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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEWER (2019) ○ Executive (Power to execute); and

○ Judiciary (Judicial Powers or construe the law)
NOTE: The reviewer is based on the following: Syllabus of Dean La Vina, Atty. Mundin, & Atty. Gamboa; ● Each branch of government is precluded from exercising or invading the
Compilation of various reviewers: such as, UP Law Bar Reviewer (2016) & Atty. Agra’s Reviewer (2017); powers of another. (De Leon)
Brief case digests; Notes and/or commentaries from Administrative Law: Text & Cases [2010] by De
Leon.
EXCEPTION TO THE RULE:
● Blending of powers.
CHAPTER I: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
○ Separation of powers does not mean an entire and complete
separation of powers or functions.
DEFINITION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
○ There may be a certain degree of blending or admixture of the three
● Branch of modern law under which the executive department of the
powers of government, particularly in administrative agencies. (De
government, acting in a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial capacity, interferes
Leon)
with the conduct of the individual for the purpose of promoting the well-being
of the community. (De Leon) CHAPTER II CASES:
● It is the part of the law which governs the organization, functions, and
procedures of administrative agencies of the government to which (quasi)
PLANAS v. GIL [67 PHIL. 62, (1939)]: Planas who was a member of Municipal Board,
legislative powers are delegated and (quasi) judicial powers are granted, and
criticized the acts of certain government officials including, President Quezon, through
the extent and manner to which such agencies are subject to control by the
a statement published in La Vanguardia. Thereafter, the Secretary to the President sent
courts. (De Leon)
a letter to Planas, ordering him to appear for investigation and prove her allegations
against the administration. She appeared before the CSC but she questioned the
SCOPE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
jurisdiction of the agency over the matter. However, CSC took cognizance of the case,
1. the law which fixes the administrative organization and structure of the
hence, the appeal to the SC. The OSG, argued that under the Separation of Powers,
government;
the Court had no jurisdiction to review the orders of the Chief Executive, because such
2. the law, the execution or enforcement of which is entrusted to administrative
orders are of purely administrative Character.
authorities;
3. the law which governs public officers including their competence (to act),
SC ruled that CSC can take cognizance of the case. According to the Court, the rule is
rights, duties, liabilities, election, etc.; non-interference, such acts of the Chief Executive performed within the limits of his
4. The law which creates administrative agencies, defines their powers and
jurisdiction are his official acts and courts will neither direct nor restrain executive action
functions, prescribes their procedures, including the adjudication or settlement in such cases. However, SC is not precluded from making an inquiry into the validity or
by them of contested matters involving private interests;
constitutionality of his acts when these are properly challenged in an appropriate legal
5. the law which provides the remedies, administrative or judicial, available to proceeding. In the present case, the President is not a party to the proceeding. Neither
those aggrieved by administrative actions or decisions;
he compelled nor restrained to act in a particular way. A mere plea that a subordinate
6. the law which governs judicial review of, or relief against, administrative
officer of the government is acting under orders from the Chief Executive is acting
actions or decisions;
orders from the Chief Executive may be an important averment, but is neither decisive
7. The rules, regulations, orders and decisions (including presidential
nor conclusive upon the Court. Therefore, Planas was not denied the right to voice out
proclamations) made by administrative authorities dealing with the
her opinion but since she made allegations against the administration it is but right for
interpretation and enforcement of the laws entrusted to their administration;
her to prove those allegations. The CSC has the right to elicit the truth.
and
8. The body of judicial decisions and doctrines dealing with any of the above.
GOVERNMENT OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v SPRINGER [50 Phil. 276 (1927)]:
National Coal Company was created by the Philippine Congress. Under the law, the
CHAPTER II: DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
voting power shall be vested with Governor-General, President of the Senate, and the
Speaker of the HoR. Thereafter, an EO was executed emphasizing that the voting right
DEFINITION: Separation of powers is that the powers assigned to one department
should be solely lodged in the Governor-General who is the head of the government.
should not be exercised by either of the other departments, and that no department
However, despite the EO, the Senate President and Speaker of the HoR, were elected
ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence or control over the
as Board of Directors of NCC. Now, GPI filed a quo warranto proceeding against
others.
Springer, et. al, questioning the validity of their election into the Board.
GENERAL RULE:
● It declares that governmental powers are divided among the three
SC ruled that that executive order was valid, in accordance with the doctrine of
departments of government, namely:
separation of powers. According to the Court, appointing persons to a public office is
○ Legislative (Power to legislate or make law) essentially an executive function and not of legislative function. On the other hand,

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legislative department creates the public office but it has nothing to do with designating
persons to fill the office. In the case at hand, the NCC is a government owned and
controlled corporation, thus, in allowing the Senate President and the House Speaker,
to appoint member of the NCC is a clear violation of separation of powers which is an
invasion of executive powers. Although, the SC stated an exception to the rule:
legislative department may only appoint persons within the legislative branch.
OCCENA v COMELEC [95 SCRA 759 (1980)]: The case is a petition for prohibition
seeking to restrain respondents from implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 (providing
for the elective and/or appointive positions in various local governments), 52 (governing
the election of local government officials scheduled on January 30, 1980), 53 (defining
the rights and privileges of accredited parties), and 54 (providing for a plebiscite,
simultaneously with the election of local officials on January 30, 1980, regarding the
proposed amendment of Article X, Section 7, of the 1973 Constitution).
(On the issue of delegation power of legislative to administrative agencies to make rules
and regulation): SC ruled that the legislative power granted by Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution to the National Assembly has been explicitly vested during the period
of transition on the Interim Batasang Pambansa by Amendment No. 2 to the
constitution. The legislative power has been described generally as being a power to
make, alter and repeal laws. It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe
general rules for the government of society. The essential of the legislative function is
the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation and promulgation as a
defined and binding rule of conduct. The power to regulate the manner of conducting
elections, to prescribe the form of the official ballot, and to provide for the manner in
which candidates shall be chosen is inherently and historically legislative. In the case
at hand, petitioner has not cited any provision of the Constitution, as amended by the
Amendments of 1976, which expressly or by implication deny to the Interim Batasang
Pambansa the authority to call for local elections.
Note: Medyo malabo yung case, but I think in relation to the topic, yung legislative
department during the time of the case, delegated the power to promulgate rules and
regulations to Interim Batasang Pambansa - which was then the National Assembly or
the body which amended the 1935 Constitution and the transitional body to 1973
Constitution.
CHAPTER III: CREATION, REORGANIZATION, AND ABOLITION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
WHAT ARE THE FOLLOWING EXPRESS POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT?
1. Power of control over the executive branch;
2. The power to enter into treaties
3. The power to execute/implement laws
4. Power over aliens or the power to deport aliens;
5. Powers of eminent domain, escheat, land reservation and recovery of ill-
gotten wealth;
6. Power to appoint government officials;
7. Power of general supervision over local governments;
8. Power to impose customs/tariff duties
9. Commander-in-Chief powers
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10. The power to grant pardon
11. The power to submit the budget to Congress.
12. Power to reorganize and abolish government agencies under executive
department.
ARE THE POWERS EXCLUSIVE? No! According to Marcos v. Manglapus, the
Supreme Court held that the enumerations found under Art. 7 are not exclusive.
“Executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.”
WHAT ARE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES?
● May be described as a body endowed with quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
powers for the purpose of enabling it to carry out the laws entrusted for
enforcement or execution. (Cruz)
● Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the term “agency” of the Government
is used to refer to any of the various units of the Government, including a
department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government- owned or -
controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein. It is a
"national agency" if it refers to a unit of the national Government and a "local
agency," if it refers to a local government or a distinct unit therein.
POWER TO CREATE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
● GR: Congress is lodged with the power to create and act through
administrative agencies.
○ All offices created by the legislature are wholly within the power of
that body, and it may prescribe the mode of filling the office and the
powers and duties of the office holders, and, if it sees fit, abolish the
office.
○ Statutory Agencies (E.g. NLRC, SEC, PRC, Social Security
Commission, Commission on Immigration and Deportation,
Philippine Patent Office, Games and Amusement Board, Board of
Energy, and Insurance Commission)
● XPN:
1. Constitutional Agencies – those created by the Constitution (E.g.
CSC, COMELEC, COA, CHR, Judicial and Bar Council, and NEDA)
2. Executive Orders/ Authorities of law (E.g. Fact-finding Agencies)
(NOTE: The president can only create administrative agencies, when
the Congress through law delegated such power to the president)
MANNER OF CREATION
1. Constitutional Agencies – those created by the Constitution
(E.g. CSC, COMELEC, COA, CHR, Judicial and Bar Council, and NEDA)
2. Statutory Agencies (E.g. NLRC, SEC, PRC, Social Security Commission,
Commission on Immigration and Deportation, Philippine Patent Office, Games
and Amusement Board, Board of Energy, and Insurance Commission)
3. Executive Orders/ Authorities of law (E.g. Fact-finding Agencies)
POWER TO REORGANIZE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
CAN THE PRESIDENT REORGANIZE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES? Yes! Art. VII
of 1987 Constitution, Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

