Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
MARK W. DIRSMITH
The Pennsylvania State Universip
UniversiQV Park, PA 16802
and
MARK A. COVALESKI
The University of Wisconsin at Madison
Madison, WI
Abstract
Control is important within public accounting firms for a variety of reasons. Yet professional pronounce-
ments are limited in providing guidance to auditors in the form of formally stated rules and requirements.
The purpose of this article is to examine the non-formalized, non-rule oriented approaches employed in
large public accounting firms to effect control. More specifically. it is directed towards understanding the
possible roles of informal and nonformal communications and mentoring in managing public accounting
firms.
Based upon evidence gathered using a naturalistic, qualitative research methodology, it is concluded
that: ( 1) informal communications exist in public accounting firms, play a limited role in informing organi-
zational members of the politics and power within the organization, and are of some benefit to lower level
individuals; and (2) nonformal communications and mentoring are involved with the performance of audit
tasks. socialization of the individual firm, and instruction as to politics and power within the organization,
and benefit the protege, mentor and firm, though at some cost. Implications of the study are also explored.
Control is important within public accounting control standard is violated, then the audit is
firms for at least three reasons. First, within the judged to be substandard with regard to con-
U.S., the individual practitioner is required by forming with generally accepted auditing stan-
the American Institute of Certified Public dards. Thus, auditors have a professional obliga-
Accountants’ first field work standard to super- tion to effect good control. And third, as profit
vise assistants (AICPA, 1984, AU 150.02). Sec- making entities, public accounting firms need to
ond, at an organizational level, public account- exert control from a business standpoint.
ing firms are required to have quality control Despite the importance of control, however, the
standards which ensure that firm members com- guidance provided by generally accepted audit-
ply with auditing standards, such as the first field ing standards is itself quite general in nature,
work standard (AICPA, 1984, AU 161.03). being limited to four paragraphs - 291 words
Importantly, if either the supervision or quality (AICPA, 1984, AU 311.09-.12).
W’e wish to thank the individuals who participated in the study for their intensiry and candor. We also wish to thank an
anonymous reviewer for suggestions.
149
150 IMARK W. DIRSMITH and MARK A. COVALESIU
The question arises as to how members of minant mastery of the subject is then passed on
public accounting firms are controlled. Perhaps to future generations of professionals (appren-
naively, it may be presumed that the exercise of tices) in a largely informal, interpersonal mode
control lies in monitoring conformity with for- of communication and control. This mastery of
mal audit programs. However, as suggested by the subject vs formal application of rules, is also
various sociological and organizational theory echoed by Hall, who states
views of control (cf. Larson, 1977; Van de Ven et
As the level of professionalization of the employees
al.,1976; Ridgway, 1983; Ouchi & Maguire,
increased, the level of formalization decreases. The
1975; Ouchi, 1977) it may well be that the inhe- presence of professionals appears to cause a diminished
rent complexity of what auditors do, expressed need for formalized rules and procedures. Since profes-
in terms of task uncertainty, task interdependen- sionals have internalized norms and standards. the impos-
ties among audit team members, and a possible ition of organizational requirements is not only unneces-
sary, it is likely to lead to professional-organizational
lack of determinancy of relevant knowledge
conflict (Hall, 1971, p. 121).
bases, serves to question the sufficiency of a
bureaucratic, rule-oriented, formalized app-
The purpose of this paper is to examine some
roach to effecting control. Perhaps focus must
of the non-formalized, non-bureaucratic. non-
be shifted to less formalized, more interpersonal,
rule oriented approaches employed in public
context dependent approaches.
accounting firms to effect control. More specifi-
Within the accounting literature, this shift in
cally, we will seek to understand the possible
approach to exercising control is most nearly
roles of informal and nonformal communica-
reflected by Boland’s discussion of control
tions and mentoring in coordinating and con-
“over” vs control “with”
trolling members of large public accounting
Control “over” is related to hierarchically structured, firms with reference to evidence gathered using
bureaucratically operated processes in which orders and a qualitative research methodology.
rules flow from the top of an organization down, and per- The paper is organized into six sections. In the
formance reports and exception conditions flow up. first section, the informal communications liter-
Control “with” is related to shared realities that are the
result of social interaction processes. Control “with” is
ature is reviewed and some propositions for
the result of socialization into a clan where values and further examination are derived. Secton two
beliefs that are shared serve as a basis for co-ordinated describes our research methodology. The third
action without orders and adjustment and without section describes the results of the first phase of
exception reports (Boland, 1979. p. 263 ). our empirical work, and discusses the complex-
ity of and limitations in the concept of informal
Concerning the work processes of professions communications. These limitations, in turn, give
in general, Larson (1979, esp. Ch. 4; see also rise to our considering nonformal communica-
Mintzberg, 1979, esp. Ch. 19) takes a similar pos- tions and mentoring as important means by
ition, stating that professions selectively define which control is effected in the fourth section;
those areas or tasks that are amenable or not the relevant literature is reviewed and proposi-
amenable to standardization and formalized tions are also derived in this section. The fifth
communication, with those areas judged not so section presents the second, more major phase
amenable dominating actual practice. Jamous & of our empirical analysis and discusses the
Peloille ( 1970) also hold that professions are results. And finally, the implications of our study
characterized by a high “indeterminationtech- are considered.
nicality” ratio, where technicality involves the
tasks that can be mastered and communicated in
the form of rules, and indetermination involves INFORMAL COMMLTNICATIONS
those tasks not able to be committed to rules
which concern the individual’s talent or the per- Kecognition of informal communications in
sonal charisma of the practitioner. The indeter- organizations is fdr from new. Beginning,
INFORMAL. COMMUNICATIONS. NONFOKMAI. COMMIINI(:ATIONS AN11 MENTOKING 151
perhaps. with the famous Hawthorne experi- because they are perceived as being faster, more
ments at Western Electric. Roethlisbergcr & reliable, more robust and more fine textured,
Dickson (1939) recognized that informal com- though perhaps less tangible and more specula-
munications were an important means of achiev- tive, than are formal communications (c.f.
ing mutual adjustment among members of work Mintzberg, 1973, 1975; Aguilar, 1967; Sutton &
groups. Based largely on this study, the “human Porter, 1968).
relations” school of thought found that the sole Even ths social dimension of informal com-
use of formal, bureaucratic methods of control is munications cannot be disparaged as transmit-
ill-advised in that they tend co demotivate ting merely gossip. Trist & Bamforth ( 195 1 ), for
people and underrepresent the importance of example. found that informal communications
informality within organizations (cf. Likert. were vital to providing emotional support and
196 1; Mintzberg. 1979 ). encouragement to individuals in performing
Retreating, somewhat, from the position of tasks that were physically dangerous. Although
the human relation school, a series of studies some social communications may be dysfunc-
conducted during the 1950’s and 60’s (cf. Trist tional from the viewpoint of management in that
& Bamforth, 195 1; Crozier, 1964; Galbraith, they interfere with work an&or can involve
1973 ) have demonstrated that the more formal. advancing individual needs, Wilensky ( 1967)
bureaucratic and informal, social means to coor- observed that they are also used by upper level
dinating members of tasks groups are perva- people to gather ideological and political infor-
sively intertwined, with informal communica- mation on lower level echelons which enables
tions at once supplementing and circumventing managers to maintain existing power, most mar-
the formal channels (Mintzberg, 1979). kedly in “democratic” organizations where lead-
Defining the formal organization as “that ers must know the minds of tile electorate. In
which is planned and agreed upon,” and infor- this sense, formal leaders must orient to the
mal as “the spontaneous and flexible tie among informal organization to gain loyalty and legiti-
members, guided by feelings and personal macy from subordinates, and have them respond
interests indispensible for the formal, but too to the spirit rather than the absolute letter of
fluid to be entirely contained by it” (p. 2 19). Dal- bureaucratic rules (Blau, 1964).
ton observed that Most of the literature on informal communica-
tions dwells on verbal communications - talk.
