THE RHETORIC OF HOMOSEXUAL PRACTICE

A Critique of the Identity/Act Distinction in

Protestant Ordination Policies
John J. Anderson

ABSTRACT
Many Protestant denominations have or recently had policies that prohibit
“self-avowed practicing homosexuals” from being ordained. By only prohib-
iting “practicing” homosexuals, proponents of these policies claim that they
do not discriminate against homosexuals as a group since, technically, a
homosexual can still be ordained as long as she is “non-practicing.” In other
words, a condemnation of homosexual practice is not the same as a condem-
nation of homosexual persons. I argue that this is not the case; the rhetoric
of homosexual practice does, in fact, amount to a condemnation of gays and
lesbians. It does so by conflating the two things it claims to keep separate—
homosexual conduct and homosexual identity. I demonstrate this conflation
by analyzing the history of this rhetoric and how it has been adjudicated in
church court decisions from the United Methodist Church and the Presby-
terian Church (USA).
KEY WORDS: homosexuality, ordination, Protestantism, United Methodist
Church, Presbyterian Church (USA)

When in 1984, the United Methodist Church (UMC) passed a resolu-

tion prohibiting “self-avowed practicing homosexuals” from serving as
ordained ministers (United Methodist Publishing House 2008, ¶ 304.3),
opponents immediately challenged the policy. Citing another UMC policy
that prohibits discrimination based on race or status (2008, ¶ 16.1 and ¶
16.14), opponents of the new ordination standard argued that it violated
the anti-discrimination policy by discriminating against gays and lesbians
on the basis of their status as homosexuals. In light of this concern, the
Judicial Council, the highest court of the UMC, ruled that prohibiting
“self-avowed practicing homosexuals” from ordained ministry was consti-
tutional. The Council did not, however, try to deny that homosexuality

John J. Anderson received his PhD from Loyola University Chicago and is an adjunct
lecturer at Merrimack College and other institutions in the Greater Boston area. He is a
recipient of the Dwight-Hooker Fellowship from Yale Divinity School and was assistant
to the editors of God, Science, Sex, Gender: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Christian
Ethics (University of Illinois Press, 2010). John J. Anderson, 17 Morgan Dr., #103, Natick
MA 01760, johnjanderson1980@gmail.com.

JRE 41.4:601–625. © 2013 Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc.

602 Journal of Religious Ethics

should be protected as a status. Instead, it stated that status was not the
issue. One member of the Council, James M. Dolliver, noted in a concur-
ring opinion that “while, arguably, to be a homosexual is to be within a
protected status . . . [the UMC] does not per se bar homosexuals from
ordained ministry.” Rather, the prohibition “is directed toward those
persons who are ‘self-avowed practicing homosexuals,’ which is an entirely
different thing” (The United Methodist Church Judicial Council 1984).1 In
other words, since a homosexual (albeit a non-practicing homosexual) can
still be ordained, the standard cannot be said to discriminate against
homosexuals as a group. The ordination standard addresses conduct, not
sexual orientation.2
Dolliver demarcates homosexual identity from homosexual conduct
in order to regulate homosexual expression without condemning homo-
sexuals as persons—or at least that is his claim. This type of argument
has been repeated many times in mainline Protestant debates about
homosexuality over the past four decades, as churches have sought to
prohibit homosexual practice while affirming the inherent dignity of
homosexuals as persons. On the face of it, this balancing act emphasizes
actions over sexual orientation, and proponents of the prohibition of
homosexual practice believe such an emphasis reflects the Bible’s refer-
ences to same-sex sexual activity.3
I argue that the rhetoric of homosexual practice is directed at identity
as well as practice because of the way it participates in constructing and
perpetuating an oppressive view of homosexuality. It does so by function-
ing in a contradictory fashion. On the one hand, proponents use the
language of homosexual practice to separate homosexual conduct from
homosexual identity or status. But, on the other hand, the language of
homosexual practice operates by doing the exact opposite—it conflates
homosexual conduct and identity. Homosexuality as an identity is so
closely associated with prohibited homosexual practice in public debate
and disciplinary procedures that the distinction between the “practicing”

1 Hereafter, The United Methodist Church Judicial Council will be referred to in citations

as Judicial Council.
2 A full discussion of these policies would include an analysis of the term “self-avowed.”

While there is not space for that analysis here, I will say briefly that the phrase is typically
understood to mean an avowal of actions (that is, homosexual practice), not of sexual
orientation. It is the opinion of this author, however, that that distinction does not always
hold true. Often times, the emphasis on avowal creates an atmosphere similar to that of
the U.S. military during the years of the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy, where stating one’s
homosexual identity was forbidden. For an in-depth discussion of this term, see J. Anderson
2011, 179–234.
3 Robert A. J. Gagnon best represents this view. His book, The Bible and Homosexual

Practice, focuses on “same-sex intercourse or homosexual practice, as opposed to homosexual

orientation,” and Gagnon argues that this emphasis is “a reflection of the Bible’s own relative
disinterest toward motives or the orientation of same-sex impulses” (2002, 37–38).
 The Rhetoric of Homosexual Practice 603

and the “non-practicing homosexual” is nugatory. Being a homosexual is

enough to implicate one in the category of the prohibited. Thus, the claim
that the prohibition of homosexual practice does not discriminate against
gays and lesbians as a group is, at best, disingenuous.
For gays and lesbians who are forced to negotiate these policies, sexual
conduct and identity relate to one another in a complex and oppressive
way. I analyze the language of homosexual practice in the context of this
relationship, focusing on the policies of two mainline Protestant denomi-
nations, the UMC and Presbyterian Church (USA). The UMC continues
to prohibit “self-avowed practicing homosexuals” from ordained ministry,
while the PC(USA) overturned its ban in 2011. In both denominations,
these policies are/were adjudicated in church court systems that serve
to mete out discipline as well as to interpret the governing documents of
each church. The decisions of these church courts reflect the difficulties of
defining and enforcing a prohibition of homosexual practice among clergy
and ordination candidates. These texts reveal that the rhetoric of homo-
sexual practice fails to shift focus from sexual identity to sexual actions.
The real differentiation embodied by this rhetoric is not that of the
practicing and the non-practicing homosexual, but of the heterosexual and
the non-heterosexual.
While I focus on the UMC and PC(USA) to show the prejudicial nature
of these policies, this rhetoric is prevalent in other denominations as well.
The Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA), for example, insti-
tuted a ban on the ordination of practicing gays and lesbians soon after its
formation in 1988; that ban was overturned in 2009. Christian B. Scharen
demonstrates how the ELCA policy was used to produce candidates for
ordination who had internalized its heteronormative standards (2000,
95). And many other Christian churches still hold similar policies that
condemn homosexual practice while also trying to respect gays and
lesbians as persons. The UMC and PC(USA), therefore, are not isolated
instances of the rhetoric of homosexual practice, but case studies that
reveal the failure of the logic at work in ordination bans, regardless of
denomination.
Furthermore, there are numerous parallels in secular law and political
debate. The record of enforcement of sodomy laws in the United States
provides striking examples of how merely identifying as a homosexual can
lead to arrest and prosecution. While the U.S. Supreme Court struck down
these laws in Lawrence v. Texas (2003), it is nevertheless worth noting
that earlier Supreme Court cases were often argued on the basis of similar
logic to the policies analyzed in this essay. In the most significant of these
decisions, Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), Michael Hardwick was arrested on
sodomy charges after a police officer entered his residence and found him
engaging in oral sex with another man. Prior to that arrest, however, the
same police officer had ticketed Hardwick for drinking in public outside a
604 Journal of Religious Ethics