Further in the case of Banda v. Ermita1, it was held that the President has the power to
reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the
President’s constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue
of previous delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under
existing statutes.
BASIS OF PRESIDENT’S POWER TO REORGANIZE
1. SEC. 17, ART. VII OF 1987 CONSTITUTION
2. EXECUTIVE ORDER 2922
● Section 20. - Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President
shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the
President which are provided for under the laws and which are not
specifically enumerated above or which are not delegated by the
President in accordance with law.
● Section 30. Functions of Agencies Under the Office of the
President. - Agencies under the Office of the President shall
continue to operate and function in accordance with their respective
charters or laws creating them, except as otherwise provided in this
Code or by law.
● Section 31 - vests in the President the continuing authority to
reorganize the offices under him in order to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency. E.O. 292 sanctions the following actions
undertaken for such purpose:
A. Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the
President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the
Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the
Common Staff Support System, by abolishing,
consolidating, or merging units thereof or transferring
functions from one unit to another.
B. Transfer any function under the Office of the President to
any other Department or Agency as well as transfer
functions to the Office of the President from other
Departments and Agencies; and
C. Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to
any other Department or Agency as well as transfer
agencies to the Office of the President from other
departments or agencies (Section 31, Chapter 10, Book III
of E.O. No. 292).
3. PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1772, amending PD 1416
● Likewise, Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1416 (Granting Continuing
Authority to the President of the Philippines to Reorganize the
National Government), as amended by PD 1722, provides that the
President of the Philippines shall have continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the National Government
and (he) may, at his discretion, create, abolish, group, consolidate,
1 Banda v. Ermita, G.R. No. 166620, [April 20, 2010], 632 PHIL 501-545
2 Administrative Code of 1987, Executive Order No. 292 , [July 25, 1987]
3 Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Romulo, G.R. No. 160093, [July 31,
2007], 555 PHIL 629-641
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merge or integrate entities, agencies, instrumentalities and units of
the National Government, as well as, expand, amend, change or
otherwise modify their powers, functions and authorities
GOOD FAITH AS A LIMITATION TO THE PRESIDENT’S POWER TO REORGANIZE
● In the case of MEWAP v. Executive Secretary3, citing the case of Canonizado
v. Aguirre, the SC ruled that reorganization involves the reduction of
personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy
or redundancy of functions. It alters the existing structure of government
offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and
responsibility between them.
● Hence, according to the case of Banda v. Ermita, it was ruled that as a general
rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of
economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.
EVIDENCE OF BAD FAITH4
1. Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new
staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned;
2. Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same
functions us created;
3. Where incumbents were replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of
appointment, performance and merit;
4. Where there is a classification of offices in the department or agency
concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same
functions as the original offices; and
5. Where the removal violates the order of separation.
POWER TO ABOLISH ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
● GR: the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. This
proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power
to destroy. A public office is either created by the Constitution, by statute, or
by authority of law. Thus, except where the office was created by the
Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature that brought it
into existence.5
● XPN: However, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive
department are concerned, the President’s power of control may justify him to
inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant him the
broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.6
CHAPTER III CASES:
SECRETARY OF DOTC v MABALOT [G.R. NO. 137200 (2002)]: A memorandum and
department order were issued by the DOTC Secretary, directed the Land
Transportation and Franchising Regulatory Board (LTFRB) to effect the transfer of its
regional functions to the DOTC Regional Office in the Cordillera Administration Region
4 Protecting the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees, Republic Act No. 6656, [June 10,
1988]
5 Banda v. Ermita, supra at 3
6 Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, 360 SCRA 718 [2001]

(CAR), pending the creation of a regular regional Franchising and Regulatory Office in
the region. Personnel of the DOTC-CAR shall perform LTFRB functions on a
concurrent capacity subject to the direct supervision and control of LTFRB Central
Office. Now, the respondent, filed a petition for certiorari before the lower court,
conteding that the memorandum order was null and void. The lower court ruled in favor
of the respondent, on the basis that it was unconstitutional and an encroachment of
powers of the legislative.
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career services are characterized to have security of tenure, therefore the petitioner is
protected from being willfully removed by the president, the only way that the petitioner
can be validly removed is for a valid cause and in accordance with the procedural due
process. According to the Court it found that, although the procedural due process was
followed and complied with the petitioner was not removed for a valid cause, since to
start with the committee was created to investigate the administrative aspect of the
criminal cases being faced by the petitioner at that time.

SC ruled that the memorandum order was constitutional. According to the Court, a
public office may be created through any of the following modes, to wit, either (1) by
the Constitution (fundamental law), (2) by law (statute duly enacted by Congress), or
(3) by authority of law. In the instant case, the creation and establishment of LTFRB-
-CAR Regional Office was made pursuant to the third mode - by authority of law. The
DOTC Secretary issued the assailed Memorandum and Department Orders pursuant
to Administrative Order No. 36 of the President. Furthermore, Presidential Decree
No.1772 gives the President the continuing power to reorganize the national
government. Hence, The organic personnel of the DOTC-CAR were merely designated
to perform the additional duties and functions of an LTFRB Regional Office. To
designate a public officer to another position may mean to vest him with additional
duties while he performs the functions of his permanent office.
EUGENIO v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION [243 SCRA 196 (1995)]: Petitioner was
the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She applied for a
Career Executive Service and a CESO rank which she was given CES eligibility,
thereafter, she was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the Career
Executive Service Board. However, CSC passed a resolution which resolved to
streamline, reorganize and effect changes in its organizational structure which affected
the petitioner’s appointment, due to the abolishment of the Career Executive Service
Board. Thus, petitioner filed the petition with the SC to annul the resolution for being
void and unconstitutional.
CHAPTER 4: POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES &CHAPTER 5:
DELEGATION OF POWERS
SCOPE OF POWERS
1. Express and Implied Powers - jurisdiction and powers of administrative
agencies are measured and limited by the Constitution or law creating them
or granting their powers, to those conferred expressly or by necessary
implication.
2. Inherent Powers - It has no inherent powers, although implied powers may
sometimes be spoken of as inherent. Thus, in the absence of any provision,
administrative agencies do not possess the inherent power to punish for
contempt which has always been regarded as a necessary incident and
attribute of the courts.
3. Quasi-Judicial Powers - official powers cannot be merely assumed by
administrative officers, nor can they be created by courts in the proper
exercise of their judicial functions.
CLASSIFICATION OF POWERS
1. Investigatory powers
2. Quasi-legislative or rule-making powers
3. Quasi-judicial or adjudicatory powers; and

SC ruled that the CSC cannot abolish the CESB. According to the Court, The controlling DISCRETIONARY POWERS MINISTERIAL POWERS
fact is that the CESB was created in PD No. 1. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as
the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature. The very essence of a discretionary A ministerial duty is one in respect to
power is that the person or persons which nothing is left to discretion. It is a
LARIN v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [280 SCRA 173 (1997]: President issued an exercising it may choose which of simple, definite duty arising under
executive order which mandates for the streamlining of the BIR. Under said order, some several courses will be followed. conditions admitted or proved to exist,
positions and functions are either abolished, renamed, decentralized or transferred to Discretion may be defined, when applied and imposed by law. A ministerial act has
other offices, while other offices are also created. The Excise Tax Service, of which the to public functionaries, as the power or been defined as one performed in
petitioner was the Assistant Commissioner, was one of those offices that was right conferred upon them by law of response to a duty which has been
abolished. Petitioner assailed the legality of EO No. 132 claiming that he was removed acting officially under certain positively imposed by law and its
as a result of the reorganization made in the BIR pursuant to E.O. No. 132. He claimed circumstances, according to the dictates performance required at a time and in a
that there is yet no law enacted by Congress which authorizes the reorganization by of their own judgment and conscience, manner or upon conditions specifically
the Executive Department of executive agencies, particularly the BIR. and not controlled by the judgment or designated, the duty to perform under
conscience of others. the conditions specified not being
SC ruled that the office of the petitioner falls under the category of Career Executive dependent upon the officer's judgment or
Service, which is appointed by the president and being a presidential appointee, it discretion.
follows that the president have the power to discipline the petitioner. Despite the fact
that the constitution grants the president the power to appoint and the inherent power
to remove, such power is not without limit. Under the Administrative code of 1987,

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Does the grant of such powers to Administrative Agencies violate the Doctrine 2. Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23
of Separation of Powers? No! Administrative agencies became the catch basin for of Article VI
the residual powers of the three branches. The theory of the separation of powers is 3. Delegation to the people at large;
designed to forestall overaction resulting from concentration of power. However with 4. Delegation to local governments; and
the growing complexity of modern life, there is a constantly growing tendency toward 5. Delegation to administrative bodies of the Constitution.
the delegation of greater powers by the legislature. [Pangasinan Transportation v.
Public Service Commission (1940)] TEST/REQUISITES OF A VALID LEGISLATIVE DELEGATION7
1. Completeness Test – The law must be complete in itself and must set forth
DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATION the policy to be executed
● What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is 2. Sufficient Standards Test – The law must fix a standard, the limits of which
expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such are sufficiently determinate or determinable, to which the delegate must
provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to conform.
make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants,
including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and WHAT IS A SUFFICIENT STANDARD? 8
logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant 1. Defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and
of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or specifies the public agency to apply it; and
privilege. This is so because the greater includes the lesser, expressed in the 2. Indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus. [Chua v. CSC (1993)] affected.

INVESTIGATIVE POWERS FORMS OF SUFFICIENT STANDARD

● The power of an administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and 1. Express
investigate the activities of persons or entities coming under its jurisdiction, or 2. Implied [Eduv.Ericta(1970)]
to secure, or to require the disclosure of information by means of accounts, 3. Embodied in other statutes on the same matter and not necessarily in the
records, reports, statements, testimony of witnesses, production of same law being challenged. [Chiongbian v. Orbos (1995)]
documents, or otherwise.
● Express Grant: POWER OF SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION
○ Contempt ● With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid
○ Subpoena down in a statute by “filling in” the details which the Congress may not have
○ Search the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their
● Implied or Express promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the
○ Clearance implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor
○ Fact-Finding Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.
○ Ocular Inspection
○ Visitorial ACCEPTED SUFFICIENT STANDARD
1. Public interest;
DELEGATION OF POWERS 2. Justice and equity;
● GR: Principle of Delegata Potesta non Potest Delegare: a delegated power 3. Public convenience and welfare;
may not be further delegated by the person to whom such power is delegated, 4. Simplicity, economy and efficiency;
and that in all cases of delegated authority, where personal trust or confidence 5. Sense and experience of men; and
is reposed in the agent and especially where the exercise and application of 6. National security
the power is made subject to his judgment or discretion, the authority is purely
personal and cannot be delegated to another unless there is a special power KINDS OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND REGULATIONS
of substitution either express or necessarily implied. 1. Supplementary legislation – pertains to rules and regulations to fix details
● XPN: in the execution of a policy in the law. e.g. IRRs of the Labor Code.
1. Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of 2. Interpretative legislation – pertains to rules and regulations construing or
Article VI of the Constitution; interpreting the provisions of a statute to be enforced and they are binding on
all concerned until they are changed, e.g. BIR Circulars.

7 Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R. Nos. 168056, 168207, 168461, 168463 & 168730, [September 1, 2005] 8 id.

