THE ROMANIAN RAILWAY DEBATE:

A THEME IN POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

by David Turnock

ft;.
THOUGH railways in Britain have undoubtedly been important for military
purposes to aid mobilization and provide access to naval bases, it could be
argued that the system was conditioned essentially by the economic and social
environment. But on the Continent where there were land frontiers to be defended and
large distances involved in troop movements the strategic factor assumed greater
importance. I Despite the increasing role of air transport for movement of military
personnel and equipment the railways retain a fundamental strategic function which
is appreciated by the Warsaw Pact member states in Eastern Europe. Moreover the
recent expansion of road transport in this area has not dislodged the railways from
first place in the movement of both goods and passengers (related to distance). So
decision-making with regard to new construction, or modernization of existing
capacity, is clearly of major political significance.>
In much of south-eastern Europe railway building did not get under way until the
last quarter ofthe nineteenth century when individual nations were evolving relatively
sophisticated policies of state intervention in the economy and comprehensive trans-
port systems were needed.s These involved basic railway networks, connecting the
main towns and providing international links where appropriatc. The issues then were
fairly clear, as indeed they are today with the emphasis on the development of the
principal international routes, underlined by the continuing programme of track
doubling and/or electrification and the introduction ofcontainer services.rBut during
the inter-war period there was considerable uncertainty. The possibilities for road
and air transport were being appreciated, yet there was no consensusover the way these
competitors should complement the railway services and conflicting claims for
limited investment funds were difficult to resolve. These difficultieswere compounded
by the substantial territorial gains made by some Eastern European countries after the
First World War; the infrastructure had to be modified with new lines of communi-
cation across former frontier zones.! All political frontier changes have a noticeable
effect on the development of the railway pattern but while Professor Beaver has
observed that 'one line already built may have been rendered almost useless by the
interposition ofa frontier across its track',6 it is also true that the removal ofa frontier
has important implications in demands for new construction. Furthermore, important
territorial annexations could reveal sharp regional contrasts in the general level of
socio-economic development, expressed in transport terms by significant variations
in the density of the railway system. This might lead to pressures for new secondary
1°5
106 THE JOURNAL OF TRANSPORT HISTORY

routes in relatively backward areas, as well as a restructuring on the main line

system.
These issues are well exemplified in Romania and the aim of this paper is to assess
the progress made in the I920S and I930S in the light ofcontemporary problems. With
limited economic means, governments were faced with the challenge of integrating
their railway systems, a task that called for the building of totally new lines, not to
mention the need for standardization ofgauge and equipment. At the same time there
were very sharp regional contrasts in the level ofdevelopment giving rise to pressures
for new secondary routes in backward areas (Bessarabia and OItenia) in addition to
further Carpathian lines to improve connections with Transylvania.
In the old kingdom (consisting of the former principalities of Moldavia and
Wallachia) basic axial railways were contemplated in the I840s, but the first con-
struction was delayed until 1869when Bucharest was connected with the Danube port
of Giurgiu.? But by the 1877/8 war, the outcome of which was the achievement of
Romanian independence and the acquisition ofthe Turkish province ofDobrogea, the
major routes had been completed and the state had some I,400km of railway (fig. I).
Most of this work had necessarily been done by foreign concessionaires, sometimes
with financial arrangements that were most unfavourable to the Rornanians.f But
after independence practically all work was carried out by Romanian engineers and
under their efforts the system grew to 3,60okm in 1914, with momentum maintained
right up to the First World War. 9 Strategic considerations were important and the
country's modest resources in relation to the great length of the frontiers meant that
difficult choices had to be made. Priority was given to the eastern frontier, marked by
the river Prut, and here a line was built parallel to the river but sufficiently far back to
lie out of artillery range from the Russian side. In Oltenia by contrast the railway
system was relatively poor and defence of the region rested on a few key installations
such as the railway bridge over the Olt at Slatina,"? However, there was a unified
organization: some local lines continued to be privately owned, but a state railway
company (Caile Ferate Romane) was formed in 1880and controlled most ofthe system
within a decade.
Although forced to yield both territory and economic concessions to the Central
Powers, following the Russian decision to make peace at Brest-Litovsk, events on the
Western Front subsequently enabled the Romanian kingdom to re-enter the war and
win major territorial gains at the Paris Peace conference. The old kingdom was virtually
doubled in size with the acquisition of Transylvania, Banat and Maramures from
Hungary, Bucovina from Austria and Bessarabia from Russia. The addition of this
territory brought many new lines within the kingdom, but the system was not a unified
one becausethe newly-acquired lines had been built to serve the Habsburg and Russian
Empires. Indeed the first lines to be built in what is now Romanian territory originally
lay outside the country: the portage line connecting the lower Danube at Cernavoda
with the Black Sea at Constanta (1860),II and the eastern expansion of railway lines
from Budapest to Alba Iulia, Oradea and Timisoara, notably the connection from
 H-H+ 1855- f870
1870-f885
SO",.,
-- f885-19CJO
19CJO 1915
BcxnIaries until 1911
_._.-- ~~ryOf;,

Debrecen~ ,(;

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Developments proposed in 1913
(Romania only)
..... Projects to be studied
~Vid/in~
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Projects to be l.ca~fat._
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Fig. 1: Development of the railway system ill Romania until the First World War
108 THE JOURNAL OF TRANSPORT HISTORY