gay bar. During this initial encounter with the officer, Hardwick explained
his action (he was throwing a beer bottle in a trashcan) by telling the
officer he was a bartender at the bar, which identified Hardwick as a gay
man. These details are not insignificant, and legal scholars have remarked
that the arrest of Hardwick on sodomy charges had as much to do with
his identification as a homosexual as it did with the act Hardwick was
engaged in at the time of his arrest. Janet R. Jakobsen and Ann Pellegrini
rightly note that in the logic of Hardwick, “homosexual identity itself
seemed to become an actionable form of homosexual practice” (2004, 36).
Jakobsen and Pellegrini analyze another Supreme Court decision that
further illustrates the tenuous nature of “homosexual practice” as a legal
category. Romer v. Evans (1996) struck down a Colorado constitutional
amendment that overturned all state and local anti-discrimination ordi-
nances protecting gays and lesbians from discrimination based on sexual
orientation. While this case is typically described as a victory for gay
rights, Justice Antonin Scalia’s minority opinion broadens the rationale
of the earlier Hardwick case in troubling ways. The Supreme Court had
argued in Hardwick that homosexual conduct is not protected constitu-
tionally. Scalia, in his Romer opinion, casts gay and lesbian political
speech as a form of homosexual conduct. Jakobsen and Pellegrini
describe his dissenting opinion as a “rhetorical bait and switch”: by
invoking the category “homosexual conduct” and applying it to Romer,
which dealt with homosexuality as a public identity, he enveloped a wide
constellation of activities and speech into what the Court had previously
interpreted to be a narrow category of sex acts (2004, 38). Clearly, for
Scalia, homosexual conduct is defined primarily by the sexual identity of
the person rather than by any specific action. These court cases show
that the language at the heart of the UMC and PC(USA) ordination
policies resonates far beyond these two denominations. Thus, an analysis
of the logic of these policies will shed light on broader debates about
homosexuality. As we interrogate the decisions that adjudicate the ban
on practicing homosexuals from ordination, it is vital to ask what under-
lies these policies and what effects they have on gays and lesbians in the
church.
To better understand the policies of these two denominations, we must
examine the historical context and theological footing of the rhetoric of
homosexual practice. German theologian Helmut Thielicke was one of the
earliest proponents of the notion that homosexual identity and conduct
should be evaluated separately. He provided a theological precedent for
the rhetoric of homosexual practice, and, as I shall argue, this precedent
is based in a heterosexist theological anthropology. Connecting this theo-
logical foundation with the actual consequences of the policies that pro-
hibit homosexual practice reveals the prejudicial moorings of the policies,
as well as the depth of the problem.
 The Rhetoric of Homosexual Practice 605

1. The Emergence of the Rhetoric of Homosexual Practice in

Christian Theology and Ethics
The rhetoric of homosexual practice is a relatively recent invention in
Christian thought, though it certainly has its predecessors in the recent
and distant past.4 The expression did not become a fixture in Protestant
parlance in the United States until the 1970s. But earlier, several indi-
viduals discussed homosexuality in ways that both suggested a division
between homosexual behavior and homosexual identity and indicated
the importance of evaluating the two separately. Sherwin Bailey, a British
scholar who wrote extensively about Christianity and homosexuality,
suggested that homosexuality as a condition and homosexual behavior
must be understood as two distinct phenomena.5 Unlike most other
Christian scholars writing about homosexuality, he reached this conclu-
sion after substantially engaging the literature in psychiatry and sexology
Bailey’s view is fully evident in his entry on “Homosexuality and Homo-
sexualism” for the 1967 edition of A Dictionary of Christian Ethics.
Homosexuality is a personal condition, not a kind of behaviour (for which the
term homosexualism is used here). . . . Homosexuality generally disposes the
subject to self-expression in physical acts with others of the same sex, and
when moral or social restraints are weak or absent there may be occasional
or habitual indulgence in some kind of homosexualism. (Bailey 1967, 152)

That Bailey took such care to distinguish homosexuality as a condition

from homosexual behavior is indicative of the degree to which the two
were associated in theology, as well as in society in general.
The first serious theological treatment of homosexuality that em-
ployed this division was Thielicke’s The Ethics of Sex, the final book in his
three-volume opus on theological ethics. Thielicke offered an in-depth
discussion of sexuality around the time that many denominations were
beginning to debate and draft policies about sexuality and homosexua-
lity, and it received much attention from scholars and pastors alike.6
Thielicke’s analysis of homosexuality provided the theological basis for

4 The category “sodomy,” for example, originated in medieval theology as a term to

identify a particular group of sexual acts deemed sinful (Jordan 1997), and the medical
invention of the “homosexual” in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries made a
particularly important impact on how later generations understood homosexual behavior—
namely as symptoms of a medical condition.
5 Bailey is most famous for his monograph on Christianity and homosexuality, Homo-

sexuality and the Western Christian Tradition (1955). For a more extensive description and
analysis of Bailey’s work, see Jordan 2011, 52–58.
6 The many reviews of The Ethics of Sex are a testament to the attention it received.