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CHAPTER IV CASES:
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS v TORRES [G.R. No.
101279 (1992)]: As a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by
Filipino housemaids employed in Hong Kong, then DOLE Secretary Ruben Torres
issued Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the
recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong
Kong. The DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the business of deploying such
Hong Kong-bound workers. The POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum
Circular No. 37, Series of 1991, on the processing of employment contracts of domestic
workers for Hong Kong. PASEI filed a petition for prohibition to annul the DOLE and
POEA circulars and to prohibit their implementation on the grounds, among others, that
DOLE and POEA acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-
making authority in issuing said circulars.
SC ruled that the Secretary of Labor was granted by the Labor Code the power to
restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities. On the other hand, the scope
of the regulatory authority of the POEA, which was created by EO 797 which took over
the functions of maintaining a registration and/or licensing system to regulate private
sector participation in the recruitment and placement of workers, locally and overseas.
In the case at hand, the administrative issuances merely restricted the scope or area
of PASEI’s business operations by excluding recruitment and deployment of domestic
helpers for Hong Kong until after the establishment of the “mechanisms” that will
enhance the protection of Filipino Domestic Helpers going to HK. Said administrative
issuances, are intended to curtail, if not to end, rampant violations of the rule against
excessive collections of placement and documentation fees, travel fees and other
charges committed by private employment agencies recruiting and deploying domestic
helpers to Hong Kong. They are reasonable, valid and justified under the general
welfare clause of the Constitution, since the recruitment and deployment business, as
it is conducted today, is affected with public interest.
MATEO v COURT OF APPEALS [247 SCRA 284 (1995)]: Edgar Sta. Maria, then
General Manager of MOWAD, was placed under preventive suspension before being
terminated by the BoD of MOWAD. He filed a special civil action for quo warranto and
mandamus. The Board moved to dismiss the case, on the ground of the RTC’s lack of
jurisdiction over disciplinary actions of government employees. RTC denied the motion.
CA dismissed the Board’s petition.
The SC granted the petition and set aside the CA decision, saying that the CSC, not
the RTC, had jurisdiction to entertain cases involving the dismissal of officers and
employees under the Civil Service Law. The hiring and firing of employees of GOCCs
are governed by the provision of the Civil Service Law and Rules and Regulations.
RTCs have no jurisdiction to entertain cases involving dismissal of officers and
employees covered by the Civil Service Law. Employees of GOCC with original charter
fall under the jurisdiction of the CSC.
CARINO v CAPULONG [222 SCRA 593 (1993)]: Private Respondent filed before the
RTC, a petition for prohibition, certiorari and mandamus against the DECS (Department
of Education) to annul and set aside the closure order and to enjoin the former from
padlocking or closing of the school campus.
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SC ruled that It is a discretionary duty of the DECS to regulate education
establishments. A ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no
room for the exercise of discretion in its performance. On the other hand, a discretionary
duty is that which by nature requires the exercise of judgment. In the case at bar,
petitioner has been operating a school without a permit in blatant violation of law. Public
respondent has no ministerial duty to issue to petitioner a permit to operate a school in
Davao City before petitioner has even filed an application or before his application has
been first processed in accordance with the rules and regulations on the matter.
Therefore, the issuance of the permit in question is not a ministerial duty of the
petitioners. It is a discretionary duty or function on the part of the petitioners because it
had to be exercised in accordance with — and not in violation of — the law and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations.
CARPIO v EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [206 SCRA 290 (1992)]: Petitioner Carpio
assails the constitutionality of RA 6975 which established the PNP and placed it under
the DILG. Carpio mainly argues that the Act derogated the power of control of the
NAPOLCOM over the PNP by vesting different powers in the local officials.
SC upheld the constitutionality of the act and clarified that there is no usurpation of the
power of control as the local executives merely act as representatives of the
NAPOLCOM. The President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the
members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and
other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department. The
President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of the Armed Forces. He remains
a civilian whose duties under the Commander-in-Chief provision represent only a part
of the organic duties imposed upon him. All his other functions are clearly civil in nature.
His position as a civilian Commander-in-Chief is consistent with, and a testament to,
the constitutional principle that “civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the
military.”
BLAQUERA v ALCALA [266 SCRA 366, 425 (1998)]: Then Pres. Aquino issued AO
268 which granted each official and employee of the government the productivity
incentive benefits. It also provided that productivity incentive benefits shall be granted
only for the year 1991. Accordingly, all heads of agencies, including government boards
of government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions, are strictly
prohibited from granting productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 and future
years pending the result of a comprehensive study being undertaken by the Office of
the Pres. The petitioners, who are officials and employees of several government
departments and agencies, were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992. Then, on
Jan. 19, 1993, then Pres. Ramos issued AO 29 authorizing the grant of productivity
incentive benefits for the year 1992. Sec. 4 of AO 29 directed all departments, offices
and agencies which authorized payment of productivity incentive bonus for the year
1992 in excess of P1, 000.00 to immediately cause the refund of the excess. In
compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies of the government
concerned caused the deduction from petitioners’ salaries or allowances of the
amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments.
SC ruled that the president’s issuance of AOs were valid and within the power of the
president as the head of the government. Governmental power and authority are

exercised and implemented through him. His power includes the control of executive
departments as provided under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution. Control means the
power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done
in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of
the latter. The Pres. can, by virtue of his power of control, review, modify, alter or nullify
any action or decision of his subordinate in the executive departments, bureau or
offices under him.
CHAPTER V CASES:
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES v POEA [160 SCRA 533 (1998)]: A Chief Officer of a
ship was killed in an accident in Japan. The widow filed a complaint for charges against
the Eastern Shipping Lines with POEA, based on a Memorandum Circular No. 2, issued
by the POEA which stipulated death benefits and burial for the family of overseas
workers. ESL questioned the validity of the memorandum circular as violative of the
principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been
given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization,
the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle,
is not subject to delegation. Nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the
case.
SC ruled that there was a valid delegation of powers, the authority to issue the said
regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797. It is true that
legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated.
What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not
what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the
legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to
the delegate. With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies
laid down in a statute by “filling in” the details which the Congress may not have the
opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what
are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the
Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and
effect of law.
TATAD v DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY [G.R. NO. 124360 (1997)]: The petitioner
question the constitutionality of RA No. 8180 “An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil
Industry and For Other Purposes.” The deregulation process has two phases: (a) the
transition phase and the (b) full deregulation phase through EO No. 372. The petitioner
claims that Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
to the President and the Sec. of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or
determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to implement
the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry, and the law does not provide any
specific standard to determine when the prices of crude oil in the world market are
considered to be declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is
considered stable.
SC ruled that Section 15 of RA 8180 did not violate the constitutional prohibition on
undue delegation of legislative power. The tests to determine the validity of delegation
of legislative power are the completeness test and the sufficiency test. The
completeness test demands that the law must be complete in all its terms and
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conditions such that when it reaches the delegate, all it must do is enforce it. The
sufficiency test demand an adequate guideline or limitation in the law to delineate the
delegate’s authority. Section 15 provides for the time to start the full deregulation, which
answers the completeness test. It also laid down standard guide for the judgement of
the President- he is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and
petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of
peso to dollar is stable- which answers the sufficiency test.
PALAEZ v THE AUDITOR GENERAL [G.R. NO. L-23725 (1965)]: The President of
the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-
three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin. Petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as
Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil
action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General,
to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any
expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any
disbursement by said municipalities. Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are
null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by
Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
SC ruled that The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in
nature. It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary,
in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may
partake of an administrative nature — involving, as it does, the adoption of means and
ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities — the authority to create
municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. Although Congress may
delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation
of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must
set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate
and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable
— to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. The Court
said that Section 68 of the RA does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid
delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not
enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President.
CHAPTER VI: QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWERS OR RULE-MAKING POWERS
GENERALLY
● Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature or
quasi-legislative (i.e. to make rules and regulations), and, in practical effect,
with the power to make law.
● However, the essential legislative functions may not be delegated to
administrative agencies and in this sense, it is said that administrative
agencies have no legislative power and are precluded from legislating in the
strict sense.
What may be granted to an administrative agency?
● It is the rule-making power to implement the law it is entrusted to enforce. It
necessarily includes the power to amend, revise, alter, or repeal its rules and

regulations, (infra.) It is a standard provision in administrative rules that prior
issuances that are inconsistent therewith are declared repeated or modified.
Conditions — The statutory grant of rule-making power to administrative agencies is
a valid exception to the rule on nondelegation of legislative power (Chap. IV.) provided
two conditions concur, namely:
a. The statute is complete in itself, setting forth the policy to be executed by the
agency; and
b. Said statute fixes a standard, mapping out the boundaries of the agency's
authority to which it must conform.
REQUISITES OF A VALID ADMINISTRATIVE RULE
1. Within the scope or authority of law
2. Authorized by law
3. Reasonable
To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted
to secure the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the
purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held
to be invalid. [Lupangco v. CA, (1988)]
4. Promulgated in accordance with prescribed procedure
What is the effect of a valid rule or regulation?
● A valid rule or regulation duly promulgated by an administrative agency has
the force and effect of law and is binding on the agency and on all those
dealing with the agency. It is law. Conversely, a regulation not adopted
pursuant to law is no law and has neither the force nor the effect of law.
LIMITATIONS ON THE RULE MAKING POWER (TEST TO DETERMINE VALIDITY
OF RULES)
● A public administrative body may make only such rules and regulations as are
within the limits of the powers granted to it or what is found in the legislative
enactment itself; otherwise, they become void.
A. If it exceeds the authority conferred to it;
B. If it conflicts with the governing statute;
C. If it extends or modifies the statute;
D. If it has no reasonable relationship to the statutory purpose;
E. If it is arbitrary or unreasonable or unconstitutional.
PUBLICATION RULES
1. Administrative rules and regulations are subject to the publication and
effectivity rules of the Admin Code.
2. Publication Requirement: EO 200 (Art. 2, Civil Code) requires publication of
laws in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.
Publication is indispensable, especially if the rule is general.
PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY FOR THE FOLLOWING TO BE EFFECTIVE:
1. Laws not only of general application, but also laws of local application, private
laws
2. Presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in
the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by
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the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution, including
even those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him
from certain prohibitions or requirements
3. Administrative rules and regulations enforcing or implementing existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation
4. City charters
5. Circulars issued by the Monetary Board not merely interpreting but "filling in
the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
PUBLICATION IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE FOLLOWING TO BE EFFECTIVE:
1. Interpretative regulations
2. Regulations which are merely internal in nature (regulating only the personnel
of the administrative agency and not the published)
3. Letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules
or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties
4. Internal instructions issued by an administrative agency
5. Municipal ordinances which are governed by the Local Government Code
[Tañada v. Tuvera, (1986)]
FILING REQUIREMENT
● The Administrative Code of 1987, particularly Section 3 thereof, expressly
requires each agency to file with the Office of the National Administrative
Register (ONAR) of the University of the Philippines Law Center three certified
copies of every rule adopted by it. Administrative issuances which are not
published or filed with the ONAR are ineffective and may not be enforced.
[GMA v. MTRCB (2007)]
Effectivity: 15 days after filing and publication
● Admin. Code, Bk. VII, Sec. 4. Effectivity. - In addition to other rulemaking
requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall
become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided
unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of
imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which
must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall
take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who
may be affected by them.
● Exceptions:
○ 1. Different date is fixed by law or specified in the rule.
○ 2. In case of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare.
PENAL RULES
● Admin. Code, Bk. VII, Sec. 6. Omission of Some Rules. – [...] (2) Every rule
establishing an offense or defining an act which, pursuant to law is punishable
as a crime or subject to a penalty shall in all cases be published in full text.
● GR: Rules must not provide penal sanctions
● XPN: “A violation or infringement of a rule or regulation validly issued can
constitute a crime punishable as provided in the authorizing statute and by
virtue of the latter.” [People v. Maceren (1977)]

