A.M. No.
2144 April 10, 1989 that said defendants be ordered to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of said plaintiffs after
CELEDONIO QUILBAN, ROMUALDO DALAGAN, FORTUNATO RAMIREZ AMADOR ALARCON and LUIS
AGAWAN, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SANTIAGO R. ROBINOL, respondent.
A.M. No. 2180 April 10, 1989
ATTY. SANTIAGO R. ROBINOL, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. A. R. MONTEMAYOR, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Subjected to frustrations were the dreams of thirty-two (32) squatter families to own the land of
approximately 50 square meters each on which their respective homes were built. To vindicate their rights
they have aired their plight before this Court. Thwarted, too, was the benevolence shown by the original
owner of the land which parted with its property at a giveaway price thinking that it was accommodating the
landless squatters.
The antecedent facts follow:
The Colegio de San Jose, a Jesuit corporation, (Colegio, for short) used to own a parcel of land at the
Seminary Road, Barrio Bathala, Quezon City. Through its administrator, Father Federico Escaler, it sold said
land to the Quezon City Government as the site for the Quezon City General Hospital but reserved an area of
2,743 square meters as a possible development site. Squatters, however, settled in the area since 1965 or
1966.
Sometime in 1970, the Colegio, through Father Escaler gave permission to Congressman Luis R. Taruc to
build on the reserved site a house for his residence and a training center for the Christian Social Movement.
Seeing the crowded shanties of squatters, Congressman Taruc broached to Father Escaler the Idea of
donating or selling the land cheap to the squatters. Congressman Taruc then advised the squatters to form
an organization and choose a leader authorized to negotiate with Father Escaler. Following that advice, the
squatters formed the "Samahang Pagkakaisa ng Barrio Bathala" (Samahan, for brevity), with Bernabe Martin
as President (Exhibit "24", Robinol), who was entrusted with the task of negotiating on their behalf for the
sale of the land to them.
But instead of working for the welfare of the Samahan, Martin went to one Maximo Rivera, a realtor, with
whom he connived to obtain the sale to the exclusion of the other Samahan members. On 28 March 1971,
the land was ultimately sold to Rivera at P 15 per square meter or a total consideration of P 41,961.65. The
prevailing price of the land in the vicinity then was P 100 to P 120 per square meter. It was evident that
Father Escaler had been made to believe that Rivera represented the squatters on the property. On the same
date, 28 March 1971, Rivera obtained TCT No. 175662 to the property in his name alone.
In 1972, thirty-two heads of families of the Samahan filed Civil Case No. Q-16433, Branch IV, Quezon City,
entitled "Celedonio Quilban, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. Maximo Rivera, et al., Defendants." with the principal prayer
reimbursement by the latter of the corresponding amount paid by Rivera to the Colegio. The Court of First
Instance of Quezon City, however, dismissed the case.
To prosecute the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Samahan members hired as their counsel Atty.
Santiago R. Robinol for which the latter was paid P 2,000.00 as attorney's fees on 8 October 1975 (Exhibit
"I"). Atty. Robinol was also to be given by the members a part of the land, subject matter of the case, equal
to the portion that would pertain to each of them. What was initially a verbal commitment on the land
sharing was confirmed in writing on 10 March 1979 (Exhibit "2").
On 14 November 1978, the Court of Appeals reversed the CFI Decision by:
(1) ordering defendant Maximo Rivera and all his co-defendants
to execute a deed of conveyance of the land in question in favor
of herein plaintiffs after the payment of the corresponding
amount paid by the defendants to the Colegio de San Jose, Inc.,
and in case of refusal or failure on their part to do so, ordering
the Clerk of Court to execute the same in favor of plaintiffs and
declaring TCT No. 175662 (Annex E) null and void and ordering
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel said certificate
and issue a new one in lieu thereof in the name of plaintiffs-
appellants, upon presentation of the deed of conveyance to be
executed in favor of appellants and (2) ordering appellees jointly
and severally to pay appellants the sum of P 2,000.00 as
attomey's fees, plus costs." (p. 30, Report and Recommendation)
To raise the amount of P 41,961.65 ordered paid by the Court of Appeals, plus expenses for ejectment of the
non-plaintiffs occupying the property, conveyance, documentation, transfer of title etc., the five officers of
the Samahan collected, little by little, P 2,500.00 from each head of family. The Treasurer, Luis Agawan,
issued the proper receipts prepared by Atty. Robinol. On 18 May 1979, the sum of P 68,970.00 was turned
over to Atty. Robinol by the officers; on 31 May 1979 the amounts of P l,030.00 and P 2,500.00 respectively;
and on 2 June 1979, the sum of P 2,500.00, or a total of P 75,000.00.
After almost a year, the five officers discovered that no payment had been made to Rivera. When queried,
Atty. Robinol replied that there was an intervention filed in the civil case and that a Writ of Execution had not
yet been issued by the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. However, it turned out that the motion for
intervention had already been dismissed. After confronting Atty. Robinol with that fact, the latter gave other
excuses, which the officers discovered to have no basis at all.
On 6 March 1980, 21 out of 32 plaintiffs arrived at a "first consensus" to change their counsel, Atty. Robinol
(Exhibit "3"). The officers of the Samahan thereafter approached Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor, who agreed
to be their counsel, after he was shown the document of 6 March 1980 containing the consensus of the
Samahan members to change Atty. Robinol as their lawyer. Upon Atty. Montemayor's advice, the officers
sent Atty. Robinol a letter dated 17 March 1980 informing the latter of their decision to terminate his
services and demanding the return of the P 75,000.00 deposited with him (Exhibit "5"). Atty. Robinol turned
deaf ears to the demand. A subsequent letter of the same tenor, dated 31 March 1980 (Exhibit "6"), was
similarly disregarded by Atty. Robinol.
On 20 March 1980, Atty. Montemayor formally entered his appearance in Civil Case No. Q-16433 as counsel
for the plaintiffs (Exhibit "8"), vice Atty. Robinol, on the strength of the authority dated 18 March 1980 given
him by plaintiffs in said civil case through the five officers (Exhibit "9"). Atty. Montemayor then filed on 20
March 1980 a Motion for Execution praying that the defendants and/or the Clerk of Court be directed to
execute a deed of conveyance in favor of the plaintiffs (Exhibit "10"). At the hearing of the Motion for
Execution on 5 June 1980, Atty. Robinol manifested that he had no objection to the appearance of and his
substitution by Atty. Montemayor (Exhibits "11" & "11-A").
Because Atty. Robinol, however, still questioned the first consensus dated 6 March 1980, another document
labelled the "second consensus" (Exhibit "E") was signed by 21 plaintiffs during a meeting held for the
purpose on 24 November 1980 to the effect that they had decided to change Atty. Robinol as their counsel
because he had delayed paying for their land notwithstanding the Decision of the Court of Appeals in their
favor.
Administrative Case No. 2144
On 15 April 1980 the Samahan officers filed this Administrative Complaint before this Court requesting the
invention of Atty. Robinol for refusal to return the P 75,000.00 and praying that the Court exercise its power
of discipline over members of the Bar unworthy to practice law. The details of their Complaint were
embodied in their Joint Affidavit executed on 14 April 1980 describing what had transpired between them
and Atty. Robinol.
In his defense, Atty. Robinol maintains that he was hired by Complainants to appeal their case to the Court of
appeals after they had lost in the lower Court; that their agreement as to attomey's fees was on a contingent
basis if he obtains a reversal of the lower Court Decision, they wig give him a portion of the property subject
matter of the litigation equal to the portion that will pertain to each of the 32 plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-
16433; that he did not receive P 70,000.00 from Complainants on 18 May 1979 but only P 56,470.00; that he
prepared and signed the receipt dated 18 May 1979 showing that he received P 70,000.00 only to save
complainants from embarrassment and shame should their co-plaintiff ask for proof that they
(Complainants) have paid their shares, which they have not; that the correct amount in his possession is only
P 62,470.00-it would really be P 75,000.00 had the five Complainants paid their shares in the amount of P
12,500.00 at P 2,500.00 each and one Fortunate Ramirez paid his balance of P 30.00; that he had the right to
hold the money in his possession as guarantee for the payment of his attomey's fees of get a portion of the
property that win pertain to each of the plaintiffs, he wants his portion converted to cash, and the cash
equivalent of his portion is P 50,000.00 (2,743 square meters divided by 32 plaintiffs equals 85 square
meters for each plaintiff, multiplied by P 500.00 up per square meter); that considering that P 50,000.00 is
even less than one-half (1/ 2) per cent of the total value of the property, which is more than a million pesos,
such amount is not unreasonable; that he is ready to give back the amount of P 12,470.00, representing the
difference between P 50,000.00 and the amount of P 62,470.00 in his possession; that complainants cannot
make this Court a collection agency and that while this Court has the exclusive disciplinary power over
members of the Bar, it is equally true that the Court cannot pass judgment on Complainants' plea that the
amount deposited by respondent be returned to them as this prayer should be ventilated in an ordinary
action; that he does not have the slightest intention to appropriate the money in his possession (P
62,470.00) for himself, but he is holding it until his attomey's fees are satisfied there being no guarantee for
its satisfaction because of Complainants' adamant refusal to pay him; that there was no previous notice to
him of his discharge; and that Atty. Montemayor accepted the case without his Robinols formal withdrawal
and conformity.
Administrative Case No. 2180
Pursuing that tack on 29 July 1980, Atty. Robinol filed a complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Anacleto R.
Montemayor for alleged gross unethical conduct unbecoming of a lawyer in that Atty. Montemayor readily
accepted the case without his Robinols formal withdrawal and conformity and knowing fully well that there
was no consensus of all the plaintiffs to discharge him as their counsel.
For his part, Atty. Montemayor denied that the attomey's fees agreed upon by plaintiffs and Atty. Robinol
were purely on a contingent basis, the truth being that the attomey's fees were payable on a cash basis of P
2,000.00 retainer fee, as evidenced by the receipt signed by Atty. Robinol (Annex "I"), plus whatever amount
is adjudicated as attomey's fees by the Court of Appeals; that the contingent fee referred to by Atty. Robinol
was the result of his insistent demand after the Court of Appeals Decision in Civil Case No. Q-16433 was
already final, as shown by the date of the agreement (Annex "2"); that twenty [20] out of thirty-two [32]
members of the Samahan signed the agreement to discharge Atty. Robinol and hire a substitute counsel as
shown by Annex "3", which is a majority of the membership and, therefore, a valid consensus; that he
agreed to act as counsel if only to arrest the growing belief of the Samahan that most members of the
Philippine Bar are unprincipled; that although there was no formal Motion for substitution, there was
substantial compliance with Sec. 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as shown by the formal entry of
appearance in Civil Case No. Q-1 6433 (Annex "8"), the written consent of the clients (Annex "9"), notice to
Atty. Robinol of his discharge and substitution (Annexes "10' and "11"), non-objection by Robinol of his
appearance as counsel (Annex "l 2"), and implied consent of the Court to the substitution as shown by its
Order of 29 May 1980 (Annex "l 3"); that his professional and personal actuations as counsel for the plaintiffs
in Civil Case No. Q-16433, CFI-Quezon City, do not cause dishonor either to himself or to the Philippine Bar;
and that the Complaint against him should be dismissed.
On 1 September 1980 and on 17 December 1980, the Court referred Adm. Case No. 2144 and Adm. Case No.
2180, respectively, to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. On 15
December 1988, the Solicitor General submitted his compliance and recommended:
1. That Atty. Santiago R. Robinol be suspended for three months
for refusing to deliver the funds of the plaintiffs in his possession,
with the warning that a more severe penalty will be imposed for
a repetition of the same or similar act, and that he be ordered to
return to the plaintiffs, through the complainants in Adm. Case
No. 2134, the sum of P 75,000.00.
2. That the case against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor, Adm.
Case No. 2180, be dismissed, since he has not committed any
misconduct imputed to him by Atty. Robinol. (pp. 59-60, Rollo)
Except for the disciplinary sanction suggested for Atty. Robinol, we concur with the recommendations.
Re: Atty. Santiago R. Robinol
Atty. Robinol has, in fact, been guilty of ethical infractions and grave misconduct that make him unworthy to
continue in the practice of the profession. After the Court of Appeals had rendered a Decision favorable to
his clients and he had received the latter's funds, suddenly, he had a change of mind and decided to convert
the payment of his fees from a portion of land equivalent to that of each of the plaintiffs to P 50,000.00,
which he alleges to be the monetary value of that area. Certainly, Atty. Robinol had no right to unilaterally
appropriate his clients' money not only because he is bound by a written agreement but also because, under
the circumstances, it was highly unjust for him to have done so. His clients were mere squatters who could
barely eke out an existence They had painstakingly raised their respective quotas of P 2,500.00 per family
with which to pay for the land only to be deprived of the same by one who, after having seen the color of
money, heart lessly took advantage of them.
Atty. Robinol has no basis to claim that since he was unjustly dismissed by his clients he had the legal right to case, the plaintiffs in the civil suit below decided to change their lawyer, Atty. Robinol, for loss of trust and
retain the money in his possession. Firstly, there was justifiable ground for his discharge as counsel. His confidence. That act was well within their prerogative.
clients had lost confidence in him for he had obviously engaged in dilatory tactics to the detriment of their
In so far as the complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Robinol against Atty. Montemayor is concerned,
interests, which he was duty-bound to protect. Secondly, even if there were no valid ground, he is bereft of
therefore, we find the same absolutely without merit.
any legal right to retain his clients' funds intended for a specific purpose the purchase of land. He stands
obliged to return the money immediately to their rightful owners. ACCORDINGLY, 1) In Administrative Case No. 2144, Atty. Santiago R. Robinol is hereby DISBARRED for having
violated his lawyer's oath to delay no man for money, broken the fiduciary relation between lawyer and
The principle of quantum meruit applies if a lawyer is employed without a price agreed upon for his services
client, and proven himself unworthy to continue in the practice of law. By reason of his unethical actuations,
in which case he would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services, as much as he has earned. In
he is hereby declared to have forfeited his rights to attomey's fees and is ordered to return the amount of P
this case, however, there was an express contract and a stipulated mode of compensation. The implied
75,000.00 to the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-16433 through the complainant in the aforementioned
assumpsit on quantum meruit therefore, is inapplicable.
Administrative Case.
But Atty. Robinol seeks to impress upon the Court that he had received only the sum of P 62,470.00 and not
2) Administrative Case No. 2180 against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor for disbarment is hereby DISMISSED
P 75,000.00 claiming that five (5) officers of the Samahan had not yet paid their shares to P 12,500.00.
for lack of merit.
We agree with the Solicitor General that complainants' evidence on this score is the more credible and that
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the respective personal records of Attys. Santiago R. Robinol and
he had, in fact, received the total sum of P 75,000.00 inclusive of the share of P 12,500.00 of the five (5)
Anacleto R. Montemayor.
officers of the Somalian For, in the pleadings filed by Atty. Robinol himself in the civil case below, namely, the
Motion for Execution on 5 June 1979; the Motion for Postponement on 31 August 1979; and the Motion to This Resolution is immediately executory.
Set Hearing of Motion for Execution on 10 March 1980, he made mention of seven (7) persons, who, as of
that time, had not yet submitted their corresponding shares which list, however, did not include any of the SO ORDERED.
five (5) officers of the Samahan.

