ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON
A. Introduction, History, and Background
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC)
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (Republic Act
No. 6713)
B. The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
Canon 1: Independence
Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of
a fair trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its
individual and institutional aspects.
Section 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their
assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law,
free of any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or
indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
1. Libarios v. Dabalos, A.M. No. RTJ-89-286 (11 July 1991)
DOCTRINE: In every case, a judge should endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the
applicable law unswayed by partisan or personal interests, public opinion or fear of
criticism. A judge should not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should
do so in a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and
integrity.
FACTS:
1. Administrative complaint filed by Roan I. Libarios for and on behalf of his client
Mariano Corvera, Jr. against respondent Judge Rosarito F. Dabalos, for grave
ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion, gross misconduct and partiality.
2. Former Mayor Mariano Corvera, Sr. was shot by Pablo Macapas inside the
courtroom of respondent Judge Dabalos, after a hearing in a frustrated murder
case against said Pablo Macapas.
 Corvera, Sr.: private complainant in the case
 Macapas: a bodyguard of Mayor Calo, Jr.
 Mayor Tranquilino Calo, Jr.: counsel of Macapas
3. A formal charge of murder was filed with the City Fiscal’s Office of Butuan City
against Pablo Macapas, Mayor Tranquilino Calo, Jr., and his driver-bodyguard
Belarmino Allocod, and 2 other “John Does”.
4. Investigating Fiscal Macario Balansag issued a resolution, finding a prima facie
case for murder against the respondents. The information was signed; however,
a motion for reconsideration of the resolution was filed by respondent Calo, Jr.,
which delayed the filing of the Information.
5. Respondents filed with the RTC Butuan City a petition for prohibition with prayer
for preliminary injunction and/or TRO, to enjoin the Investigating Fiscal from
acting on their MR.
6. Executive Judge Vicente Hidalgo issued a TRO. However the TRO expired after
the lapse of 20 days, without a preliminary injunction being issued.
7. Before the motion for reconsideration could be resolved, Investigating Fiscal
Balansag was gunned down while on his way to his office.
8. Based on the investigation conducted by the NBI linking the death of Fiscal
Balansag to the killing of Corvera, Sr., another formal complaint for murder was
filed against Calo, Jr. and 4 others.
9. Acting City Fiscal Brocoy resolved the pending motion for reconsideration,
affirming the resolution finding a prima facie case for murder against the
respondents.
10. The information earlier signed by Investigating Fiscal Balansag, carrying a NO
BAIL recommendation, was filed before Branch IV of the RTC of Butuan City but
was withdrawn for being fatally defective in form, the same having been signed
by Fiscal Balansag who was already dead at the time of the filing of said
information.
11. A new information signed by Acting Fiscal Brocoy carrying also a NO BAIL
recommendation, was filed with the court without the necessary supporting
affidavits and papers. The case was erroneously assigned to Branch IV of the
RTC of Butuan City, where the original information prior to its withdrawal was
assigned.
12. The accused filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or Opposition to the Issuance of a
Warrant of Arrest Without Bail, and in the alternative, accused sought the fixing
of bail for their temporary release. Said motion was set for hearing on 15
December 1988.
13. Upon motion of the prosecution, the case was scheduled for raffle. On said
schedule, accused Calo, Jr. and his counsel personally filed an opposition to the
holding of the raffle on the ground of lack of notice to the parties.
14. Corvera, Jr. and his counsel together with their sympathizers staged a rally
demanding the immediate arrest of the accused. After their rally in the afternoon
of 8 December 1988, they personally went to see respondent judge in his
chamber to reiterate their demand.
15. THE VIOLATION: After said meeting, respondent judge issued an order in his
capacity as Executive Judge, directing the raffle of the case with due notice to
the parties. Without conducting any prior hearing, in the same order, respondent
judge directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused, fixing at
the same time the bail for accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod at P50,000.00 each on
the ground that they were not charged as co-principals by cooperation or
inducement, and that the evidence of guilt against them was merely
circumstantial; however, no bail was recommended for the temporary release of
accused Macapas.
16. CA: Respondent judge was declared to have acted with grave abuse of discretion
in fixing the bail of the accused without a hearing.
17. Complaint: The act of respondent judge in granting bail to the accused Calo, Jr.
and Allocod without a hearing, is tantamount to gross ignorance and willful,
malicious and blatant disregard of the provisions of Sec. 5, Rule 114 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, which require a hearing before an accused
charged with a capital offense can be granted bail. The impartiality of
respondent judge in issuing the questioned warrants of arrest but allowing bail is
also questioned on the ground of his “close association” with the accused Calo,
Jr.
ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON
18. Defense of respondent judge:
 Sec. 5 of Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which requires a
hearing of an application for admission to bail, filed by any person who
is in custody for the commission of a capital offense, is applicable only
to cases where the accused is already in custody, but neither of the 3
accused was being detained at the time their application for bail was
acted upon by respondent judge.
 Merely followed the precedents set by his predecessors, in issuing
warrants of arrest before the raffle of a case in order to avoid delay in
the arrest of the accused.
 Denied the allegation that he was a law partner of accused Calo, Jr.,
claiming that he was a mere employee in the business of said accused,
and that he appeared with accused Calo, Jr. as co-counsel in a case,
but not as an associate.
 He has some doubts whether accused Calo, Jr. could have done the
acts of giving a revolver to accused Macapas outside the courtroom
and pushed Macapas into the courtroom to shoot Corvera, Sr., which
acts were allegedly done in the presence of witnesses who by their own
admissions, are security personnel and companions of the late Mayor
Corvera.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge violated Section 1 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
HELD: YES. Respondent judge is imposed a FINE of P20,000.00 and WARNED to exercise
more care and diligence in the performance of his duties as a judge.
RATIO:
 In every case, a judge should endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the
applicable law unswayed by partisan or personal interests, public opinion or fear
of criticism.
 In cases where a person is accused of a capital offense, the trial court must
conduct a hearing in a summary proceeding, to allow the prosecution an
opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all evidence it may desire to
produce to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, before
resolving the issue of bail for the temporary release of the accused. (Due
Process)
 Considering that respondent judge had a close association with respondent
Calo, Jr., prudence and regard for his position as judge demanded that he
should have refrained from fixing the bail and from concluding that the evidence
against him was merely “circumstantial”, in order to avoid any doubt as to his
judicial impartiality. He should have waited for the raffle of the case and allowed
the judge to whom the case was actually raffled to resolve the issue of fixing the
bail of said accused, if he was bailable.
2. Re: Allegations Made Under Oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee on September
26, 2013 Against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan, A.M. No. SB-14-21-J
(23 September 2014)
RECIT-READY: This case concerns the Associate Justice of Sandiganbayan, Ong, who was
accused of, among other things, partying with Napoles and that the acquittal of Napoles
was because Ong and Napoles were in cahoots or knew each other.
DOCTRINE: The Supreme Court agrees with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez that respondent’s
association with Napoles during the pendency and after the promulgation of the decision
in the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal, constitutes gross misconduct notwithstanding
the absence of direct evidence of corruption or bribery in the rendition of the said
judgment.
FACTS:
1. This administrative complaint was filed by the Court En Banc after investigation into
certain allegations that surfaced during the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing
indicated prima facie violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct by an Associate
Justice of the Sandiganbayan. The investigation was conducted motu proprio
pursuant to the Court's power of administrative supervision over members of the
Judiciary.
2. In the middle of 2013, the local media ran an expose involving billions of government
funds channeled through bogus foundations. Dubbed as the "pork barrel scam," as
the money was sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF)
allotted to members of the House of Representatives and Senate, the controversy
spawned massive protest actions all over the country
3. These personalities identified by the whistle-blowers allegedly transacted with or
attended Mrs. Napoles' parties and events, among whom is incumbent
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, herein respondent.
4. Benhur Luy (Luy), a cousin of Mrs. Napoles who had worked for several years with the
Napoleses, filed illegal detention charges against Mrs. Napoles who accused him of
double-dealing. When Luy went public with his story about Mrs. Napoles' anomalous
transactions and before the warrant of arrest was issued by the court, she reportedly
tried to reach out to the other whistle-blowers for them not to testify against her but
instead point to Luy as the one receiving and distributing the money.
5. The following day, the social news network Rappler published an article by Aries Rufo
entitled "Exclusive: Napoles Parties with Anti-Graft Court Justice" showing a
photograph of Senator Jinggoy Estrada (Senator Estrada), one of the main public
figures involved in the pork barrel scam, together with Mrs. Napoles and respondent.
The reporter had interviewed respondent who quickly denied knowing Mrs. Napoles
and recalled that the photograph was probably taken in one of the parties frequently
hosted by Senator Estrada who is his longtime friend.
6. Respondent also supposedly admitted that given the ongoing pork barrel controversy,
the picture gains a different context; nevertheless, he insisted that he has untainted
service in the judiciary, and further denied he was the one advising Mrs. Napoles on
legal strategies in connection with the Kevlar helmet cases where she was acquitted
by a Division of the Sandiganbayan of which respondent is the Chairman and the
then Acting Presiding Justice.
7. In a letter dated September 26, 2013 addressed to Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A.
Sereno, respondent meticulously explained the controversial photograph which
raised questions on his integrity as a magistrate, particularly in connection with the
ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON
decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan' s Fourth Division in the Kevlar helmet
cases, which convicted some of the accused but acquitted Mrs. Napoles.
8. Respondent surmised that the photograph was taken during the birthday of Senator
Estrada in February, either in the year 2012 or 2013, but definitely not in 2010 or
earlier. He explained that he could vaguely remember the circumstances but it would
have been rude for him to prevent any guest from posing with him and Senator
Estrada during the party. On the nature of his association with Mrs. Napoles,
respondent asserted that he has never “partied” with Napoles.
9. As to the Kevlar helmet cases, respondent said it was impossible for him to have
been advising Mrs. Napoles, as claimed by Mr. Rufo, as even the article itself noted
that Mrs. Napoles' own brother, Reynald L. Lim, (a.k.a. Reynaldo L. Francisco), a co-
accused in the case, was convicted by the Sandiganbayan. He stressed that these
cases were decided on the merits by the Sandiganbayan, acting as a collegial body
and he was not even the ponente of the decision. Respondent thus submitted
himself to the discretion of the Chief Justice such that even without being required to
submit an explanation, he voluntarily did so "to defend [his] reputation as a judge
and protect the Sandiganbayan as an institution from unfair and malicious
innuendos."
10. This Court upon evaluation of the factual circumstances found possible
transgressions of the New Code of Judicial Conduct committed by respondent.
Accordingly, a Resolution was issued on January 21, 2014 stating that: WHEREFORE,
the Court hereby resolves to have the instant administrative matter RE-DOCKETED as
A.M. No. SB-14-21-J (Re: Allegations Made Under Oath at tlze Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee Hearing held on September 26, 2013 against Associate Justice Gregory
S. Ong, Sandiganbayan), and ASSIGNS the same to retired Supreme Court Justice
Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez for investigation, report and recommendation within a
period of sixty (60) days from notice hereof.
11. The Investigating Justice formulated the charges against the respondent, as follows:
1. Respondent acted as contact of Napoles in connection with the Kevlar case while
it was pending in the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division wherein he is the Chairman;
2. Respondent, being Napoles’ contact in the Sandiganbayan, fixed the Kevlar case
resulting in her acquittal;
3. Respondent received an undetermined amount of money from Napoles prior to the
promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case thus, she was sure (“kampante”) of
her acquittal;
4. Respondent visited Napoles in her office where she handed to him eleven (11)
checks, each amounting to P282,000.00 or a total of P3,102,000.00, as advanced
interest for his P25.5 million BDO check she deposited in her personal account; and
5. Respondent attended Napoles’ parties and was photographed with Senator
Estrada and Napoles.
12. Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, a retired Member of this Court, submitted her
report and concluded that (among MANY OTHER things):
a. Respondent’s acts of allowing himself to be Napoles’ contact in the
Sandiganbayan, resulting in the fixing of the Kevlar case, and of accepting
money from her, constitute gross misconduct, a violation of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
b. Respondent’s transgression pertains to his personal life and no direct
relation to his judicial function. It is not misconduct but plain dishonesty.
His act is unquestionably disgraceful and renders him morally unfit as a
member of the Judiciary and unworthy of the privileges the law confers on
him. Furthermore, respondent’s conduct supports Benhur’s assertion that
he received money from Napoles. Dishonesty likewise violates Canon 2 (1
and 2) on Integrity of the same Code providing in part that judges must
ensure that their conduct is above reproach and must reaffirm the people’s
faith in the integrity of the Judiciary.
c. In joining Senator Estrada and Napoles in a picture taking, respondent gave
a ground for reproach by reason of impropriety. It bears reiterating Canon 4
(1) on Propriety of the same Code which provides that judges shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
d. This incident manifests respondent's disregard of the dictum that propriety
and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge. This exacting standard of decorum is demanded from
judges to promote public confidence in the integrity of the Judiciary.
e. Considering this glaring irregularity, it is safe to conclude that indeed
respondent has a hand in the acquittal of Napoles. All along, the whistle
blowers were telling the truth.
f. RECOMMENDATION: DISMISSAL from the service WITH FORFEITURE of all
retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, and WITH PREJUDICE
to reemployment to any government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
ISSUE: Whether or not Justice Ong violated Canon 1 Section 1 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
RULING: YES. The Court finds respondent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S.
Ong GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT, DISHONESTY and IMPROPRIETY, all in violations of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, for which he is hereby
DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued
leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch, agency or
instrumentality of the government including government-owned or -controlled
corporations.
RATIO:
 Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper
or wrong behavior; while ·"gross" has been defined as "out of all measure beyond
allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused."
 The Court agreed with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez that respondent's association with
Napoles during the pendency and after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar
case resulting in her acquittal, constitutes gross misconduct notwithstanding the
absence of direct evidence of corruption or bribery in the rendition of the said
judgment.
 In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
is required. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is
reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct
complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even
preponderant.
 Bribery is committed when a public officer agrees to perform an act in connection
with the performance of official duties in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or
present received. A judge who extorts money from a party-litigant who has a case
before the court commits a serious misconduct and this Court has condemned such
act in the strongest possible terms. Particularly because it has been committed by
ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON
one charged with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice, it
quickly and surely corrodes respect for law and the courts.
 A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct, a price
one has to pay for occupying an exalted position in the judiciary, beyond which he
may not freely venture. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge to
avoid not just impropriety in the performance of judicial duties but in all his activities
whether in his public or private life. He must conduct himself in a manner that gives
no ground for reproach.
 It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that judges should live
in retirement or seclusion; it is desirable that, so far as the reasonable attention to
the completion of their work will permit, they continue to mingle in social intercourse,
and that they should not discontinue their interests in or appearance at meetings of
members at the bar. A judge should, however, in pending or prospective litigation
before him be scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to
waken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an
element in determining his judicial course.
 Judges must, at all times, be beyond reproach and should avoid even the mere
suggestion of partiality and impropriety. Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
states that "[p ]ropriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the
performance of all the activities of a judge." Section 2 further provides: SEC. 2. As a
subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and
willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent
with the dignity of the judicial office.
 In this light, it does not matter that the case is no longer pending when improper acts
were committed by the judge. Because magistrates are under constant public
scrutiny, the termination of a case will not deter public criticisms for acts which may
cast suspicion on its disposition or resolution. As what transpired in this case,
respondent's association with Napoles has unfortunately dragged the Judiciary into
the "Pork Barrel" controversy which initially involved only legislative and executive
officials. Worse, Napoles' much-flaunted "contact" in the judiciary is no less than a
Justice of the Sandiganbayan, our special court tasked with hearing graft cases. We
cannot, by any stretch of indulgence and compassion, consider respondent's
transgression as a simple misconduct.
Section 2. In performing judicial duties, judges shall be independent from judicial
colleagues in respect of decisions which the judge is obliged to make independently.
Section 3. Judges shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or
dispute pending before another court or administrative agency.
Sabitsana, Jr. v. Villamor, A.M. No. 90-474 (4 October 1991)
Gandeza, Jr. v. Tabin, A.M. No. MTJ-09-1736 (25 July 2011)
Section 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance
the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that
they are in a special position to influence the judge.
Re: Gregory Ong, supra.
3. Rivera v. Barro, A.M. No. 2003-CTJ (96 SCRA 338), 28 February 1980
RULES OF COURT, Rule 137.
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in
which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity
or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the
civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or
in which he has been presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the
subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and
entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a
case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
FACTS:
1. Respondent Silvino Lu. Barro, City Judge of Gingoog City, is charged with
malfeasance and/or misfeasance in office by way of an affidavit executed by
Antonio Rivera, Barangay Chairman of Barangay No. 12, Gingoog City.
2. One evening, at Barrio Lunao, Gingoog City, Misarnis Oriental, several persons,
including one Arturo Barro, nephew of respondent Judge, were apprehended for
illegal gambling.
3. A criminal case was filed against said persons in respondent’s sala.
4. Respondent Judge dismissed the case.
5. It is contended that because one of the accused is respondent’s nephew,
respondent should have inhibited himself from trying the case, pursuant to the
provisions of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court.
6. Respondent:
 admits that one of the accused in said criminal case in his nephew;
 that he did not inhibit himself, although he intended to do so, because
nobody manifested any objection and because he was informed that the
prosecution was going to reinvestigate the case;
 that he took into account the fact that if the case is assigned to another
judge, it would take several months to dispose of, unduly clogging the
docket of the court; and
 that the dismissal of the case was not premised on the fact that one of the
accused is his nephew.
7. Deputy Court Administrator Leo D. Medialdea recommends that respondent be
held administratively liable without formal investigation, considering that his
failure to inhibit himself at the very outset constituted a violation of the rule
intended to free the courts from any suspicion of bias and prejudice.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge violated Section 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
HELD: YES. Respondent is found guilty as charged and, taking into account his previous
administrative cases, hereby ordered to pay a FINE equivalent to his salary for 3 months.
ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON
RATIO:
 In Paciano Basuan v. Juan A. Baes, this Court reprimanded respondent judge for
having sat and partly acted in CAR Case…wherein his nephew-in-law, Atty.
Manuel M. de Baybay, was the counsel for the defendant Manuel Solomon. The
respondent’s subsequent inhibition does not extenuate his culpability. The rule
which he violated is intended to free courts from any suspicion of bias and
prejudice.
RULES OF COURT, Rule 137 -Disqualification of Judicial Officers
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in
which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity
or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the
civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or
in which he has been presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the
subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and
entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a
case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
Section 2. Objection that judge disqualified, how made and effect. — If it be claimed that
an official is disqualified from sitting as above provided, the party objecting to his
competency may, in writing, file with the official his objection, stating the grounds therefor,
and the official shall thereupon proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in
accordance with his determination of the question of his disqualification. His decision
shall be forthwith made in writing and filed with the other papers in the case, but no
appeal or stay shall be allowed from, or by reason of, his decision in favor of his own
competency, until after final judgment in the case.
Section 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and
influence by, the executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear
to be free therefrom to a reasonable observer.
4. Tan v. Rosete, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1563 (8 September 2004)
DOCTRINE: The exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary because the
people’s confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the magnitude of legal
knowledge and the diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the highest
standard of integrity and moral uprightness they are expected to possess. When the judge
himself becomes the transgressor of any law which he is sworn to apply, he places his
office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary itself. It is therefore paramount that a judge’s
personal behavior both in the performance of his duties and his daily life, be free from any
appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach.
FACTS:
1. Lucila Tan filed the instant complaint against Judge Maxwel S. Rosete, former
Acting Presiding Judge, MTC, Branch 58, San Juan, Metro Manila, for violation of
Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act (R.A. No. 3019).
2. Lucila Tan was the private complainant in 2 criminal cases involving B.P. 22 and
Other Deceits pending before respondent judge’s sala.
3. Before the cases were decided, respondent judge allegedly sent a member of
his staff to ask complainant for P150,000.00 in exchange for the non-dismissal
of the cases. She was shown copies of respondent judge’s Decisions dismissing
the case, both still unsigned, and was told that respondent judge would reverse
the disposition of the cases as soon as she remits the amount demanded. The
staff member allowed complainant to keep the copy one of the draft Decision.
4. Complainant, however, did not accede to respondent’s demand because she
believed that she had a very strong case. The criminal cases were eventually
dismissed by respondent judge.
5. Respondent judge denied the allegations of complainant.
 It was complainant who attempted to bribe him in exchange for a favorable
decision.
o Tried to delay and to derail the promulgation of the decisions.
o Sought the intervention of then San Juan Mayor, Jinggoy Estrada,
her neighbor in Greenhills, San Juan to obtain judgment in her
favor.
o Insinuated that she could help him get appointed to a higher
position provided he decides the suits in her favor.
o Offered to give cash for the downpayment of a car he was
planning to buy. But he refused the offer.
 He said that he had entrusted to Judge Quilatan his Decisions before he left
for New Zealand on study leave. Thus, he asserted that it was impossible
for him to change the resolution of the cases and it was likewise impossible
for any member of his staff to give complainant copies of said Decisions.
6. The Court referred the complaint to the Executive Judge of the RTC of Pasig City
for investigation, report and recommendation. First Vice Executive Judge Edwin
A. Villasor conducted several hearings on the administrative case.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge violated Section 5 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
HELD: Respondent Judge Maxwel S. Rosete is SUSPENDED from office without salary and
other benefits for 4 MONTHS.
RATIO:
 The presentation during the investigation of the unsigned copy of the draft
decision supports complainants allegation.
ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON
o It would be impossible for complainant to obtain a copy of a judge’s
draft decision, it being highly confidential, if not through the judge
himself or from the people in his office. And an ordinary employee in
the court cannot promise a litigant the reversal of a case’s disposition
if not assured by the judge who drafted the decision.
 The Investigating Judge observed that there is an apparent inconsistency in the
testimony of the Respondent Judge’s two witnesses regarding the incident at
Sangkalan Restaurant in Quezon City where Complainant claimed that she met
Respondent Judge, a certain Fernan, and Buboy, while she was with two
Prosecutors.
o Fernando B. Espuerta testified that he was at Sangkalan Restaurant
with Respondent Judge and Buboy (Rodolfo Cea), while the latter
(Rodolfo Cea) denied that he met the Complainant at Sangkalan
Restaurant.
 Respondent asserts that he was already in New Zealand at the time when
complainant claims that he met with her. However, the evidence he presented
only shows his New Zealand visa and the dates when he entered said country.
He did not show to the investigating body the dates when he left and returned to
the Philippines.
o Apparently, he entered New Zealand on two dates: March 4, 2001 and
May 1, 2001. Thus, the Court infer that he was in the Philippines
before May 1, 2001, which is consistent with complainant’s testimony,
as well as that of Fernando Espuerta, that she met with respondent
judge and his companions, Fernando and Buboy in April 2001.
 Respondent’s acts violate the standard of judicial conduct required to be
observed by members of the Bench. They constitute gross misconduct which is
punishable under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court.
5. HON. RTC JUDGES MERCEDES G. DADOLE (Executive Judge, Branch 28), petitioners,
vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
CASE OVERVIEW: This is a petition to annul the decision of the respondent Commission on
Audit (COA) affirming the notices of the Mandaue City Auditor, which diminished the
monthly additional allowances received by the petitioner judges of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) and Municipal Trial Court (MTC) stationed in Mandaue City.
FACTS:
 In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving monthly
allowances of P1,260 each through the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted
by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the said city. In 1991, Mandaue City
increased the amount to P1,500 for each judge.
 On March 15, 1994, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued
the disputed Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which provided that:
 “In the light of the authority granted to the local government units under the
Local Government Code to provide for additional allowances and other benefits
to national government officials and employees assigned in their locality, such
additional allowances in the form of honorarium at rates not exceeding
P1,000.00 in provinces and cities and P700.00 in municipalities may be
granted”
 Acting on the DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of
disallowance to herein petitioners, in excess of the amount authorized by LBC
55. Beginning October, 1994, the additional monthly allowances of the
petitioner judges were reduced to P1,000 each. They were also asked to
reimburse the amount they received in excess of P1,000 from April to
September, 1994.
 On September 21, 1995, respondent COA rendered a decision denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration. The COA held that:
The issue to be resolved in the instant appeal is whether or not the City Ordinance of
Mandaue which provides a higher rate of allowances to the appellant judges may prevail
over that fixed by the DBM under Local Budget Circular No. 55 dated March 15, 1994.
 Applying the foregoing doctrine, appropriation ordinance of local government
units is subject to the organizational, budgetary and compensation policies of
budgetary authorities (COA 5th Ind., dated March 17, 1994 re: Province of
Antique; COA letter dated May 17, 1994 re: Request of Hon. Renato Leviste,
Cong. 1st Dist. Oriental Mindoro).
 In this regard, attention is invited to Administrative Order No. 42 issued on
March 3, 1993 by the President of the Philippines clarifying the role of DBM in
the compensation and classification of local government positions under RA No.
7160 vis-avis the provisions of RA No. 6758 in view of the abolition of the
JCLGPA. Section 1 of said Administrative Order provides that:
 Section 1. The Department of Budget and Management as the lead
administrator of RA No. 6758 shall, through its Compensation and Position
Classification Bureau, continue to have the following responsibilities in
connection with the implementation of the Local Government Code of 1991:
a) Provide guidelines on the classification of local government positions and on the
specific rates of pay therefore;
b) Provide criteria and guidelines for the grant of all allowances and additional forms of
compensation to local government employees;
ISSUE: Whether or not Local Budget Circular No. 55 void for going beyond the supervisory
powers of the President.
HELD: YES. Setting a uniform amount for the grant of additional allowances is an
inappropriate way of enforcing the criterion found in Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA
7160. The DBM over-stepped its power of supervision over local government units by
imposing a prohibition that did not correspond with the law it sought to implement. In
other words, the prohibitory nature of the circular had no legal basis.
RATIO:
 We recognize that, although our Constitution guarantees autonomy to local
government units, the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power
of control by Congress and the power of supervision by the President.
 Clearly then, the President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a
local government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law.
This is the scope of the Presidents supervisory powers over local government
units. Hence, the President or any of his or her alter egos cannot interfere in
local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts within the
parameters of the law and the Constitution.
 Any directive therefore by the President or any of his or her alter egos seeking to
alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local
government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local
ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON
autonomy and separation of powers of the executive and legislative
departments in governing municipal corporations.
 Does LBC 55 go beyond the law it seeks to implement? Yes.
 LBC 55 provides that the additional monthly allowances to be given by a local
government unit should not exceed P1,000 in provinces and cities and P700 in
municipalities. Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160, the law that supposedly
serves as the legal basis of LBC 55, allows the grant of additional allowances to
judges when the finances of the city government allow. The said provision does
not authorize setting a definite maximum limit to the additional allowances
granted to judges.
 Thus, we need not belabor the point that the finances of a city government may
allow the grant of additional allowances higher than P1,000 if the revenues of
the said city government exceed its annual expenditures.
 Thus, to illustrate, a city government with locally generated annual revenues of
P40 million and expenditures of P35 million can afford to grant additional
allowances of more than P1,000 each to, say, ten judges inasmuch as the
finances of the city can afford it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed decision and resolution,
dated September 21, 1995 and May 28, 1996, respectively, of the Commission on Audit
are hereby set aside.
6. Leynes v. Commission on Audit, et al., G.R. No. 143596,(11 December 2003)
FACTS
 Petitioner JUDGE TOMAS LEYNES is at present the presiding judge of RTC
Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro
o He was formerly assigned to the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental
Mindoro as the sole presiding judge of its MTC
o His salary and representation allowance (RATA) were drawn from the
budget of SC
o He received a monthly allowance of P944 from the local funds of the
Municipality of Naujan starting 1984
 March 15, 1993 – Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of Naujan (through Resolution 057),
sought the opinion of Provincial Auditor and Provincial Budget Officer regarding
any budgetary limitation on the grant of a monthly allowance to petitioner.
 May 7, 1993 – SB unanimously approved Resolution 101 increasing petitioner’s
allowance to P1,600
 1994 –Municipal Government of Naujan again provided for petitioner judge’s
P1,600 monthly allowance in its annual budget which was again approved by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the Office of Provincial Budget and
Management of Oriental Mindoro.
 February 17, 1994- Provincial Auditor Salvacion M. Dalisay sent a letter to the
Municipal Mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan directing them:
o To stop the payment of the P1,600 monthly allowance or RATA
o To require the immediate refund of the amounts previously paid to the
judge.
 Dalisay said that the Municipality of Naujan could not grant RATA to petitioner
judge in addition to the RATA the latter was already receiving from the Supreme
Court based on Section 36, RA No. 7645, General Appropriations Act of 1993,
stating that: “No one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than one
source.”
 Petitioner appealed to COA Regional Director Gregoria S. Ong.
 COA Reg Dir Ong upheld the opinion of Provincial Auditor Dalisay
o She added that Resolution No. 101 failed to comply with Section 3 of
Local Budget Circular No. 53 outlining the conditions for the grant of
allowances to judges and other national officials or employees by the
local government units, particularly “That similar allowances/additional
compensation are not granted by the national government to the
officials/employees assigned to the LGU.”
 Petitioner judge appealed the resolution of the Regional Director to COA
 Disallowance of the payment of the P1,600 monthly allowance to petitioner was
issued.
o He received his P1,600 monthly allowance from the Municipality of
Naujan only for the period May 1993 to January 1994.
 September 14, 1999 – COA issued its decision affirming the resolution of
Regional Director Gregoria S. Ong. It ruled that:
o The conflicting provisions of Section 447, Par. (1) (xi) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (that the finances of the municipality allow the
grant thereof) and Section 36 of the General Appropriations Act of 1993
[RA 7645] (No one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than one
source) have been harmonized by the Local Budget Circular No. 53 dated
01 September 1993 (provided that similar allowance/additional
compensation are not granted by the national government to the
official/employee assigned to the local government unit), issued by the
Department of Budget and Management pursuant to its powers under
Section 25 and Section 327 of the Local Government Code;
o The subject SB Resolution No. 101 dated 11 May 1993 of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro is null and void;
o Judge Tomas C. Leynes, being a national government official is prohibited to
receive additional RATA from the local government fund.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner was entitled to receive the additional allowances granted to
him by the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, in addition to that provided by the
Supreme Court (YES)
RULING
 An administrative circular cannot supersede, abrogate, modify or nullify a statute. A
statute is superior to an administrative circular, thus the latter cannot repeal or
amend it.
o In the present case, NCC No. 67, being a mere administrative circular,
cannot repeal a substantive law like RA 7160.
 Repeal of statutes by implication is not favored, unless it is manifest that the
legislature so intended. The legislature is assumed to know the existing laws on the
subject and cannot be presumed to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.
 There was no other provision in RA 7645 from which a repeal of Section 447(a)(1)(xi)
of RA 7160 could be implied.
 The presumption against implied repeal becomes stronger when one law is special
and the other is general. (Generalia specialibus non derogant or a general law does
not nullify a specific or special law)
ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON
 The reason for this is that the legislature, in passing a law of special character,
considers and makes special provisions for the particular circumstances dealt with by
the special law.
 The General Appropriations Act (R.A. No. 7645), being a general law, could not have,
by mere implication, repealed Section 447(a)(1)(xi) of the Local Government Code
(R.A. No. 7160).
 In this case, RA 7160 (the LGC of 1991) is a special law which exclusively deals with
local government units (LGUs), outlining their powers and functions in consonance
with the constitutionally mandated policy of local autonomy.
 RA 7645 (the GAA of 1993) was a general law which outlined the share in the
national fund of all branches of the national government.
 Therefore, RA 7645 being a general law, could not have, by mere implication,
repealed RA 7160. Rather, RA 7160 should be taken as the exception to RA 7645 in
the absence of circumstances warranting a contrary conclusion.
 In construing NCC No. 67, force and effect should not be narrowly given to isolated
and disjoined clauses of the law but to its spirit, broadly taking all its provisions
together in one rational view.
o Taking NCC 67 as a whole, what it seeks to prevent is the dual collection of
RATA by a national official from the budgets of “more than one national
agency.”
 NCC 67 applies only to the national funds administered by the DBM, not the local
funds of the LGUs to prevent the much-abused practice of multiple allowances, thus
standardizing the grant of RATA by national agencies. By no stretch of the
imagination can NCC 67 be construed as nullifying the power of LGUs to grant
allowances to judges under the Local Government Code of 1991. It applies only to
the national funds administered by the DBM, not the local funds of LGUs.
 To rule against the power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges will threaten the
principle of local autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution.
 The power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges and leaving to their discretion the
amount of allowances they may want to grant, depending on the availability of local
funds ensures the genuine and meaningful local autonomy of LGUs.
o Section 3, paragraph (e) thereof is invalid.
o Section 3, paragraph (e) of LBC 53, by outrightly prohibiting LGUs from
granting allowances to judges whenever such allowances are (1) also
granted by the national government, or (2) similar to the allowances
granted by the national government, violates Section 447(a)(1)(xi) of the
Local Government Code of 1991.
 An ordinance must be presumed valid in the absence of evidence showing that it is
not in accordance with the law.
 The resolution of the Municipality of Naujan granting the P1,600 monthly allowance
to petitioner judge fully complied with the law hence it is VALID.
 The Court ruled in favor of petitioner judge.
7. Alfonso v. Alonzo-Legasto, A.M. No. MTJ-94-995, 5 September 2002
FACTS
 This is a complaint for various administrative charges against Respondent Judge
consisting of graft and corruption, rendition of an unjust interlocutory order,
fraud against public treasury, malversation of public funds, estafa,
discrimination, favoritism, grave abuse of authority and serious misconduct
ISSUE: WON respondent is administratively liable (YES)
 41 Complainants were employees of the City Government of QC
o They were appointed by various city mayors at different times under
separate appointment papers and received salaries and other benefits
from the City Government
o They held positions under the Office of the City Mayor, Special
Assistance for MeTC and were assigned at the OCC-MeTC and the
different branches of MeTC QC to assist the organic staff of the
judiciary
 August 16, 1993 – Respondent wrote a letter to Mayor Ismael Mathay Jr.
returning all but one of the 41 complainants to QC Government allegedly to:
o Utilize the maximum potentials and resources of all National and City
paid employees
o In view of the recent personnel survey that the Office of the Clerk of
Court (MTC) is overstaffed
o Judge said that she is returning said employees to properly assess,
determine and evaluate actual number of support employees from the
City in the effective and efficient operation of the said office.
 The letter returning MeTC employees was based on an alleged plan to
reorganize the OCC-MeTC which dated back to the time of former Executive
Judge Guillermo Loja.
 Victor Ala supposedly assessed the work aptitude of complainants by
clandestinely observing them for several days during a two-week period at the
OCC
o Results were reduced into a confidential Aide Memoire, which
concluded that “there was general breakdown of office functions, as
personnel were engaged in lively and animated conversation among
themselves, accompanied by boisterous laughter unbecoming of an
office and non-productive moving about was also an ordinary sight”
o Prior to the submission of the letter, respondent met with then Clerk of
Court Herman Cimafranca and respondent Camaya to discuss the
possibility of reducing the personnel in the OCC
o Respondent Judge convened all the employees including the
complainants and told them the plan to steamline the workforce.
 August 17, 1993 – Mayor Mathay issued Office Order 47 reassigning the 43
complainants to different offices of the QC Government
o They suffered no diminution of salary or benefit nor were subjected to
difficulties as a result of the personnel movement they retained their
respective items.
 THE TRANSFER OF COMPLAINANTS TO OTHER OFFICES WAS THE ROOT OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT
 Complainants averred conspiracy between respondents Camay and Remedies
“Baby” Garcia (alleged girl Friday of respondent judge) to favor some of her
“favorite” national employees (hence the transfer and unfair treatment) They
aver that:
o Judge was also charged with doctoring payroll to collect 30 days of
election-related work when she should have been credited with only
five days of work.
o Camaya usurped the authority of Clerk of Court Herman in signing
vouchers and purchase request papers so she could collect bribe
money from suppliers.
o Garcia falsified three daily time records for 2.5 months
ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON
RULING
 Respondent violated the rules and regulations governing the detail,
reassignment or transfer of court employees including locally-funded court
personnel.
 The decision to return the 41 City Government employees exceeded her
authority under Sec. IV of AO 6 which is limited the temporary re-assignment of
court employees (for a period of three months extendible only once for the same
period).
 She had no authority to cause the permanent transfer of the court employees
since its jurisdiction is only given to the Office of the Court Administration and
not in her capacity as Executive Judge.
 It was her duty to apprise this Court of the personnel requirements of the OCC-
MeTC and the alleged need to steamline the staffing pattern before informing
the local government of the return of its employees.
o But she referred the matter personally to the office of then Vice Mayor
Charito Planas for evaluation and assessment, which is contrary to
Sec. III of AO 30-91 (vesting I the Office of the Court Administrator the
sole responsibility for all liaison and coordination activities with the
Legislative and Executive departments) and Sec. IV of AO 6 (requiring
prior notice to this Court, as regards the purported transfer of
employees which would compromise the administration of justice)
 She likewise violated Rule 3.08 of the Code of Judicial Conduct (judges are
required to maintain professional competence in court managements)
 The 41 employees were appointees of QC Government, there were no common
derogatory records which would explain respondent’s recommendation for their
collective transfer
 PENALTIES:
o Respondent Judge – fined P10K for abuse of authority for the transfer
of the 41 complainants and for neglect of her duty for her failure to
initiate an investigation into the falsified daily time records of
Remedies “Baby” Garcia
o Remedies “Baby” Garcia – GUILTY of using falsified DTR for December
16-31, 1989 and is hereby suspended for 1 month (if not possible, pay
P20K fine instead)
o BOTH ARE WARNED
Sections 6 and 7. Independence in relation to society; the institutional and operational
independence of the judiciary.
Section 8. High standards of judicial conduct to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary
8. OCA v. Necessario, A.M. No. MTJ-07- 1691, 2 April 2013
RECIT READY: Judges solemnized marriages (mga 1000 plus marriages) with no
appropriate marriage documents (walang marriage license, no certification from the
embassy as to foreigners, false affidavits of cohabitation). As such, they were held guilty
of gross inefficiency and neglect of duty, and were accordingly dismissed from service.
The members of the judiciary should promote high standards of conduct to reinforce
public confidence in the judiciary.
FACTS:
 The judicial audit team of the OCA reported irregularities in the solemnization of
marriages in the lower courts of Cebu, as there were fixers for instant marriages
being offered by packages.
 A special secret team of two lawyers (male and female) was created, for it to go
undercover as a couple looking to get married. With this, they went to the Palace
of Justice in Cebu.
 The female lawyer then asked the clerk inside if there was a shortcut to the
marriage process, and she was assured that they could get married the next day.
But this instant marriage recipe would come at a cost of P3000.
 Feeling informed, the lawyers then reported their findings to the judicial audit
team. The OCA then filed a memorandum to the SC.
 This memorandum was treated as a formal administrative complaint. The
judges, respondents herein, were directed to file their comments, and were
suspended pending the resolution of the case.
Evidence against the erring judges
 643 marriages were examined by the judicial audit team, and 280 of which were
solemnized without a marriage license, pursuant to Art. 34 of the family code (5
year cohabitation). Some irregularities were:
o Logbooks of the MTCC indicate a higher number of solemnized
marriages
o Unusual number of marriage licenses obtained from nearby civil
registrars
o Solemnized marriages, the licenses of which were procured on the
same day as the solemnization
 A number of interviews of court personnel were also garnered, the gist of which
stated that the marriages that were solemnized by the respondent judges were
motivated by bribes
 Multiple affidavits of private persons were collected by the judicial audit team,
all of which stated that their marriages were solemnized pursuant to Art. 34 of
the FC. Providing that at the time they did not understand what it meant, but
after learning it, declared that such an article did not apply to them
Interlocutory orders of the court
 The SC issued a resolution requiring judges Necessario, Acosta, Tormis, and
Rosales of the MTCC to file their respective comments, telling why they should
not be punished.
 Court personnel and personnel of the local civil registrars were also impleaded
Defenses of the judges
 They all relied on the presumption of regularity. That all the documents
presented to them were genuine and authentic, and all they had to do was to
solemnize the marriage. They said that they were not obliged to check the
authenticity of such documents.
OCA Report
 All judges should be dismissed for gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing
marriages that were tainted with defects at the outset, because during the
cohabitation the parties were still minors; for solemnizing marriages of
foreigners without the required certificate from the embassy; for solemnizing
marriages without marriage licenses
ISSUE:
ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON
Whether the judges and personnel of the lower courts of Cebu are guilty of gross
ignorance of the law, gross neglect of duty or gross inefficiency and gross misconduct.
HELD:
 This Court has long held that court officials and employees are placed with a
heavy burden and responsibility of keeping the faith of the public. It shall not
countenance any conduct which would violate the norm of public accountability
and diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.
 The palace of justice in Cebu was practically a hub of swift marriages.
Respondent judges and personnel disregarded laws and procedure to the
prejudice of the parties and the proper administration of justice.
 Respondent judges are all guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty when
they solemnized marriages without following the proper procedure laid down by
law.
 The presumption of regularity will not lie if the marriage documents do not
appear regular on its face, such as superimpositions and erasures on relevant
data. This presumption may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty, as the visible abnormalities in the text of the marriage
documents should have alerted the judges.
 Liability: Necessario, Acosta, Tormis, Rosales = DISMISSED FROM SERVICE
9. Tuldague et al. v. Balayo, et al., A.M. No. RTJ-05-1962, 17 October 2013
FACTS
 AM RTJ-05-1962 Petitioner alleged that Judge Pardo committed corruption and
violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
1. In People vs. Rosndeo, Judge Pardo allegedly asked and received P6,000
from Rosendo in exchange fro a favorable decision on his application for
probation.
2. In Land Registration Case, Pardo allegedly obtained P1K from Petitioner
John Toribio for a speedy release of a copy of the grant of petition
3. In People vs. Johny Kimayong, Pardo allegedly received and asked one deer
from accused in exchange for a favorable decision
4. He allegedly received P10K from Richard Calpito, in exchange for endorsing
him to the position of Process Server in RTC
5. He allegedly ordered Lugeorge (Electrician II of the Maintenance Section of
the RTC) to take out two cans coat master paint from the Hall of Justice.
These cans were brought to Pardo’s house.
