Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
July 2009
Volume 6, No. 7
KOREAN WON:
Risk thermometer
HOT DOWN p. 26
UNDER:
Aussie and Kiwi
dollars p.
p. 88 UNDERSTANDING
THE DOLLAR:
Know the players
IS THERE A BEST p. 18
TIME OF THE MONTH
for breakouts? p.
p. 20
20
CONTENTS
EUR/USD D 10:02:18
{
1.26895
Competitive 1.26870 1.26875
1.26890
0 5
Bid/Ask
Spreads
1.0 87 87 1.0
1.26885
1.26880 {
Bid 875 10 Offer 870 1.26875 1
1-Click
1.26870
Entry Order
E
Amt(M) Cpty Bid Offer Cpty Amt(M) 1.26865
1.26860
1.0 870 875 1.0
1.26855
{
1.0 866 883 1.0 New Order
Display Up to
o 1.0 856 884 10.0
10 Levels of 10.0 856 885 7.5
Market Depthh 7.5 855 886 10.0
www.fxcm.com/atforex
1-646-432-2970
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WARNING: Trading foreign exchange on margin carries a high level of risk and may not be suitable for all investors. Before deciding to trade foreign exchange, you
should carefully consider your monetary objectives, level of experience, and risk appetite. The possibility exists that you could sustain a loss of some or all of your
deposited funds, and therefore you should not speculate with capital that you cannot afford to lose. *Without proper risk management, currency trading has a high
degree of leverage which can lead to large losses as well as gains. **Please note FXCM Micro in its discretion may or may not offset individual transactions unlike
transactions in most FXCM Standard accounts.
CONTENTS
Forex News
Forex scams on the rise . . . . . . . . . . . . .32
Financial market regulators are seeing an
uptick in scams, especially in the forex market.
By Chris Peters
webmaster@currencytradermag.com.
Ablesys InterbankFX
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These results are based on simulated or hypothetical performance results that have certain inherent limitations. Unlike the results shown in an actual performance record, these results
do not represent actual trading. Also, because these trades have not actually been executed, these results may have under-or over-compensated for the impact, if any, of certain market
factors, such as lack of liquidity. Simulated or hypothetical trading programs in general are also subject to the fact that they are designed with the benefit of hindsight. No representation
is being made that any account will or is likely to achieve profits or losses similar to these being shown. The testimonial may not be representative of the experience of other clients and
the testimonial is no guarantee of future performance or success CTA Firm
CONTRIBUTORS
CONTRIBUTORS
T
he spring months were kind to the currencies months. Figure 1 shows the Aussie dollar posted a stunning
Down Under, as the Aussie/U.S. dollar rally vs. the U.S. dollar, soaring from its March low at
(AUD/USD) and the New Zealand/U.S. dollar 0.6280 to its 0.8250 June peak. Kiwi bulls launched a similar
(NZD/USD) were finally able to shake off the type of rally, taking the currency from the March low at
massive bear moves that had driven them to multi-year 0.4890 to the June high at 0.6590.
lows in late 2008 and 2009. Let’s take a look at the economic forecasts, monetary pol-
A number of factors contributed to the bullish turn- icy outlooks, and currency market forecasts for these two
arounds in the Aussie and the kiwi, including positive countries. Do the fundamentals support an extension of
growth and interest-rate differentials, a shift away from these currencies’ rallies, or have the Aussie and kiwi
risk aversion, and rising commodity prices in recent overextended themselves?
— CONTACT —
Bob Dorman Allison Chee Mark Seger
Ad sales East Coast and Midwest Ad sales West Coast and Southwest Account Executive
bdorman@activetradermag.com achee@activetradermag.com seger@activetradermag.com
(312) 775-5421 (415) 272-0999 (312) 377-9435
Bubble contamination
FIGURE 1 — CRB INDEX VS. U.S. DOLLAR INDEX
The CRB-dollar relationship appears to be a near-perfect inverse correlation Analyzing market bubbles
(the dollar index scale is inverted).
bursts some theories about
the relationship between oil
and the dollar.