Timisoara (Temesvar) to the Danube at Bazias, a convenient port for transhipment to

river boats for the journey on to the Black Sea to supply Russia at the time of the
Crimean War. 12 The Transylvanian system developed through the late nineteenth
century and the prevailing orientation was westwards to the Pannonian Plain (and
Budapest especially), although several international connections were forged across
the Carpathian frontier following historic routes through some ofthe principal passes.13
A direct link led from Moldavia into Bucovina: indeed the first axial line through
Moldavia had developed as an extension of the Austrian line through Galicia to
Cernauti (Cernowitz). But links with Bessarabia were unsatisfactory, especially for
Bucharest-Chisinau (Kishinev) traffic, due to the priority given to links with Odessa
in the formative period and the strategic interest in a Balkan thrust which led to the
building of a railway to Galati in 1878.14
The situation at the end of the war was further confused by current projects.
Following the acquisition of Southern Dobrogea in the Balkan War of 19 I 3 a railway
development plan was drawn up to expedite the integration of this new territory and
also to improve links between Bucharest and the provinces.O notably by means of a
direct line between Bucharest and Craiova. However, little work could be done before
Romania's entry into the First World War in 1916 and during this struggle military
needs dictated a different order ofpriorities. The Germans built a line from Rm. Sarat
towards Braila while the Russians forged a link between Husi and Bucova]. Austria-
Hungary also sought a connection, between Ilva Mid: and Vatra Dornei, although
only limited progress was achieved by the end of the war. 16 This latter case is rather
important, however, for whereas the German and Russian projects were dismantled
in peace time, the Transylvanian project remained an important objective and was
finally achieved in 1938. It is possible that interest in this project first stemmed from
the Central Powers' occupation of the Ukraine and the need for an additional rail
connection avoiding Romanian territory. Certainly German engineers are reported
as having been active in the area in 1918. Such a line would presumably have replaced
the light railway that had been built in 1915 between Prundul Birgaului and Vatra
Dornei to allow the evacuation of10comotivesand rolling stock cut offby the Brussilow
offensive. 17
The outcome ofthe hostilities demanded a major reappraisal ofpolicy. The transport
problem confronting the new Romanian government can be outlined in terms of
accessibility for rail travel by taking the principal towns and comparing their straight
line distances from the capital, Bucharest, with the actual distance by rail. All county
(judej) centres were considered along with other towns with a population in 1930 of
more than 15,000. The results are shown in figure 2. A small number oftowns (Cahul,
Chilia Noua, Hotin, Ismail, Orhei, Silistra and Soroca) had no rail access at all. But the
distance by boat or road to the nearest railhead was short (except for Chilia Noua and
Ismail in the Danube Delta) and they have all been included in the accessibility calcu-
lations as though the railway went the whole way. He-wever, important variations
remains. Whereas some towns have a direct rail link with the capital, with rail distance
 Rail distance to Bucharest Km
where the straight-line
distance equ,als 1 a

lOa
1·10

130

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Fig. 2: Railwayaccess between Bucharest andthe major provincial towns during the Inter-War period
IIO THE JOURNAL OF TRANSPORT HISTORY

less than 1'1 times the straight-line distance (Constanta, Giurgiu, Pitesti, Ploiesti and
Tirgoviste), some other towns record values approaching 2'0 (Resita 1'78, Bazargic
1'79, Oravita 1'80, Bistrita 1'80, Rm, Vllcea 1'83, Turnu Magurele 1,88 and Sighet
1'96), Occasionally the rail distance is more than twice the straight line distance:
Petrosani 2' 18, Chilia N oua 2' 22, Ismail z- 55 and Alexandria 2' 62, Although the towns
with very direct rail accessare all quite close to Bucharest, the reverse is by no means
the rule for the other extreme: thus Alexandria with the highest index is less than
rookm from the capital as the crow flies, and the towns of'Rm, Vilcea and T, Magurele
were also within the old kingdom, On a provincial basis, however, it is clear that the
new territories were all in a relatively poor position except for Bucovina, served by
an extension ofthe principal railway through Moldavia (table I), Some ofthe country's

TABLE I
Rail links between Bucharest and the principal towns in the provinces o/Romania, 1930

Average rail distance to

Population (ooos) Bucharest in relation to
straight-line distance
Region Total Urban Survey' (=1'00)

Banat 94°'0 167'S 144'7 I'S9

Bessarabia 2864'4 371'0 3 1O'S I'S7
Bucovina 8S3'O 228'1 16S'o 1'29
Cri~ana/Maramure~ 1390'4 276'3 272'0 1,60
Dobrogea 815'5 196'S 127'0 1'46
Moldavia 2433'6 592'1 463'9 1'2S
Muntenia- 3390'0 462'7 367'4 1'37
Oltenia IS I3'2 198'2 ISI'I 1'4 8
Transylvania 3218'0 SI9'7 449'6 I'S3
Romania- 17427'4 3°12'0 24SI'2 1'44