 RESPONDENT’s answers:
o Denied that Rosendo gave him money for his probation. He presented
Fr. Lazo as witness (testified that he did not see Rosendo handing
anything to Pardo)
o Denied charges that he obtained P1K from Toribio
o Denied receiving a deer from Kimayong
o Denied receiving P10K for endorsing them to vacant positions in RTC
o Denied ordering Lugeorge to take two cans of paint because Lugeorge
confessed that it is him who took the cans of paint
o Petitioner filed this case to get even with him because he:
 Enjoined petitioner from signing applications for leave of
absence of employees which he used to do
 Recalled Process Server Calpito and Prestoza who used to be
under petitioner’s disposal
 Issued memorandum prohibiting petitioner from serving
summons before the raffle of cases
 Stopped practice of filing pleadings with Office of the clerk of
court and limited it to initiatory pleadings only
 AM OCA IPI 05-2243-P
o Petitioner and Balajo accused Calpatura of corruption, in cahoots with
Pardo
 Calpatura allegedly approached litigants and offered them assistance provided
they would give him money or animals.
 In the same criminal case against Rosendo, Calpatura allegedly sent an
emissary to ask for P10,000.00 so that Judge Pardo would decide favorably
Rosendo’s probation.
 28 March 2005- Calpatura allegedly sent Rosendo a text message, stating to
give him P3,000.00, through Dominador.
 In Civil Case No. 292, the plaintiff (Gorospe) testified that his friend Jose
Cabañero introduced him to Calpatura while they were following up this case in
the RTC.
o July 2004 – Gorospe, together with Cabañero, allegedly met Calpatura
in the Cabarroguis public market.
o Calpatura allegedly urged him to buy hard drinks and pulutan. Gorospe
agreed because he was seeking help with his case.
o November 2004 – Calpatura allegedly asked him to prepare a goat for
Judge Pardo’s birthday.
o Judge Pardo allegedly instructed Gorospe to give him the goat through
Calpatura. Thereafter, Calpatura allegedly asked him again for money.
 Juanito Pascua (Juanito) testified that Calpatura visited him in jail to ask for two
goats. Judge Pardo allegedly instructed Calpatura to ask for the goats in order to
expedite his release from jail.
 Calpatura allegedly acted as "fixer" and "bagman" for Judge Pardo in cases
where the accused deposited cash bonds.
o Both Calpatura and Judge Pardo allegedly shared with the released
cash bonds thereafter.
 In Criminal Case No. 1468, Aurelia Diaz (Diaz) testified that Calpatura and
Prestoza asked for her released cash bond amounting to P16,000.00, so that
the estafa case against her would be dismissed. Diaz narrated that on 14
October 2002, Judge Pardo asked her if she would give him the released cash
bond amounting to P16,000.00. Diaz agreed but asked Judge Pardo to
acknowledge its receipt.
 Calpatura allegedly bragged to court litigants about drafting decisions and his
closeness to Judge Pardo.
 Calpatura allegedly projected himself as a lawyer even though he did not pass
the bar.
CALPATURA’s answer:
 Denied the allegations against him.
 Denied that he offered assistance to litigants in exchange for money or animals
and that he was a "fixer" and "bagman" of Judge Pardo.
 Denied receiving P3,000.00 from Rosendo through Dominador.
o He presented Dominador, who testified that Rosendo did not give him
money on 28 March 2005.
ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON
 Claimed that the allegations against him were products of instigations with ill-
motive brought about by complainants’ illegitimate and capricious ambitions. He
alleged that Tuldague sought to be free from constructive suggestions and
corrections on his wrong office actions, i.e. issuance of summons before the
raffle of cases. He likewise claimed that Balajo harbored ill-feelings against him
since he questioned his issuance of commitment orders.
A.M. No. 05-10-661-RTC
 August 15-19, 2005 – a judicial audit was conducted in the RTC of Cabarroguis,
Quirino, based on the directive of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) and
Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. to investigate Judge Pardo.
 September 2005 – the audit team submitted their initial report providing,
among others, that in Branches 31 and 32 of the RTC, Judge Pardo, as presiding
and pairing judge, accumulated a total of:
o 44 cases without further action or settings for a considerable length of
time;
o 7 cases submitted for decision or resolution but already beyond the
reglementary period to decide or resolve;
o 1 case not yet set for hearing
 Resolution dated October 18, 2005 – Court En Banc, upon recommendation by
the OCA, resolved to:
o Consolidate the instant judicial audit and investigation report with the
complaints against Judge Pardo;
o Include Calpatura as respondent in the charge of corruption;
o Refer the consolidated cases to Justice Marigomen, Consultant, OCA,
for investigation, report and recommendation within 60 days from the
termination of the formal hearing.
 Resolution dated April 4 2006 –the Court En Banc, resolved to redocket the
complaint, amend the earlier resolution and limit the charges against Judge
Pardo to:
o Corruption through, among others, sharing of cash bonds;
o Demanding money or live animals in exchange for endorsing applicants
for vacant positions;
o Taking of court property specifically two big cans of coat master paint
allocated for the painting of the Hall of Justice.
 Court approved Pardo’s application for optional retirement but held in abeyance
his retirement benefits until the final resolution of this case
 OCA’s RECOMMENDATIONS: corruption case be dimissed for insufficiency of
evidence and Pardo be fined P20K for violation of New Code of Judicial Conduct
which shall be deducted from his retirement benefits. The matter regarding
judicial audit be considered closed and terminated.
o Pardo is liable for violating Sec.1, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct
o Pardo did not deny that he had a drinking spree with Rosendo (more
than 2 hours) – this act is disturbing and improper since Rosendo had
a pending application for probation with Judge Pardo
o Charges of corruption, taking of cans of paint and endorsing applicants
in exchange for money or animals – Complainants failed to
substantiate their charges
ISSUE: WON Judge Pardo is liable for violation of New Code of Judicial Conduct
RULING
 Affirm OCA with modifications
 The Court held that a judge’s acts of meeting with litigants outside the
office premises beyond office hours and sending a member of his staff to
talk with complainant constitute gross misconduct. Moreover, a judge was
held liable for misconduct when he entertained a litigant in his home and
received benefits given by the litigant.
 Complainants did not have direct knowledge of their charges and merely
relied on their witnesses to testify on the alleged wrongful act of Judge
Pardo.
 There were material inconsistencies present on Rosendo’s testimonies,
which greatly affected his credibility.
 SEC. 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross misconduct as a
serious offense.
 This is not Pardo’s first offense.
o Guilty of Gross Ignorance of the law
 Court’s decision:
o For failure of complainants to substantiate their charges against
Judge Pardo, case is dismissed.
o He is still liable for gross misconduct.
o Adopt finding that the matter regarding judicial audit be
considered closed terminated.
 Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and fine him of P40K to be
deducted from his retirement benefits.
 OCA is directed to release the retirement pay and other benefits due him.
10. DR. JANOS B. VIZCAYNO v. JUDGE JASPER JESSE G. DACANAY, AM No. MTJ-10-1772,
Dec 05, 2012
FACTS:
 On 31 March 2009, Judge Dacanay went to Catarman, Liloan, Cebu to
personally see Lot 1529-P, subject of the forcible entry and damages in Civil
Case No. 650-R pending in his court; and he inspected said property in the
presence of the plaintiffs and in the absence of Dr. Vizcayno and his counsels.
 Complainant only learned of the ocular inspection through neighbors Norma Tan,
Herminia Domain, and Fernan Baguio. Feeling aggrieved, complainant filed a
motion for inhibition of respondent judge to hear the civil action.
 Complainant argues that respondent judge committed a gross violation of the
due process clause protected under the Constitution when the latter conducted
an ex-parte ocular inspection without notice to him.
 Also, respondent judge failed to live up to that norm of conduct that "judges
should not only be impartial but should also appear impartial," when he
conducted the ocular inspection together with the plaintiffs. Such act,
complainant claims, is highly improper and grossly inappropriate, and is a
violation of Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary (New Code of Judicial Conduct) which provides that "a judge should
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities."
ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON
 In his answer, respondent judge explains that he went to the subject property
with his utility personnel only to conduct his own personal investigation on the
case to determine whether the disputed construction therein really exists, and to
help him in suggesting to the parties to settle the case amicably. At the time of
his personal inspection of the property, no one from either the plaintiffs or the
defendant ever entertained him. What he did was to make a mere assessment
of the property for his personal satisfaction, in all good faith and without fraud,
dishonesty, or malicious intent.
 Respondent judge asserts that he cannot be accused of gross ignorance of the
law, abuse of authority, manifest partiality, and delay, as he made the inspection
in good faith and with noble intentions. Citing Lumbos v. Baliguat, he argues that
to constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the subject
decision, order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties
is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but it must be moved by bad faith,
fraud, dishonesty or corruption. He likewise denies incurring delay, averring that
the records of the case easily reveal that it was complainant and his counsel
who, for several instances, failed to appear during the scheduled hearings of the
case.
 On 10 March 2010, the OCA, under Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez
and Deputy Court Administrator Jesus Edwin A. Villasor, issued its Evaluation
and Recommendation on the present complaint.
 The OCA’s recommendation reads as follows:
“PREMISES CONSIDERED, for conducting an ocular inspection without informing the
parties, we find respondent, Judge Jasper Jesse Dacanay, guilty of conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service in violation of Sec. 1, Canon 4 of The New Code of Judicial
Conduct, which is considered a serious charge.”
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Dacanay should be held administratively liable for conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service for conducting an ocular inspection without
informing the parties
HELD: YES. Judge Dacanay's actuations, although not necessarily attended with bad faith,
fraud, dishonesty or corruption, were precipitate and imprudent. The pre-trial stage has
not begun. There was failure to inform all parties about the ocular inspection.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Jasper Jesse G. Dacanay is found guilty of committing
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service in violation of Canon 4 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and is imposed a fine of ?30,000.
Judge Dacanay is directed to pay, within 15 days from notice of this Decision, this fine
together with the fine imposed in A.M. No. MTJ-03-1480. Judge Dacanay is sternly warned
that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
RATIO:
 Judge Dacanay issued an Order dated 31 March 2009, the same day as the
ocular inspection, resetting the preliminary conference on 29 May 2009, yet the
order did not contain any notice to the parties of Judge Dacanay's ocular
inspection.
 We have previously ruled that an ocular inspection without notice to nor
presence of the parties is highly improper.[13] Good and noble intentions
notwithstanding, Judge Dacanay's actuations gave an appearance of
impropriety. His behavior diminished public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.
 We have repeatedly stressed that all those involved in the dispensation of
justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond
reproach. Their conduct must, at all times, be circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility free from any suspicion that may taint the judiciary.
 As the administration of justice is a sacred task, this Court condemns and
cannot countenance any act on the part of court personnel that would violate
the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the
faith of the people in the judiciary.
11. JUDGE RIZALINA T. CAPCO-UMALI v. JUDGE PAULITA B. ACOSTA-VILLARANTE, A.M. No.
RTJ-08-2124
---------------------------------
JUDGE PAULITA B. ACOSTA-VILLARANTE v. JUDGE RIZALINA T. CAPCO-UMALI, A.M. No. RTJ-
08-2125, August 27, 2009
FACTS:
 Judge Acosta-Villarante wrote a Memorandum of March 27, 2007 addressed to
Executive Judge Maria Cancino-Erum of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Mandaluyong City.
 The Memorandum refers to an unfortunate incident wherein during the first
meeting of RTC Judges ever held on March 23, 2007 (Friday) under Judge
Erum’s judgeship where the newly appointed vice executive Judge Rizalina
Capco-Umali marred the event by conduct very unbecoming of a judge by
uttering unsavory remarks and epithets or words designed to humiliate Judge
Villarante in the presence of fellow judges coupled with her attempt to inflict
physical harm to her which JudgeErum miserably failed to control and dominate
and opted to take a passive stance.
 Because of this, Judge Capco-Umali filed a libel case against Judge Villarante.
Judge Villarante countered it by filing an Administrative Complaint charging
Judge Capco-Umali with violation of Canon 4, Sections 1 and 2 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct, and a complaint for Grave Oral Defamation and Grave
Threats before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City.
 It all started when Judge Erum paid a visit to Mayor Neptali Gonzales. All was
working out until they came to the topic of local allowances.
 Mayor Gonzales noticed the disparity on the allowances especially that
respondent Villarante was receiving additional three thousand pesos (P3,000)
on top of her regular allowance as Executive Judge; and additional five thousand
pesos (Php5,000) on top of her allowance as Acting Judge of Br. 209.
 Judge Erum showed the payroll and told the Mayor that it was Judge Villarante
who requested it and that the Mayor approved, in which the Mayor denied the
said approval.
 The Mayor summoned LOIDA, her staff and directed the latter to retrieve the
previous payrolls including the 2006 payrolls.
 Come, March 23, 2007 (Friday) Monthly Judges Meeting was held. The meeting
was going smoothly until the topic of local allowance had been touched.
Reporting to the body what transpired during the courtesy call at the Mayor’s
Office on March 15, 2007, when the matter of giving to the new executive judge
the increased allowances of Executive Judge Paulita B. Acosta-Villarante and
that the latter would revert back to the authorized amount for Executive Judges
ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON
was discussed, respondent Villarante was angered and blurted out addressing
the new Executive Judge, thus:
o "Kayo, simula ng maupo sa pwesto, wala ng ginawa kundi kutkutin at
maghanap ng evidencia para ako masira, nagsusumbong,
nagmamanman. Wala naman pakialaman sa allowance kanya kanya
yan dapat.["]
 Having personal knowledge of the conversation that transpired at the Mayor’s
Office on March 15, 2007, Judge Umali felt obliged to come to the rescue of the
embattled Judge Maria A. Cancino-Erum and to refute respondent’s misplaced
tirade by stating matter of fact the truth and what I saw and heard.
 While complainant is still enlightening her fellow Judges of the real facts that
transpired at the Mayor’s Office, Judge Villarante kept talking too and even
shouting at the top of her voice towards complainant. Villarante even called
complainant a liar (sinungaling) repeatedly.
 Complainant got upset by the verbal aggression made by Judge Villarante that
she told the latter, thus:
o "Matanda ka na, halos malapit ka na sa kamatayan gumagawa ka pa
ng ganyan, madadamay pa kami."
 Judge Villarante fought back: "Bog, sana mangyari sa iyo, bog!".
 More heated exchanges ensued because Judge Villarante kept on
saying sinungaling to the complainant.
 After that, cooler heads intervened.
 By Comment of May 28, 2007, Judge Acosta-Villarante denied that she wrote the
Memorandum to maliciously impute a crime, vice or defect on Judge Capco-
Umali as she merely requested for the suspension of the holding of the monthly
meeting of judges to avoid a repetition of the incident and to afford the parties
an opportunity to "cool off."
 In a next meeting, Judge Villarante took the floor and asked others that any
matters regarding the allowances, the others should not question.
 At that juncture Judge Capco-Umali stood up and in a mode of anger pointing a
finger against herein Complainant, she repeatedly said in a loud voice:
o "Matanda ka na…! Mamamatay ka na!..." at iba pa na may
kahalintulad.
 Judge Villarante answered:
o “Judge ako! Judge ako!
 And before Judge Capco-Umali exits the room, she was about to get attacked by
Judge Villarante if not of the timely interference of another Judge.
ISSUE/S:
 Whether or not both Judges should be sanctioned for violation of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct.
HELD:
 YES. Both were sanctioned by the Supreme Court.
 WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judges Rizalina T. Capco-Umali and Paulita B.
Acosta-Villarante GUILTY of violation of Section 1, Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary ("[J]udges shall avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities."), for which they are
each FINED in the amount of Eleven Thousand (P11,000) Pesos.
 In view of the retirement of Judge Paulita B. Acosta-Villarante, the Fiscal
Management and Budget Office, Office of the Court Administrator is ordered to
DEDUCT the amount of Eleven Thousand Pesos (P11,000) from her retirement
benefits.
 Judge Rizalina T. Capco-Umali, who is still in the service, is STERNLY WARNED
that a repetition of similar acts will be dealt with more severely. The same stern
warning applies to retired Judge Paulita B. Acosta-Villarante in her capacity as a
member of the Bar.
RATIO:
 On Judge Capco-Umali:
o Failed to live up to the standard of propriety entrenched in the
aforequoted code of conduct. While, she might have been provoked by
Judge Acosta-Villarante’s referral to her as a liar, she should have
maintained her composure instead of shouting back at a fellow judge.
o She should have exercised self-restraint instead of reacting in such a
very inappropriate manner considering that she is in the presence of
fellow Judges and other employees of RTC, Mandaluyong City.
o She should have put more consideration and effort on preserving the
solemnity of the said meeting, and on giving those who are present the
courtesy and respect they deserved.
 On Judge Acosta-Villarante:
o It was Judge Acosta-Villarante’s unseemly behavior, calling Judge
Capco-Umali "sinungaling" in front of their fellow Judges that initiated
the altercation between the two Judges.
o Judge Acosta-Villarante should have been more cautious in choosing
the words to address the already volatile situation with Judge Capco-
Umali.
o If indeed the memorandum was produced strictly to allow the parties to
cool off and avoid a repetition of the incident, on this ground alone,
there was no need to mention the alleged misbehavior of Judge Capco-
Umali during the meeting. The memorandum was thus written as a
medium for retaliation against Judge Capco-Umali.
 An act complained of anchored on a violation of Code of Judicial Conduct, may
only constitute a serious charge under Section 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court if the same amounts to gross misconduct. The respective acts for which
the herein respondents have been charged do not amount to gross misconduct.
Thus, the charges against them cannot be considered serious.
 Nevertheless, respondents should be held administratively liable for violation of
Section 1, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary. Under Section 11(B) in relation to Section 9 (A) of Rule 140, as
amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, violation of Supreme Court rules constitutes a
less serious charge. Respondents, therefore, may be sanctioned with:
o [1] suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not
less than (1) nor more than three (3) months; or
o [2] a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
Canon 2: Integrity
Section 1. Conduct beyond reproach
12. CASAR ET AL. V. SOLUREN, A.M. NO. RTJ-12-2316 (9 OCTOBER 2012)
ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON
FACTS:
 An administrative case was filed by the complainants against Judge Soluren for
violation of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) Circular No. 03-2010,
dated January 12, 2010, which suspended the conduct of jail visitation and
inspection by Executive Judges and Presiding Judges pending results of the re-
examination of the provisions of A.M. No. 07-3-02-SC.
 Judge Soluren went to the Aurora Provincial Jail and conferred with the inmates
including those who had pending cases before her sala.
 The purpose of Judge Soluren’s visit was to persuade the prisoners into signing
a letter addressed to then Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, calling for the
dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against her by the District Public
Attorney of Baler, Aurora, and for the removal of the Presiding Judge of RTC-
Baler.
 Evidence presented:
o Certification from Prison Guard Administrator for the unauthorized
visits made by Judge Soluren to the provincial jail
o Affidavit executed by Soluren’s companion during her visits
o Handwritten letter signed by the detention prisoners admitting that
they were not aware of the import of the letter to the Chief Justice due
to lack of explanation by Judge Soluren
 Judge Soluren: admitted that she went to the Aurora Provincial Jail on four (4)
occasions but they were not official jail visitations
 OCA: Judge Soluren guilty of Simple Misconduct and imposing upon her a fine of
P10,000.00
ISSUE: W/N Judge Soluren is guilty of simple misconduct
RULING: YES. Judge Soluren opened herself to charges of impropriety when she went to
the Aurora Provincial Jail to solicit the sympathies and signatures of the prisoners,
especially those who had pendings cases in her sala. Respondent is liable to pay a fine of
10,000.
RATIO:
 The Court has consistently enjoined judges to avoid not just impropriety in their
conduct but even the mere appearance of impropriety because the appearance
of bias or prejudice can be damaging as actual bias or prejudice to the public’s
confidence on the Judiciary’s role in the administration of justice.
13. CAMPOS V. CAMPOS, A.M. NO. MTJ-10-1761 (8 FEBRUARY 2012)
FACTS:
 A complaint for serious misconduct, immorality and dishonesty was filed by Aida
R. Campos, Alistair R. Campos, and Charmaine R. Campos (complainants)
against Eliseo M. Campos (respondent)incident.
 Aida and Eliseo were married and had 2 children: Alistair and Charmane.
 In 2008, Eliseo filed a petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage alleging that:
o He and Aida were both psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.
o He is a homosexual who could not be intimate with his wife unless he
imagined he was with another man.
o His wife had affairs with other men which he did not bother to stop or
question because of his homosexuality.
 Aida denied the allegations and alleged that Eliseo wanted their marriage
annulled so that he could marry another woman with whom he was having a
relationship.
o Aida filed instead a petition for legal separation.
 Aida further alleged that in relation to a property under the name of their child
Alistair:
o Respondent executed an affidavit of loss claiming that the title over a
parcel of registered land under the name of Alistair, was lost in his
possession but which at that time was in Alistairs possession.
o Respondent wanted the property back in the event his petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage would be granted by the court.
 Respondent admitted executing the affidavit of loss but only to protect his
interest because he learned that Aida and Alistair wanted to use the property as
a collateral for a loan.
 Findings of Investigating Judge as affirmed by OCA:
o Respondent is not guilty of dishonesty with regard to his claim of
homosexuality and the execution of the affidavit of loss to protect his
rights
o Respondent is guilty of simple misconduct in allowing the title of the
property to be registered in the name of then minor Alistair by
manipulating the transaction despite Alistair’s lack of legal capacity to
enter into the transaction just to avoid losing the property should he
lose in a pending case filed against him (if he lose the case, property
will be taken).
ISSUE: W/N Judge Campos was guilty of simple misconduct
RULING: YES. Respondent is liable to pay a fine o 20,000.
RATIO:
 The New Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary provides that judges must:
o accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by
the ordinary citizen
o conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the
judicial office
o comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official
or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that
looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice.