For centuries observers and leaders have remarked on
Mintzberg (1973), for example, found that
the distinctions beween expected and unexpected
behavior in organizations. The fact that the distinctions
much of what managers do in managing is talk
continue to be made under various names points to an and listen because of the varieties of signals that
apparently universal condition. From at least the time of such communicatons convey (see also Weick,
Augustus Caesar. these dissimilarities were recognized 1978). Similarly Gronn (1983) demonstrated
and incorporated in the terms de jure (by right) and de
that talking and listening dominated much of
facto (in fact ). which are roughly equivalent to legal or
official andnctualbut unofficiul(Dalton, 1959. p. 219).
management activity, that this talk is administra-
tion. and that it is used to perform the work of
alternately tightening and loosening formal,
It has generally been observed that informal bureaucratic controls. Gronn interpreted talk as
communicatons center on both job-related and creating an inter-subjective, sense-making of
social information. For example, Conrath organization reality, encouraging subordinates
( 1973) found that roughly 60% of informal com- to broadly attend to the values of superiors, and
munications directly concern the performance getting people to actively do things (see also
of organizational tasks. Similarly. managers have Forester, 1980).
been found to favor informal. personal. verbal Similar to Boland ( 1979), Blakar ( 1979)
channels of communications (devoting as much argued that reality is largely socially mediated
as 65-80% of their rime to such activity) through the construction and use of words, as is
152 MARK W. DIRSMITH and .MARK A. COVALESICl
the sense of “community” among the talkers. personal problems; develop work skills; encour-
Blakar attributes this to verbal language being age innovation and cooperation; remain with
open and generative in the sense that new word and be committed to the organization; and
combinations, shadings of words, accents placed articulate the central values of the organization
on words by body movements are influenced by (see also Buchanan, 1977; Van IMaanen, 19’9a;
social contexts and, in turn, intluence social con- Weiner, 1982).
texts (see also March & Simon, 1958; Berger & Implicitly, the preservation of power through
Luckman, 1967; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). maintenance of shared values, language, ritual
Three basic themes surfaced in the above dis- and precedent pervades the foregoing discus-
cussions which relate to the use of informal com- sion of informal communications (in contrast
munications in performing tasks, in socializing with the formal construct of authority). Simpl)
the individual into the organization, and in pre- expressed, the issue involves how organizational
serving power through symbolic interchange. members acquire and maintain power, and how
Concerning tasks, Feldman & March ( 1981) superiors get subordinates to behave as desired
reasoned that informal communications are where formal, bureaucratic rules are insufft-
used not so much to make task-related decisions, cient. In a relatively early discussion, Blau
but to broadly monitor the environment for (1964) reasoned that a key ingredient to the
problems and opportunities in an inductive, acquisition and use of power is that it must be
exploratory manner. Thus, while formal com- legitimated in an informal way, which entails the
munications may involve a focusing of attention subordinate respecting and desiring to gain the
to make decisions, informal communications are approval of a potentially powerful person.
broadening. Pfeffer (1981, see also Mintzberg, 1983)
Daft & Wiginton ( 1979) surmised that the use argued that disagreement over organizational
of broadening, naturalistic language is intended goals and indeterminancies in operational know-
to provide high variety information necessary ledge bases contributes to a breakdown both in
for detecting and considering ill-structured, the applicability of technically rational decision
complex problems (see also Hedberg et al., making and in the sufftciency of formal, bureauc-
1976). Similarly, Thomas & Griffin (1983) con- ratic communications. Rather than the organiza-
cluded that informal communications signific- tion being conceived of as a machine that con-
antly influence the perceived variety of tasks, as sumes resources and achieves something, its
well as perceived autonomy, task significance, reality is socially constructed and its processes
satisfaction and motivation of individuals, and, to must be supported through political activity and
a less significant extent, professionalism and use of informal communications. Such com-
attitude towards feedback. munications are, in turn, devoted to supporting,
Informal communications have also been rationalizing and legitimating decisions that are
linked with socializing individuals into the made as a result of power and politics (see also
organization, which, in turn, involves the inter- Burchell et al., 1980). Paradoxically, formal.
nalization of, and moral commitment to, the val- bureaucratic communicatons cannot directly
ues, norms and objectives of the organization accommodate the discounting of technical
( Inzeriili & Rosen, 1983). Feldman ( 1981, rationality in favor of power and politics inter-
1984) argued that such group norms are largely nally, while keeping up rational appearances
informally expressed rules that groups/organiza- externally (see also IMeyer & Rowan. IV”).
tions adopt to both aid the individual in inter- Within the accounting literature. informal
preting their everyday work experiences and communication has received little attention.
regularize the individual’s behavior in order to: Consistent with the earlier findings of Simon rt
ensure organizational survival; develop, simplie al. ( 195-i), Hopwood ( 19’3. 1974 ) concluded
or make predictable the behavior expected of that informal accounting information exists and
individuals; avoid potentially embarassing inter- is used because formal communications do not
INFORMAL COMMIINICATIONS. NONFORMAL C:OMMlJNICATIONS AND MENTOKING 153
How are these relationships manifested? organizational members had as yet “to earn their
During the course of the interviews, no spurs”.
attempt was made to retain constancy in the Concerning the issue of benefits to the indi-
questions asked beyond those stated above. vidual and the firm, partners and managers
Rather, information gathered in previous inter- thought that while informal communications
views was selectively shared with participants to may tend to ease the “culture shock” of joining
engender further reflection and discussion con- the firm, it did little to benefit the firm itself, that
cerning issues thought to be critical by the par- it was “useless but harmless” other than generat-
ticipants. In addition, as the study progressed, ing some misinformation.
there was a tendency to emphasize the latter, Stti and senior views contrasted markedly.
more complex questions as a consensus Virtually unanimously. they held that informal
emerged concerning the more simple issues. communications did much more than conve)
As the study progressed, researcher interpre- social information and that they all participated
tations were shared with selected participants in in the informal network. They saw such com-
order to elicit their views as to their applicabil- munications as being fairly accurate and
ity. The first phase of the analysis of interview directed at serving two principal functions. First,
data is presented in the following section. they centered on the business of auditing-con-
veying such information as: (a) compensation
information across all ranks within each office.
INFORMAL COMMUNICATION (b) the value of partners’ shares, (c) utilization
OBSERVATIONS (charged time/available time) and billing rates of
individuals at the various ranks, (d) impending
What was to become the initial phase of the turnover, (e) prospective client acquisitions and
study, involved interviews with approximately losses, (f) realization rates (collected fees
30 individuals, primarily at the partner and staff resources expended) for specific clients, (g)
levels. All individuals concurred that informal engagement and budget information for specific
communication networks were much in evi- clients, (h) billings to clients and (i ) office pro-
dence in large public accounting firms. But here fits. This information was reported as being
the similarity in views across ranks ended. accessed within 1-2 yr after joining the firm. and
As determined during the earlier interviews. cut across all levels of the o&e. Importantly.
partners and managers generally viewed infor- while such information \vas sometimes available
mal communications as being a “grapevine”, from formal sources, it ~sas ovenvhelmingl>.