BY BARBARA ROCKEFELLER
After the Nasdaq collapsed, it took years for the index to significantly rebound.
Speculators are forming Source: Chart — Metastock; data — Reuters and eSignal
Pondering the possibilities Projecting the linear regression trendline points to oil around $90 by the end of
These are not forecasts; they are possi- 2009.
bilities. A $20 rise in the price of oil
from $70 to $90 is about 29 percent.
Does that mean the knee-jerk market
will cause a bubble in the Euro of
about the same percentage? If so, we
would be looking for the Euro to rise
from around 1.4052 in late June to
1.6722 by year end, if the Euro moves
one-for-one with oil.
The question is whether this is a
realistic expectation. Unfortunately, it
probably is. I call it “bubble contami-
nation” because the price of oil is influ-
enced as much by its own price itself as
by the real fundamentals; it is in the
grip of speculators.
As for the dollar coming under pres-
sure and the Euro being the automatic
beneficiary, the long-standing anti-dol-
lar bias in the market now has some Source: Chart — Metastock; data — Reuters and eSignal.
heavy ammunition behind it: the
extreme level of debt issued by the U.S. government to fight real reason for the Euro to rise, if that’s what happens, will
recession. This high debt is thought to be automatically be the price of oil.
inflationary and outside the ability of the Fed to manage.
But inflation has yet to appear. It is, so far, theoretical. The For information on the author see p. 6.
Trading currencies
The subset of foreign exchange market
participants who view the forex mar-
ket as a potential profit opportunity
for almost a third of the return of a cies as little more than the transaction- appears to be rather small. It is largely
portfolio of international equities over al vehicle necessary to buy foreign limited to speculators, hedge funds,
time and almost two-thirds of the and dealers and proprietary traders
return on a portfolio of global at banks. Although foreign
exchange trading can be very lucra-
bonds. For that matter, investors in
U.S. blue-chip multinational com-
The subset of market tive, banks typically may not make
panies also take on currency expo- as much money outguessing the
sure, albeit indirectly. participants who view forex market as one might imagine.
It is ironic, but prices in the cur- Instead they make money the old-
rency market may not be set the as a potential profit fashioned way, relying on the
way we might assume they are, spread between the bid, or purchase
with profit-maximizing buyers and
sellers duking it out over them.
opportunity appears to be price, and offer, or sell price, and
access to superior and private infor-
That’s because many, if not most, of mation, such as what their clients
the folks trading those trillions of rather small, mostly limited are doing (that is, the order book).
dollars every day are not trying to In the U.S. equity market, client
maximize their profits in the for- to speculators, hedge activity is inside information, and it
eign exchange market. They simply is illegal to trade on it. However, the
don’t see currencies as an asset
class — as an opportunity for prof-
funds, and dealers and foreign exchange market is mostly
unregulated. (Banks have to comply
it — but rather as a risk that needs with applicable capital regulations,
to be hedged, a cost that needs to be proprietary traders at banks. and listed currency derivatives con-
made certain, or a transactional tracts are regulated.) If bank traders
vehicle needed to purchase another shares. Some international equity do not use information generated from
asset, which is more likely what they funds hedge all or some of the curren- the clients’ activities to influence their
are trying to maximize return on. cy risk embedded in their portfolios, own assessment and risk taking for the
Corporate treasurers are hedgers. but for the most part they seem to be in bank, then they are not maximizing
Currency exposure is an uncertainty, the minority. Fixed-income managers the opportunity of their position. Their
and uncertainties are often costly. more typically hedge out the currency performance will likely reflect that.