Inevitable, therefore, is the conclusion that Atty. Robinol has rendered himself unfit to continue in the
practice of law. He has not only violated his oath not to delay any man for money and to conduct himself
with all good fidelity to his clients. He has also brought the profession into disrepute with people who had
reposed in it full faith and reliance for the fulfillment of a life-time ambition to acquire a homelot they could
call their own.

Re: Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor

In so far as Atty. Montemayor is concerned, we agree with the findings of the Solicitor General that he has
not exposed himself to any plausible charge of unethical conduct in the exercise of his profession when he
agreed to serve as counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-16433.

Of the thirty-two (32) plaintiffs in said civil case, twenty-one (21) had signed the first consensus of 6 March
1980 expressing their resolve to change their lawyer. In as much as Atty. Robinol sought to exclude seven (7)
of the plaintiffs (out of 32) for non-payment of their shares, only twenty five (25) of them should be
considered in determining the majority. Consequently, twenty-one (21) out of twenty-five (25) is sufficient to
make the said consensus binding. It is more than a simple majority.

Moreover, the following developments estop Atty. Robinol from questioning his discharge as counsel: On 17
March 1980 he was informed in writing by plaintiffs of the termination of his services (Exhibit "5"). That was
followed by another letter of 31 March 1980 of the same tenor (Exhibit "6"). In his Memorandum of 12
December 1985 and during the proceedings before the lower Court on 5 June 1980 he had stated that he
had no objection to Atty. Montemayor's appearance in Civil Case Q-16433. When the latter did enter his
appearance, therefore, on 20 March 1980 it was only after assuring himself that Atty. Robinol's services had
been formally terminated. He had in no way encroached upon the professional employment of a colleague.

There is no gainsaying that clients are free to change their counsel in a pending case at any time (Section 26,
Rule 138, Rules of Court) and thereafter employ another lawyer who may then enter his appearance. In this