“random rumor generator” or “gossip mill”. that obtained via informal sources both because it
was almost purely social in nature. To the extent was more readily accessed (see Ci’Keill!.. 1981. )
that it did relate to the firm. they reported that it and because it was obtainable earlier in ;t career.
was concerned with transmitting salary informa- Second, it conveyed political information. such
tion, although the substance of such information as: (a) “career making or career busting” engagc-
was viewed as being quite inaccurate. Clearly. ments, (b) reputations. attitudes. aptitudes and
individuals from these ranks did not view infor- career paths of upper level organizational mem-
mal communications as involving audit task- bers, typically expressed in terms of persons
related functions or socialization of staff. They being “t&t trackers” and “vegetators”, and those
did feel that it rouchrd on politics within the having or not having organizational power. and
office, although such information was again ( c) personal conflicts among tirm members.
viewed as being inaccurate. It W;LSfelt that staff Such information was not viewed as being araila-
members and seniors were involved primarily in blc from formal sources. informal communica-
executing the “crati- of auditing”, as opposed to rions were roof viewed as involving audit tasks
being involved with the “business of auditing” nor socializing the individual into the firm’s/
and the politics ot’ practice management; such office’s way of thinking and doing. Paradoxically.
INFORMAL. <:OMhl~lNICATIONS. NONFORMAL <:OMMIINI<:ATIONS AND MI~NTORIN(; 155
it was generally thought that the informal net- vidual fits in with the firm’s values (see also Bar-
work did much to buoy up morale, particularly nard. 1946; Sofer. 1970 ). For people below man-
during the initial stages of a career when indi- agers, compensation tended to be informall?
viduals are groping to find out where and how linked with utilization - the “stars” were seen
they fit into the organization. and to communi- as more committed and more heavily utilized,
cate the importance of demonstrating organiza- and therefore received larger raises. Ironically,
tional commitment to building a career. While such a state was also seen as tending to “burn out
the formal policy for every offtce from which the best”.
people were interviewed was that “eating time” The issues of information sources and benefits
(not charging a client for tasks performed) was were then broached. Despite acceptance and
strictly forbidden, the informal system noted use of the term “informal”. such information was
that it is one way of demonstrating a commit- seen as being a “trickle down” from partners and
ment (universally judged to be important by managers to selected individuals, the “chosen”,
interviewees) to the firm and also the client. who were perceived to be being groomed for
One theme that emerged from interviews promotion. These individuals then selectively
with staff and seniors was “we-they” thinking shared information laterally with peers and ver-
and talking. They perceived that they were tically with subordinates. Both concepts of
expected to execute the technical craft of audit- “trickle down” to “select individuals” were
ing (the “we”) while letting the managers and interpreted to be key.
partners (the “they”) perform the business func- Concerning benefits. as noted above, a major-
tions. Most of those interviewed were keenly ity of interviewees thought that individuals
interested in the business of auditing and benefitted through improved morale and know-
actively engaged in informal communications in ledge of where they fit into the overall organiza-
order to learn more of the “they” world, includ- tion, while a minority held that it was useless but
ing the status of power and politics in the offtce. harmless. Opinions were fairly divided between
Thus. the informal network was seen as being such activity benefitting the firm and being use-
directed at higher ranked individuals and peers less but harmless. Interestingly, a few held that
(competitors). And their effort was apparently the perception of engaging in informal com-
successful, as they viewed their business skills as munications could actually be detrimental if
being fairly well to very well developed despite such an action was deemed by managers and
a reported lack of support of such development partners to be “indiscreet”, “lacking in loyalty”,
by the formal system. or engaging in “office politics” ifit were done in
The most mentioned theme of informal com- a readily visible manner.
munications was compensation. Despite stric- Partners and managers were then interviewed
tures against formally conveying such informa- once more to discuss the similarities and dis-
tion in all offices interviewed (in some cases, the similarities in views between the two sets of
formal system actively sought to suppress shar- ranks. They commonly expressed surprise at the
ing such information), it was contended that vir- degree to which staff and seniors reported using
tually everyone in the office knew everybody informal communications to convey business
else’s raise and bonus within one week after the information. For example, one partner in charge
individual was notified. with an admission that (PIC) of an offrce explained his presentation of
higher level salary information was less accurate. business related information, e.g. offtce and firm
Generally. this informally generated compensa- profits, client acquisitions and losses, at formal
tion information was interpreted by staff and quarterly and annual meetings for the office.
seniors as communicating organizational goals Talking at length on the matter, he eventually
and values: thus. what is usually thought to be an expressed surprise at exactly how much he was
extrinsic reward. was interpreted as having sharing with its lower levels compared to only a
intrinsic meaning. of dramatizing how an indi- few years ago. He attributed this change to both
156 MARK W. DIRSMITH and MARK A. COVALESKI
an increasing demand for such information by “informal communication” was wholly applica-
lower levels and the increasingly competitive ble. Granted it was not done in a formal and
environment of public accounting which neces- bureaucratic mode, it did, however, have some
sitates stressing the business aspects of public measure of organizational sanction. Thus, impor-
accounting across ranks. He also remarked that tantly, such interpersonal relations, were inter-
although business information is not actively preted as lying somewhere between formal (that
communicated by the formal system, it is availa- which is planned and agreed upon, Dalton,
ble. But, as revealed by lower levels, an impor- 1959) and informal (that which involves spon-
tant difference was that the informal system was taneous and flexible ties among members,
anticipatory, client and individual specific, and guided by feelings and personal interests, Dal-
more readily accessible. This finding seems to ton, 1959).
stress the “we-they” observation noted earlier, It was then noted that when asked about infor-
that lower levels view the informal system more mal communications in public accounting,
favorably and the higher levels view the formal partners and managers characterized it as a
system as being sufficient to the firm’s needs. lower organizational level activity. When asked
This same view was echoed by other, espe- of this, partners stated that they do engage in lat-
cially younger partners who indicated that the eral dialogue concerning the business, power
business of auditing had to be recognized by and politics of public accounting, but again the
members of the firm beyond partners, especially term “informal communications” did not seem
managers and to a lesser degree seniors. How- to be a good descriptor; they saw such activity as
ever, they saw this focus as being transmitted in something they should be doing that was not
a “personal mode” rather than by formal, wholly spontaneous, and that involved consider-
bureaucratic means, to select, lower level mem- ably more than “feelings and personal interests”
bers who “had the right stuff ‘. It is in this manner (Dalton, 1959).
that the “trickle-down” to the “chosen” was We consequently concluded that “informal
born. communications” per se is a complex and yet
Although the existence of informal communi- limited construct. By this we mean that it is dis-
cations was again admitted, its accuracy was still cussed in a wide variety of literatures and is seen
questioned. One national office partner as being associated with a number of organiza-
recounted an experience while he was a PIC of a tionally-related functions; and yet we found that
medium-sized office. After announcing the raises its role in performing these functions in public
and bonuses to seniors, one expressed marked accounting firms to be quite limited. It appears
disappointment. When questioned on the basis to be, at least in part, a lateral phenomenon, and
for this, the senior said that each year the seniors that something between formal and informal
wrote their own salary information on a slip of communications appears to be going on verti-
paper and placed it in a hat. This information was cally and at higher levels. We surmised that
then used to construct a distribution of salaries “nonformality” might be the answer. In addition,
while preserving individual anonymity. The PIC eventually the term “mentoring” was applied by
asked what this distribution looked like, was one partner to the “trickle-down” to the “cho-
told, and commented, based upon his own com- sen” notion. These findings, in turn, gave rise to
plete information, “I don’t know what office this a partial reformation of our research concerns
salary information applies to, but it certainly isn’t and to the second phase of our empirical work.
ours!”