See Hulme 1964, Nelson 1965, Stettner 1965, Shinn 1965, Schrotenboer 1966, and Rutenber
1966. For a recent article that explores Thielicke’s discussion of homosexuality, see Childs
2010.
606 Journal of Religious Ethics

theologians and church leaders to draft policies that sought to protect the
dignity of homosexual persons while also categorically prohibiting homo-
sexual behavior. He did this by dividing his treatment of homosexuality
into two parts, a theological evaluation of the person and a moral evalu-
ation of actions.
Thielicke criticized theologians like Karl Barth for making the state-
ment that “homosexuality is sinful.” He claimed that their error is to
project their own anti-homosexual prejudices onto their assessment of
homosexuality, and this leads to evaluating homosexuality the same way
one evaluates homosexual conduct. Thielicke argued that rather than
rejecting homosexuality outright, the Christian theologian and ethicist
must take seriously the notion that homosexuality can be or is a consti-
tutional predisposition. On the basis of that premise, Thielicke asked two
questions that were unique for his time and vocation: “What is the person
who is so constituted by ‘fate’ to think of himself from the theological point
of view? This is after all the real question. And then how shall he act on
the basis of this self-understanding?” (Thielicke 1964, 272). Thielicke’s
answer to the first question was that the homosexual need not think of
himself as more sinful or corrupt than anyone else, because homosexuality
is a predisposed condition for which the homosexual is not culpable. Thus,
he made the analogy that just as original sin is to be distinguished from
the actualization of a concrete sin, so is the homosexual predisposition to
be distinguished from homosexual acts (1964, 282–83).
Thielicke’s analogy is fitting for his argument because he saw the
homosexual constitution as a product of the disordered state in a post-
lapsarian world. It is a “symptomatic participation in the fate of the
fallen world,” and, Thielicke claimed that this meant that homosexuals
should not be evaluated as inherently more sinful than “us ‘normal’
persons” (1964, 282–83). As he wrote:

The predisposition itself, the homosexual potentiality as such, dare not be

any more strongly depreciated than the status of existence which we all
share as men in the disordered creation that exists since the Fall (post
lapsum). . . . Consequently, there is not the slightest excuse for maligning
the constitutional homosexual morally or theologically. (1964, 283)

Theologically, Thielicke preferred to speak of all humanity as bearing

the same fallen status, with no room for singling out one group of persons
over any other. For this reason Thielicke argued that homosexuality as an
existential situation was immune from the condemnation leveled against
homosexual acts.
While Thielicke’s discussion of homosexuality as a predisposition
is noteworthy for what some have called its “qualified acceptance” of
the homosexual (Nelson 1978, 196), the heterosexist underpinnings of
his theological anthropology are easy to detect. Thielicke stressed that
 The Rhetoric of Homosexual Practice 607

homosexuals and heterosexuals shared the same postlapsarian existence,

but by no means did this place both sexual orientations on equal footing.
Theologically speaking, heterosexuality is good because it is part of the
order of creation. Indeed, Thielicke’s theological sexual anthropology
was based on the view that the sex differentiation referenced in the
first chapters of Genesis carries normative weight, for it establishes God’s
intention for man and woman to be together (1964, 4). Thus, while the
expression of heterosexuality always occurs in this fallen world and is
mired by sin, the heterosexual’s sexuality rests on the sure footing of
God’s intention for humankind. The expression of homosexuality is also
sinful, but homosexuality as a predisposition is rooted not in God’s
intention, but in human sinfulness. It is a “distortion or depravation” of
the created order of the sexes (1964, 283).
This theological difference cannot be underestimated, for it has an
immense impact on Thielicke’s description of the homosexual and his
moral evaluation of homosexual practice. Thielicke’s discussion of the
theological and existential situation that homosexuals find themselves in
depicts persons who have little choice in how they conduct themselves
sexually. Indeed, the constitutional homosexual, beset as he is with a
sexuality in discord with God’s intention for creation, is troubled by “the
slippery ground of his existence” and caught in “a situation of permanent
conflict” (1964, 287).
Thielicke did note that some of the conflict a homosexual faces is not
inherent to her sexual constitution, but is rooted in societal discrimination
and prejudice. Nevertheless, a consequence of Thielicke’s description
of homosexual personhood (one which he did not seem to appreciate) is
that a homosexual constitution compromises the sovereignty of the moral
agent. The homosexual is not in complete control of his actions, and is
defined by an inherent, dubious capacity to give in to sexual tempta-
tions and engage in homosexual practice. In other words, while Thielicke
wanted to keep his judgment of homosexual behavior separate from his
view of homosexuality as a condition, those two things elide in the course
of his analysis. Ultimately, then, the division does not protect the homo-
sexual person from a negative judgment.
For mainline American Protestants, Thielicke’s division between the
homosexual person and homosexual behavior was useful in responding
both to the medical establishment’s changing views about homosexuality
and the rise of the modern gay rights movement. The visibility of the
gay rights movement—especially following the 1969 Stonewall Riots—
in the late 1960s led gays and lesbians to publicly reject the stigma
attached to being gay. Frank Kameny, for example, coined the slogan
“Gay is good” (inspired by the phrase “Black is beautiful”) in 1968 to
offer an understanding of homosexuality not defined by frameworks of
pathology or sin.
608 Journal of Religious Ethics

Not coincidentally, these political and cultural movements paralleled

the shift in the official position of the medical community regarding
homosexuality. The pathological definition of homosexuality had come
under increasing challenge by the medical community in the 1960s and
early 1970s, culminating in the decision of the American Psychiatric
Association to remove homosexuality from its list of mental disorders in
1973. With homosexuality no longer viewed by the medical community as
a medical condition to be treated, mainline Protestant denominations had
to grapple with how to balance biblical authority with the consensus of
the professional community. As Heather White notes in her historical
study of Christian views of homosexuality, the separation of conduct from
the sexual orientation itself played a crucial role in this regard:
The distinction between homosexuality as a neutral orientation and
homosexual conduct as a sinful breach of Christian teachings functioned in
more complicated ways to provide Protestant churches a provisional stance
amid conflicting frameworks of medical science and biblical morality. . . . By
distinguishing orientation from practice, they could continue to embrace
medical frameworks that questioned homosexual pathology while also
upholding doctrines of homosexual sinfulness. (White 2007, 107)

Thus, the language of homosexual practice provides a vocabulary that

concedes the modern concept of homosexuality as a deeply ingrained,
non-pathological aspect of personhood, but also re-affirms biblical refer-
ences to homosexuality as a binding proscription of homosexual conduct.
This vocabulary became codified in the 1970s as a result of several
mainline Protestant statements regarding homosexuality. These state-
ments embodied the division of homosexual identity and conduct by, on
the one hand, expressing the need to protect gays and lesbians from
violence and discrimination in the church and society and asserting the
basic human dignity of gays and lesbians as creatures of God; and, on the
other hand, stating unequivocally that homosexual practice was against
Christian teaching. Along these lines, the UMC amended its Book of
Discipline in 1972 with a statement on homosexuality that affirmed
homosexuals to be persons of sacred worth no less than heterosexuals, but
labeled the practice of homosexuality incompatible with Christian teach-
ing.7 This statement was incorporated into the UMC’s ordination stand-
ards in 1984, when the General Conference adopted ¶ 304.3, banning
self-avowed practicing homosexuals from ordination.
The United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America
(UPCUSA)—a denomination that joined with two other Presbyterian
churches in 1983 to form the PC(USA)—used Bailey’s entry from the

7 The location of this statement within the Book of Discipline has changed over the years.

In the 2008 edition, it is found at ¶ 161F.