A.C. No. 3294 February 17, 1993
MARIO S. MARIVELES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ODILON C. MALLARI, respondent.
Rodolfo B. Ta-asan for complainant.
PER CURIAM:
On January 11, 1989, Mario S. Mariveles of Davao City filed an administrative complaint against his former
counsel, Attorney Odilon C. Mallari, whose legal services he had engaged in 1984 to handle his defense in
Criminal Case No. 6608 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City where he was charged with violation of B.P.
Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
After an adverse decision was rendered on December 26, 1986, Mariveles instructed Attorney Mallari to
appeal the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals, which the respondent did.
However, in the Court of Appeals, despite numerous extensions of time, totalling 245 days, which he
obtained from the Court, Attorney Mallari failed to file the appellant's brief, resulting in the dismissal of the
appeal.
Complainant discovered his lawyer's desertion only when he was subpoenaed by the trial court to appear
before it for the execution of the decision which had become final.
Through new counsel, complainant filed a Petition for Reinstatement of Appeal, Cancellation of Entry of
Judgment and Admission of Appellant's Brief in CA-G.R. CR No. 04482, but it was denied by the appellate
court.
He sought relief in this court (G.R. No. 85964, "Mario S. Mariveles vs. Court of Appeal, et al.") which, on
March 13, 1989, granted his petition, ordered the Court of Appeals to cancel the entry of judgment in CA-
G.R. CR No. 04482, reinstate the appeal, and admit the appellant's brief filed by his new counsel. The Court
said:
It is true that the failure of counsel to file brief for the appellant
which led to the dismissal of the appeal does not necessarily
warrant the reinstatement thereof. However, where the
negligence of counsel is so great that the rights of accused are
prejudiced and he is prevented from presenting his defense,
especially where the appellant raises issues which place in
serious doubt the correctness of the trial court's judgment of
conviction, the aforesaid rule must not be rigidly applied to avoid
a miscarriage of justice. These teachings of jurisprudence are
present in the case at bar.
On the first aspect, the failure of petitioner's former counsel to
file the brief, for reasons unknown and without any cause
imputable to petitioner, amounted to deliberate abandonment
of his client's interest and justifies reinstatement with
consequent due consideration of petitioner's appeal through a
new counsel. (pp. 106-107, Rollo).
On February 15, 1989, the administrative complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP's Committee on Bar Discipline investigated the complaint and held hearings. On March 3, 1992, it
submitted to this Court a report/resolution finding:
In sum, what was committed by the respondent is a blatant violation of our Code of
Professional Responsibility.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 12.03 — A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of
time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse
without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his
failure to do so.
Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted
to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable.
Suffice it to state that a lawyer has no business practicing his profession if in the course
of that practice, he will eventually wreck and destroy the future and reputation of his
client and thus disgrace the law profession. The last thing that his peers in the law
profession and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines would do is to disrobe a member
of the profession, for he has worked for the attainment of his career burning the
midnight oil throughout school and passing the bar. The undersigned, however, could
not find any mitigating circumstances to recommend a lighter penalty. Disbarment is
the only recourse to remove a rotten apple if only to instill and maintain the respect
and confidence of all and sundry to the noble profession. (pp. 249-250, Rollo)
The Court concurs with the above observations. The respondent demonstrated not only appalling
indifference and lack of responsibility to the courts and his client but also a shameless disregard for his
duties as a lawyer. He is unfit for membership in this noble profession.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Attorney Odilon C. Mallari guilty of abandonment and dereliction
of duty toward his client and hereby orders him DISBARRED from the legal profession and to immediately
cease and desist from the practice of law. Let the Office of the Court Administrator and the Executive Judges
of the Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth Judicial Regions, be furnished with copies of this resolution for
dissemination to all the courts in those regions.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5108 May 26, 2005
ROSA F. MERCADO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Rosa F. Mercado filed the instant administrative complaint against Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, seeking his
disbarment from the practice of law. The complainant alleged that respondent maliciously instituted a
criminal case for falsification of public document against her, a former client, based on confidential
information gained from their attorney-client relationship.
Let us first hearken to the facts.
Complainant is a Senior Education Program Specialist of the Standards Development Division, Office of
Programs and Standards while respondent is a Deputy Executive Director IV of the Commission on Higher
Education (CHED).1
Complainant's husband filed Civil Case No. 40537 entitled "Ruben G. Mercado v. Rosa C. Francisco," for
annulment of their marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. This annulment case had been
dismissed by the trial court, and the dismissal became final and executory on July 15, 1992.2
In August 1992, Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, counsel of complainant, died. On February 7, 1994, respondent
entered his appearance before the trial court as collaborating counsel for complainant. 3
On March 16, 1994, respondent filed his Notice of Substitution of Counsel, 4 informing the RTC of Pasig City
that he has been appointed as counsel for the complainant, in substitution of Atty. de Leon.
It also appears that on April 13, 1999, respondent filed a criminal action against complainant before the
Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City, entitled "Atty. Julito Vitriolo, et al. v. Rose Dela Cruz F. Mercado," and
docketed as I.S. No. PSG 99-9823, for violation of Articles 171 and 172 (falsification of public document) of
the Revised Penal Code.5 Respondent alleged that complainant made false entries in the Certificates of Live
Birth of her children, Angelica and Katelyn Anne. More specifically, complainant allegedly indicated in said
Certificates of Live Birth that she is married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez, and that their marriage was
solemnized on April 11, 1979, when in truth, she is legally married to Ruben G. Mercado and their marriage
took place on April 11, 1978.
Complainant denied the accusations of respondent against her. She denied using any other name than "Rosa
F. Mercado." She also insisted that she has gotten married only once, on April 11, 1978, to Ruben G.
Mercado.
In addition, complainant Mercado cited other charges against respondent that are pending before or
decided upon by other tribunals – (1) libel suit before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City; 6 (2)
administrative case for dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
pursuit of private business, vocation or profession without the permission required by Civil Service rules and
regulations, and violations of the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," before the then Presidential
Commission Against Graft and Corruption;7 (3) complaint for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service before the Office of the Ombudsman, where he was found
guilty of misconduct and meted out the penalty of one month suspension without pay; 8 and, (4) the
Information for violation of Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, as amended, otherwise known as the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees before the Sandiganbayan.9
Complainant Mercado alleged that said criminal complaint for falsification of public document (I.S. No. PSG
99-9823) disclosed confidential facts and information relating to the civil case for annulment, then handled
by respondent Vitriolo as her counsel. This prompted complainant Mercado to bring this action against
respondent. She claims that, in filing the criminal case for falsification, respondent is guilty of breaching their
privileged and confidential lawyer-client relationship, and should be disbarred.
Respondent filed his Comment/Motion to Dismiss on November 3, 1999 where he alleged that the
complaint for disbarment was all hearsay, misleading and irrelevant because all the allegations leveled
against him are subject of separate fact-finding bodies. Respondent claimed that the pending cases against
him are not grounds for disbarment, and that he is presumed to be innocent until proven otherwise. 10 He
also states that the decision of the Ombudsman finding him guilty of misconduct and imposing upon him the
penalty of suspension for one month without pay is on appeal with the Court of Appeals. He adds that he
was found guilty, only of simple misconduct, which he committed in good faith.11
In addition, respondent maintains that his filing of the criminal complaint for falsification of public
documents against complainant does not violate the rule on privileged communication between attorney
and client because the bases of the falsification case are two certificates of live birth which are public
documents and in no way connected with the confidence taken during the engagement of respondent as
counsel. According to respondent, the complainant confided to him as then counsel only matters of facts
relating to the annulment case. Nothing was said about the alleged falsification of the entries in the birth
certificates of her two daughters. The birth certificates are filed in the Records Division of CHED and are
accessible to anyone.12
In a Resolution dated February 9, 2000, this Court referred the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.13
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set two dates for hearing but complainant failed to appear in both.
Investigating Commissioner Rosalina R. Datiles thus granted respondent's motion to file his memorandum,
and the case was submitted for resolution based on the pleadings submitted by the parties. 14
On June 21, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors approved the report of investigating commissioner Datiles,
finding the respondent guilty of violating the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client,
and recommending his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
On August 6, 2003, complainant, upon receiving a copy of the IBP report and recommendation, wrote Chief
Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., a letter of desistance. She stated that after the passage of so many years, she has
now found forgiveness for those who have wronged her.
At the outset, we stress that we shall not inquire into the merits of the various criminal and administrative
cases filed against respondent. It is the duty of the tribunals where these cases are pending to determine the
guilt or innocence of the respondent.
We also emphasize that the Court is not bound by any withdrawal of the complaint or desistance by the
complainant. The letter of complainant to the Chief Justice imparting forgiveness upon respondent is
inconsequential in disbarment proceedings.
We now resolve whether respondent violated the rule on privileged communication between attorney and
client when he filed a criminal case for falsification of public document against his former client.
A brief discussion of the nature of the relationship between attorney and client and the rule on attorney-
client privilege that is designed to protect such relation is in order.
In engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes on him special powers of trust and confidence.
Their relationship is strictly personal and highly confidential and fiduciary. The relation is of such delicate,
exacting and confidential nature that is required by necessity and public interest. 15 Only by such
confidentiality and protection will a person be encouraged to repose his confidence in an attorney. The
hypothesis is that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the
administration of justice.16 Thus, the preservation and protection of that relation will encourage a client to
entrust his legal problems to an attorney, which is of paramount importance to the administration of
justice.17 One rule adopted to serve this purpose is the attorney-client privilege: an attorney is to keep
inviolate his client's secrets or confidence and not to abuse them. 18 Thus, the duty of a lawyer to preserve
his client's secrets and confidence outlasts the termination of the attorney-client relationship, 19 and
continues even after the client's death. 20 It is the glory of the legal profession that its fidelity to its client
can be depended on, and that a man may safely go to a lawyer and converse with him upon his rights or
supposed rights in any litigation with absolute assurance that the lawyer's tongue is tied from ever disclosing
it.21 With full disclosure of the facts of the case by the client to his attorney, adequate legal representation
will result in the ascertainment and enforcement of rights or the prosecution or defense of the client's
cause.
Now, we go to the rule on attorney-client privilege. Dean Wigmore cites the factors essential to establish the
existence of the privilege, viz:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as
such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client,
(6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal
advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.22
In fine, the factors are as follows:
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by
reason of this relationship that the client made the communication.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on privileged communication
even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter declines the
employment.23 The reason for this is to make the prospective client free to discuss whatever he wishes
with the lawyer without fear that what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or used against him, and for the
lawyer to be equally free to obtain information from the prospective client. 24
On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective) client to a lawyer for some purpose other than on
account of the (prospective) attorney-client relation is not privileged. Instructive is the case of Pfleider v.
Palanca,25 where the client and his wife leased to their attorney a 1,328-hectare agricultural land for a
period of ten years. In their contract, the parties agreed, among others, that a specified portion of the lease
rentals would be paid to the client-lessors, and the remainder would be delivered by counsel-lessee to
client's listed creditors. The client alleged that the list of creditors which he had "confidentially" supplied
counsel for the purpose of carrying out the terms of payment contained in the lease contract was disclosed
by counsel, in violation of their lawyer-client relation, to parties whose interests are adverse to those of the
client. As the client himself, however, states, in the execution of the terms of the aforesaid lease contract
between the parties, he furnished counsel with the "confidential" list of his creditors. We ruled that this
indicates that client delivered the list of his creditors to counsel not because of the professional relation then
existing between them, but on account of the lease agreement. We then held that a violation of the
confidence that accompanied the delivery of that list would partake more of a private and civil wrong than
of a breach of the fidelity owing from a lawyer to his client.
(2) The client made the communication in confidence.
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. 26 The client must
intend the communication to be confidential.27
A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between
attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information
to no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the
accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given.28
Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a compromise agreement prepared by a
lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered to the opposing party, 29 an offer and counter-
offer for settlement,30 or a document given by a client to his counsel not in his professional
capacity,31 are not privileged communications, the element of confidentiality not being present.32
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.33
The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere information, but for the
purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations. The communication must
have been transmitted by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice.34
If the client seeks an accounting service, 35 or business or personal assistance,36 and not legal advice, the RESOLUTION
privilege does not attach to a communication disclosed for such purpose.

Applying all these rules to the case at bar, we hold that the evidence on record fails to substantiate SERENO, J.:
complainant's allegations. We note that complainant did not even specify the alleged communication in
confidence disclosed by respondent. All her claims were couched in general terms and lacked specificity. She
contends that respondent violated the rule on privileged communication when he instituted a criminal
action against her for falsification of public documents because the criminal complaint disclosed facts
relating to the civil case for annulment then handled by respondent. She did not, however, spell out these This is a disbarment case filed by Emilia Hernandez (complainant) against her lawyer, Atty. Venancio B.
facts which will determine the merit of her complaint. The Court cannot be involved in a guessing game as to
Padilla (respondent) of Padilla Padilla Bautista Law Offices, for his alleged negligence in the handling of her
the existence of facts which the complainant must prove.