When asked directly about the “trickle-down”
of information, tne common response of mana- NONFORMAL COMIMUNICATIONS AiiD
gers and partners was that it does occur and that LMENTORING
this is a naturally occurring feature of organiza-
tional life. but that they did not feel that the term The term “mentor” originally appeared in
INFORMAL COMMUNICATIONS. NONFORMAL COMMUNICATIONS AND MENTORINC; 157
Homer’s O@ssql~ as the name of King Ulysses’ Lastly comes “peer pals.” who more informally
trusted friend, Mentor, who nurtures, protects aid each other to be successful.
and educates Ulysses’ son, Telemachus, during Hunt & Michael ( 1983) have argued that men-
Ulysses’ absence. Mentor introduces Tele- toring directly impacts on the mentor, protege
machus to the other leaders and guides him in and organization. Effective mentors typically
the assumption of his duties and position, thus gain satisfaction both in seeing a protege be suc-
going beyond teaching specific skills, to foster- cessful and in ensuring that organizational values
ing personal, professional and civic develop- are preserved. Mentoring provides the mentor
ment, and integrating him into the existing with a creative outlet during the middle years of
power structure by educating him as to its social organizational life, thus combating stagnation
norms and expectations. and also aiding the mentor to build and maintain
According to Levison et al. ( 1978), and con- organizational power. The obvious benefit to the
sistent with Telemachus’ experience, a mentor protege is enhanced success, but also can have a
does many things for the protege, including: positive effect on emotional adjustment in that
teaching specific skills; developing intellectual the protege tends to have a better self-image,
abilities; intervening and protecting to foster better knows where he fits in the organization
entry, adjustment and advancement in the and senses that someone cares. Perhaps the
organization; serving as a host and guide who organization receives the most far-ranging
welcomes the newcomer into the profession, benefits; mentoring tends to foster improved
shows him how it operates and introduces him education, less mobility, improved job satisfc-
to the most important actors; providing advice, tion, an appreciation for complexity, develop-
encouragement and constructive criticism; and ment of more far-ranging managerial talent, the
serving as a role model who exhibits appropriate adoption of organizational values as the indi-
values and a workable approach to professional vidual’s own, and “professional” behavior and
endeavor (see also Berleu & Hall, 1966; Schein attitudes; it also ensures philosophical con-
& Van Maanen, 1977). Thus, mentoring involves tinuity in cases of upper managerial level succes-
many of the themes, expressed as Propositions sion (see also Levinson et al., 1978; Kram,
l-4, being examined in our study. 1983). The existence of mentoring, as well as
Generally, it has been found that mentoring is the presence of such benefits, tend to be more
important to successfully launching and build- prominent in settings characterized by multiple
ing professional and business careers (cf. Jen- management levels, committee based promo-
nings, 1971; Orth &Jacobs, 1971; Roche, 1979; tion decisions, and an ever narrowing pyramid of
Kram, 1983). Shapiro et al. ( 1978) suggested a positions (Hunt & Michael, 1983) characteris-
contimuum of mentor-like dyads within organi- tics directly applicable to large public account-
zations. At the most powerful, emotionally ing firms.
charged end of the continuum, is the true men- In a typically equal, bilateral relationship,
tor-protege dyad, which tends to be hierarchi- mentors tend to be at a high organizational level,
cal. parental, exclusionary, elitist and the most possess power, have self confidence, are par-
free-ranging in terms of scope (see also Ranter, ticipatory in their orientation, are willing to
1977). Next is the sponsor-protege dyad, which share and protect, and are trustworthy (Hunt &
lacks the power and robustness of mentorship in Michael, 1983; Blau, 1964). Proteges, on the
that the sponsor occupies a lower level position other hand, tend to have already established a
and consequently has less power and is less able record good performance, possess the right
to protect the protege than the mentor. Then social background (usually similar to the men-
comes the guide-protege dyad in which the tor), know officers socially, look professional,
guide conveys information and advises the pro- have demonstrated commitment, have high visi-
tege on the workings of the system, and the pre- bility and are loyal (Hunt & Michael, 1983).
sence of organizational pitfalls and shortcuts. Thus, each party has something to offer in a
158 MARK W. DIRSMITH and MARK A. COVALESKI
doing daylight runs, they may not be here tomor- it’s an ‘I’m ok, everyone else is an asshole’ attitude.” The
row”. We found this response somewhat ironic place went up for grabs.
2a as it relates to mentoring, but that this may changes or unusual things happened this year?”
not be very noteworthy. or “Who covers when X goes on vacation?”
Guides can teach people the non black and
Mentor@ relationships involve audit task white mental sets behind the “it depends rather
relatedfunctions, particularly in terms of level than the right answer thinking”, “I can live with
of complexity of the task and surveillance that”, “I can get my arms around this problem”
Conveying audit task complexity and surveil- world of the everyday auditor. Guides teach to
lance instruction was judged by participants to see with peripheral vision (for oblique corrob-
be applicable to mentoring relationships, espe- oration, see also Hylas & Ashton, 1982). And
cially during the earlier years of a career. First, finally, surveillance was also interpreted as
whereas formal audit programs instruct staff grooming peope to be alert to situations suggest-
what to do, the mentor, (or in this case, more ing an extension of client services -particularly
nearly the “guide”) nonformally (they are not for sponsor dyads (manager-senior).
strictly, bureaucratically required to do so) However, our use of the word “can” is
attempts to instruct as to the bow and why of an pointed. Some guides/seniors, while reporting
audit task. Second, whereas the audit program that they think such functions are important and
merely lists instructions, the guide may amplify that they sometimes perform them, felt that they
or deamplify a particular audit step. One exam- were under such time constraints that they
ple given was understanding the client’s busi- could not do a very effective job. We conclude,
ness; while such an instruction is listed in all therefore, that mentoring and nonformal com-
audit programs, the guide can intensify the munications are related to the performance of
meaning of the step. For example, one seasoned audit tasks as stated in Proposition 2b.
engagement partner reported stressing this
point with his managers to improve both the Mentoring involves socialization
power of the audit per se and client relations, The issue of socialization was not interpreted
stating, to be important at the lower ranks as it relates to
mentoring. At these levels, it was reported that
Typically, non mega-big clients have a hole in the VP more formal effort was made to socialize the
Finance area. I try to teach my managers how to fill that
individual into the firm through training prog-
hole by “role playing.” not in decision making but in
analysis. At the end of audit, they try to understand the rams, office social functions, etc. As noted above,
client’s business risks to see ifwe’ve covered them in our at the lower levels, mentoring seems to be more
audit. In part, they do this through analytical review. audit craft-directed, although guides reported
They do it, but don’t get credit for it. What 1 have them
that they did try to give insights into some of the
do, is don the hat of an external financial analyst or lend-
“ins and outs” of the firm, and more particularly
ing officer, and share the risk assessment portion of their
analysis with client management, much as a VP Finance the political “touch points” of the client and the
does/should do. It helps them truly understand the engagement partner. The mental set seems to be
client’s business and get credit for it, thereby cementing more one of supporting a technical appren-
client relations and setting up the possibility for exten- ticeship.
sion of services.