 The Rhetoric of Homosexual Practice 609

Dictionary of Christian Ethics in its statement on human sexuality

adopted in 1970, stating, “There is a difference between homosexuality as
a condition of personal existence and homosexualism as explicit homo-
sexual behavior” (The General Assembly of the UPCUSA 1970, 18). The
document also relied on Thielicke’s The Ethics of Sex to articulate homo-
sexuality as an identity. It noted that while Scripture does not single out
homosexuality as more heinous than other sins, homosexuality remains
indicative of “man’s refusal to accept his creatureliness” (1970, 18). This
statement did not address the ordination of gays and lesbians, but the
UPCUSA took up this issue in its 1978 statement “The Church and
Homosexuality,” which banned “persons who do not repent of homosexual
practice” from ordination. But it also made clear that homosexuals who
repent of homosexual practice—either by adopting a celibate way of life or
redirecting their sexual desire toward heterosexual relationships—can be
ordained. What is more, a non-practicing homosexual who seeks ordina-
tion is encouraged to disclose his or her sexuality, if only for the sake of
helping other gays and lesbians repent of their “practice.” “Indeed, such
candidates must be welcomed and be free to share their full identity. Their
experience of hatred and rejection may have given them a unique capacity
for love and sensitivity as wounded healers among heterosexual Chris-
tians, and they may be incomparably equipped to extend the church’s
outreach to the homosexual community” (The General Assembly of the
UPCUSA 1978, 60). In 1985, two years after the PC(USA) was formed, a
ruling of the General Assembly Permanent Judicial Commission (GAPJC),
the denomination’s highest court, declared that the 1978 statement was
“definitive guidance” for the church, giving it the force of law (General
Assembly Permanent Judicial Commission of the Presbyterian Church
(USA) 1985).8 In 1993, the General Assembly, the denomination’s highest
legislative body, reinforced the GAPJC’s decision by making the 1978
statement an “Authoritative Interpretation” of the Constitution of the
PC(USA). This Authoritative Interpretation set the ordination standard
regarding homosexuality until the General Assembly amended the Con-
stitution in 1997 by adopting G-60106b, a clause that prohibited persons
from ordination who refused to repent from a practice—that is, homo-
sexual practice—that the PC(USA) considered sinful.
It should be pointed out that this policy did not actually mention
homosexuality by name, and many of its proponents argued that its goal
was to raise behavioral standards for everyone, gay and straight alike.
While this is true in a technical sense, there is no question that the
controversy surrounding the ordination of gays and lesbians precipitated

8 Hereafter, the General Assembly Permanent Judicial Commission of the Presbyterian

Church (USA) will be referred to in citations as GAPJC.

610 Journal of Religious Ethics

the adoption of this policy.9 The fact that homosexual practice was not
named specifically was as much a strategy for getting G-60106b passed
as it was a plan to raise ordination standards for all. This policy was
overturned in 2011, paving the way for “practicing” gays and lesbians to
be ordained.
These policies were drafted over several decades and by many different
incarnations of the legislative bodies of the UMC and PC(USA). This is
an important point, because it emphasizes that the language I analyze
emerges from complex, often politicized, processes that involve many
members of the respective denominations. The end result is oftentimes a
policy that is somewhat ambiguous and open to interpretation. As cases
are brought forth that test the language of these policies, the role of the
church courts becomes paramount.

2. The Enforcement of the Rhetoric of Homosexual Practice

The documents surveyed codified the position that being homo-
sexual was protected as a status, but that acting homosexual was sinful.
However, the enforcement of these policies reveals that, much like in
Thielicke’s theological evaluation of homosexuality, the condemnation of
homosexual practice is no different than a suspicion of homosexual per-
sonhood. The line between personhood and practice, which proponents of
these ordination policies declare to be clear and justifiable, is nebulous at
best. There are numerous examples of the adjudication of these policies in
the UMC and PC(USA) that demonstrate how policies prohibiting homo-
sexual practice come to define homosexuals as persons.
Decisions of the UMC Judicial Council provide examples of this con-
flation of identity and practice. For example, in 1971, the year prior to the
UMC adopting legislation calling homosexual practice “incompatible with
Christian teaching,” F. Gene Leggett, an ordained minister in the South-
west Texas Annual Conference, announced at a meeting of the Conference
that he was a homosexual. The following month, “in light of this state-
ment and its implications,” the Conference suspended Leggett’s ordina-
tion, finding him “unacceptable in the work of the ministry” (Judicial
Council 1972, emphasis mine; Associated Press 1971). This action did not
initially involve church courts because of the UMC’s practice of annually
appointing clergy, meaning that each year an Annual Conference reaffirms
(or in this case, does not) each clergyperson’s ordination credentials and
assigns ministerial appointments. The Judicial Council upheld the con-
stitutionality of Leggett’s suspension. Leggett only stated that he was a
homosexual, but his colleagues were troubled by the implications of such

9 For a detailed discussion of the drafting and passage of G-60106b, see Weston 1999.
 The Rhetoric of Homosexual Practice 611

a statement. Were they worried that he would represent himself in public

as a homosexual, or that he would engage in homosexual sex? Whatever
the answer, Leggett’s suspension shows how just being openly gay made
one susceptible to church discipline.
Of course, Leggett’s suspension occurred before the ban on homo-
sexual practice was established. But the introduction of this ban, allowing
discipline to focus—presumably—on actions rather than status, only
changed the situation slightly. Identity and practice can be separated in
theory but conflated in practice because the term “practice” is ambiguous
and easy to manipulate. While it is easy to assume that practice refers
to sex with someone of the same gender, the term has actually proven
harder to define. Since the 1984 adoption of ¶ 304.3 banning self-avowed
practicing homosexuals from ordination, many decisions of the Judicial
Council that address this policy either emphasize the need for the General
Conference or Annual Conferences (the General Conference is the national
legislative body of the UMC and Annual Conferences are regional legis-
lative bodies) to define the phrase “self-avowed practicing homosexual” or
adjudicate the definitions offered by different Annual Conferences.10
Two decisions are particularly important regarding the ambiguity of
the term homosexual practice. The first was a 1995 decision adopted by
the California Pacific Conference that defined the phrase “self-avowed
practicing homosexual.” The Conference’s definition read, in part:
A self-avowed homosexual is one who makes it known by affirming publicly
that she/he engages in genital sexual behavior with a person of the same
gender. . . . “Practicing” does not mean behavior such as friendship or
persons living together as roommates, socializing or meeting with homo-
sexuals, or speaking in support of or agreement with homosexuality.
(Judicial Council 1995)

