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Gonzales v.

Comelec

G.R. No. L-27833 April 18, 1969

Facts: RA 4880 was enacted by the congress which prohibits the early nomination of candidates and limiting the period of election
campaign or partisan political party activity. The constitutionality of said law was challenged, precisely the basic liberties of free speech
and free press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association were invoked to nullify the act.

Issue: Whether or not RA 4880 is constitutional?

Ruling: Yes, RA 4880 is constitutional.

From the language of the specified constitutional provision, it would appear that the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law
may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. The realities of life in a complex society preclude however a literal
interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to insist that at all times and under all circumstances it
should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for recognition. How is it to be limited then?

This Court spoke, in Cabansag v. Fernandez; of two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for permissible restriction. Thus:
"These are the 'clear and present danger' rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, as interpreted in a number of cases, means
that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high' before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented." It has the advantage
of establishing according to the above decision "a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be
public established."

The Cabansag case likewise referred to the other test, the "dangerous tendency" rule and explained it thus: "If the words uttered
create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some
definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general
terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness.
It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative
body seeks to prevent.

This test then as a limitation on freedom of expression is justified by the danger or evil a substantive character that the state has a
right to prevent. Unlike the dangerous tendency doctrine, the danger must not only be clear but also present. The term clear seems
to point to a causal connection with the danger of the substantially evil arising from the utterance questioned. Present refers to the
time element. It used to be identified with imminent and immediate danger. The danger must not only be probable but very likely
inevitable.

The constitutional objections are thus formidable. It cannot be denied that the limitations thus imposed on the constitutional rights of
free speech and press, of assembly, and of association cut deeply, into their substance. This on the one hand.

On the other, it cannot be denied either that evils substantial in character taint the purity of the electoral process. There can be under
the circumstances then no outright condemnation of the statute. It could not be said to be unwarranted, much less arbitrary. There is
need for refraining from the outright assumption that the constitutional infirmity is apparent from a mere reading thereof.

Such an approach finds support in the exposition made by the author of the measure, Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada, appearing before
us as amicus curiae. He did clearly explain that such provisions were deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the
necessary and appropriate response not merely to a clear and present danger but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive
evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late has invariably marred election campaigns and
partisan political activities in this country. He did invite our attention likewise to the well-settled doctrine that in the choice of remedies
for an admitted malady requiring governmental action, on the legislature primarily rests the responsibility. Nor should the cure
prescribed by it, unless clearly repugnant to fundamental rights, be ignored or disregarded.

More than that, he would stress the two provisos already mentioned, precisely placed in the state as a manifestation of the undeniable
legislative determination not to transgress the preferred freedom of speech, of press, of assembly and of association. It is thus
provided: "That simple expressions or opinion and thoughts concerning the election shall not be considered as part of an election
campaign [and that nothing in the Act] shall be understood to prevent any person from expressing his views on current political
problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of the candidates for public office whom he supports. If properly implemented then,
as it ought to, the barrier to free, expression becomes minimal and far from unwarranted.

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