I. County towns and other towns with a population exceeding IS,Ooo.

2, Excluding Bucharest,
Source: Statistical yearbooks,

largest cities were situated close to the frontiers and where the rail access was poor
(Chisinau 1'55, Cluj 1'53, Oradea 1'46, Arad 1'41 and Timisoara 1'38) there were
particularly strong economic and strategic arguments to improve the alignment,
The many difficulties facing the new government have been discussedelsewhere, IS
The Liberal party's policy of economic nationalism left little finance for new railway
projects in view of the difficulties over negotiation of foreign loans and the heavy
capital demands of industrialization and electrification schemes, There was some
activity in 1921 and 1922, but apart from the completion of the Buhaesti-Roman
line (started before the war) and construction ofa short link south of Salonta, to allow
direct running between Arad and Oradea within Romanian territory, this effort was
 THE ROMANIAN RAILWAY DEBATE III

directed to renewal of track installations damaged by war, and standardization of the

gauge for the railways in Bessarabia, formerly part ofthe Russian broad-gauge system.
Some other new construction was achieved during the late 1920S, mainly in Dobrogea
(Tulcca and Techirghiol branches) at a time when the new (National Peasant) govern-
ment was successfully negotiating foreign loans. But the overriding impression is one
of persistent 'slippage' on major projects which might well have been completed
relatively quickly had there not been territorial changes.
Thc Bucharest-Craiova line (first studied in the 1890s) was planned for completion
in 1916. Work started on the most important installation, the Olt river bridge at
Stoenesti, before the First World War but the whole line was not opened until
1950. Even in the context of a modest achievement overall it is anomalous that this
line did not have higher priority. Not only would it have benefited many towns in
Muntenia and Oltenia but it would also have improved access to the Banat (via
Orsova) and Transylvania (via the Jiu valley). But economic and strategic considera-
tions evidently brought emphasis to bear upon proposals for routes to Brasov: hence
the Buzau valley project (only partially completed) and the eventual doubling of the
Prahova valley route. Again there was delay with the Habsburg project to connect
Ilva Mica with Vatra Dornei and provide a standard gauge crossing of the Eastern
Carpathians. Despite its obvious merits in the context of Greater Romania (work was
resumed 1924-7) the line was only completed in 1938 under the menacing political
climate of that period. Evidently under the conditions prcvailing in Greater Romania
only the most pressing projects were implemented and, significantly, all lines built
since the First World War are crucial elements in the prcsent pattern of operations.
Yet there was no shortage of ideas for new construction from the railway lobby.
The proposals ofR. Baiulescu, N. I. Petculescu and AI. Coltescu show a tremendous
number of possibilities (fig. 3). They included proposals to improve links between
Bucharest and the provinces. The most notable casesare the routes from the capital to:
Craiova, Petrosani, Deva and Oradea; Pitesti, Curtea de Arge~ and Sibiu; Brasov,
Sighisoara, Tlrgu Mures, Cluj, Dej and Sighet; Faurci, Iasi and SorocafHotin; Galati
and Cetatea AlbajOrhei; and Oltenita and Balcic. In addition there were suggestions
for improved access to the ports in anticipation ofheavier international traffic. Galati
and Braila were to have better connections with Transylvania and proposed con-
struction south of Brasov would provide a direct link with Giurgiu.w International
links were to be improved by a Danube bridge near Turnu Severin (for Yugoslavia)
and an east-west line connecting Oradea, Cluj and Iasi, it was thought, could be part
of a new international route much discussed in the mid-1920S to connect Italy with
the Black Sea.2 0 Finally new lines would be needed to help in defence of the new
frontiers: especially interesting were proposals made for Banat, Dobrogea and
Maramures where new construction would eliminate the need for trains to reach out-
lying parts of Romanian territory by transit through a neighbouring country
(Czechoslovakia in the case of Sighet, Hungary for Nadlac and Yugoslavia for
Bazia~).21
II2 THE JOURNAL OF TRANSPORT HISTORY

Lists of possibilities required some organization into priorities and this was the
purpose of the C.F.R. plan of 1930. 22 Five categories were proposed, the top priority
being accorded to lines entering the new territories in the vicinity ofBumbesti, Sulita
and Gura Humorului. Similar importance attached to other lines needed to improve
long distance routes from Bucharest: Ilva Mica; Curtea de Arges; Caransebes (for

o. Kill 120
,

....- Coltescu 1927

Fig.3: Proposalsfor newconstruction on theRomanian Railways 1919-30

Resita ironworks); Salva, an alternative route to Sighet, and the direct line to Craiova.
Short listshad previously been provided by the Liberal party politician Vintila: Bratianu
(1924) and M. Leverre, a foreign technical adviser to the National Peasant government
(1929).23 Both their programmes featured the'short cut' to Chisinau and the remaining
section of the Tulcea branch (both completed by 1934). They recommended the
Bumbesti and Ilva Mica lines, later given priority by the C.F.R., but they also expressed
interest in the Brasov-Buzau connection. This was partially completed (Bra~ov to
Intorsura Buzaului) by 1934 but the remaining section on to Nehoiu was given only
secondary priority by the C.F.R. because of the proximity of the Prahova Valley line
which they very much wanted to electrify following the study by the Comisia de
Electrificare (1932-4).24
 THE ROMANIAN RAILWAY DEBATE II3

Following the C.F.R. plan came a slightly amended strategy by F. Codrescu in

1934. 25 Then came the last major formulation of railway projects before the Second
World War, put forward in 1941 (although it isclear from the text that it was conceived
with the frontiers of Greater Romania in mind and must therefore have been written
before they collapsed in 1940).26 The author, M. Tudoran, was a Romanian engineer
much interested in the evolution of the railway system, with all its peculiarities, and
anxious that sensible priorities should be established for the building of new lines.s?
Figure 4 shows his recommendations against a background ofthe modest achievements
of the inter-war period to date. King Carol was enthusiastic about railways, and was

~
....
---~,"
~_.........

