CHENG V.

GENATO (December 29, 1998)

FACTS

Respondent Genato entered a contract to sell to spouses Da Jose pertaining to

his property in Bulacan. The contract made in public document states that the spouses
shall pay the down payment and 30 days after verifying the authenticity of the
documents, they shall pay the remaining purchase price.

Da Jose spouses was not able to finish verifying the documents and as such
asked for a 30 day extension. Pending the extension and without notice to the spouses,
Genato made a document for the annulment of the contract.

Petitioner Cheng expressed interest over the property and paid 50K check with
the assurance that the contract between Genato and the spouses Da Jose will be
annulled. Da Jose spouses protested with the annulment and persuaded Genato to
continue the contract. Genato returned the check to Cheng and hence, this petition.

HELD

The contract between Genato and spouses Da Jose was a contract to sell which
is subject to a suspensive condition. Thus, there will be no contract to speak of, if the
obligor failed to perform the suspensive condition which enforces a juridical relation.
Obviously, the foregoing jurisprudence cannot be made to apply to the situation in the
instant case because no default can be ascribed to the Da Jose spouses since the 30-
day extension period has not yet expired.

Even assuming that the spouses defaulted, the contract also cannot be validly
rescinded because no notice was given to them. Thus, Cheng's contention that the
Contract to Sell between Genato and the Da Jose spouses was rescinded or resolved
due to Genato's unilateral rescission finds no support in this case.

The contract between Genato and Cheng is a contract to sell not a contract of
sale. But But even assuming that it should be treated as a conditional contract of sale, it
did not acquire any obligatory force since it was subject to a suspensive condition that
the earlier contract to sell between Genato and the Da Jose spouses should first be
cancelled or rescinded.

Art.1544 should apply because for not only was the contract between herein
respondents first in time; it was also registered long before petitioner's intrusion as a
second buyer (PRIMUS TEMPORE, PORTIOR JURE). (Spouses made annotation on the
title of Genato). Since Cheng was fully aware, or could have been if he had chosen to
inquire, of the rights of the Da Jose spouses under the Contract to Sell duly annotated
on the transfer certificates of titles of Genato, it now becomes unnecessary to further
elaborate in detail the fact that he is indeed in bad faith in entering into such
agreement.
 Coronel vs CA (1996)

FACTS:

This case is about a sale of land in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City by the vendor
Romulo Coronel to the vendees Conception Alcaraz and her daughter Ramona Patricia
Alcaraz with the following conditions:

The Coronel’s will immediately transfer the certificate of title in their name upon
receipt of the downpayment which is ₱50,000.

Upon the transfer in their names of the subject property, the Coronel’s will
execute the deed of absolute sale in favor of Ramona and then Ramona shall
immediately pay the Coronel’s the whole balance of ₱1,190,000.

On January 15, 1985, Conception paid the downpayment of ₱50,000 and then on
February 6, 1985, the property was now registered under the name of Coronel’s. By
Feb. 18, 1985, the Coronel’s sold the property to Catalina B. Mabanag for ₱1,580,000
after she made a ₱300,000 downpayment. This is the reason why the Coronel’s
cancelled and rescind the contract with the Alcaraz by depositing back the ₱50,000 to
Ramona’s bank account.

On Feb. 22, Conception filed a complaint for specific performance against the
Coronel’s. On April, the Coronel’s executed a deed of absolute sale over the subject
property to Catalina after which on June Catalina was issued a new title over the
subject property.

ISSUE

Whether or not the “Receipt of Down payment” embodied a perfected contract of

sale or just a mere contract to sell?

HELD

CONTRACT OF SALE- contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the

ownership and to deliver a determinate thing and the other to pay a price certain in
money or its equivalent.

CONTRACT TO SELL- the prospective seller explicitly reserves the transfer of the
title to the prospective buyer, meaning the seller does not yet agree or consent to
transfer the ownership of the property until the happening of a contingent event like full
payment of price.

SUPREME COURT RULING:

When the “Receipt of Down Payment” document was prepared and

signed by Romulo Coronel, the parties had agreed to a conditional contract of sale the
consummation of the contract is subject only to the successful transfer of the certificate
of Title.