For an administrative regulation to have the force of penal law:
1. The violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the
delegating statute itself; and
2. The penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself [Perez vs.
LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc., (2006), citing U.S. v. Panlilio
(1914)]
Can administrative bodies make penal rules? NO. Penal statutes are exclusive to
the legislature and cannot be delegated. Administrative rules and regulations must not
include, prohibit or punish acts which the law does not even define as a criminal act.
[People v. Maceren (1977)]
POWER TO AMEND, REVISE, ALTER OR REPEAL RULES
● Following the doctrine of necessary implication, [t]he grant of express power
to formulate implementing rules and regulations must necessarily include the
power to amend, revise, alter, or repeal the same. [Yazaki Torres
Manufacturing, Inc. v. CA (2006)]
CHAPTER VI CASES:
ABELLA v CSC [442 SCRA 507 (2004)]: “Petitioner Francisco A. Abella, Jr., a lawyer,
retired from the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), now the Philippine
Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), as Department Manager of the Legal Services
Department. He held a civil service eligibility for the position of Department Manager,
having completed the training program for Executive Leadership and Management
under the Civil Service Academy, pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 850, which was then
the required eligibility for said position. Two years after his retirement, petitioner was
hired by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) on a contractual basis. On
Petitioner was issued by SBMA a permanent employment as Department Manager III,
Labor and Employment Center. However, when said appointment was submitted to
respondent Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. III, it was disapproved on the
ground that petitioner’s eligibility was not appropriate. Petitioner was advised by SBMA
of the disapproval of his appointment. In view thereof, petitioner was issued a
temporary appointment as Department Manager III, Labor and Employment Center,
SBMA.
The SC ruled Civil Service laws have expressly empowered the CSC to issue and
enforce rules and regulations to carry out its mandate. In the exercise of its authority,
the CSC deemed it appropriate to clearly define and identify positions covered by the
Career Executive Service. Logically, the CSC had to issue guidelines to meet this
objective, specifically through the issuance of the challenged Circular. On petitioner’s
averment that he was not afforded due process for CSC’s alleged failure to notify him
of a hearing relating to the issuance of the challenged Circular, is not convincing. The
issuance of the circular was an exercise of a quasi-legislative function as such, prior
notice to and hearing of every affected party, as elements of due process, are not
required since there is no determination of past events or facts that have to be
established or ascertained. As a general rule, prior notice and hearing are not essential
to the validity of rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct.
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SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v NTC [G.R. NO. 151908 & 152063 (2003)]:
Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) promulgated rules and regulations on the billing of
telecommunications services. Petitioners-communications companies filed an action
for declaration of nullity of the billing circulars, alleging, among others: that NTC
contravened the Civil Code provisions on sales in regulating the sale of prepaid call
cards; and that the billing circular violated the constitutional prohibition against the
deprivation of property without due process of law. The NTC moved to dismiss the case
for failure of petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied the
motion to dismiss and enjoined the NTC from implementing the questioned circulars.
The CA, however, dismissed the case on appeal without prejudice to the referral of the
petitioners' grievances and disputes on the assailed issuances with the NTC.
The Supreme Court held that the trial court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the civil
case. Judicial power includes the authority of the courts to determine the validity of the
acts of administrative agencies. In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule
or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust
administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies only where the act
of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial
function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rulemaking or quasi-legislative
power. In like manner, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the
administrative agency exercises its quasi judicial or adjudicatory function.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES v COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. NO. 116356 (1998)]:
Petitioner insists on paying pilotage fees prescribed under PPA circulars. Because EO
1088 sets a higher rate, petitioner now assails its constitutionality. Respondent Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Respondent Court pointed out that
petitioner, during pre-trial, limited the issues to whether EO 1088 is illegal or
unconstitutional and whether private respondent may enforce and collect fees under
EO 1088. It then affirmed the factual findings and conclusion of the trial court that
petitioner failed to show proof to support its position. In sum, petitioner raised the main
issue on whether EO 1088 is unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court held that EO 1088 is constitutional. According to the Court, what
determines whether an act is a law or an administrative issuance is not its form but its
nature. Here as we have already said, the power to fix the rates of charges for a
service, including pilotage service, has always been regarded as legislative in
character. Its legislative purpose is the “rationalization of pilotage service charges,
through the imposition of uniform and adjusted rates for foreign and coastwise vessels
in all Philippine ports. We conclude that E.O. No. 1088 is a valid statute and that the
PPA is duty bound to comply with its provisions. The PPA may increase the rates but
it may not decrease them below those mandated by E.O. No. 1088. “Administrative or
executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to
the laws or the Constitution.” It is axiomatic that an administrative agency, like the PPA,
has no discretion whether to implement the law or not. Its duty is to enforce it.
Unarguably, therefore, if there is any conflict between the PPA circular and a law, such
as EO 1088, the latter prevails.
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ARANETA v GATMAITAN [101 PHIL 328 (YEAR)]: The President issued E.O 22 - DISTINGUISH FROM JUDICIAL POWER
prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, and the E.O 66 and 80 as amendments
KIND OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIAL
to EO 22, as a response for the general clamor among the majority of people living in
the coastal towns of San Miguel Bay that the said resources of the area are in danger PROCEEDINGS
of major depletion because of the effects of trawl fishing. A group of Otter trawl
operators filed a complaint for injunction to restrain the Secretary of Agriculture and NATURE Inquisitorial Adversarial
Natural Resources from enforcing the said E.O. and to declare E.O 22 as null and void.
RULES OF Liberally Applied Follow technical rules in the Rules
SC ruled that the President is empowered by law to issue the executive orders. Accdg PROCEDURE of Court
to the Court, congress provided under the Fisheries Act that a.) it is unlawful to take or
catch fry or fish eggs in the waters of the Phil and b.) it authorizes Sec. of Agriculture NATURE AND Decision limited to Decision includes matters brought
and Nat. Resources to provide regulations/ restrictions as may be deemed necessary. EXTENT OF matters of general as issue by the parties
The Act was complete in itself and leaves it to the Sec. to carry into effect its legislative DECISION concerns
intent. The Pres. did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the
inhabitants and dispose of issues of gen. concern w/c were in consonance and strict PARTIES The agency itself may be The parties are only the private
conformity with law. a party to the litigants
proceedings before it
TAYUG RURAL BANK v CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHIL. [G.R. NO. L-46158
(1986)]: Tayug is a banking corporation in Pangasinan. It obtained loans from CB. DISTINGUISH FROM QUASI-LEGISLATIVE
Then, CB through the Director of Department of Loans and Credit, issued a
memorandum, informing all rural banks that an additional penalty will be imposed. RULE MAKING POWER ADJUDICATORY POWER
Thus, Tayug Rural Bank filed a complaint against the CB to recover the penalty
imposed and to restrain the same from continuing the imposition of the penalty. The quasi-legislation looks to the future and Quasi-judicial action involves
lower court ruled in favor of Tayug. changes existing conditions by making a enforcement of liabilities as they stand
new rule to be applied prospectively. on present or past facts and under laws
SC ruled that the Central Bank cannot impose penalty by virtue of a memorandum. A supposed to exist.
reading of the circular and pertinent provisions, including that of RA 720, shows that
nowhere therein is the authority given to the Monetary Board to mete out additional Adjudication applies to named persons legislation lays down general regulations
penalties to the rural banks on past due accounts with the Central Bank. As said by the or to specific situations that apply to classes of persons or
CFI, while the Monetary Board possesses broad supervisory powers, nonetheless, the situations.
retroactive imposition of administrative penalties cannot be taken as a measure
SUPERVISORY in character. Administrative rules have the force and effect of law.
There are, however, limitations in the rulemaking power of administrative agencies. All CLASSES OF QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS
that is required of administrative rules and regulations is to implement given legislation 1. Directing (corrective/ award), e.g., backwages
by not contradicting it and conform to the standards prescribed by law. Rules and 2. Enabling (grant/ permit), e.g., grant of franchise
regulations cannot go beyond the basic law. Since compliance therewith can be 3. Dispensing (exempt/ relieve), e.g., amnesty
enforced by a penal sanction, an administrative agency cannot implement a penalty not 4. Summary (compel/ force), e.g., cease and desist
provided in the law authorizing it, much less one that is applied retroactively. 5. Equitable

CHAPTER VII: QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER REQUISITES FOR A VALID EXERCISE

DEFINITION: The power of the administrative agency to determine questions of fact to
which the legislative policy is to apply, in accordance with the standards laid down by
the law itself. [Smart Communications v. NTC (2003)]
1. Jurisdiction
2. Due Process
General Rule: A tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions acts without
jurisdiction if no authority has been conferred to it by law to hear and decide cases.
1. Jurisdiction to hear is explicit or by necessary implication, conferred through
the terms of the enabling statute.
2. Effect of administrative acts outside jurisdiction—Void.
3. Rationale: They are mere creatures of law and have no general powers but
only such as have been conferred upon them by law.