Companies find it difficult to succeed risk of a foreign bond purchase in the The currency market may hold out
in growing earnings by increasing pro- swap market or another derivative the promise of lucrative profit oppor-
ductivity, client servicing, and the like, market; they simply want to capture tunities for those who are willing to
but executives are loath to risk earn- the interest-rate potential and capital take the time to learn how to trade for-
ings on what appears to some to be lit- gain of the bond, not the value of the eign exchange because many other
tle more than a bet on a currency direc- currency in which it is denominated. participants are not looking to maxi-
tion. Moreover, the incentive structure Central banks also operate in the for- mize profits in that space. However,
appears to be such that the decision to eign exchange market, but they oper- because of the nature of the foreign
hedge when not necessary is much ate under political and economic moti- exchange market, retail investors seem
A
Source: TradeStation re particular times of the day,
month, or year better than others
TABLE 1 — TOTAL RESULTS for trading certain strategies or
With the exception of the AUD/USD and GBP/USD pairs, 10-day currencies? Certainly, the fact that
breakouts triggered in the first 10 days of the month fared poorly. currency pairs demonstrate definite liquidity
patterns in different portions of the 24-hour
1 2 3 global forex trading session suggests specific
USD/CAD Avg. trade -$71 $155 -$55 times might be more favorable than others.
Total P/L -$6,648 $18,878 -$6,248 There are also studies indicating certain longer-
No. entries 93 122 113 term “seasonal” influences tied to the equity
USD/CHF Avg. trade -$37 $116 -$20 markets (see “Related reading”).
Total P/L -$3,977 $12,475 -$2,199 But what about the advantages or disadvan-
No. entries 108 108 111 tages of trading currencies or certain strategies
USD/JPY Avg. trade -$125 $304 $163 at different times of the month? Could a simple
Total P/L -$12,971 $31,020 $18,121 momentum strategy — a short-term breakout,
No. entries 104 102 111 for example — perform better or worse in one
GBP/USD Avg. trade $321 $66 $75 part of the month?
Total P/L $36,299 $7,055 $7,472 To find out, let’s look at how a basic channel
No. entries 113 107 99 breakout strategy performed at different times
AUD/USD Avg. trade $118 $47 $57 of the month in seven major currency pairs.
Total P/L $14,029 $5,097 $5,853
No. entries 119 109 103 The strategy
EUR/JPY Avg. trade $12 -$148 $115 The entry signal was a simple 10-day breakout:
Total P/L $1,285 -$16,855 $13,159 Go long on a move above the highest high of
No. entries 106 114 114 the past 10 days and go short on a move below
EUR/USD Avg. trade -$44 $186 $261 the lowest low of the past 10 days. Positions
Total P/L -$4,561 $20,652 $29,002 were exited on the close five days after entry if
No. entries 104 111 111 not reversed by a signal in the opposite direc-
tion.
Total trade signals: 747 773 762 This approach was used because of its sim-
Median no. signals: 106 109 111 plicity and the fact that it traded regularly but
Median (avg.) trade: -$37 $91 $95
not hyperactively — it triggered approximately
two or three times a month per currency pair in
Median (total) P/L: -$3,977 $12,475 $7,472
the analysis period.
Total $: $23,455 $78,320 $65,159
continued on p. 22
1 2 3
USD/JPY 44.23% 61.76% 61.26%
USD/CAD 49.46% 53.28% 53.10%
USD/CHF 53.70% 52.78% 54.95%
The currencies EUR/USD 52.88% 51.35% 58.56%
The system was tested on seven currency pairs: U.S. dol- GBP/USD 48.67% 52.34% 48.48%
lar/Japanese yen (USD/JPY), U.S. dollar/Canadian dollar AUD/USD 54.62% 49.54% 58.25%
(USD/CAD), U.S. dollar/Swiss franc (USD/CHF), EUR/JPY 47.17% 46.49% 55.26%
Euro/U.S. dollar (EUR/USD), British pound/U.S. dollar Median 49.46% 52.34% 55.26%
(GBP/USD), Australian dollar/U.S. dollar (AUD/USD),
and Euro/Japanese yen (EUR/JPY). These rep-
resent the most active dollar-linked currency TABLE 3 — RESULTS FOR NARROWED PORTFOLIO
pairs, as well as a major non-dollar cross rate.