According to Supreme Court, the receipt of down payment document manifests a

clear intent of the Coronel’s to transfer the title to the buyer, but since the title is still in
the name effect the transfer even though the buyers are able and willing to immediately
pay the purchase price. The agreement as well could not have been a contract to sell
because the seller or the Coronel’s made no express reservation of ownership or the
title of the land.

On Feb. 6, 1985, the Contract of Sale between the Coronel’s and the Alcaraz’
became obligatory.
 MENDOZA V. KALAW (October 12, 1921)

FACTS:

Federico Cañet sold his land under a conditional sale to Primitivo Kalaw. Less
than two months after, he sold it again to Agapito Mendoza under an absolute sale.

Mendoza took possession of the land and enclosed it with fence. Kalaw
attempted to claim possession but Mendoza refused. Kalaw attempted to have his title
registered in the registry of deeds but was denied by for the reason that there existed
some defect in the description of the property, and that the title of the vendor had not
therefore been registered. The register of deeds, however, did make a preventive
annotation.

HELD:

The ruling should be in favor of Mendoza because even if he acquired the

property subsequent to the conditional sale in favor of Kalaw, a conditional sale, before
the performance of the condition, can hardly be said to be a sale of property, especially
where the condition has not been performed or complied with.
 ADALIN V. CA (October 10, 1997)

FACTS

Appellee-Vendors sold their 5-door commercial building to Appellants Yu and Lim

located in front of Imperial Hotel in Cotabato City.

Since there are lessees in the property, the vendors offered it first to them twice
but they refused both offers. As such, appellee-vendors and appellants executed a deed
of conditional sale. The contract states that they appellants will pay the down payment
of 300K first and the remaining balance after the appellee-vendors completely evicted
the lessees occupying the property.

After the vendors and the tenants made known their intention to buy the
property for a higher price. As such, the vendors executed three deeds of sale of
registered land in favor of the lessees.

The vendors offered to return the downpayment paid by the appellants but the
latter refused. The vendors contend that they can rescind the contract because the
condition to evict the tenants was not completed.

HELD

Although the contract was a conditional sale, what was subject to the condition
is the payment of the balance. Both parties have their respective obligations yet to be
fulfilled, the seller the eviction of the tenants and the buyer, the payment of the
balance of the purchase price. The choice of who to sell the property to, however, had
already been made by the sellers and is thus no longer subject to any condition nor
open to any change. In that sense, the sale to the appellants was definitive and
absolute. A clear breach of contract was made by the vendors.

A case double sale occurred when the vendors sold the property to the tenants.
When the tenants bought the property, they are fully aware of its prior sale to the
appellants. Though the second sale to the said tenants was registered, such prior
registration cannot erase the gross bad faith that characterized such second sale, and
as such, there is no legal basis to rule that such second sale prevails over the first sale
of the said property.
 ESPIRITU V. VALERIO (December 23, 1976)

FACTS

Valerio filed a case to quiet title against mother and daughter Espiritu who were
asserting their adversary rights over said land and disturbing his possession thereof.

Valerio presented a deed of sale from which he acquired the property while the
Espiritus allege that they acquire the same from their deceased father.

The Espiritus also presented two deeds of sale to prove that their deceased
father have a legal right over the property which they inherited.

ISSUE

WON mother and daughter Espiritu have a better right over the property.

HELD

Apparently, this case concerns the sales of one parcel of land by the same
vendor but in favor of two different vendees.

If both allegations of the parties are valid, Espiritu's contention that they have a
better right than that the claimed by Valerio would seem to be meritorious in the light
of the facts of the case and the provisions of Article 1544 of the New Civil Code, it not
being disputed that the Deed of Sale in favor of them was registered first.

But since the deeds of sale presented by Esiritu are found to be falsified, they
have no legal right to claim the disputed property.
 TAÑEDO V. CA (January 22, 1996)

FACTS

Lazaro Tañedo executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Ricardo Tañedo and
Teresita Barrera in which he conveyed a parcel of land which he will inherit. Upon the
death of his father he executed an affidavit of conformity to reaffirm the said sale. He
also executed another deed of sale in favor of the spouses covering the parcel of land
he already inherited. Ricardo registered the last deed of sale in the registry of deeds in
their favor.

