CIVREV Digests

XI.
PROPERTY RELATIONS OF THE SPOUSES

A. Marriage settlements, FC 74, 75, 130 (3); 103 (3)
1. Form & registration requirement, FC 77, NCC 1357, 1358, NCC 709
Lucero, Mark Joey S.

Valencia v. Locquiao
G.R. 122134, October 3, 2003
“Under the New Civil Code, Article 127 thereof provides that the form of donations propter
nuptias is regulated by the statute of frauds. Article 1403, par. 2, which contains the Statute of
Frauds requires that the contracts mentioned thereunder need be in writing only to be
enforceable. However, as provided in Article 129, express acceptance “is not necessary for the
validity of these donations.” Thus, implied acceptance is sufficient.”
FACTS:
Herminigildo and Raymunda Locquiao executed a deed of donation propter nuptias which
was written in the Ilocano dialect, denominated as Inventario Ti Sagut in favor of their son,
respondent Benito Locquiao (hereafter, respondent Benito) and his prospective bride,
respondent Tomasa Mara (hereafter, respondent Tomasa). By the terms of the deed, the
donees were gifted with four (4) parcels of land, including the land in question, as well as a
male cow and one-third (1/3) portion of the conjugal house of the donor parents, in
consideration of the impending marriage of the donees.
The donees took their marriage vows on June 4, 1944 and the fact of their marriage was
inscribed at the back of O.C.T. No. 18383.
Herminigildo and Raymunda died on December 15, 1962 and January 9, 1968, respectively,
leaving as heirs their six (6) children, including respondent Benito, all surnamed Locquiao.
With the permission of respondents Benito and Tomasa, petitioner Romana Valencia
(hereinafter, Romana) took possession and cultivated the subject land. When respondent
Romanas husband got sick sometime in 1977, her daughter petitioner Constancia Valencia
(hereafter, petitioner Constancia) took over, and since then, has been in possession of the
land.
Later on, disagreements among five (5) heirs or groups of heirs, including petitioner
Romana, concerning the distribution of two (2) of the lots surfaced. As their differences
were settled, the heirs concerned executed a Deed of Compromise Agreement. Although not
directly involved in the discord, Benito signed the compromise agreement together with his
feuding siblings, nephews and nieces. Sometime in 1983, the apparent calm pervading
among the heirs was disturbed when petitioner Constancia filed an action for annulment of
title against the respondents before the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan.
Respondent Benito filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan
a Complaint seeking the ejectment of petitioner Constancia from the subject property. The
Municipal Trial Court rendered a Decision ordering the defendant in the case, petitioner
Constancia, to vacate the land in question.
Petitioners Romana and Constancia countered with a Complaint against respondents

Benito and Tomasa which they filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan.
Meanwhile, the decision in the ejectment case was appealed to the same RTC where the
case for annulment of title was also pending. Finding that the question of ownership was
the central issue in both cases, the court issued an Order suspending the proceedings in the
ejectment case until it shall have decided the ownership issue in the title annulment case.
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for annulment of title on
the grounds of prescription and laches. It likewise ruled that the Inventario Ti Sagut is a
valid public document which transmitted ownership over the subject land to the
respondents. With the dismissal of the complaint and the confirmation of the respondents
title over the subject property, the RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC in the
ejectment case.
Dissatisfied, petitioners elevated the two (2) decisions to the respondent Court of
Appeals. Since they involve the same parties and the same property, the appealed cases
were consolidated by the appellate court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not acceptance of the donation by the donees is required in donations propter
nuptias.
HELD:
NO. Acceptance is not necessary for the validity of such gifts. As provided in Article 129,
implied acceptance is sufficient. Unlike ordinary donations, donations propter nuptias or
donations by reason of marriage are those “made before its celebration, in consideration of
the same and in favor of one or both spouses.” The distinction is crucial because the two
classes of donations are not governed by exactly the same rules, especially as regards the
formal essential requisites.
“Under the New Civil Code, Article 127 thereof provides that the form of donations propter
nuptias is regulated by the statute of frauds. Article 1403, par. 2, which contains the Statute
of Frauds requires that the contracts mentioned thereunder need be in writing only to be
enforceable. However, as provided in Article 129, express acceptance “is not necessary for
the validity of these donations.” Thus, implied acceptance is sufficient.”
2. Donations propter nuptias, FC 81 cf. Art. 86 (1), FC 82 – 87, NCC Arts. 748-749, NCC
761, NCC 765; FC Art. 50; 43 (3), FC 48; 44; 61
Macuha, Ana Regine B.
Solis v. Solis
53 Phil 912 (1928)
In donations propter nuptias the marriage is really a consideration, but not in the sense of
beingnecessary to give birth to the obligation, as is clearly inferred from article 1333 of the
Civil Code, which makes the fact that the marriage did not take place a cause for the
revocation of suchdonations, thus taking it for granted that there may be a valid donation
propter nuptias even without marriage, since that whichhas not existed cannot be revoked.
The marriage in a donation propter nuptias is rather a resolutory condition which, as such
presupposes the existence of the obligation which may be resolved or revoked, and not a
condition necessary for the birth of the obligation.
FACTS:
The spouses Juan Lambino and Maria A. Barroso begot three children named Alejo, Eugenia
and Marciana Lambino. On June 2, 1919 said spouses made a donation of propter nuptias of
the lands described in the complaint in favor of their son Alejo Lambino and Fortunata Solis
in a private document in consideration of the marriage which the latter were about to enter
into. One of the conditions of this donation is that in case of the death of one of the donees,
one-half of these lands thus donated would revert to the donors while the surviving donee
would retain the other half. On the 8th of the said month of June 1919, Alejo Lambino and
Fortunata Solis were married and immediately thereafter the donors delivered the
possession of the donated lands to them. On August 3, 1919 donee Alejo Lambino died. In
the same year donor Juan Lambino also died. After the latter's death, his wife, Maxima
Barroso, recovered possession of the donated lands.
The surviving donee Fortunata Solis filed the action against the surviving donor Maxima
Barroso and Eugenia and Marcelina Lambino, heirs of the deceased donor Juan Lambino,
with their respective husbands, demanding of the defendants the execution of the proper
deed of donation according to law, transferring one-half of the donated property, and
moreover, to proceed to the partition of the donated property and its fruits.
The court rendered judgment based upon article 1279 of the Civil Code granting plaintiff's
prayer and ordering the defendants to execute a deed of donation in favor of the plaintiff,
adequate in form and substance to transfer to the latter the legal title to the part of the
donated lands assigned to her in the original donation.
ISSUES:
1. WON Article 1279 is applicable.

2. WON the donation propter nuptias is valid.
HELD:
1. No, article 1279 of the Civil Code, relating to contracts, is not applicable to the present
case.
2. No, the donation propter nuptias is not valid.
In this case, there is a donation propter nuptias which is not valid and did not create any
right, since it was not made in a public instrument, and hence, article 1279 of the Civil Code
which the lower court applied is not applicable thereto. The last named article provides
that, should the law require the execution of an instrument or any other special form in
order to make the obligations of a contract effective, the contracting parties may compel
each other to comply with such formality from the moment that consent has been given,
and the other requirements for the validity of the contract exist. Suffice it to state that this
article refers to contracts and is inapplicable to the donation in question which must be
governed by the rules on donations. It may further be noted, at first sight, that this article
presupposes the existence of a valid contract and cannot possibly refer to the form
required in order to make it valid, which it already has, but rather to that required simply
to make it effective, and for this reason, it would, at all events, be inapplicable to the
donation in question, wherein the form is required precisely to make it valid.
Magaoay
Mateo v. Lagua (1969)

29 SCRA 864
Donations proper nuptias (by reason of marriage) are without onerous consideration, the
marriage being merelythe occasion or motive for the donation, not its causa. Being
liberalities, they remain subject to reduction for inofficiousness upon the donor's death, if they
should infringe the legitime of a forced heir.
FACTS:
Sometime in 1917, the parents of Alejandro Lagua donated two lots to him in consideration
of his marriage to petitioner Bonifacia Mateo. The marriage was celebrated on May 15,
1917 and thereafter the couple took possession of the lots, but the certificates of title
remained in the donor’s name.
In 1923, Alejandro died, leaving behind his widow Bonifacia with their infant daughter,
who lived with the father-in-law Cipriano Lagua who in turn undertook to farm on the
donated lots. At first, Cipriano gave to Bonifacia the share from the lots’ harvests, but in
1926 he refused to deliver to petitioner the said share, which reason prompted her to
initiate an action and won for her possession of the lots plus damages.
On July 31, 1941, Cipriano executed a deed of sale of the said lots in favor of his younger
son, herein respondent Gervacio. Petitioner learned of this only in 1956 when Cipriano
stopped giving to petitioner her share to the harvest. A Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
was issued under respondent’s name by the Registry of Deeds (ROD) of Pangasinan.
The CFI of Pangasinan declared the TCT issued to respondent null and void and ordered
cancelled by the ROD, and for respondent to vacate and deliver the lots to petitioner. In
1957, Gervacio and Cipriano filed with the CFI for the annulment of the donation of the two
lots. While the case was pending, Cipriano died in 1958. It was dismissed for prescription,
having been filed after the lapse of 41 years. When appealed, the CA in 1966 held that the
donation to Alejandro of the two lots with the combined area of 11,888 sq. m. exceeded by
494.75 sq. m. his legitime and the disposable portion that Cipriano could have freely given
by will, and to the same extent prejudiced the legitime of Cipriano’s other heir,
Gervacio. The donation was thus declared inofficious and herein petitioners were ordered
to reconvey to Gervacio a portion of 494.75 sq. m. from any convenient part of the lots.
ISSUE:
Is the court of appeals ruling on the inofficiousness of the donation proper?
RULING:
No. Before the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, the net estate of the
decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the
value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations
subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the
legitimes of the compulsory heirs can be established, and only thereafter can it be
ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes. Certainly, in order
that a donation may be reduced for being inofficious, there must be proof that the value of
the donated property exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus the donee’s share as
legitime in the properties of the donor. In the present case, it can hardly be seen that, with
the evidence then before the court, it was in any position to rule on the inofficiousness of
the donation involved here, and to order its reduction and reconveyance of the deducted
portion to the respondents.
3. Parties to a marriage settlement - FC 78, NCC Art. 38, 39, FC 79, RPC 34, FC 135 (1)
4. Which law governs property relations - FC 80, NCC 16 and 17.
5. Void donations by the spouses, FC 87
Merrera
Matabuena v. Cervantes
38 SCRA 284 (1971)
While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a “donation between the spouses during the
marriage,” policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of
morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship.
FACTS:
Cornelia Matabuena alleged absolute ownership of the parcel of land in question by reason
of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased by virtue of an
affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962 and had the land declared in her
name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon. She specifically raised the question
that the donation made by Felix Matabuena to defendant Petronila Cervantes was null and
void.
The defendant, on the other hand, did assert ownership precisely because such a donation
was made in 1956 and her marriage to the deceased did take place in 1962, six years after
the deed of donation had been executed. The lower court, after noting that it was made at a
time before defendant was married to the donor, sustained the defendant’s stand. Hence
this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ban on a donation between the spouses during a marriage applies to a
common-law relationship.
RULING:
Yes. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a “donation between the spouses
during the marriage,” policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the
dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law
relationship.
If the policy of the law is, in the language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of
that Court, “to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because
of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply
rooted in our ancient law then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to
persons living together as husband and wife without benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be
doubted that assent to such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater
influence of one party over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is
correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad
Sabinum, fr. 1), ‘it would not be just that such donations should subsist, lest the condition of
those who incurred guilt should turn out to be better.’ So long as marriage remains the
cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities
attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage.
Palafox, Danielle
Arcaba v. Tabancura
G.R. No. 146683, Nov. 22, 2001
Where it has been established by preponderance of evidence that 2 persons lived together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation
made by one in favor of the other is void under Article 87 FC.
FACTS:
Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No.
437-A located at Balintawak St. and Rizal Avenue in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte on
January 1956. Zosima died in 1980 hence Francisco and his mother in law executed a deed
of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, where the latter waived her share consisting
of ¼ of the property in favor of Francisco. Since Francisco do not have any children to take
care of him after his retirement, he asked Leticia, his niece, Leticia’s cousin, Luzviminda
Paghacian and Cirila Arcaba, the petitioner, who was then a widow and took care of
Francisco’s house as well as the store inside.
According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room. On
the other hand, Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of Francisco claimed that the latter told
her that Cirila was his mistress. However, Cirila defended herself that she was a mere
helper who could enter the master’s bedroom when Francisco asked her to and that
Francisco was too old for her. She denied having sexual intercourse with Francisco. When
Francisco’s nieces got married, Cirila who was then 34YO widow started working for
Francisco who was 75 year old widower. The latter did not pay him any wages as
househelper though her family was provided with food and lodging. Francisco’s health
deteriorated and became bedridden. Tabancura testified that Francisco’s only source of
income was the rentals from his lot near the public streets.
In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he executed a “Deed of Donation Inter
Vivos” where he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq m., together with his
house to Cirila who accepted the same. The larger portion of 268 sq m. was left under his
name. This was made in consideration of the 10 years of faithful services of Cirila. Atty
Lacaya notarized the deed and was later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.
In October 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot received by Cirila had a market value
of P57,105 and assessed value of P28,550. Respondents herein are the decedent’s nephews
and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession, alleged that Cirila was the common-law
wife of Francisco. They filed a complaint against Cirila for declaration of nullity of a deed of
donation inter vivos, recovery of possession and damages.
ISSUE:
WON the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in Arcaba’s favor was valid.
RULING:
The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein
donation is not valid. The conclusion was based on the testimony of Tabancura and certain
documents bearing the signature of “Cirila Comille” such as application for business permit,
sanitary permit and the death certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not
demand her wages is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver–employee.
Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is
already old and may no longer be interested in sex. At the very least, cohabitation is the
public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as
man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public as such. Secret meetings or
nights clandestinely spent together, even if often repeated, do not constitute such kind of
cohabitation; they are merely meretricious. In this jurisdiction, SC has considered as
sufficient proof of common-law relationship the stipulations between the parties, a
conviction of concubinage, or the existence of legitimate children.
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived
together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that
the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 FC.
B. Absolute community of property (ACP) – FC 88, 91, 92, 93

1. When applicable, FC 75, 103 (3); 130 (3); 92 (3)
2. Commencement, FC 88
3. Waiver during marriage, FC 89
4. Waiver after marriage, FC 89 par. 2 cf NCC Art. 168
5. Suppletory rules:
Co-ownership, FC 90; of NCC 484-501
6. What constitutes ACP, FC 91
Memorize!
(a) All property at time of marriage
(b) Property acquired subsequently
(c) Winnings from gambling, FC as of NCC 164
(d) Presumption of ACP, FC 93 of NCC 160
Pascual, Aizen Paula DS.

Muller v. Muller
G.R. No. 149615, August 29, 2006
He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean
hands.
FACTS:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in
Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house
owned by respondent’s parents but decided to move and reside permanently in the
Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his
parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in
Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting to
P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of petitioner, Elena
Buenaventura Muller.
Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment,
the spouses eventually separated.
On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition for separation of properties before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The court granted said petition. It also decreed the
separation of properties between them and ordered the equal partition of personal
properties located within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during
the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it was acquired
using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot
recover his funds because the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII
of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement.
RULING:
No.Respondent Helmut Muller is not entitled to reimbursement.There is an express

prohibition against foreigners owning land in the Philippines.Art. XII, Sec. 7 of the 1987
Constitution provides: “Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”
In the case at bar, the respondent willingly and knowingly bought the property despite a
constitutional prohibition. And to get away with that constitutional prohibition, he put the
property under the name of his Filipina wife. He tried to do indirectly what the
fundamental law bars him to do directly.
With this, the Supreme Court ruled that respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the
ground of equity. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not
permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly.
Perez, Carla Patricia S.

Beumer v. Amores
G.R. 195670, December 3, 2012
A foreigner cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he
willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition against foreign
ownership of Philippine land enshrined under Sec. 7, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution.
FACTS:
Willem Beumer (Dutch national) and Avelina Amores (Filipina) married on March 29,
1980. RTC Negros Oriental declared the nullity of their marriage in Nov. 30, 2000 on the
basis of Beumer’s psychological incapacity under Art. 36 FC. Beumer then filed a Petition
for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership and prayed for the distribution of properties
acquired by purchase and by way of inheritance during the subsistence of their marriage.
Amores, in her defense, contended that except for their 2 residential houses, she and
Beumer did not acquire any conjugal properties during their marriage. She averred that
she used her own personal money to purchase the lots on which the said houses were
situated, and her inheritance for the other 2 lots. Beumer countered that while the 4 lots
were registered in Amores’ name, they were acquired with the money the former received
from the Dutch government as disability benefit.
RTC ruled that Beumer could not have acquired any right over the 4 lots because of the
constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of private lands, but declared the 2
houses to be co-owned by Beumer and Amores. CA affirmed. Beumer insisted that he has
the right to be reimbursed of his capital funds spent in acquiring the properties.
ISSUE:
Whether Beumer’s petition for reimbursement should be granted.
RULING:
No. Beumer openly admitted that he and Amores were aware of the constitutional
prohibition and that it was because of it that they registered the properties in Amores’
name. The Court cannot grant his claim based on equity because equity will follow the law
and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be
done directly. Neither can the claim be granted on the basis of unjust enrichment as the
same does not apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution. The purpose of the
prohibition is to conserve national patrimony.
7. What is excluded from ACP, FC 92; FC 95
Perez, Mark Josep R.