At the manager level, there was a trend away
from counselling on doing toward behaving and
Third, whereas audit programs require verbal being partner-like (see Baker, 1980). The impor-
inquiries to be made of the client, the guide may tance of this shift was underscored by one sea-
indicate who of the client’s staff to ask them of soned partner who commented “The most
and how much credence to place in the answers. important criterion I look at in considering the
Fourth and related to three above, where audit promotion of a manager, is ‘Does this person
programs appear to stress the heavily procedural behave like a partner?’ ”
work, a guide can stress the more amorphous The issue of active vs passive socialization
auditor steps, such as simply asking “What. through mentoring also arose. It was com-
INFORMAL COMMUNICATIONS. NONFORMAL COMMUNICATIONS AND MENTORING 161
mented by a few participants that earlier, lower sponsor relations, the consensus of partners and
level mentoring involved actively teaching the managers was that the raison d’etre for mentor-
protege, with the mentor actively guiding and ing was for the career management of the pro-
giving advice. In the later. higher level mentor- tege. Mentoring was seen as touching on politics
ing, some of the essence of public accounting in a number of ways. All partners and managers,
was viewed as not being readily taught, but only particularly the nonseasoned veterans, believed
demonstrated through action. Here, mentoring that a good mentor instructed the protege on
was seen as serving as a role model. One partner office and firm politics. He also gave advice and
commented, “There are many things a good directly assisted the protege in managing his vis-
partner does that cannot be articulated to ibility and the perceptions of important others.
others. This means that he has to make himself Much of this visibility involved: being assigned
visible to the manager”. to the “right” jobs in terms of their being highly
Select partners were then asked if they were visible in the firm, bringing in significant busi-
talking about core organizational values. Virtu- ness, and presenting and effectively participat-
ally all suffered a temporary glazing of the eyes. ing in office, regional and national continuing
When asked if there were any individuals who education meetings. This management of per-
they thought had established the philosophical ceptions sometimes took a turn toward the ton-
tone for the firm, each partner was able to name gue-in-cheek. One partner told ofhis own, termi-
one, two or thee individuals without hesitation, nal promotion and the assistance given him by a
and to discuss each person’s impact on the firm, PIC who was widely reported to be a consum-
even though most of the interviewees had never mate mentor. After gaining the promotion, the
met them. Upon reflection, they “guessed” that partner met the senior managing partner of the
mentoring did involve imprinting the protege firm, who commented that his partnership prop-
with their/the firm’s values. osal (a dossier-like document) picture did not
When asked if mentoring involved engender- show that he had had a beard. Apparently the
ing organizational commitment, those asked vir- mentor had changed the individual’s most
tually all answered yes (all partners answered in recent picture to one that appeared more “part-
the affirmative), but that the commitment had ner-like”.
already to be there as a base for the partner- In terms of perceptions, one younger partner
manager mentoring to take place. Interviewees stated that an effective mentor instructs the pro-
interpreted commitment as involving a mosaic tege on managing the perception of client ser-
of traits which included goodness, loyalty, dis- vice and commitment to the engagement and
cretion. trustworthiness and dependability. One conurring partners, in contrast with giving client
seasoned partner commented that he “ . only service. Similarly, a senior manager argued that a
worked with managers who have shown com- good mentor “ . . . looks after the numbers of his
mitment first to their clients and then to the disciples and defends them against the higher
firm”. Commitment was at once seen as a pre- ups in the promotion process. I’ve seen this pro-
requisite, a resource and an output of effective cess have to start earlier and earlier in a person’s
mentoring. career”. When asked what these “numbers”
We conclude that there is quite strong sup- were, he replied I‘ . . . the classics - realization
port for Proposition 2c. that mentoring is closely rates, client billings, time budget averages”. In
associated with socialization into the public addition, he stated that a mentor reveals the
accounting firm. particularly at higher levels. “touch points” of the partners the protege works
with so that these may be “touched” or avoided
Mentoring inr)olues power and politics as the case may be.
The strongest and most emotionally charged This management of perceptions and num-
responses were obtained in this portion of our bers was repeatedly echoed by managers and
interviews. Again in contrast with guide and younger partners, but as conditioned by office
162 MARK W. DLRSMITH and MARK A. COVALESKI
context. To begin with, office size was perceived act of mentoring is itself politically charged in
to be important, for in smaller offices, it was dif- that non-mentoring, seasoned partners, may
ficult to covertly manage the perception of interpret the perceptions management aspects
client service because a PIC was typically seen as of mentoring as somehow undermining the
maintaining client contact, at least for the more integrity of the firm.
important engagements. In addition, “maturity The issue of age was then posed during a
of the market” was important-the more highly limited number of individual interviews with
competitive the client market among the Big 8, other-than-seasoned partners. Most thought that
the more a “Pat Man” spirit tended to pervade the dilemma did exist. One manager, for exam-
the office and the more mentors had to stress ple, said that he had had an “old guard” mentor
“looking after the numbers”. As noted earlier, a during the 1977-1978 period who did not “tune
shift toward this numbers orientation was seen him in to the shifting values of the firm” toward
as arising in the 1975-1978 period during which the business rather that profession of auditing,
competition markedly increased among the Big wherein he had to attend to “the numbers.”
8. Another stated that it was important to have
This numbers orientation was reported to involvement with a mentor of similar vintage
take place both in fact and appearance. That is, who was recently promoted to partner “because
managers had to do things to produce the right they are attuned to the realities of the situation.”
numbers, but also these had to be prominently Interestingly, most partners and managers who
displayed in the partnership proposal; one were interviewed who had mentors at some
important role of the mentor was to “orchestrate time, reported the desirability of having two or
the proposal process.” But, office context was three mentors who varied in “vintage,” from sea-
again important. For the more established, pro- soned partners with “clout” to younger partners
fitable, powerful, non-nouvauc ricbe offices, this with recent experience with proposal orchestra-
“numbers orchestration” ran the risk of being tion.