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POWERS INCLUDED IN QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS
1. Subpoena Power – In any contested case, the agency shall have the power
to require the attendance of witnesses or the production of books, papers,
documents and other pertinent data. [Sec. 13, Bk. VII, 1987 Admin Code]
2. Contempt Power
GR: Get the aid of RTC.
XPN: Law gives agency contempt power. [Sec. 13, Bk. VII, 1987 Admin Code]
3. Power to issue Search Warrant or Warrant of Arrest
General Rule: Only Judges may issue.
Under the express terms of our Constitution, it is doubtful whether the arrest
of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the
purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to
an administrative investigation. [Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board (1963),
decided under the 1935 Constitution. Note that the 1987 and 1935
Constitutions are the same in limiting the issuance of warrants of arrest to a
judge.]
(1) Under Article III, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution, only judges, and no
other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search;
(2) The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens,
whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested,
following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation [Salazar
v. Achacoso, (1990)]
Board of Commissioners v. De La Rosa (1991) reiterates the rule that for a
warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration to be valid, it
must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation.
A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for purposes
of investigation only is null and void for being unconstitutional
WHAT IS ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS?
● While [Admin. Agencies are] free from the rigidity of certain procedural
requirements, they cannot entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and
essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an
administrative character [Ang Tibay v. CIR (1940)]
● A decision rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked
at any time directly or collaterally by means of a separate action or proceeding
where it is invoked. [Garcia v. Molina (2010)]
● In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process lies simply in the
opportunity to explain one’s side or to seek reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. What is proscribed is the absolute lack of notice or
hearing. [Office of the Ombudsman v. Coronel (2006)]
CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS
1. Right to a hearing (Includes the right of a party to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof)
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
3. Decision must be supported by evidence.
4. Evidence must be substantial.
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5. Quantum of Proof: Substantial Evidence. The amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion
[Sec. 5, Rule 133, Rules of Court]
6. Decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected
7. Independent consideration of judge (Must not simply accept the views of a
subordinate)
8. Decision rendered in such a manner as to let the parties know the various
issues involved and the reasons for the decision rendered.
DUE PROCESS IS VIOLATED WHEN:
1. There is failure to sufficiently explain the reason for the decision rendered; or
2. If not supported by substantial evidence; and
3. Imputation of a violation and imposition of a fine despite absence of due notice
and hearing. [Globe Telecom v. NTC (2004)]
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
1. The right against self-incrimination may be invoked by the respondent at the
time he is called by the complainant as a witness.
2. If he voluntarily takes the witness stand, he can be cross examined; but he
may still invoke the right when the question calls for an answer which
incriminates him for an offense other than that charged [People v.Ayson
(1989)]
NOTICE AND HEARING,
● When required:
1. When the law specifically requires it.
2. When it affects a person’s status and liberty
● When not required:
1. Urgent reasons
2. Discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an
undisputed fact [Suntay v. People (1957)]
3. If it involves the exercise of discretion and there is no grave abuse.
4. When it involves rules to govern future conduct of persons or
enterprises, unless law provides otherwise.
5. In the valid exercise of police power.
ADMINISTRATIVE RES JUDICATA
● When it applies
○ The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings and not to the exercise of purely administrative
functions. Administrative proceedings are non-litigious and summary
in nature; hence, res judicata does not apply. [Nasipit Lumber Co. v.
NLRC (1989)]
REQUISITES OF RES JUDICATA
1. The former judgment must be final;
2. It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties;

3. It must be a judgment on the merits; and
4. There must be identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action [Ipekdijan
Merchandising v. CTA (1963)]
EFFECT OF RES JUDICATA
● Decisions and orders of administrative bodies rendered pursuant to their
quasi-judicial authority have, upon their finality, the force and effect of a final
judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata, which forbids the
reopening of matters once judicially determined by competent authorities.
● General Rule: Res judicata does not apply in administrative adjudication
relative to citizenship
● Exception: for res judicata to be applied in cases of citizenship, the following
must be present:
○ (1) A person's citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a
controversy where said person is a party;
○ (2) The Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active
part in the resolution thereof;
○ (3) the finding or citizenship is affirmed by SC [Board of
Commissioners v. De la Rosa (1991)]
FORUM SHOPPING
● There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one
forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in
another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts
but also in connection with litigation commenced in the courts while an
administrative proceeding is pending, in order to defeat administrative
processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a
favorable court ruling.
● The test for determining whether a party has violated the rule against forum
shopping is where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in
the action under consideration. [Fortich v. Corona (1998), citing First
Philippine International Bank v. CA (1996)]
● The rule against forum shopping applies only to judicial cases or proceedings,
not to administrative cases. [Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez (2010)]
CHAPTER VII CASES:
DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC. v ESTEVA [509 SCRA 332, 369-370 (2006)]: Anent the
first assignment of error, petitioner argues that judicial review under Rule 65 of the
revised Rules of Civil Procedure is limited only to issues concerning want or excess or
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The special civil action for certiorari is a remedy
designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not mere errors of judgment. It is the
contention of petitioner that the NLRC properly assumed jurisdiction over the parties
and subject matter of the instant case. The errors assigned by the respondents in their
Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals do not pertain to the jurisdiction of
the NLRC; they are rather errors of judgment supposedly committed by the the NLRC,
in its Resolution, dated 29 February 2000, and are thus not the proper subject of a
petition for certiorari. Petitioner also posits that the Petition for Certiorari filed by
respondents with the Court of Appeals raised questions of fact that would necessitate
a review by the appellate court of the evidence presented by the parties before the
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Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, and that questions of fact are not a fit subject for a special
civil action for certiorari.
SC ruled that the DOLE Secretary is in the nature of having/exercising quasi-judicial
power. Quasi-judicial power has been described by this Court in the following manner:
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the power of
the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power
to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to
decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power
when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or
administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or
reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty
entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or
bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official
action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. Since rights of specific persons
are affected it is elementary that in the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due
process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings.
ANG TIBAY v CIR [69 PHIL 635 (1940)]: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang
Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage
of leather, Toribio caused the layoff of a number of his employees. However, the
National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred that
the said employees laid off were members of NLU while no members of the rival labor
union (National Worker’s Brotherhood) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a
company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU. The case reached the
Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU went
to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing for the
CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.
SC ruled that The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are
specifically stated in the law of its creation (CA No 103). It is more administrative board
than part of the Integrated Judicial system of the nation. It not only exercises judicial or
quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and
employees, but its function is more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction
over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question,
matter, controversy, or dispute arising between and/or affecting employers and
employees or laborers and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers and regulate
relations between them subject to and in accordance with the provision of CA 103.
For administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the
following:
1. The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
2. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented.

3. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it
does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to
support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
SCENARIOS, INC. v VINLUAN [G.R. NO. 173283 (2008)]: A former setman of
Scenarios, Inc., filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of salaries and
nonpayment of benefits against petitioners Scenarios, Inc. Summons were issued and
sent by registered mail to Scenario, Inc. However, the summons envelope bore the
mark "RETURN TO SENDER" and "UNCLAIMED.” The NLRC issued an order
remanding the case to the labor arbiter for proper service of summons and appropriate
proceedings. Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
assailing the aforesaid orders of the NLRC. The Court of Appeals granted the petition
and ruled that petitioners failed to overcome the presumption that the notices and
summons had been regularly sent and received in the ordinary course of events.
Petitioners posit that they were denied due process when the labor arbiter decided the
case even in the absence of sufficient proof that the summons and notices were
delivered to them.
SC ruled that the petitioners were not denied due process. Service of notices and
resolutions, including summons, in cases filed before the labor arbiters is governed by
Sections 5 and 6 of Rule III of the New NLRC Rules of Procedure. Moreover, it is a
fundamental rule that unless the contrary is proven, official duty is presumed to have
been performed regularly and judicial proceedings regularly conducted. This
presumption of the regularity of the quasi-judicial proceedings before the NLRC
includes the presumption of regularity of service of summons and other notices. It is
therefore incumbent upon herein petitioners to rebut that legal presumption with
competent and proper evidence, for the return of the registered mail as “unclaimed” is
prima facie proof of the facts indicated therein.
PISON-ARCEO v. NLRC [344 PHIL. 723, 736 (1997)]: This is a labor case for illegal
dismissal, reinstatement and payment of backwages against Hacienda Lanutan
(unregistered name) with a corporation name of Pison-Arceo Agricultural and
Development Corporation. At the Labor Arbiter, what was impleaded were Hacienda
Lanutan (like an alias or nickname) and Jose Edmundo Pison, the administrator of the
Hacienda. LR decided in favor of the workers. NLRC when it affirmed the decision of
the LR, it used Pison-Arceo Agricultural instead of Hacienta Lanutan which is what was
initially impleaded. For this reason, Corporation assails that they were deprived of due
process and NLRC acted in excess of its jurisdiction (no proper service of summons).
SC held that NLRC did not exceed its jurisdiction and that Corporation was not deprived
of its day in court because when Hacienda Lanutan was impleaded, Corporation as its
sole owner was in fact also impleaded. Hacienda Lanutan is an arm of the Corporation
(petitioner). The SC stressed that in quasi-judicial proceedings, procedural rules
governing service of summons are not strictly construed. Substantial compliance
thereof is sufficient.
PASCUAL v. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS [280 SCRA 345 (1969)]: Salvador
Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton filed an administrative case against Arsenio
Pascual Jr. for alleged immorality. At the initial hearing thereof, Gatbonton’s counsel
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announced that he would present Pascual as his first witness. Pascual objected, relying
on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. The Board
of Examiners took note of such a plea but scheduled Pascual to testify in the next
hearing unless in the meantime he could secure a restraining order from a competent
authority. Pascual filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for prohibition
with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners. The
lower court ordered that a writ of preliminary injunction issue against the Board
commanding it to refrain from hearing or further proceeding with such an administrative
case and to await the judicial disposition of the matter. Subsequently, a decision was
rendered by the lower court finding the claim of Pascual to be well-founded and
prohibiting the Board "from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for
the complainant in said investigation without his consent and against himself." Hence,
the Board appealed.
SC ruled that a medical practitioner charged with malpractice in administrative case
can avail of the constitutional guarantee not to be a witness against himself. The case
for malpractice and cancellation of the license to practice medicine while administrative
in character possesses a criminal or penal aspect. An unfavorable decision would result
in the revocation of the license of the respondent to practice medicine. Consequently,
he can refuse to take the witness stand.
UNITED PEPSI-COLA v LAGUESMA [288 SCRA 15 (1998)]: Petitioner is a union of
supervisory employees. Then, union filed a petition for certification election on behalf
of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. However, its petition
was denied by the med-arbiter and, on appeal, by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, on the ground that the route managers are managerial employees and,
therefore, ineligible for union membership under the first sentence of Art. 245 of the
Labor Code, which provides, Managerial employees are not eligible to join or form any
labor organization. However, the SOL dismissed the case.
SC ruled that The Department of Labor continued to use the term "supervisory unions"
despite the demise of the legal definition of "supervisor" apparently because these were
the unions of front line managers which were then allowed as a result of the statutory
grant of the right of self-organization under the Industrial Peace Act. Had the
Department of Labor seen fit to similarly ban unions of top and middle managers which
may have been formed following the dictum in Caltex, it obviously would have done so.
Yet it did not, apparently because no such unions of top and middle managers really
then existed.
DELFIN v. INCIONG [192 SCRA 151 (1990)]: 136 employees of Atlantic Container
Corporation filed a complaint against their employer for not executing the contents of
their collective bargaining agreement. However, upon trial, it was discovered that the
petitioners were the ones who did not follow the agreement as they continually held
strikes and asked for an increase in salary. The CIR was abolished during the pendency
of the case and it was passed to the NLRC. The NLRC ruled that 86 out of the 136
petitioners be reinstated in the position. The petitioners appealed which was
subsequently denied. The petitioners then filed the same complaint to the Minister of
Labor, Amado Inciong, who dismissed the complaint on the following grounds: 1) that
the charge subject of the petition is barred by res judicata; 2) that petitioners’ cause of