'-~---.... "'//'" '- . . ,-,~ 'j!):. '-'C~~~

-- -, ~ c==~
Railway built by 1914 Tudoran proposals Projects completed ==--
Double track New line 1 Pecica-Nadlac
Single track Doubling of existing line 2 Salva-Viseu
Railway built 1914 - 1940 ~ Electrification of existing 3 Deda- Saralel
Frontier crossing point line 4 Suceava-Gura
Line closed at frontier ...... Post-war developments Humorului
5 Faurei- Tecuci
9 Motru/Rovinari Branches 6 Navodari Branches
o
,
Km 120
,
10 Bumbesti- Livezeni 7 Snagov Branch
8 Bucharest - Craiova

Fig. 4: Tudoran proposalsfor newrail construction in 1941. Alsowork carried out 1914-40 and 194J-78
II4 THE JOURNAL OF TRANSPORT HISTORY

in a strong political position, having evolved his own style of'monarcho-fascist' rule,
but although the late 1930S was a period ofgrowing insecurity, investment could only
be justified for the railways promising the greatest strategic or economic importance.
The Resita ironworks was connected with Caransebes and flow ofgoods to Bucharest
thereby expedited, while the line from Ilva Mica to Vatra Dornei was likewise com-
pleted in 1938.
A related line was started from Salva to Viseu in Maramures, This was to avoid the
strategically/unacceptable arrangement whereby Maramures was reached either from
Satu Mare with a transit through Czechoslovak territory or from Cernauti with
transit through southern Poland. This anomaly arose through the four-way partition
of the Hungarian Tisa Valley railway after the First World War into Hungarian,
Czechoslovak, Romanian and Polish sections. The new railway from Salva could have
been used to take Russian troops into Czechoslovakia (assuming Romanian support for
a Franco-Russian operation to thwart German ambitions) but construction was over-
taken by the division ofTransylvania in 1940. After this Vienna diktat and Romania's
loss of northern and eastern parts of Transylvania, the Hungarians built a new line
between Deda and Sarafel, enabling them to reach Gheorgheni, Miercurea Ciuc and
S( Gheorghe via the Somes valley, without crossing the revised frontiers. It was only
after the war, with Romanian administration restored to North Transylvania, that
work was completed between Salva and Viseu and Sighet could be reached by rail from
other parts of Romania without crossing international frontiers. 28 The Jiu valley
connection (Bumbesti-Livezeni) and the long-standing project for a direct line
between Craiova, Bucharest and Tecuci were also finished at this time as were short
branches built in anticipation of the completion of the Danube-Black Sea Canal near
Constanta.
Since these works were completed there has been no further railway building in
Romania apart from short branches to tap new mineral sources, notably the Motru
lignite field: Rovinari in 1956, Plostina in 1966 and Turceni (power station) in 1976.29
The 'spread' phase in the evolution ofthe rail system may now be seen to be complete
as development moves into the co-ordination phase with some evidence of 'concen-
tration' and 'liquidation'. 30 With the emphasis on double-tracking and electrification
of the most important main lines there is little scope for development of new routes.
Some journeys could be much more direct but experience in the 1930S in the Buzan
Valley and the areas of Deva and Curtea de Arges points to the great difficulties of
coping with the mass movement on the steep slopes of the hill country. Some new
lines have apparently been considered, such as Sulina-Tulcea, and there are those who
argue that rising petrol prices will restore so much advantage to the railway as to
justify resumption of the Buzau Valley line and perhaps the undertaking of the
Onesti-Bretcu line, to improve connections with Brasov from the Lower Danube
and Northern Moldavia respectively. There might also be a casefor improving railway
access to Botosani from Iasi, by means of a link from Hirlau (proposed in the
1920S) or from Todireni.I! Immediate plans, announced in 1979, will complete
 THE ROMANIAN RAIL WAY DEBATE 115
Nodes f o r m e d ; { r .,.;.._' International ••••••
• Before 1918 . "::'x :..." transit routes
(closed)
() 1918 1976
a Projected
Lrnks completed
- Before 1900
- - 1900 1918

Br Br,,~ov C Crarova
Bu Bucharest T Timi~oara -<---
---'-~---

Pig. 5: Graph analysis of theRomanian railway system

construction between Curtea de Arges and Rm. Vi1cea and between Brad and Deva.
It is evident therefore that the ambitions of the I920S and I930S have only been
partially realized and the network remains most imperfectly connected. Graph
analysis is a simple technique for the comparison of networks through time and the
simplified view ofthe Romanian railway system presented in figure 5 shows the growth
in the number ofnodes and links and provides the base for calculations intable 2. The
Beta and Alpha indexes give indications of connectivity and both measures show
progress during the twentieth century with a steady increase in the average number of
links serving each node, despite an increase in the total number ofnodes and terminals
at the same time. However, the additional links proposed but never provided en-
visaged a far greater improvement in connectivity than that achieved between 1900 and
1976 with a Beta index of 1'45 instead of 1'18 (1'10 in 1900) and an Alpha index of 0'23
instead of 0'09 (0'05 in 1900). The Eta index is a measure of scale and shows how the
average length ofeach link in the system has been reduced slightly as the network has
become more complex.
How can this failure to complete the Romanian railway system be accounted for?
State planning has been involved from the beginning, first with questions of route
selection for the initial 'minimum distance network', and later in the filling out ofthe
116 THE JOURNAL OF TRANSPORT HISTORY

system. Economic and political/strategic claims have had to be reconciled and this has
been difficult. It could be argued that without a comprehensive national plan (not
possible until after nationalization in 1948), these questions could only be resolved on
an ad hoc basis. Yet it is anomalous that railway building pushed steadily ahead until
the First World War and then faltered. It seems arguable that the great increase in the
size of the country tended to paralyse the Bucharest bureaucracy by increasing the
range and scale of problems to be faced. Compelling outstanding schemes for lines in
the old kingdom had to be balanced against the claims of the new provinces where