thought “bush-league and garrish” by partners The issue of mentoring itself being political
within the office. was broached in six interviews. Generally, it was
Age of the mentor emerged as important, Dur- reported that mentoring was indeed a sensitive
ing two independent interview sessions with activity. In fact, two had moved their offices to
individuals from two different firms at the ranks foster or suppress mentoring activity (see Davis
of senior manager (one was being considered for 1984): the partner had moved his office out of
promotion at the time), a recently promoted “partner row” so that possible proteges could
partner and a seasoned partner, the issues of feel freely about seeing him; the senior manager
numbers and perceptions management were moved his office as close to the PIG’s as possible
broached. In both situations, the manager and to both “strip away disciples” and increase his
younger partner became animated that this does visibility. Generally, it was reported that there
exist and must be attended to, to be successful. existed a jealousy of the “have riots”” for the
In contrast, the seasoned partners at first denied “haves.” Being a protege was also reported to be
that it exists, that excellence and client service politically sensitive. First, discretion is a key
alone are enough. But then, after 45 min of dis- ingredient to mentor relationships. After receiv-
cussion, admitted that they “guessed” the man- ing vertically transmitted information, ifthe pro-
agement of perceptions was indeed true, but tege indiscretely “ventates laterally” to peers
deeply regretted it. Once more, the shift toward the mentorship could be attenuated. Paradoxi-
such management occurring during the 1975- cally, however, mentoring involves building the
1978 period arose as a topic of conversation. organizational power of the protege which does
The interchange pointed to a dilemma for mana- involve sharing information laterally. but selec-
gers and partners, that not only must the mentor tively so. Second, similar to the mentor findings,
instruct the protege as to politics, bt also that the individuals who did not have mentors were
INFORMAL COMMUNICATIONS, NONFORMAL COMMUNICATIONS AND MENTORING 163
reported to be jealous of peers who did. preservation of the “professional” image exter-
On the issue of power, mentoring was widely nally and internally is fostered by teaching the
reported to arise to help the protege advance, business of auditing via nonformal and informal
not the mentor. (Here it is important to note, means. 0ne phenomenon that many of our inter-
that interpretation by the researchers played a viewees commented on is that the “business of
more active, inferential role.) Latently, inter- auditing” is rising to the surface and is beginning
viewees “guessed” that mentoring could bring to be formally stressed at the manager level and
power to the mentor: it involved passing on the somewhat at the senior level. Whether this por-
individual’s way of thinking and doing; mentors tends the death of a profession (Mautz & Sharaf,
help those who are, in return, loyal; and proteges 196 1) or a profession becoming candid about
seek leaders whom they respect and have itself (Larson, 1977) remains to be seen. Usually
power, aiming to gain their approval as part of paradoxes are hard to handle in a direct manner.
the exchange, and in so doing, legitimate the A second paradox concerns the craft of audit-
power of the mentor. And so, a base for power ing. Earlier within this section, it was noted that
appears to exist. However, participants ques- mentors can aid in developing a protege’s
tioned whether or not this power is ever peripheral vision, and an appreciation for softer,
mobilized, at least on an overt level. more qualitative auditing. However, according
Mentoring seemed to cope with, and yet be to Meyer & Rowan (1977) society has an appe-
fraught with paradoxes (once more, interpreta- tite for the harder, quantitative, technically
tion by the researchers played an elevated role rational services upon which it depends. Does
in the following discussion). The first paradox there exist a decoupling between what gets
relates to the profession/business of auditing. documented and what is auditing, and do men-
Mautz 8r Sharaf stated, for example, tors aid in this decoupling? This question was
asked of a limited number of seasoned partners.
If we feel auditing performs a useful service and that this
Virtually all answered in the affirmative, that one
sewice should be continued, we hare an obligation to
professional institutions that make this service available of their major problems is to keep staff long
to the public. We may modiq or alter the nature and var- enough so that they may learn what auditing is
ieq of such service ifwe will, but with this privilege goes all about. Two national office partners, using
an important responsibilir) to do so only ifit unquestion- such phrases as “sniff tests”, indicated that fairly
ably is in the best long range interests of society. a pro-
routinely they spend a week or more with the
fession exists, not to compensate its members more or
less handsomely. but to serve society ( 1961, p. 239). client, without an audit program, without even a
memo pad, gaming a deep understanding of the
Reflecting an opposite viewpoint, but with an client problems and strengths, just by “wander-
identical conclusion, Larson ( 1977, esp. Ch. 11) ing around talking with key people”. The formal
argued that any profession has a self-interest to audit is then, in part, built around this free form,
posture professional disinterest. “anti-bureauc- impressions-audit to document and corraborate
racy” and a service ideal above all else. while their impressions. The reason? When the partner
simultaneously suppressing the appearance of then discusses the financial reporting problems
“business”: its very survival rests with this post- with the client, “the documentation sells him on
eringsuppression. The juxtaposition of Mautz 8r booking the proper [ adjusting] entries where my
Sharaf vs Larson is one of professionalism in fact impressions would not”. Thus, the formal
vs appearance. aspects of the audit can be used in legitimating
How does a public accounting firm handle the the nonformal. These partners also indicated
dualiry of the profession/business of auditing? To that their firms do not formally address this audit
stress the business of auditing via formal, craft duality, but rather leave it to the seasoned
bureaucratic means for the purpose of managing partners to “pass on” to the younger generations
people would prove difficult to suppress given by nonformal means; these and several other
the “public” nature of Big 8 firms. Perhaps the partners, however, worried whether increasing
164 IMARK W. DIRSMITH and MARK A. COVALESKI
emphasis on the formal documentation would tradiction to more established theories, it is the
eventually displace these looser audit tech- organization that may shy away from formality
niques and concerns. because of the paradoxes that it would have to
A third paradox concerns that of being vs face, and its members prefer formality to know
appearing (see also Baker, 1980). As noted ear- where they fit in despite the supposition that
lier, proteges are chosen because they are com- informal systems arise to serve them. As a final
mitted to the client and firm, and offer the prom- note on this session, one casual partner
ise of being loyal to the mentor. Next, a younger observer, unknown to the researcher, indepen-
mentor counsels the protege on the necessity of dently asked “How important is a mentor in your
appearing to be committed to the client and staying with the firm?” The consensus response
generating the “right” numbers. If commitment from the 26 managers was that it can and does
exists as a base, being and appearing are both play an important role.
present across the two steps. But, ifthe potential The fifth and final paradox to be considered,
protege is keenly politic, might he not observe relates to an extended bureaucratic/political
that the appearance of client and firm commit- mentoring. Every younger partner interviewed
ment is also necessary to taking step one? Might commented that before promotion, partnership
not the mentor’s perceptions also be managed? was seen as being “ . the final plateau”. But after
If so, being is possibly decoupled from appearing promotion, a whole new “superstructure”
and, if widespread, this could again spell the became visible. All but one had indicated that he
demise of the profession. This was feared by a had had a mentor until partnership, but now, for
number of seasoned partners in our study who this unforeseen set of hurdles, they had none.
lamented the gamesmanship involved in manag- They were considered to be a peer, at least in
ing numbers and proposal orchestration. name, and yet they felt that “All partners are not
A fourth paradox relates to business training. created equal - even in a general partnership.”