Removing the AUD/USD, GBP/USD, and EUR/JPY pairs
Figure 1 shows a few trades that occurred in the
underscores the period 1 underperformance.
EUR/USD pair.
1 2 3
The test USD/CAD Avg. trade -$71 $155 -$55
The month was divided into three periods: 1) Total P/L -$6,648 $18,878 -$6,248
day 1 through day 10; 2) day 11 through day 20; No. entries 93 122 113
3) day 21 through the last day of the month. USD/CHF Avg. trade -$37 $116 -$20
These divisions were based on calendar day, not Total P/L -$3,977 $12,475 -$2,199
trading day — that is, “3” is the third day of the No. entries 108 108 111
month, not necessarily the third trading day. USD/JPY Avg. trade -$125 $304 $163
The trades were grouped according to the peri- Total P/L -$12,971 $31,020 $18,121
od in which the entry signal occurred, not the No. entries 104 102 111
period in which the exit occurred, or the period EUR/USD Avg. trade -$44 $186 $261
in which the bulk of the trade lasted. For exam- Total P/L -$4,561 $20,652 $29,002
ple, a trade triggered on the final day of period No. entries 104 111 111
1 that lasted five days into period 2 would fall
into period 1. Total trade signals: 409 443 446
The analysis period spanned September 1999 Median no. signals: 104 109.5 111
through June 2009, and included 2,282 trades — Median (avg.) trade -$58 $186 $163
approximately 325 trades per currency pair, or Median (total) P/L: -$5,605 $19,765 $7,961
32 per pair, per year. Commissions or slippage Total $: -$28,157 $83,024 $38,676
were not assessed in the test.
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pairs had negative average trades and total P/Ls (one, mation from Table 3. The winning percentages increase
EUR/JPY, was essentially flat) while only two (GBP/USD from periods 1 to 3, with period 1 containing the lowest win
and AUD/USD) had positive average trades and P/Ls. rate for two currencies (dollar/yen and dollar/Canada) and
Also, the first period had the fewest trade sig-
nals — something that could be interpreted as FIGURE 3 — WINNING PERCENTAGE FOR SELECT PAIRS
evidence that it was unfriendly to the type of The winning percentage increase from period 1 to period 3 was even
momentum trade signal represented by the more noticeable in the limited portfolio.
strategy.
Table 2 breaks down the winning percentages
by period. Again, the first period of the month
came up weakest, with a 49.46-percent median
win rate for the seven currency pairs, compared
to 52.34 percent for the middle of the month,
and 55.26 percent for the final third. The highest
and lowest winning percentages for each cur-
rency pair are highlighted green and red,
respectively. The first period never had the
highest winning percentage, but it had the low-
est twice. Although the third period had the
lowest winning percentage in one currency pair
(GBP/USD), it had the highest in four other
currency pairs.
Three currency pairs bear comment at this
point in the analysis. The EUR/JPY pair is the
only currency pair that doesn’t contain the dol-
lar, and because it produced essentially random 1 2 3
results, we’ll exclude it from further analysis. USD/JPY 44.23% 61.76% 61.26%
The pound and Aussie dollar are interesting in USD/CAD 49.46% 53.28% 53.10%
their correlation — two “crown” currencies that USD/CHF 53.70% 52.78% 54.95%
bucked the trend of period 1 underperfor- EUR/USD 52.88% 51.35% 58.56%
mance. Let’s concentrate now on the four other Median 51.17% 53.03% 56.76%
currencies — USD/CAD, USD/CHF,
USD/JPY, and EUR/USD — which are the
major dollar-linked currency pairs, and FIGURE 4 — AVERAGE TRADE FOR SELECT CURRENCY PAIRS
which had more uniform performance. Period 3 was a mixed bag, but period 1’s average trade was clearly the
worst, while period 2’s was the best.