Abrenica v. Abrenica
G.R. No. 180572, June 18, 2012
Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code excludes from the community property the property
acquired before the marriage of a spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former
marriage; and the fruits and the income, if any, of that property.
FACTS:
Petitioner Atty. Erlando Abrenica was a partner of respondents in a law firm. In 1998,
respondents filed before the SEC two (2) cases against petitioner. The first was for
Accounting and Return and Transfer of Partnership Funds With Damages and Application
for Issuance of Preliminary Attachment, where they alleged that petitioner refused to
return partnership funds representing profits from the sale of a parcel of land in Lemery,
Batangas. The second was also for Accounting and Return and Transfer of Partnership
Funds where respondents sought to recover from petitioner retainer fees that he received
from two clients of the firm and the balance of the cash advance that he obtained in 1997.
The case was subsequently transferred to RTC of Quezon City pursuant to RA 8799
wherein petitioner was held liable for both cases. The respondents then filed a Motion for
the Issuance of Writ of Execution which was opposed by petitioner. Subsequently,
petitioner filed and Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that the sheriff had levied on the
properties belonging to his children and his spouse Joena Abrenica (Joena). They asserted
that petitioner Joena’s right to due process was violated when she was not made a party-in-
interest to the proceedings in the lower courts, even if her half of the absolute community
of property was included in the execution of the judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether Joena’s right to due process was violated.
RULING:
No, Joena’s right to due process was not violated.
The Court pointed out that after the dissolution of the first marriage of Erlando, he and
Joena got married on 28 May 1998. In her Affidavit, Joena alleged that she represented her
stepchildren; that the levied personal properties were owned by the latter. The Court,
however, noted that two of these stepchildren were already of legal age when Joena filed
her Affidavit. As to Patrik Randel, parental authority over him belongs to his parents.
Absent any special power of attorney authorizing Joena to represent Erlando’s children, her
claim cannot be sustained. Petitioner Joena also asserted that the two (2) motor vehicles
purchased in 1992 and 1997, as well as the house and, formed part of the absolute
community regime. However, Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code excludes from the
community property the property acquired before the marriage of a spouse who has
legitimate descendants by a former marriage; and the fruits and the income, if any, of that
property. Neither these two vehicles nor the house and lot belong to the second marriage.
8. Charges upon ACP, FC 94

(a) Family expenses cf. FC 100 (3), FC 121(5) and FC 94 (4), (5)
(b) Debts of spouses, Art. 94 (2) and (3)
(c) Subsidiary liabilities, Art. 94 (9)
Prudente, Maica A.
Buado v. CA
G.R. No. 145222, April 24, 2009
Conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse,
unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership.
FACTS:
Spouses Roberto and Venus Buado filed a complaint for damages against Erlinda Nicol
(Erlinda). Said action originated from Erlinda Nicol’s civil liability arising from the criminal
offense of slander filed against her by petitioners. RTC rendered a decision ordering
Erlinda to pay damages. Finding Erlinda’s personal properties insufficient to satisfy the
judgment, the Deputy Sheriff issued a notice of levy on real property on execution. Two (2)
days before the public auction sale, an affidavit of third-party claim from one Arnulfo Fulo
was received by the deputy sheriff prompting petitioners to put up a sheriff’s indemnity
bond. The auction sale proceeded with petitioners as the highest bidder. A certificate of
sale was issued in favor of petitioners. Almost a year later, Romulo Nicol, the husband of
Erlinda Nicol, filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of sale and damages.
Respondent alleged that Sps. Buado connived and directly levied upon and execute his real
property without exhausting the personal properties of Erlinda Nicol. Respondent averred
that there was no proper publication and posting of the notice of sale. Furthermore,
respondent claimed that his property which was valued at ₱500,000.00 was only sold at a
"very low price" of ₱51,685.00, whereas the judgment obligation of Erlinda Nicol was only
₱40,000.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conjugal property of Spouses Nicol should be accountable for the
criminal liability of Erlinda
RULING:
NO. In determining whether the husband is a stranger to the suit, the character of the
property must be taken into account. In Mariano v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the
husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a "stranger" to the case prosecuted and
adjudged against his wife for an obligation that has redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. On the other hand, in Naguit v. Court of Appeals and Sy v. Discaya, the Court
stated that a spouse is deemed a stranger to the action wherein the writ of execution was
issued and is therefore justified in bringing an independent action to vindicate her right of
ownership over his exclusive or paraphernal property. Pursuant to Mariano however, it
must further be settled whether the obligation of the judgment debtor redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership or not.
There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122 of the Family
Code explicitly provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the
wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except
insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. Unlike in the system of absolute
community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-
delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency
of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the
system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to
make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse. Parenthetically, by no
stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil obligation arising from the crime of
slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
(d) Sole obligations of a spouse, Art. 94

(e) Gambling losses, FC 95
(f) Other charges, Art. 94
10. Administration and enjoyment of ACP
(a) Joint administration, FC 96; FC 90
Racadio, Marie Bernadette M.

Dar v. Legasto
G.R. No. 143016, August 30, 2000
While the said rule requires that it be strictly complied with, it merely underscores the
mandatory nature that the certification or the requirement cannot altogether be dispensed
with. It does not prevent the substantial compliance therewith under justifiable
circumstances. Circular no. 28-91 was designed to serve as an instrument to promote and
facilitate the orderly administration of justice and should not be interpreted with such
absolute literalness as to subvert the ultimate objective of all rules and procedure- which it to
achieve substantial justice.
FACTS:
Private Respondent Nenita Co filed a case for unlawful detainer against the petitioners Mr.
& Mrs. Ronnie Dar, Mr. & Mrs. Randy Angeles, Mr. & Mrs. Joy Constantino and Mr. & Mrs.
Liberty Cruz in the Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City. They were sued as Mr. and Mrs.
in the said case. The trial court decided adversely to the petitioners. The Court of Appeals
issued a resolution dismissing the petitioner’s petition for review on certiorari and
mandamus for failure to comply with the Rule on Certification of Non-Forum Shopping
after finding that the petition "was signed only by Ronnie Dar, Randy Angeles, Joy
Constantino, and Liberty Cruz, without authority attached thereto to sign for and in behalf
of their co-petitioners." In other words, while petitioners Ronnie Dar, Randy Angeles, Joy
Constantino and Liberty Cruz signed the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, their
respective spouses did not sign the same. The petitioners contend that since what is
involved in the instant case is their common rights and interest to abode under the system
of absolute community of property, either of the spouses can sign the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition is dismissible because only one of the spouses signed the
petition
RULING:
NO. With respect to the contents of the certification, the rule of substantial compliance may
be availed of. In the instant case, the Court of Appeals should have taken into consideration
the fact that the petitioners were sued jointly, as Mr. and Mrs., over a property in which
they have common interest. Such being the case, the signing of one of them in the
certification substantially complies with the rule on certification of non- forum shopping.
Riguerra, Paolo Miguel

Cotoner v. Revilla
G.R. No. 190901, November 12, 2014
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of
the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
FACTS:
Revilla spouses faced financial difficulties in raising funds for Alfredo Revilla’s travel to
Saudi Arabia, so Paz Castillo-Revilla borrowed money from Amada Cotoner-Zacarias
(Amada). By way of security, the parties verbally agreed that Amada would take physical
possession of the property, cultivate it, then use the earnings from the cultivation to pay
the loan and realty taxes. Upon full payment of the loan, Amada would return the property
to the Revilla spouses. Unknown to the Revilla spouses, Amada presented a fictitious
document entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihanng Lupa" before the Provincial Assessor of Cavite.
Amada sold the property to the spouses Casorla. The Casorla spouses executed a deed of
absolute sale in favor of the Sun spouses. The Revilla spouses then discovered that the
property’s tax declaration was already in the name of the Sun spouses. The Revilla spouses
claim that the signature of the husband was forged. Amada contends that the lower courts
never declared as falsified the signature of Alfredo’s wife. Since the property is conjugal in
nature, the sale as to the one-half share of the wife should not be declared as void.
ISSUE:
W/N the signature of the wife is is binding even without the consent of the husband.
RULING:
No. The transaction took place before the effectivity of the Family Code in 2004. Generally,
civil laws have no retroactive effect. Article 172 of the Civil Code provides that “[t]he wife
cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband’s consent, except in cases
provided by law.” Thus, as correctly found by the Court of Appeals, “ that the signature of
plaintiff-appellee Paz on the Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa was not forged, her signature
alone would still not bind the subject property, it being already established that the said
transaction was made without the consent of her husband plaintiff-appellee Alfredo.
(b) Sole administration

(1) incapacity, FC 96 (2) – no court order
(2) separation in fact FC 100 (3) – with court order
(3) abandonment, FC 101 – with court order
(5) pendency of legal separation proceeding, FC 61 – with court order
(c) Disposition and encumbrance, FC 96-98
Sarangay, Jossa M.
Matthews v. Taylor
G.R. No. 164584, June 22, 2009
Foreigner husband’s written consent to lease land (registered in the name of the wife,
although funded by the husband’s money) is not required.
FACTS:
On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor, a British subject, married Joselyn C.
Taylor, a 17-year old Filipina. While their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought from
Diosa Martin a property situated in Boracay Island, and such sale was allegedly financed by
Benjamin. When Joselyn leased the Boracay property to petitioner Philip Matthews,
Benjamin sought the nullification of the contract on two grounds: first, that he was the
actual owner of the property since he provided the funds used in purchasing the same; and
second, that Joselyn could not enter into a valid contract involving the subject property
without his consent.
The RTC considered the Boracay property as community property of Benjamin and Joselyn;
thus, the consent of the spouses was necessary to validate any contract involving the
property. Benjamin’s right over the Boracay property was bolstered by the court’s findings
that the property was purchased and improved through funds provided by Benjamin. The
CA affirmed the conlusions made by the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marital consent of respondent Benjamin Taylor is not required in the
agreement of lease; and Whether or not the subject of the agreement of lease is the
exclusive property of Jocelyn Taylor.
RULING:
Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner on
the basis of Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands
in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated "vendee" in the
Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we
sustain Benjamin’s claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into
such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no
reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the
subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any
event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease of the
Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising the
prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would
countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were
to be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and
right over the land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition.
This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.
11. Effect of separation de facto, FC 100; 101; cf. FC 239 – summary proceedings for
court authority to dispose
12. Effect of abandonment, FC 101, FC 72 – damages, rescission/nullity of a contract
13. Dissolution of ACP, FC 99, 102, 43 (2); FC 63(2), 104
(a) Death, FC 103 cf. Rule 73 Sec. 12 ROC
Senique, Alyssa Paulina R.

Heirs of Go v. Servacio
G.R. No. 157537, Sept. 7, 2011
The disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal property by the surviving spouse without
the prior liquidation mandated by Article 130 of the Family Code is not necessarily void if said
portion has not yet been allocated by judicial or extrajudicial partition to another heir of the
deceased spouse. At any rate, the requirement of prior liquidation does not prejudice vested
rights.
FACTS:
Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land to Protacio B. Go, Jr. He later. executed an Affidavit
of Renunciation and Waiver, that it was his father Protacio, Sr, not he, who had purchased
the said land (the property). Thereafter, the Marta, mother of Protacio jr. died. Protacio, Sr.
and his son Rito sold a portion of the property Servacio. In 2001, the petitioners demanded
the return of the property but Servacio refused. They sued Servacio and Rito for the
annulment of the sale of the property. The petitioners averred that following Protacio, Jr.’s
renunciation, the property became conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to
Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property between Protacio, Sr. and
Marta was null and void. Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had exclusively
owned the property because he had purchased it with his own money.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale by Protacio, Sr., et al. to Servacio was void for being made without
prior liquidation.
RULING:
NO.
Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988, their property relation was properly characterized as one of conjugal partnership
governed by the NCC. Upon Marta’s death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved,
pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code,[15] and an implied ordinary co-ownership
ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the
assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation. Protacio, Sr., although becoming a
co-owner with his children in respect of Martas share in the conjugal partnership, could not
yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Marta’s share without an actual partition
of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all
that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Martas share. Nonetheless, a co-owner could
sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his
undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. Consequently, the sale by
Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other co-owners was not
necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively
transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Martas share. Thus, the appropriate
recourse of co-owners in cases where their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire
property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an
action for PARTITION.
Sobrepena, Kim Angeli

Domingo v. Molina
G.R. No. 200274, April 20, 2016
Article 130 of the Family Code requires the liquidation of the conjugal partnership upon death
of a spouse and prohibits any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property prior to
the conjugal partnership liquidation.
FACTS:
In June 15, 1951, the spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a property in Camiling,
Tarlac, consisting of a 1/2 undivided portion over a parcel of land. During his lifetime,
Anastacio borrowed money from respondent spouses Molina. 10 years after Flora’s death,
Anastacio sold his interest over the land to the spouses Molina to answer for his debts. In
1986, Anastacio died.
Melecio, one of the children of spouses Domingo, learned of the transfer and filed a
Complaint for Annulment of Title and Recovery of Ownership against spouses Molina.
Melecio claims that Anastacio gave the subject property to serve as collateral for the money
that Anastacio borrowed. Anastacio could not have validly sold the interest over the subject
property without Flora’s consent, as Flora was already dead at the time of the sale. Melecio
further asserts that he occupied the subject property, and that Molina must have falsified
the document transferring the interest over the land.
RTC: Melecio failed to establish claim that Anastacio did not sell the property to the
spouses Molina.
CA: affirmed RTC
ISSUE:
WON the sale of land belonging to the conjugal partnership is valid.
RULING:
Petition denied.
The conjugal partnership of Anastacio and Flora was dissolved when Flora died in 1968.
While Article 130 of the Family Code provides that any disposition involving the conjugal
property without prior liquidation of the partnership shall be void, this rule does not apply
since the provisions of the Family Code shall be without prejudice to vested rights already
acquired in accordance with the Civil Code.
Anastacio, as a co-owner, had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest,
but not the interest of his co-owners. The spouses Molina would be a trustee for the benefit
of the coheirs of Anastacio in respect of any portion that might belong to the coheirs after
liquidation and partition.
Melecio’s recourse as a co-owner of the conjugal properties is an action for partition under
Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
Socrates, Tomas
Uy v. Estate of Fernandez
G.R. No. 200612, April 5, 2017
Upon the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains due to the death of either spouse,
the surviving spouse has an actual and vested one-half undivided share of the properties,
which does not consist of determinate and segregated properties until liquidation and
partition of the conjugal partnership. The surviving spouse becomes a co-owner of the
properties with the other heirs. A co-owner could sell his undivided share.
FACTS:
Vipa Fernandez-Lahaylahay and Levi Lahaylahay got married in 1961 without any
agreement on the property relations. Sometime in 1990, Rafael Uy started to lease a
property of Vipa in Iloilo. In 1994, Vipa died, and the daughter of Vipa, Grace, became the
administrator of the estate of Vipa. As to Levi, he lived in Aklan. In 1998, Rafael stopped
paying the rent. In 2003, Grace, representing the Estate of Vipa, filed an unlawful detainer
case against Rafael Uy. The MTCC of Iloilo ruled in favor of Grace in 2008, but upon appeal,
the RTC reversed the MTCC in 2009. The case went to the CA and reinstated the MTCC’s
decision ordering Uy to vacate, despite Uy’s contention that the land was already sold to
him in 2005.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Uy must leave the leased premises for failure to pay the rent.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that Uy may not be ordered to vacate. Upon the death of Vipa, half
of the subject property was automatically reserved for the surviving spouse, Levy. The
other half is transmitted to Vipa’s heirs, the children and Levy himself. It results to implied
co-ownership. None of the co-owners may assert claim on a specific property prior to
actual partition. Nevertheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share. Here, the sale of
the share of Levy in favor of Uy is valid, making Uy a co-owner of the property. Hence, since
the sale was consummated on December 29, 2005, from that date on, Uy is a co-owner of
the property and not a mere lessee. He cannot be ordered to vacate thru an unlawful
detainer action. However, from 1998 to December 28, 2005, Uy was a lessee, and he still
has the obligation to pay the unpaid rentals for that period plus interest.
(b) Legal separation, FC 63(2); FC 66