Ricardo later learned that Lazaro sold the same property to his children through
a deed of sale.

ISSUE

WON the Tañedo spouses have a better right over the property against the
children of Lazaro Tañedo.

HELD

Since a future inheritance generally cannot be a subject of a contract, the deed

of sale and the affidavit of conformity made by Lazaro has no effect. The subject of
dispute therefore is the deed of sale made by him in favor of spouses Tañedo and
another to his children after he already legally acquired the property.

Thus, although the deed of sale in favor of private respondents was later than
the one in favor of petitioners, ownership would vest in the former because of the
undisputed fact of registration. On the other hand, petitioners have not registered the
sale to them at all.

Petitioners contend that they were in possession of the property and that private
respondents never took possession thereof. As between two purchasers, the one who
registered the sale in his favor has a preferred right over the other who has not
registered his title, even if the latter is in actual possession of the immovable property.
 CRUZ V. CABANA (June 22, 1984)

FACTS

Leodegaria Cabana sold his real propery first to Teofilo Legaspi and Illuminada
Cabana and then later to Abelardo Cruz.

Legaspi and Cabana were able to take possession of the property but they were
not able to register the deed of absolute sale because the property was still mortgaged
to PNB. They however were able to register with the RD the sale with the right to
repurchase.

On the other hand, Cruz succeeded to register the deed of absolute sale in his
favor.

HELD

Even though Cruz was the first to register the deed of absolute sale, he cannot
be given a better right over the property because he was a buyer in bad faith.

Cruz knew the prior sale of the property because he was informed by the RD
that Legazpi and Cabana already registered the sale of the said property.

Knowledge of a prior transfer of a registered property by a subsequent purchaser

makes him a purchaser in bad faith and his knowledge of such transfer vitiates his title
acquired by virtue of the latter instrument of conveyance which creates no right as
against the first purchaser.
 NAVERA V. CA (April 26, 1990)

FACTS

Leocadio Navera owns a parcel of land in Albay which was inherited by his 5
children. His 3 children already have their share of the inheritance from the other
properties of Leocadio. The subject land was now owned by his 2 daughters. An OCT
was issued in the name of Elena Navera et.al (et.al refers to his sister Eduarda Navera)

When Elena died, his share of the land was inherited by her heirs Arsenio and
Felix Narez. The other portion was owned by Eduarda.

Eduarda sold her portion to her nephew Arsenio and then one year after to
Mariano Navera. Both sales were made in a public instrument but both sales were also
not registered in the Registry of Property.

ISSUE

WON the second sale of the property is valid.

HELD

Since the records show that both sales were not recorded in the Registry of
Property, the law clearly vests the ownership upon the person who in good faith was
first in possession of the disputed lot.

The possession viewed in the law includes not only the material but also the
symbolic possession, which is acquired by the execution of a public instrument. This
means that after the sale of a realty by means of a public instrument, the vendor, who
resells it to another, does not transmit anything to the second vendee, and if the latter,
by virtue of this second sale, takes material possession of the thing, he does it as mere
detainer, and it would be unjust to protect this detention against the rights of the thing
lawfully acquired by the first vendee.

In the case at bar, the prior sale of the land to respondent Arsenio Nares by
means of a public instrument is clearly tantamount to a delivery of the land resulting in
the material and symbolic possession thereof by the latter.
 Balatbat vs CA (1996)

FACTS

Petitioner is the agricultural lessee of a parcel of land located at Santiago, Sta.

Ana, Pampanga which is owned by Daniel Garcia. The latter sold the land to private
respondent Domingo Pasion and had declared for taxation purposes. Sometime after
the sale, respondent, on a claim that he will personally cultivate the land, filed with the
Court of Agrarian Relations a complaint to eject petitioner alleging therein that he had
notified petitioner of his intention to personally cultivate the landholding, but despite
the lapse of one (1) agricultural year from receipt of the notice thereof, petitioner
refused to vacate the land.