Narrowing the focus
Table 3, which shows the statistics for the
four remaining currency pairs, paints a
much more negative picture of 10-day
breakout signal performance in the first
period of the month, but also highlights
more favorable aspects of the second peri-
od, which appears to be the most consistent
in this limited portfolio. Period 1 had the
fewest trade signals (Figure 2) — again, a
sign of a lack of price momentum — as well
as negative average trade and P/L figures
for all pairs. Period 2 had the highest aver-
age trade and net P/L figures, and the sec-
ond-highest number of trade signals.
Period 3 had the most trade signals and the
second-highest average trade and P/L
numbers.
Figure 3 sheds more light on the infor-
BY HOWARD L. SIMONS
K
orea may be the only
country on earth able to
stand toe-to-toe with
Poland in a Bad Choice of
Neighbors contest. Poland’s history
includes multiple partitions, a complete
disappearance, brutal invasions and fight-
ing on its soil, and an artificial division
between hostile powers, while Korea’s his-
tory includes … pretty much the exact
same list.
FIGURE 2 — CARRY TO THE YEN FAILED FIRST
The significant and lasting difference
The yen-won cross is more important than the dollar-won cross. While in between the two countries is Korea had
August 2007 the KRW/USD carry was relatively dormant, the yen began to the good sense to be occupied by the U.S.
move against the KRW at this time (green vertical line). The KRW didn’t start to instead of Russia. It is often pointed out
weaken dramatically against the USD for another six months. that when Ghana was granted independ-
ence from the UK in 1960, it had the same
gross domestic product (GDP) as Korea, a
situation almost incomprehensible today.
If you are going to be occupied, make sure
the occupying power does everything it
can to finance your development and
prove a point about the merits of its eco-
nomic system vis-à-vis a communist alter-
native.
The largesse, however, has not been in
one direction only. The Korean brand of
crony capitalism — consisting of large
conglomerates, or chaebol, intertwined
with government agencies — provided a
model for the evolution of American busi-
ness during the recent bailout binge.
The same reliance on a small group of
large businesses and a small group of large
neighbors has made the Korean economy
continued on p. 28
Dan Gramza Jon Najarian Guy Adami Kathy Lien Rob Booker Cornelius Luca
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ADVANCED STRATEGIES
and currency given to spasms, mostly in a negative direction, over markets proved vulnerable to just a few large enterprises weaken-
the past 20 years. Twice — once during the 1997-1998 Asian cri- ing or to a small number of external factors beyond its control.
sis and once during the 2007-2009 credit crunch — Korean
financial markets and the won (KRW) have taken a severe beating External exposure
as the chaebol system and the country’s large exposure to foreign While the common perception is Korea is a mercantilist economy
funding underscored a certain economic inflexibility. The Korean overweighted toward exports, it might be instructive to note how
the monthly balance of trade expressed as
a percentage of GDP remained negative for
most of the 1990s until the onset of the
Asian crisis (Figure 1). The country ran a
trade deficit and a capital surplus for most
of this period — the combination that has
characterized the U.S. for more than 30
years.
It was not until the massive capital out-
flows induced by the Asian crisis that the
KRW and the ability to import goods col-
lapsed and the country shifted into a trade
surplus that would endure almost continu-
ously until the end of 2007. Then the KRW
fell once again as capital flowed outward;
the trade balance remained negative, how-
ever, because the country did not immedi-
ately enter a recession.
It is important to recognize the source of
the capital flowing out of Korea. If we com-
pare the Royal Bank of Scotland (formerly
ABN-Amro) carry trade indices for borrow-
ing either the Japanese yen (JPY) or the
U.S. dollar (USD) and lending in KRW,
Figure 2 shows the JPY has been the more
important of the two funding currencies
(see “Currency traders should be hum-
bler,” and “Looking at the carry trade,” May
and June 2007, respectively, regarding the
carry indices and the yen carry trade, and
“The short, awful life of the dollar carry
trade,” August 2008, regarding the dollar
carry trade).