TABLE 2
Graph analysis ~r the railway netwotk"

Total Indexes
Nodes and Length
Year Terminalss Links (oookm) Beta! Alpha4 EtaS

X900 XII X22 6'9 X·IO 0'05 56.6

x9x8 x7° x93 9'6 X'14 0'°7 49·7
x938 x77 203 ro-o X'XS 0'07 49'2
X976 x86 220 II'X x·x8 0'09 50·4
Maximum x9x 277 X3'2 x'4S 0'23 47'6

I. Boundarieshave been standardizedasfor the present.Linesbuilt or projectedacrossthe frontier have

been examined as if the frontier station was the terminus (except where transit through a neighbouring
country was necessary to reach another part of Romania).
2. For the purposesofthisexercise thesystemhasbeensimplifiedandjunctions occurring closetogether
are related to a single node.
3. The Beta index shows the average number of links serving each node.
4. The Alpha index isanother measureofconnectivity, comparing the number ofclosedcircuitsin the
network against the maximum possible(valueswill run between zero and 1'00).
s. The Eta index shows the scale of network by measuring the average length of each link (in km),
Further information on indexes is contained in A. M. Hay, Transport fl'r the Space Econotuv (1973) and
E. J. Taafe and H. L. Gauthier, Geography PfTranspottation (Englewood Cliffs, I973).
N.B. Calculationstake account of allrailwayprojectsknown to have been proposedsincethe FirstWorld
War. The additional length involved can only be approximate. A margin of 10 per cent has been added
to straight-line distances.

there were strong political and strategic demands for new construction. The case was
a strong one because some of the country's largest urban and industrial centres lay in
the peripheral parts of the country (Arad, Oradea, Resita and Timisoara in the west,
Baia Mare and Cernauti in the north, Chisinau in the east). The provincial lobby tried
to ensure that extensions on outlying parts of the system would take precedence over
improvements to existing lines nearer to Bucharest, even though the latter would
assist long distance journeys to the provinces.
The financial situation too was difficult. There was frequent allegation ofcorruption
in railway management, especially during the period when the C.F.R. was virtually a
 THE ROMANIAN RAILWAY DEBATE II7

government department and a vested interest of Liberal party politicians.P The

establishment ofan autonomous regime ('regie autonorna'] in 1928 when the National
Peasant party won power, followed by the absorption ofa large number of privately-
owned local lines in 1931, was conducive to greater efficiency and a more rapid pace
of modernization. But the deficits continued, and the disappointing financial returns
certainly had a negative effect on development programmes. In 1932 there was a quite
unequivocal claim that 'all idea of new construction has been abandoned because the
railways cannot be run economically'A' It is perhaps hardly surprising that this view
should have prevailed during the depression, but of the more permanent significance
was the agricultural reform of 1921 which affected development plans through the
disruption of cereal exports which had previously underpinned investment pro-
grammes in capital works. The unsatisfactory condition ofmuch ofthe existing equip-
ment meant that most investment earmarked for the railways, through the foreign
loan of 1929, had to be used to recondition existing track and workshops, although
the National Peasant party, then in power, had called for construction of new routes
when in opposition.w
Competition from other forms oftransport constituted another important influence.
By the late 1920S the growth ofroad traffic was beginning to undermine the confidence
of the railway lobby. The increase in the number of buses to almost 3,000 by 1930 was
reflected in the growth of routes, including many which drew traffic from railway
services.s! Some transport experts called for a planned integration of bus and rail
services, which would justify new rail building 011 a limited basis. But decision-making
in the 1930S suggests that only the most pressing cases were accepted. Instead there was
investment in new roads like the soseaua a/pilla from Novaci in Oltenia to Sebes in
Transylvania (1935)36, as well as the programme to improve existing roads (such as
the 'Carol II' road from Bucharest to Oradea). And there was foreign helP - particularly
from Suede company in Sweden where physical conditions were thought to be quite
similar to those in Romania: the main road from Bucharest to Alexandria still retains
the concrete surface laid in the late 1930S when this first stage ofthe new road to Craiova
was seen as part ofa future national system of Al/tobalmclI. 37 At the locallevcl, too, the
importance of roads is evident in the thinking of the 1930S notably in the Apuseni
Mounrains.ef Further studies were made in this area after the partition ofTransylvania
in 1940 meant that access to Cluj was cut by an international frontier between Romania
and Hungary. Although railways had a role in the plans to restructure the transport
system they were seen as second in importance to new roads. 39
At the same time interest was developing in air services as the most feasible solution
to long-distance travel.e? A Franco-Romanian Air Navigation Company was set up
immediately after the First World War. And by 1939 the state airline Liniile Acriene
Romdne Exploatate de Stat, LARES, operated domestic routes from Bucharest to
Balcic, Cetatea Alba, Chisinau, Arad, Cernauti and Satu Marc. There were also
provincial contacts between Cernauti, Constanta and Arad. The air lobby was quite
strong and realized not only a network ofdomestic and international services but also
II8 THE JOURNAL OF TRANSPORT HISTORY

an aircraft-building industry set up in the Brasov area. Such competition inevitably