In his amended answer with counterclaim, petitioner denied having received any
notice from the private respondent and by way of special and affirmative defenses. The
trial court ruled against petitioner. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly gave retroactive application to

Section 7 of RA 6389.

HELD

No. Petition was dismissed for want of merit.

The Supreme Court ruled that Section 7 of R.A. No. 6389 cannot be given
retroactive effect because, while during the debates on the bill which was eventually
enacted into Republic Act No. 6389, there were statements made on the floor that “the
owner will lose the right to eject after the enactment of this measure” even in cases
where the owner has not really succeeded in ejecting the tenants. Congress failed to
express an intention to make Republic Act No. 6389 retroactive and to cover ejectment
cases on the ground of personal cultivation then pending adjudication by the courts.

Since under the original provision of Section 36(1) of R.A. No. 3844, the
dispossession of the agricultural lessee on the ground of personal cultivation by the
agricultural lessor-owner can only take place when “authorized by the Court in a
judgment that is final and executory,” it follows then that since the repeal of the
provision took effect before the judgment in this case became final and executory,
private respondent may no longer dispossess petitioner on that ground because it had
been removed from the statute books.
 RADIOWEALTH V. PALILEO (May 20, 1991)

FACTS

Spouses Castro sold a parcel of unregistered coconut land in Surigao del Norte to
Manuelito Palileo. The sale is evidenced by a notarized deed of sale and Palileo
exercised acts of ownership through his mother and also paid real estate taxes.

Meanwhile, a judgment over a civil case was rendered agains Enriqur Castro
ordering him to pay 22K to Radiowealth Finance Co.

Pursuant to this, the provincial sheriff levied upon and sold in public auction the
subject land that was previously sold to Palileo. A certificate of sale was issued in favor
of Radiowealth being the lone bidder and after the expiration of the period of
redemption, a deed of final sale was also executed in their favor and both deeds was
registered to the Registry of Deeds.

ISSUE

WON the sale in public auction is valid.

HELD

Had Art.1544 been applied, the judgment should be rendered in favor of

Radiowealth being the one who registered the land first. But since the subject land is an
unregistered land, a different rule should apply.

Under Act.3344 mere registration of a sale in one's favor does not give him any
right over the land if the vendor was not anymore the owner of the land having
previously sold the same to somebody else even if the earlier sale was unrecorded.

Article 1544 of the Civil Code has no application to land not registered under the
torrens system. It was explained that this is because the purchaser of unregistered land
at a sheriffs execution sale only steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor, and
merely acquires the latter's interest in the property sold as of the time the property was
levied upon. As such, the execution sale of the unregistered land in favor of petitioner is
of no effect because the land no longer belonged to the judgment debtor as of the time
of the said execution sale.
 Dagupan Trading Co. vs Macam (1965)

FACTS:

Sammy Maron and his seven brothers and sisters were pro-indiviso owners of a
parcel of unregistered land located in barrio Parayao, Binmaley, Pangasinan. In 1955,
while their application for registration of said land under Act No. 496 was pending, they
executed, on June 19 and on September 21, two deeds of sale conveying the property
to herein respondent Rustico Macam who thereafter took possession of the property
and made substantial improvements upon it. On October 14, 1955, OCT No. 6942
covering the land was issued in the name of the Marons, free from all liens and
encumbrances.

On August 4, 1956, however, by virtue of a final judgment of the Municipal Court

of Manila in a civil case in favor of Manila Trading and Supply Co. (Manila Trading)
against Sammy Maron, levy was made upon whatever interest he had in the subject
property. Thereafter, said interest was sold at public auction to the judgment creditor
Manila Trading. The corresponding notice of levy, certificate of sale and the sheriff's
certificate of final sale in favor of Manila Trading - because nobody exercised the right
of redemption - were duly registered, and on March 1, 1958, the latter sold all its rights
and title in the property to herein petitioner Dagupan Trading Company (Dagupan
Trading).