(c) Annulment and declaration of nullity, FC 50 in rel. to FC 43 (2)
(d) Judicial separation of property, FC 134-138
Surla, Kristine
Ugalde v. Ysasi
G.R. No. 130623, February 29, 2008
Under Article 175 of the Civil Code, the judicial separation of property results in the
termination of the conjugal partnership of gains.
FACTS:
In 1951, Ugalde and Ysasi got married. They did not execute any ante-nuptial agreement.
They separated sometime in April 1957.
In 1964, respondent allegedly contracted another marriage with Smith. Petitioner alleged
that respondent and Smith had been acquiring and disposing of real and personal
properties to her prejudice as the lawful wife. Petitioner alleged that she had been
defrauded of rental income, profits, and fruits of their conjugal properties.
In 1984, petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains
against respondent before the RTC. Respondent countered that on 2 June 1961, he and
petitioner entered into an agreement which provided, among others, that their conjugal
partnership of gains shall be deemed dissolved as of 15 April 1957 which was approved by
the CFI in its Order dated 6 June 1961. He also alleged that petitioner already obtained a
divorce from him before the Supreme Court of Mexico. Further, respondent alleged that
their marriage was void because it was executed without the benefit of a marriage license.
ISSUE:
What is the effect of the 6 June 1961 Order of the CFI?
RULING:
The finality of the 6 June 1961 CFI Order resulted in the dissolution of the petitioner and
respondent’s conjugal partnership of gains.
Petitioner and respondent were married on 15 February 1951. The applicable law at the
time of their marriage was the Civil Code which took effect on 30 August 1950. Pursuant to
Article 119 of the Civil Code, the property regime of petitioner and respondent was
conjugal partnership of gains, thus:
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other
regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern
the property relations between husband and wife.
Article 142 of the Civil Code defines conjugal partnership of gains, as follows:
Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a
common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or
industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the
net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
termination of the conjugal partnership of gains:
Art. 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.
The finality of the 6 June 1961 Order in Civil Case No. 4791 approving the parties’
separation of property resulted in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains in
accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code. Hence, when the trial
court decided Special Proceedings No. 3330, the conjugal partnership between petitioner
and respondent was already dissolved.
Petitioner alleges that the CFI had no authority to approve the Compromise Agreement
because the case was for custody, and the creditors were not given notice by the parties, as
also required under Article 191 of the Civil Code. Petitioner cannot repudiate the
Compromise Agreement on this ground. A judgment upon a compromise agreement has all
the force and effect of any other judgment, and conclusive only upon parties thereto and
their privies, and not binding on third persons who are not parties to it.
Enriquez, Ephraim T.
Lavadia v. Heirs of Luna
G.R. No. 171914, July 23, 2014
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by
Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first marriage
involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks
competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who
contracts a subsequent marriage.
FACTS:
Atty. Luna, a practicing lawyer, married Eugenia in 1947. Their marriage begot seven
children. After two decades of marriage, Atty. Luna and his wife agreed to live separately as
husband and wife, and executed an Agreement For Separation and Property Settlement”
whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve their conjugal property. On January
2, 1076, Atty. Luna obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with Eugenia from the
Dominican Republic. On the same day, he married Soledad. In 1977, Atty. Luna organized a
new law firm with several other lawyers. The new law office thru Atty. Luna obtained a
condominium unit which they bought on an installment basis. After full payment, the
condominium title was registered in the names of the lawyers with pro-indivisio shares.
When the law office was dissolved, the condominium title was still registered in the names
of the owners, with Atty.Luna’s share fixed at 25/100. Atty. Luna established a new law
firm with Atty. Dela Cruz. After Atty.Luna’s death in 1997, his share in the condominium
unit, his law books and furniture were taken over by Gregorio, his son in the first marriage.
His 25/100 share in the condominium was also rented out to Atty. Dela Cruz. Soledad, the
second wife, then filed a complaint against the heirs of Atty. Luna. According to her, the
properties were acquired by Atty. Luna and her during their marriage, and because they
had no children, 3/4 of the property became hers, 1/2 being her share in the net estate, and
the other half bequeathed to her in a last will and testament of Atty. Luna. The RTC ruled
against her, and awarded the properties to the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first marriage,
except for the foreign law books, which were ordered turned over to her. Both parties
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals modified the RTC judgment by
awarding all the properties, including the law books to the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first
marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce decree between Atty. Luna and Eugenia was valid, which will
decide who among the contending parties were entitled to the properties left behind by
Atty. Luna.
RULING:
No, divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia was void and ineffectual under the nationality
rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of
the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a
foreign country lacks competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the
assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.
Given the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the
presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of his own personal funds and
effort remained. It should then be justly concluded that the properties in litis legally
pertained to their conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of his death. Consequently,
the sole ownership of the 25/100pro indiviso share of Atty. Luna in the condominium unit,
and of the law books pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.
Espinosa, Frederick V.
Noveras v. Noveras
G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014
Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the
petition for judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.
FACTS:
David and Leticia were Filipinos but later became US citizens who own properties in the
USA and in the Philippines. Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair Leticia
obtained a decree of divorce from a court in California in wherein the court awarded all the
properties in the USA to Leticia. Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal
Property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora. Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition
for judicial separation of property on paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article 135 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property should be granted.
RULING:
YES. Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property
was not tackled in the trial court’s decision because, the trial court erroneously treated the
petition as liquidation of the absolute community of properties.
The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed
separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. It is
undisputed that the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when David decided to
go back to the Philippines to set up his own business. Leticia heard from her friends that
David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita
Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where David was once confined,
testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for
Operation form. And more significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was granted by the
California court in June 2005.
The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property automatically
dissolves the absolute community regime, as stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 of the
Family Code.
14. Effects of dissolution

(a) Liquidation procedure, FC 102 (cf 106, 129[7])
Jore, Ma. Jovi P.

Quiao v. Quiao
G. R. No. 183622, July 4, 2012
Share of the guilty party from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of
the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.
FACTS:
Brigido Quiao and Rita Quiao contracted marriage in 1977. They had no separate
properties prior to their marriage. During the course of said marriage, they produced four
children. In 2000, Rita filed a complaint against Brigido for legal separation for cohabiting
with another woman. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision in 2005 declaring the
legal separation of the parties pursuant to Article 55. Save for one child (already of legal
age), the three minor children remains in the custody of Rita, who is the innocent spouse.
The properties accrued by the spouses were ordered by the court to be divided equally
between them subject to the respective legitimes of their children and payment of unpaid
conjugal liabilities; however, Brigido’s share of the net profits earned by the conjugal
partnership shall be forfeited in favor of their children in accordance to par. 9 of Article 129
of the FC. The court also ordered the reimbursement of attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses in favor of Rita.
A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which was granted by the trial
court. By 2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to the earlier decision; the writ was partially
executed. After more than nine (9) months later, Brigido filed a motion for clarification
asking the RTC to define “Nets Profits Earned.” In an order, the court held that the phrase
denotes “the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate
properties of each of the spouses and debts.” It also held that after determining the
remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favour of the common children because
the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned
(pursuant to Art 63 (2) and 43(2),FC). Only separate properties of Brigido shall be
delivered to him which he has none. Upon a motion for reconsideration, RTC initially set
aside its previous decision and stated that NET PROFIT EARNED shall be computed in
accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of the FC. However, it later reverted to its original
Order, setting aside the last ruling.
ISSUES:
What law governs the property relations between the Husband and the Wife who got
married in 1977? What law governs the dissolution and the consequent liquidation of the
common properties of the Husband and the Wife by virtue of decree of legal separation?
What is the meaning of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership for purposes of
effecting the forfeiture authorized under Art 63 of the FC?
What properties shall be included in the forfeiture of the guilty spouse in the net conjugal
partnership as a result of the issuance of the decree of legal separation?
RULING:
Article 129 of the Family Code applies since the property relation is governed by the
system of CPG. Brigido claimed that the court is wrong when it applied Art 129 and argued
that Art 102 should be applied because no other provision of the FC which defined net
profit earned subject to forfeiture as a result of legal separation. When Brigido and Rita got
married in 1977, the operative law was the civil code. Since they did not agree on marriage
settlement, the property relation between them is the conjugal partnership of gains. Under
such property relation, the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their
separate property and the income from their work and industry. The husband and the wife
also own in common all the property of the CPG.
Since at the time of the dissolution of their marriage the operative law is already the FC, the
same applies and the applicable law as to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets
and liabilities is Art 129 of the FC in relation to Art 63(2) of the FC. It is applicable because
Art 256 of the FC provides that “this code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws”
The net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains are all the fruits of the separate
properties of the spouses and the products of their labor and industry. Article 102(4) of the
FC expressly provides that for purposes of computing net profits subject to forfeiture under
Art 43 (2), 63(2), Articles 102(4) applies. In such provision, net profits shall be the increase
in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration
of marriage and the market value at the time of dissolution. It applies to both absolute
community regime and conjugal partnership of gains. The court however clarified that
Article 102(2) of the FC applies in the instant case for purpose only of defining net profit.
The share of the guilty spouse from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited
in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63 (2).When a couple enters into
a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article 142 of the Civil Code, "the husband
and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and income from
their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the
partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the
marriage." From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property
and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or
properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.
Considering that the couple's marriage has been dissolved under the Family Code, Article
129 of the same Code applies in the liquidation of the couple's properties in the event that
the conjugal partnership of gains is dissolved. It was established by the trial court that the
spouses have no separate properties when they got married; there is nothing to return to
any of them. Conjugal properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or
their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party,
his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the
common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused,
like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the
conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate property which may be
accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.
(b) For cause other than death, FC 43 (2); FC 63(2); 147; 148
(c) Termination due to death, FC 104 19
Ko, Nikki Mei Q.

Diño v. Diño
G.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011
FACTS:
Alain M. Diño (Alain) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño (Caridad) were childhood friends and
sweethearts. They started living together. On 14 January 1998, they were married. On 30
May 2001, Alain filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Caridad, citing
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Alain alleged that respondent
failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had abandoned her
responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting
with her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent
was not faithful and would at times become violent and hurt him. Alain later learned that
Caridad filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with Alain, which was
granted by the Superior Court of California. Alain also learned that, Caridad married a
certain Manuel V. Alcantara. Dr. Tayag, a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological
report establishing that Caridad was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Dr.
Tayag found that Caridad’s disorder was long-lasting and by nature, incurable. The trial
court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was psychologically incapacited
to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
RULING:
NO. Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages 6 (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the FC.
In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during
the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be
liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496
of the Civil Code, partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial
proceedings. x x It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same
proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Article 51. XXXX The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no
way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of
either or both of the parents; but the value of the properties already received under the
decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime.
XXXX
Lazaro, Aprille Keith M.

Yu v. Reyes-Carpio
G.R. No. 189207, June 15, 2011
It is more proper to rule first on the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of each
party’s psychological incapacity to perform their respective marital obligations. If the Court
eventually finds that the parties’ respective petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage is
indeed meritorious on the basis of either or both of the parties’ psychological incapacity, then
the parties shall proceed to comply with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code before a final
decree of absolute nullity of marriage can be issued. Pending such ruling on the declaration of
nullity of the parties’ marriage, the Court finds no legal ground, at this stage, to proceed with
the reception of evidence in regard the issues on custody and property relations, since these
are mere incidents of the nullity of the parties’ marriage.
FACTS:
Eric Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Caroline T. Yu with the
RTC of Pasig. Judge Suarez on May 30, 2006 issued an order stating that Eric’s partial offer
of evidence dated April 18, 2006 would be submitted for resolution after certain exhibits
have been remarked. But the exhibits were only relative to the issue of the nullity of the
marriage of Eric and Caroline. On September 12, 2006, Caroline moved to submit the case
for resolution, considering that the incidents on custody, support, and property relations
(incidental issues) were mere consequences of the declaration of nullity of the parties’
marriage.
Eric opposed this motion saying that the incident on declaration of nullity cannot be
resolved without presentation of evidence for the incidents on custody, support, and
property relations. Eric added that the incidental issues and the issue on declaration of
nullity can both proceed and be simultaneously resolved. RTC ruled in favour of Eric’s
opposition.
Caroline caused the inhibition of Judge Suarez, so that the case was re-raffled to another
branch presided by Judge Reyes-Carpio. While the case was being tried by Judge Reyes-
Carpio, Caroline filed an Omnibus Motion seeking the strict observation by the said judge of
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage as codified in A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC, and that the case on the declaration on nullity be already submitted for resolution
ahead of the incidental issues, and not simultaneously. Eric opposed this motion.
Judge Reyes-Carpio granted the Omnibus Motion, saying that the main cause of action is the
declaration of nullity of the marriage and the incidental issues are merely ancillary
incidents thereto. Eric moved for reconsideration, which was denied by Judge Reyes-
Carpio. Eric then filed for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65. CA affirmed the judgment of
the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether the main issue of nullity of marriage must be submitted for resolution first before
the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations (incidental issues) –
NO.
HELD:
It appears in the records that the Orders in question, or what are alleged to have been
exercised with grave abuse of discretion, are interlocutory orders. An interlocutory order is
one which “does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court’s task of
adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards
each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court. Eric
Yu to prove that the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion and that
those were patently erroneous. Considering that the requisites that would justify certiorari
as an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order have not been complied with, the
proper recourse for petitioner should have been an appeal in due course of the judgment of
the trial court on the merits, incorporating the grounds for assailing the interlocutory
orders.
It must be noted that Judge Reyes-Carpio did not disallow the presentation of evidence on
the incidents on custody, support, and property relations. It is clear in the assailed orders
that the trial court judge merely deferred the reception of evidence relating to custody,
support, and property relations. And the trial judge’s decision was not without basis. Judge
Reyes-Carpio finds support in the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages. Particularly, Secs. 19 and 21 of the Rule clearly allow the reception of evidence
on custody, support, and property relations after the trial court renders a decision granting
the petition, or upon entry of judgment granting the petition:
Section 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall
declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by
the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented
under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children
and delivery of their presumptive legitimes. – Upon entry of the judgment granting the
petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate court
granting the petition, the Family Court, on motion of either party, shall proceed with the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, including custody,
support of common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes pursuant to
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous
judicial proceedings.
Evidently, Judge Reyes-Carpio did not deny the reception of evidence on custody, support,
and property relations but merely deferred it, based on the existing rules issued by this
Court, to a time when a decision granting the petition is already at hand and before a final
decree is issued. Conversely, the trial court, or more particularly the family court, shall
proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common
children, and delivery of their presumptive legitimes upon entry of judgment granting the
petition. And following the pertinent provisions of the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, this act is undoubtedly consistent with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code,
contrary to what petitioner asserts. Particularly, Arts. 50 and 51 of the Family Code state:
Article 50. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in the previous judicial proceedings.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash,
property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved,
had already provided for such matters.
Also, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly allows the deferment of the reception of evidence on
custody, support, and property relations. Conversely, the trial court may receive evidence
on the subject incidents after a judgment granting the petition but before the decree of
nullity or annulment of marriage is issued. And this is what Judge Reyes-Carpio sought to
comply with in issuing the assailed orders. As correctly pointed out by the CA, Eric Yu’s
assertion that ruling the main issue without receiving evidence on the subject incidents
would result in an ambiguous and fragmentary judgment is certainly speculative and,
hence, contravenes the legal presumption that a trial judge can fairly weigh and appraise
the evidence submitted by the parties.
Therefore, it cannot be said at all that Judge Reyes-Carpio acted in a capricious and
whimsical manner, much less in a way that is patently gross and erroneous, when she
issued the assailed orders deferring the reception of evidence on custody, support, and
property relations. To reiterate, this decision is left to the trial court’s wisdom and legal
soundness. Consequently, therefore, the CA cannot likewise be said to have committed
grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Orders of Judge Reyes-Carpio and in ultimately
finding an absence of grave abuse of discretion on her part.
C. Conjugal partnership of gains
Jore, Ma. Jovi P.

Quiao v. Quiao
G. R. No. 183622, July 4, 2012
FACTS:
ISSUES:
RULING:
laws”
Tec, Natasha Kim R.

Orpiano v. Tomas
G.R. No. 178611, Jan. 14, 2013
Allowing Estrella to proceed with the annulment case while the collection case is still pending
is like saying that she may accept the deed of sale and question it at the same time. For this is
the necessary import of the two pending cases: joining as plaintiff in the collection case
implies approval of the deed, while suing to declare it null and void in the annulment court
entails a denunciation thereof. This may not be done. "A person cannot accept and reject the
same instrument" at the same time. It must be remembered that "the absence of the consent
of one (spouse to a sale) renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the
conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale.
FACTS:
Petitioner Estrella Aduan Orpiano is the widow of Alejandro Orpiano. Part of their conjugal
estate is an 809.5 square meter lot in Quezon City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. RT-23468. IN 1979 Estrella was declared an absent spouse, and Alejandro was
granted the authority to sell the lot. On March 19. 1996. Alejarndro sold the lot on
installment basis to the Tomas Spouses. The latter had until December to complete their
payments, however they failed in their obligation prompting Alejandro to seek the
collection of the amount unpaid by the Tomas spouses, with damages before the RTC.
While the case was still pending Alejandro passed away, his heirs, including Estrella were
substituted in his stead in the case. Estrella moved to amend the complaint to one for
annulment of sale an cancellation of title, but the court denied her motion. She moved to be
dropped as a party plaintiff but was also denied.
On June 11 2005 Estrella filed a case for annulment of sale and cancellation of title against
the Tomas Spouses, claiming the declaration of absence and Alejandro’s Authority to sell
the lot are null and void. The Tomas spouses prayed for the dismissal thereof on the ground
of forum shopping. RTC ruled in favor of the Tomas Spouses and dismissed the annulment
(of sale) case. CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Estrella can amend the cause of action in the collection case to one for
annulment of the sale.
RULING:
No. In amending the collection suit, it would adversely affect the interest of her co-heirs.
She cannot amend but she can, however, be dropped as party plaintiff. According to Section
11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on
motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms
that are just. In the case, Estrella is both and heir and owner of the co jugal share wherein
she has to succeed to her husband’s rights even as she must protect her conjugal share
from Alejandro’s perceived undue disposition. By seeking to be dropped from the collection
case, Estrella was foregoing collection of her share in the amount that may be due and
owing from the sale. It does not imply, waiver in any manner that affects the rights of the
other heirs. Moreover, the proper remedy that she should have availed us a petition for
Certiorari or otherwise question the RTC’s denial of her motion to be dropped as a party
plaintiff citing just reasons which call for a ruling to the contrary because issues arising
from joiner or misjoinder of parties are the proper subject of certiorari. Estrella in the case
made a mistake in proceeding to file the annulment case directly, after these remedies were
denied.
1. When CPG commences and applies

(a) Marriages under FC, FC 107 cf. FC 88, FC 89
(b) Marriages before FC, FC 105(2) of FC 256
(c) Suppletory rules, FC 108 cf. NCC 1767-1768
2. What is included in the CPG, FC Art. 106
a. Presumption of CPG, FC 116
Villanueva, Manuel Jejomar M.

Titan v. David
G.R. No. 169548, March 15, 2010
Conveyance or sale of conjugal property requires the consent of both spouses, any sale done
without the same is void except those specified by law.
FACTS:
The spouses david owned a 602 sqm. Lot in White Plains, Quezon City which was
registered to the wife Martha David.
The two has been separated de facto since 1976, and no longer communicated with each
other.
In 1995 Manuel David found that Martha had previously sold the property to Titan
Construction Corporation (Titan) for P1,500,000.00 through a Deed of Sale dated on the
same year.
Manuel Filed for Annulment of Contract and Recovenyance against Titan alleging that the
sale executed by Martha in favor of Titan was without his knowledge and consent.
The RTC ruled in favor of Manuel, and ordered Titan reconvey the said property, being that
it was conjugal in character since it was purchased by Manuel and Martha with conjugal
funds during their marriage.
The CA affirmed the same.
Titan now claims that it was a buyer in good faith and for value; that the property was
Martha’s paraphernal property; that it properly relied on the SPA presented by Martha.
ISSUE:
Can a buyer present the defence of good faith in buying conjugal property?
RULING:
The court says no. Article 116 of the Family Code declares that in all property acquired
during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or
registered in the name of one or both spouses, it is presumed to be conjugal unless the
contrary is proved.
We are not persuaded by Titans arguments that the property was Marthas exclusive
property because Manuel failed to present before the RTC any proof of his income in 1970,
hence he could not have had the financial capacity to contribute to the purchase of the
property in 1970; and that Manuel admitted that it was Martha who concluded the original
purchase of the property. In consonance with our ruling in Spouses Castro v. Miat, Manuel
was not required to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership.
Rather, the presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was
acquired does not appear.Here, we find that Titan failed to overturn the presumption that
the property, purchased during the spouses marriage, was part of the conjugal partnership.
Since the property was undoubtedly part of the conjugal partnership, the sale to Titan
required the consent of both spouses. Article 165 of the Civil Code expressly provides that
the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. Likewise, Article 172 of the
Civil Code ordains that the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the
husband’s consent, except in cases provided by law.
Vitug, Loisse Danielle D.