Indeed, complainant failed to attend the hearings at the IBP. Without any testimony from the complainant as case.
to the specific confidential information allegedly divulged by respondent without her consent, it is difficult, if
not impossible to determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged communication. Such
confidential information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged communication
The records disclose that complainant and her husband were the respondents in an ejectment case filed
between attorney and client. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege. 37 The burden
against them with the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC).
of proving that the privilege applies is placed upon the party asserting the privilege. 38

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the complaint against respondent Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
In a Decision[1] dated 28 June 2002, penned by Judge Rosmari D. Carandang (Judge Carandang), the RTC
SO ORDERED.
ordered that the Deed of Sale executed in favor of complainant be cancelled; and that the latter pay the

complainant therein, Elisa Duigan (Duigan), attorneys fees and moral damages.

Complainant and her husband filed their Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals

(CA) ordered them to file their Appellants Brief. They chose respondent to represent them in the case. On

their behalf, he filed a Memorandum on Appeal instead of an Appellants Brief. Thus, Duigan filed a Motion to
EMILIA R. HERNANDEZ, A.C. No. 9387
Complainant, (Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1562) Dismiss the Appeal. The CA granted the Motion in a Resolution[2] dated 16 December 2003.
Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

BRION, No Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the Resolution dismissing the appeal was filed by the couple.
- versus - PEREZ,
SERENO, and
Complainant claims that because respondent ignored the Resolution, he acted with deceit, unfaithfulness
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated: amounting to malpractice of law.[3] Complainant and her husband failed to file an appeal, because
ATTY. VENANCIO B. PADILLA,
Respondent. June 20, 2012 respondent never informed them of the adverse decision. Complainant further claims that she asked

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x respondent several times about the status of the appeal, but despite inquiries he deliberately withheld

response [sic], to the damage and prejudice of the spouses.[4]

The Resolution became final and executory on 8 January 2004. Complainant was informed of the Resolution Duigan, he instructed his office staff to contact Mr. Hernandez thru available means of communication, but

sometime in July 2005, when the Sheriff of the RTC came to her house and informed her of the Resolution. to no avail.[11] Thus, when complainants husband went to the office of respondent to tell the latter that the

Sheriff of the RTC had informed complainant of the CAs Resolution dismissing the case, respondent was just

On 9 September 2005, complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint[5] with the Committee on Bar Discipline as surprised. The lawyer exclaimed, KALA KO BA NAKIPAG AREGLO NA KAYO.[12]

of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), seeking the disbarment of respondent on the following

grounds: deceit, malpractice, and grave misconduct. Complainant prays for moral damages in the amount of In his 5 January 2009 Report,[13] IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. found that

₱350,000. respondent violated Canons 5, 17, and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code). He

recommended that respondent be suspended from practicing law from 3 to 6 months.

Through an Order[6] dated 12 September 2005, Director of Bar Discipline Rogelio A. Vinluan ordered

respondent to submit an answer to the Complaint. In his Counter-Affidavit/Answer,[7] respondent prayed for The board of governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XIX-2010-452 on 28 August 2010. Therein, they

the outright dismissal of the Complaint. resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for six months.

Respondent explained that he was not the lawyer of complainant. He averred that prior to the mandatory

conference set by the IBP on 13 December 2005, he had never met complainant, because it was her Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[14] He prayed for the relaxation of the application of the

husband who had personally transacted with him. According to respondent, the husband despondently Canons of the Code. On 14 January 2012, the IBP board of governors passed Resolution No. XX-2012-

pleaded to me to prepare a Memorandum on Appeal because according to him the period given by the CA 17[15] partly granting his Motion and reducing the penalty imposed to one-month suspension from the

was to lapse within two or three days.[8] Thus, respondent claims that he filed a Memorandum on Appeal practice of law.

because he honestly believed that it is this pleading which was required.[9]

Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, acting Director for Bar Discipline Dennis A.B. Funa, through a

Before filing the Memorandum, respondent advised complainants husband to settle the case. The latter letter[16] addressed to then Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, transmitted the documents pertaining to the

allegedly gestured approval of the advice.[10] disbarment Complaint against respondent.

After the husband of complainant picked up the Memorandum for filing, respondent never saw or heard We adopt the factual findings of the board of governors of the IBP. This Court, however, disagrees with its

from him again and thus assumed that the husband heeded his advice and settled the case. When Decision to reduce the penalty to one-month suspension. We thus affirm the six-month suspension the

respondent received an Order from the CA requiring him to file a comment on the Motion to Dismiss filed by Board originally imposed in its 28 August 2010 Resolution.
Respondent insists that he had never met complainant prior to the mandatory conference set for the
disbarment Complaint she filed against him. However, a perusal of the Memorandum of Appeal filed in the
appellate court revealed that he had signed as counsel for the defendant-appellants therein, including
complainant and her husband.[17] The pleading starts with the following sentence: DEFENDANT[S]-
APPELLANTS, by counsel, unto this Honorable Court submit the Memorandum and further allege that: x x x.
[18]Nowhere does the document say that it was filed only on behalf of complainants husband.
It is further claimed by respondent that the relation created between him and complainants husband cannot
be treated as a client-lawyer relationship, viz:
It is no more than a client needing a legal document and had it prepared by a lawyer
for a fee. Under the factual milieu and circumstances, it could not be said that a client
entrusted to a lawyer handling and prosecution of his case that calls for the strict
application of the Code; x x x[19]
As proof that none of them ever intended to enter into a lawyer-client relationship, he also alleges that
complainants husband never contacted him after the filing of the Memorandum of Appeal. According to
respondent, this behavior was very unusual if he really believed that he engaged the formers services.[20]
Complainant pointed out in her Reply[21] that respondent was her lawyer, because he accepted her case
and an acceptance fee in the amount of ₱7,000.
According to respondent, however, [C]ontrary to the complainants claim that he charged ₱7,000 as
acceptance fee, the fee was only for the preparation of the pleading which is even low for a Memorandum
of Appeal: x x x.[22]
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of
fidelity to the clients cause.[23] Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is that lawyers duty to serve the
client with competence and diligence.[24] Respondent has failed to fulfill this duty.
According to respondent, he merely drafted the pleading that complainants husband asked from him.
Respondent also claims that he filed a Memorandum of Appeal, because he honestly believed that this was
the pleading required, based on what complainants husband said.
The IBP Investigating Commissioners observation on this matter, in the 5 January 2009 Report, is correct.
Regardless of the particular pleading his client may have believed to be necessary, it was respondents duty
to know the proper pleading to be filed in appeals from RTC decisions, viz:
Having seen the Decision dated 18 June 2002 of the trial court, respondent should
have known that the mode of appeal to the Court of Appeals for said Decision is by
ordinary appeal under Section 2(a) Rule 41 of the1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. In all such cases, Rule 44 of the said Rules applies.[25]
When the RTC ruled against complainant and her husband, they filed a Notice of Appeal. Consequently, what
should apply is the rule on ordinary appealed cases or Rule 44 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Rule 44
requires that the appellants brief be filed after the records of the case have been elevated to the CA.
Respondent, as a litigator, was expected to know this procedure. Canon 5 of the Code reads:
CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing
legal education programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as
well as in the practical training of law students and assist in disseminating information
regarding the law and jurisprudence.
The obligations of lawyers as a consequence of their Canon 5 duty have been expounded in Dulalia, Jr. v. Moreover, respondent does not deny that he was given notice of the fact that he filed the wrong pleading.

Cruz,[26] to wit: However, instead of explaining his side by filing a comment, as ordered by the appellate court, he chose to

ignore the CAs Order. He claims that he was under the presumption that complainant and her husband had
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for the law and legal processes. They are expected to be in the already settled the case, because he had not heard from the husband since the filing of the latters
forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with
it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal Memorandum of Appeal.
developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be
conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty,
they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as
This explanation does not excuse respondents actions.
members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.

First of all, there were several remedies that respondent could have availed himself of, from the moment
In his MR, respondent begged for the consideration of the IBP, claiming that the reason for his failure to file
he received the Notice from the CA to the moment he received the disbarment Complaint filed against
the proper pleading was that he did not have enough time to acquaint himself thoroughly with the factual
him. But because of his negligence, he chose to sit on the case and do nothing.
milieu of the case. The IBP reconsidered and thereafter significantly reduced the penalty originally imposed.

Second, respondent, as counsel, had the duty to inform his clients of the status of their case. His failure to
Respondents plea for leniency should not have been granted.
do so amounted to a violation of Rule 18.04 of the Code, which reads:

18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
The supposed lack of time given to respondent to acquaint himself with the facts of the case does not
respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.
excuse his negligence.

If it were true that all attempts to contact his client proved futile, the least respondent could have done was
Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate

to inform the CA by filing a Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance as counsel. He could have thus explained
preparation. While it is true that respondent was not complainants lawyer from the trial to the appellate

why he was no longer the counsel of complainant and her husband in the case and informed the court that
court stage, this fact did not excuse him from his duty to diligently study a case he had agreed to handle. If

he could no longer contact them.[28] His failure to take this measure proves his negligence.
he felt he did not have enough time to study the pertinent matters involved, as he was approached by

complainants husband only two days before the expiration of the period for filing the Appellants Brief,

respondent should have filed a motion for extension of time to file the proper pleading instead of whatever Lastly, the failure of respondent to file the proper pleading and a comment on Duigans Motion to Dismiss is

pleading he could come up with, just to beat the deadline set by the Court of Appeals.[27] negligence on his part. Under 18.03 of the Code, a lawyer is liable for negligence in handling the clients