On September 4, 1958, Dagupan Trading filed an action against Macam, praying

that it be declared owner of one-eighth portion of the subject property. The CFI of
Pangasinan dismissed the said complaint, and the Court of Appeals affirmed its
decision.

ISSUE

Who has the superior right over the one-eight portion of the subject property?

HELD

The Supreme Court likewise affirmed both decisions of the lower courts. At the
time of the levy, Sammy Maron already had no interest on the one-eight portion of the
property he and his siblings have inherited because for a considerable time prior to the
levy, said interest had already been conveyed upon Macam "fully and irretrievably" - as
the Court of Appeals held. Consequently, the subsequent levy made on the property for
the purpose of satisfying the judgment rendered against Sammy Maron in favor of the
Manila Trading Company was void and of no effect.
 The unregistered sale and the consequent conveyance of title and ownership in
favor Macam could not have been cancelled and rendered of no effect upon the
subsequent issuance of the Torrens title over the entire parcel of land. Moreover, upon
the execution of the deed of sale in his favor by Sammy Maron, Macam had
immediately taken possession of the land conveyed as its new owner and introduced
considerable improvements upon it himself. To deprive him, therefore, of the same by
sheer force of technicality would be against both justice and equity.
 Carumba vs CA (1970)

FACTS

Amado Canuto and Nemesia Ibasco sold a parcel of land located in the barrio of
Santo Domingo, Iriga, Camarines Sur, to the spouses Amado Carumba and Benita
Canuto. The deed of sale was never registered. On January 21, 1957, a complaint for a
sum of money was filed by Santiago Balbuena against Amado Canuto and Nemesia
Ibasco. A decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. The ex-officio sheriff issued a
“Definite Deed of Sale” of the property in favor of Santiago which was subsequently
registered. The CFI, finding that after the execution of the document, Carumba had
taken possession of the land, planting bananas, coffee and other vegetables, declared
him to be the owner of the property under a consummate sale; held void the execution
levy made by the sheriff, pursuant to a judgment against Carumba’s vendor, Amado
Canuto; and nullified the sale in favor of the judgment creditor, Santiago Balbuena. The
Court, therefore, declared Carumba the owner of the litigated property. The Court of
Appeals declared that there having been a double sale of the land, Balbuena’s title was
superior to that of his adversary since the execution sale had been properly registered
in good faith and the sale to Carumba was not recorded.

ISSUE

Whether the rule on double sale would apply on the case at bar.

HELD

No. While under Article 1544, registration in good faith prevails over possession
in the event of a double sale by the vendor of the same piece of land to different
vendees, said article is of no application to the case at bar. The reason is that the
purchaser of unregistered land at a sheriff’s execution sale only steps into the shoes of
the judgment debtor. He merely acquires the latter’s interest in the property sold as of
the time the property was levied upon.
 SIY CONG BIEN VS HSBC (1932)

FACTS

Plaintiff is a corporation engaged in business generally, and that theDefendant

HSBC is a foreign bank authorized to engage in the bankingbusiness in the Philippines.

On June 25, 1926, Otto Ranft called the office of the plaintiff to purchase abaca
hemp, and he was offered the bales of hemp as described in the contested negotiable
quedans.The parties agreed to the aforesaid price, and on the same date the quedans,
together with the covering invoice, were sent to Ranft by the Plaintif, without having
been paid for the hemp, but the Plaintif’s understanding was that the payment would
be made against the same quedans, and it appear that in previous transaction of the
same kind between the bank and thePlaintif, quedans were paid one or two days after
their delivery to them.

Immediately these quedans were pledged by Otto Ranft to theDefendant HSBC

to secure the payment of his preexisting debts to the latter. The baled hemp covered by
these warehouse receipts was worth P31,635.00; 6 receipts were endorsed in blank by
the Plaintif and Otto Ranft, and 2 were endorsed in blank, by Otto Ranft alone.

On the evening of the said delivery date, Otto Ranft died suddenly at his house
in the City of Manila. When the Plaintif found out, it immediately demanded the return
of the quedans, or the payment of the value, but was told that the quedans had been
sent to the herein Defendant as soon as they were received by Ranft.