Imani v. Metrobank
G.R. No. 187023, November 17, 2010.
The party claiming that the property is conjugal must show proof that said property was
acquired during marriage.
FACTS:
Evangeline D. Imani and her co-sureties signed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement in favor
of respondent Metrobank. As sureties, they bound themselves to pay Metrobank whatever
indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but not exceeding Six Million Pesos
(P6,000,000.00). CPDTI defaulted in the payment of its loans. The sheriff levied on a
property registered in Imani’s name. Petitioner opposed the motion, asserting that the
property belongs to the conjugal partnership. Attached to her opposition were an affidavit
executed by Crisanto Origen, the former owner of the property, attesting that spouses Sina
and Evangeline Imani were the vendees of the subject property; and the photocopies of the
checks allegedly issued by Sina Imani as payment for the subject property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property is conjugal.
RULING:
No.
The said affidavit can hardly be considered sufficient evidence to prove her claim that the
property is conjugal. As correctly pointed out by Metrobank, the said affidavit has no
evidentiary weight because Crisanto Origen was not presented in court to affirm the
veracity of his affidavit. The basic rule of evidence is that unless the affiants themselves are
placed on the witness stand to testify on their affidavits, such affidavits must be rejected for
being hearsay. The party claiming that the property is conjugal must show proof that the
property was acquired during marriage.
Yu, Karl Alen G.

Dewara v. Lamela
G.R. No. 179010, April 11, 2011
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Registration in the name of
the husband or the wife alone does not destroy this presumption. The separation-in-fact
between the husband and the wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal
partnership. The lot retains its conjugal nature. Moreover, the presumption of conjugal
ownership applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not
appear. The use of the conjugal funds is not an essential requirement for the presumption to
arise.
FACTS:
Eduardo Dewara and petitioner Elenita Dewara were married before the enactment of the
Family Code. Thus, the Civil Code governed their marital relations. Husband and wife were
separated-in-fact because Elenita went to work in California. In 1985, Eduardo, while
driving a private jeep registered in the name of Elenita, hit respondent Ronnie Lamela.
Ronnie filed a case for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence against
Eduardo and he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment and to pay civil
indemnity of ₱72,598.70 as damages. The writ of execution on the civil liability was served
on Eduardo, but it was returned unsatisfied because he had no property in his name, thus
prompting the levying of properties in the name of Elenita for being the spouse. Elenita
opposed the execution sale claiming the property to be her paraphernal property. Lamela
countered that it belong to their conjugal partnership. RTC ruled it was paraphernal
property. CA reversed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the property is part of the conjugal partnership of Sps. Dewara thus subject to
execution
RULING:
Yes. There is no dispute that the subject property was acquired by spouses Elenita and
Eduardo during their marriage. It is also undisputed that their marital relations are
governed by the conjugal partnership of gains, since they were married before the
enactment of the Family Code and they did not execute any prenuptial agreement as to
their property relations. Before debts and obligations may be charged against the conjugal
partnership, it must be shown that the same were contracted for, or the debts and
obligations should have redounded to, the benefit of the conjugal partnership. However, if
the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if the property should be
insufficient, the fines and indemnities may be enforced upon the partnership assets only
after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 of the Civil Code have been covered.
Abasta, Benazir Faye V.

Lim v. Equitable PCI Bank
G.R. No. 183918, January 15, 2014
All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, unless it is shown that it is owned
exclusively by the husband or the wife; that this presumption is not overcome by the fact that
the property is registered in the name of the husband or the wife alone; and that the consent
of both spouses is required before a conjugal property may be mortgaged. This presumption
under Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one
spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved.
FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco Lim executed an SPA in favor of his brother Franco to mortgage his
share in a property in order to secure a loan. This first loan extended by BDO in 1989 was
fully paid by Franco in 1992. However in 1996, Franco and their mother obtained another
loan over the same property which they failed to pay.
Respondent Bank tried to foreclose the property due to the non-payment of the loan.
Petitioner thus tried to get a TRO and for the foreclosure and to secure a cancellation of the
SPA executed in favor of his brother. Petitioner alleged that he did not authorize Franco to
mortgage the subject property to respondent and that his signatures in the Real Estate
Mortgage and the Surety Agreement were forged.
the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner. It ruled that petitioner was able to prove
by preponderance of evidence that he did not participate in the execution of the mortgage
contract giving rise to the presumption that his signature was forged.
The CA reversed the RTC Decision. It ruled that petitioner’s mere allegation that his
signature in the mortgage contract was forged is not sufficient to overcome the
presumption of regularity of the notarized document.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Respondent Bank was failed to exercise due diligence when granting the
loan without the signature of Petitioner's wife in the mortgage contract.
RULING:
NO. Respondent exercised due diligence. The nature of the property was never raised as
an issue. Hence, the absence of his wife’s signature on the mortgage contract also has no
bearing in this case.
All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, unless it is shown that it is owned
exclusively by the husband or the wife; that this presumption is not overcome by the fact
that the property is registered in the name of the husband or the wife alone; and that the
consent of both spouses is required before a conjugal property may be
mortgaged. However, we find it iniquitous to apply the foregoing presumption especially
since the nature of the mortgaged property was never raised as an issue before the RTC,
the CA, and even before this Court. In fact, petitioner never alleged in his Complaint that the
said property was conjugal in nature. Hence, respondent had no opportunity to rebut the
said presumption.
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides as follows:

"Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."
The presumption applies to property acquired during the lifetime of the husband and wife.
In this case, it appears on the face of the title that the properties were acquired by [one
spouse]. When the property is registered in the name of a spouse only and there is no
showing as to when the property was acquired by said spouse, this is an indication that the
property belongs exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption under Article 160 of the
Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of
innocent third parties are involved.
b. What are included in CPG, FC 106, 117, 115, 118, 119, 120
Allorde, Channelle Anne B.

Villanueva v. CA
427 SCRA 439
All property acquired by the spouses during the marriage, regardless in whose name the
property is registered, is presumed conjugal unless proved otherwise. The presumption is not
rebutted by the mere fact that the certificate of title of the property or the tax declaration is in
the name of one of the spouses only. Article 116 of the Family Code expressly provides that the
presumption remains even if the property is "registered in the name of one or both of the
spouses."
FACTS:
On October 7, 1926, Eusebia Napisa Retuya (Eusebia), was the legal wife of Nicolas Retuya
(Nicolas). They were blessed with five (5) children. During their marriage, they acquired
real properties and all improvements situated in Mandaue City, and Consolacion, Cebu.
Nicolas was a co-owner of a parcel of land situated in Mandaue City which he inherited
from his parents. In 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited
with Pacita Villanueva (Pacita), wherein Procopio Villanueva (Procopio), was their
illegitimate son. Nicolas, then, was the only person who received the income of the
properties. In 1985, Nicolas suffered a stroke. From such time and until present, Procopio
has been receiving the income of the properties. Meanwhile, Natividad Retuya, a legitimate
child of Spouses Retuya went to Procopio to negotiate since their father was already
incapacitated, however, the latter refused. Eusebia then filed a complaint before the
barangay but no settlement was reached. Hence, a complaint for reconveyance was filed by
Eusebia, claiming that the subject properties are her conjugal properties with Nicolas. The
trial court applied Article 116 of the Family Code and ruled in favor of Eusebia. Petitioners
posed their appeal but to no avail, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Thus, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject properties are conjugal.
RULING:
YES. The marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia continued to exist regardless of the fact that
Nicolas was already living with Pacita. Hence, all property acquired from 7 October 1926,
the date of Nicolas and Eusebia’s marriage, until 23 November 1996, the date of Eusebia’s
death, are still presumed conjugal. Petitioners have neither claimed nor proved that any of
the subject properties was acquired outside or beyond this period.
All property acquired by the spouses during the marriage, regardless in whose name the
property is registered, is presumed conjugal unless proved otherwise. The presumption is
not rebutted by the mere fact that the certificate of title of the property or the tax
declaration is in the name of one of the spouses only. Article 116 of the Family Code
expressly provides that the presumption remains even if the property is "registered in the
name of one or both of the spouses."
Aranas, Janine Karla A.

Mendoza v. Reyes
124 SCRA 154
Property acquired during a marriage is presumed to be conjugal and the fact that the land is
later registered in the name of only one of the spouses does not destroy its conjugal nature.
FACTS:
Ponciano S. Reyes (Ponciano) filed a complaint for annulment of a deed of sale of two
parcels of land with their improvements, executed by his wife, Julia in favor of the
petitioners. Ponciano averred that said properties were conjugal properties and that it was
sold to the petitioners without his knowledge or consent. At the same time the spouses
were living separately and were not in speaking terms. The petitioners alleged that the
properties were paraphernal properties of Julia and that they had purchased the same in
good faith and for adequate consideration, which Julia supported. The CFI agreed with the
petitioners.
The respondents obtained a loan from RFC together to pay the balance of the selling price
of the lots in issue and for the construction of a house on the said lots. In the deed of sale,
the vendee named is 'Julia de Reyes'. Her signatures appear over the caption vendee and
those of Ponciano under the phrase: 'with my marital consent’.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lots are conjugal property.
RULING:
Yes. The (strong) presumption in ART 160 of the Civil Code, that All property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership; unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife must be applied. There is no question
that the disputed property and its improvements were acquired by onerous title during the
marriage. Moreover, the records show that the funds came from loans obtained by the
spouses from the RFC. Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, all debts and obligations
contracted by the husband and the wife for the benefit of the conjugal partnership are
liabilities of the partnership.
To rebut the presumption and the evidence of the conjugal character of the property, the
petitioners have only the testimony of Julia to offer. Such testimony was negated by the fact
that she herself executed the ITR’s of the properties “in behalf of the conjugal partnership”.
Property acquired during a marriage is presumed to be conjugal and the fact that the land
is later registered in the name of only one of the spouses does not destroy its conjugal
nature. If the fact that property acquired during marriage was registered in the name of the
husband alone does not affect its conjugal nature, neither does registration in the name of
the wife. Any person who buys land registered in the married name of the wife is put on
notice about its conjugal nature.
Arriesgado, Mark Reynold M.
De La Pena v. Avila (2012)
The presumption mentioned in the Art. 160 of the Civil Code applies only for the property
acquired during marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when the
property was acquired. Moreover, the presumption in favour of the conjugality is rebuttable,
but only with strong, clear and convincing proof of exclusive ownership.
FACTS:
Antonia Dela Pena, who was married to Antegono Dela Pena, obtained a loan from Aguila
Sons and Co. As a security for the payment of the said loan, Antonia executed a Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage in favour of Aguila on their residential lot in Marikina. However, Antonia
also executed a Deed Of absolute sale in favour of Gemma Avila over the same property
because of Antonia’s failure to pay her obligation from Aguila. Gemma Avila also mortgaged
the same property to Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC-BPI) to secure a loan from
the bank. Antonia, together with her son Alvin John, filed against Gemma praying for the
annulment of the said deed of sale. She claims that the said property was conjugal property
and was sold without the consent of his husband who already died by that time. She also
invokes the presumption of Conjugality under Art. 160 of the Civil Code. The RTC ruled in
favour of Antonia and upheld the presumption of conjugality. The CA ruled otherwise.
Thus, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the said property that was sold is part of the Conjugal Partnership.
RULING:
As the parties invoking the presumption of conjugality under Art. 160 of the Civil Code, the
Dela Penas did not even come close to proving that the subject property was acquired
during the Marriage between Antonia and Antegono. The record is bereft of evidence that
from which the actual acquisition of the property by Antonia was during the Marriage.
Although the title stated in its registration that it is under the name of, “Antonia Dela Pena,
married to Antegono dela Pena,” such is merely a description of the civil status of the wife
and cannot mean that the husband is also a registered owner. The reason for the
inconclusiveness of the said description is that it is possible that the property was acquired
when she was single but only registered when she got married.
3. What is excluded from CPG, FC 109
Bassig, Ma. Karina A.

Laperal v. Katigbak (1964)
10 SCRA 493
All properties acquired during the marriage are, by law, presumed conjugal unless it is proven
to be the exclusive property of the husband or the wife.
FACTS:
Laperal disagree with the findings of the CFI that the property covered by TCT. No. 57626
to be the separate or paraphernal property of Evelina Kalaw, rather they maintain that
such is the conjugal assets of Evelina and Ramon Katigbak for it was acquired during the
marriage.
The litigation is a sequel of the one instituted by the Laperals against Katigbak and Kalaw
whereby the trial court rendered judgment against katigbak and Kalaw to pay the Laperals
the sum of P14,000.00, and to return the jewelry involved, or to pay plaintiffs P97,500.00. A
month after, Kalaw filed a complaint against her husband Katigbak, for “judicial separation
of property and separate administration” contending thereby that neither of them had
brought properties unto the marriage and that it was her mother who bought the property
for her and had placed it only in her name as the practice of her mother.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property in question is the paraphernal property of Evelina Kalaw
RULING:
YES. In the Coingco case, the court ruled: The second question raised in the motion for
reconsideration is, whether the presumption that the properties in litigation are conjugal
properties because they were acquired during the coverture may be sufficiently rebutted
by any one of the following facts: (1) the titles to them are in the name of wife alone; (2)
that the husband gave his marital consent to their being mortgaged by the wife; (3) that the
wife financially able to buy those properties. While it is true that each one of them, taken
separately, may not be sufficient to overcome the above-quoted presumption established
by Art. 14 of the Civil Code, it is nonetheless true that all of them taken together, with all
the other facts and circumstances established by the evidence, might be, and were,
considered by the lower court as sufficient to rebut the same presumption.
In the case before Us, the deed to the disputed land is in the name of the wife. At the time of
its purchase, the property was already of such substantial value as admittedly, the husband,
by himself could not have afforded to buy, considering that singular source of income then
was his P200.00 a month salary from a Manila Bank.
Jairus Vincent Z. Bernardez

Francisco v. CA (1998)
Art. 160 NCC provides a presumption that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong
to the conjugal partnership. However, the party who invokes this presumption must first
prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage.
FACTS:
Teresita Francisco (petitioner) is the legal wife of Eusebio Francisco by his second
marriage in 1962. She alleges that since their marriage, she and Eusebio have acquired four
properties. These properties were administered by Eusebio until he was incapacitated on
account of tuberculosis, heart disease and cancer. Eusebio’s children by his first marriage
(private respondents) then succeeded in convincing their father to sign a general power of
attorney (GPA) authorizing their oldest sibling to administer the subect properties.
Petitioner then filed a suit for the annulment of the said GPA. In their defense, the private
respondents maintain that the assets in controversy claimed by petitioner as "conjugal" are
capital properties of Eusebio as these were acquired by the latter either through
inheritance or through his industry prior to his second marriage. Moreover, they stress that
Eusebio is not incapacitated contrary to petitioner’s allegation.
ISSUE:
Whether the properties, subject matter of controversy, are not conjugal but the capital
properties of Eusebio exclusively
RULING:
Yes. Articles 158[5] and 160[6] of the NCC have been repealed by the Family Code on
August 3, 1988. Nonetheless, the new law cannot be applied in this case without impairing
prior vested rights. Hence, this case shall be resolved based on the provisions of the
NCC.
Art. 160 NCC provides a presumption that all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership. However, the party who invokes this presumption must
first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. This, the
petitioner failed to do.
On the contrary, the petitioner admitted that some of the properties were brought by
Eusebio into their marriage.1 Some were even acquired by Eusebio as inheritance. With
respect to the other properties, petitioner supports her claim by presenting building
permits but the Court held that said documents do not prove that the improvements were
acquired during the second marriage; and the fact that one is the applicant or licensee is
not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the property is conjugal or not. With
respect to the property registered in the name of “Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita
Francisco.” It suffices to say the phrase "married to" preceding "Teresita Francisco" is
merely descriptive of the civil status of Eusebio Francisco.
From the foregoing, the Court held that the subject properties form part of Eusebio’s
exclusive properties.
Brito, John Patrick T.