 Respondent is from the charge of dishonesty.
o Alleged homosexuality is for the determination of the trial court
pending the petition for declaration of nullity
o Respondent did not appear to have acted in bad faith or committed
dishonesty in executing the affidavit of loss of the title to the property.
 GUILTY OF SIMPLE MISCONDUCT in causing the registration of the title in his
son’s name with the intention of defrauding a possible judgment-obligee:
o Simple misconduct has been defined as an unacceptable behavior
that transgresses the established rules of conduct for public officers. It
is an unlawful behavior. Misconduct in office is any unlawful behavior
by a public officer in relation to the duties of his office, willful in
character. It generally means wrongful, improper, unlawful conduct
motivated by a premeditated, obstinate, or intentional purpose
although it may not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent.
 Respondent knew at that time of the registration of the property that he had a
pending case and that he could possibly lose the case.
ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON
In order to manipulate the situation and taking advantage of his knowledge of the law,
respondent caused the registration of the property in Alistair’s name with the intention of
defrauding a possible judgment-obligee.
14. SISON-BARIAS V. JUDGE MARINO RUBIA, A.M. NO. RTJ-14-2388 (10 JUNE 2014)
FACTS:
 Complainant Emilie Sison-Barias is involved in three cases pending before the
sala of respondent Judge Marino Rubia:
o Intestate proceeding over the intestate estate of her late husband
opposed by her mther-in-law, Romelias Barias
o Guardianship proceeding over the estate of complainant’s late
husband
o Civil action for annulment of contracts and reconveyance of real
properties filed by Romelias and Evelyn Tanael against complainant
 Complainant alleged that there was delay in the publication of the notice in the
petition for issuance of letters of administration filed.
 She was then introduced by her brother, Enrique "Ike" Sison, to respondent
Eileen Pecaña, the daughter of his good friend, who was a data encoder in the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC- Laguna
o During their meeting, complainant informed respondent Pecaña of the
delay in the publication of the notice in the petition for issuance of
letters of administration.
o She then asked respondent Pecaña to check the status of the
publication of the notice.
o Respondent Pecaña asked for complainant’s number so that she could
inform her as soon as any development takes place in the case.
 Pecaña asked complainant to meet her again at her house and informed
complainant that she could no longer assist her since respondent Judge Rubia
had already given administration of the properties to Evelyn Tanael.
 Pecaña sent her a text message asking complainant to call her. Complainant
called respondent Pecaña who informed her that respondent Judge Rubia
wanted to talk to her.
o During the dinner meeting, respondents allegedly asked complainant
inappropriate questions. Complainant was then informed that
respondent Judge Rubia knew of this fact through Atty. Noe Zarate,
counsel of Romelias Barias.
o This disclosure surprised complainant, as she was under the
impression that opposing counsel and respondent Judge Rubia had no
business discussing matters that were not relevant to their pending
cases.
 In the meantime, complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia acted in a
manner that showed manifest partiality in favor of the opposing parties,
Romelias Barias and Evelyn Tanael, as represented by their counsel, Atty. Noe
Zarate.
o Did not consider comments/oppositions to the motion for
consolidation filed by Romelias
o Refused to issue orders allowing her to comply with her duties as
administrator of late husband’s estate
o Refused to to grant her request for subpoena that she had prayed for
to compel Evelyn Tanael to produce the documents showing the
accrued rentals of the parcel of land belonging to her late husband
Failed to require a timely filing of the pre-trial brief on the part of Evelyn
o
Tanael and Romelias Almeda-Barias who were never declared in
default
 Complainant had several exchanges of text message with Pecana:
COMPLAINANT:
xxx my lawyer jz called me at galit n galit. xxx. Sa kakadaldal na
mention s lawyr my meeting wid u n judge rubia. My lawyr ws mad dat
m nt suppose to do dat w/out hs knowledge. I cnt understand anymore
wat he ws sayng kanina kse nga galit. He wil file yata somtng abt dat n
I dnt knwwat? Pls. Help me. (August 8, 2010, 2:31 p.m.)
AILEEN PECAÑA [sic]:
Ha? Anong ififile? Bkt xa galit? Bka lalo tayo mapahamak? (August 8,
2010, 3:48 p.m.)
COMPLAINANT
M nt very sure bt he mentioned abt administrative or administratn
something. Xxx He ws mad bcoz f our meetng nga, dats wat struck hm.
xxx (August 8, 2010, 4:18 p.m.)
AILEEN PECAÑA [sic]
Admin? Nku d mapapahamak nga kaming 2 ni juj. Pati ikaw
mapapahamak pa dn. (August 8, 2010, 4:28 p.m.)
AILEEN PECAÑA [sic]
Bkt xa galit kng mkpg kta ka sminwidout his knowledge. I cnt fathom y
wil it end up filing an admin case. (August 8, 2010, 4:29 p.m.)
AILEEN PECAÑA [sic]
Pls Emily do something 2 pacify ur lawyer, juj rubia will definitely get
mad wid us. (August 8, 2010, 4:30 p.m.)
 Complainant then filed the following cases:
o moved for Judge Rubia’s inhibition over the pending cases
o Against Judge Rubia for conduct unbecoming of a judge, partiality,
gross ignorance of the law or procedure, incompetence, and gross
misconduct
o Against Pecana for gross misconduct
 Pecana’s answer:
o Alleged meeting between complainant and respondent Judge was
merely a chance encounter.
 Judge Rubia’s comment:
o Alleged meeting between him and his co-respondent Pecaña together
with complainant was a mere chance encounter.
o It took complainant eight (8) months since the alleged dinner meeting
to file a motion for inhibition and an administrative case
o denied knowledge of any text messages exchanged between
complainant and respondent Pecaña as well as any active advocacy in
favor of the opposing counsel
 CA Associate Justice Gaerlan’s investigation:
o Recommended that no penalty be imposed against respondents
ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON
because complainant failed to prove her claim with substantial
evidence that would justify the imposition of a penalty on respondents
o Convinced that the meeting at Burgos Circle was just a chance
encounter
ISSUE: W/N Judge Rubia and Pecana should be held administratively liable
RULING: YES. Respondent Judge Rubia is hereby DISMISSED from the service.
Respondent Eileen Pecaña is SUSPENDED for one (1) year for gross misconduct.
RATIO:
A. On Pecana: violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel.
 Court personnel, regardless of position or rank, are expected to conduct
themselves in accordance with the strict standards of integrity and morality.
 As a court employee, respondent Pecaña should have known better than to
interact with litigants in a way that could compromise the confidence that the
general public places in the judiciary.
 Respondent Pecaña should have refused to meet with complainant in her home
and any other form of extended communication with complainant, save for those
in her official capacity as a Data Encoder of the court.
 The continued communication between complainant and respondent Pecaña
makes her culpable for failure to adhere to the strict standard of propriety
mandated of court personnel.
 Pecaña admitted to meeting with complainant several times, despite the
former’s knowledge of the pendency of cases in the court where she is employed
and in addition to the text messages exchanged between them; even to the
extent of advising complainant against filing an administrative case against her
and respondent Judge Rubia.
 She had a duty to sever all forms of communication with complainant or to
inform her superiors or the proper authority of complainant’s attempts to
communicate with her which she failed to do so.
B. On Judge Rubia: violation of New Code of Judicial Conduct
 By participating in the dinner meeting and by failing to admonish respondent
Pecaña for her admitted impropriety, respondent Judge Rubia violated Canons
1(Independence) and 2 (Integrity) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
o Nothing in the record shows that Judge Rubia took action after being
informed of Pecaña’s interactions with a litigant.
o As a judge, he had the authority to ensure that all court employees,
whether or not they were under his direct supervision, act in
accordance with the esteem of their office.
o Had it been true that a settlement was being brokered by respondent
Judge Rubia, it should have been done in open court with the record
reflecting such an initiative.
 His actions failed to assure complainant and other litigants before his court of
the required "cold neutrality of an impartial judge.". Because of this, respondent
Judge Rubia also violated Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct on
Impartiality.
 By meeting with complainant, respondent Judge Rubia also violated Canon 4 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct on Propriety
o Respondents have relentlessly stood by their position that the meeting
was a chance encounter, and, thus, no impropriety could be attributed
to the meeting itself.
o Judge Rubia’s actions belittled the integrity required of judges in all
their dealings inside and outside the courts. Thus, Judge Rubia now
lost the requisite integrity, impartiality, and propriety fundamental to
his office. He cannot be allowed to remain a member of the judiciary.
15. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR
vs. JUDGE ALAN L. FLORES, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 7,
TUBOD, LANAO DEL NORTE AND FORMER ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 21, KAPATAGAN, LANAO DEL NORTE, A.M. No. RTJ-12-2325 April
14, 2015
CASE OVERVIEW: This administrative case originated from an investigation conducted by
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) pursuant to two anonymous letters alleging
certain irregularities being committed by Judge Flores. The first letter dated April 28, 2011
was received on May 10, 2011 by the OCA and sent by a certain "John Hancock" while the
other was received on June 15, 2011 and sent by "Concerned Citizens."
FACTS:
 Both letters accused Judge Flores of rendering favorable judgments in exchange
for monetary consideration and deciding cases on annulment of marriage even if
said cases were beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the courts he presided and,
that every time an audit team of the OCA visits Iligan, Lanao del Norte and
Marawi City, Judge Flores would meet them at the airport, act as their driver,
entertain them and even give presents for their return to Manila.
 In addition, "John Hancock" alleged that Judge Flores demands P5,000.00 for
special proceedings and notarial commissions, maintains the services of four
non-court personnel who regularly reported to him and acted as his errand boys,
bag-men, personal security and drinking buddies, and if Judge Flores is not with
his mistress in Cagayan de Oro City or Ozamis City, he is having drinking sprees
from 3 p.m. until 7 or 8 p.m. with his errand boys at "Randy's Place" in Tubod,
Lanao del Norte. Judge Flores also allegedly claims to be protected by one of the
associate justices of the Supreme Court (SC) who is a former Free Legal
Assistance Group lawyer, and by a "Lawyer-Administrator" who is assigned in
Lanao del Norte.
 Acting on these anonymous letters, the Court approved OCA's request for an
audit team (OCA team) to conduct an investigation. The authority included an
"on-the-spot" investigation/examination of any available document in other
government offices, which may have direct connection with the charges.
 After the investigation, the OCA found several violations and misconduct that is
very unbecoming of a Judge.
 While the OCA team was conducting its investigation, they were informed by
Prosecutor Cabrera, who was then assigned to handle the cases in Branch 7,
that he filed an affidavit-complaint against Judge Flores.
 Particularly, Prosecutor Cabrera charged Judge Flores with violating the
provisions of SC Administrative Circular No. 23-9554 when he failed to timely
resolve several incidents in Criminal Case. Prosecutor Cabrera also claimed that
Judge Flores neglected to resolve incidents in eight criminal cases, which were
then pending in his sala, and that he rendered favorable decisions in numerous
petitions for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in exchange for monetary
consideration even if the parties reside in areas outside the territorial
jurisdiction of his courts.
ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON
 It was also alleged that he maintained the services of Oscar Flores (Oscar),
Gedeon Catedral (Gedeon),58 Mario Capalac and Jeter Flores (Jeter) who served
as his driver, unofficial security guards and bribe collectors.
 In his reply, Judge Flores contended that the allegations in the letters are
unfounded and are mere attempts to put him in a bad light, especially since the
letters are not supported by "public records of indubitable integrity."
 The cases before his courts are decided based on the merits and the evidence
presented and that only those required by law on notarial commissions and
special proceedings are charged with a 5,000.00 fee and its collection is the
responsibility of the Office of the Clerk of Court. Further, the people who come to
his court are accorded with utmost respect and consideration.
 Finally, he denied the accusations that he keeps a mistress; that he engages in
a habitual drinking spree; and that he entertains OCA teams in an excessive and
lavish fashion whenever they visit his sala.
 In the Consolidated Report dated June 11, 2013, Investigating Justice Renato C.
Francisco (Justice Francisco) found sufficient evidence to hold Judge Flores
administratively liable for ignorance of the law, gross misconduct and undue
delay in rendering decisions and orders. According to Justice Francisco, the
"undisputed Investigation Report of the OCA" shows an alarming number of
pending cases, as well as decided cases, where the actual residence of the
parties are apparently not within the territorial jurisdiction of the courts presided
by Judge Flores but these were disregarded, in violation of Section 4 of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, as amended.
 There were also several instances when the public prosecutor recommended the
dismissal of the cases on ground of improper venue but Judge Flores simply
stated that the prosecutor's role in these cases is merely to determine if
collusion exists between the parties, or if evidence is being suppressed.
 Accordingly, Justice Francisco recommended the charge of usurpation of the
judge's function against Atty. Bernardino Bering (raised by the OCA in its
memorandum) be referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant for appropriate
action.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct on Judge
Flores
HELD: This Decision is immediately executory and Judge Flores is ORDERED to CEASE
AND DESIST from discharging the functions of his Office upon receipt of this Decision.
RATIO:
 In this case, the OCA report is replete with findings showing that Judge Flores
deliberately disregarded the foregoing rule. He continued to try and resolve
cases despite glaring circumstances, which should have created doubt as to the
veracity of the residential addresses declared in the petitions. Prosecutor
Cabrera even actually brought these to the attention of Judge Flores but he was
merely brushed aside. Worse, there were even instances when Judge Flores,
during questioning, knowingly led a party into curing the defect.
 Thus, in a particular case (Narvasa case), the petitioner declared that she
resides at c/o Lacson's Residence, Poblacion, Tubod, Lanao del Norte. During
her cross-examination,94 however, she admitted that she actually resides in
Steel Town, Sta. Elena, Iligan City. When Judge Flores propounded clarificatory
questions, the petitioner ended up declaring that she resides in Quibranza
Building, Tubod, Lanao del Norte
 The undisputed OCA Investigation Report in the present consolidated cases
showed an alarming number of pending and decided cases where the actual
residence of the parties are obviously not within the territorial jurisdiction of the
courts presided by Judge Flores but he nevertheless took cognizance of these
cases without even making an inquiry as to their veracity.
 Judge Flores' incompetence became even more manifest when he curtailed the
efforts of the public prosecutors in ensuring that the rule on proper venue will
not be circumvented.
 As observed by the OCA team, Judge Flores almost always rejects the public
prosecutors' recommendation of dismissal in their investigation report on the
alleged reason that the role of the prosecutor is only to determine if collusion
exists between the parties or if the evidence is being suppressed. Competence
and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office and
every judge is required to observe the law. There is gross ignorance of the law
when an error committed by the judge was gross or patent, deliberate or
malicious, or when a judge ignores, contradicts or fails to apply settled law and
jurisprudence because of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.
 No less than the Code of Judicial conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful
to the laws and maintain professional competence. Indeed, competence is a
mark of a good judge. A judge must be acquainted with legal norms and
precepts as well as with procedural rules. When a judge displays an utter lack of
familiarity with the rules, he erodes the public's confidence in the competence of
our courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law.
Section 2. Behavior and conduct must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity
of the Judiciary
16. ANONYMOUS v. JUDGE RIO ACHAS, AM No. MTJ-11-1801, Feb. 27, 2013
FACTS:
 An anonymous letter-complaint was sent to the court alleging immorality and
conduct unbecoming of a judge against respondent Achas
 Letter calls on court to loo look into the morality of respondent Judge Achas and
alleges that:
(1) it is of public knowledge in the city that Judge Achas is living
scandalously with a woman who is not his wife;
(2) he lives beyond his means;
(3) he is involved with illegal activities through his connection with bad
elements, the kuratongs;
(4) he comes to court very untidy and dirty;
(5) he decides his cases unfairly in exchange for material and
monetary consideration;
(6) he is involved with cockfighting/gambling.
 Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) referred the matter to Executive Judge
Miriam Orquieza-Angot for Discreet Investigation and Report
 Report: Judge Angot found that Judge Achas had been separated from his legal
wife for quite some time and they are living apart; and that he found for himself
a young woman with whom he would occasionally go out with in public and it
ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON
was not a secret around town, but that she could not be certain whether such
were true, and only ascertained that he had established friendships or alliances
with people of different social standings from around the city.
 Respondent denied all the allegations against him and claimed that they were
hatched to harass him, pointing to disgruntled professionals, supporters and
local candidates who lost during the May 2010 elections and after 28 years in
the government service, he had remained loyal to his work and conducted
himself in a righteous manner
 The case was docketed as an administrative matter and was referred to the
executive judge of the RTC for investigation, report and recommendation
 OCA recommended that Respondent be REPRIMANDED as to the charge of
immorality and that he be ordered to refrain from going to cockpits or avoid such
places altogether, with a warning that the same or similar complaint in the
future shall be dealt with more severely
ISSUE: WON respondent was immoral and has conduct unbecoming of a Judge
HELD: For violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, respondent Judge Rio
Concepcion Achas is REPRlMANDED and FINED in the amount of P5,000.00,
ADMONISHED not to socially mingle with cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors, and
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely
RATIO:
 New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary pertinently provides:
CANON 2 - Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to
the personal demeanor of judges.
SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it
is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the
integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done
CANON 4 - Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge.
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities.
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal
restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely
and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the
dignity of the judicial office.
 For going out in public with a woman not his wife, Judge Achas has clearly failed
to abide by the above-cited Canons of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
Philippine Judiciary
 Considering that his immoral behavior is not a secret around town, it is apparent
that respondent judge has failed to ensure that his conduct is perceived to be
above reproach by the reasonable observer, and has failed to avoid the
appearance of impropriety in his activities, to the detriment of the judiciary as a
whole
 Regarding his involvement in cockfighting, however, there is no clear evidence
 he denied engaging in cockfighting and betting, but admitted, however, that
he reared fighting cocks for leisure, having inherited the practice from his
forefathers
 While rearing fighting cocks is not illegal, Respondent should avoid mingling with
a crowd of cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors as it undoubtedly impairs the
respect due him
 As a judge, he must impose upon himself personal restrictions that might be
viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and
willingly
 No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its
occupant than does the judicial office
 Judges in particular must be individuals of competence, honesty and probity,
charged as they are with safeguarding the integrity of the court and its
proceedings  he should behave at all times so as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary
 Under Section 10 in relation to Section 11 C ( 1) of Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, "unbecoming conduct" is classified as a light charge,
punishable by any of the following sanctions:
(1) a fine of not less than Pl,OOO.OO but not exceeding PIO,OOO.OO;
and/or
(2) censure;
(3) reprimand;
( 4) admonition with warning.
 The Court, thus, finds that the penalty of a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 and
reprimand are proper under the circumstances
17. In Re: Complaint against JUDGE MARTONINO MARCOS and Clerk of Court SHIRLEY
VISAYA, Municipal Trial Court, Gerona, Tarlac, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1520. January 27, 2004
FACTS:
 This administrative matter arose from a Complaint filed by Romeo Zacarias and
an undated Anonymous Complaint of a concerned citizen of Gerona, Tarclac,
identically charging Judge Martonino R. Marcos and Clerk of Court Shirley M.
Visaya with immoral conduct and illegal solicitation from litigants (graft and
corruption)
 Complaint of Zacarias was referred by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
to Executive Judge Adriano of the RTC of Tarlac City for discreet investigation,
and subsequently for formal investigation, report and recommendation
 After conducting the investigation, he stated in his report to the OCA that a court
insider had confirmed the illicit relationship of respondents and he then
recommended the filing of formal charges against them
 In view, however, of the appointment/promotion of respondent judge as the
presiding judge of the RTC of Tarlac City, the Court, pursuant to its Resolution in
AM No. 01-8-10-SC, thereafter referred the matter to Associate Justice Josefina
Guevara-Salonga of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and
recommendation
 respondent judge averred that the allegations of complainant lacked factual and
legal basis, claiming that the Complaint had been filed merely to harass him and
denied having ever demanded money from complainant, who had allegedly
approached him for advice in the latters criminal case  that the complainant
might have misinterpreted as bribe the amounts he had paid for his cash bond
and for the damages adjudged against him
ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON
 As to the charge of immorality, respondent judge averred that his hectic
schedule hardly allowed him to indulge in illicit relations and emphasized that on
top of his duties as judge, he was also a lay minister and president of the Parish
Pastoral Council of Ramos, Tarlac, as well as an active member of the
freemasonry and the cursillo movements
 Justice Guevara-Salonga held that while complainant had failed to present any
direct and positive evidence of his charges of graft and corruption against
respondents, the records of the criminal case validated and confirmed his
accusations, that the inconsistencies in the statements of respondents in their
Comments and testimonies during the clarificatory hearing belied their claim
that complainant had voluntarily posted the bond
 Another discrepancy that supported complainants’ allegation, according to
Justice Guevara-Salonga, was respondent clerk’s classification of the cash bond
as part of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) instead of the Fiduciary Fund
 having been in service for 27 years, respondent clerk ought to have been
aware of the latters duty to check the forms and to collect the cash bond for the
court
 the foregoing findings were telling proofs that the acts of respondents had been
irregular, unlawful, anomalous and totally inconsistent with any claim of good
faith in the performance of their judicial functions
 As to the charge of immorality, she recommended that it be dismissed, as it was
based only on vicious rumors and unverified reports and recommended that
respondents be penalized with severe reprimand and suspension from office for
a period of one (1) month for grave misconduct
ISSUE: WON the respondents’ acts were unlawful, anomalous and inconsistent with any
claim of good faith in the performance of their judicial functions
HELD: Judge Martonino R. Marcos is hereby found GUILTY of violating the Code of Judicial
Conduct and is SUSPENDED without pay for four months. Clerk of Court Shirley M. Visaya,
on the other hand, is found GUILTY of simple misconduct as well as inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of official duties, for which she is SUSPENDED without
pay for six (6) months and one (1) day. Both are sternly warned that a repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely
RATIO:
 The actions of judges and judicial personnel must not only be proper at all times,
but also appear to be so. This axiom is necessary, because the image of the
judiciary is mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women
who compose it. Failure to adhere steadfastly to this strict standard of conduct
is a ground for administrative sanctions
 The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a magistrate should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities; and should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. Since appearance and
reality fuse in the performance of judicial functions, the judge -- like Caesars wife
-- must not only be pure, but also be beyond suspicion
 respondent Judge’s omission in issuing a Commitment Order poses severe
implications against their stance of innocence and compliant performance of
duties  respondent Judge should have issued a Commitment Order to the jail
warden, but then, the certification that complainant started to serve the
sentence is a clear indication that he was not released at all after his arrest
 the actions of respondent judge were not free from all appearances of
impropriety  his conduct lacked the meticulous care expected of one ever
mindful of the image of the judiciary that one portrays. It is the kind of behavior
for which he must be administratively dealt with, as it erodes public confidence
in the judicial system
 As to respondent clerk, the court found that she was equally remiss in the
performance of her duties  by her own admission, she required complainant to
post the cash bond, even though she had not been instructed to do so by
respondent judge. She thereby arrogated judicial power unto herself  the laxity
of respondent clerk in the supervision of court personnel was repugnant to her
role as an adjudicative and administrative officer of the court
 It has been stressed that the conduct and behavior of everyone charged with the
dispensation of justice is circumscribed by the trust and confidence reposed in a
public office
 The image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or
otherwise, of the men and women who work therein, from the judge to the
lowliest clerk
 Clerks of court are key figures in the judicial system so they must be assiduous
in performing their official duties and in supervising and managing court dockets
and records and they cannot slacken in their jobs under one pretext or another
 Although the charge of undue solicitation against respondent judge was not
sufficiently proven, he had unquestionably violated Canons 1 and 2 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct  This violation carries with it a penalty of dismissal from
service, suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than
three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months, or a fine of more than P20,000 but
not exceeding P40,000
 As to the clerk:
o Undue solicitation by respondent clerk was not sufficiently established.