case, viz:
 Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them, otherwise their negligence in fulfilling their
duty would render them liable for disciplinary action.[29]
Respondent has failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer. When a lawyer violates his duties to his client, he
engages in unethical and unprofessional conduct for which he should be held accountable.[30]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Venancio Padilla is found guilty of violating Rules 18.02, 18.03, 18.04, as well
as Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Hence, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for SIX (6) MONTHS and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will be dealt
with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of respondent as a member of the bar and
furnished to the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts of the country for their information and guidance.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7749 July 8, 2013
JOSEFINA CARANZA VDA. DE SALDIVAR, COMPLAINANT,
vs.
ATTY. RAMON SG CABANES, JR., RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court’s resolution is an administrative complaint1 filed by Josefina Caranza vda. de Saldivar
(complainant) against Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes, Jr. (respondent), charging him for gross negligence in
violation of Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code).
The Facts
Complainant was the defendant in an unlawful detainer case, docketed as Civil Case No. 1972, 2 filed by the
heirs of one Benjamin Don (heirs) before the Municipal Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur (MTC), wherein she
was represented by respondent. While respondent duly filed an answer to the unlawful detainer complaint,
he, however, failed to submit a pre-trial brief as well as to attend the scheduled preliminary conference.
Consequently, the opposing counsel moved that the case be submitted for decision which motion was
granted in an Order3 dated November 27, 2003. When complainant confronted respondent about the
foregoing, the latter just apologized and told her not to worry, assuring her that she will not lose the case
since she had the title to the subject property.
On December 30, 2003, the MTC issued a Decision 4 (MTC Decision) against complainant, ordering her to
vacate and turn-over the possession of the subject property to the heirs as well as to pay them damages. On
appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32 (RTC), reversed the MTC Decision and
dismissed the unlawful detainer complaint.5 Later however, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC’s
ruling and reinstated the MTC Decision.6 Respondent received a copy of the CA’s ruling on January 27, 2006.
Yet, he failed to inform complainant about the said ruling, notwithstanding the fact that the latter
frequented his work place. Neither did respondent pursue any further action.7 As such, complainant
decided to engage the services of another counsel for the purpose of seeking other available remedies. Due
to respondent’s failure to timely turn-over to her the papers and documents in the case, such other
remedies were, however, barred. Thus, based on these incidents, complainant filed the instant
administrative complaint, alleging that respondent’s acts amounted to gross negligence which resulted in
her loss.8
In a Resolution9 dated March 10, 2008, the Court directed respondent to comment on the administrative
complaint within ten (10) days from notice.
Accordingly, respondent filed a Manifestation with Compliance 10 dated May 19, 2008, admitting to have
agreed to represent complainant who claimed to be the tenant and rightful occupant of the subject property
owned by the late Pelagia Lascano (Pelagia). He alleged that upon careful examination of the heirs' unlawful
detainer complaint, he noticed a discrepancy between the descriptions of the subject property as indicated
in the said pleading as opposed to that which complainant supplied to him. On the belief that the parties
may be contesting two (2) sets of properties which are distinct and separate from one another, respondent,
at the preliminary conference conducted on October 28, 2003, moved for the suspension of further
proceedings and proposed that a commissioner be appointed to conduct a re-survey in order to determine
the true identity of the property in dispute. The MTC allowed the counsels for both parties to decide on the
manner of the proposed re-survey, leading to the assignment of a Department of Agrarian Reform Survey
Engineer (DAR Engineer) for this purpose. In relation, the heirs’ counsel agreed to turn-over to respondent in
his office11 certain documents which indicated the subject property’s description. Thus, pending the
conduct and results of the re-survey, the preliminary conference was tentatively reset to November 27,
2003.12
As it turned out, the heirs’ counsel was unable to furnish respondent copies of the above-stated documents,
notwithstanding their agreement. This led the latter to believe that the preliminary conference scheduled on
November 27, 2003 would not push through. Respondent averred that the aforesaid setting also happened
to coincide with an important provincial conference which he was required to attend. As such, he
inadvertently missed the hearing.13 Nonetheless, he proffered that he duly appealed the adverse MTC
Decision to the RTC,14 resulting to the dismissal of the unlawful detainer complaint, albeit later reversed by
the CA.
Thereafter, pending the heirs' appeal to the CA, respondent came upon the information that the disputed
property was subject of a petition for exemption from the coverage of Presidential Decree No. (PD)
2715 filed by Pelagia against complainant’s mother, Placida Caranza (Placida). Based on several documents
furnished to him by certain DAR personnel, respondent was satisfied that Placida indeed held the subject
property for a long time and actually tilled the same in the name of Pelagia, thereby placing it under PD 27
coverage. Due to such information, respondent was convinced that Placida – and consequently, complainant
(who took over the tilling) – was indeed entitled to the subject property. Hence, he advised complainant that
it would be best to pursue remedies at the administrative level, instead of contesting the appeal filed by the
heirs before the CA. It was respondent’s calculated legal strategy that in the event the CA reverses the
decision of the RTC, an opposition to the issuance of a writ of execution or a motion to quash such writ may
be filed based on the afore-stated reasons, especially if an approved plan and later, an emancipation patent
covering the subject property is issued.16
Meanwhile, the survey conducted by the DAR Engineer revealed that complainant's tillage extended to
about 5,000 square meters of the subject property which was determined to belong to the heirs, the rest
being covered by the title of Pelagia. Dissatisfied, complainant manifested her intention to secure the
services of a private surveyor of her own choice, and promised to furnish respondent a copy of the survey
results, which she, however, failed to do. Later, complainant accused respondent of manipulating the DAR
Survey Results which caused their lawyer-client relationship to turn sour and eventually be severed. She has
since retrieved the entire case folders and retained the services of another lawyer. 17
In a Resolution18 dated July 7, 2008, the Court resolved to refer the instant administrative case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for its evaluation, report and recommendation.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set the case for mandatory conference on April 15, 2009 19 and
required the parties to submit their respective position papers. 20
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
On June 18, 2009, the Investigating IBP Commissioner, Rebecca Villanueva-Maala (Investigating
Commissioner), issued a Report and Recommendation (Commissioner’s Report), 21 finding respondent to
have been negligent in failing to attend the preliminary conference in Civil Case No. 1972 set on November
27, 2003 which resulted in the immediate submission of the said case for decision and eventual loss of
complainant’s cause.
The Investigating Commissioner observed that respondent could have exercised ordinary diligence by
inquiring from the court as to whether the said preliminary conference would push through, considering
that the November 27, 2003 setting was only tentative and the heirs’ counsel was not able to confer with
him. Further, the fact that respondent had to attend an important provincial conference which coincided
with the said setting hardly serves as an excuse since he should have sent a substitute counsel on his behalf.
Also, respondent never mentioned any legal remedy that he undertook when the heirs elevated the decision
of the RTC to the CA. In fact, he did not file any comment or opposition to the heirs’ appeal. Finally,
respondent’s enumerations of his legal options to allegedly protect the complainant’s interests were found
to be thought only after the fact.22
Thus, based on the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner ruled that respondent failed to exercise
ordinary diligence in handling his client's cause, warranting his suspension from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months.23
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Commissioner’s Report in Resolution No. XIX-2011-
26624dated May 14, 2011, finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and in accord
with applicable laws and rules.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration 25 which was, however, denied, in Resolution No. XX-2012-
51726dated December 14, 2012.
The Court's Ruling
The Court resolves to adopt the IBP's findings and recommendation.
The relationship between an attorney and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this
light, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the
required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. Verily, a lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a
high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case,
regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. 27 Canon 17, and Rules 18.03
and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code embody these quintessential directives and thus, respectively state:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client's request for information.
Case law further illumines that a lawyer’s duty of competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing
the cases entrusted to the counsel's care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly
representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing
and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their
termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so. 28
Conversely, a lawyer's negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary action. 29 While such
negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has consistently held that the
lawyer’s mere failure to perform the obligations due his client is per se a violation. 30
Applying these principles to the present case, the Court finds that respondent failed to exercise the required
diligence in handling complainant’s cause.
Records show that he failed to justify his absence during the scheduled preliminary conference hearing in
Civil Case No. 1972 which led the same to be immediately submitted for decision. As correctly observed by
the Investigating Commissioner, respondent could have exercised ordinary diligence by inquiring from the
court as to whether the said hearing would push through, especially so since it was only tentatively set and
considering further that he was yet to confer with the opposing counsel. The fact that respondent had an
important commitment during that day hardly exculpates him from his omission since the prudent course of
action would have been for him to send a substitute counsel to appear on his behalf. In fact, he should have
been more circumspect to ensure that the aforesaid hearing would not have been left unattended in view of
its adverse consequences, i.e., that the defendant’s failure to appear at the preliminary conference already
entitles the plaintiff to a judgment. 31 Indeed, second-guessing the conduct of the proceedings, much less
without any contingent measure, exhibits respondent’s inexcusable lack of care and diligence in managing
his client’s cause.1âwphi1
Equally compelling is the fact that respondent purposely failed to assail the heirs’ appeal before the CA.
Records disclose that he even failed to rebut complainant's allegation that he neglected to inform her about
the CA ruling which he had duly received, thereby precluding her from availing of any further remedies. As
regards respondent’s suggested legal strategy to pursue the case at the administrative level, suffice it to state
that the same does not excuse him from failing to file a comment or an opposition to an appeal, or even,