Tan v. Andrade
G.R. No. 171904, Aug 7, 2013
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
FACTS:
Rosario Vda. De Andrade (Rosario) was the registered owner of 4 parcels of land situated
in Cebu City which she mortgaged to and subsequently foreclosed by one Simon. When the
redemption period was about to expire, Rosario sought the assistance of Bobby Tan
(Bobby) who agreed to redeem the subject properties. Rosario sold the property to Bobby
and her son, Proceso, Jr. which was evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. Proceso, Jr.
executed a Deed of Assignment, ceding unto Bobby his rights and interests over the subject
properties for consideration. The Deed of Assignment was signed by one of Rosario’s sons,
Henry, as instrumental witness. In the Deed of Sale, Bobby extended an Option to buy the
subject properties in favor of Proceso, Jr., giving the latter until 7pm to purchase the same.
Which he failed to do so, hence Bobby consolidated his ownership over the subject
properties. Rosario’s children namely, Grace, Proceso, Jr., Henry, Andrew, Glory, Miriam
Rose, Joseph Jasmin Blaza, and Charity A. Santiago all filed a complaint for reconveyance
1 Under Art. 148 of NCC, the following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse: (1) That which is brought to the
marriage as his or her own; (2) That which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title; x x x.
and annulment of deeds of conveyance and damages against Bobby and alleged that the
transaction between Rosario and Bobby was not one of sale but actually an equitable
mortgage which was entered into to secure Rosario’s indebtedness with Bobby. They also
claimed that Rosario had no right to dispose of their respective shares because the subject
properties were inherited by them from their father, Proceso Andrade, Sr., the subject
properties were conjugal in nature. In this light, they argued that they remained as co-
owners of the property together with Bobby, despite the issuance of the TCTs in his name.
ISSUE:
WON the subject properties are Conjugal in nature.
RULING:
Pertinent to the resolution of this second issue is Article 160 of the Civil Code which states
that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless
it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." For this presumption
to apply, the party invoking the same must, however, preliminarily prove that the property
was indeed acquired during the marriage.
In this case, records reveal that the conjugal partnership of Rosario and her husband was
terminated upon the latter’s death on August 7, 1978 while the transfer certificates of title
over the subject properties were issued on September 28, 1979 and solely in the name of
"Rosario Vda. de Andrade, of legal age, widow, Filipino." Other than their bare allegation, no
evidence was adduced by the Andrades to establish that the subject properties were
procured during the coverture of their parents or that the same were bought with conjugal
funds. Moreover, Rosario’s declaration that she is the absolute owner of the disputed
parcels of land in the subject deed of sale was not disputed by her son Proceso, Jr., who was
a party to the same. Hence, by virtue of these incidents, the Court upholds the RTC’s finding
that the subject properties were exclusive or sole properties of Rosario.
Calimlim, Jeninah A.
Veloso v. Martinez (1914)
28 Phil. 255
The jewels were the wife’s sole and separate property, acquired from her mother; that as such
paraphernal property she exercised dominion over them; that she had the exclusive control
and management of the same; that they had not been delivered to her husband to be
administered or controlled by him; that, inasmuch as they had not been delivered to her
husband to be administered by him, she could not be deprived of them by any act of his,
without her consent, and without a compliance with the provisions of the Civil Code. (Arts.
1382, 1384.)
FACTS:
Lucia Martinez was appointed as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband
Domingo Franco. Mariano Veloso filed an action against Lucia to recover the possession of
a certain parcel of land together with damages. Lucia answered, setting up a counterclaim
for the recovery of certain jewelry alleged to be in the possession of Mariano. The jewels
belonged to Lucia personally and that she had inherited the same from her mother.
Domingo, before his death, borrowed money from Mariano and gave as security said
jewelry. Mariano, on the other hand, claims that the jewels were pawned to him by
Domingo, with the full knowledge and consent of Lucia. Mariano asserts that after
Domingo’s death, Lucia promised to pay the amount for which the said jewels were
pawned. But Lucia positively denies that she knew that her husband had pawned her
jewels or that she promised to redeem the same by paying the amount due.
ISSUE:
Whether Lucia was entitled to recover from Mariano the jewelry.
RULING:
Lucia is entitled to the possession of said jewels, or to their value, amounting to P6,000. The
record shows that the jewels were the sole and separate property of the wife, acquired
from her mother, and in the absence of further proof, we must presume that they
constituted a part of her paraphernal property. As such paraphernal property she exercised
dominion over the same. (Article 1382, Civil Code.) She had the exclusive control and
management of the same, until and unless she had delivered it to her husband, before a
notary public, with the intent that her husband might administer it properly. (Article 1384,
Civil Code.) There is no proof in the record that she had ever delivered the same to her
husband, in any manner, or for any purpose. That being true, she could not be deprived of
the same by any act of her husband, without her consent, and without compliance with the
provisions of the Civil Code above cited.
Chua Cheng, Ma. Lawreine Francesca C.
Berciles v. GSIS
128 SCRA 53
Retirement premiums are presumed conjugal property, if there is no proof that the premiums
were paid from the exclusive funds of the deceased.
FACTS:
Judge Berciles died leaving survivors benefits and other benefits accruing to his heirs. In
addition, there is a return of retirement premiums paid by the retiree in the among of
P9,700 to be paid by the GSIS. Such benefits are now being claimed by two families and
both of whom claim to be the deceased’s lawful heirs. Illuminada Ponce and her children as
the legal spouse and legitimate children of the late judge, filed for the benefits which was
duly supported by the required documents (i.e. marriage certificate). On the other hand,
Flor Fuentebella and her children claiming to be married said late judge, presented sworn
statements of other people attesting to her marriage with Berciles, family pictutes, etc. GSIS
decided to to distribute the retirement benefits among heirs, including the widow,
legitimate children, acknowledged natural child, and the illegitimate children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not GSIS’ distribution was correct.
RULING:
NO. The disposition of made by GSIS of the retirement benefits due to the heirs of the late
Judge Berciles is erroneous. The retirement benefits shall accrue to his estate and will be
distributed among his legal heirs in accordance with the law on intestate succession.
Illuminada and her children are the lawful heirs entitled to the distribution of the benefits
which shall accrue to the estate of the deceased judge and will be distributed among the
petitioners as his legal heirs in accordance with the law on intestate succession. Moreover,
the retirement premiums totaling P9,700 is presumed conjugal property, there beign no
proof that the premiums were paid from the exclusive funds of the deceased judge (Art.
160, New Civil Code). Such being the case, one-half of the amount belongs to the wife as
her property in the conjugal partnership and the other half shall go to the estate of the
deceased judge which shall in turn be distributed to his legal heirs.
Dioquino, Apriljo Frances B.

Plata v. Yatco (1964)
12 SCRA 718
Since the property was paraphernal, and the creditors and purchasers were aware of it, the
fact being clearly spread on the land records, it is plain that Plata's possession thereof was not
derived from Gaudencio Begosa. The illegal detainer judgment against the husband alone
cannot bind nor affect the wife's possession of her parapherna, which by law she holds and
administers independently, and which she may even encumber or alienate without his
knowledge or consent
FACTS:
In 1954 petitioner, Amalia Plata who was single at the time, purchased a parcel of land in
Caloocan Rizal and sold the property to Celso Saldaña on February 13, 1958. Subsequently
on September 24, 1958 Saldaña resold the property to Plata, who was now married to
Gaudencio Begosa (Begosa).
On the same date, petitioner mortgaged the property to Cesarea Villanueva (Villanueva) in
consideration of a loan of P3, 000.
For petitioner’s failure to pay the mortgage, the property was extrajudicially foreclosed to
the mortgagee as the highest bidder on April 12, 1960.
Respondent Villanueva sued Begosa for illegal detainer and obtained final judgment against
him in the court of first instance.
A writ of execution was duly issued, but petitioner resisted all efforts to eject her from the
property, claiming ownership of the said property.
Upon motion of the judgment creditors, the court cited both petitioner and Begosa for
contempt for refusing to vacate the said property.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is bound by the detainer judgment against Begosa?
RULING:
NO. The respondents Villanueva could not ignore the paraphernal character of the property
in question, which had been unquestionably acquired by petitioner while still single. The
subsequent conveyance thereof to Celso Saldaña, and the reconveyance of her several
months afterward of the same property, did not transform it from paraphernal to conjugal
property, there being no proof that the money paid to Saldaña came from common or
conjugal funds.
Although Gaudencio Begosa signed the mortgage as a co-mortgagor, by itself alone, that
circumstance would not suffice to convert the land into conjugal property, considering that
it was paraphernal in origin.
Since the property was paraphernal, and the creditors and purchasers were aware of it, the
fact being clearly spread on the land records, it is plain that Plata's possession, therefore,
was not derived from Gaudencio Begosa. The illegal detainer judgment against the husband
alone cannot bind nor affect the wife's possession of her paraphernal, which by law she
holds and administers independently, and which she may even encumber or alienate
without his knowledge or consent. Hence, as she was not made partly defendant in the
eviction suite, the petitioner-wife could validly ignore the judgment of eviction against her
husband, and it was no contempt of court for her to do so, because the writ of execution
was not lawful against her.
4. Administration of exclusive property

(a) By the spouse-owner, FC 110
(b) By the other spouse, FC 110 2nd par; FC 142, 75, 227
Calimlim, Jeninah A.
Veloso v. Martinez (1914)
28 Phil. 255
The jewels were the wife’s sole and separate property, acquired from her mother; that as such
paraphernal property she exercised dominion over them; that she had the exclusive control
and management of the same; that they had not been delivered to her husband to be
administered or controlled by him; that, inasmuch as they had not been delivered to her
husband to be administered by him, she could not be deprived of them by any act of his,
without her consent, and without a compliance with the provisions of the Civil Code. (Arts.
1382, 1384.)
FACTS:
Lucia Martinez was appointed as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband
Domingo Franco. Mariano Veloso filed an action against Lucia to recover the possession of
a certain parcel of land together with damages. Lucia answered, setting up a counterclaim
for the recovery of certain jewelry alleged to be in the possession of Mariano. The jewels
belonged to Lucia personally and that she had inherited the same from her mother.
Domingo, before his death, borrowed money from Mariano and gave as security said
jewelry. Mariano, on the other hand, claims that the jewels were pawned to him by
Domingo, with the full knowledge and consent of Lucia. Mariano asserts that after
Domingo’s death, Lucia promised to pay the amount for which the said jewels were
pawned. But Lucia positively denies that she knew that her husband had pawned her
jewels or that she promised to redeem the same by paying the amount due.
ISSUE:
Whether Lucia was entitled to recover from Mariano the jewelry.
RULING:
Lucia is entitled to the possession of said jewels, or to their value, amounting to P6,000. The
record shows that the jewels were the sole and separate property of the wife, acquired
from her mother, and in the absence of further proof, we must presume that they
constituted a part of her paraphernal property. As such paraphernal property she exercised
dominion over the same. (Article 1382, Civil Code.) She had the exclusive control and
management of the same, until and unless she had delivered it to her husband, before a
notary public, with the intent that her husband might administer it properly. (Article 1384,
Civil Code.) There is no proof in the record that she had ever delivered the same to her
husband, in any manner, or for any purpose. That being true, she could not be deprived of
the same by any act of her husband, without her consent, and without compliance with the
provisions of the Civil Code above cited.
Dizon
Manotok Realty v. CA (1987)
149 SCRA 372
Articles 136 and 137 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provide:
Art. 136. The wife retains the ownership of the paraphernal property.
Art. 137. The wife shall have the administration of the paraphernal property, unless she
delivers the same to the husband by means of a public instrument empowering him to
administer it.
In this case, the public instrument shall be recorded in the Registry of Property. As for the
movables, the husband shall give adequate security.
FACTS:
Private respondent Felipe Madlangawa claims that he has been occupying a parcel of land
in the Clara de Tambunting de Legarda Subdivision since 1949 upon permission, with the
understanding that the he would eventually buy the lot. On April 2, 1950, the owner of the
lot, Clara Tambunting, died and her entire estate were placed under custodia legis.
On April 22, 1950, Madlangawa made a deposit for the said lot in the sum of P1,500.00
which was received by Vicente Legarda, husband of the late owner. There remained an
unpaid balance but he did not pay/was unable to pay this because de Legarda’s heirs could
not settle their differences. Apart from the initial deposit, no further payments were made.
On April 28, 1950, Don Vicente Legarda was appointed as a special administrator of the
estate.
Subsequently, the Manotok Realty became the successful bidder and vendee of the
subdivision. It caused the publication of several notices advising the occupants to vacate
their respective premises. Madlangawa was one of the many occupants who refused to
vacate. Petitioner filed the action below to recover the said lot.
RTC dismissed the petitioner's action. On appeal, CA found that the identity of the lot
sought to be recovered is the same as what was in the possession of Madlangawa. It ruled
that the only right remaining to petitioner is to enforce the collection of the balance
because accordingly, it stepped into the shoes of its predecessor.
Petitioner’s contention: Vicente Legarda had no authority to sell the said property on May
12, 1950 since the former was appointed as administrator of the estate of Clara
Tambunting only on August 28, 1950. Therefore, the questioned sale could not have bound
Clara Tambunting's estate because the vendor Vicente Legarda neither acted as the owner
nor the administrator of the subject property when the alleged sale took place. Regarding
the provision in the deed of sale wherein it bound itself to respect the contracts of sale or
promises to sell that may have been executed by Vicente Legarda, the petitioner argues that
this is only for those valid sales executed by the deceased Clara Tambunting and by persons
vested with authority to act on behalf of the estate.
Madlangawa’s contention: that the provisions of the deed of sale are a declaration or
admission against the interest of the petitioner, and shows that the acts of Vicente Legarda
had been ratified by the Philippine Trust Company and approved by the probate court. The
petitioner is estopped from questioning the authority of Vicente Legarda in selling the
property in dispute.
ISSUE:
WON Don Vicente Legarda validly disposed the lot to Madlangawa as administrator of the
paraphernal properties of Dona Clara Tambunting – NO.
RULING:
There is nothing in the records that will show that Don Vicente Legarda was the
administrator of the paraphernal properties of Dona Clara Tambunting during the lifetime
of the latter. Therefore, he could not have validly disposed of the lot in dispute as a
continuing administrator of the paraphernal properties of Dona Clara Tambunting. It is also
undisputed that the probate court appointed Don Vicente Legarda as administrator of the
estate only on August 28, 1950, more than three months after the questioned sale had
taken place.
The SC is led to the inevitable conclusion that the sale between Don Vicente Legarda and
Madlangawa is void ab initio, the former being neither an owner nor administrator of the
subject property. Such being the case, the sale cannot be the subject of the ratification by
the Philippine Trust Company or the probate court.
After the appointment of Don Vicente Legarda as administrator of the estate, he should
have applied before the probate court for authority to sell the disputed property in favor of
Madlangawa. If the probate court approved the request, then Don Vicente Legarda would
have been able to execute a valid deed of sale in favor of Madlangawa. Unfortunately, there
was no effort on the part of the administrator to comply with the above-quoted rule of
procedure nor on that of the respondent to protect his interests or to pay the balance of the
instalments to the court appointed administrator.
Dy, Czara Loraine F.

Ong v. CA
G.R. No. L-63025, Nov. 29, 1991
FACTS:
Teodora Ong is the wife of Ramon Ong, petitioner. She conducted her own logging business.
In furtherance of said business, she loaned 2,827.83 from Francisco Boix, private
respondent. Due to mismanagement, she defaulted on her obligation. Boix filed a complaint,
based on the promissory notes issued by Teodora. Judgment was rendered in favor of Boix,
he then moved to execute the judgment. The Sheriff of Camarines Norte (private co-
respondent) levied and attached a parcel of land. An auction sale was held and Boix was
adjudged the highest bidder and a writ of possession was issued.
Ramon filed a motion with the CFI of Manila to quash the writ of possession and was
denied. He then brought the case to the CA to annul the auction sale, alleging that the
property is conjugal and thus could not be held liable for personal debts contracted by the
wife. The CA found that the subject property is paraphernal property, it was declared in the
name of Teodora Ong, while the house erected thereon was declared in the name of Ramon
Ong and Teodora Ong.
ISSUE:
W/N the parcel of land is exclusive property of the wife.
HELD:
Yes, the parcel of land is an exclusive property of the wife. The mere use of the surname of
the husband in the tax declaration of the subject property is not sufficient proof that said
property was acquired during the marriage and is therefore conjugal. It is undisputed that
the subject parcel was declared solely in the wife's name, but the house built thereon was
declared in the name of the spouses. Under such circumstances, coupled with a careful
scrutiny of the records of the present case, We hold that the lot in question is paraphernal,
and is therefore, liable for the personal debts of the wife.
As correctly pointed out by the respondent Court, the party who invokes the presumption
that all property of the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership (Art. 160, New Civil
Code) must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of
acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the
presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.
Furthermore, even assuming for the sake of argument that the property in dispute is
conjugal, the same may still be held liable for the debts of the wife in this case. Under Art.
117 of the Civil Code, the wife may engage in business although the husband may object
(but subject to certain conditions). It is clear from the records that the wife was engaged in
the logging business with the husband's knowledge and apparently without any objection
on his part. The acts of the husband show that he gave his implied consent to the wife's
engagement in business. After all, whatever profits are earned by the wife from her
business go to the conjugal partnership. It would only be just and equitable that the
obligations contracted by the wife in connection with her business may also be chargeable
not only against her paraphernal property but also against the conjugal property of the
spouses.
5. Encumbrance/disposition of exclusive property, FC 111 as amended by RA 10572,

FC 112
Wong, et al. v. IAC
200 SCRA 792
A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the
support of the family or when she borrows money for the purpose of purchasing things
necessary for the support of the family if the husband fails to deliver the proper sum; when the
administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts or by the
husband and when the wife gives moderate donations for charity. Having failed to establish
that any of these circumstances occurred, the Wongs may not bind the conjugal assets to
answer for Katrina's personal obligation to them.
FACTS:
Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda on January 6, 1964. Romarico and Katrina had
been most of the time living separately. During the marriage or on January 6, 1971,
Romarico bought a 1,787 square-meter parcel of land in June 1972, Katrina entered into an
agreement with Anita Chan who consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale valued at
199,895 Hongkong dollars or P321,830.95. Katrina failed to return the pieces of jewelry
within the 20-day period agreed upon so Anita Chan demanded payment of their value.
Anita Chan and her husband Ricky Wong filed against Katrina and her husband Romarico
Henson, an action for collection of a sum of money. Trial court promulgated a decisions in
favor of the Wongs. A writ of execution was thereafter issued levied upon were four lots in
Angeles City all in the name of “Romarico Henson ... married to Katrina Henson.” Lots were
sold in a public auction. Romarico filed an action for the annulment of the decision saying
that he had nothing to do with the business transactions of Katrina as he did not authorize
her to enter into such transactions; and that the properties levied on execution and sold at
public auction by the sheriff were his capital properties and therefore, as to him, all the
proceedings had in the case were null and void. The RTC, finding that there was no basis for
holding the conjugal partnership liable for the personal indebtedness of Katrina, ruled in
favor of reconveyance in view of the jurisprudence that the interest of the wife in the
conjugal partnership property being inchoate and therefore merely an expectancy, the
same may not be sold or disposed of for value until after the liquidation and settlement of
the community assets.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the execution of a decision in an action for collection of a sum of money
may be nullified on the ground that the real properties levied upon and sold at public
auction are the alleged exclusive properties of a husband who did not participate in his
wife's business transaction from which said action stemmed.
RULING:
Yes, since he wasn’t given his day in court. He wasn’t even represented. Romarico acted, or,
as charged by petitioners, failed to act, in the belief that he was not involved in the personal
dealings of his estranged wife. That belief was buttressed by the fact that the complaint
itself did not mention or implicate him other than as the husband of Katrina.
However, On the matter of ownership of the properties involved, however, the Court
disagrees with the appellate court that the said properties are exclusively owned by
Romarico. Having been acquired during the marriage, they are still presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership even though Romarico and Katrina had been living separately.
The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties subsists in the absence of clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the
properties are exclusively owned by Romarico. While there is proof that Romarico acquired
the properties with money he had borrowed from an officemate, it is unclear where he
obtained the money to repay the loan. If he paid it out of his salaries, then the money is part
of the conjugal assets and not exclusively his. Proof on this matter is of paramount
importance considering that in the determination of the nature of a property acquired by a
person during covertrue, the controlling factor is the source of the money utilized in the
purchase.
The conjugal nature of the properties notwithstanding, Katrina's indebtedness may not be
paid for with them her obligation not having been shown by the petitioners to be one of the
charges against the conjugal partnership. In addition to the fact that her rights over the
properties are merely inchoate prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the
consent of her husband and her authority to incur such indebtedness had not been alleged
in the complaint and proven at the trial.
6. If property bought by installments, FC Art. 118, 119
Jovellanos v. CA
G.R. No. 100728 June 18, 1992
Any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both spouses shall be reimbursed by
the owner or owners upon liquidation of the partnership.
FACTS:
In September 2, 1955 Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife entered into a contract denominated
as a lease and conditional sale agreement over a parcel of land in the latter's Quezon City
Community Development Project, including a bungalow thereon. At that time, Daniel
Jovellanos was married to Leonor Dizon, with whom he had three children, the petitioners
herein. Leonor Dizon died. On May 30, 1967, Daniel married private respondent Annette H.
Jovellanos with whom he begot two children.
On January 8, 1975, with the lease amounts having been paid, Philamlife executed to Daniel
Jovellanos a deed of absolute sale and, on the next day, the latter donated to herein
petitioners all his rights, title and interests over the lot and bungalow thereon. Daniel died
and his death spawned the present controversy.
Private respondent Annette claims that the subject property was acquired by her deceased
husband while their marriage was still subsisting and that said property forms part of the
conjugal partnership of the second marriage. Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that
the property as well as the beneficial and equitable title thereto, was acquired by their
parents during the existence of the first marriage.
ISSUE:
WON the subject property forms part of his conjugal property from Daniel Jovellanos’
second marriage.
RULING:
YES. The conditional sale agreement in said contract is in the nature of a contract to sell. In
a contract to sell or a conditional sale, ownership is not transferred upon delivery of the
property but upon full payment of the purchase price. Generally, ownership is transferred
upon delivery, but even if delivered, the ownership may still be with the seller until full
payment of the price is made, if there is stipulation to this effect. Compliance with the
stipulated payments is a suspensive condition the failure of which prevents the obligation
of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force.
Daniel acquired ownership over the subject property only upon full payment of the said
amount and it was only on January 8, 1975 that Philamlife executed the deed of absolute
sale thereof in his favor. The right of Daniel to the property under the contract with
Philamlife was merely an inchoate and expectant right which would ripen into a vested
right only upon his acquisition of ownership which, was contingent upon his full payment
of the rentals. Since as early as 1967, he was already married to Annette this property
necessarily belonged to his conjugal partnership with his said second wife.
However reimbursements should be made in line with the pertinent provision of Article
118 of the Family Code that "any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both
spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner or owners upon liquidation of the partnership."
Garcia, Charlotte Yris C.