While she admitted to having acted on her own in directing
complainant to post the cash bond  SIMPLE MISCONDUCT and
under Section 52 (B) (2) of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service, simple misconduct is punishable with suspension
from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months
o She is also found guilty of inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of her official duties, a grave offense that is punishable
with suspension from six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year
o The court deems it proper to impose the minimum penalty of
suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day, after considering her 27
years of service in the government
18. CITY OF TAGBILARAN V. HONTANOSAS, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1169, January 29, 2002
FACTS:
 Complainant charges respondent Judge Agapito Hontanosas, Jr., Presiding Judge
of MTCC in Tagbilaran City with:
(1) open defiance of a lawful order of a
superior court directing respondent’s inhibition from a case;
(2) open, notorious, and habitual gambling in the casinos of Cebu and
in the cockpits of Bohol
ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON
 On the first complaint, it was alleged that respondent disobeyed an order from
the RTC to relinquish the criminal cases (against the wife of the richest Chinese-
Filipino businessman in Bohol) and instead forced the fiscal to rest the case,
even before the prosecution could cross-examine the defense witnesses and
thereafter, respondent rendered a judgment acquitting the accused
 On the second complaint, it was alleged that:
o It is a matter of common knowledge among lawyers in Bohol and the
general public in Tagbilaran that Judge Hontanosas goes to Cebu on
the afternoon fast boat and comes back on the early trips
from Cebu to Tagbilaran, 3-4 times a week
o He goes to the casinos in Cebu and spends the whole night there
before going back to Tagbilaran at 6 or 7 AM
o Every Sunday, he is seen in the cockpits of Tagbilaran and the enarby
towns
o That for P500 and P5,000, a decision in favor of the litigants may be
secured from respondent
 Complaint prays that pending the investigation, the respondent be suspended
and after investigation, be removed from office and his name be stricken from
the Roll of Attorneys
 Respondent denied allegations but admitted that he would sometimes go to a
Casino in Cebu to accompany his wife and that he goes to cockpits during
Sundays and holidays and even gamble a little on these occasions
 Respondent avers that the filing of the instant administrative complaint was
purely an act of vengeance on the part of Atty. De la Serna for
the formers verdict in Criminal Cases Nos. 7142 and 7143 which was
unfavorable to the prosecution handled by the latter
 Office of Court Administrator resolved to docket the case as a regular
administrative matter
 Atty. De la Serna and Mr. Sarmiento, in a Manifestation informed the Court that
they were no longer interested in pursuing this case because they felt that it
would be futile to spend any more time and effort and mailing cost on this case
 so the Court thereafter referred the latter Manifestation to the Office of the
Court Administrator for evaluation and report
 Court Administrator Justice Velasco, Jr., points out that the Court does not, as a
matter of course, dismiss administrative complaints against members of the
Bench on account of the withdrawal of the charges or desistance of the
complainant from prosecuting the complaint; otherwise its disciplinary power
may be put to naught, thereby undermining the trust character of a public office
and impairing the integrity and dignity of the Court as a disciplining authority
 Court Administrator recommended that the first charge be dismissed not
because of the desistance of the complainant but because of patent lack of
merit
 Court Administrator found that for being present in casinos and for gambling in
cockpits respondent Judge violated:
(1) Supreme Court Circular No. 4 dated 27
August 1980, which prohibits judges of inferior courts and court
personnel from playing or being present in gambling casinos
(2) Paragraph 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which requires that
the judges official conduct and personal behavior be free from the
appearance of impropriety
 Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be directed to refrain
from frequenting casinos, cockpits and other gambling places
ISSUE: WON the findings of the Court Administrator that respondent judge violated the
Canons of Judicial Ethics and the SC circular are correct
HELD: the Court hereby Resolves to DISMISS, for want of merit, the charge against
respondent Judge Agapito L. Hontanosas, Jr., of open defiance of a lawful order of a
superior court and IMPOSE upon him a FINE of P12,000 for violation of Circular No. 4
dated 27 August 1980 and, more specifically, for violation of Section 5(3-b) of P.D. No.
1067-B and Paragraphs 3 and 22 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. He is STERNLY
WARNED that the commission of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely
RATIO:
 Circular No. 4 issued on 27 August 1980 by then Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando reads as follows:
The attention of the Court has been invited to the presence of some judges in gambling casinos operating
under Presidential Decree No. 1067-B.
This is clearly violative of Section 5(3-b) of said Decree.
It reads as follows:
(3-b) Persons not allowed to play -
(a) Government officials connected directly with the operation of the government or any of its
agencies.
In accordance with law and pursuant to the Resolution of the Court en banc in Administrative Matter No.
1544-0, dated August 21, 1980, judges of inferior courts and the court personnel are enjoined from playing
in or being present in gambling casinos.
Moreover, judges are likewise enjoined to keep in mind the Canons of Judicial Ethics, paragraph 3 of which
provides:
3. Avoidance of appearance of impropriety. - - A judges official conduct should be free from the appearance
of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial
duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.
 The prohibition imposed by the Circular refers to both actual gambling and mere
presence in gambling casinos
 Having earlier reached the conclusion that respondent gambled in a casino, the
court finds respondent to have violated Section 5(3-b) of P.D. No. 1067-B 
such transgression is also a violation of Paragraph 22 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics, which provides: The judge should be studiously careful himself to avoid
the slightest infraction of the law, lest it be a demoralizing example to others
 Respondent is also administratively liable for going to cockpits and placing bets
in cockfights and the fact that the cockpits where he used to go were licensed
and the cockfights were conducted on authorized days will not absolve him
 While such gambling was not illegal, he openly and deliberately disregarded and
violated Paragraph 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics quoted in Circular No. 4 
it is plainly despicable to see a judge inside a cockpit and more so, to see him
bet therein
ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON
 Mixing with the crowd of cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors is unbecoming a
judge and undoubtedly impairs the respect due him
 Judiciary itself suffers therefrom because a judge is a visible representation of
the Judiciary. Most often, the public mind does not separate the judge from the
Judiciary. In short, any demeaning act of a judge or court personnel demeans
the institution he represents
 Truly, respondent deserves more than a directive to refrain from frequenting
casinos, cockpits and other gambling places, as recommended by the Court
Administrator
 Under the amended Rule 140 of the Rules of Court:
o a violation of a circular issued by this Court, such as Circular No. 4, is
a less serious charge (Sec. 4.4),
o gambling in public is a light charge (Sec. 5)
o If found guilty of a less serious charge the respondent may be
punished with a penalty of fine of not less than P10,000 but not
exceeding P19,999 (Sec. 10-B.2);
o for a light charge, he may be punished with a fine of not less
than P1,000 but not exceeding P9,999 (Sec. 10-C.1)
 the Court may impose on respondent Judge a fine of P12,000
19. EUGENIO K. CHAN V. JUDGE JOSE S. MAJADUCON, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1697. October 15,
2003
FACTS:
 A concerned citizen, in an undated letter, charged respondent Judge Jose
S. Majaducon with not wearing black robe during court sessions and with being
habitually tardy
 Another complaint filed by Chan charged respondent with committing acts of
improprieties and irregularities, alleging that respondent:
1. xxx starts his hearings at 10:00 oclock in the morning and 2:30-3:00 oclock in the afternoon.
2. xxx does not wear his robe despite the requirement of the Supreme Court xxx;
3. xxx entertains lawyer[s] in his sala despite the absence of the opposing lawyer[s];
4. xxx continued to hear cases despite obvious appearance of impartiality [sic]. He insist [sic] to hear the
case despite the fact that her [sic] daughter being [sic] involved in the defendant bank;
5. xxx was already reprimanded by the Honorable Supreme Court and he is a subject of adverse write ups in
the newspapers;
6. xxx does not prepare or study the cases. He reads the cases during the hearing time
 Respondent controverted the allegations against him that:
1. On his refusal to wear the judicial robe during court sessions. Respondent judge states that upon his
doctors advice, he stopped wearing the judges robe during court sessions because doing so allegedly
triggers and aggravates his hypertension. He promised to resume wearing the robe once his blood pressure
had stabilized.
2. On conducting hearings behind schedule. Respondent judge admits that he takes breaks from court
sessions at 10 a.m. and 3:30 p.m. to take merienda or attend to personal needs. However, respondent
judge claims that he starts the hearings in his court on time and that his sessions sometimes even last for
more than eight hours in a day. According to respondent judge, if ever his hearings started late, it was
either because he had to attend to other equally pressing matters such as signing/revising
Orders/Resolutions or because the litigants and/or their counsels were late.
3. On entertaining counsels/litigants in his chambers. Respondent admits entertaining litigants and their
counsels with pending cases in his sala as his chambers two doors are always open. He claims, however,
that he never discusses with his visitors the merits of their cases and that he has never been influenced by
them.
4. On studying cases during hearings. Respondent judge explains that while he does consult the records of
cases during hearings, it is only to verify contested matters. He states that this is necessary, as he cannot
memorize all the details of cases, especially the voluminous ones that he had inherited from the previous
judge.
 Respondent Judge also claimed that complainant may have wanted to get back
at him
 Sometime after, complainant withdrew his complaint against respondent judge
stating that he had realized that respondent is only rightly doing his job
 Respondent judge also informed the Court that since the complaint, he had
resumed wearing the judicial robe as his blood pressure had stabilized
 the Office of the Court Administrator found respondent judge liable for violation
of Administrative Circular No. 25 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
and recommended the dismissal of the other charges against respondent judge
for lack of merit  OCA recommends that respondent judge be fined P5,000
ISSUE: WON respondent Judge violated the Code of Judicial Conduct
HELD: the Court finds respondent Jose S. Majaducon, former Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 23, General Santos City guilty of violating Circular No. 25 dated 9 June
1989, Rules 1.01 and 2.01 and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Respondent
Jose S. Majaducon is ordered to PAY A FINE of P10,000, the same to be deducted from
whatever retirement benefits he is entitled
RATIO:
 On Respondent Judges Refusal to Wear the Mandated Judicial Robe:
o Pursuant to Sections 5 and 6, Article [VIII] of the Constitution and in
order to heighten public consciousness on the solemnity of judicial
proceedings, it is hereby directed that beginning Tuesday, August 1,
1989, all Presiding Judges of all Trial Courts shall wear black robes
during sessions of their respective Courts
o The wearing of robes by judges during official proceedings, which harks
back to the 14th century, is not an idle ceremony. Such practice serves
the dual purpose of heightening public consciousness on the solemnity
of judicial proceedings, as Circular No. 25 states, and of impressing
upon the judge the exacting obligations of his office
o A judge must take care not only to remain true to the high ideals of
competence and integrity his robe represents, but also that he wears
one in the first place
o While circumstances, such as the medical condition claimed by
respondent judge, may exempt one from complying with Circular No.
25, he must first secure the Courts permission for such exemption 
he cannot simply excuse himself, like respondent judge, from
complying with the requirement
 On Respondent Judges Practice of Entertaining Lawyers and Litigants with
Pending Cases in his Sala
o The Code of Judicial Conduct (Code) provides:
Rule 1.01. A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence.
CANON 2 A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF
IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.
Rule 2.01. A judge should behave at all times so as to promote public confidence in
ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
o Court cannot emphasize enough the pivotal role lower court judges
play in the promotion of the people’s faith in the judiciary
o The admonition in Canon 2 that judges must not only avoid
impropriety, but also the appearance of impropriety is more sternly
applied to them It is in this light that the Court frowns upon the holding
by trial court judges of in-chamber meetings with litigants or their
counsels without the presence of the adverse party  and instead of
taking heed of this ethical prohibition, respondent judge readily
admitted transgressing it
o Respondent judge should have realized that his very conduct of
entertaining litigants and their counsels in his chamber without the
presence of the adverse party or his counsel constitutes an impropriety
 On the Appropriate Penalty to be Imposed Against Respondent Judge
o OCA recommends that respondent judge be fined P5,000. However,
in Gallo v. Judge Cordero, the Court imposed a fine of P10,000 on a
judge for impropriety in meeting with a litigant in his office and for
other irregular conduct  under the circumstances, the Court deems
it appropriate to impose similarly a fine of P10,000 on respondent
judge
o Neither complainants’ desistance nor respondent judge’s retirement
precludes the Court from holding respondent judge liable and imposing
on him the penalty of P10,000 fine.
o A complainant’s desistance from an administrative complaint against a
member of the bench will not, by itself, warrant the dismissal of the
case
20. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ) v. JUDGE ROLANDO MISLANG, A.M. No. RTJ-14-2369
---------------------------------
HOME DEVELOPMENT FUND (HDMF) v. JUDGE ROLANDO MISLANG, A.M. No. RTJ-14-
2372, July 26, 2016
PER CURIAM:
FACTS:
 Consolidated cases filed by De Lima and Po against Judge Rolando Mislang
 On October 29, 2010, the NBI recommended that a preliminary investigation be
conducted in view of the HDMF's Complaint Affidavit against Delfin S. Lee and
other officers of Globe Asiatique for the crime of syndicated estafa constituting
economic sabotage through the fraudulent take-out of housing loans for fake
borrowers.
 Allegedly, these borrowers had actually no intention to apply for housing loans
but were paid by Globe Asiatique agents to sign blank loan documents.
 Because of this fraudulent scheme, the HDMF suffered damages in the amount
of about P6.5 Billion.
 The DOJ then formed a panel of prosecutors to investigate the complaint. (1st
DOJ case)
 On November 15, 2010, Delfin Lee, together with Globe Asiatique, filed a
Complaint for specific performance and damages against the HDMF before the
Makati RTC.
 The NBI Anti-Graft Division recommended that Lee, among others, be charged
with the crime of syndicated estafa constituting economic sabotage.
 Thus, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors that would handle the preliminary
investigation of the complaint. (2nd DOJ case)
 Lee filed a petition for the suspension of the 2nd DOJ case pending the outcome
of the 1st DOJ case because there were issues (not mentioned in the full text)
from the 1st DOJ case which constituted prejudicial question in the 2nd DOJ case.
DOJ denied the petition for lack of common issues and parties.
 Panel of prosecutors take on the issues of the two DOJ cases:
o 1st DOJ case - main issue is the right of Globe Asiatique to replace its
buyers pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), Funding
Commitment Agreement (FCA), and Collection Servicing Agreement
(CSA) it entered into with HDMF.
o 2nd DOJ case - whether or not respondents are liable for the crime of
syndicated estafa.
 Lee moved for a partial reconsideration of the abovementioned Omnibus Order
but the same was denied.
 On July 28, 2011, after filing his counter-affidavit, Lee filed a Petition for
Injunction (with Application for Temporary Restraining Order or TRO) against the
DOJ, which was raffled to the sala of Judge Mislang.
 Lee's counsel inquired and the DOJ's counsel entered into a stipulation with
regard to the existence of the 2nd DOJ case and the Makati civil case. The
parties, with the permission of Judge Mislang, then agreed to submit for
resolution the petition for injunction upon submission of their respective
memoranda within fifteen (15) days.
 However, on August 12, 2011, after Lee had submitted his memorandum the
day before, he filed an unverified Urgent Motion for the ex-parte resolution of his
application for the issuance of a TRO. Thereafter, without waiting for the DOJ's
memorandum, Judge Mislang granted Lee’s petition.
 Thus, the HDMF and the DOJ filed separate complaints, against Judge Mislang,
alleging that the latter acted in patent disregard of the rules on injunctive relief
and prejudicial question, exhibited gross ignorance of the law and/or procedure,
and manifested partiality and gross misconduct in issuing the assailed Orders.
 OCA’s recommendation: Judge Mislang be found guilty of gross ignorance of the
law and be dismissed from service, with forfeiture of retirement benefits except
leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations.
ISSUE/S:
 Whether or not Judge Mislang erred in granting a TRO and should be dismissed
from service with forfeiture of benefits.
HELD:
 YES. The Supreme Court adopted OCA’s recommendation.
 WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court finds Judge Rolando G.
Mislang, Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 167, GUILTY of Gross Ignorance
of the Law in A.M. No. RTJ-14-2369 and A.M. No. RTJ-14-2372
and ORDERS his DISMISSAL from the service with FORFEITURE of retirement
benefits, except leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in any
ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON
branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned and
controlled corporations.
RATIO:
 Judge Mislang issued two (2) TROs, a writ of preliminary injunction and a status
quo order, both of which did not satisfy the legal requisites for their issuance, in
gross violation of clearly established laws and procedures which every judge has
the duty and obligation to be familiar with. Unfortunately, he miserably failed to
properly apply the principles and rules on three (3) points, i.e.:
o the prematurity of the petition,
o the inapplicability of the prejudicial question, and
o the lack of jurisdiction of the court.
 Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural laws.
 They must know the laws and apply them properly in all good faith. Judicial
competence requires no less.
 Thus, unfamiliarity with the rules is a sign of incompetence.
 Basic rules must be at the palm of his hand.
 When a judge displays utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he betrays the
confidence of the public in the courts.
 Ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice.
 Judges owe it to the public to be knowledgeable, hence, they are expected to
have more than just a modicum of acquaintance with the statutes and
procedural rules; they must know them by heart.
 When the inefficiency springs from a failure to recognize such a basic and
elemental rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his functions, a judge is
either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and the prestigious title
he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done
in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.
Section 3. Disciplinary measures against lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional
conduct
21. SHERYLL C. DELA CRUZ v. PAMELA P. MALUNAO, A.M. No. P-11-3019 March 20, 2012
FACTS:
 This administrative matter originated from a criminal complaint filed by
complainant Dela Cruz against respondent Malunao, Clerk III of Branch 28 of the
RTC Nueva Vizcaya for the crime of robbery with extortion.
 The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya forwarded
the records of the case to the SC since Malunao is a trial court employee under
the exclusive administrative supervision of the Supreme Court.
 Malinao through several calls and text messages informed Complainant that
ALAY KAPWA Cooperative had given bribe money in the amount of
PHP20,000.00 to JUDGE FLOR through an unidentified individual in exchange
of fixing the case in favor of the said cooperative against ERNESTO ROXAS, a
business partner of complainant.
 Malunao further informed de la Cruz that JUDGE FLOR was willing to return the
money to ALAY KAPWA Cooperative if the latter will give PHP35,000.00 to Judge
Flor through Malinao. Malunao also intimidated Dela Cruz that if the latter will
not give the said amount to Judge Flor, the said judge will rule in favor of ALAY
KAPWA Cooperative.
 Intimidated of the heavy damage that will arise from losing the case against
ALAY KAPWA, Complainant Dela Cruz agreed to pay the amount of
PHP35,000.00 but in installment basis. Malunao demanded the amount of
PHP15,000.00 to be paid on 08 May 2008.
 the Complainant personally approached Judge Flor at the Hall of Justice parking
lot and when asked by Dela Cruz regarding the amount of PHP35,000.00 that
Malunao asked of her, Judge Flor denied any knowledge of said transaction.
 Judge Flor referred Complainant Dela Cruz to the NBI-Bayombong District Office
in order for the latter to file the necessary complaint against Malunao.
 the operatives of the NBI-BAYDO proceeded complainants residence, to conduct
an entrapment operation against Subject Malunao.
 Upon Subject Malunaos receipt of the marked money, the entrapment operation
was announced and Subject Malunao was arrested.
 Malunao claimed that Dela Cruz framed her into making it appear that she
committed the offense for which she is now being charged.