Though it does not address the basic injustice of prohibiting homosexual

practice, a definition such as this might prevent ecclesial rulings that
interpret “homosexual practice” so broadly as to include any public rep-
resentation of one’s status as a homosexual (such as Scalia’s dissenting
opinion in Romer). The Judicial Council ruled the definition was invalid,
but chose not to address the portion of the definition that dealt specifically
with homosexual practice. Instead, it stated that it was invalid because its
definition of “self-avowal” was insufficient insofar as it did not specify to
whom the avowal is to be made. The Council continued: “The failure of the
definition to include such identification renders the definition invalid. For
this reason, it is unnecessary to address the other questions presented”

10See Judicial Council 1984, Judicial Council 1993, Judicial Council 1994a, Judicial
Council 1994b, Judicial Council 1994c, Judicial Council 1995, Judicial Council 1998, Judicial
Council 2001, and Judicial Council 2005a.
612 Journal of Religious Ethics

(1995, emphasis mine). One of those questions, of course, dealt directly

with the definition of practice. That the Council turned down an oppor-
tunity to clarify what homosexual practice refers to is curious, since it
took the initiative to give guidance concerning how to proceed in defining
self-avowal. If the Council placed an importance on defining the phrase
“self-avowed practicing homosexual,” as it had stated it did in previous
decisions (1984 and 1993), its inaction regarding a proposed definition of
homosexual practice is inexplicable.
The irony of the attention the Judicial Council has paid to properly
defining the language of ¶ 304.3 is that it has also maintained that, in
the absence of any precise definition or in the presence of multiple
definitions, ¶ 304.3 is no less enforceable. In 2005 the California-Nevada
Annual Conference passed a statement that addressed the language of
homosexual practice. It read: “The California-Nevada Annual Conference
hereby specifically refuses and declines to define the word ‘practicing’ or
‘practicing homosexual’” (Judicial Council 2005a). After its passage, a
member of the Annual Conference submitted a query to the conference
bishop asking if the item called into question the enforceability ¶ of
304.3. The bishop responded that it did not, and the Judicial Council
was then asked to review the bishop’s ruling on the matter. In Decision
1020, the Judicial Council ruled, “the refusal of an annual conference to
define ‘practicing’ or ‘practicing homosexual’ does not void or violate the
enforceability of ¶ 304.3” (Judicial Council 2005a). This ruling would
have made sense if ¶ 304.3 offered a definition of homosexual practice.
If it did, there would be no reason for an Annual Conference to offer its
own definition. But ¶ 304.3 does not. A footnote to ¶ 304.3 offers a
definition of the entire phrase—“‘Self-avowed practicing homosexual’ is
understood to mean that a person openly acknowledges to a bishop,
district superintendent, district committee of ordained ministry, Board
of Ordained Ministry, or clergy session that the person is a practicing
homosexual”—but the definition is silent on what does and does not
constitute homosexual practice. It is concerned only with specifying
what constitutes self-avowal. Thus, there seems to be no official defini-
tion of the term.
Proponents of ¶ 304.3 might argue that the term “homosexual practice”
refers specifically to genital contact between persons of the same gender.
The Judicial Council emphasized this point in Decision 920. There, the
Council stipulated that a minister who is under review for being “a
self-avowed practicing homosexual” must be asked “whether she is
engaged in genital sexual acts with a person of the same gender” (Judicial
Council 2001). Furthermore, during the highly publicized trial of Beth
Stroud in 2005, this focus on genital contact was emphasized once again
(Judicial Council 2005b). While these cases confirm that the phrase
“homosexual practice” includes genital sex, it does not draw clear
 The Rhetoric of Homosexual Practice 613

boundaries as to what else may or may not be construed as homosexual

practice. At what point does one move from the category of “non-
practicing” to “practicing”? Does going on a date with someone of the same
gender or kissing someone of the same gender make one a practicing
homosexual? Does fantasizing about someone of the same gender consti-
tute homosexual practice? These questions remain unanswered.
At the very least, then, the lack of a detailed definition of homosexual
practice in the UMC documents makes it unclear what is being prohibited
and what is being prosecuted in disciplinary cases. An example from the
Book of Discipline further demonstrates this ambiguity. With one excep-
tion, all the offenses with which ordained ministers may be charged name
specific actions: sexual abuse, harassment, racial discrimination, etc. The
exception concerns homosexuality. “Being a self-avowed practicing homo-
sexual” is a chargeable offense in the UMC (2008, ¶ 2702). The wording
implies that it is not a specific act, but being a specific kind of person—the
kind of person who commits homosexual acts—that is a chargeable offense
in the UMC, turning what is supposed to be an ordination standard
focused on specific prohibited conduct into a judgment of a group of
persons. In the 2005 decision of the UMC Judicial Council that resulted
in the defrocking of Beth Stroud, two members of the Council offered a
minority opinion that further illustrates this point. The authors, Susan T.
Henry-Crowe and Beth Capen, argue that ¶ 304.3 of the Discipline
establishes an a priori judgment of homosexual candidates. “Only in
¶ 304.3,” they write, “is there a prohibition which relates to prejudged
‘conduct’ prior to examination of character. Is this not categorical discrimi-
nation?” (Judicial Council 2005b).
Some might argue that I am reading too much into the language
of these policies and their adjudication. But if, for some, the conflation
of homosexual conduct and identity is not explicit enough in the UMC
policies, consider the adjudication of the prohibition of homosexual prac-
tice in PC(USA) during the years when that policy was in effect.
Since the denomination’s formation in 1983, numerous decisions of the
GAPJC, despite the court’s efforts to protect homosexuality as a status,
have created circumstances that allow gay and lesbian ordinands, minis-
ters, and church officers to be questioned and/or disciplined based on the
knowledge or suspicion that they are homosexual. The cases that best
illustrate this situation are remedial cases, meaning they are cases
brought against an ordaining body rather than an individual. One of the
first significant cases in this judicial history involves Lisa Larges. Larges
became a candidate for ordination in 1986—eleven years before G-6.0106b
was adopted—in the Presbytery of the Twin Cities Area. In 1991, prior to
the final interview with her Committee on Preparation for Ministry
(CPM), she informed the CPM that she was a lesbian. The CPM conducted
the interview and voted to continue with her ordination process. Later
614 Journal of Religious Ethics