Tarrosa v. De Leon
G.R. No. 185063, July 23, 2009
In a contract to sell, ownership is retained by the seller and is not passed to the buyer until full
payment of the price, unlike in a contract of sale where title passes upon delivery of the thing
sold.
FACTS:
On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio De Leon, then single, and the People’s Homesite and Housing
Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase on
installment of a lot situated in Quezon City. On April 24, 1968, Bonifacio married Anita de
Leon. They had two children, Danilo and Vilma. On June 22, 1970, PHHC executed a Final
Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio upon full payment of the price of the lot. TCT was issued
on February 24, 1972 in the name of Bonifacio, “single.” On January 12, 1974, Bonifacio
sold the lot to his sister, Lita, and her husband, Felix Tarrosa. The Deed of Sale did not bear
the written consent and signature of Anita. On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died.
Three months later, Tarrosa spouses registered the Deed of Sale. Anita, Danilo, and Vilma
filed a reconveyance suit allegeing that Bonifacio was still the owner of the lands. Tarrosa
spouses averred that the lot Bonifacio sold to them was his exclusive property because he
was still single when he acquired it from PHHC. They further alleged that they were not
aware of the marriage between Bonifacio and Anita at the time of the execution of the Deed
of Sale.
The RTC ruled in favor of De Leon, stating that the lot in question was the conjugal property
of Bonifacio and Anita. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property Bonifacio purchased on installment before the marriage
would be considered conjugal property.
RULING:
Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, the governing provision in effect at the time Bonifacio
and Anita contracted marriage, provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or the wife. For the presumption to arise, it is not, as Tan v. Court of Appeals
teaches, even necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the
partnership. Only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the
presumption that the property is conjugal. In fact, even when the manner in which the
properties were acquired does not appear, the presumption will still apply, and the
properties will still be considered conjugal.
Evidently, title to the property in question only passed to Bonifacio after he had fully paid
the purchase price on June 22, 1970. This full payment, to stress, was made more than two
(2) years after his marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968. In that effect, the property was
acquired during the existence of the marriage; as such, ownership to the property is, by
law, presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership.
Petitioners’ argument that the disputed lot was Bonifacio’s exclusive property, since it was
registered solely in his name, is untenable. The mere registration of a property in the name
of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature. What is material is the time when the
property was acquired.
7. Improvements on CPG property, FC 120
Gonzalez, Jed Nathaniel M.

Munoz, Jr. v Ramirez
G.R. No. 156125, August 25, 2010
When the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the
value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses
shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the
property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall
be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost
of the improvement.
FACTS:
Erlinda Ramirez, married to Eliseo Carlos, was the owner of a 77-hectare parcel of land in
Mandaluyong. Eliseo mortgaged the subject property to obtain a loan from the GSIS. The
built a house on the subject lot after the mortgage. Later, however, the spouses sold the
land to Francisco Muñoz.
The spouses filed an action for annulment of title against Muñoz, alleging that they agreed
on a mortgage, not a sale. However, Ramirez and her family were evicted. Moreover, it was
discovered that the subject parcel of land was Erlinda’s exclusive paraphernal property as
she inherited it from her father. The RTC ruled that the sale was valid since the property
can be sold without Eliseo’s consent. CA reversed, stating that since the subject property
has been used as collateral in a loan, it cannot be mortgaged or sold without Eliseo’s
consent.
ISSUE:
Whether the subject property is conjugal or paraphernal.
RULING:
PARAPHERNAL.
Article 120 of the Family Code, which supersedes Article 158 of the Civil Code, provides the
solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that are made on the separate
property of the spouses, at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of
either or both spouses. Under this provision, when the cost of the improvement and any
resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the
improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal
partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at
the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by
the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement. Thus,
the subject property remained the exclusive paraphernal property of Erlinda at the time
she contracted with the petitioner; the written consent of Eliseo to the transaction was not
necessary. The NBI finding that Eliseo's signatures in the special power of attorney and
affidavit were forgeries was immaterial.
Hernandez, Katrina Ysobelle A.

Padilla v. Padilla
October 4, 1943
The ownership of the land is retained by the wife until she is paid the value of the lot, as a
result of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. xxx And when may she demand payment?
Not until the liquidation of the conjugal partnership because up to that time, it is neither
necessary nor appropriate to transfer to the partnership the dominion over the land, which is
lawfully held in usufruct by the conjugal partnership during the marriage.
FACTS:
Narciso A. Padilla and Concepcion Paterno were married on December 12, 1912. Narciso,
who was a medical student, contributed a small capital to the conjugal partnership at the
time of the marriage. Concepcion, on the other hand, brought to the marriage considerable
property in real estate, jewelry and cash. Practically all of the conjugal partnership
property came from the fruits of the paraphernal property. Narciso died on February 12,
1934. The husband, who left no children, executed a will giving his whole estate to his
mother, Isabel Bibby Vda. de Padilla. The property included in the inventory is appraised at
P261,000. Seven pieces of real estate are in controversy in this case. The remaining ten real
properties left by the deceased husband admittedly pertain to the conjugal partnership.
Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla, filed a petition wherein she prayed that her
paraphernal property be segregated from the inventoried estate and delivered to her
together with the corresponding reimbursements and indemnities; that she be given one-
half of the conjugal partnership property; and that her usufructuary right over one-half of
the portion pertaining to the heir instituted in the will be recognized. The CFI of Manila
rendered judgment declaring certain pieces of real estate and jewelry as well as certain
sums of money to be paraphernal, and ordering the same to be delivered to Concepcion.
From the foregoing judgment, Isabel Bibby Vda. de Padilla appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the value of the paraphernal land to be reimbursed to the wife is that
obtaining at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
RULING:
Yes. With conjugal funds the husband constructed buildings on the wife's lots on Arquiza,
Juan Luna, Camba and Martin Ocampo streets. Isabel Padilla claims that from the time of
the construction of the buildings, the conjugal partnership became the owner of the whole
property, and the subsequent increase in value should accrue to the conjugal partnership,
and any depreciation should be suffered by the partnership.
Isabel Padilla’s theory is untenable. The ownership of the land is retained by the wife until
she is paid the value of the lot, as a result of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. The
mere construction of a building from common funds does not automatically convey the
ownership of the wife's land to the conjugal partnership. Such a mode of using the land,
namely, by erecting a building thereon, is simply an exercise of the right of usufruct
pertaining to the conjugal partnership over the wife's land. In consequence of this
usufructuary right, the conjugal partnership is not bound to pay any rent during the
occupation of the wife's land because if the lot were leased to a third person, instead of
being occupied by the new construction from partnership funds, the rent from the third
person would belong to the conjugal partnership. Therefore, before payment of the value of
the land is made from the common funds, inasmuch as the owner of the land is the wife, all
the increase or decrease in its value must be for her benefit or loss. And when may she
demand payment? Not until the liquidation of the conjugal partnership because up to
that time, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to transfer to the partnership the
dominion over the land, which is lawfully held in usufruct by the conjugal
partnership during the marriage.
Furthermore, the wife should not be allowed to demand payment of the lot during the
marriage and before liquidation because this would unduly disturb the husband's
management of the conjugal partnership. The scheme of the Civil Code is that in the
interest of successful administration of the common property, the wife should not interfere
with the husband's way of directing the affairs of the partnership.
Jacinto, Christine
Padilla v. Paterno
December 26, 1961
The mere construction of a building from common funds does not automatically convey the
ownership of the wife's land to the conjugal partnership.
FACTS:
Narciso Padilla died leaving only his widow Concepcion Paterno. His will instituted his
mother, Isabel Padilla as universal heiress. Paterno moved for the delivery of her one-half
share of the conjugal partnership and several other claims which were opposed by Padilla.
During the marriage of Narciso and Concepcion, they erected conjugal buildings on the
Arquiza and Juan Luna properties. These properties are the paraphernal properties of
Paterno. However, said buildings were however destroyed during the battle for the
liberation of Manila in 1945. Isabel Padilla, as the executrix of Narciso’s estate now
contends that by virtue of the construction of the conjugal improvements on the 2
properties, said properties are now converted to conjugal property and that the
subsequent destruction of the conjugal improvements did not revert them back to being
paraphernal.
ISSUE:
Whether the construction of conjugal improvements on the paraphernal property of

Paterno converted the property to conjugal property.
RULING:
No, the lands on which said improvements were erected remained paraphernal until and
unless the value of said lands was paid to Concepcion Paterno. Thus, said lands must be
returned to the Testate Estate of Concepcion Paterno. However, any amount due or that
may be received from the War Damage Commission for the improvements that were
destroyed on those two pieces of property shall be divided share and share alike between
the estate of Isabel Padilla and the estate of Concepcion Paterno.
Since the Arquiza and Juan Luna properties never became conjugal properties because of
the destruction of the conjugal improvements, the same remained paraphernal in nature
and consequently, all income that accrued during their administration by Isabel Padilla
until all properties were finally delivered to Paterno’s estate, rightfully belongs to Paterno.
As such, the administratrix of the estate of Paterno has the right to seek for the accounting
of the income of said paraphernal properties.
Joaquin, Marione
Coungco v. Flores
82 Phil. 284
The construction of a building during marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses does
not ipso facto make the land a conjugal property.
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the minute resolution of the court which dismissed
the appellant's appeal by certiorari. The appellant raised three questions regarding their
conjugal property rights. The first question raised regarding the validity of the extrajudicial
partition agreement made by both parties in which the lots in question were listed as
conjugal property made before the marriage bond had been dissolved. The second
question, whether the presumption that the properties in litigation are conjugal properties
because they were acquired during coverture. And the third question, is that the lots in
question, assuming them to be paraphernal, automatically became conjugal from the
moment that buildings were constructed thereon, although the buildings were destroyed
during the recent war and before the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. With regard
to the first and second question, the Supreme Court did not disturb the findings of the
Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the construction on the paraphernal land of one spouse automatically
converts such land to conjugal property.
RULING:
No. If there were buildings erected on the lands which were paraphernal personal property
of the appellee during the latter's marriage with the appellant, and such buildings were
destroyed by reason of the recent war, before the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of
both spouses, it is obvious that the conjugal partnership did not ipso facto acquire the land
from the time of the construction of the buildings, so as to make afterwards the land
without any buildings a conjugal property of the result of the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership.
Manresa holds that, "of course, during the marriage the buildings constructed on the
private land belonging to one of the spouses, are legally conjugal in nature, but upon the
dissolution of the partnership, that building will or will not be conjugal, depending upon
the result of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, because it is only in that stage
when profits can be spoken of, when after paying the partners and the creditors there still
remain something to be divided."
That for the purpose of finding if there are any conjugal properties in a conjugal
partnership, it is absolutely necessary to have the liquidation of the assets of the same,
because it is only after such liquidation when it can be determined whether there is any
property which is conjugal and should be owned by and assigned to the partners
8. Charges upon and obligations of CPG, FC 121, 122, 123
Jore, Ma. Jovi P.

Mariano v. CA (1989)
174 SCRA 59
When the conjugal partnership is liable for the debts and obligations contracted by the wife in
her business since the income derived therefrom, having been used to defray some of the
expenses for the maintenance of the family and the education of the children, had redounded
to the benefit of the partnership.
FACTS:
A suit filed by Esther Sanchez against Lourdes Mariano for recovery of the value of ladies'
ready made dresses allegedly purchased by and delivered to the latter. A writ of
preliminary attachment issued upon a bond posted by Veritas Insurance Company in the
amount of P 11,000.00, and resulted in the seizure of Lourdes Mariano's property worth P
15,000.00 or so Her motion for the discharge of the attachment having been
denied Lourdes Mariano went up to the Court of Appeals on certiorari. That Court
ordered the Trial Court to receive evidence on whether or not the attachment had been
improvidently or irregularly issued. The Trial Court did so, came to the conclusion that the
attachment had indeed been improperly issued, and consequently dissolved it. Pending
approval of the record on appeal, Lourdes Mariano filed a motion for the immediate
execution of the judgment which the Court granted. Sheriff garnished the sum of P
11,000.00 from Veritas Insurance Company, and levied on real and personal property
belonging to the conjugal partnership of Esther and her husband, Daniel. Esther then filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, praying for the annulment of the execution
pending appeal authorized by the Trial Court; but her petition was adjudged to be without
merit and was accordingly dismissed. Daniel filed a complaint for annulment of the
execution in the Court of First Instance at Quezon City in his capacity as administrator of
the conjugal partnership. He alleged that the conjugal assets could not validly be made to
answer for obligations exclusively contracted by his wife, and that, moreover, some of the
personal property levied on, such as household appliances and utensils necessarily used in
the conjugal dwelling, were exempt from execution. He also applied for a preliminary
injunction pending adjudication of the case on the merits.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conjugal partnership of Daniel and Esther Sanchez could be made liable
for Esther's judgment obligation arising from the spouses' joint business with Lourdes
Mariano
RULING:
Yes. The conjugal partnership of Daniel and Esther Sanchez could be made liable for
Esther's judgment obligation arising from the joint business with Lourdes Mariano.
There is no dispute about the fact that Esther was engaged in business not only without
objection on the part of her husband, Daniel, but in truth with his consent and approval. It
is also established that, as expressly acknowledged by Esther herself and never denied by
Daniel, the profits from the business had been used to meet, in part at least, expenses for
the support of her family, i.e., the schooling of the children, food and other household
expenses. Under the circumstances, Lourdes Mariano action against Esther Sanchez was
justified, the litigation being "incidental to the business in which she is engaged and
consequently, the conjugal partnership of Daniel and Esther Sanchez was liable for the
debts and obligations contracted by Esther in her business since the income derived
therefrom, having been used to defray some of the expenses for the maintenance of the
family and the education of the children, had redounded to the benefit of the
partnership. Hence, the liability of the conjugal assets to respond for the wife's obligations
in the premises cannot be disputed.
Ko, Nikki Mei Q.

Ayala v. CA (1998)
286 SCRA 272
"The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the
marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded
to the benefit of the family."
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills (hereinafter referred to as PBM) obtained a 50M loan from
petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). As added security for
the credit line extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching (Ching), Executive Vice
President of PBM, executed security agreements on making himself jointly and severally
answerable with PBM's indebtedness to AIDC.
PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and
Ching.
After trial, the court rendered judgment ordering PBM and Ching to jointly and severally
pay AIDC.
Thereafter, Deputy Sheriff of Rizal and appointed sheriff, caused the issuance and service
upon respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale on three (3) of their conjugal
properties. Sheriff then scheduled the auction sale of the properties levied.
Sps. Ching filed a case of injunction against the Sheriff to enjoin the auction sale alleging
that the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership.
Temporary restraining order was granted.
The auction sale took place. AIDC being the only bidder, a Certificate of Sale by Sheriff
Magsajo was issued, which was registered. Upon expiration of the redemption period,
petitioner sheriff issued the final deed of sale which as also registered.
ISSUE:
Whether the subject loan redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership thus
subjecting the conjugal property to auction sale.
RULING:
NO. In all our decisions involving accommodation contracts of the husband, we

underscored the requirement that: "there must be the requisite showing . . . of some
advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses" or "benefits to his family" or
"that such obligations are productive of some benefit to the family."
The Court of Appeals disposed of these questions in the following manner:
No matter how one looks at it, the debt/credit respondents-appellants is purely a

corporate debt granted to PBM, with petitioner-appellee-husband merely signing as
surety. As such surety, is solidarily liable with the principal debtor AIDC, such liability
under the Civil Code provisions is specifically restricted by Article 122 (par. 1) of the
Family Code, so that debts for which the husband is liable may not be charged against
conjugal partnership properties. Article 122 of the Family Code is explicit — "The
payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the
marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they
redounded to the benefit of the family.
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals.