 Malunao told Dela Cruz she needed ₱15,000.00 to pay for the tuition fee of her
daughter. When Malunao followed up the loan, Dela Cruz instructed her to come
to her house and while waiting for the latter to get the money, a tall woman
emerged from the kitchen and took her bag, announced NBI ito. Two men also
entered the house and arrested her.
 Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued a Joint-Resolution forwarding the
records of the case to the Supreme Court since Malunao is a trial court
employee under the exclusive administrative supervision of the Supreme Court.
 Court referred the instant administrative complaint to Executive Judge Merianthe
Pacita M. Zuraek, Branch 29, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for her investigation,
report and recommendation.
 Judge Zuraek submitted her Report/Recommendation recommending the
dismissal of the case for clear lack of evidence.
 Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended the dismissal of Malunao
with forfeiture of retirement benefits and accrued leave credits, contrary to the
recommendation of the Executive Judge Zuraek, because technical rules of
procedure and evidence, the legal basis of Executive Judge Zuraeks
recommendation, should not be strictly applied in administrative proceedings.
 In addition, the OCA provided additional information that Malunao has three (3)
other pending administrative matters against her, aside from the present case
which are Extortion and Illegal Solicitation, Extortion and Grave Misconduct and
violation of R.A. No. 3019 and R.A. No. 6723.
ISSUE: W/N Malunao should be dismissed
HELD: YES
 In the present case, Malunao clearly used her position as Clerk III in Branch 28
to solicit money from Dela Cruz with the promise of a favorable decision. This
ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON
violation of Section 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
constitutes the offense of grave misconduct meriting the penalty of dismissal.
 Dela Cruzs Sinumpaang Salaysay, the joint affidavit of arrest executed by the
NBI agents, the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, photocopy of the marked
money, the Complaint Sheet, and the photographs of Malunao entering Dela
Cruzs house, and the contents of Malunaos bag after receipt of the money, all
prove by subsantial evidence the guilt of Malunao for the offense of grave
misconduct.
 What is more alarming and disconcerting is the fact that Malunao has continued
to solicit money from litigants, even after she had been preventively suspended
as Clerk III. Malunao has the propensity to abuse a position of public service and
is not fit to remain in the civil service.
 Respondent Malunao is GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT. She is hereby
DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of retirement benefits except
accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and financial institutions.
Canon 3: Impartiality - Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial
office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the
decision is made.
Section 1. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias or prejudice
22. Cruz v. Judge Phlbert Iturralde, A.M. RTJ No. 03-1775 (30 April 2003)
RECIT-READY: Mr. Cruz wanted to file an injunction against Mrs. Cruz, as well as an HDO.
There was no presiding judge at the time. Executive Judge Rivera took over. Mr. Cruz
applied for a Motion to Suspend Proceedings + HDO. DENIED by Judge Rivera. Mrs. Cruz
wanted to compel Mr. Cruz to return travel documents. Mr. Cruz opposed. Judge Iturralde
retuned. DENIED opposition to compel return of travel documents. Since Cruz didn’t get
what he wanted, he filed admin case against Iturralde and said that the latter was biased.
SC said NO – no proof; cannot be mere averments; does not substitute judicial remedies,
etc.
DOCTRINE: Mere suspicion of partiality is not enough. There should be hard evidence to
prove it, as well as a manifest showing of bias and partiality stemming from an
extrajudicial source or some other basis.
FACTS
1. On April 18, 2001, Dr. Isagani C. Cruz filed against his Swiss wife, Yolande L. Cruz, a
Complaint for Injunction under Article 72 of the Family Code1.
2. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 01-6139, was assigned to Branch 72 of the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, the designated Family Court in that area.
1Art. 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits acts
which tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may
apply to the court for relief. (116a)
3. As Branch 72 had no presiding judge at the time, the hearings were conducted by
Executive Judge Mauricio M. Rivera.
4. After several negotiations, the parties filed a Joint Motion to Suspend Proceedings
with Prayer for a Hold-Departure Order on Mrs. Cruz.
5. Judge Rivera granted the Motion for the suspension of the proceedings, but denied
the request for the issuance of a hold-departure order.
6. On September 21, 2001, Mrs. Cruz filed a Motion asking the court to allow her and
her two children to take a vacation to Switzerland and to compel complainant to
return her travel documents. Shortly thereafter, on October 19, 2001, respondent
Iturralde assumed office as the new presiding judge of Branch 72.
7. At a hearing on November 26, 2001, Isagani Cruz filed his Opposition to the Motion
filed by Mrs. Cruz. He also asked the court to issue a HDO and/or a writ of preliminary
injunction to prevent her from leaving the country. During the same hearing, Judge
Iturralde expressed his predisposition to grant Mrs. Cruz’s Motion. His declaration
supposedly constituted partiality, which showed that he had already prejudged the
incidents of the case.
8. Consequently, Mr. Cruz filed a Motion to inhibit Judge Iturralde from further hearing
the case. Judge Iturralde denied this Motion in an Order dated February 28, 2002.
9. Earlier, on January 9, 2002, complainants counsel received, SIMULTANEOUSLY BY
MAIL, respondents Orders dated November 26, December 7 and December 18,
2001.
10. The December 18, 2001 Order denied the application of Mr. Cruz for the issuance of
a HDO and/or a writ of preliminary injunction and compelled him to surrender all the
travel documents of his wife and children.
MR. CRUZ’S ARGUMENTS:
 He claims that the simultaneous mailing of the three Orders had a very insidious
effect. He argues that he could have moved for the amendment or correction of the
two earlier ones, had these been served on him ahead of the December 18, 2001
Order. He insinuates that the last Order was either antedated or properly dated but
mailed very late.
 According to him, either of these acts renders respondent liable for gross negligence
of duty. Furthermore, in ordering him to return the travel documents of his wife and
denying his application for a hold-departure order/injunction respondent allegedly
committed either gross ignorance or deliberate misapplication of the law.
JUDGE ITURRALDE’S ARGUMENTS
 Denied allegations - no specific act of dishonesty, gross misconduct, or gross
ignorance of the law and procedure on his part. If at all, he might have been
perceived as biased because of his Orders that were unfavorable to complainant. In
his defense, the latter maintains that he merely upheld Executive Judge Rivera’s
earlier Order.
 He first met the parties and their respective counsels only during the November 26,
2001 hearing, and that none of them had been known to him personally or otherwise
prior to that date. Moreover, he believed he could decide the case on the merits --
without bias, prejudice, fear or favor. Thus, he found no justifiable reason to inhibit
himself from hearing it. He claims that he even advised the parties to appeal his
Orders by way of a petition for certiorari, if they believe his rulings were erroneous.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Iturralde should be held administratively liable.
RULING: NO.
ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON
RATIO:
 The rule in administrative cases is that complainants bear the onus of establishing
their averments by substantial evidence.
 The complaints pertain to alleged errors he committed in the exercise of his
adjudicative functions. Such errors cannot be corrected through administrative
proceedings, but should instead be assailed through appropriate judicial remedies.
 Disciplinary proceedings against judges do not complement, supplement or
substitute judicial remedies. Thus, any inquiry into their administrative liability arising
from judicial acts may be made only after other available remedies have been
settled. Parties-litigants abuse court processes by prematurely resorting to
administrative disciplinary action, even before the judicial issues involved have been
finally resolved.
 It is settled that mere suspicion of partiality is not enough. There should be hard
evidence to prove it, as well as a manifest showing of bias and partiality stemming
from an extrajudicial source or some other basis. To be sure, a judges conduct must
be clearly indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice before it can be stigmatized as
biased and partial.
 In this case, the truth of such allegations cannot be presumed or deduced from the
circumstances stated by complainant in his verified Complaint.
5.
 The Court will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon employees
of the judiciary, but neither will it hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits that
only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.
6.
23. Kaw v. Osorio, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1801 (23 March 2004)
RECIT-READY: Judge Osorio was allegedly telling Kaw to pay him so that the pending case
in Osorio’s sala would be held in Kaw’s favor. Kaw was paying up and paying up, and even
7.
attended Osorio’s birthday party. The SC held that although the allegations of corruption
weren’t proven, Osorio shouldn’t have fraternized with, nor accepted money from, Kaw.
Fine = Php 40,000 (can’t be suspended anymore, >70 years old).
DOCTRINE: A judge is not only required to be impartial; he must also appear to be
impartial.
FACTS:
1. Complainant George L. Kaw was an offended party in a criminal case against Wilson
Go et. al.. While the case was ongoing he was approached by a state prosecutor who
said that he was sent by Judge Osorio to ask if the complainant wanted to be assured
of a favorable judgment in the criminal cases which the latter had filed and were
8.
heard by the judge.
2. The judge’s emissary told George Kaw that a favorable decision in all cases would
cost P100,000.00, P40,000.00 of which was to be paid immediately and the
balance of P60,000.00 to be handed over upon promulgation of the judgment in all
cases.
3. Kaw argued that he did not want to accept the offer since he had adequate evidence
for the conviction of the accused, but at that time, he felt he had no choice but to
9.
accept the offer of Judge Osorio and thought that if he would reject it, he would lose
all his cases. So, he relented and accepted the offer.
4. As a consequence, in the morning of May 18, 1993, according to the complainant, he
handed over to the state prosecutor the amount of P40,000.00 for delivery to Judge
Osorio which turned out to be only the first of a series of payments requested by and
made to Judge Osorio. [4 times payment was made; last straw was engaging the
services of some law firm Judge Osorio knew]: Php 5,000 was given during the
funeral of Osorio’s wife, another 10,000 was given in Steaktown, West Ave., another
1,000 was given to the son of Osorio; another 10,000 was given during Osorio’s
birthday party]
a. On one occasion, Judge Osorio told Kaw that his lawyer was not performing
well and that [Kaw] should change him. He suggested that I engage the
services of the Law Firm of Quijano, Padilla and Natividad where his
brother-in-law, Marcelino Bunag, is connected, to facilitate, according to
him, the decisions of the cases. Judge Osorio even gave me the address
and telephone number of said law firm.
b. Not wanting to displease Judge Osorio on May 10, 1996 at about 5 oclock
in the afternoon, Kaw visited the Quijano, Padilla and Natividad Law Offices
with address at 320 Escolta corner T. Pinpin Street. Mr. Bunag asked for
P200,000.00 as acceptance fee and guaranteed that Kaw will win all my
cases before Judge Osorio. Since the amount being asked by Mr. Bunag
was too stiff, and Kaw wasn’t impressed with the law office, he did not hire
the services of Quijano, Padilla and Natividad Law Offices. “I nonetheless as
suggested by Judge Osorio, replaced my lawyer.”
Kaw found out about rumors that Wilson Go was bragging because he was sure to be
acquitted in the criminal cases which were filed against him and was heard to say
that Judge Osorio agreed to acquit him in consideration of the amount of almost a
million pesos. Kaw asked Osorio if it was true that aside from his commitment to
Kaw, he also committed himself to accused Wilson Go.
Before answering, the judge allegedly kept quiet for some time and told complainant
that the case against Wilson Go was weak and that the case is being reviewed by his
clerk of court. The judge further assured him not to worry after complainant’s
reminder about their agreement.
On August 25 or 26, 1997, the complainant called up Atty. Gregorio Y. Narvasa, II in
order to seek his counsel. Upon narration of the events that transpired, Kaw pleaded
Atty. Narvasa to accompany him and the state prosecutor to see Judge Osorio at his
residence since he was one of the lawyers handling one of the cases against Benito
Go and Wilson Go. Complainant feared that if the accused would be acquitted in said
criminal cases, they may be forever barred from being charged criminally for the
wrong that they had committed against him.
a. (Atty. Narvasa acceded to the request under the following conditions: (1) he
would not talk to the judge; (2) they would ask the judge to decide the case
on its merits; and (3) whether or not Judge Osorio rules for or against the
complainant, the latter will file an administrative case against the judge
before the Supreme Court.)
On August 28, 1997, Atty. Narvasa, the state prosecutor and the complainant arrived
at the residence of Judge Osorio wherein they were led to the sitting room and asked
to wait for him. When Judge Osorio arrived, the state prosecutor reminded him of the
scheduled promulgation of judgment the following day. The judge told them he
cannot tell them what his decision was before the actual promulgation of judgment
and made remarks to the effect that his decision of cases are always based on the
evidence.
Shortly before the promulgation of the decision, the complainant learned that the
state prosecutor filed a motion to inhibit the judge. The prosecutor told him that it
was Judge Osorio who prompted the motion and dictated the reasons and grounds to
be alleged in the motion.
ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON
10. On September 4, 1997, complainants brother Valentino Kaw came and informed him
about the conversation he had with Wilson Go regarding the subject criminal cases,
and said that Go had Osorio by the neck, because Go paid Osorio half a million
pesos.
11. Benito Go was convicted, but Wilson Go was acquitted.
12. Benito Go died [it wasn’t mentioned when], and Osorio knew this. Accordingly, Benito
Go’s criminal liability was extinguished. However, complainant submits that Benito Go
was still convicted in consonance with Judge Osorios plan to conceal his illicit action
in exonerating Wilson Go.
13. Osorio denied everything.
14. Investigating Justice Asunction invstigated and found that Judge Adriano Osorio
should be suspended for a period of six (6) months without pay.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Osorio should be held administratively liable
RULING: YES. The Court only fined him Php40,000.00 because he reached the retirement
age of 70 (so he couldn’t be suspended or dismissed).
RATIO:
 While respondent judge may not necessarily be held liable for extortion and graft and
corruption as it was not substantially proven, he should be made accountable for
violating Canons 2 and 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct:
 The Canons of Judicial Ethics further provide that a judges official conduct should be
free from the appearance of impropriety and his personal behavior, not only upon the
bench and in the performance of judicial duties but also in his everyday life, should
be beyond reproach.
 Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly
accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen.
 A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The
personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private
life should be above suspicion.
 Respondent judge’s conduct fell short of the standard expected of a magistrate of
the law. His act of inviting complainant and his wife to his birthday party corroded
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, considering that
complainant had a pending case in his sala. A judge is not only required to be
impartial; he must also appear to be impartial.
o Fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this image.
 Respondent judge likewise openly transgressed Rule 5.04, Canon 5 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct: a judge or any immediate member of the family shall not accept a
gift, bequest, favor or loan from anyone except as may be allowed by law. Likewise,
the Canons of Judicial Ethics expressly provides that a judge should not accept any
present or favors from litigants or from lawyers practicing before him. Accepting
money on the occasion of his wife’s death was a transgression of this rule.
SEC. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains
and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the
impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.
24. Ty v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, et al., G.R. Nos. 149797-98 (13
February 2004)
RECIT-READY: One of the RTC judges in those Ty vs. BF cases basically gave hints to BF
about what BF should be doing and also hastily decided on some issues in favor of BF.
The Supreme Court held that this was all improper, and that Judge Tac-An should be
inhibited.
DOCTRINE:
 The role of the trial judge in the conduct of judicial proceedings should only be
confined to promote the expeditious resolution of controversies and prevent
unnecessary waste of time or to clear up some obscurity
 At the very first sign of lack of faith and trust to his actions, whether well grounded or
not, the Judge has no other alternative but inhibit himself from the case. A judge may
not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances appear
that will induce doubt to his honest actuations and probity in favor of either party, or
incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination.
FACTS
OK SO YOU GUYS REMEMBER TALA REALTY IN STATCON AND NANCY TY VS. BANCO
FILIPINO IN PERSONS? SAME EXACT SET OF FACTS. Just a refresher:
1. Banco Filipino stockholders founded a company (Tala Realty) to handle BF’s real
estate assets because banks have a limit as provided by law. BF sold the properties
to Tala Realty to implement this agreement (verbal trust) that Tala will handle the BF
properties.
2. In 1992, Tala Realty repudiated the trust, claimed the titles for itself, and demanded
payment of rentals, deposits and goodwill, and threatened to eject BF for non-
compliance/non-payment.
3. From 1995-1996, BF filed seventeen (17) complaints against Tala Realty for
reconveyance of different properties with 17 different RTCs. One of these was the
case in RTC Batangas Branch 84, presided by respondent Judge Paterno V. Tac-an.
4. On November 15, 1995, Tala, et al. filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. Respondent judge granted the motion and dismissed
the complaint. However, on a motion for reconsideration by Banco Filipino, the
complaint was reinstated.
5. On October 21, 1996, Banco Filipino moved for an order directing Tala, et al. to
produce or make available books, documents and other papers relevant to the case.
Notwithstanding Tala, et al.’s opposition thereto, the trial court directed Tala, et al. to
produce certain documents within a specified period of time, despite failure by Banco
Filipino to tender the costs for such production and inspection.
6. In its Order dated November 20, 1996, the trial court justified Banco Filipino’s failure
to advance the expenses of production and inspection: “those documents in which
the defendant is bound to keep by law or regulation, their production cannot be the
subject of assessment for cost against plaintiff-movant”. – suggested to BF what
exhibits they can offer and which they should withdraw.
7. Thereafter, Banco Filipino formally offered its exhibits, all of which were admitted by
the trial court. Tala, et al.’s motion for reconsideration of the order admitting the said
exhibits was denied. Banco Filipino’s motion to withdraw certain exhibits was
granted.
8. Thereafter, Tala, et al. filed a motion for the voluntary inhibition and/or
disqualification of respondent judge Tac-an on the grounds of manifest prejudgment
and partiality.
ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON
9. Petitioner argues that, by selectively appreciating some, and not all, of the orders of
respondent judge cited as badges of hostility, bias and prejudgment, the appellate
court departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings and
disregarded principles laid down by jurisprudence. Petitioner asserts that the Orders
which were issued by respondent judge demonstrated his predilection to act with
bias in favor of Banco Filipino and manifested his escalating hostility and animosity
towards petitioner and her co-defendants, Tala, et al.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Tac-an should be inhibited from the case
RULING: YES.
RATIO:
1. Re. registered mail: Rule 13, Section 8, of the Rules of Court provides that service by
registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee; but if he fails to
claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from the date of the first notice
of the postmaster, service shall take effect at the expiration of such time.
In the case at bar, there is no postmasters certification that the registered mail was
unclaimed by the addressee and thus returned to the sender, after first notice was
sent to and received by addressee on a specified date. Absent such notice, the
disputable presumption of completeness of service does not arise and by implication,
respondent judge could not presume actual receipt by addressee.
2. Re. Nov. 20 Order: Records reveal that Tala did not charge Banco Filipino for the
documents it eventually produced pursuant to the motion for production. Respondent
judges peremptory act of absolving Banco Filipino from paying the expenses for the
production of documents is disturbing for its lack of basis. There was no basis for
respondent judge to conclude that the amount involved was insignificant considering
that, as the records would show, no reference of any amount was made by the
parties. Moreover, his categorical declaration that Tala, et al. did not bother to charge
Banco Filipino the amount of expenses runs counter to the evidence at hand. In
opposing the motion for the production of documents,[17] Tala, et al. cited, as one of
their grounds, the excessive expense it would incur in case the motion would be
granted. Sound judicial action dictates that he should have inquired first into the
validity of Tala, et al.’s claim, whose rights were bound to be affected, instead of
making a sweeping and dismissive Order exempting Banco Filipino from complying
with its legal obligation.
3. The role of the trial judge in the conduct of judicial proceedings should only be
confined to promote the expeditious resolution of controversies and prevent
unnecessary waste of time or to clear up some obscurity. There is, however, undue
interference where the judge’s participation in the conduct of the trial tends to build
or bolster a case for one of the parties. This is enjoined by the Code of Judicial
Conduct, Rule 3.06 which provides: While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent
waste of time or clear up some obscurity, properly intervene in the presentation of
evidence during the trial, it should always be borne in mind that undue interference
may prevent the proper presentation of the cause or the ascertainment of truth.
4. There is undue interference if the judge, as in the instant case, orders the
presentation of specific documentary evidence without a corresponding motion from
any party, or directs a party when and who to present as a witness and what matters
such witness will testify on.
5. Respondent judge transgressed the boundaries of impartiality when he suggested to
Banco Filipino what evidence to present to prove its case. While the trial court may
interfere in the manner of presenting evidence in order to promote the orderly
conduct of the trial, the final determination of what evidence to adduce is the sole
prerogative of the contending parties.
6. Courts, while not unmindful of their primary duty to administer justice, without fear or
favor, and to dispose of cases speedily and in as inexpensive a manner as is possible
for the court and the parties, should refrain from showing any semblance of bias or
more or less partial attitude in order not to create any false impression in the minds
of the litigants. For obvious reasons, it is the bounden duty of all to strive for the
preservation of the people’s faith in our courts.
7. It is inappropriate for respondent judge to rule, in an interlocutory order, on the
principal issue that effectively disposes of the merits of the case. In the interest of
substantial justice, the issue of whether or not there is a trust relationship between
the parties must be threshed out in a full-dress hearing and not merely in an
interlocutory Order.
25. Montemayor v. Bermejo, Jr., A.M. No.MTJ-04-1535 (12 March 2004)
RECIT-READY: Honestly, read below because I haven’t taken Civpro yet and I don’t???
Understand anything??? But I’ll try. Ok. Benjamin and Desmond Montemayor filed a case
against Lolita Marco. Lolita Marco was late for everything, including submitting her
position paper, and asked the Judge to extend the posting of her supersedes bond,
among others. The Judge (1) allowed her to extend; (2) didn’t decide on some motions;
and (3) lost a Registry Return Card which would have allowed Judge Bermejo to compute
the proper time for posting a Notice of Appeal. The issue is whether these acts constitute
impropriety. The Court ruled that it did because judges are supposed to be organized and
should act in a way that doesn’t show partiality.