that year, the CPM recommended to the presbytery that Larges be

certified as ready to receive a call, one of the last steps before ordination.
The presbytery, aware that Larges had identified herself as a lesbian,
certified Larges as ready to receive a call. After the vote, thirty-two
members of the presbytery who voted “no” filed a complaint with the
Permanent Judicial Commission (PJC) of the Synod of Lakes and
Prairies—the synod to which the Presbytery of the Twin Cities Area
belongs—arguing that the certification of Larges was “irregular” and
should be revoked. The Synod PJC ruled that the provisions of “The
Church and Homosexuality” that banned “self-affirming, practicing homo-
sexuals” from ordination applied to Larges and that, therefore, her certi-
fication was irregular and should be rescinded. The Synod PJC was aware
that Larges had identified herself as a lesbian and not as a “practicing
lesbian,” but it argued that it found sufficient evidence to believe her to be
a “practicing homosexual,” though no such evidence was presented. Since
the evidence was never produced, it seems the rationale of the Synod PJC
was that her sexual orientation justified an inference about her disposi-
tion toward homosexual practice, regardless of whether or not she was
currently “practicing.” One study collecting data on ordination standards
asserts that the Synod PJC “made a judgment call guessing as to what
Ms. Larges might do in the future, not on any activity she was doing at
the time” (North Como Presbyterian Church 2005, 159).11
The presbytery promptly appealed the Synod PJC’s decision to the
GAPJC. In the decision, LeTourneau, et al. v. The Presbytery of the Twin
Cities Area (hereafter LeTourneau), the GAPJC acknowledged that Larges
never claimed to be a practicing lesbian but nevertheless upheld the
Synod PJC’s decision to revoke Larges’s certification for ordination. The
GAPJC was careful to point out that Larges was to remain a candidate for
ordination, but her presbytery could not certify her as “ready to receive
a call” until Larges had satisfactorily shown that she was not a practic-
ing homosexual. The decision affirmed, in other words, the notion that a
homosexual orientation is reason enough for a presbytery to refrain from
certifying a candidate as ready to receive a call. The implied reasoning
seems to be that being a homosexual grounds a reasonable suspicion that
one is or will inevitably become a practicing homosexual as well. To this
end, the GAPJC stated, “Sexual orientation and practice is relevant to a
candidate’s qualifications for ordination and must be investigated by a
presbytery’s [CPM] when, as here, the candidate has taken the initia-
tive in declaring his or her sexual orientation” (GAPJC 1992). The 1992
GAPJC clearly viewed the declaration of homosexual identity as some-
thing that calls one’s fitness for ordination into serious question. Because

11 I rely on this work for my summary of the Synod PJC decision in the case of Lisa

Larges.
 The Rhetoric of Homosexual Practice 615

she had declared herself to be a lesbian, Larges was guilty of homosexual

practice until proven innocent, and her CPM had not conducted sufficient
inquiries to sustain her innocence.
One direct consequence of the GAPJC’s decision in the 1992 case
regarding Lisa Larges was to set a judicial precedent allowing ordination
committees to question ordination candidates about their sexual orienta-
tion and, presumably, their sexual history. Coming out to one’s denomi-
nation not only could but should entail an investigation of orientation and
practice, according to the 1992 GAPJC. From the time of the LeTourneau
decision to the overturning of the PC(USA)’s anti-gay ordination policy
in 2011, this imperative to question gay and lesbian candidates about
their sexualities was upheld by the GAPJC in numerous cases, though the
specific circumstances under which an investigation becomes warranted
changed from case to case.
A key decision in this history is the 2002 case Ronald L. Wier v. Session,
Second Presbyterian Church of Ft. Lauderdale (hereafter Wier). In this
decision, which involved the ordination of a church member to the office
of deacon or elder (the decision does not specify which), the GAPJC upheld
the responsibility of an ordaining body to question candidates for church
office regarding homosexuality, and the way it did so highlights the
convoluted nature of the identity/conduct distinction. On the one hand,
the GAPJC seemingly offered protection to gay and lesbian candidates
from unwarranted, invasive questions by ordaining bodies. It emphasized
that the ordination standard in G-6.0106b stipulates that only those who
refuse to repent from “self-acknowledged practice” are disqualified from
ordination and church office, and that such self-acknowledgment must be
“plain, palpable, and obvious” before any special inquiry is warranted
(GAPJC 2002). The GAPJC stressed this point to prevent a recurrence of
what happened in the LeTourneau case from 1992, where Lisa Larges was
charged based on the suspicion that she would engage in homosexual
practice at some point in the future. To file charges against someone under
these circumstances, the GAPJC argued in Wier, is “to single out a
category of persons above and beyond other persons as more likely to sin”
(GAPJC 2002). By making this statement, the GAPJC was essentially
making the case against conflating sexual orientation and practice, some-
thing that had not been done before in the PC(USA).
On the other hand, the GAPJC then provided justification, as in the
1992 case, for questioning a candidate concerning his or her sexual
orientation and potential practice.
Since the ordaining and installing governing body best knows the life
and character of the candidate, initial and further inquiry as to compliance
with all the standards for ordination and installation belongs to that
governing body. If that governing body has reasonable cause for inquiry
based on its knowledge of the life and character of the candidate, it has
616 Journal of Religious Ethics

the positive obligation to make due inquiry and uphold all the standards
for ordination and installation. Consideration for inquiry is to be made solely
on an individual basis. . . . Therefore, if notwithstanding the requirement of
individualized inquiry based on reasonable cause, a governing body makes
a line of inquiry to a candidate without reasonable cause, all candidates
currently before that governing body must undergo the same inquiry.
(GAPJC 2002, emphasis mine)