Ching v. CA (2004)
423 SCRA 356
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained two loans from the Allied
Banking Corporation (ABC). (PBMCI) Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching executed a
continuing guaranty with the ABC for the payment of the said loan. The PBMCI defaulted in
the payment of all its loans so ABC filed a complaint for sum of money against the PBMCI.
Trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment against Alfredo Ching requiring the
sheriff of to attach all the properties of said Alfredo Ching to answer for the payment of the
loans. Encarnacion T. Ching, wife of Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on
attachment allegeing inter alia that the 100,000 shares of stocks levied on by the sheriff
were acquired by her and her husband during their marriage out of conjugal funds.
Petitioner spouses aver that the source of funds in the acquisition of the levied shares of
stocks is not the controlling factor when invoking the presumption of the conjugal nature of
stocks under Art. !21 and that such presumption subsists even if the property is registered
only in the name of one of the spouses, in this case, petitioner Alfredo Ching. According to
the petitioners, the suretyship obligation was not contracted in the pursuit of the
petitioner-husband’s profession or business.
ISSUE:
WON 100,000 shares of stocks may be levied on by the sheriff to answer for the loans
guaranteed by petitioner Alfredo Ching
HELD:
No. The CA erred in holding that by executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship
agreement with the private respondent for the payment of the PBMCI loans, the petitioner-
husband was in the exercise of his profession, pursuing a legitimate business.
The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the
petitioners. The private respondent failed to adduce evidence that the petitioner-husband
acquired the stocks with his exclusive money.
The appellate court erred in concluding that the conjugal partnership is liable for the said
account of PBMCI.
Article 121 provides: The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) All debts and
obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those
contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind
the partnership.
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the husband
alone, there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses.
In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the
petitioners was benefited by the petitioner-husband’s act of executing a continuing
guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI.
The contract of loan was between the private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the
benefit of the latter. No presumption can be inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-
husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal
partnership would thereby be benefited. The private respondent was burdened to establish
that such benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership.

Homeowners v. Dailo
G.R. 153802, Mar.11, 2005
“The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife. The
absence of the consent of one renders the sale null and void, including the portion of the
conjugal property pertaining to the husband who has contracted the sale. For the subject
property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the late husband must have redounded
to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. There must be the requisite showing then of some
advantage which clearly accrues to the welfare of the spouses. The burden of proof that the
debt has been contracted for the benefit of the CPG lies with creditor-party litigant claiming
such. Ei incumbit probation qui dicit, non qui negat (He who asserts, not he who denies, must
prove).”
FACTS:
Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr were married on August 8, 1967. During their
marriage the spouses purchased a house and lot situated at San Pablo City from a certain
Dalida. The subject property was declared for tax assessment purposes The Deed of
Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as
vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife.
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Gesmundo,
authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank
to be secured by the spouses Dailo’s house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA,
Gesmundo obtained a loan from petitioner. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the
same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner.
The abovementioned transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor of
Gesmundo, took place without the knowledge and consent of respondent. Upon maturity,
the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of
Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one year
without the property being redeemed, petitioner consolidated the ownership thereof by
executing an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale.
In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died. In one of her visits to the subject property,
Miguela learned that petitioner had already employed a certain Brion to clean its premises
and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire
within the premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property,
which was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with the RTC San Pablo City a Civil
Case for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Damages against petitioner. In the latter’s Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the property in question was the
exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. After trial on the merits, the trial court
rendered a Decision declaring the said documents null and void and further ordered the
defendant is ordered to reconvey the property subject of this complaint to the plaintiff, to
pay the plaintiff the sum representing the value of the car which was burned, the attorney’s
fees, moral and exemplary damages.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s Decision, but deleted the award for damages
and attorney’s fees for lack of basis. Hence, this petition
ISSUE:
1. WON the mortgage constituted by the late marcelino dailo, jr. on the subject property as
co-owner thereof is valid as to his undivided share.
2. WON the conjugal partnership is liable for the payment of the loan obtained by the late
marcelino dailo, jr. the same having redounded to the benefit of the family.
HELD:
The petition is denied.
1. NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall
belong to both spouses jointly.
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In
the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. . . .
In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the
consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal
property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale. Respondent and the late
Marcelino. Were married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed the property
relations between respondent and her late husband. With the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code
was made applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already established before its
effectivity unless vested rights have already been acquired under the Civil Code or other
laws.
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and
the late Marcelino even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of
gains is a special type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common
fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those
acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute
community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner,
the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all
that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal
partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus, the property
relations of respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4
on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on
partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil
Code provisions on partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and
consent of his wife, Marcelino constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property,
which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the
Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any
disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.
The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who
makes the disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-ownership
under Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should
not distinguish. Thus, both the trial court and the appellate court are correct in declaring
the nullity of the real estate mortgage on the subject property for lack of respondent’s
consent.
2. NO. Under Article 121 of the Family Code,
“The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . .
(1) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other
to the extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . .”
Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to
the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to
show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Ei incumbit
probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove).
Petitioner’s sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino to finance the
construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family,
without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Consequently, the conjugal
partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation.
Macuha
Ando v. Campo
G.R. 184007, February 16, 2011
If the property belongs to petitioner and his wife, and not to the corporation of which the
petitioner is president, it can be said that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership, a
third party, or, at the very least, the Court can consider that petitioner’s wife is a third party
within the contemplation of the law.
FACTS:
Paquito Ando (petitioner) was the president of Premier Allied and Contracting Services,
Inc. (PACSI), an independent labor contractor. Andresito Campo and the other respondents
were hired by PACSI as pilers or haulers. Respondents were dismissed from employment.
Consequently filing a case for illegal dismissal and some money claims with the NLRC. The
Labor Arbiter ruled in respondents’ favor. PACSI and Ando were directed to pay a total of
P422,702.28 (for separation pay and award of attorney’s fees). PACSI and Ando appealed to
NLRC, which affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision. Respondents moved for its execution.
To answer for the reward, the NLRC acting sheriff issued a Notice of Sale on Execution of
Personal Property over a property in the name of “Paquito V. Ando xxx married to Erlinda
S. Ando.” Prompting Ando to file an action for prohibition before the RTC. Ando claims that
the property belonged to him and his wife and not the corporation, and hence, could not be
the subject of the execution sale. RTC denied the prayer for TRO and directed him to file a
claim with the NLRC Sheriff. Instead, Ando filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. Ando
argued that the property to be levied belonged to him – and his wife – in their personal
capacity and thus the execution should not prosper. It was likewise denied.
ISSUE:
WON the property owned by Ando and his wife could be levied for reason of a debt
incurred by him, in his representative capacity and his company, PACSI
HELD:
No. The TCT of the property bears out that, indeed, it belongs to petitioner and his wife.
Thus, even if the Court considers petitioner as an agent of the corporation and, therefore,
not a stranger to the case such that the provision on third-party claims will not apply to
him, the property was registered not only in the name of petitioner but also of his wife. She
stands to lose the property subject of execution without ever being a party to the case. This
will be tantamount to deprivation of property without due process.
Magaoay
Security Bank v. Mar Tiera Corp.
G.R. No. 143382, Nov. 29, 2006
To hold the conjugal partnership liable for an obligation pertaining to the husband alone
defeats the objective of the Civil Code to protect the solidarity and well being of the family as a
unit. Hence, it limits the liability of the conjugal partnership only to debts and obligations
contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
FACTS:
Respondent Mar Tierra Corporation, through its president, Wilfrido C. Martinez, applied for
a P12,000,000 credit accommodation with petitioner Security Bank and Trust Company.
Petitioner approved the application and entered into a credit line agreement with
respondent corporation. It was secured by an indemnity agreement executed by individual
respondents Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel J. Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound
themselves jointly and severally with respondent corporation for the payment of the loan.
Respondent corporation was not able to pay all its debt balance as it suffered business
reversals, eventually ceasing operations. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent
corp and individual respondents.
RTC issued a writ of attachment on all real and personal properties of respondent
corporation and individual respondent Martinez including the conjugal house and lot of the
spouses but it found that it did not redound to the benefit of his family, hence, it ordered
the lifting of the attachment on the conjugal house and lot of the spouses Martinez.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conjugal partnership may be held liable for an indemnity agreement
entered into by the husband to accommodate a third party.
RULING
No. SC upheld the CA. Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is
liable for “all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.”
In the case at bar, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between petitioner and
respondent corporation, was solely for the benefit of the latter. The accessory contract (the
indemnity agreement) under which individual respondent Martinez assumed the
obligation of a surety for respondent corporation was similarly for the latter’s benefit.
Petitioner had the burden of proving that the conjugal partnership of the spouses Martinez
benefited from the transaction. It failed to discharge that burden.
Merrera
Ravina v. Villa-Abrille
GR No. 160708, Oct. 16, 2009
Just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the husband, without knowledge and
consent of the wife, sells conjugal property, such sale is void. If the sale was with the
knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement, such
sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given five (5) years from the date the
contract implementing the decision of the husband to institute the case.
FACTS:
The properties involved in this case are: 1) Lot 7, which was acquired by the spouses
during their marriage; 2) Lot 8 which was acquired by Pedro when he was still single; and
3) House built (on lot 7 and 8) from their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from DBP.
Pedro offered to sell the house and two lots to petitioners Ravina. Mary Ann objected.
Pedro still sold the properties without her consent. Pedro, with the connivance of Ravina
and some Civilian Armed Forces (CAFGU) transferred all the belongings from the house to
an apartment and prevented Mary Ann and the kids from entering the house.
Thus, Mary Ann and the children filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale, Specific
Performance and Damages before the RTC. During the trial, Pedro declared that the house
was built with his own money. Petitioner Ravina testified that they bought the house and
lot from Pedro upon examination of the title.
The RTC ruled that the sale of Lot 7, 8 and the house were all void. The CA, on the other
hand, declared the sale of Lot 8 as valid. Hence this Petition.
ISSUES:
Whether Lot 7 is an exclusive property of Pedro or conjugal property.

Whether or not the sale of Lot 7 by Pedro was valid considering the absence of Mary Ann’s
consent.
RULING:
It is presumed to be Conjugal property of spouses Pedro and Mary Ann.
Petitioner Ravina asserts that Lot 7 was exclusive property of Pedro, it being acquired by
Pedro thru barter or exchange with his another exclusive property.
No evidence was adduced to show that the subject property was acquired through
exchange or barter. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the
absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to
prove that the subject property is exclusively owned by Pedro. The fact is, Lot 7 was
acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann. Likewise, the house built
thereon is conjugal property, having been constructed through the joint efforts of the
spouses, who had even obtained a loan from DBP to construct the house. Article 160 of the
New Civil Code provides, "All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife."
It is valid, but annullable within five years.
Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of

the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now
treats such a disposition to be void if done (a) without the consent of both the husband and
the wife, or (b) in case of one spouse’s inability, the authority of the court.
the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors.
Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the husband, without
knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal property, such sale is void. If the sale was
with the knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a
disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given five (5) years
from the date the contract implementing the decision of the husband to institute the case.
Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of sale within five (5)
years from the date of sale and execution of the deed. However, her action to annul the sale
pertains only to the conjugal house and lot and does not include Lot 8, a property
exclusively belonging to Pedro and which he can dispose of freely without Mary Ann’s
consent.
Palafox
Hernandez v. Mingoa
G.R. No. 146548, Dec. 18, 2009
Before the effectivity of the FC, alienation and/or encumbrance of conjugal property by the
husband without the wife’s consent is not null and void but merely voidable.
FACTS:
In 1958, Domingo Hernandez Sr. (Central Bank employee) and his spouse Sergia, were
awarded a piece of real property by the Philippine Homesite and Housing Corporation
(PHHC) by way of salary deduction. On Oct. 18, 1963, petitioners then having paid in full
the entire amount of P6,888.96, a Deed of Absolute Sale (DOAS) of the property was
executed by PHHC in their favor. TCT No. 107534, covering the property was issued to
petitioners on May 23, 1966. Tax payments due on the property were religiously paid (until
1955) by petitioners.
Hernandez, Sr. died intestate in April 1983 and it was only after his burial that his heirs
found out that TCT No. 107534 was already cancelled a year before (in 1982), and in lieu
thereof, TCT No. 290121 was issued to respondents. Upon diligent inquiry, petitioners
came to know that the cancellation of TCT No. 107534 in favor of respondents (TCT No.
290121) was based upon 3 sets of documents, namely, (1) Irrevocable Power of Attorney;
(2) Irrevocable SPA; and (3) DOAS.
Petitioners filed a complaint against the respondents before RTC QC for annulment and/or
declaration of nullity of TCT No. 290121 including all its derivative titles, the Irrevocable
SPA in favor of Dolores Camisura, SPA in favor of Plaridel Mingoa, Sr., and DOAS of RE
executed by Plaridel Mingoa, Sr. in favor of Melanie Mingoa for being products of forgery
and falsification; and reconveyance and/or issuance to petitioners by RD QC of the
certificate of title covering the subject property. Respondents filed a MTD which the RTC
denied. CA reversed and set aside the appealed decision, thereby dismissing the complaint
filed by the petitioners before the trial court. Petitioners subsequent MR was denied.
ISSUE:
WON the title of the subject property in the name of Mingoa may still be reconveyed to the
petitioners.
RULING:
Neither petitioners nor Hernandez, Sr., took possession of the said property. It was
respondents took possession of the said property and are in actual and physical possession
thereof up to the present, and have made considerable improvements, including a
residential house where they presently reside. The Owners Duplicate Copy of the title over
the property given by the PHHC to Hernandez, Sr. was in the possession of Mingoa, the
latter being able to facilitate the cancellation of the said title and the issuance of a new TCT
in her name. From the time when respondents were able to possess the property to the
time when petitioners had knowledge that the TCT in the name of Hernandez, Sr. had
already been cancelled by RD QC covers almost a span of 17Y; and from the time when the
Heirs filed the original action is a period of another 12Y.
SC cannot but conclude that the SPA executed by Hernandez, Sr. in Camisura's favor was, in
reality, an alienation involving the subject property. SC particularly note that Hernandez,
Sr., aside from executing said SPA, likewise sold his rights and interests over the property
awarded by the PHHC to Camisura.
Consent of Hernandez, Sr. to the contract is undisputed, thus, the sale of his share in the
conjugal property was valid. With regard to the consent of his wife, Sergia Hernandez, to
the sale involving their conjugal property, RTC found that it was lacking because said wife’s
signature on the SPA was falsified. Even CA observed that the forgery was so blatant as to
be remarkably noticeable to the naked eye of an ordinary person. Having compared the
questioned signature on the SPA with those of the documents bearing the sample standard
signature of Sergia, SC affirm both lower courts' findings regarding the forgery. Sergia’s
lack of consent to the sale did not render the transfer of her share invalid.
It bears stressing that the subject matter herein involves conjugal property. Said property
was awarded to Hernandez, Sr. in 1958. The SPAs were executed in 1963 & 1964. Title in
the name of Hernandez, Sr. was issued on May 23, 1966. The sale of the property to Mingoa
and the issuance of a new title in her name happened in 1978. Since all these events
occurred before FC took effect in 1988, the provisions of the NCC govern these transactions
particularly the ff provisions:
Art. 165. The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership.

Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is
under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or
encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. If she
refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same. x x x.
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within 10Y from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into
without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband
which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property.
Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the
marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
Petitioners argue that the disposition of conjugal property made by a husband without the
wife’s consent is null and void and the right to file an action thereon is imprescriptible, in
accordance with Garcia v. CA and Bucoy v. Paulino.
In the said cases of Garcia and Bucoy, the contracts involving the sale of conjugal property
by the husband without the wife's consent were declared null and void by SC. But even in
Bucoy, SC significantly ruled, in reference to Article 173, that: “The plain meaning attached
to the plain language of the law is that the contract, in its entirety, executed by the husband
without the wife’s consent, may be annulled by the wife.”
In succeeding cases, SC held that alienation and/or encumbrance of conjugal property by

the husband without the wife’s consent is not null and void but merely voidable.
In Sps. Alfredo v. Sps. Borras, SC held that: FC which took effect on Aug. 3, 1988, provides
that any alienation or encumbrance made by the husband of the conjugal partnership
property without the consent of the wife is void. However, when the sale is made before the
effectivity of FC, the applicable law is CC.

Fuentes v. Roca
G.R. No. 178902, April 21, 2010
Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no
consent may assail her husband’s sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the
other spouse’s written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void.
FACTS:
On, Oct 11, 1982, Tarciano Roca bought a 358-square meter lot in Zambales from his
mother. Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to the petitioners Fuentes
spouses through the help of Atty. Plagata who would prepare the documents and
requirements to complete the sale. In the agreement between Tarciano and Fuentes
spouses there will be a Php 60,000 down payment and Php 140,000 will be paid upon the
removal of Tarciano of certain structures on the land and after the consent of the estranged
wife of Tarciano, Rosario, would be attained. Atty. Plagata went to Manila to get the
signature of Rosario but notarized the document at Zamboanga . The deed of sale was
executed January 11, 1989. As time passed, Tarciano and Rosario died while the Fuentes
spouses and possession and control over the lot. Eight years later in 1997, the children of
Tarciano and Rosario filed a case to annul the sale and reconvey the property on the
ground that the sale was void since the consent of Rosario was not attained and that
Rosarios’ signature was a mere forgery. The Fuentes spouses claim that the action has
prescribed since an action to annul a sale on the ground of fraud is 4 years from discovery.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Roca children’s action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the
spouses already prescribed.
HELD:
Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this case is the Family
Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold
the conjugal property without the consent of his wife on January 11, 1989, a few months
after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code which gives the wife right to have the sale
annulled during the marriage within ten years from the date of the sale, Article 124 of the
Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may
assail her husband’s sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the other
spouse’s written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void. The
passage of time did not erode the right to bring such an action.