As mentioned earlier, informal communications, It seemed the “rookie” partners sensed a need
nonformal communications and mentoring for both counselling and protection in this
appear to be key to teaching the business of “new” environment, and yet the need to
auditing. One of the researchers attended a CPE demonstrate that they needed it not. In any
session for twenty six managers on managing. event, it was widely reported that mentoring
During the session, the question was posed of was dead at the partnership level, aside from the
“what characteristics kept you in public passive, role model form of mentoring.
accounting and what caused you to almost We conclude that mentoring and nonformal
leave?” Curiously the level of business training communications are closely, strongly and com-
received appeared near the top of each respec- plexly allied with the power and politics of pub-
tive list! Similarly, amount and quality of partner lic accounting firms, as suggested by Proposition
contact also appeared in each list, though more 2d.
in the middle. At the very top of the list of factors
that caused the managers to almost leave, and Everyone participates in mentor relationships
one that was voiced with considerable anima- As noted in the beginning of this section,
tion, was “ no handle on your career as a man- while everyone interviewed recognized that
ager”. This finding is strongly suggestive of that mentoring exists in public accounting firms, not
obtained from the informal communications everyone participated in such a relationship,
phase of our study noted earlier - that inter- other than the lower level, “peer pal” form of
viewees thought that the business training they mentor-like dyads. Many partners who viewed
received was strong, but that the formal system themselves as mentors, lamented a reluctance
did not provide it. Perhaps these managers held by other partners to engage in such an activity
a similar view, but were uncomfortable with the commenting that they believed it necessary to
informality and uncertainty of it! Perhaps in con- the long run survival of the firm. Typically, the
INFORMAL COMMUNICATIONS, NONFORMAL COMMUNICATIONS AND MENTORING 165
reluctant partners were interpreted as viewing an appreciation for the complexity and the poli-
themselves as “client men”. Other non-mentor tics of organizational life, and continuity of
partners who viewed it as important, lamented leadership philosophy. As a cost, seasoned, non-
that they were not involved in such relationships retired partners, however, voiced a concern
and sensed some sort of lack as a consequence, over the gamesmanship-teaching that appa-
both from a firm contribution and a personal rently was part and parcel of mentoring; they
development standpoint. Similarly, not all lower feared a loss of preserving “the spirit” of the firm
level staff reported being a protege; those who profession. Once more, the spectre of a dilemma
were not, typically reported that they did not faced by mentors and proteges, as well as the
feel fully integrated into the firm. Only one firms, arose. Finally, the benefit of continuity of
younger partner reported not having had a men- leadership philosophy was thought by some
tor, other than a partner who orchestrated his (most of these were national office personnel)
proposal (it is important to note that this person to be a two edged sword in that this tendency
was promoted only after fourteen years of ser- made it difficult to change that philosophy as
vice, while the average was twelve years and ten rapidly as may be desirable; for example, push-
years was the low end for “fast trackers”). ing the firm toward thinking more in terms of the
We therefore conclude that not everyone business of auditing was reported as one
engages in mentoring relationships and that philosophical shift they thought desirable. In
Proposition 3 is not supported. fact, one partner reported that his firm seemed
to be accelerating the business numbers orienta-
The protege, the mentor and the firm benefit tion by appointing much younger PIG’s who
from the mentor relationship would, in turn, counsel managers on their
Persons who reported being or having been a importance. If true, this state seems to hint at the
protege also reported feeling more integrated mutually dependent nature of formal and non-
into the firm’s way of thinking and doing, that formal systems as discussed by Mintzberg
they were nurtured, or perhaps more nearly, ( 1979a). Thus, consistent with Proposition 4, it
groomed and supported during the promotion appears that the protege, mentor and firm
process, and better attuned to the political benefit from mentoring, although not without
realities of the firm. They also felt mentoring costs.
bore costs, in terms of loyalty to the mentor,
some political sensitivity to nonmentor
partners, and peer pressure by non-proteges. IMPLICATIONS
Mentors, particularly well seasoned and
retired partners, reported a strong sense of Perhaps the most significant implication aris-
accomplishment from having been a mentor. ing from our study is that nonformal communi-
Two retired PICs unequivocably stated that cations and mentoring exist as one way in which
mentoring was the most rewarding activity that management comes about in large public
they had performed as a partner. Although inter- accounting firms. In fact, it may well be that the
viewees were reluctant to speak in terms of non-bureaucratic, non-regulated forms of man-
organizational values, they became animated in agement, such as mentoring, are the principal
discussing “passing on the genetic heritage of means to effecting coordination and control. As
the firm”. Once more, particularly for the such, nonformality and mentoring are well
younger partner-mentors, the cost of political deserving of further research, on at least two
sensitivity was advanced, as well as the threat of fronts. The first front is concerned with auditing,
losing face from a failed protege. per se. That is, effort should be devoted to exa-
Deriving from the benefits to proteges and mining the nature, extent and consequences of
mentors, the firms were seen as benefitting by nonformal communications and mentoring on
having better educated members who possessed the conduct of the audit. That is, focus should be
166 MARK W. DIRSMITH and MARK A. COVALESKI
placed on how auditing is done - the process laws, while nonformal communications convey
rather than the technology of auditing. As noted and enculture people to conform to organiza-
earlier, their impact on performing audit tasks tional norms, while informal communications
characterized by high variety and audit surveil- instruct as to organizational and group mores.
lance activities appear to be particularly fruitful. More specifically concerning the relation bet-
The second front is more concerned with ween informal and formal systems, we question
coordinating and controlling organizational the conclusion that they are useful compliments
members from a control theory standpoint. Con- to one another and that they tend not to conflict
sistent with the reasoning advanced by Van de (cf. Clancy & Collins, 1979). While this may be
Ven et al. ( 1977) Mintzberg( 1979a) and Ouchi more nearly true of formal and nonformal sys-
( 1979) it appears that coordination and control tems, our findings concerning the informal com-
within public accounting firms may reside munication of salary information suggests that
largely in the individual rather than through the its inaccuracy, combined with the interpretation
external and formal application of bureaucratic that relative salaries communicate organiza-
rules, sanctions and rewards. As discussed by tional values, may motivate aberrant behavior by
Larson ( 1977) the person rather than the task is organizational members.
programmed to think and do in a certain manner As another implication, the concepts of poli-
within a profession. This programming appears tics, power and paradox have long remained
to involve the broad socialization of the indi- unexamined by accounting researchers. Focus-
vidual into the profession. Consequently, a ing on the basic definitions of politic as being “
major implication of our study is to underscore . sagacious in promoting policy” and of power
the need to examine the socialization process in as having “ . the ability to get things done”
the public accounting profession, that, in part, (Webs&m), we question the wisdom of resear-
involves mentoring relationships. chers ignoring the complex processes that
Combining these first and second fronts, it is underly the promotion and implementation of
noteworthy to point out that the processes of audit and practice management policies (see
conducting audits and managing a practice are Blau, 1964, and Pfeffer, 1981 for useful discus-
co-mingled, and that it may therefore be neces- sions). In particular, we find the numerous
sary to examine practice management philoso- paradoxes that our inquiry touched upon (e.g.
phies and techniques in order to fully under- the profession vs business of auditing, cf. Larson,
stand auditing as a discipline. 1977, the dramatized and documented vs the
Based on our analysis of a variety of literatures, backstage and amorphous aspects of the auditing
it is evident that informal communication is a craft, Meyer St Rowan, 1977) to be intriguing
multi-theoretical construct which is more com- areas for future research. In addition, we believe
plex than any one area suggests. Ironically, based the apparent “structuration” (Di Maggio & Pow-
on the initial phase of our research, it also ell, 1983) of these paradoxes, wherein their
appears to be limited in how it has thus far been dialectic interplay is artificialy contained by
articulated. That is, it appears to be at one end of forcing the appearance rationality (e.g. manage-
a continuum, with formal communications on ment of the “right” numbers) on an essentially
the other end. The middle region appears to be arational situation, to be worthy of future
the domain of nonformal communications research.
which appear to have some degree of organiza- The last implication to be considered con-
tional sanction or at least recognition. We cerns the nature of the research methodology
believe that future research should seek to we employed. Similar to those doing quantita-
examine the relationship among these three tive, positivistic research, those doing qualita-
forms of communication. One analogy which we tive, naturalistic research must also be con-
feel may prove useful is that formal communica- cerned with validity, perhaps even more so since
tions are used to convey organizational rules and the “sociology of validity” has not yet been fully
INFORMAL COMMUNICATIONS. NONFORMAL COMMUNICATIONS AND MENTORING I67
articulated (Campbell, 1984). More specifically views, however, what is missing is the animation
as it concerns the current research, a question of participants’ answers to our questions. It is
arises of whether our findings are a function of due to the intensity of subjects responses to our
the characteristics of informal and nonformal questions that we conclude that they were
communications and mentoring in public responding honestly. However, as is true for all
accounting, or whether our preconceptions research, the value of our analysis can only be
intruded on our analysis. In describing our inter- ascertained through future research.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abdel-Khahk, A. R. & Ajinkya, B. B.. An Evaluation of “The Everyday Accountant and Researching His ReaI-
ity, Accounting, Organizations andSociety ( 1983) pp. 375-384.