The language in this statement shows that, despite providing a strong

definition for what constitutes self-acknowledgement, the GAPJC did
not clarify how an ordaining body might go about getting a candidate
to acknowledge homosexual practice. If an ordaining body has reason to
suspect someone of homosexual practice, then making inquiries of that
individual is the ordaining body’s positive obligation. If the ordaining body
did not have reasonable cause, questions could still be asked, but must be
asked of everyone being considered for ordination to avoid singling out,
in the GAPJC’s own words, “a category of persons above and beyond other
persons as more likely to sin” (2002).
It is easy to see how these guidelines can be abused. If an ordaining
body, for example, is considering three persons for ordination, and one
of them is known or thought to be a homosexual, then they might just
ask specific questions of all three candidates to avoid the appearance of
discrimination. Whether or not this was the intention of the GAPJC, some
have interpreted it this way (Vermaak 2009, 308). And despite the fact
that the GAPJC spoke against investigating someone simply because
of his or her sexual orientation, the ruling construed the guidelines so
broadly that the possibility for such an inquiry was still very much alive.
A decision the following year scaled back the latitude that the GAPJC
granted ordaining bodies in Wier to question candidates about homosexual
practice—with or without reasonable cause. In Presbytery of San Joaquin
v. Presbytery of the Redwoods (hereafter San Joaquin), the GAPJC first
affirmed the comments in Wier that sexual orientation could not by itself
prohibit someone from ordination. It then made clear that ordaining
bodies must have reasonable grounds to conduct special investigations of
candidates, and the reasonable grounds “must include factual allegations
of how, when, where, and under what circumstances the individual was
self-acknowledging a practice which the confessions call a sin” (GAPJC
2003b). Wier had stated something very similar, but the loophole it
opened—that ordaining bodies could investigate candidates about homo-
sexual practice without reasonable cause as long as they asked questions
of all candidates—was effectively closed by the GAPJC in 2003.
That is, the loophole was closed from 2003 to 2006, when the GAPJC
issued another decision that seemingly overturned portions of San
Joaquin. The circumstances of the 2006 GAPJC decision, Colonial
Presbyterian Church v. Grace Covenant Presbyterian Church, began in
 The Rhetoric of Homosexual Practice 617

2004 with the election of church officers at Grace Covenant Presbyterian

Church (hereafter, Grace Covenant). Between the election and installa-
tion of said officers, members of the Committee on Ministry (COM) of
Heartland Presbytery, to which Grace Covenant belonged, expressed
concern over one officer-elect who was “thought to be a lesbian” (GAPJC
2006). The COM met with representatives from Grace Covenant to discuss
the officers elected but did not report any concerns about them. The
ordination and installation of officers took place at Grace Covenant
several weeks after the meeting.
Several months later, the session of Colonial Presbyterian Church
(hereafter, Colonial), another church in the presbytery, requested from the
session of Grace Covenant that the church address an alleged delinquency
in the ordination of one or more of its elders. Grace Covenant did not
comply, at which time the session of Colonial submitted a complaint to
Heartland Presbytery that the election, ordination, and installation of
an elder at Grace Covenant was irregular and delinquent. The PJC of
Heartland Presbytery dismissed the case without holding a trial, arguing
that the complainant did not state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. In short, because there was not a claim that homosexual practice
had occurred—as stated earlier, the case was initiated because one elected
officer was thought to be a lesbian, not a practicing lesbian—there was no
cause to question whether the election, ordination, and installation of the
elder was constitutional. Colonial challenged that ruling, appealing to
the PJC of the Synod of Mid-America. The Synod PJC upheld the ruling
of the Presbytery PJC, and used the precedent from San Joaquin to argue
its case, citing that decision’s assertions that sexual orientation was not
sufficient grounds for a special investigation of ordination candidates and
that factual allegations of the self-acknowledgement of homosexual prac-
tice was necessary if an investigation was to be made.12 Colonial appeared
to be acting on the belief that one elected elder was a lesbian and did not
provide any evidence that said elder had self-acknowledged homosexual
practice.
Colonial, however, appealed to the GAPJC. The GAPJC overturned the
decisions of the Synod and Presbytery PJCs, applying the Wier ruling to
argue that Grace Covenant knew enough of the “life and character of the
candidate” to inquire of the candidate in question whether she was willing
to comply with the ordination standard in G-6.0106b. To be clear, the
GAPJC ruling was very narrow in scope; it suggested that, based on an
earlier decision (GAPJC 2003a) that stated the alleged facts of a com-
plaint must be assumed true when a PJC is deciding on whether the
complaint has enough merit to warrant a trial, the lower court rulings
were wrong to dismiss the case without holding a trial. It ordered that

12 See the summary of the Synod PJC decision in Vermaak 2009, 355.
618 Journal of Religious Ethics

Heartland Presbytery PJC look into the examining practices of Grace

Covenant and, if necessary, convene a trial.
In issuing this ruling, the GAPJC did not seem to consider the fact
that the complaint did not suggest that homosexual practice was self-
acknowledged by the elected elder (Vermaak 2009, 356). Furthermore,
Wier and San Joaquin stated that the ordaining body was in the best
position to decide if a candidate needed to be questioned to determine his
or her readiness for ordination. Grace Covenant did not see the need to
examine the elder-elect on her fitness for ordination regarding G-6.0106b,
yet, the GAPJC basically ruled that Colonial should have been able to
initiate a trial, even without producing any evidence to suggest that Grace
Covenant had reasonable grounds to investigate the elder in question.
These rulings in the PC(USA) judicial system show that the official
distinction between homosexual orientation and homosexual practice
often has little practical consequence. Prior to the 1996 passage of
G-6.0106b, the conflation of homosexual orientation and homosexual prac-
tice had been made explicit in the LeTourneau decision, which prevented
Lisa Larges from being declared ready to receive a call simply because she
is a lesbian. During the period when G-6.0106b was in force, the associa-
tion between being a homosexual and practicing one’s homosexuality
became more tacit. GAPJC decisions tried to stress that sexual orientation
was not a bar to various ordainable offices in the church, but it also gave
committees that supervise and approve candidates for ordination leeway
to investigate candidates who were gay. The investigations are clearly
meant to determine if the candidate in question is a practicing homo-
sexual and, thus, ineligible to hold a church office. But the lack of clarity
in terms of when such an investigation is appropriate created an envi-
ronment where any gay or lesbian candidate for ordination was treated as
a potential practicing homosexual. While candidates may have a good feel
for whether someone overseeing their ordination processes will insist on
conducting such an inquiry into their personal lives, the surfeit of church
court cases dealing with this very question—not all of which have been
discussed here13—prove that there was a legitimate cause for concern for
any gay or lesbian candidate for ordination or church office. After all,
many of the cases were initiated by persons who were not a part of the
ordination process and who were simply concerned that an ordained
officer in the church was in violation of G-6.0106b. Thus, in a denomina-
tion that expressly prohibited practicing homosexuals from being ordained

13
It is difficult to come up with an exact number of cases heard by the various levels of
courts (Presbytery, Synod, General Assembly) in the PC(USA). Jane Adams Spahr—herself
no stranger to church discipline—noted that in 2002 alone there were twenty-four new cases
initiated regarding openly gay or lesbian clergy or church officers (Davidson, Smith, and
Spahr 2003, 385).
 The Rhetoric of Homosexual Practice 619

and provided the opportunity for a gay candidate to be questioned about

whether he or she was practicing, there was little or no respite for gays
and lesbians from the suspicions implicit in the policy and its judicial
enforcement. Gays and lesbians who were ordained or who were candi-
dates for ordination were always at risk of having their sexual subjectivity
brought under ecclesial adjudication. In short, the neat division between
“homosexual” and “practicing homosexual” was meaningless.
In both the UMC and PC(USA), the enforcement of ordination bans
on practicing homosexuals has revealed in different ways the difficulty
of protecting the status of being a homosexual while also categorically
prohibiting homosexual practice. The unstable meaning of the phrase
itself and the willingness of church courts to allow inquiries into the
sexual behaviors and histories of gay and lesbian candidates for ordi-
nation show that, despite the stated intentions of the authors and
defenders of these policies, the effects of the prohibition of homosexual
practice discriminate against gays and lesbians as a group and discour-
age gays and lesbians from pursuing positions of leadership when such
policies are in place. In short, the rhetoric of homosexual practice
addresses much more than “practice”—it is a judgment against gay and
lesbian personhood.

