.
RULING:
NO. Bail cannot be granted as a matter of right even after an accused, who is
charged with a capital offense, appeals his conviction for a non-capital crime. Courts
must exercise utmost caution in deciding applications for bail considering that the
accused on appeal may still be convicted of the original capital offense charged and
that thus the risk attendant to jumping bail still subsists. In fact, trial courts would be
well advised to leave the matter of bail, after conviction for a lesser crime than the
capital offense originally charged, to the appellate court’s sound discretion.
Petition is DENIED for lack of merit and assailed resolutions are AFFIRMED.
FACTS:
Obosa was charged with two counts of murder for the ambush and slaying of former
Secretary of Interior and Local Governments Jaime Ferrer and his driver Jesus
Calderon. However, he was only convicted of two counts of homicide by the trial
court. Obosa applied for bail with the trial court. While this is pending, he appealed
the case to the CA, which found strong evidence of guilt. Meanwhile, the trial court
approved Obosa’s bail bond, prompting the prosecution to request the CA to cancel
the bail bond approved by the trial court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused is entitled to right to bail pending appeal as a
matter of right
RULING:
The Purpose of
In the case of De la Camara vs. Enage, we analyzed the purpose of bail and why it
should be denied to one charged with a capital offense when evidence of guilt is
strong:
"x x x Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with capital
offenses when the evidence of guilt is strong. Such a right flows from the presumption
of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of
freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Thereby a regime of liberty is honored in the observance
and not in the breach. It is not beyond the realm of probability, however, that a person
charged with a crime, especially so where his defense is weak, would just simply
make himself scarce and thus frustrate the hearing of his case. A bail is intended as a
guarantee that such an intent would be thwarted. It is, in the language of Cooley, a
'mode short of confinement which would, with reasonable certainty, insure the
attendance of the accused' for the subsequent trial. Nor is there anything
unreasonable in denying this right to one charged with a capital offense when
evidence of guilt is strong. as the likelihood is, rather than await the outcome of the
proceeding against him with a death sentence, an ever-present threat, temptation to
flee the jurisdiction would be too great to be resisted." (Underscoring supplied).
The aforequoted rationale applies with equal force to an appellant who, though
convicted of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, was nevertheless originally charged with a capital offense. Such
appellant can hardly be unmindful of the fact that, in the ordinary course of things,
there is a substantial likelihood of his conviction (and the corresponding penalty)
being affirmed on appeal, or worse, the not insignificant possibility and infinitely more
unpleasant prospect of instead being found guilty of the capital offense originally
charged. In such an instance, the appellant cannot but be sorely tempted to flee.
Appeal in a Criminal Case Opens the Whole Case for Review, including Penalty
In Quemuel vs. CA, et al., this Court held that the appeal in a criminal case opens the
whole case for review and this includes the penalty, which may be increased. Thus,
on appeal, as the entire case is submitted for review, even factual questions may
once more be weighed and evaluated. That being the situation, the possibility of
conviction upon the original charge is ever present. Likewise, if the prosecution had
previously demonstrated that evidence of the accused's guilt is strong, as it had done
so in this case, such determination subsists even on appeal, despite conviction for a
lesser offense, since such determination is for the purpose of resolving whether to
grant or deny bail and does not have any bearing on whether petitioner will ultimately
be acquitted or convicted of the charge.
Bail is a Matter of Discretion on Appeal
We have previously held that, while the accused, after conviction, may upon
application be bailed at the discretion of the court, that discretion — particularly with
respect to extending the bail — should be exercised not with laxity, but with caution
and only for strong reasons, with the end in view of upholding the majesty of the law
and the administration of justice.
Bail
BASCO VS RAPATALO

FACTS:
One of the accused in a murder complaint filed a petition for bail. A hearing was set
and reset several times but did not materialize. It was later discovered that bail had
already been granted and a release order was issued.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not applications for bail must be heard.

RULING:
YES. When bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the
discretion of the court, should first be conducted to determine the existence of strong
evidence, or lack of it, against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent
assessment of the evidence presented by the parties. Since the determination of
whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong is a matter of
judicial discretion, the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where
the prosecution chooses to just file a comment or leave the application for bail to the
discretion of the court.