DOCTRINE:
A judge must at all times not only be impartial but maintain the appearance of
impartiality. Thus, under Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge should avoid
impropriety and appearance of impropriety in all activities.
FACTS:
1. Administrative case that stemmed from an unlawful detainer case, filed by Benjamin
and Desmond Montemayor vs. Lolita Marco.
2. In pre-trial, Judge Bermejo, finding no possibility of settlement, issued a Pre-Trial
Order on May 20, 2002, defining the issues submitted for decision and the
stipulations agreed upon, and directing the parties to submit their respective position
papers within 10 days from receipt of the Order, after which, the case shall be
deemed submitted for decision.
3. Accordingly, the Montemayors submitted their Position Paper on June 13, 2002.
More than a month later, they filed a Motion for Early Resolution dated July 30, 2002.
The defendant, Lolita Marco, on the other hand, submitted her Position Paper only on
August 14, 2002.
4. The Montemayors then filed another Motion for Early Resolution on September 6,
2002. Acting on this motion, Judge Bermejo issued an Order dated September 23,
2002 declaring the case submitted for decision.
5. On October 10, 2002, Judgment was rendered in favor of the Montemayors. Copies
thereof were sent by registered mail to the parties and their respective counsels on
October 16, 2002.
ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON
6. On December 12, 2002, the plaintiffs filed their first Motion for Execution and set the
same for hearing on December 16, 2002. However, the motion was not included in
the court calendar because December 16, 2002 apparently was not a motion day.
7. On December 20, 2002, the defendant filed a Notice of Appeal.
8. Subsequently, the Montemayors filed a Second Motion for Execution dated
December 26, 2002 and set the same for hearing on January 3, 2003.
Concomitantly, Dr. Conrado T. Montemayor (Dr. Montemayor), the complainant herein
and the plaintiff’s attorney-in-fact, also filed on December 26, 2002 a Motion to
Require Defendants Counsel to Inform the Court the Date He Received a Copy of the
Judgment and set the same for hearing on January 3, 2003. Judge Bermejo did not
act on either motion.
9. In his Order[5] dated January 6, 2003, Judge Bermejo gave due course to the appeal
of Marco, and required the latter to post a supersedeas bond 2 in the amount of
P587,500.00 within 10 days from receipt thereof. The defendant didn’t do this. On
April 24, 2003, the defendant filed an Urgent Motion for Extension dated April 23,
2003 claiming that she only had until April 21, 2003 within which to post a
supersedeas bond and praying for an extension of 10 days, or until May 1, 2003, to
post the bond. The respondent Judge granted the motion and gave the defendant
until May 5, 2003 within which to post a supersedeas bond.
10. Incensed by the foregoing proceedings, Dr. Montemayor filed with the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) the instant Administrative Complaint charging Judge
Bermejo with gross incompetence and inefficiency, gross negligence, gross ignorance
of the law, gross misconduct, and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.
11. Dr. Montemayor asserts that the respondent Judge failed to decide the case within
the period provided under Section 11, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
(Rules of Court). He alleges that Judge Bermejo did not bother to check defendants
preposterous claim that she received a copy of the Judgment only on December 5,
2002, even if it was released more than forty-five (45) days earlier on October 16,
2002. He stresses that even if the defendant received a copy of the Judgment on
December 5, 2002, still, Judge Bermejo should have reckoned the period to appeal
from the time the defendants counsel received a copy of the Judgment and not when
the defendant received it herself. What is more, the REGISTRY RETURN CARD
SHOWING THE DATE THE DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL RECEIVED A COPY OF THE
JUDGMENT WAS MISSING FROM THE RECORDS.
12. Dr. Montemayor also faults the respondent Judge for granting the defendants Urgent
Motion for Extension to post a supersedeas bond in violation of Section 13, Rule 70
of the Rules of Court.
13. Moreover, Judge Bermejo did not resolve the three (3) Motions for Execution and two
(2) Motions to Require Defendants Counsel to Inform the Court the Date He Received
a Copy of the Judgment.
14. Dr. Montemayor also avers that Judge Bermejo prevented the transmittal of the
records of the case to the appellate court within 15 days from the perfection of the
appeal in violation of Section 6, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. According to him, it
was only after the respondent Judge received the defendants supersedeas bond that
the former issued the Order dated May 5, 2003 directing the Branch Clerk of Court to
transmit the records of the case to the appellate court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Bermejo should be held administratively liable
2 A supersedeas bond, also known as a defendant's appeal bond, is a type of surety bond that a court
requires from an appellant who wants to delay payment of a judgment until the appeal is over. An
appellant's bond to stay execution on a judgment during the pendency of the appeal.
RULING: YES; fine of Php 5,000 for delaying rendition of judgment; Php 10,000 for
impropriety.
RATIO:
 The registry receipts are indeed missing from the records but Judge Bermejo is
denying it to cover up such loss. An obvious disregard of keeping records is evidence
of incompetence and lack of professionalism. A judge is charged with exercising extra
care in ensuring that the records of the cases and official documents in his custody
are intact. There is no justification for missing records save fortuitous events This
Court reiterates that judges must adopt a system of record management and
organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt and efficient dispatch of
business. It is, in fact, incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing
system in his court because he is after all the one directly responsible for the proper
discharge of his official functions.
 Judge Bermejo is suppressing proof of the registry return receipts, in which case, he
is not only guilty of dragging his feet in the resolution of the motions but, worse, bias
in favor of the defendant. On such receipts hinge the answer to Dr. Montemayors
question: Did the defendant file her Notice of Appeal on time? A negative answer
would have dire consequences for the defendant since it would preclude any stay in
the execution of the adverse judgment.
 The supersedeas bond should be filed within the period for the perfection of the
appeal. The records show that on January 6, 2003, Judge Bermejo granted the
defendant 10 days from receipt of the Order giving due course to the Notice of
Appeal to post a supersedeas bond. Assuming that the defendant received a copy of
the Judgment only on December 5, 2002, the period granted was way beyond the 15-
day period for perfecting an appeal.
 The Court didn’t conclusively say that Bermejo was outright guilty of bias and
prejudice, but by countenancing, permitting, and even creating the many delays in
obvious disregard of the letter and the spirit of the Rules of Court and the Rule on
Summary Procedure, Judge Bermejo has put in question his partiality.
 Under Rule 2.01 of the Code, a judge should so behave at all times as to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The appearance of
bias or prejudice can be as damaging to public confidence and the administration of
justice as actual bias or prejudice.
26. Umali-Paco et al. v. Quilala et al., A.M. No. RTJ-02-1699 (15 October 2003)
RECIT-READY: Civil case for specific performance gone wrong. Judge Quilala is a bit of a
rowdy fella who apparently helped a witness answer a question, violated the Code of Civil
Procedure, and bickered with the counsel for the defense in a show of arrogance. The
Court ruled that he was, indeed, guilty of conduct unbecoming a judge because there was
no need for him to bicker, and there was no need for him to ask questions on behalf of
counsel, and, moreover, he should not have violated the Code of Civil Procedure.
DOCTRINE: Trial judges should be circumspect, carefully judicious and foremost, legally
correct in their pronouncements or utterances, especially in open court, to avoid any
showing of ignorance, arrogance or bias or partiality to a party.
FACTS:
ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON
1. Complainants were officers of the Philippine Retirement Authority (PRetA 3 ), the
defendant in an action for specific performance, entitled "Philippine Retirement
Authority Members Association Foundation, Inc., (PRAMA) vs. Philippine Retirement
Authority (PRA)”. Complainants charged respondent judge with bias and partiality on
various occasions.
2. Judge Quilala, during the hearing on PRAMA’s application for a writ of preliminary
injunction, led and coached Ramon Collado, a witness for PRAMA, and instructed
PRAMA’s counsel on what questions to ask.
3. On 06 March 2001, respondent judge issued an order granting the motion of PRAMA
to set the case for hearing without giving the counsel for PRetA an opportunity to
oppose it. On 20 March 2001, at the hearing on the prayer of PRAMA for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, respondent judge remarked
that he could very well issue the writ ex parte, impressing upon the plaintiff that he
was in a position to resolve the application without having to hear the evidence for
defendant PRA. In the same hearing, respondent judge unceremoniously interrupted
Atty. Vernette Umali-Paco, the collaborating counsel for PRA and one of herein
complainants, while Atty. Umali-Paco was explaining a matter propounded by the
court.
4. Complainants further averred that during the hearing on the afternoon of 19
February 2001, respondent judge delegated to his acting clerk of court Aida C.
Lomugdang, who was not a member of the bar, the task of receiving evidence from
the parties (whoooa) as well as of ruling on any objections which might be proffered
thereon, thereby ignoring Section 9, Rule 30, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
which requires (1) that the parties agree to the delegation in writing, (2) that the clerk
of court be a member of the bar, and (3) that the clerk of court would not issue
rulings on any objections which might be interposed.
5. In connivance with respondent judge, respondent stenographer Lilia N. Batu had
made it to appear that the session was presided over by Judge Quilala himself. In the
assailed stenographic notes, the statements issued by Lomugdang were shown to
have been made by Judge Quilala although the judge was neither present nor even in
his chambers during the hearing.
6. SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS:
1) by leading or coaching a witness for the plaintiff;
2) by granting the motion of the plaintiff to set the case for an earlier hearing
without giving the counsel for the defendant an opportunity to oppose it;
3) by commenting, during one hearing, that he could issue the writ of
preliminary injunction ex parte; and
4) by unduly interrupting one of the complainants, Atty. Vernette Umali-Paco,
while the latter was explaining a matter in open court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Quilala should be held administratively liable
RULING: YES. EVERYONE COMPLICIT got punished:
 Judge Quilala: guilty for conduct unbecoming a judge and of violating Section 9,
Rule 30, of the Rules of Court, and he is hereby penalized with a FINE of Ten
Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos;
 Acting clerk of court Aida C. Lomugdang: guilty of having acted in contravention
with the rules on the reception by her, albeit upon the directive of respondent
3 “Philippine Retirement Authority” is now officially PRetA, because “Philippine Reclamation Authority”
is PRA (formerly PEA). Source: I used to work for GOCC stuff.
judge, of evidence without herself being a member of the bar, and she is hereby
SEVERELY REPRIMANDED;
 Stenographer Lilia N. Batu: remiss in her duty to accurately reflect the
circumstances surrounding the proceedings in the afternoon hearing of 19
February 2001, and she is ADMONISHED to henceforth be circumspect in her
duties. Respondents are each warned against committing any further infraction
on their part.
RATIO:
 Re. allegation on helping witness: It is within the sound discretion of the trial judge to
ask questions from witnesses, if only to clarify what may appear to him to be vague
points in the narration. Questions designed to avoid obscurity in the testimony or to
elicit additional relevant evidence are not improper. The judge may aptly need to
intervene in the presentation of evidence in order to expedite the resolution of a case
and prevent unnecessary waste of time. Judges, however, should be extremely
careful so as not to be misunderstood, and they must refrain from making
comments, remarks or suggestions that could lead to even the slightest suspicion
that he is thereby unduly assisting a party or counsel. Judge Quilala deviated
somewhat from usual practice when he ignored the objection of counsel and,
instead, asked the question himself. Investigating Justice Sundiam, nevertheless,
was correct in holding that bias and partiality could not necessarily be inferred
therefrom.
 Re. bickering with counsel for the defendant: Enough could be gleaned from the
records about respondent judge’s unnecessary bickering with counsel for the
defendant. His utterances could easily and very well be mistaken for, if not reflective
of, a mark of arrogance. Rather than rule on the objection of Atty. Rigonan,
respondent judge instead brushed off the matter with what would appear to be a
conceited show of a prerogative of his office, a conduct that falls below the standard
of decorum expected of a judge. Trial judges should be circumspect, carefully
judicious and foremost, legally correct in their pronouncements or utterances,
especially in open court, to avoid any showing of ignorance, arrogance or bias or
partiality to a party.
 Re. Judge leaving chambers: The pertinent rules of procedure indeed were obviously
ignored. The rule is unequivocal and admits of no further discussion; neither
agreement by the parties nor their acquiescence can justify its violation.
Section 3. Conduct to minimize occasions for disqualification
Section 4. Refrain from comment on judicial matters
27. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL
BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G. R. No. 133250. May 6, 2003
CARPIO, J.
FACTS:
 Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez filed on November 13, 2002 his Consolidated
Opposition to the main and supplemental motions for reconsideration.
 To recall, the Courts decision of July 9, 2002 on the instant case states in its
summary:
ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered
by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA
may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of
these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens,
subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make
such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas.
Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the
only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15
hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of
77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section
3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring
any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares
of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section
2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources
other than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged
areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or
disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the
transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in
view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
 Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab
initio.
 Amari seeks the inhibition of Justice Antonio T. Carpio, ponente of the Decision,
on the ground that Justice Carpio, before his appointment to the Court, wrote in
his Manila Times column of July 1, 1997, I have always maintained that the law
requires the public bidding of reclamation projects.
 Justice Carpio, then a private law practitioner, also stated in the same column,
The Amari-PEA reclamation contract is legally flawed because it was not bid out
by the PEA.
 Amari claims that because of these statements Justice Carpio should inhibit
himself on the grounds of bias and prejudgment and that the instant case
should be re-deliberated after being assigned to a new ponente.
ISSUE: W/N the motion to inhibit should be granted
HELD: NO.
 First, the motion to inhibit came after Justice Carpio had already rendered
his opinion on the merits of the case.
 The rule is that a motion to inhibit must be denied if filed after a member of
the Court had already given an opinion on the merits of the case, the
rationale being that a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate upon the
action of the Court (only to) raise an objection of this sort after a decision
has been rendered.
 Second, as can be readily gleaned from the summary of the Decision
quoted above, the absence of public bidding is not one of the ratio
decidendi of the Decision which is anchored on violation of specific
provisions of the Constitution.
 The absence of public bidding was not raised as an issue by the parties.
The absence of public bidding was mentioned in the Decision only to
complete the discussion on the law affecting reclamation contracts for the
guidance of public officials.
 At any rate, the Office of the Solicitor General in its Motion for
Reconsideration concedes that the absence of public bidding in the
disposition of the Freedom Islands rendered the Amended JVA null and
void.
 Third, judges and justices are not disqualified from participating in a case
just because they have written legal articles on the law involved in the case
28. IN THE MATTER OF THE ALLEGED IMPROPER CONDUCT OF SANDIGANBAYAN
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ANACLETO D. BADOY, JR., TAKING AN AMBULANCE BUT PROCEEDING
TO THE GMA TV STATION FOR AN INTERVIEW INSTEAD OF PROCEEDING FORTHWITH TO
THE HOSPITAL, A.M. No. 01-12-01-SC, January 16, 2003
Ponente: SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
FACTS:
1. November 29, 2001: Justice Badoy, aboard an ambulance, "whisked himself" to
the GMA Broadcast Station in Quezon City for a live interview in the news
program Saksi.
2. There, he announced the loss of a Resolution he penned in connection with the
plunder case against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and others.
3. The media sarcastically referred to the event as a "staged comedy" or a
"television tryst." Leading newspapers contained facetious headlines, such as
"Ambulance rushes Badoy — to TV Station," "What's with Justice Badoy," and
"Unorthodox Behavior — Analyze Badoy, Erap Lawyers ask SC."
4. Acting on the media reports, this Court directed Justice Badoy to show cause
why he should not be administratively charged with conduct unbecoming a
Justice of the Sandiganbayan.
5. Justice Badoy: alleged that three days prior to the incident, he could not find his
Resolution ordering that former President Estrada be detained at Fort Sto.
Domingo. So he requested the National Bureau of Investigation to conduct an
investigation, but to no avail.
6. November 29, 2001: agitated that someone might have stolen the Resolution
and claimed that he sold it for a fee, he decided to go to the GMA-7 Broadcast
Station and report its loss, in order that the public may know he is honest. In
going there, he chose to ride in an ambulance because he felt very sick and
cold, intending to proceed to a hospital after the interview.
ISSUE: W/N Justice Badoy violated Canons of Judicial Ethics
ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON

RULING: YES. He is guilty of the administrative offense: conduct unbecoming a Justice for
going to GMA-7 Broadcast Station aboard an ambulance and reporting the loss of a
Resolution, classified as a light charge under Section 10 of Rule 140 of the Revised Rules
of Court.
WHEREFORE, respondent Justice Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr. (Retired), is hereby FINED in the
sum of P13,000.00 for conduct unbecoming a Justice and for delay in issuing an Order,
to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
interviews to the media on any matter or incident related to the issues subject of
the controversy" all the more punctuates his indiscretion.
 Judges are subject to human limitations. Imbedded in their consciousness is the
complex of emotions, habits and convictions.
 Aware of this actuality, it behooves them to regulate these deflecting forces and
not to let them loose, either to their own detriment or to that of the courts they
serve.
 This is the high price they have to pay as occupants of their exalted positions.

RATIO:

 An introspective appraisal of the "ambulance incident" yields reasons for this

Court to adjudge Justice Badoy guilty of conduct unbecoming a Justice.
 Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "a judge should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities."
 He should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity
of the Judiciary.
Sections 5 and 6. Disqualification of judges
 Concomitant with this is the express mandate of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
that "justice should not be bounded by the individual idiosyncrasies of those
who administer it."
29. MERCEDES R. GOCHAN, ALFREDO R. GOCHAN, ANGELINA R. GOCHAN HERNAEZ, MA.
 A judge should adopt the usual and expected method of doing justice, and not MERCED R. GOCHAN GOROSPE, CRISPO R. GOCHAN JR. and MARLON R.
seek to be spectacular or sensational in the conduct of his court. GOCHAN vs. VIRGINIA GOCHAN, LOUISE GOCHAN, LAPULAPU REAL ESTATE
 Justice Badoy tramples upon the foregoing judicial norms. CORPORATION, FELIX GOCHAN & SONS REALTY CORPORATION and MACTAN
 There is no reason why he should rush to the GMA-7 Broadcast Station just to REALTY CORPORATION, G.R. No. 143089. February 27, 2003
inform the public about the loss of a Resolution.
 This is an internal office incident which should not be reported to the whole Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J.:
nation.
 His claim that the Resolution might have been stolen and sold by someone FACTS:
(using his name) for a fee is a wild conjecture.
 Not only did his conduct give an image that he could not manage his work
 There is no dispute as to the antecedent facts that gave rise to the instant
effectively, but it also indicated that he had corrupt personnel.
petition involving close relatives who are either aunties, nieces and nephews or
 Moreover, it dragged innocent parties as possible culprits.
first-cousins.
 Justice Badoy's aberrant behavior deserves administrative sanction.
 03 April 1998: private respondents filed a Complaint for Specific Performance
 As the Chairman of the Division hearing the plunder case against the former and Damages against petitioners.
President of the Philippines, he should have been more circumspect in his
 The case was raffled to respondent Judge Dicdican
actuation.
 11 August 1998: respondent judge denied petitioners motion without
 The loss of the Resolution, being an internal matter, could have been addressed
conducting a hearing. Respondent judge however did not stop with the denial
inside his own chamber. That he brought it to the arena of public opinion is pure
but went on to rule on the merits of the affirmative defenses.
vanity. It cannot be countenanced.
 The ruling is the subject of a petition for certiorari before this Court which is
 If lawyers are prohibited from making public statements in the media regarding
pending resolution on a motion for reconsideration.
a pending case to arouse public opinion for or against a party, with more reason
should judges be prohibited from seeking publicity.  Because of the pendency of this petition, petitioners filed on 28 September
1998 a motion to suspend proceedings.
 Judges are not actors or politicians who thrive by publicity. Publicity undermines
 Instead of suspending proceedings, the respondent judge set the case for pre-
the dignity and impartiality of a judge.
trial on 09 November 1998, per Order dated 01 October 1998.
 Thus, at no time should he be moved by a desire to cater to public opinion to the
 05 November 1998: petitioners’ counsel Atty. Rolando Lim filed a motion to
detriment of the administration of justice.
reset the pre-trial from 09 November 1998 to 03 December 1998 on the ground
 The fact that Justice Badoy, just three (3) weeks prior to the "ambulance
that he had to go to Japan because of a previous commitment.
incident," was strictly ordered by Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., "to cease
and desist from holding press conferences, issuing press statements, or giving
ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON
 Atty. Vicente Espina, who attended the pre-trial to explain Atty. Lims absence,
manifested to respondent judge that the petitioners were willing to explore the
possibility of an amicable settlement.
 In spite of the absence of handling counsel Atty. Lim and in spite of Atty. Espinas
manifestation of a possible compromise, respondent judge proceeded with and
terminated the pre-trial.
 And in spite of the manifestation of Atty. Espina, respondent judge indicated in
the pre-trial order he issued that the possibility (of a compromise) is nil.
 After the termination of the pre-trial, respondent judge proceeded to hear the
evidence of private respondents
 23 April 1999: petitioners counsel Atty. Lim filed an urgent motion praying that
the hearing on 28 April be moved to 30 April 1999 on the ground that he had to
undergo medical tests and treatment on 27 and 28 April 1999, and that his law
partner Atty. Espina would not be able to attend in his behalf because the latter
had to attend his brothers wedding in Kananga, Leyte on 28 April 1999.
 Petitioner’s counsel went to court on 30 April 1999 and was surprised to learn
that his motion to reset the hearing on 28 April 1999 was disregarded and that
trial proceeded with private respondent’s counsel conducting a re-direct
examination of their first witness and presenting their second witness on direct
examination.