inform his client of any adverse resolution, as in this case. Irrefragably, these are basic courses of action
which every diligent lawyer is expected to make.
All told, it cannot be gainsaid that respondent was guilty of gross negligence, in violation of the above-cited
provisions of the Code.
As regards the appropriate penalty, several cases show that lawyers who have been held liable for gross
negligence for infractions similar to those of the respondent were suspended for a period of six (6) months.
In Aranda v. Elayda,32 a lawyer who failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice which
resulted in the submission of the case for decision was found guilty of gross negligence and hence,
suspended for six (6) months. In Heirs of Tiburcio F. Ballesteros, Sr. v. Apiag, 33 a lawyer who did not file a
pre-trial brief and was absent during the pre-trial conference was likewise suspended for six (6) months. In
Abiero v. Juanino,34 a lawyer who neglected a legal matter entrusted to him by his client in breach of
Canons 17 and 18 of the Code was also suspended for six (6) months. Thus, consistent with existing
jurisprudence, the Court finds it proper to impose the same penalty against respondent and accordingly
suspends him for a period of six (6) months.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes, Jr. is found guilty of gross negligence in violation of
Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon his receipt of this
Resolution, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 2797 October 4, 2002
ROSAURA P. CORDON, complainant,
vs.
JESUS BALICANTA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On August 21, 1985, herein complainant Rosaura Cordon filed with this Court a complaint for disbarment,
docketed as Administrative Case No. 2797, against Atty. Jesus Balicanta. After respondent’s comment to the
complaint and complainant’s reply thereto, this Court, on March 29, 1995 referred the matter to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP, for brevity) for investigation, report and recommendation within 90
days from notice. Commissioner George Briones of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline was initially tasked
to investigate the case. Commissioner Briones was later on replaced by Commissioner Renato Cunanan.
Complainant filed a supplemental complaint which was duly admitted and, as agreed upon, the parties filed
their respective position papers.
Based on her complaint, supplemental complaint, reply and position paper, the complainant alleged the
following facts:
When her husband Felixberto C. Jaldon died, herein complainant Rosaura Cordon and her daughter
Rosemarie inherited the properties left by the said decedent. All in all, complainant and her daughter
inherited 21 parcels of land located in Zamboanga City. The lawyer who helped her settle the estate of her
late husband was respondent Jesus Balicanta.
Sometime in the early part of 1981, respondent enticed complainant and her daughter to organize a
corporation that would develop the said real properties into a high-scale commercial complex with a
beautiful penthouse for complainant. Relying on these apparently sincere proposals, complainant and her
daughter assigned 19 parcels of land to Rosaura Enterprises, Incorporated, a newly-formed and duly
registered corporation in which they assumed majority ownership. The subject parcels of land were then
registered in the name of the corporation.
Thereafter, respondent single-handedly ran the affairs of the corporation in his capacity as Chairman of the
Board, President, General Manager and Treasurer. The respondent also made complainant sign a document
which turned out to be a voting trust agreement. Respondent likewise succeeded in making complainant
sign a special power of attorney to sell and mortgage some of the parcels of land she inherited from her
deceased husband. She later discovered that respondent transferred the titles of the properties to a certain
Tion Suy Ong who became the new registered owner thereof. Respondent never accounted for the proceeds
of said transfers.
In 1981, respondent, using a spurious board resolution, contracted a loan from the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP, for brevity) in the amount of Two Million Two Hundred Twenty Pesos (P2,220,000) using as
collateral 9 of the real properties that the complainant and her daughter contributed to the corporation. The
respondent ostensibly intended to use the money to construct the Baliwasan Commercial Center (BCC, for
brevity). Complainant later on found out that the structure was made of poor materials such as sawali, coco
lumber and bamboo which could not have cost the corporation anything close to the amount of the loan
secured.
For four years from the time the debt was contracted, respondent failed to pay even a single installment. As
a result, the LBP, in a letter dated May 22, 1985, informed respondent that the past due amortizations and
interest had already accumulated to Seven Hundred Twenty-nine Thousand Five Hundred Three Pesos and
Twenty-five Centavos (P729,503.25). The LBP made a demand on respondent for payment for the tenth
time. Meanwhile, when the BCC commenced its operations, respondent started to earn revenues from the
rentals of BCC’s tenants. On October 28, 1987, the LBP foreclosed on the 9 mortgaged properties due to
non-payment of the loan.
Respondent did not exert any effort to redeem the foreclosed properties. Worse, he sold the corporation’s
right to redeem the mortgaged properties to a certain Hadji Mahmud Jammang through a fake board
resolution dated January 14, 1989 which clothed himself with the authority to do so. Complainant and her
daughter, the majority stockholders, were never informed of the alleged meeting held on that date. Again,
respondent never accounted for the proceeds of the sale of the right to redeem. Respondent also sold to
Jammang a parcel of land belonging to complainant and her daughter which was contiguous to the
foreclosed properties and evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 62807. He never accounted for the
proceeds of the sale.
Sometime in 1983, complainant’s daughter, Rosemarie, discovered that their ancestral home had been
demolished and that her mother, herein complainant, was being detained in a small nipa shack in a place
called Culianan. Through the help of Atty. Linda Lim, Rosemarie was able to locate her mother. Rosemarie
later learned that respondent took complainant away from her house on the pretext that said ancestral
home was going to be remodeled and painted. But respondent demolished the ancestral home and sold the
lot to Tion Suy Ong, using another spurious board resolution designated as Board Resolution No. 1, series of
1992. The resolution contained the minutes of an alleged organizational meeting of the directors of the
corporation and was signed by Alexander Wee, Angel Fernando, Erwin Fernando and Gabriel Solivar.
Complainant and her daughter did not know how these persons became stockholders and directors of the
corporation. Respondent again did not account for the proceeds of the sale.
Complainant and her daughter made several demands on respondent for the delivery of the real properties
they allegedly assigned to the corporation, for an accounting of the proceeds of the LBP loan and as well as
the properties sold, and for the rentals earned by BCC. But the demands remained unheeded. Hence,
complainant and her daughter, in a letter dated June 4, 1985, terminated the services of respondent as their
lawyer and repeated their demands for accounting and turn-over of the corporate funds, and the return of
the 19 titles that respondent transferred to the corporation. They also threatened him with legal action in a
letter dated August 3, 1985.
Soon after, complainant found out from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, for brevity) that
Rosaura Enterprises, Inc., due to respondent’s refusal and neglect, failed to submit the corporation’s annual
financial statements for 1981, 1982 and 1983; SEC General Information Sheets for 1982, 1983 and 1984;
Minutes of Annual Meetings for 1982, 1983 and 1984; and Minutes of Annual Meetings of Directors for
1982, 1983 and 1984.
Complainant also discovered that respondent collected rental payments from the tenants of BCC and issued
handwritten receipts which he signed, not as an officer of the corporation but as the attorney-at-law of
complainant. Respondent also used the tennis court of BCC to dry his palay and did not keep the buildings in
a satisfactory state, so much so that the divisions were losing plywood and other materials to thieves.
Complainant likewise accused respondent of circulating rumors among her friends and relatives that she had
become insane to prevent them from believing whatever complainant said. According to complainant,
respondent proposed that she legally separate from her present husband so that the latter would not inherit
from her and that respondent be adopted as her son.
For his defense, respondent, in his comment and position paper, denied employing deceit and machination
in convincing complainant and her daughter to assign their real properties to the corporation; that they
freely and voluntary executed the deeds of assignment and the voting trust agreement that they signed; that
he did not single-handedly manage the corporation as evidenced by certifications of the officers and
directors of the corporation; that he did not use spurious board resolutions authorizing him to contract a
loan or sell the properties assigned by the complainant and her daughter; that complainant and her
daughter should be the ones who should render an accounting of the records and revenues inasmuch as,
since 1984 up to the present, the part-time corporate book-keeper, with the connivance of the complainant
and her daughter, had custody of the corporate records; that complainant and her daughter sabotaged the
operation of BCC when they illegally took control of it in 1986; that he never pocketed any of the proceeds of
the properties contributed by the complainant and her daughter; that the demolition of the ancestral home
followed legal procedures; that complainant was never detained in Culianan but she freely and voluntarily
lived with the family of P03 Joel Constantino as evidenced by complainant’s own letter denying she was
kidnapped; and that the instant disbarment case should be dismissed for being premature, considering the
pendency of cases before the SEC and the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga involving him and complainant.
Based on the pleadings and position papers submitted by the parties, Commissioner Renato Cunanan, in his
report1 dated July 1, 1999, recommended respondent’s disbarment based on the following findings:
"A. The complainant, Rosaura Jaldon-Cordon and her daughter, Rosemarie were stockholders of a
corporation, together with respondent, named Rosaura Enterprises, Inc.
"Per the Articles of Incorporation marked as Annex ‘A’ of Complainant’s Position Paper,
complainant’s subscription consists of 55% of the outstanding capital stock while her daughter’s
consists of 18%, giving them a total of 73%. Respondent’s holdings consist of 24% while three
other incorporators, Rosauro L. Alvarez, Vicente T. Mañalac and Darhan S. Graciano each held 1%
of the capital stock of the corporation.
"B. On April 5, 1981, complainant and her daughter Rosemarie Jaldon executed two Deeds of
Transfer and Assignment conveying and transferring to the corporation 19 parcels of land in
exchange for shares of stock in the corporation.
"x x x xxx xxx
"C. Both Deeds of Assignment particularly page 3 thereof indicate that respondent accepted said
assignment of properties and titles in behalf of the corporation as Treasurer. The deeds were
signed on April 5, 1981.
"x x x xxx xxx
"Together, therefore, complainant and her daughter owned 1,711 shares of the 1,750 shares
comprising the authorized capital stock of the corporation of 97% thereof.
"No increase in capitalization was applied for by the corporation.
"F. Respondent claims in his Comment, his Answer and his Position Paper that on April 4, 1981 he
was elected as Chairman and Director and on April 5, 1981 he was elected President of the
corporation. Respondent’s own Annexes marked as ‘G’ and ‘G-1’ of his Comment show that on
April 4, 1981 he was not only elected as Chairman and Director as he claims but as ‘Director,
Board Chairman and President.’ The purported minutes was only signed by respondent and an
acting Secretary by the name of Vicente Mañalac.
"Said Annex does not show who was elected Treasurer.
"Respondent’s Annex ‘H’ and ‘H-1’ shows that in the alleged organizational meeting of the
directors on April 5, 1981 a certain Farnacio Bucoy was elected Treasurer. Bucoy’s name does not
appear as an incorporator nor a stockholder anywhere in the documents submitted.
"The purported minutes of the organizational meeting of the directors was signed only by
respondent Balicanta and a Secretary named Verisimo Martin.
"G. Since respondent was elected as Director, Chairman and President on April 4, 1981 as