action had prescribed and that the same is now barred by laches; 3) that the corporate
and distinct personality of respondent Inland was not successfully pierced.
SC ruled that the case is barred from res judicata. For a prior judgment to constitute a
bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur: a) it must be a final
judgment or order; (b) the court rendering the same must have jurisdiction over the
subject matter and over the parties; (c) it must be a judgment or order on the merits,
and (d) there must be between the two cases identity of parties, subject matter and
cause of action.
CHAPTER VIII: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL AND REVIEW
DIFFERENT KINDS OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL AND REVIEW
1. That which inheres in the relation of administrative superior to administrative
subordinate where determinations are made at lower levels of the same
administrative system;
2. That embraced in statutes which provide for a determination to be made by a
particular officer of body subject to appeal, review, or redetermination by
another officer or body in the same agency or in the same administrative
system;
3. That in which the statute attempts to make a court a part of the administrative
scheme by providing in terms or effect that the court, on review of the action
of an administrative agency, shall exercise powers of such extent that they
differ from ordinary judicial functions and involve a trial de novo of matters of
fact or discretion and application of the independent judgment of the court;
4. That in which the statute provides that an order made by a division of a
Commission or Board has the same force and effect as if made by the
Commission subject to a rehearing by the full Commission, for the ‘rehearing’
is practically an appeal to another administrative tribunal;
5. That in which the statute provides for an appeal to an officer on an
intermediate level with subsequent appeal to the head of the department or
agency; and
6. That embraced in statutes which provide for appeal at the highest level,
namely, the President.
DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY
● Where a decision of the department head generally need not be appealed to
the Office of the President, since the department head (e.g. Secretary) is the
alter ego of the President, and the former’s acts are presumably the
President’s. However, the doctrine does not apply when (a) the act is
repudiated by the President, or (b) the act is required (by law) to be performed
specifically by the department head.
DOCTRINE OF FINALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
• Courts will not interfere with the act of an administrative agency before it has
reached finality or it has been completed.
• Rationale: Without a final order or decision, the power has not been fully and
finally exercised.
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• Prohibition is not the proper remedy when the enabling law itself, which is B.P.
Blg. 325, has specifically tasked the Cabinet to review and approve any
proposed revisions of rates of fees and charges. Petitioners should have
availed of this easy and accessible remedy instead of immediately resorting
to the judicial process. [Paredes v. CA (1996)]
CHAPTER VIII CASES:
SUYAT, JR. v TORRES [441 SCRA 265 (2004)]: The case stemmed from a criminal
case of robbery where Prosecutor Suyat was the reviewing prosecutor. Suyat,
demanded money from the suspects in order for him to dismiss the case. Thereafter,
an entrapment was made. An administrative complaint was filed with the DOJ, accusing
Suyat, of grave misconduct and bribery. Then, the DOJ recommended to the Executive
Secretary of the OP for the immediate dismissal of Suyat. In response, the ES issued
a memorandum which concurred the recommendation and eventually approved by the
President to dismiss Suyat through an administrative order. Suyat filed an MR,
however, it was denied. He appealed to the CA, but likewise, was dismissed due to
inappropriate remedy.
SC ruled that the AO of the President had become final and executory when the
petitioner filed his petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals hence beyond the
jurisdiction of the CA to alter, modify or reverse. In the case at hand, the filing by the
petitioner of a second motion for reconsideration of AO No. 95, being a prohibited
pleading, did not suspend the period to appeal the February 28, 1996 Order to the CA
via a petition for review. Indubitably then, when the petitioner filed his petition for
certiorari with the CA after the President denied his second motion for reconsideration,
AO No. 95 of the President had become final and executory, beyond the jurisdiction of
the CA to alter, modify, or reverse.
TAN v DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY [125 SCRA 302 (1983)]: The Bureau of Forestry
issued Notice 2087 advertising for public hearing a certain tract of public forest land.
Petitioner submitted his application in due form after paying the necessary fees and
posting the required bond. Later that year, President Carlos Garcia issued a directive
to the Director of the Bureau of Forestry to convert the land into a forest reserve for
watershed purposes. The Agriculture and Natural Resources issued General
Memorandum No. 46 granting ordinary timber license where the area is not more than
3,000 hectares. This was subsequently revoked by General Memorandum No. 60.
SC ruled that Tan did not exhaust all his administrative remedies. In the case at hand,
Tan di not appeal the order of the Secretary to the President, who issued Proclamation.
Considering that the President has the power to appeal the orders or acts of his
subordinates, thus, Tan’s failure to take the appeal is failure on his part to exhaust his
administrative remedies.
CALO v. FUERTES [G.R. NO. L-16537 (1962)]: The Director of Lands, rendered a
decision, denying and dismissing Calo’s claim and contest against the Homestead
Application of Fuertes ordering him to vacate the premises. Calo filed an MR but it was
denied. So, he brought it to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, which
modified the decision – reimbursing Calo for the expenses made. However, Calo was
still dissatisfied with the decision, so asked for a reconsideration but denied then to the

OP but withdrew before the office could act. Thereafter, he went directly to the CFI to
file a petition for writ of certiorari. However, the LC dismissed the case.
SC ruled that the withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President of the Philippines is
tantamount to not appealing at all thereto. Such withdrawal is fatal, because the appeal
to the President is the last step he should take in an administrative case.
FORTICH v CORONA [G.R. NO. 131457 (1998)]: The Office of the President (OP)
issued a decision converting a large parcel of land from agricultural land to agro-
industrial/institutional area. Because of this, a group of farmer-beneficiaries staged a
hunger strike in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Compound. The
strike generated a lot of publicity and even a number of Presidential Candidates (for
the upcoming 1998 elections) intervened on behalf of the farmers. Because of this
“blackmail”, the OP re-opened the case and through Deputy Executive Secretary
Renato C. Corona issued the so-called, “politically motivated”, “win-win” resolution,
substantially modifying its decision after it had become final and executory.
SC ruled that the “win-win” resolution, issued after the original decision had not become
final and executory, had any legal effect. The rules and regulations governing appeals
to the Office of the President of the Philippines are embodied in Administrative Order
No. 18. In the said order, it was stated that decisions, resolutions or orders of the OP
shall become final after the lapse of 15 days from receipt of a copy by the parties and
only one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained. In the case at hand, when the
OP issued the Order on June 23, 1997 declaring the decision of March 29, 1996 final
and executory, as no one has seasonably filed an MR, the said Office had lost its
jurisdiction to re-open the case.
SSS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION v BATHAN-VELASCO [G.R. NO. 108765 (1999)]:
Private respondent, filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition for certification
of election to determine the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank
and filed employees of SSS. The Bureau ordered a certification election to conducted
in its main office and regional branches. The petitioner was one of the contending
parties in the elections. Elections were held, and private respondent won. Petitioner
filed an election protest with the Bureau to annul the certification election but it was
denied. Thereafter, petitioner brought the case to the SSS Regional Office, however,
the respondent denied the election protest and declared the private respondent the
winner.
SC ruled that the petitioner did not exhaust all administrative remedies before going to
the Court. The rule is well-entrenched that a party must exhaust all administrative
remedies before resorting to the courts. The premature invocation of the intervention
of the court is fatal to one’s cause of action. This rule would not only give the
administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but would
also prevent the unnecessary and premature resort to courts. In the case at hand,
petitioner failed to take an appeal from the order of the Director of Bureau of Labor
Relations to the Secretary of Labor.
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CHAPTERS IX: JUDICIAL REVIEW; CHAPTER X: DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION
OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; & DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION
JUDICIAL REVIEW
• GR: Judicial review may be granted or withheld as Congress chooses, except
when the Constitution requires or allows it. Thus, a law may provide that the
decision of an administrative agency shall be final and not reviewable and it
would still not offend due process.
• However, Sec. 1, par. 2, Art. VIII of the Constitution, which provides that
judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, clearly means that judicial review of
administrative decisions cannot be denied the courts when there is an
allegation of grave abuse of discretion. [NACHURA]
• It is generally understood that as to administrative agencies exercising quasi-
judicial or legislative power there is an underlying power in the courts to
scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even
though no right of review is given by statute. xxx Judicial review is proper in
case of lack of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion, error of law, fraud or
collusion. [San Miguel Corp. v. NLRC (1975)]
RATIONALE:
(1) There is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such
agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review
is given by statute;
(2) The purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its
jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the parties;
(3) It is that part of the checks and balances which restricts the separation of
powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications. [St. Martin’s Funeral
Homes v. NLRC (1998)]
N.B. Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court of Appeals shall have
appellate jurisdiction over awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or
authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Monetary Board is a quasi-judicial agency
exercising quasi-judicial powers or functions. The Court of Appeals has appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments, orders, resolutions or awards of the BSP Monetary
Board on administrative complaints against banks and quasi-banks.
Nothing in R.A. 7653 or in R.A. 8791 explicitly allows an appeal of the decisions of the
BSP Monetary Board to the Court of Appeals. However, this shall not mean that said
decisions are beyond judicial review. [United Coconut Planters Bank v. E. Ganzon, Inc.,
(2009)]