affected the case for new construction and gave relatively more weight to the struggle
for viability on existing lines. Apart from the main routes used by international trains.s!
improvements in express passenger services were most notable on routes from the
capital to the nearest provincial cities (Brasov, Constanta and Galati) with rapid services
and pullman cars in use. Elsewhere emphasis was placed on economy measures, through
the introduction ofSentinel-Cammell railcars (,automotoare') in 1932 on the Bacau-
Piatra Neamt and Bucharesr-Oltenita/Pietrosita branches.s- Such equipment was
subsequently produced in Romania and suggestions were made about copying the
German concept of'vagoane automotoare cu acumulatori' for branch-line work, with
batteries supplying power to electric motors.O
A further line of argument relates to divided opinions within the railway business.
Against the plea for new lines to provide alternative routes, to increase capacity for
inter-regional transfers and provide more direct connections between particular pairs
of cities, was the view that existing lines should be developed by doubling track and
by electrification. Electrification was proposed in a lecture by the engineer C. I.
Budeanu in 1933 but subsequent discussion (which was included in the publication)
called for alternative new construction between Curtea de Arge~ and Rimnicu Vilcea
(resulting in shorterjourneys from Bucharest to most ofTransylvania as well as a lower
summit level) or completion of the line from Nehoiu to Intorsura Buzaului.tt The
issue was resolved in favour of the electrification lobby because of the strong case for
a more rational fuel policy (Romania having very limited supplies of high-grade coal
but good prospects for electricity generation by thermal or hydro stations). Allied
with this argument was the appreciation of the value of roads for many secondary
transport fuctions and the great practical difficulties of dealing with unstable terrain
in the Subcarpathians. Landslides are a common phenomenon in the Subcarpathianst!
and this hazard prevented construction going beyond both Curtea de Argc~ and
Nehoiu. It also undermined work on the Brad-Deva route where partially-completed
viaducts stand as monuments to a phase in Romania's railway age that was delayed
by the challenge of unstable terrain until road transport could expand sufficiently to
remove much of the logic behind these schemes. Nevertheless electrification was
delayed. The Prahova Valley route was doubled in 194 I and the C. F.R. was empowered
to elaborate studies for electrification in that year. 46 Work ceased with the war and
electrification was only completed in 1969. In the meantime the case for the Curtea de
Arges-Rimnicu Vilcea line was reopened, with long tunnels through the watersheds
ofthe Subcarpathians to overcome the physical difficulties.e? But the scheme was again
resisted and road transport services have continued to develop.sf
This paper tries to examine, as far as the evidence allows, the evolution of the
Romanian railway system against a background of fluctuating political boundaries.
Evidently the changed context for decision-making created problems of adaptation.
The rate of progress was slow and there was pronounced lag in the completion of
certain projects previously given the highest priority. From the viewpoint ofpolitical
 THE ROMANIAN RAILWAY DEBATE II9