Shortly thereafter the Plaintiff filed a claim for the aforesaid sum of P31,645.00
in the intestate proceedings of the estate of the deceased Otto Ranft,which on an
appeal from the decision of the committee on claims, was allowed by the CFI of Manila.
In the meantime, demand had been made by the Plaintiff on the Defendant bank for
the return of the quedans, or their value, which demand was refused by the bank on
the ground that it was a holder of the quedans in due course.

ISSUE

Whether or not the quedans endorsed in blank gave the HSBC rightful and valid
title to the goods?

HELD

YES. SC ruled in favor of Defendant HSBC.

 It may be noted

first, that the quedans in question were negotiable in form;

second, that they were pledged by Otto Ranft to the Defendant bank to secure
the payment ofhis preexisting debts to said bank;

third, that such of the quedans as were issued in the name of the Plaintiff were
duly endorsed in blank by the Plaintiff and by Otto Ranft;

and fourth, that the two remaining quedans which were duly endorsed in blank
by him.

The bank had a perfect right to act as it did, and its action is in accordance with
sections 47, 38, and 40 of the Warehouse Receipts Act.
 Almendra vs IAC (1991)

FACTS

Aleja Ceno was first married to Juanso Yu Book with whom she had 3 children:
Magdaleno, Melecia, and Bernardina. During said marriage, Aleja acquired a parcel of
land which she declared in her name under Tax Declaration No. 11500. Book took his
family to China where he eventually died. Aleja and Bernardina returned to the
Philippines. After Book’s death, Bernardina filed against her mother a case for the
partition of the said property in the CFI of Leyte. The lower court rendered a decision
finding that the property had been subdivided into Lots Nos. 6354, 6353, 6352, and
6366.Lots 6354 and 6353 (without prejudice to whatever may be the rights of Melecia)
were declared owned by Bernardina while lots 6352 (subject to whatever may be the
rights of Magdaleno) and 6366 were declared owned by Aleja.

Meanwhile, Aleja married Santiago Almendra with whom she had 4 children:
Margarito, Angeles, Roman, and Delia. During said marriage, they acquired a 59,196
square-meter parcel of land in Cagbolo, Abuyog, Leyte. Also during such time, Aleja
inherited from her father, Juan Ceno, a 16,000 square-meter parcel of land while
Santiago inherited from his mother, Nicolasa Alvero, a 164 square-meter parcel of
residential land in Nalibunan, Abuyog, Leyte.

While Santiago was alive, he apportioned all of his properties among Aleja’s
children in the Philippines, including Bernardina. Upon his death, Aleja sold to Angeles
and Roman certain parcels of land. When Aleja died, Margarito, Delia, and Bernardina
filed for the annulment of the deeds of sale in their favor, partition of the properties
and accounting their produce. They contend that the deeds of sale were obtained
through fraud, undue influence, and misrepresentation and that there was a deficit in
the consent of Aleja in the execution of the documents because she was then residing
with Angeles. Furthermore, the uniform price of P2,000.00 in all the sales was grossly
inadequate. Also, it was averred that the IAC erred in having sanctioned the sale of
particular portions of yet undivided real properties. It was the IAC’s view that no
conclusive proof was presented to override the duly notarized deed of sale.

ISSUE

Did the IAC err in having sanctioned the sale of particular portions of yet
undivided real properties?
HELD

The unquestionability of the due execution of the deeds of sale notwithstanding,

the Court may not put an imprimatur on the intrinsic validity of all the sales. The sale to
Angeles of 1/2 portion of the conjugal property (acquired by Aleja and Santiago) may
only be considered valid as a sale of Aleja’s 1/2 interest therein. Aleja could not have
sold particular hilly portion specified in the deed of sale in absence of proof that the
conjugal partnership property had been partitioned after the death of Santiago. Before
such partition, Aleja could not claim title to any definite portion of the property for all
she had was an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire property.
However, the sale of the 1/2 portion of the 16,000 square-meter parcel of land is also
valid because said property is paraphernal being Aleja’s inheritance from her own
father. As regards the sale of the property (covered by Tax Declaration No. 11500) to
Roman Almendra, the Court held that since the property had been found to have been
subdivided, Aleja could not have intended the sale of the whole property covered by the
tax declaration. She could exercise her right of ownership only over Lot No. 6366 which
was unconditionally adjudicated to her in said case. Lot No. 6352 was given to Aleja
“subject to whatever may be the rights thereto of her son Magdaleno Ceno.” A reading
of the deed of sale covering parcel of land would show that the sale is subject to the
condition stated above: hence, the rights of Magdaleno Cena are amply protected. The
rule on caveat emptor applies.
 Paulmitan vs CA (1992)