respondent’s own Annexes ‘G’ to ‘G-1’ would show, then complainant’s claim that respondent
was likewise acting as Treasurer of two corporations bear truth and credence as respondent
signed and accepted the titles to 19 parcels of land ceded by the complainant and her daughter,
as Treasurer on April 5, 1981 after he was already purportedly elected as Chairman, President and
Director.
"H. Respondent misleads the Commission into believing that all the directors signed the minutes
marked as Exhibit ‘H’ to ‘H-1’ by stating that the same was ‘duly signed by all the Board of
Directors’ when the document itself shows that only he and one Verisimo Martin signed the
same.
"He also claims that ‘all the stockholders signed’ the minutes of organizational meeting marked as
Annexes ‘G’ and ‘G-1’ of his Comment yet the same shows that only the acting Chairman and
acting Secretary signed.
"I. Respondent claims that the Board or its representative was authorized by the stockholders
comprising 2/3 of the outstanding capital stock, as required by law, to mortgage the parcels of
land belonging to the corporation, which were all assigned to the corporation by complainant and
her daughter, by virtue of Annex ‘I’ and ‘I-1’: attached to his Comment.
"The subject attachment however reveals that only the following persons signed their conformity
to the said resolution: respondent Balicanta who owned 109 shares, Vicente Mañalac (1 share),
Daihan Graciano (1 share).
"Complainants who collectively held a total of 1,711 shares out of the 1,750 outstanding capital
stock of the corporation were not represented in the purported stockholders’ meeting
authorizing the mortgage of the subject properties.
"The 2/3 vote required by law was therefore not complied with yet respondent proceeded to
mortgage the subject 9 parcels of land by the corporation.
"J. Respondent further relies on Annex ‘J’ of his Comment, purportedly the minutes of a special
meeting of the Board of Directors authorizing him to obtain a loan and mortgage the properties
of the corporation dated August 29, 1981. This claim is baseless. The required ratification of 2/3
by the stockholders of records was not met. Again, respondent attempts to mislead the
Commission and Court.
"K. Further, the constitution of the Board is dubious. The alleged minutes of the organizational
meeting of the stockholders electing the members of the Board, have not been duly signed by the
stockholders as shown in respondent’s annex ‘G’ which was purportedly the organizational
meeting of the stockholders.
"L. Also, Annex ‘J’ of respondent’s Comment which purportedly authorized him to obtain a loan
and to mortgage the 9 parcels of land was only signed by himself and a secretary.
"M. In said Annex 'J' of respondent’s Comment he stated that complainant Rosaura Cordon was
on leave by virtue of a voting trust agreement allegedly executed by complainant ‘in his favor
covering all her shares of stock.’ The claim is baseless. The voting trust referred to by respondent
(annex ‘D’ of his Comment), even if it were assumed to be valid, covered only 266 shares of
complainants yet she owned a total of 1,039 shares after she and her daughter ceded in favor of
the corporation 19 parcels of land.
"Being a former lawyer to complainant, respondent should have ensured that her interest was
safeguarded. Yet, complainant was apparently and deliberately left our (sic) on the pretext that,
she had executed a voting trust agreement in favor of respondent.
"It is suspicious that complainant was made to sign a voting trust agreement on 21 August 1981
and immediately thereafter, the resolutions authorizing respondent to obtain a loan and to
mortgage the 9 parcels of land were passed and approved.
"N. It is also highly irregular for respondent who is a lawyer, to allow a situation to happen where,
with the exclusion of complainant as director the result was that there remained only 4 members
of the Board,.
"O. Respondent’s own pleadings submitted to the Commission contradict each other.
"1. For instance, while in his Comment respondent DENIES that he employed deceit
and machination in convincing the complainant and her daughter to sign the articles of
incorporation of Rosaura Enterprises and in ceding to the corporation 19 parcels of
land in Zamboanga City, because ‘they freely, intelligently and voluntarily signed’ the
same, yet, in his Position Paper, respondent took another stance.
"In paragraphs 1.1 and 1.2 of his Position Paper which was submitted 12 years later,
respondent claimed that ‘it was actually the idea of Atty. Rosaura L. Alvarez’ that a
corporation be put up to incorporate the estate of the late Felixberto D. Jaldon.
"2. Likewise, respondent claimed that complainant and her daughter were not
directors, hence they were not notified of meetings, in paragraph 2-6 (c) of his
Comment he blamed the other stockholders and directors for the corporation’s
inability to comply with the Land Bank’s demands saying that they ‘have consistently
failed since 1982 to convene (1.) for the annual stockholders’ meetings and (i.i) for the
monthly board meeting’.
"His own pleadings claim that he had been the Chairman/President since 1981 to the
present. If (sic) so, it was his duty to convene the stockholders and the directors for
meetings.
"Respondent appeared able to convene the stockholders and directors when he
needed to make a loan of p2.2 million; when he sold the corporation’s right of
redemption over the foreclosed properties of the corporation to Jammang, when he
sold one parcel of land covered by TCT 62,807 to Jammang in addition to the 9 parcels
of land which were foreclosed, and when he sold the complainant’s ancestral home
covered by TCT No. 72,004.
"It is thus strange why respondent claims that the corporation could not do anything
to save the corporation’s properties from being foreclosed because the stockholders
and directors did not convene.
"This assertion of respondent is clearly evident of dishonest, deceitful and immoral
conduct especially because, in all his acts constituting conveyances of corporate
property, respondent used minutes of stockholders’ and directors’ meetings signed
only by him and a secretary or signed by him and persons who were not incorporators
much less stockholders.
"It is worthy of note that in respondent’s Exhibits 15, 16, 17 and 18 of his position
paper, there were 7 new stockholders and complainant appeared to have only 266
shares to her name while her daughter Rosemarie had no shares at all. Respondent did
not present any proof of conveyance of shares by complainant and her daughter.
"It is further worth noting that complainant’s voting trust (annex ‘D’ of respondent’s
Comment) where she allegedly entrusted 266 shares to respondent on August 21,
1981 had only a validity of 5 years. Thus, she should have had her entire holdings of
1,283 shares back in her name in August 1986.
"Respondent’s purported minutes of stockholders’ meeting (Exhs. ‘15’ and ‘17’) do not
reflect this.
"There was no explanation whatsoever from respondent on how complainant and her
daughter lost their 97% control holding in the corporation.
"3. As a further contradiction in respondent’s pleadings, we note that in paragraph
2.7.C of his Comment he said that ‘only recently, this year, 1985, the complainant and
her aforenamed daughter examined said voluminous supporting receipts/documents
which had previously been examined by the Land Bank for loan releases, during which
occasion respondent suggested to them that the corporation will have to hire a full-
time book-keeper to put in order said voluminous supporting receipts/documents, to
which they adversely reacted due to lack of corporate money to pay for said book-
keeper.’ But in respondent’s Position Paper par. 6.3 he stated that:
‘Anyway, it is not the respondent but rather the complainant who should render a
detailed accounting to the corporation of the corporate records as well as corporate
revenues/income precisely because since 1994 to the present:
‘(a). The corporate part-time book-keeper Edilberto Benedicto, with the indispensable
connivance and instigation of the complainant and her daughter, among others, has
custody of the corporate records, xxx’
"4. In other contradictory stance, respondent claims in par. 7.3 of his position paper
that ‘complainant and her daughter sabotaged the BCC operations of the corporation
by illegally taking over actual control and supervision thereof sometime in 1986, xxx’
"Yet respondent’s own exhibits in his position paper particularly Exhibit 15 and 16
where the subject of the foreclosed properties of the corporation comprising the
Baliwasan Commercial Center (BCC) was taken up, complainant and her daughter were
not even present nor were they the subject of the discussion, belying respondent’s
claim that the complainant and her daughter illegally took actual control of BCC.
"5. On the matter of the receipts issued by respondent evidencing payment to him of
rentals by lessees of the corporation, attached to the complaint as Annexes ‘H’ to ‘H-
17’, respondent claims that the receipts are temporary in nature and that subsequently
regular corporate receipts were issued. On their face however the receipts clearly
appear to be official receipts, printed and numbered duly signed by the respondent
bearing his printed name.
"It is difficult to believe that a lawyer of respondent’ stature would issue official
receipts to lessees if he only meant to issue temporary ones.
"6. With regard to respondent’s claim that the complainant consented to the sale of
her ancestral home, covered by TCT No. T-72,004 to one Tion Suy Ong for which he
attached as Exhibit 22 to his Position Paper the minutes of an annual meeting of the
stockholders, it behooves this Commission why complainant’s signature had to be
accompanied by her thumb mark. Furthermore, complainant’s signature appears
unstable and shaky. This Office is thus persuaded to believe complainant’s allegation in
paragraph 3b of her position paper that since September 1992 up to March 1993 she
was being detained by one PO# (sic) Joel Constantino and his wife under instructions
from respondent Balicanta.
"This conclusion is supported by a letter from respondent dated March 1993, Annex
‘H’ of complainant’s position paper, where respondent ordered Police Officer
Constantino ‘to allow Atty. Linda Lim and Rosemarie Jaldon to talk to Tita Rosing.’
"The complainant’s thumb mark together with her visibly unstable shaky signature
lends credence to her claim that she was detained in the far flung barrio of Culianan
under instructions of respondent while her ancestral home was demolished and the
lot sold to one Tion Suy Ong.
"It appears that respondent felt compelled to over-ensure complainant’s consent by
getting her to affix her thumb mark in addition to her signature.
"7. Respondent likewise denies that he also acted as Corporate Secretary in addition to
being the Chairman, President and Treasurer of the corporation. Yet, respondent
submitted to this commission documents which are supported to be in the possession
of the Corporate Secretary such as the stock and transfer book and minutes of
meetings.
"The foregoing findings of this Commission are virtual smoking guns that prove on no
uncertain terms that respondent, who was the legal counsel of complainant in the
latter part of the settlement of the estate of her deceased husband, committed
unlawful, immoral and deceitful conduct proscribed by Rule 1.01 of the code of
professional responsibility.
"Likewise, respondent clearly committed a violation of Canon 15 of the same code
which provides that ‘A lawyer should observe candor fairness and loyalty in all his
dealings and transactions with his client.’
"Respondent’s acts gravely diminish the public’s respect for the integrity of the
profession of law for which this Commission recommends that he be meted the
penalty of disbarment.
"The pendency of the cases at the SEC and the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga filed
by complainant against respondent does not preclude a determination of respondent’s
culpability as a lawyer.
"This Commission cannot further delay the resolution of this complaint filed in 1985 by
complainant, and old widow who deserves to find hope and recover her confidence in
the judicial system.
"The findings of this office, predominantly based on documents adduced by both
parties lead to only one rather unpalatable conclusion. That respondent Atty. Jesus F.
Balicanta, in his professional relations with herein complainant did in fact employ
unlawful, dishonest, and immoral conduct proscribed in no uncertain terms by Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In addition, respondent’s actions
clearly violated Canon 15 to 16 of the same Code.
"It is therefore our unpleasant duty to recommend that respondent, having committed
acts in violation of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, thereby causing a great
disservice to the profession, be meted the ultimate sanction of disbarment." 2
On September 30, 1999, while Commissioner Cunanan’s recommendation for respondent’s disbarment was