geography this case study throws some light on the process of adapting infrastructure
to shifting political boundaries. Priorities only gradually emerged (given the existence
of an acceptable basic railway network) and the high cost of making modifications
occasionally required the negotiation of cumbersome international arrangements,
such as the one governing the former Hungarian railway through the Upper Tisa
valley that fell under Czechoslovak, Polish and Romanian control after the First
World War. Development was retarded by acute shortage of capital and a high
priority being placed upon industries of military significance. Just as the ambitious
projects for hydro-electricity generation which were held back by the availability
of oil and gas, so the railway programme was confronted by a powerful road lobby
inspired by the Autobahnen in Germany. But the widening range of regional interests
resulting from enlarged political frontiers added their complications to the railway
debatc.r? The pleas of the railway interests were wcakcncd by conflicting claims and
gained only slight recognition when the deterioration in international security
demanded state investment to improve the country's defences on the eve ofthe Second
World War. SO
NOTES
I. L. W. Pvc, (ed.}, Communications and Political Development (Princeton, N.J., 1963); E. Ullman,
'The role of transportation and the basesof interaction', in W. L. Thomas (cd.), Mall's Role in Changillg
the Face of theEarth (Chicago, 1956), 862-95; R. 1. Wolfe, 'Transportation and politics: the example of
Canada', Annals, Associatioll of American Geographers, LII (1962),176-<)0.
2. H. Hunter, Soviet Transportation Policy (Cambridge, Mass. 1957). Seealso F. Bauer et al., Gesthiclue
dcr Eiscnbahncn dcr Ostcrrcichischc-Unoarische Monarchic (Vienna, 1898-9, 4 vols); W. Gumpel, Das
Verltchrswesen Ostcuropas (Koln, 1967); A. Rudzhi, O~'Sallisation of Transportation ill Captive Europe
(New York, 1(54); idem, Railroad System ill CaptiveEurope (New York, 1954); R. E. H. Mellor, Eastern
Europe: A Geography of the Comecon Countries 1975), 197-217; L. Symons (cd.), Russian Transport: An
Historical and Gccl,(!raphical SI/rl'ey (1972); D. Turnock, 'Transport in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe', in G. Schopflin (cd.), Soviet Union andEastern Europe: A Halldbook (1970), 349-61.
3. H. M.Jagtianu, The Role ~rthe State ill the Provision ,!f Railll'ays (19 24),45- 89; P. F. Kupka,
Die Eiscnbahncn Ocstcrrclch-Unoatns 1822-1867 (Leipzig, 1888); W. Peters, Crossdcutschlauds Eiscnbahnen
(Berlin, 1(41); N. Spulber, The State alldEconomic Development ill Bastetn Europe (New York, 19(6).
4. D. Turnock, 'Modernisation of Romania's railways', Modern Railways, xxxv (1978), 416-19.
5. L. Pasvolsky, Economic Nationalism of the Danubian States, (19 28); 1. T. Berend and G. Ranki,
Economic Development ill East Central Europe (New York, 1(74); T. Hertz, Economic Problellls of the
Danubian States (1947).
6. S. H. Beaver, 'Railways in the Balkan peninsula', GeographicalJol/mal, XCVII (1961), 274. Main-line
projects in the area have attracted considerable attention: A. J. May, 'Trans-Balkan railway schemes',
[ournal of Modem History, XXIV (1952), 352-67; P. Richardson, 'New railway projects in the Balkan
peninsula', Scottish Geographical Magazine, XXIV (1908),254; F. B. Singleton andJ. Wilson, 'The Bel-
grade-Bar railway', Geography, LXII (1977), 121-5; S. Wank, 'Achrcnthal and the Sanjak of Novibazar
railway project', S lavonicandEastEuropean Reviell', XLII ( I 9 6 3), 353-69; O. Wilson, 'The Belgrade-Bar
railroad: an essay in economic and political geography', in G. W. Hoffman(ed.), Eastern Europe: Essays
in Geosraphical Problems, (1969), 365.:.g3.
7. A. Cebue and C. Mocanu, Dill istoria transporturilor de ca/atori III Romdnia (Bucharest, 1967). See
also P. M. Kalla-Bishop, Hunoarian Raihvays (1973); E. N. Sava, Istoricul Cai/or Ferate Rom&ne 1885-1902
(Bucharest, 1904).
120 THE JOURNAL OF TRANSPORT HISTORY
8. T. Savin, 'Caracterul concesiunilor pentru constructii feroviare In Romania burghezo-rnosiercasca',
Probleme cconomice, x (I) (19S7), 83-100.
9. Several new lines were under construction in 1915 and a direct connection between Bucharest and
Craiva was projected; S. Petrescu, Amtlicher Fiihrer dcr Rumanischcn Eiscnbahnan undSeestrasscn (Munchen,
19 I5).
10. G. M. Iannescu, CrlTS degeografia militarii (Bucharest, 1889); L. W. Lyde and A. F. Mockler-
Ferryman, A Military Geography of the Balkan Peninsula, (I90S), 70.
II. J. H. Jensen and G. Rosegger, 'British railway builders along the Lower Danube 18S6-1869',
Slavonic andEastEuropean Review, XLVI (1968), IOS-28.
12.. The line was not primarily a military railway and the development of Bazias was mainly con-
ditioned by the coal-mining and iron-production in the Banat Mountains (tapped by the branch railway
to Oravita and Anina). The railway to Bazias is now cut by Yugoslav territory and the frontier sections
(including the Bazias terminus) are now closed. I am obliged to Mr I. M. Laszlo in Canberra for infor-
mation on this point.
13. The role of the principal passes is discussed by I. Sandru, 'Rolul pasurilor ~i trecatorilor carpaticc
in mobilitatea populapei', Analele sfiinfifice ale Univ. A. 1. Cuza din Iasi; Seq. llc, xx (1974),83-92.
Romania's significance in the context of the Orient Express and related services is discussed by M.
4
Barsley, OrientExpress (1966); G. Behrend, GrandEuropean Expresses: The Story Wagon Lits (1962).
14. E. A. Pratt, Rise of Rail Power in War and Conquest 1833-1914 (19IS), 217.
IS. M. Tudoran, Orientarea sistematizarea fi complectarea rctelei C.F.R. (Bucharest, 1934), 2S-6. The
plan is also discussed in G. C. Logio, Rumania: Its History, Politics andEconomics (1932),190.
16. A. Schneider, Gebirgsbahnen Europas (Zurich, 1963), 369; also available as Railways Through the
Mountains o.fEurope (1963),323.
17. H. Prolich, 'Die K.u.K. Kraftwagenbalm Nr. I Felso Borgo-Dorna Voelgy', Der Eiscnbahn,
XII(1964),249-52.
18. D. Turnock, 'The industrialisation of Romania from the unification of principalities to the
Second World War', in F. W. Carter (cd.), An Historical Geography o.fthe Balkans (1977), 319-78. See
also c. Cioriccanu, La Rouma;nie economiqlle (Paris, 1928); G. Antipa, L' occupation ennemie dela Roumanic
(Paris, 1929).
19. Discussion by S. Mehedinji, Le pays et lepeuple roumain (Bucharest, 1928), 104; idem. 'La situation
geographiquc de la Rournanie au point de vue comercial', L' economiste roumaine, III (1927), 33.
20. D. Arnaoutovitch, Histoire des chemins defer yougoslaves 1825-1937 (Paris, 1937).
21. The special arrangements for working certain frontier lines are discussed by F. Wiener, 'Rumania',
Bulletin o.fthe International Railway Convetltiotl 18, XVlll (1936),309-10. All the anomalies have now been
dealt with, by new construction in the case of Maramures (Salva-Vi~eu), by minor realignments in the
case of Banat [Nadlac and Nerau) and by closure in the case of Bazias,
22. Tudoran, op. cit., 114-24.
23· Ibid., 33-4; 39-40.
24. C. D. Busila, Electrijicarca drumurilor de fer [Bucharest.roj s}: D. Leonida. 'Electrificarea cailor
ferate', lnstitutulRomtSn deEnergie, CCXLl (1941). Further proposals are outlined by G. Emandi, 'Trans-
porturile feroviare', in N. Lupu-Kostaky etal.(eds). Aspecte ale economic! romanefti(Bucharest, 1939),76-7.
25. F. Codrescu, Comunicatiilejeroviare In Romdnia (Bucharest. 1934).
26. M. Tudoran, 'Constructiilc de Iinii noi ferate in legatura cu programul de investitii C.F.R.',
Bulctinul Societalii Politcchnice din Romdnia, XL (1941),767-93. Some urban developments for Bucharest
were put forward by C. J. Sfinrescu, Apararea urbanistica (Bucharest, 1939), 18-19.
27. M. Tudoran, 'Curiozitati technice din trecutul C.F.R.', Buletinul Societalii Politcchnicc dinRomJnia,
XL (1941), 661-88.
28. R. L. Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time (Cambridge, Mass., 19S6). There is still a complication for
the Soviet Union, who annexed the former Czechoslovak and Polish sections ofthis Carpathian territory.
Her freight trains through the upper Tisza valley negotiate a 37km transit through Romanian territory
 THE ROMANIAN RAILWAY DEBATE 121