3. Sexual Identity, Sexual Expression, and the Rhetoric of

Homosexual Practice
The rejoinder to my argument will no doubt be to point to the fact that
few ordination candidates have been denied ordination based on their
status alone, and that those gay and lesbian clergy and ordinands who
have been subjected to discipline are those that came out as “practicing.”
Such a line of reasoning has given these policies staying power over the
past four decades, but the ban on homosexual practice does not simply
isolate a set of actions deemed sinful. Because these policies link specific
actions to sexual identity—that is, the actions’ moral value is connected to
the sexual identity of the persons performing them—it is difficult to enact
a clear-cut division between sexual conduct and sexual identity. If homo-
sexual identity is a key component in the moral evaluation of sexual
conduct, then is homosexual identity genuinely protected as a status? Is
a “non-practicing” homosexual, even if he or she manages to become
ordained, truly equal under these policies?
Furthermore, to say that banning practicing homosexuals from ordina-
tion is different from a ban on homosexuals in general seems predicated
on the notion that there is a tidy division between the sexual self and
sexual expression, and that categorically denying the latter somehow does
not do harm to the former. Such a claim is only tenable in the abstract,
and then only for those who have never lived within or tried to view
620 Journal of Religious Ethics

reality from the sexual margins. Michael Hartwig has argued forcefully
that imposed life-long sexual abstinence is both immoral and harmful,
insofar as it “undermines the development of our capacity to love with
greater depth and intimacy” (Hartwig 2000, 3), and this seems especially
true in the case of a categorical ban on homosexual practice because it
imposes life-long abstinence on one particular group.14 Whatever the
intentions of the proponents of these policies—whether they seek a middle
path in an effort to hold struggling denominations together, or whether
they seek to enforce a morality driven by biblical literalism in as politi-
cally correct a way as possible—the effect of these policies is to create a
hostile environment for gays and lesbians in the church. This environ-
ment amounts to what Jakobsen and Pellegrini have referred to as
“coercive homogeneity” (2004, 149).
After all, if a homosexual’s sexual identity is protected as an integral
aspect of her identity as a whole, and if that identity is then defined by
a practice labeled sinful and incompatible with Christian teaching, then a
homosexual’s subjectivity is so defined by sin that the abundant life that
Christ offers seems like a tantalizing fantasy to gays and lesbians. Scott
Anderson, a minister in the PC(USA) who for years struggled to serve his
denomination in the face of discrimination and recently became one of the
first “practicing” gay persons to be ordained, noted in his official objection
to G-6.0106b that the categorical prohibition of homosexual practice has
such an effect.

The message it sends to gay and lesbian believers everywhere is that no

matter how hard we might work and strive to conform our lives to the shape
of the Gospel, we are disqualified on the basis of unchosen aspects of who we
are from ever being able to respond to the call of God. This comes danger-
ously close, I believe, to telling gay and lesbian believers that Jesus Christ
has nothing to offer people like me. (S. Anderson 2010)

The prohibition of homosexual practice, to Anderson, gives the Gospel

a distinctly heterosexual form. The reflections of one minister who was
ousted from the UMC, Rose Mary Denman, express something similar.
She writes that she assumed she was heterosexual for so long “because to
stand in relationship to God and the Church was seen as synonymous
with being heterosexual” (Denman 1990, 182).
The prohibition of homosexual practice sends a clear message that the
church is a space for heterosexuals, whether real or pseudonymous, and
the reality of being gay or lesbian is denied validity. Consider the words
of Lisa Larges in her objection to G-6.0106b. She writes:

14 As Paul Capetz has shown, there are strong theological precedents in Protestantism

that oppose mandating life-long abstinence for a group of persons. See Capetz 2010, 115–31.
 The Rhetoric of Homosexual Practice 621

[G-6.0106b] denies the dignity and lived experience of same-gender loving

people. . . . It removes sex from the context of intimacy and covenantal
relationship and denies the fullness and richness of committed loving
relationships between persons of the same gender. . . . It denies the full
humanity of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender persons by focusing
solely and exclusively on one part of their lives. (Larges 2007)

Larges distills into a few short sentences what is truly at stake—the full
humanity of gays and lesbians. If church policy treats the sexuality of
gays and lesbians as the defining trait of their personhood only to deny
them the lived experience of their sexuality, are homosexuals fully human
in the eyes of those who espouse these policies? This question is not
hyperbolic. If the theological anthropology that underlies the rhetoric of
homosexual practice is heterosexist, then those who do not identify as
heterosexual do not have an equal place within it. And this is what
convolutes the distinction between homosexual identity and homosexual
practice. Those who support ordination bans on practicing homosexuals
speak clearly about their views of homosexual behavior, but too often
either equivocate when it comes to evaluating homosexual identity or say
it is not the issue. Such equivocation is simply not acceptable. They must
be clear about how they define homosexual identity and how they evaluate
it morally.
The irony of my argument is that the conflation of conduct and identity
is not in and of itself a bad thing. Sexual identities (and identities in
general) must be connected to the daily realities of our lives, to how we
choose to express ourselves as sexual beings. The ban on homosexual
practice denies gays and lesbians this possibility, which is why it is so
disingenuous to suggest that categorically banning homosexual practice
does not discriminate against all homosexuals. To move beyond this
situation, these policies must be overturned. But, in the mainline Protes-
tant denominations that have recently taken this step—namely, the
PC(USA) and the ELCA—the reticence to sanction same-gender marriages
shows that full equality for those who do not identify as heterosexual
requires more than a policy change. Theologically, our vision of what it
means to be human must be severed from heteronormative definitions of
sex and gender. Such a theological anthropology would free us to evaluate
the morality of sexual expression by how it contributes to the abundant life
to which Christ calls us. Perhaps most challenging, though, is communi-
cating these theological and ethical revisions to denominational bodies
and congregations in a way that moves the church toward a place that is
affirming for all persons regardless of sexual identity.
622 Journal of Religious Ethics

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