pending review before Executive Vice-President and Northern Luzon Governor Teofilo Pilando, respondent
filed a motion requesting "for a full-blown investigation and for invalidation of the entire proceedings and/or
remedial action under Section 11, Rule 139-B, Revised Rules of Court," alleging that he had evidence that
Commissioner Cunanan’s report was drafted by the lawyers of complainant, Attys. Antonio Cope and Rita
Linda Jimeno. He presented two unsigned anonymous letters allegedly coming from a disgruntled employee
of Attys. Cope and Jimeno. He claimed to have received these letters in his mailbox.3
Respondent’s motion alleging that Attys. Antonio Cope and Rita Linda Jimeno drafted Commissioner
Cunanan’s report was accompanied by a complaint praying for the disbarment of said lawyers including
Commissioner Cunanan. The complaint was docketed as CBD Case No. 99-658. After Attys. Cope and Jimeno
and Commissioner Cunanan filed their answers, a hearing was conducted by the Investigating Committee of
the IBP Board of Governors.
On May 26, 2001, the IBP Board of Governors issued a resolution 4 dismissing for lack of merit the complaint
for disbarment against Attys. Cope and Jimeno and Commissioner Cunanan. And in Adm. Case No. 2797, the
Board adopted and approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner Cunanan, and meted against
herein respondent Balicanta the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for 5 years "for commission
of acts of misconduct and disloyalty by taking undue and unfair advantage of his legal knowledge as a lawyer
to gain material benefit for himself at the expense of complainant Rosaura P. Jaldon-Cordon and caused
serious damage to the complainant."5
To support its decision, the Board uncovered respondent’s fraudulent acts in the very same documents he
presented to exonerate himself. It also took note of respondent’s contradictory and irreconcilable
statements in the pleadings and position papers he submitted. However, it regarded the penalty of
disbarment as too severe for respondent’s misdeeds, considering that the same were his first offense. 6
Pursuant to Section 12 (b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, 7 the said resolution in Administrative Case No.
2797 imposing the penalty of suspension for 5 years on respondent was automatically elevated to this Court
for final action. On the other hand, the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment against Attys. Cope and
Jimeno and Commissioner Cunanan, docketed as CBD Case No. 99-658, became final in the absence of any
petition for review.
This Court confirms the duly supported findings of the IBP Board that respondent committed condemnable
acts of deceit against his client. The fraudulent acts he carried out against his client followed a well thought
of plan to misappropriate the corporate properties and funds entrusted to him. At the very outset, he
embarked on his devious scheme by making himself the President, Chairman of the Board, Director and
Treasurer of the corporation, although he knew he was prohibited from assuming the position of President
and Treasurer at the same time.8 As Treasurer, he accepted in behalf of the corporation the 19 titles that
complainant and her daughter co-owned. The other treasurer appointed, Farnacio Bucoy, did not appear to
be a stockholder or director in the corporate records. The minutes of the meetings supposedly electing him
and Bucoy as officers of the corporation actually bore the signatures of respondent and the secretary only,
contrary to his claim that they were signed by the directors and stockholders.
He likewise misled the IBP investigating commission in claiming that the mortgage of 9 of the properties of
the corporation previously belonging to complainant and her daughter was ratified by the stockholders
owning two-thirds or 67% of the outstanding capital stock when in fact only three stockholders owning 111
out of 1,750 outstanding shares or 6.3% assented thereto. The alleged authorization granting him the power
to contract the LBP loan for Two Million Two Hundred Twenty Pesos (P2,220,000) was also not approved by
the required minimum of two-thirds of the outstanding capital stock despite respondent’s claim to the
contrary. In all these transactions, complainant and her daughter who both owned 1,711 out of the 1,750
outstanding shares of the corporation or 97.7% never had any participation. Neither were they informed
thereof.
Clearly, there was no quorum for a valid meeting for the discussion and approval of these transactions.
Respondent cannot take refuge in the contested voting trust agreement supposedly executed by
complainant and her daughter for the reason that it authorized respondent to represent complainant for
only 266 shares.
Aside from the dishonest transactions he entered into under the cloak of sham resolutions, he failed to
explain several discrepancies in his version of the facts. We hereby reiterate some of these statements noted
by Commissioner Cunanan in his findings.
First, respondent blamed the directors and the stockholders who failed to convene for the required annual
meetings since 1982. However, respondent appeared able to convene the stockholders and directors when
he contracted the LBP debt, when he sold to Jammang the corporation’s right of redemption over the
foreclosed properties of the corporation, when he sold one parcel of land covered by TCT No. 62807 to
Jammang, when he mortgaged the 9 parcels of land to LBP which later foreclosed on said mortgage, and
when he sold the complainant’s ancestral home covered by TCT No. 72004.
Second, the factual findings of the investigating commission, affirmed by the IBP Board, disclosed that
complainant and her daughter own 1,711 out of 1,750 shares of the outstanding capital stock of the
corporation, based on the Articles of Incorporation and deeds of transfer of the properties. But respondent’s
evidence showed that complainant had only 266 shares of stock in the corporation while her daughter had
none, notwithstanding the fact that there was nothing to indicate that complainant and her daughter ever
conveyed their shares to others.
Respondent likewise did not explain why he did not return the certificates representing the 266 shares after
the lapse of 5 years from the time the voting trust certificate was executed in 1981.9
The records show that up to now, the complainant and her daughter own 97% of the outstanding shares but
respondent never bothered to explain why they were never asked to participate in or why they were never
informed of important corporate decisions.
Third, respondent, in his comment, alleged that due to the objection of complainant and her daughter to his
proposal to hire an accountant, the corporation had no formal accounting of its revenues and income.
However, respondent’s position paper maintained that there was no accounting because the part-time
bookkeeper of the corporation connived with complainant and her daughter in keeping the corporate
records.
Fourth, respondent’s claim that complainant and her daughter took control of the operations of the
corporation in 1986 is belied by the fact that complainant and her daughter were not even present in the
alleged meeting of the board (which took place after 1986) to discuss the foreclosure of the mortgaged
properties. The truth is that he never informed them of such meeting and he never gave control of the
corporation to them.
Fifth, Commissioner Cunanan found that:
"5. on the matter of the receipts issued by respondent evidencing payment to him of rentals by lessees of
the corporation, attached to the complaint as Annexes ‘H’ to ‘H-17’, respondent claims that the receipts are
temporary in nature and that subsequently regular corporate receipts were issued. On their face however
the receipts clearly appear to be official receipts, printed and numbered duly signed by the respondent
bearing his printed name.
"It is difficult to believe that a lawyer of respondent’s stature would issue official receipts to lessees if he only
meant to issue temporary ones."10
Sixth, respondent denies that he acted as Corporate Secretary aside from being the Chairman, President and
Treasurer of the corporation. Yet respondent submitted to the investigating commission documents which
were supposed to be in the official possession of the Corporate Secretary alone such as the stock and
transfer book and minutes of meetings.
Seventh, he alleged in his comment that he was the one who proposed the establishment of the corporation
that would invest the properties of the complainant but, in his position paper, he said that it was a certain
Atty. Rosauro Alvarez who made the proposal to put up the corporation.
After a thorough review of the records, we find that respondent committed grave and serious misconduct
that casts dishonor on the legal profession. His misdemeanors reveal a deceitful scheme to use the
corporation as a means to convert for his own personal benefit properties left to him in trust by complainant
and her daughter.
Not even his deviousness could cover up the wrongdoings he committed. The documents he thought could
exculpate him were the very same documents that revealed his immoral and shameless ways. These
documents were extremely revealing in that they unmasked a man who knew the law and abused it for his
personal gain without any qualms of conscience. They painted an intricate web of lies, deceit and
opportunism beneath a carefully crafted smokescreen of corporate maneuvers.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates upon each lawyer, as his duty to society, the obligation to
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. Specifically, he is forbidden to
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. 11 If the practice of law is to remain an
honorable profession and attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets
and principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. 12 Thus, the requirement of
good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the
possession of legal learning.13 Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon
admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain one’s good standing in that
exclusive and honored fraternity.14Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character.
Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do
the pleasant thing if it is wrong. 15 This must be so because "vast interests are committed to his care; he is
the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his client’s property, reputation, his life, his
all."16
Indeed, the words of former Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals Pompeyo Diaz cannot find a more
relevant application than in this case:
"There are men in any society who are so self-serving that they try to make law serve their selfish ends. In
this group of men, the most dangerous is the man of the law who has no conscience. He has, in the arsenal
of his knowledge, the very tools by which he can poison and disrupt society and bring it to an ignoble
end."17
Good moral standing is manifested in the duty of the lawyer "to hold in trust all moneys and properties of WHEREFORE, respondent Attorney Jesus T. Balicanta is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is directed to
his client that may come into his possession." 18 He is bound "to account for all money or property collected strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
or received for or from the client." 19 The relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in SO ORDERED.
nature. Thus, lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property received by them on behalf of
their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct.20

This Court holds that respondent cannot invoke the separate personality of the corporation to absolve him
from exercising these duties over the properties turned over to him by complainant. He blatantly used the
corporate veil to defeat his fiduciary obligation to his client, the complainant. Toleration of such fraudulent
conduct was never the reason for the creation of said corporate fiction.

The massive fraud perpetrated by respondent on the complainant leaves us no choice but to set aside the
veil of corporate entity. For purposes of this action therefore, the properties registered in the name of the
corporation should still be considered as properties of complainant and her daughter. The respondent
merely held them in trust for complainant (now an ailing 83-year-old) and her daughter. The properties
conveyed fraudulently and/or without the requisite authority should be deemed as never to have been
transferred, sold or mortgaged at all. Respondent shall be liable, in his personal capacity, to third parties who
may have contracted with him in good faith.

Based on the aforementioned findings, this Court believes that the gravity of respondent’s offenses cannot
be adequately matched by mere suspension as recommended by the IBP. Instead, his wrongdoings deserve
the severe penalty of disbarment, without prejudice to his criminal and civil liabilities for his dishonest acts.