(Valea Viseului-Sighet-Cimpulung pe Tisa) and broad-gauge track is provided for this purpose by the
C.F.R. See also I. G. Petrescu, Reteaua eailorJaate romdnc (Bucharest, 19(5); A. Hcrbsr-Rsdoi, 'Aspcctc
actuale ale geografiei transporturilor din para noastra', Terra, IV(II) (1972), 29-40.
29. Despite the modest increase in the railway in the post-war period (II ,039km in 1975 compared
with IO,967 in 1955 and 9,990 in 1938) misleading statements on the limited scope of the inherited
railway system tend to be copied from communist sources: T. Gilberg, Modernieatian in Romania since
World War II (New York, 1975), 19I.
30. A. Ekstrom and M. Williamson, 'Transportation and urbanization', in A. G. Wilson (ed.), Urban
andRegiona! Plamling (1971),37.
31. I. Blaga, Repartizarea taitoriala afor/e1or de produqic itlRomallia (Bucharest, 1974), 91-I08.
32. Logio, 1932, op. cit., 191-7.
33. lbid., 19I.
34. Ibid., 198. TheRailwayGazette gives ample evidence ofthe problems ofinadequate capacity, with
the additional difficulties arising from a poor coal supply and of standardization: vol. 35 (1921), 353;
vol. 44 (1926), 480; vol. 46 (1927),700.
35. F. Codrescu, Automobilismu! {i posibilitdtile sale dedesvoltare ill Romallia (Bucharest, 1933).
36. I. Velcea and V. Cucu, 'Geografiaeconomicli a raionului Novaci', Problcme degeografie, CXI (1956),
272. .
37. F. Codrescu, Drumurile ill Romania (Bucharest, 1938); M. Manoilescu, Ideea de plan economic
national (Bucharest, 1938); idem, ldei nouipentru 0 retea de druniuti noui (Bucharest, 1941).
38. I. L. Ciomac and V. Popa-Neqa, Cercetdri aSl/pra sfarilor economic dill M/i. Apuseni (Bucharest,
1936),254.
39. T. Nicoara, 'Probleme Motilor', in Revista Ndurilor, LV (1943),136-40.
40. M. Manoilescu, Politica de stata aviatiei (Bucharest, 1929).
41. The main international routes were (a) to Craiova and Timisoara (for Paris via Simplon Tunnel):
(b) to Sighisoara and Arad (for Paris via Budapest and Vienna): (c) to Sighisoara and Oradea (for Prague
via Kosicc): (d) to Ccrnauti (for Berlin and Warsaw), and (e) to Iasi and Chisiniiu (for Moscow).
42. I. Miculescu, D~ficite1e C.F.R. (Bucharest, 1932).
43. C. I. Budeanu, Aspecte actuale all' problemiei traqiunii eletttice in le<~atllra cu adoptarea e1ectrifiearii ill
Romania (Bucharest, 1931).
44. C. I. Budeanu, Traqiunea electrieapeliniile C.F.R in(adTIII prob/ell/elor economic! nafiotla/e(Bucharest,
1933).
45. V. Tufescu, 'Mudflows in the flysch Carpathians and bend Subcarpathians of Romania', in
ZeitsehrifiJUr Geomorphologie, IX (1970),146.
46. C. D. Busila, Traqiunea elearici pe caileferate (Bucharest, 194 1).
47. M. Peaha, 'Contributii 1a studiul posibilitatilor de construire a cliii ferate Curtea de ArgeH{imnicll
Vilcea', in Comunieari de Geografie, CXI (1965),287-300.
48. A. Caranfil, 'Development of road passenger transport in Romania', RevueRoumaine de Geologie
Geophysique et Geographie: Serie de Geographie, XII(1968),187-91.
49. D. Easton, AJrameworkfor political atlalysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1965), 130-2.
50. I am grateful for advice from Mr. A.J. Budd and Mr. G. Ottley including their comments on a
previous draft of this paper.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
L. J. ANDREW VILLALON is a lecturer in the
Department of History at the University of
Cincinnati.
JAMES M. LAUX is Professor of History at the
University of Cincinnati.
MICHAEL ROBBINS is the Managing Director of
London Transport's Railway Division.
JON PRESS has been commissioned to write the
history of the footwear industry in Eire by C. &
J. Clark.
DAVID TURNOCK is a Reader in the Department
of Geography at the University of Leicester.