EXTENT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1) Questions of Law – such as:
(a) Constitutionality of the law creating the agency and granting it
powers
(b) Validity of agency action if these transcend limits established by law
(c) Correctness of interpretation or application of the law
(2) Questions of Fact
• Admin. Code, Bk. VII, Sec. 25 (5). Judicial Review. - Review shall be
made on the basis of the record taken as a whole. The findings of fact of
the agency when supported by substantial evidence shall be final except
when specifically provided otherwise by law.
• GR: Findings of fact by the agency are final when supported by
substantial evidence.
• XPN:
(a) Specifically allowed otherwise by law
(b) Fraud, imposition, or mistake other error of judgment in evaluating
the evidence [Ortua v. Singson Encarnacion (1934)]
(c) Error in appreciation of pleadings and interpretation of the
documentary evidence presented by the parties [Tan Tiong Teck v.
SEC (1940)]
(d) Decision of the agency was rendered by an almost divided agency
and that the division was precisely on the facts as borne out by the
evidence [Gonzales v. Victory Labor Union (1969)]
(3) Questions of Discretion - when a matter has been committed to agency
discretion, courts are reluctant to disturb agency action on it. But a party may
get a court to intervene against arbitrary action and grave abuse of discretion
[Cortes]
DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
• GR: Where the law has delineated the procedure by which administrative
appeal or remedy could be effected, the same should be followed before
recourse to judicial action can be initiated. [Pascual v. Provincial Board (1959)]
REQUISITES OF THE DOCTRINE
(1) The administrative agency is performing a quasi-judicial function;
(2) Judicial review is available; and
(3) The court acts in its appellate jurisdiction.
RATIONALE:
(1) Legal reason: The law prescribes a procedure.
(2) Practical reason: To give the agency a chance to correct its own errors and
prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts
(3) Reasons of comity: Expedience, courtesy, convenience.
EXCEPTION TO THE RULE:
(1) Purely legal questions. [Castro v. Secretary (2001)]
(2) There is grave doubt as to the availability of the administrative remedy
[Pascual v. Provincial Board (1959)]
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(3) Steps to be taken are merely matters of form. [Pascual v. Provincial Board
(1959)]
(4) Administrative remedy not exclusive but merely cumulative or concurrent to a
judicial remedy. [Pascual v. Provincial Board (1959)]
(5) There are circumstances indicating urgency of judicial intervention [DAR v.
Apex Investment (2003)]
(6) Rule does not provide plain, speedy, adequate remedy [Information
Technology Foundation v. COMELEC (2004)]
(7) Resort to exhaustion will only be oppressive and patently unreasonable.
[Cipriano v. Marcelino (1972)]
(8) Where the administrative remedy is only permissive or voluntary and not a
prerequisite to the institution of judicial proceedings. [Corpus v.Cuaderno, Sr.
(1962)]
(9) Application of the doctrine will only cause great and irreparable damage which
cannot be prevented except by taking the appropriate court action. [De Lara,
Jr. v. Cloribel (1965)]
(10) When it involves the rule-making or quasi-legislative functions of an
administrative agency [Smart v. NTC (2003)]
(11) Administrative agency is in estoppel. [Republic v.Sandiganbayan (1996)]
(12) Doctrine of qualified political agency (respondent is a department secretary
whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed
approval of the latter) [Demaisip v. CA 1959); Pagara v. CA (1996)]
(13) Subject of controversy is private land in land case proceedings. [Soto v.
Jareno (1986)]
(14) Violation of due process. [Pagara v. CA (1996)]
(15) Where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably
prejudice the complainant [Republic v. Sandiganbayan (1996)]
(16) Administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. [DAR v. Apex Investment (2003)]
(17) Resort to administrative remedy will amount to a nullification of a claim [Paat
v. CA (1997); Alzate v. Aldana, (1960)]
(18) No administrative review provided for by law [Estrada v. CA (2004)]
(19) Issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies rendered moot [see
enumeration in Estrada v. CA (2004)]
(20) When the claim involved is small
(21) When strong public interest is involved
(22) In quo warranto proceedings [see enumeration in Lopez v. City of Manila
(1996)]
(23) Law expressly provides for a different review procedure. [Samahang
Magbubukid v. CA (1999)]
The exceptions may be condensed into three:
(1) Grave abuse of discretion;
(2) Purequestionoflaw;or
(3) No other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.
NOTE: However, the long list has been developed by jurisprudence. It is prudent to cite
it over the shortened list.
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EFFECTS OF FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES • The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally
• A direct action in court without prior exhaustion of administrative remedies, cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the
when required, is premature, warranting its dismissal on a motion to dismiss claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have
grounded on lack of cause of action. been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such
• Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the
not affect the Court’s jurisdiction. administrative body for its view. [Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. CA, supra]
• If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the court • The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto
can take cognizance of the case and try it [Republic v. Sandiganbayan (1996)] itself authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially
lodged with an administrative body of special competence. [Vidad v. RTC
DOCTRINE OF DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY (1993)]
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION RATIONALE OF THE DOCTRINE: In this era of clogged docket courts, the need for
REMEDIES specialized administrative boards with the special knowledge and capability to hear and
JURISDICTION OF Appellate Concurrent, Original Jurisdiction determine promptly disputes on technical matters has become well-nigh indispensable.
COURT with Admin Body Between the power lodged in an administrative body and a court, the unmistakable
GROUND FOR Exhaustion of The court yields to the jurisdiction trend has been to refer it to the former. [GMA v. ABS CBN (2005)]
NON-EXERCISE OF administrative remedy of the administrative agency
JURISDICTION a condition precedent because of its specialized REQUISITES OF DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION
knowledge or expertise. (1) An administrative body and a regular court have concurrent and original
COURT ACTION Dismiss Suspend Judicial action jurisdiction
(2) Question to be resolved requires expertise of administrative agency
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION (3) Legislative intent on the matter is to have uniformity in rulings
• GR: Courts will not intervene if the question to be resolved is one which (4) Administrative agency is performing a quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function
requires the expertise of administrative agencies and the legislative intent on (not rule-making or quasi-legislative function [Smart v. NTC (2003)]
the matter is to have uniformity in the rulings. [Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan
(1935, US Supreme Court decision)] WHEN THE DOCTRINE INAPPLICABLE
• It can only occur where there is a concurrence of jurisdiction between the court (1) If the agency has exclusive (original) jurisdiction (i.e. Doctrine of Exhaustion
and the administrative agency. would apply);
(2) When the issue is not within the competence of the administrative body to act
• It is a question of the court yielding to the agency because of the latter’s
on (e.g. pure questions of law, over which the expertise is with the courts);
expertise, and does not amount to ouster of the court. [Texas & Pacific
a. Regular courts have jurisdiction in cases where what is assailed is
Railway v. Abilene (1907, US Supreme Court decision)]
the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the
• It is the recent jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative
in many cases that demand the special competence of administrative
function [Smart v. NTC (2003)]
agencies. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a
(3) When the issue involved is clearly a factual question that does not require
particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in
specialized skills and knowledge for resolution to justify the exercise of
character. However, if the determination of the case requires the expertise,
primary jurisdiction.
specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because
technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must
EFFECTS OF THE DOCTRINE
first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be
• While no prejudicial question strictly arises where one is a civil case and the
supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction
other is an administrative proceeding, in the interest of good order, it behooves
of a court [Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. CA (1990)]
the court to suspend its action on the cases before it pending the final outcome
• Well-entrenched is the rule that courts will not interfere in matters which are
of the administrative proceedings [Vidad v. RTC (1993)]
addressed to the sound discretion of the government agency entrusted with
• Does not per se have the effect of restraining or preventing the courts from
the regulation of activities coming under the special and technical training and
the exercise of their lawfully conferred jurisdiction. A contrary rule would
knowledge of such agency. Administrative agencies are given a wide latitude
unduly expand the doctrine of primary jurisdiction [Conrad and Co., Inc. v. CA
in the evaluation of evidence and in the exercise of their adjudicative functions,
(1995)]
latitude which includes the authority to take judicial notice of facts within their
special competence [(Quiambao v. CA (2005)]