AguIIar, F. J., Scanning the Business Environment (New York: McMillan, 1967)
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, A/CPA Codification of Statements of Auditing
Standards (Chicago: CCH. 198 1).
Baker, C. R., Management Strategy in a Large Accounting Firm, The Accounting Review (July 1977) pp.
576-586.
Barnard, C. I., Functions and Pathology of Status Systems in Formal Organizations, in Whyte, W. F. (ed.),
Industry and Society (New York: McGraw HiII, 1946).
Berger. P. L. & Luckman, T.. The Social Construction of Reality (New York: Anchor Books, 1967).
Berleu, D. E. & Hall, D. T., The Socialization of Managers: Effects of Expectations on Performance,Aaminis-
trative Science Quarterly ( 1966) pp. 207-223.
Blakar. R. M., Language as a Means of Social Power, in Rommetveit. R. & BIaker. R. M. (eds.), Studies of
Language, Tbougbt and Verbal Communication (London: Academic Press, 1979)
Blau, P. M., Exchange andPower in Social Life (New York: John Wiley, 1964)
Boland, R. J., Jr., Control, Causality and InformationSystem Requirements, Accounting Orgunizutionsand
Society ( 1979) pp. 259-272.
Buchanan, B., Building Organization Commitment: The Socialization of Managers Work Organizations,
AdministrativeScienceQua?-terly (December 1974)~~. 533546.
Burchell S.. Clubb, C., Hopwood, A., Hughes, J. and Nahopiet, J., The Roles of Accounting in Organizations
and Society, Accounting, Organizations andSociety ( 1980) pp. 5-27.
Campbell D. T., Problems of being Scientific in Applied Social Sciences, seminar presented at The Pennsyl-
vania State Universiry, April. 1984.
Clancy, D. K & Collins, F.. Informal Accounting Information Systems: Some Tentative Findings, Account-
ing Organizations and Society ( 1979) pp. 2 l-30.
Conrath. D. W., Communications Environment and Its Relationship to Organizational Structure, Munuge-
me&Science (1973) pp. 586602.
Crazier, M.. The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964)
Daft, R. L. 8i Wiginton, J. C.. Language and Organization.Acude?n~~ ofManagementReview(Summer 1979)
pp. 179-191.
Dalton. M.. Men Who Manage (New York: John Wiley, 1959)
Davis. T. R.. The Intluence of the Physical Environment in Offices,Academy ofManugementReview( 1984)
pp. 271-283.
Di Maggie. P. J. & Powell, W. W’.. The iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Homorphism and Collective Ration-
ality in Organizational Fields. American SociologicalReview ( 1983) pp. 147-160.
Edie. J. M. (ed.). What is Phenomenology? (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1962).
Feldman, D. C.. The Development and Enforcement of Group Norms, Academy of Management Review
(January 1984) pp. 47-53.
Feldman. D. C.. The Multiple Socialization of Organization Members Academy of Management Review
(April 1981)~~. 309-318.
Feldman. M. S. & March, J. G., Information in Organization as Signal and Symbol, Administratiw Science
Quarter@(198l)pp. 171-186.
Forester, J.. Listening: The Social Policy of Everyday Life, SocialPraxis ( 1980) pp. 219-232.
168 MARK W. DIRSMITH and MARK A. COVALESKI
Schein, E H. 8; \‘an Maanrn. J.. Career Development. in Hackman, J.. & Suttlc. J. (eds), Im/~ro?~ing L<fi a/
Work (Glenview, II.. Scott Foresman, 1977) pp. 30-95.
Shapiro, E. C.. Haseltinc. F. I’. & Rowe. M. P.. MovinR lip: Role Models. Mentors and the Patron System.Slorm
Mrrn~~cwzerzf Reuiew ( 1978). pp. 5 I-5R.
Simon. H A.. Geretzkoa, H.. Kozmetsky. G.. & Tyndall. G.. Centralization isDecent,-alizatioI? in Organiz-
ing the Controller’s Department (New York: Controllership Foundation, 1954 ).
Safer. C Men in Mid Career (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
Sutton. H 8r Porter I.. W’.. A Study of the Grapevmr in Governmental Organization, P~?-sonne/P~vcholo~~~~
( 1968) pp. 22.3-230.
Thomas, J. S; Griffin. R.. The Social Information Processing of Task Design: A Review of the Literature,
Acadeq* ofManagement Review (October 1983)pp. 672-682.
Tomkins. C. 8; Groves. R.. The Everyday Accountant and Researching His Realiv. Accounting Organiza-
tions and Socie[lr ( 1984) pp 361-374.
Trist. E. L 6i Bamforth. K W.. Some Social and Psychological Consequences of the Long-Wall Method of
Goal-Getting, Human Relations ( 195 1) pp. .1-38.
Van De Ven, A. H.. Delbecq. A. L., & Koenig, R.. Jr., Determinants of Coordination Modes Within Organiz-
ations. American Sociological Reuiew (April 1876) pp. 322-338.
Van Maanen. J.. On the Understanding of Interpersonal Relations. in Bennis, W., Van Maanen, J,, Schein. E..
& Stelle. F. (eds. ) Essqa in Interpersonal Dynamics pp. 1.3-42 (Homewood. II: Dorsey Press, 1979a )
\‘an hlaanen. J.. ReclaiminR Qualitative Methods for Organizational Research: A Preface, Administrative
Science Quarterly ( 1979b) pp. 520-526.
Von Glenoa. M. A., Controlling the Performance of Professionals Through Creation of Congruent Environ-
ments, Journal of Business Research (September 1983) pp. 345-361.
Weick. R E., The Spines of Leaders, in McCall. M. W’..Jr., & Lombardo. M. M. (eds.)Leadersbip: WhereElse
Can We Go pp. 3’-61 (Durham. NC: Duke University Press, 1978)
Weiner. Y.. Commitment in Organizations: A Normative View, AcudemJ~ of Management Review (July
1982). pp. 418-428
Wilensky. P. L.. Organizational Intelligence (New York: Basic Books, 1967).
Wilmott. H. C.. Paradigms for Accounting Research: Critical Reflections on Tort&ins and Groves “Everyday
Accountant and Researching His Reality”,Accounting, OrganizutionsandSociety( 1983)~~. 389-406.