FACTS

Agatona Sagario Paulmitan, who died sometime in 1953, left Lot No. 1091 with
an area of 69,080 square meters. She begot two legitimate children, namely: Pascual
Paulmitan, who also died in 1953, and Donato Paulmitan, who is one of the petitioners.
Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa is Donato's daughter while the third petitioner, Rodolfo
Donato executed on May 28, 1974 a Deed of Sale over the same in favor of petitioner
Juliana P. Fanesa, his daughter. Sometime in 1952, for non-payment of taxes, Lot No.
1091 was forfeited and sold at a public auction, with the Provincial Government of
Negros Occidental being the buyer. On May 29, 1974, Juliana P. Fanesa redeemed the
property from the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental for the amount of
P2,959.09.

On learning of these transactions, respondents children of the late Pascual

Paulmitan filed on January 18, 1975 with the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental a Complaint against petitioners to partition the properties plus damages.
Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa claimed that she acquired exclusive ownership thereof not
only by means of a deed of sale executed in her favor by her father, petitioner Donato
Paulmitan, but also by way of redemption from the Provincial Government of Negros
Occidental.

ISSUE

Whether or not Juliana acquired full ownership over the subject lot

May a co-owner acquire exclusive ownership over the property held in common?

HELD

When Pascual Paulmitan died intestate in 1953, his children, the respondents,
succeeded him in the co-ownership of the disputed property. Pascual Paulmitan's right
of ownership over an undivided portion of the property passed on to his children, who,
from the time of Pascual's death, became co-owners with their uncle Donato over the
disputed decedent estate. When Donato Paulmitan sold on May 28, 1974 Lot No. 1091
to his daughter Juliana P. Fanesa, he was only a co-owner with respondents and as
such, he could only sell that portion which may be allotted to him upon termination of
the co-ownership. The sale did not prejudice the rights of respondents to one half
(1/2) undivided share of the land which they inherited from their father. It did not vest
ownership in the entire land with the buyer but transferred only the seller's pro-indiviso
share in the property and consequently made the buyer a co-owner of the land until it
is partitioned.

The sale by petitioner Donato Paulmitan of the land to his daughter, petitioner
Juliana P. Fanesa, did not give to the latter ownership over the entire land but merely
transferred to her the one half (1/2) undivided share of her father, thus making her the
co-owner of the land in question with the respondents, her first cousins. The
redemption of the land made by Fanesa did not terminate the co-ownership nor give
her title to the entire land subject of the co-ownership.

The right of repurchase may be exercised by co-owner with respect to his share
alone. While the records show that petitioner redeemed the property in its entirety,
shouldering the expenses therefor, that did not make him the owner of all of it. In other
words, it did not put to end the existing state of co-ownership. There is no doubt that
redemption of property entails a necessary expense. The result is that the property
remains to be in a condition of co-ownership. While a vendee a retro, under Article
1613 of the Code, "may not be compelled to consent to a partial redemption," the
redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its totality does not vest in
him ownership over it. Failure on the part of all the co-owners to redeem it entitles the
vendee a retro to retain the property and consolidate title thereto in his name. But the
provision does not give to the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire property. It
does not provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership.

Although petitioner Fanesa did not acquire ownership over the entire lot by
virtue of the redemption she made, nevertheless, she did acquire the right to
reimbursed for half of the redemption price she paid to the Provincial Government of
Negros Occidental on behalf of her co-owners. Until reimbursed, Fanesa hold a lien
upon the subject property for the amount due her.