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• All the proceedings of the court in violation of the doctrine and all orders and
decisions rendered thereby are null and void [Province of Aklan v. Jody King
Construction and Development Corp. (2013)]
NOTE: The court may raise the issue of primary jurisdiction sua sponte and its
invocation cannot be waived by the failure of the parties to argue it as the doctrine
exists for the proper distribution of power between judicial and administrative bodies
and not for the convenience of the parties [Euro-Med Laboratories Phil., Inc. v. Province
of Batangas(2006)]
CHAPTER IX CASES:
MACAILANG v ANDRADA [G.R. NO. L-21607 (1970)]: The parties had a dispute over
4 parcels of land. The District Land Officer, decided in favor of the plaintiff. However,
the Director of Lands, reversed the decision. The plaintiff, went to the Secretary of
Agriculture for appeal which reversed the decision of Director of lands. Thereafter, the
defendants appealed to the OP, which again reversed the decision through a letter-
decision. So, the plaintiff filed before the CFI, which raised the issue of finality of the
decision rendered by the Secretary.
SC ruled that the Court has the power to nullify the decisions of administrative agencies.
In the matter of judicial review of administrative decisions, some statutes for such
judicial review, others are silent. Mere silence, however, does not necessarily imply that
judicial review is unavailable. Where the law stands mute, the accepted view is that the
extraordinary remedies in the Rules of Court are still available.
OCA v LOPEZ [A.M. No. P-10-2788 (2011): Claudio Lopez (Process Server for the
MTC, Supiden, La Union) was charged with a violation of SEC 11 of RA 9165
(Dangerous Drugs Act), after a search of his house yielded the seizure of 790.6 grams
of dried marijuana fruiting tops. Consonant with the En Banc Resolution, authorizing
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to initiate motu proprio the filing of
administrative complaint against judges and/or employees of the inferior courts who
have been convicted and/or charged before the Sandiganbayan or the courts, the OCA
recommended the filing of an administrative complaint against Lopez for Grave
Misconduct and Conduct Unbecoming a Government Employee. The Court approved
the OCAs recommendation and required Lopez to comment on the complaint. Lopez
submitted a one-page answer/comment alleging that a criminal case was pending
before the RTC La Union and that from the evidence presented, it was clear that the
prosecution failed to prove its case and that the case might be dismissed. Lopez
therefore prayed that this instant complaint be dismissed.
SC ruled that Lopez should be liable for administratively. The present case is an
administrative case, not a criminal case, against respondent. Therefore, the quantum
of proof required is only substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. We emphasize
the well settled rule that a criminal case is different from an administrative case and
each must be disposed of according to the facts and the law applicable to each case.
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CHAPTER X CASES:
NFA v COURT OF APPEALS: Earlier, the NFA conducted a public bidding to award
security contracts for the protection of its facilities. Among those awarded were the
private respondents. When David became the new Administrator of the NFA, he caused
the review of all security contracts and created a Prequalification Bids and Awards
Committee (PBAC). When the time of the bidding came, some bids were disqualified
for failure to comply with documentary requirements including those of Respondents.
Respondents Lanting Security and Watchman Agency filed complaints with the RTC to
restrain the Administrator from proceeding with the public bidding. During the pendency
of the writ of preliminary injunction, David terminated the contracts of the security
agencies and engaged the services of seven new agencies. Respondents filed another
complaint to restrain the NFA from terminating their services. The lower court ruled in
favor of Respondents. On appeal to the SC, the NFA contends that respondents did
not exhaust administrative remedies and hence, their complaint is premature.
SC ruled that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to some
limitations and exceptions. In the case at bar, respondent’s contracts were terminated
in the midst of bidding preparations and their replacements hired barely five days after.
An appeal to the NFA Board or Council of Trustees and the Secretary of Agriculture as
mandated by the provisions of the Administrative Code was not a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The urgency of the situation which
necessitated a recourse to the courts is justified.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS v NAVARRO [G.R. NO. L-33146 (1977)]: Private
respondents are importers of fresh fruits which importation was seized by the Bureau
of Customs. Said importation was classified as non-essential consumer commodities,
they are banned by Central Bank Circulars as prohibited importation or importation
contrary to law and made subject to forfeiture proceedings by Petitioner. Thereafter, a
warrant of seizure and detention was issued. The respondents contend that the
issuance of warrant was only an attempt to divest the respondent Judge of jurisdiction
over the subject matter on the case. Respondent judge, issued an order for the release
of the articles in question, thus preventing Bureau of customs from proceeding with the
auction sale.
SC ruled that respondent court did not acquire jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture
cases for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code. The question of seizure and
forfeiture is for the administrative in the first instance and then the commissioner of
Customs. This is the field where the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction controls.
Thereafter an appeal may be taken to the Court of Tax Appeals. A Court of First
Instance is thus devoid of competence to act on the matter. There is further judicial
review, but only by the Supreme Court in the exercise of its certiorari decision.
Consequently, a Collector of Customs when sitting in forfeiture proceedings constitute
a tribunal upon which the law expressly confers jurisdiction to hear and determine all
questions touching the forfeiture and further disposition of subject matter of such
proceedings.
VDA DE TAN v VETERANS BACKPAY COMMISSION [G.R. NO. L-12944 (1959)]:
The petitioner here is the widow of veteran who’s a Chinese national who died in a
battle at Rizal Province during Japanese occupation. Petitioner, as widow of the

veteran, filed an application for back pay. However, the respondent denied the
application or claim of the petitioner on the ground that aliens are not entitled to
backpay. Thereafter, petitioner brought the case to the trial court.The TC ordered
respondent to give due course to the claims of petitioner. Then, respondent instituted
an appeal and contended that petitioner should have first exhausted her administrative
remedies by appearing to the President.
SC ruled that the respondent commission is estopped from invoking the rules of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. Considering that in its resolution, it declared that
the opinions of the Secretary of Justice were “advisory in nature, which may either be
accepted or ignored by the office seeking the opinion, and any aggrieved party has the
court for recourse”, thereby leading the petitioner to conclude that only a final judicial
ruling in her favor would be accepted by the Commission.
BORDALLO v PROFESSIONAL REGULATIONS COMMISSION [G.R. NO. 140920
(2001)]: President Ramos, signed RA 8544 or the Philippine Merchant Marine Officers
Act of 1998. The law provides, among others, the examination, registration and
issuance of Certificate of Competency to Merchant Marine Officers. The law also
created the Board of Marine Desk Officers. Thereafter, the Board of Marine, conducted
the examination for deck officers, in which the petitioner took the examination.
Petitioners received notices from the respondent that they failed the exams. Hence,
petitioner’s filed a petition before the Board claiming that they should be considered as
having passed. However, the Board denied the petition. Petitioners filed before the CA
but again, it was denied. It was ruled that petitioners should have appealed to the PRC
first.
SC ruled that the petition for mandamus in the CA was proper. As a rule, where the law
provides for the remedies against the action of an administrative board, body, or officer,
relief to courts can be sought only after exhausting all remedies provided. The rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute but admits of exceptions. One of
these exceptions is when the question is purely legal,such as the one presented in the
case at bar. The failure of petitioners to appeal to the PRC, therefore, is not fatal to
petitioners’ cause.
KILUSANG BAYAN v DOMINGUEZ [G.R. NO. 85439 & 91927 (1992)]: In this case,
the SC ruled that the suit brought by KBMBPM is not premature due to non-exhaustion
of administrative remedies, on the ground that KBMBPM should have petitioned directly
the Secretary of Agriculture to reverse the Order stripping the KBMBPM Board of its
authority. According to the SC, as to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the rule
is well-settled that this requirement does not apply where the respondent is a
department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied
approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him. This doctrine of qualified
political agency ensures speedy access to the courts when most needed. There was
no need then to appeal the decision to the office of the President; recourse to the courts
could be had immediately. Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies also yields to other exceptions, suchas when the question involved is purely
legal, as in the instant case, or where the questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary or
oppressive. Such is the claim of petitioners which, as hereinafter shown, is correct.
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CHAPTER XI CASES:
INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES v COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. NO. 88550 (1990)]:
Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the Bureau of
Energy Development (BED), for the exploration of two coal blocks in Eastern Samar.
IEI asked the Ministry of Energy for another to contract for the additional three coal
blocks. IEI was advised that there is another coal operator, Marinduque Mining and
Industrial Corporation (MMIC). IEI and MMIC signed a Memorandum of Agreement on
which IEI will assign all its rights and interests to MMIC. IEI filed for rescission of the
memorandum plus damages against the MMIC and the Ministry of Energy Geronimo
Velasco before the RTC of Makati, alleging that MMIC started operating in the coal
blocks prior to finalization of the memorandum. IEI prayed for that the rights for the
operation be granted back. RTC ordered the rescission of the memorandum and for
the reinstatement of the contract in favor of IEI. CA reversed the ruling of the RTC,
stating that RTC has no jurisdiction over the matter.
The SC ruled that the civil court had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the suit for
rescission of the MoA concerning a coal operating contract over blocks. It was held that
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of
what coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity should be granted
coal operating contracts over said areas involves a technical determination by the BED
as the administrative agency in possession of the specialized expertise to act on the
matter.
ROXAS v CA [G.R. NO. 127876 (1999)]: Petitioner applied before the DAR for the
conversion of 2 Haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural lands. However, due to
a law which mandated the DAR to acquire the hacienda, DAR acquired the haciendas.
Petitioner sent a letter to the Secretary of DAR, withdrawing voluntary offer to sell,
however it was denied. So, Roxas instituted a case before DARAB (DAR Adjudication
Board), praying for the cancellation of the CLOA’s issued by DAR. However, DARAB
ruled that the case involved prejudicial question, hence, the case should be submitted
to the Office of Secretary of DAR. Roxas directly appealed to the CA. However, it was
dismissed, hence this petition.
SC ruled the Court can take cognizance of the petition despite Roxas’ failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. According to the Court, despite the court has no jurisdiction
to rule on the reclassification of land from agricultural to non-agricultural – DAR’s failure
to observe due process does not give the court the power to adjudicate over petitioner’s
application for land conversion. Doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court
to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is
initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. DAR is in a better
position to resolve petitioner's application for conversion, being primarily the agency
possessing the necessary expertise on the matter.
PIMENTEL, JR. v SENATE COMMITTEE [G.R. NO. 187714 (2011)]: Senator Madrigal
introduced a Resolutio, which directed the Senate Ethics Committee to investigate the
alleged double insertion of P200 million by Senator Manny Villar into the C5 Extension
Project. After the election of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as Senate President, the Ethics
Committee was reorganized, but the Minority failed to name its representatives to the
Committee, prompting a delay in the investigation. Thereafter, the Senate adopted the
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Rules of the Ethics Committee. In another privilege speech, Senator Villar stated he
will answer the accusations before the Senate, and not with the Ethics Committee.
Senator Lacson, then chairperson of the Ethics Committee, then moved that the
responsibility of the Ethics Committee be transferred to the Senate as a Committee of
the Whole, which was approved by the majority. In the hearings of such Committee,
petitioners objected to the application of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to the
Senate Committee of the Whole.

SC ruled that the Doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply in this case, hence, the
petition is premature. The Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case,
which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case
is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge
of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of
fact are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding
before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the
proper jurisdiction of the court. Tthe power of judicial review is not so much power as it
is a duty imposed on this Court by the Constitution and that we would be remiss in the
performance of that duty if we decline to look behind the barriers set by the principle of
separation of powers.

CHAPTER XII: ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

• *Book VII, Administrative Code of 1987
• *Executive Order No. 26 - Prescribing procedure and sanctions to ensure
speedy disposition of administrative cases

- END OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW -

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