A glance at this comparative carry chart
should convince KRW traders the yen-won
cross is the more important rate to keep in
mind. It began to move against the KRW in
August 2007 (green vertical line), a time
when the KRW/USD carry was quiet.
Indeed, in a perfect world a KRW trader
would study the incentives for Japanese
lenders to close their carry trades, sell the
KRW and repurchase their borrowed JPY.
The KRW did not start to weaken precipi-
tously against the USD until February
2008, six months after it started to weaken
against the yen.
The weak
interest-rate link
While expected interest-rate differentials
explain major market exchange rates well
(especially the USD/EUR and USD/CAD
rates), they are less effective in explaining
the movements of minor exchange rates.
The USD/KRW rate is no exception.
If we first calculate the forward rate ratio
between six- and nine-month LIBOR
(FRR6,9) — the rate at which we can lock
in borrowing for three months starting six
months from now, divided by the nine-
month rate itself — for each currency, we
get a measure of expected interest-rate
the KRW — than American short-term interest rates. cy by the three-month period of a standard non-deliverable for-
Figure 4 shows the connection here is weak, and the lead time
ward; here the lead time has been closer to five months. Also,
involved is irregular. Normally FRR differentials lead the curren-
while the sharp drop in the differential during the first half of
2008 led the KRW lower, similar
drops in the first halves of 2002 and
FIGURE 3 — KOREAN STOCK – WON LINK BROKE DURING WON COLLAPSE
2004 did nothing of the sort.
The long period of Korean stock-market outperformance vs. the U.S. from late 2001 Moreover, none of the large spikes
through 2007 coincided with a stronger KRW. in the FRR6,9 differential, including
those of late 2000, mid-2003, and
January 2008, led to a stronger
KRW. We have to conclude, there-
fore, the USD/KRW exchange rate is
not driven by expected short-term
interest-rate differentials.
Volatility
Finally, let’s turn to the subject of
volatility. If we map the volatility of
KRW forwards for a USD holder
against the USD/KRW exchange
rate, we see two separate and dis-
tinct regimes since the volatility
data began in March 1999 (Figure
5). Between that date and
November 2004, KRW volatility
was quiet and virtually unrelated to
the USD/KRW rate. After December
2004, the link between volatility
and the KRW became quite direct
and remained that way into
FIGURE 4 — WON-DOLLAR RATE NOT A STRONG FUNCTION OF EXPECTED December 2008. During the 2008
INTEREST-RATE DIFFERENTIALS sell-off in the KRW, volatility
The connection between interest-rate differentials and the KRW is weak and irregular. jumped as fast as the KRW weak-
ened. Such a link suggests the KRW
was part of leveraged hedge-fund
and commodity-trading strategies,
one where a general order to reduce
risk led to the aforementioned
unwinding of carry trades and
shedding of Korean assets, regard-
less of their intrinsic worth.
Restated, Korean markets, like so
many others, were being carried
along on a general tide of increased
risk acceptance or aversion.
LEGEND:
Volume: 30-day average daily volume, in thousands. direction. For example, the % rank for 10-day move by the long-term volatility (100-day standard deviation
shows how the most recent 10-day move compares to of prices). The % rank is the percentile rank of the
OI: 30-day open interest, in thousands.
the past twenty 10-day moves; for the 20-day move, volatility ratio over the past 60 days.
10-day move: The percentage price move from the the % rank field shows how the most recent 20-day
close 10 days ago to today’s close. move compares to the past sixty 20-day moves; for This information is for educational purposes only.