 However, when respondent judge threatened to waive petitioners right to
examine private respondent’s witnesses, petitioners counsel had no choice but
to accede to do what he was not prepared for.
 05 August 1999: petitioners filed a motion to inhibit respondent judge from
further sitting in the case on grounds of partiality, pre-judgment and gross
ignorance of the law.
 In an order dated 13 August 1999, respondent judge denied the motion for
inhibition on the ground that petitioners failed to appear to substantiate the
motion.
 16 August 1999: petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of
denial which the respondent judge likewise denied in his Order dated 20 August
1999, reiterating that petitioners failed to appear during the hearing on the
motion.
 CA: opined that the apprehensions of respondents about the bias or partiality of
Judge Dicdican in favor of petitioners were well-founded. It held that the totality
of the circumstances showed that he had a glaring animosity towards their case.
It further ruled that he had likewise displayed petulance and impatience in his
handling of the case, a norm of behavior inconsistent with the cold neutrality of
an impartial judge
ISSUE: W/N Judge Dicdican should have inhibited himself
RULING: Judge Dicdican need not inhibit himself.
“WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed CA Decision and
Resolution REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The prayer for the inhibition of Judge Isaias
Dicdican is hereby DENIED. He is DIRECTED to proceed with the hearing of CEB-21 854
with all reasonably speed. No pronouncement as to costs.”
RATIO:
 Petitioners argue that the CA erred when it ruled that Judge Dicdican should be
inhibited from hearing Civil Case No. CEB-21854 on the ground of bias and
prejudice.
 A critical component of due process is a hearing before a tribunal that is
impartial and disinterested.
 Every litigant is indeed entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge.
 All the other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would be
meaningless if the ultimate decision were to come from a biased judge. Section
1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his
wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to
either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the
subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the
record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid
reasons other than those mentioned above.
 The Rules contemplate two kinds of inhibition: compulsory and voluntary. The
instances mentioned in the first paragraph of the cited Rule conclusively
presume that judges cannot actively and impartially sit in a case.
 The second paragraph, which embodies voluntary inhibition, leaves to the
discretion of the judges concerned whether to sit in a case for other just and
valid reasons, with only their conscience as guide.
 To be sure, judges may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation.
 But when circumstances reasonably arouse suspicions, and out of such
suspicions a suggestion is made of record that they might be induced to act with
prejudice for or against a litigant, they should conduct a careful self-
examination.
 Under the second paragraph of the cited Section of the Rules of Court, parties
have the right to seek the inhibition or the disqualification of judges who do not
appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial or independent in handling a
case.
 Whether judges should inhibit themselves therefrom rests on their own sound
discretion.
 That discretion is a matter of conscience and is addressed primarily to their
sense of fairness and justice.
 However, judges are exhorted to exercise their discretion in a way that the
people’s faith in the courts of justice would not be impaired.
 Verily, the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 does not give judges the
unfettered discretion to decide whether to desist from hearing a case.
 The inhibition must be for just and valid causes.
 The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for them to
inhibit, especially when the charge is without basis.
 This Court has to be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or
prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality.
 In a string of cases, the Supreme Court has said that bias and prejudice, to be
considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, must be proved
with clear and convincing evidence.
 Bare allegations of their partiality will not suffice. It cannot be presumed,
especially if weighed against the sacred oaths of office of magistrates, requiring
ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON
them to administer justice fairly and equitably -- both to the poor and the rich,
the weak and the strong, the lonely and the well-connected.
 Equally important is the established doctrine that bias and prejudice must be
shown to have resulted in an opinion on the merits on the basis of an
extrajudicial source, not on what the judge learned from participating in the
case.
 As long as opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings are based on
the evidence presented and the conduct observed by the magistrate, such
opinion -- even if later found to be erroneous -- will not prove personal bias or
prejudice on the part of the judge.
 relationships to influence judicial conduct of judgment xxx”
While palpable error may be inferred from the decision or the order itself,
extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt
purpose. At bottom, to disqualify a judge, the movant must prove bias and
prejudice by clear and convincing evidence.
 Prescinding from the foregoing standards, SC does not agree with the Court of
Appeals conclusion that Judge Dicdican has shown a glaring bias against
respondents case.
 His actuations have not engendered reasonable suspicion as to his fairness and
ability to decide the case with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
 Verily, respondents have not convinced SC that Judge Dicdican should inhibit
himself from hearing the case.
30. Oktubre vs. Velasco, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1444 (20 July 2004)
FACTS:
 Plaintiff is the attorney-in-fact of D’Arcy, a non-resident American and widow of
Abraham. Respondent Judge is Abraham’s nephew.
 Abraham built a 4-storey commercial and residential building and owned it in
common with his siblings. After Abraham died, none of the heirs petitioned for
the estate settlement and D’Arcy administered the building.
 3 tenants occupied the building with some rooms reserved for Abraham’s
relatives and the tenants paid their rent to the plaintiff.
 After being appointed as the MTC Judge, respondent stayed in the building for a
few days. He sought for an extension but D’Arcy turned him down since she
would be using the room he was staying at.
 Complainant alleges that the refusal resulted in Velasco sending her an
intimidating letter, moving out the jeep from the garage without her knowledge
and permission, and destroyed and changed the padlock of the room.
 The parties also met in the office of the Punong Barangay for mediation but no
settlement occurred since the respondent questioned her residency in Agbao.
o She reiterated that she was being given a warrant of arrest and was
locked up in jail for 6 hours before being able to pay a cash bond.
 Complainant sought to annul the warrant of arrest and prays that the judge be
disciplined for (1) using his sala’s letterhead, (2) failure to inhibit himself from
his own criminal complaints and (3) for his issuance of the warrant of arrest.
 Respondent admitted doing the acts regarding the Paler building, its tenants
and D’Arcy’s jeep but claimed that he merely acted to protect his maternal co-
heir’s interest.
 OCA recommended to find respondent Judge guilty of Grave Misconduct, Gross
Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Authority.
ISSUE: WON respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct
HELD: Yes, he is guilty for grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse
of authority for violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.13 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is
DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits and with prejudice to
his reinstatement, including government owned or controlled corporations.
 Canon 2, Rule 2.03 provides “A judge shall not allow family, social or other
 Rule 3.12 mandates that “a judge should take no part in a proceeding where the
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned xxx d) the judge is related by
consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree or to counsel
within the fourth degree”
 He is liable for inappropriately using his Office’s letterhead and acting on his
own criminal complaints against the complainant and D’Arcy.
o Respondent alleged that he wanted to protect the interest of his
maternal co-heirs but his explanation is flimsy. He further required the
tenants to pay their rent at the MTC Maasin, although he was then
staying at the building. He clearly intended to use the prestige of his
judicial office to advance their interest.
o A judge is prohibited from doing so in cases where he is a party under
Rule 3.12
o Respondent does not deny that he did not conduct a preliminary
investigation on the complaint for Robbery. He also aggravated his
liability when he issued the warrant of arrest.
31. Villaluz vs. Mijares, A.M. No. RTJ-98-1402 (3 April 1998)
FACTS:
 Retired CA Justice Villaluz charged Judge Mijares, incumbent RTC Pasay City
Judge with dishonesty, corrupt practices, grave misconduct and immorality, as
alleged:
o Mijares, in consignation case “Tengco Homeowner’s Association vs.
Susana Realty, Inc.” placed the consignation of plaintiff association’s
rental deposit to her private bank account instead of turning them over
to the City Treasurer
o She also took cognizance and decided the petition for correction of
entry in the birth record of her grandson, who is the child of her
daughter, notwithstanding such close relationship, which she should
have refused and procured the transfer to other branches that are
equally qualified.
 Respondent judge denied any participation in the collection of deposits from the
Tengco Homeowner’s Association and claimed that it was from her disgruntled
employees. On the 2nd charge, she asserted that the disqualification of judges
does not apply since the proceedings only called for the clarification and
correction of an erroneous entry. Mijares also denied that she made a false
declaration regarding her residence.
ISSUE: WON respondent Judge Mijares is guilty of grave misconduct
ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON

HELD: Yes, she is guilty of grave misconduct and is fined for P20,000 on the 1st charge
and P10,000 on the 2nd charge. She is also warned that the commission of the same or
similar offense will be dealt more severely.
 Justice Valdez opined that respondent violated Circular No. 9 and 5; but also
admitted that except for the testimony of Anita Domingo, there is no direct and
hard evidence that Mijares got and made personal use of the rental deposits.
 Respondent was also clearly disqualified from trying the case since she was
related within the 6th degree of consanguinity to one of the parties in the Special
Proceedings and that it was mandatory for Mijares to inhibit herself from hearing
the case.
o Mijares contended that the petition did not involve controversial
matters and merely pertained to clerical errors. But it cannot be free
from bias or partiality in resolving the case by reason of her close blood
relationship to him.
o The Court reminds judges to be prudent and circumspect in the
performance of their duties for “a judge owes it to the public and to the
legal profession to know the factual basis of the complaint and the very
law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy.
 Complainant’s charge for the 3rd allegation was not sufficiently substantiated
since the respondent’s testimony that it was the address that her husband
resided and this was where they established their family residence after getting
married.
32. Perez v. Suller, A.M. No. MTJ-94-436. (6 November 1995)
Ponente: ROMERO, J.:
FACTS:
ISSUE: W/N it was proper for respondent judge to conduct the preliminary
investigation and then order the arrest of the accused when the complaining witness
in Criminal Case No. SM-7962, as claimed by complainant mayor, is his nephew
RULING: NO. “IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent is FINED in the amount of One
thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) for not having inhibited himself in the preliminary
investigation of Criminal Case No. SM-7962 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Carlo
Perez, Et. Al." With a stern warning that a repetition or the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.”
RATIO:
 SC: no taint of irregularity attended the issuance of the warrant of arrest by
respondent judge
 Additionally, the complainant questions the impartially of the respondent judge
in conducting the preliminary investigation of the crime on the ground that the
complaining witness is his nephew, Cristobal Suller, Jr.
 Respondent judge’s comment, being silent on his relationship with complaining
witness, Cristobal Suller, Jr., the Court deems it an admission of the alleged
relationship.
 Respondent judge could have easily denied the alleged relationship and
adduced proof to that effect, but he chose to sidestep said issue by being silent,
notwithstanding that this constitutes one of the principal charges against him.
 The Court finds that respondent judge have refrained from handling the
preliminary investigation since he was closely related to the complainant,
Cristobal Suller Jr., his nephew and a relative by consanguinity within the sixth
degree.
 The Court mandates that all judges strictly comply with the Code of Judicial
Conduct 5 provides, in Rule 3.12 that:

"Rule 3.12. — a judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge’s
 In a sworn letter-complaint dated March 23, 1994, Salvador M. Perez, Municipal
impartially might reasonably be questioned. These cases include, among others,
Mayor of San Miguel, Pangasinan accused Judge Hilarion A. Suller of grave
proceedings where:
abuse of discretion, misconduct, ignorance of the law and acts unbecoming of a
judge relative to Criminal Case No. SM-7962 entitled "People v. Carlo Perez,
(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the
Salvador Perez, Jr. and Jerico Perez," for qualified trespass to dwelling.
sixth degree or to counsel within the fourth degree;
 Complainant Mayor: alleged that respondent Judge conducted the preliminary
 Rule 137 Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court which applies suppletorily
investigation in said case although the complaining witness, Cristobal Suller, Jr.
provides:
is his nephew and thereafter issued the warrant of arrest against the accused on
the same day the complaint was filed without requiring the accused and their
"Section 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in
witnesses to submit their counter-affidavits; that on the following day, a Friday,
any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as their,
respondent judge purposely left his station to thwart any opportunity for the
legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the
accused to post bail.
sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
 Respondent judge averred that the issuance of the warrant was in accord with
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been
the provisions of Section 6, Rule 112 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has
Procedure. He denied the allegations that he left his station on March 18, 1994,
presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review,
the day after the filing of the complaint; that in a Joint "Sworn Statement" dated
without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered
April 7, 1994, his Branch Clerk of Court, Staff Assistant and interpreter attested
upon the record.
that the respondent judge together with affiants reported for work on said date
 While conducting preliminary investigation may not be construed strictly as
 His comment, however, was silent as to his relationship with the complaining
"sitting in a case," the underlying reason behind disqualification under Rule 3.12
witness in Criminal Case No. SM-7962, Cristobal Suller, Jr.
ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON
of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Section 1 of Rule 137 is the same.
 Clearly, respondent judge’s participation in the preliminary investigation
involving his nephew is a violation of the aforequoted rules laid down to guide
members of the judiciary.
 The rationale for the rule on disqualification of a judge stems from the principle
that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free,
disinterested, impartial and independent.
 A judge should not handle a case in which he might be perceived to be
susceptible to bias and impartiality.
 The rule is intended to preserve the people’s faith and confidence in the courts
of justice.
 As can be gleaned from the records, respondent judge may have been
influenced or affected by his relationship to Suller, Jr. during the preliminary
investigation.
 Based on the documentary evidence presented, it appears that during the
preliminary investigation, respondent judge ordered the accused to submit
within the ten-day reglementary period, their counter-affidavit to controvert the
complaint filed against them; that prior to the expiration of said period,
respondent judge issued a Resolution dated March 17, 1994 ordering, among
others, the forwarding of the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor despite protestations from the accused.
 This, in effect, deprived the accused of their opportunity to adequately present
their position during the preliminary investigation.
 Such actuation of respondent judge demonstrated partiality of the complaining
witness, his nephew, thus casting doubt on his fairness in conducting the
preliminary investigation.
 The behavior of judges and court personnel, must at all times, not only be
characterized by propriety and decorum, but must also be above suspicion.
 Due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on
the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and just. 11
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, moreover, mandates that a judge
should avoid, not merely impropriety in all his acts but even the appearance of
impropriety.

33. DR. CORAZON D. PADERANGA, et al. v. HONORABLE RUSTICO D.
PADERANGA, A.M. No. RTJ-14-2383 August 17, 2015
BERSAMIN, J.
FACTS:
 Prior to his compulsory retirement from the Judiciary on 2013, the respondent
served as the Presiding Judge of the RTC Camiguin. He is now administratively
charged based on two separate complaints.
 The first complaint ,was brought by his own sisters of the full blood, namely: Dra.
Corazon D. Paderanga , Dulce, Carmencita and Amor to charge him with conduct
unbecoming of a judge and grave misconduct.
 The second, was instituted by Patria to charge him with ignorance of the law,
disregard of the New Code of Judicial Conduct and abuse of authority.
 The Court consolidated the two cases A.M. No. RTJ-07-2033 with A.M. No. RTJ-
14-2383.
Factual antecedents of A.M. No. RTJ-14-2383
 Complainants aver that Respondent Judge, being a magistrate, failed to exert
any effort to mediate the differences and misunderstandings between his
siblings.
 The complainants also allege that Respondent Judge compounded the trouble
between his siblings when he instigated, encouraged and advised Narciso, Jr. to
file charges against his sister, Dra. Corazon.
 They assert that the Respondent Judge abused his power as a judge by
continuously trying to harass and oppress his female siblings by threatening to
file Civil and Criminal cases against Carmencita and Dulce for not giving him his
share of the fruits of the land held in common by the three of them.
 Dra. Corazon’s Allegation
 Respondent Judge took advantage of his powerful position and unjustly enriched
himself by encroaching on Lot 12910 which was owned by her without asking for
her consent or approval, fenced and introduced improvements therein.
 Patria’s Allegation
 Patria avers that she and the respondent Judge live in their ancestral house
located in Tupsan, Mambajao, Camiguin. During one of his visits to Camiguin,
Narciso, Jr. found his room in disarray and claimed that there were valuable
things missing.
 Upon hearing the commotion created by his siblings on the second floor,
respondent Judge went upstairs and accused Patria of stealing the missing
items, which included a camera. In that occasion, complainant Patria claims that
Respondent Judge uttered defamatory remarks upon her. Later, it turned out
that nothing was missing from Narciso, Jr.’s belongings.
 Carmen and Patria sought the assistance of the Barangay Captain with regard to
their proposal that Respondent Judge accommodate Narciso, Jr. in the ground
floor rather than having him stay at one of the rooms in the second floor of the
ancestral house.
 She also claimed that the said judge one night allegedly uttered the following
words: “Ikaw bugok, idiot aka. Epapreso taka anang imong kaso naa sa Fiscal
karon.”
 During the dialogue, Respondent Judge and Narciso, Jr. turned down the
proposal of Carmen and Patria. O
 Patria joined her sisters Dulce, Amor, Carmen and Corazon in filing this
Administrative Complaint with the OCA.
 an Information for Violation of Republic Act 7610 was filed against Patria before
the sala of Respondent Judge. The following day, he issued a Warrant for the
arrest of Patria.
 Upon learning that police officers were after her, Patria surrendered to the
Executive Judge of the RTC of Misamis Oriental and posted a cash bond of
P16,000.00. Subsequently, she filed a Motion for Disqualification against the
respondent Judge on the ground that respondent judge is related to her and the
complainant, Michelle P. Carillo, within the sixth degree of consanguinity.
 Justice del Castillo recommended that the Respondent Judge be suspended
form the service without compensation and benefits for a period of two (2)
months.
ETHICS GO2 – DIMLA, ESPIRITU, GERVACIO, JUAN, LIAO, MARAVILLA, ONTENGCO, POBE, TABALINGCOS, TIANGSON, YASON

Factual antecedents of A.M. No. RTJ-07-2033 - Other imputations against the respondent were baseless, or were not subject to
 Patria cited the following grounds: I. FOR IGNORANCE AND/OR DEFIANCE OF administrative sanction
THE LAW AND DISREGARD OF THE CODE ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT. II. FOR USING  2nd ISSUE:
THE POWER OF HIS COURT AS AN INSTRUMENT OF VENGEANCE.
- The respondent’s issuance of the warrant of arrest against his own sister was an
 the respondent had loudly and angrily uttered the following remarks at her: outright violation of the stringent rules on compulsory disqualification. For him,
“Ikaw bugok, iduot taka, epapreso taka anang imong caso naa sa fiscal!” (“You
self-disqualification was absolute and should have been immediate. It did not
idiot, I will send you to prison in that case against you pending now in the fiscal’s matter that he presided in a single-sala station.
office!”); that he did issue an order of arrest against her in violation of Section 1,
Rule 137 of the Rules of Court and Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct; - Neither was it an excuse that the private complainant in the criminal case
that he intentionally caused the warrant of arrest to be served against her in her against his sister could protest unless he acted as promptly as he did on the
school to humiliate her; and that he had been pressuring her and their sisters to case. No protest would be justified should self-disqualification be mandatory.
execute an affidavit of desistance in relation to the charges they brought against Consequently, he was not exempt from administrative liability for acting upon
him in A.M. No. RTJ-14-2383. the criminal case involving his own sister, and issuing the warrant of arrest
against her.
 The respondent countered that the charges in the second complaint were
already included in A.M. No. RTJ-14-2383 then being investigated by Justice Del - The rules on the disqualification of judges, particularly compulsory self-
Castillo; and that he had already submitted his comment disqualification, are basic legal guidelines that must be at the palm of every
judge’s hands. They are as basic as a rule of thumb. That the respondent
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the following acts of the respondent constituted conduct disobeyed them should render him fully accountable for gross ignorance of the
unbecoming of a judge, namely: law or rule.
(a) failing to exert efforts to mediate the differences and misunderstandings among his - “As public servants, judges are appointed to the judiciary to serve as the visible
siblings, particularly between Narciso, Jr. and Corazon, that had led to the filing of civil and
representation of the law, and more importantly, of justice. From them, the
criminal cases against each other;
people draw their will and awareness to obey the law.” If judges, who have sworn
(b) instigating Narciso, Jr. to file charges against Corazon that compounded the
misunderstanding among his siblings; to obey and uphold the Constitution, shall conduct themselves as respondent
(c) threatening the filing of criminal cases against his sisters; (d) accusing Patria of did, in wanton disregard and violation of the rights of the accused, then the
stealing Narciso, Jr.’s belongings, specifically his camera; people, especially those who have had recourse to them shall lose all their
(e) uttering defamatory remarks against Patria; and respect and high regard for the members of the Bench and the judiciary itself
(f) taking advantage of his position and unjustly enriching himself by appropriating for shall lose the high moral ground from which it draws its power and strength to
himself Lot 12910 to the prejudice of the rightful owner; and compel obedience to the laws
(2) Whether or not his issuance of the warrant of arrest against Patria amounted to gross  Respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of law and conduct unbecoming of a
misconduct, ignorance of the law, disregard of the New Code of Judicial Conduct and judge.
abuse of authority.
HELD: YES
 1ST ISSUE:
- The Court agrees with Justice Del Castillo that the respondent was not guilty of
conduct unbecoming of a judge or of grave misconduct under the first complaint
except for his appropriation for himself of Lot 12910 in order to unjustly enrich
himself.
- Disbelieving the respondent’s denial, Justice Del Castillo pointed out that the
respondent’s signature on the sketch plan reflected his actual knowledge and
approval of the partition of their parents’ estate; and noted that his denial was
inconsistent with his acts, and was apparently implausible
- respondent Judge was in bad faith when he unilaterally appropriated the
disputed portion in his favor. He thereby disregarded the sworn obligation of
every judge to observe respect for the rights of others at all times if he expected
others to respect the courts and its judges, as well as the Judiciary as an
institution. His failure in this regard merited him the condign administrative
penalty