20-day move: The percentage price move from the the 60-day move, the % rank field shows how the most Currency Trader provides this data in good faith, but
close 20 days ago to today’s close. recent 60-day move compares to the past one-hun- assumes no responsibility for the use of this infor-
60-day move: The percentage price move from the dred-twenty 60-day moves. A reading of 100% means mation. Currency Trader does not recommend buy-
close 60 days ago to today’s close. the current reading is larger than all the past readings, ing or selling any market, nor does it solicit orders to
The “% rank” fields for each time window (10-day while a reading of 0% means the current reading is buy or sell any market. There is a high level of risk
moves, 20-day moves, etc.) show the percentile rank lower than the previous readings. in trading, especially for traders who use leverage.
of the most recent move to a certain number of the Volatility ratio/% rank: The ratio is the short-term The reader assumes all responsibility for his or her
previous moves of the same size and in the same volatility (10-day standard deviation of prices) divided actions in the market.
lent enterprises — often cases in which the drying up of defendants claimed historical returns of 6 to 10 percent for
incoming funds exposes Ponzi schemes (in which funds each month from January 2000 through June 2006, without
from new clients are used to pay off previous clients to cre- a single loss.
ate the impression of investment profits where none exist). The most recent action, filed against San Francisco-based
Since Bernard Madoff’s high-profile case first shook the SNC Asset Management on June 9, involved approximate-
investment world in December 2008, the Securities and ly 500 customers. The perpetrators of SNC Asset
Exchange Commission (SEC) has reported a massive Management are accused of scamming members of the San
increase in the number of fraud cases. In June alone, anoth- Francisco Bay area Korean community, claiming historical
er six cases were filed involving multi-million dollar Ponzi returns of 50 percent per year, and guaranteed monthly
schemes. The CFTC filed 23 cases against Ponzi-type returns of 2 to 3 percent. Similar to Madoff’s apparent
schemes in the first half of 2009. exploitation of the close-knit Jewish community to acquire
“The CFTC is committed to using every means to end the clients, SNC Asset Management CEO Peter C. Son and CFO
Ponzi-liferation of schemes that have been detected and Jin K. Chung allegedly abused the trust of the Korean com-
exposed thus far so that wrongdoers are severely punished munity in an attempt to pocket millions.
and others are deterred from pursuing a life of criminality,” The CFTC claims the scam began as early as 2003, alleg-
said CFTC director of enforcement Stephen J. Obie in a ing it defrauded investors out of more than $85 million,
recent enforcement-action announcement. with approximately $22 million acquired from October 2007
The latest string of cases filed by the CFTC, on May 21, through October 2008, after which the scheme fell apart.
May 26, and June 9, all involved forex-related firms. In one This makes the case one of the largest in recent years
case involving Houston-based PrivateFX Global One, the brought by the CFTC involving the forex market.
ACCOUNT BALANCE
Rank Country 2007 Ratio* 2006 2008+ Rank Country 2007 Ratio* 2006 2008+
1 Singapore 39.209 23.486 35.383 26.983 13 Mexico -8.171 -0.797 -4.375 -15.527
2 Hong Kong 25.529 12.332 22.936 30.621 14 India -11.285 -1.024 -9.299 -33.33
3 China 371.833 10.993 253.268 440.011 15 France -26.915 -1.038 -12.835 -45.327
4 Switzerland 43.109 10.094 56.382 44.847 16 UK -80.722 -2.879 -82.975 -45.392
5 Sweden 39.099 8.615 33.804 40.429 17 U.S. -731.214 -5.296 -788.115 -673.266
6 Taiwan 32.975 8.57 26.3 25.024 18 Australia -57.129 -6.28 -40.384 -42.833
7 Germany 250.263 7.536 178.837 235.257 19 South Africa -20.707 -7.307 -16.284 -20.53
8 Netherlands 47.376 6.095 55.874 38.339 20 Spain -145.141 -10.079 -110.14 -154.036
9 Russia 76.241 5.89 94.34 102.331
Totals in billions of U.S. dollars
10 Japan 210.967 4.812 170.437 157.079 *Account balance in percent of GDP +Estimate
11 Canada 12.726 0.886 17.838 9.652 Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook
12 Brazil 1.551 0.116 13.643 -28.3 Database, April 2009.
Unemployment
Release 1-year Next Release 1-year Next
Period date Rate Change change release Period date Rate Change change release
AMERICAS
Argentina Q1 6/12 8.4% 1.1% 0.0% 9/14 ASIA AND SOUTH PACIFIC
Brazil May 6/25 8.8% -0.1% 0.9% 7/23 Australia May 6/11 5.7% 0.1% 1.6% 7/9
Canada May 6/18 8.4% 0.4% 2.3% 7/10 Hong Kong March-May 6/16 5.3% 0.0% 2.0% 7/20
EUROPE Japan May 6/30 5.2% 0.2% 1.2% 7/31
France Q1 6/4 9.1% 1.1% 1.5% 9/3 Singapore Q1 4/30 3.2% 0.7% 1.3% 7/31
Germany May 6/30 7.7% 0.0% 0.3% 7/30
UK Feb.-April 6/17 7.2% 0.7% 1.9% 7/15
CPI
Release 1-year Next Release 1-year Next
Period date Change change release Period date Change change release
AMERICAS AFRICA
Argentina May 6/10 0.4% 5.4% 7/14 S. Africa May 6/24 0.4% 8.0% 7/29
Brazil May 6/10 0.5% 5.2% 7/8
Canada May 6/18 0.7% 0.1% 7/17 ASIA AND SOUTH PACIFIC
EUROPE Australia Q1 4/23 0.1% 2.5% 7/22
France May 6/12 0.2% -0.3% 7/16 Hong Kong May 6/22 -0.3% 0.0% 7/21
Germany May 6/10 -0.1% 0.0% 7/9 India May 6/30 0.7% 8.6% 7/31
UK May 6/16 0.6% 2.2% 7/21 Japan May 6/26 -0.2% -1.1% 7/31
Singapore May 6/23 0.6% -0.3% 7/23
PPI
Release 1-year Next Release 1-year Next
Period date Change change release Period date Change change release
AMERICAS AFRICA
Argentina May 6/10 0.4% 5.6% 7/14 S. Africa May 6/25 -1.1% -3.0% 7/30
Brazil May 6/9 -0.1% 1.2% 7/9
Canada May 6/30 -1.1% -4.3% 7/30 ASIA AND SOUTH PACIFIC
EUROPE Australia Q1 4/20 -0.4% 4.0% 7/20
France May 6/30 -0.3% -7.8% 7/29 Hong Kong Q1 6/12 -0.3% -1.4% 9/14
Germany May 6/19 0.0% -3.6% 7/20 India May 6/12 0.5% 0.4% 7/9
UK May 6/5 0.4% -0.3% 7/10 Japan May 6/10 -0.4% -5.4% 7/10
Singapore May 6/29 1.2% -20.9% 7/29
LEGEND:
Change: Change from previous report release. NLT: No later than. Rate: Unemployment rate.
As of June 30.
EVENTS
Event: International Investors’ Trade Fair Event: The Fifth Middle East Forex Trading Expo and
Date: Sept. 4-6 Conference 2009
Location: Düsseldorf, Germany Date: Nov. 17-18
For more information: http://www.mdna.com Location: Jumeirah Emirates Towers Hotel, Dubai
For more information: http://www.meforexexpo.com
Event: 4th Annual Paris Trading Show
Date: Sept. 18-19 Event: Lawrence G. McMillan’s
Location: Paris, France Intensive Options Seminar
For more information: http://www.salonat.com Date: Nov. 9
Location: New York City, Marriott Marquis
Event: Melbourne Trading & Investing Expo For more information: Go to
Date: Oct. 2-3 http://www.optionstrategist.com and click on “Seminars”
Location: Melbourne Convention & Exhibition Centre
Event: Sydney Trading & Investing Expo Event: International Traders Expo
Date: Oct. 30-31 Date: Nov. 18-21
Location: Sydney Convention & Exhibition Centre Location: Mandalay Bay Resort & Casino, Las Vegas
For more information on both expos: Go to For more information: http://www.tradersexpo.com
http://tradingandinvestingexpo.com.au