Aguete v. PNB
G.R. No. 170166, April 6, 2011
Where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes,
and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
FACTS:
On Oct. 14, 1974, Jose Ros obtained a loan of P115,000 from PNB secured by a real estate
mortgage on a parcel of land. The loan remained unpaid upon maturity so PNB instituted
foreclosure proceedings and acquired the property as the highest bidder. After the lapse of
1 year without the property having been redeemed, the title was consolidated in the name
of PNB.
Estrella Aguete, Ros’ wife, claimed that she had no knowledge of the loan obtained by Ros
and did not consent to the REM he executed on their conjugal property. A complaint was
filed to annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale, and consolidation of the
property, on the grounds that Aguete’s signature was forged and that the loan did not
redound to the benefit of the family.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA reversed the decision and ruled that assuming Aguete
did not give her consent to Ros’ loan, the conjugal partnership is still liable because its
proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family. Records of the case reveal that the loan
was used for the expansion of the family’s business, buy and sell of garlic and virginia
tobacco.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA ruled correctly.
RULING:
Yes. The Civil Code was the applicable law at the time of the mortgage. The husband cannot
alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent, express or implied, of
the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract is voidable. Art. 173 of the Civil Code
allows Aguete to question Ros’ encumbrance of the subject property. If the husband himself
is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the money and services to
be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term
"x x x x obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual benefit may
be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the
contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to
benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the
husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed.

Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, Sr.
G.R. No. 164201, December 10, 2012
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the enumerated liabilities under Article 121
of the Family Code, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their
separate properties.
FACTS:
Petitioner Efren Pana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others were charged with murder
before the RTC of Surigao City where Efren was subsequently acquitted for insufficiency of
evidence but Melecia and another person were found guilty as charged and sentenced them
to the penalty of death. The RTC ordered those found guilty to pay each of the heirs of the
victims, jointly and severally. A subsequent Writ of Execution was issued by the RTC
resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Melecia.
Petitioner and his wife filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming that the
levied properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia but the same was
denied. A Petition for Certiorari was filed before the CA but the same was also dismissed
for failure to sufficiently show that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing its
assailed orders.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in holding that the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia
can be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the murder
case.
RULING:
No.
Efren and Melecia were married when the Civil Code was still the operative law on
marriages. The presumption, absent any evidence to the contrary, is that they were
married under the regime of the conjugal partnership of gains. The Family Code, on the
other hand, contains terms governing conjugal partnership of gains that supersede the
terms of the conjugal partnership of gains under the Civil Code. Consequently, the Court
must refer to the Family Code provisions in deciding whether or not the conjugal
properties of Efren and Melecia may be held to answer for the civil liabilities imposed on
Melecia in the murder case.
The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on her may be enforced
against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the
Family Code have been covered. If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the
enumerated liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with
their separate properties.
The Court directed the RTC of Surigao City to first ascertain that, in enforcing the writ of
execution on the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia Pana for the satisfaction
of the indemnities imposed by final judgment on the latter accused the responsibilities
enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.
Prudente, Maica A.
Borlongan v. BDO
G.R. No. 217617, April 5, 2017
Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court allows third-party claimants of properties under
execution to vindicate their claims to the property in a separate action with another court.
FACTS:
Sps. Eliseo Borlongan, Jr. (Eliseo) and his wife Carmelita, acquired a real property in Pasig
City. In 2012, they went to the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City to obtain a copy of the TCT in
preparation for a prospective sale of the subject property. To their surprise, the title
contained an annotation that the property covered thereby was the subject of an execution
sale pending before Makati RTC. Petitioner immediately procured a copy of the records and
found out that respondent Banco de Oro (BDO) filed a complaint for sum of money against
Tancho Corporation, the principal debtor of loan obligations obtained from the bank.
Likewise impleaded were several persons, including Carmelita, who supposedly signed
four (4) security agreements totaling ₱l3,500,000 to guarantee the obligations of Tancho
Corporation. It appears from the records that Makati RTC issued an Order directing the
service of summons to all the defendants at the business address of Tancho Corporation.
Parenthetically, the records show that respondent BDO already foreclosed the Fumakilla
Compound, following Tancho Corporation's failure to pay its obligation. Makati RTC
rendered a Decision holding the defendants liable to pay BDO. Later on, Makati RTC
granted the Motion to Conduct Auction filed by BDO and the same as the highest bidder.
Eliseo upon discovery of the sale, executed an affidavit of adverse claim. He alleged in his
Complaint that the subject property is a family home that belongs to the conjugal
partnership of gains he established with his wife. He further averred that the alleged surety
agreements upon which the attachment of the property was anchored were signed by his
wife without his consent and did not redound to benefit their family. Thus, he prayed that
the surety agreements and all other documents and processes, including the ensuing
attachment, levy and execution sale, based thereon be nullified.
ISSUE:
WON non-debtor husband, Eliseo, has the right to annul the levy and execution sale of the
subject property ordered by the Makati RTC against his wife.
RULING:
YES. The availability of the remedy requires only that that the claim is a third-party or a
"stranger" to the case. Pursuant to Mariano case however, it must further be settled
whether the obligation of the judgment debtor redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership or not. In the present case, it is not disputed that the conjugal property was
attached on the basis of a surety agreement allegedly signed by Carmelita for and in behalf
of Tancho Corporation. In Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals, we elucidated that there is no
presumption that the conjugal partnership is benefited when a spouse enters into a
contract of surety, holding thusly: In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that
the conjugal partnership of the petitioners was benefited by the petitioner-husband's act of
executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private respondent for
and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between the private respondent and the
PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No presumption can be inferred from the fact that
when the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of
surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited. The private respondent was
burdened to establish that such benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership.
It could be argued that the petitioner-husband was a member of the Board of Directors of
PBMCI and was one of its top twenty stockholders, and that the shares of stocks of the
petitioner-husband and his family would appreciate if the PBMCI could be rehabilitated
through the loans obtained; that the petitioner-husband's career would be enhanced
should PBMCI survive because of the infusion of fresh capital. However, these are not the
benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the New Civil Code. The benefits must be those
directly resulting from the loan. They cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the
loan itself. Furthermore, it is not apparent from the records of this case that BDO had
established the benefit to the conjugal partnership flowing from the surety agreement
allegedly signed by Carmelita.
9. Ownership, administration and enjoyment

(a) Joint administration, FC 124 cf. FC 96, 142

Homeowners v. Dailo
G.R. 153802, Mar.11, 2005
“The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife. The
absence of the consent of one renders the sale null and void, including the portion of the
conjugal property pertaining to the husband who has contracted the sale. For the subject
property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the late husband must have redounded
to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. There must be the requisite showing then of some
advantage which clearly accrues to the welfare of the spouses. The burden of proof that the
debt has been contracted for the benefit of the CPG lies with creditor-party litigant claiming
such. Ei incumbit probation qui dicit, non qui negat (He who asserts, not he who denies, must
prove).”
FACTS:
Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr were married on August 8, 1967. During their
marriage the spouses purchased a house and lot situated at San Pablo City from a certain
Dalida. The subject property was declared for tax assessment purposes The Deed of
Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as
vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife.
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Gesmundo,
authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank
to be secured by the spouses Dailo’s house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA,
Gesmundo obtained a loan from petitioner. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the
same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner.
The abovementioned transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor of
Gesmundo, took place without the knowledge and consent of respondent. Upon maturity,
the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of
Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one year
without the property being redeemed, petitioner consolidated the ownership thereof by
executing an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale.
In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died. In one of her visits to the subject property,
Miguela learned that petitioner had already employed a certain Brion to clean its premises
and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire
within the premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property,
which was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with the RTC San Pablo City a Civil
Case for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Damages against petitioner. In the latter’s Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the property in question was the
exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. After trial on the merits, the trial court
rendered a Decision declaring the said documents null and void and further ordered the
defendant is ordered to reconvey the property subject of this complaint to the plaintiff, to
pay the plaintiff the sum representing the value of the car which was burned, the attorney’s
fees, moral and exemplary damages.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s Decision, but deleted the award for damages
and attorney’s fees for lack of basis. Hence, this petition
ISSUE:
1. WON the mortgage constituted by the late marcelino dailo, jr. on the subject property as
co-owner thereof is valid as to his undivided share.
2. WON the conjugal partnership is liable for the payment of the loan obtained by the late
marcelino dailo, jr. the same having redounded to the benefit of the family.
HELD:
The petition is denied.
1. NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall
belong to both spouses jointly.
the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. . . .
In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the
consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal
property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale. Respondent and the late
Marcelino. Were married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed the property
relations between respondent and her late husband. With the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code
was made applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already established before its
effectivity unless vested rights have already been acquired under the Civil Code or other
laws.
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and
the late Marcelino even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of
gains is a special type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common
fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those
acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute
community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner,
the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all
that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal
partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus, the property
relations of respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4
on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on
partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil
Code provisions on partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and
consent of his wife, Marcelino constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property,
which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the
Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any
disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.
The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who
makes the disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-ownership
under Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should
not distinguish. Thus, both the trial court and the appellate court are correct in declaring
the nullity of the real estate mortgage on the subject property for lack of respondent’s
consent.
2. NO. Under Article 121 of the Family Code,
“The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . .
(1) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other
to the extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . .”
Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to
the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to
show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Ei incumbit
probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove).
Petitioner’s sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino to finance the
construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family,
without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Consequently, the conjugal
partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation.

Alinas v. Alinas
G.R. No. 158040, April 14, 2008
The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal property shall belong to the spouses jointly.
These powers of administration do not include the disposition of and encumbrance, which can
only be done by the authority of the court or with the written consent of the other spouse.
FACTS:
Spouses Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas (petitioners) separated sometime in 1982, with
Rosario moving to Pagadian City and Onesiforo moving to Manila. Respondent Victor Alinas
is the brother of Onesiforo. Petitioners alleged that they entrusted their properties to
respondent spouses. Sometime in 1993, petitioners discovered that their two lots were
already titled in the name of the respondent spouses. Onesiforo’s signature appeared in an
Absolute Deed of Sale selling one of the lots to respondent spouses. Records also show a
notarized document whereby petitioner acknowledged that his brother used his own
money to redeem one of the lots mortgaged and foreclosed and thus his brother became
the owner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale of conjugal property by Onesiforo Alinas to respondent spouses is
valid despite the lack of consent on the part of the wife.
RULING:
NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides that the administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In the event that one
spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance, which must have the
authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
Pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code and jurisprudence, the sale of petitioners'
conjugal property made by petitioner Onesiforo alone is void in its entirety. It should be
noted that respondent spouses were well aware that the property is a conjugal property of
petitioners. They also knew that the disposition being made by Onesiforo is without the
consent of his wife, as they knew that petitioners had separated, and the sale documents do
not bear the signature of petitioner Rosario. The fact that Onesiforo had to execute the
Absolute Deed of Sale and a notarized Agreement reveals that they had full knowledge of
the severe infirmities of the sale. Such being the case, no injustice is being foisted on
respondent spouses as they risked transacting with Onesiforo alone despite their
knowledge that the subject property is a conjugal property.

Docena v. Lapesura
355 SCRA 658
The husband as the statutory administrator of the conjugal property could have filed the
petition for certiorari and prohibition alone, without the concurrence of the wife.
FACTS:
Private respondent Casiano Hombria filed a Complaint for the recovery of a parcel of land
against his lessees, petitioner-spouses Antonio and Alfreda Docena. The trial court ruled in
favor of the petitioners. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial
court and ordered the petitioners "to vacate the land they have leased from the plaintiff-
appellant.
Private respondent Hombria filed a Motion for Execution of the above decision which has
already become final and executory. The motion was granted by the public respondent
judge, and a Writ of Execution was issued therefor. The petitioners filed a Motion to Set
Aside or Defer the Implementation of Writ of Demolition. This motion was denied by the
public respondent judge in an Order dated November 18, 1998, a copy of which was
received by the petitioners on December 29, 1998. On January 13, 1999, petitioners moved
for an extension of the period to file a motion for reconsideration until January 28,
1999. The motion was finally filed by the petitioners on January 27, 1999, but was denied
by the trial court in an Order dated March 17, 1999. A copy of the Order was received by
the petitioners on May 4, 1999.
A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by the petitioners with the Court of
Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge in issuing the
Orders dated November 18, 1998 and March 17, 1999, and of the sheriff in issuing
the alias Writ of Demolition. In a Resolution dated 4 June 18, 1999, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition on the grounds that the petition was filed beyond the 60-day period,
and that the certification of non-forum shopping attached thereto was signed by only one
of the petitioners.
ISSUE:
W/N the absence of the wife’s signature is not in compliance
RULING:
No. If suits to defend an interest in the conjugal properties may be filed by the husband
alone, with more reason, he may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping to be attached
to the petition.—Under the New Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the
conjugal partnership. In fact, he is the sole administrator, and the wife is not entitled as a
matter of right to join him in this endeavor. The husband may defend the conjugal
partnership in a suit or action without being joined by the wife. Corollarily, the husband
alone may execute the necessary certificate of non-forum shopping to accompany the
pleading. The husband as the statutory administrator of the conjugal property could have
filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition alone, without the concurrence of the wife.
If suits to defend an interest in the conjugal properties may be filed by the husband alone,
with more reason, he may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping to be attached to the
petition.
Sarangay, Jossa M.
Sps. Aggabao v. Parulan
G.R. No. 165803, Sept. 1, 2010
“Article 124 (2) of the Family Code - In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as
a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may
be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization
by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.”
FACTS:
Respondent Sps. Parulan own two properties in BF Homes Parañaque City. In 1991,
through the insistence of Anatacio (licensed broker), drafted the agreement to sell the
property to petitioner Sps. Aggabao. In their meeting, respondent Elena Parulan presented
a SPA authorizing her to sell their property. Thereafter, petitioners together with Anatacio
inquired into the status of the subject properties and found out that one of the said
properties was mortgaged to Los Banos Bank and a conjugal property. Petitioners still paid
respondent Elena. However, she did not turn over the duplicate copy of TCT of the property
and claimed that such copy was in the possession of a relative who was then in Hongkong.
Petitioner learned that the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT had been all along in the custody
of Atty. Jeremy Z. Parulan, who appeared to hold an SPA executed by his brother Dionisio
authorizing him to sell both lots. Subsequently, Atty. Purulan filed an action for the
declaration of the nullity of the deed of absolute sale executed by Ma. Elena, and the
cancellation of the title issued to the petitioners by virtue thereof.
The RTC ruled that the sale was void pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code, which the
CA affirmed since Dionisio had not consented to the sale of the conjugal property by Ma.
Elena. The petitioners impute error to the CA contending that the more appropriate law to
apply was Article 173 of the Civil Code, not Article 124 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Which between Article 173 of the Civil Code and Article 124 of the Family Code should apply
to the sale of the conjugal property executed without the consent of Dionisio?
Ruling:
Article 124, Family Code, applies to sale of conjugal properties made after the effectivity of
the Family Code.
The sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of the Family
Code. The proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is settled
that any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during the effectivity of
the Family Code is governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.
Also, according to Article 256 of the Family Code, the provisions of the Family Code may
apply retroactively provided no vested rights are impaired. In Tumlos v. Fernandez, the
Court rejected the petitioners argument that the Family Code did not apply because the
acquisition of the contested property had occurred prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, and pointed out that Article 256 provided that the Family Code could apply
retroactively if the application would not prejudice vested or acquired rights existing
before the effectivity of the Family Code. Herein, however, the petitioners did not show any
vested right in the property acquired prior to August 3, 1988 that exempted their situation
from the retroactive application of the Family Code.
The Court also agrees with Dionisio that the void sale was a continuing offer from the
petitioners and Ma. Elena that Dionisio had the option of accepting or rejecting before the
offer was withdrawn by either or both Ma. Elena and the petitioners. The last sentence of
the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code makes this clear, stating that in the
absence of the other spouses consent, the transaction should be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may
be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or upon
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
(b) Sole administration

(1) Incapacity, FC 124, 253

Uy v. CA
346 SCRA 246
FACTS:
This case is a dispute between Teodoro L. Jardeleza (herein respondent) on the one hand,
against his mother Gilda, and sister and brother-in-law, the spouses Jose Uy and Glenda
Jardeleza (herein petitioners) on the other hand. The controversy came about as a result of
their fathe of respondent- Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr’s suffering of a stroke which left him
comatose and bereft of any motor or mental faculties. Teodoro Jardeleza, filed a petition for
guardianship. It was prayed therein that Letters of Guardianship be issued for Gilda, wife of
Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and that no such property be negotiated, mortgaged or otherwise
alienated to third persons.
Afterwards, Gilda herself filed a petition for the declaration of incapacity of Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr., assumption of sole powers of administration of conjugal properties, and
authorization to sell the same, which the Court granted.
Teodoro opposed that the order was essentially a petition for guardianship and there was a
failure to comply with the basic requirements- consent of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. which he
cannot be deprived through mere summary proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the procedural rules on summary proc under Art. 124 of F.C. is applicable.
RULING:
NO.
Because Dr. Jardeleza, Sr. was unable to take care of himself and manage the conjugal
property due to illness that had rendered him comatose, the proper remedy was the
appointment of a judicial guardian of the person or estate or both of such incompetent,
under Rule 93, Section 1, 1964 Revised Rules of Court.
Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator of the
conjugal property must observe the procedure for the sale of the wards estate required of
judicial guardians under Rule 95, 1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial
proceedings under the Family Code.
In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the procedure under the Revised
Rules of Court. Indeed, the trial court did not even observe the requirements of the
summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code. Thus, the trial court did not serve
notice of the petition to the incapacitated spouse; it did not require him to show cause why
the petition should not be granted.
Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that absent an opportunity to be heard, the
decision rendered by the trial court is void for lack of due process.
(2) Separation in fact, FC 100 (3), 127(3), 253

(3) Abandonment, FC 101, 128, 253
(4) Pendency of legal separation proceedings, FC 61
10. Disposition and encumbrance, FC 124-125; FC 97, 121, 122
Sobrepena, Kim Angeli

Cheesman v. Intermediate (1991)
193 SCRA 93
An alien cannot recover or hold the lot so acquired, in view of the prohibition in the
Constitution as to the sale to aliens of residential lands.
FACTS:
Thomas Cheesman and Criselda Cheesman were married on December 4, 1970, but have
been separated since 1981.
On 1974, a Deed of Sale was executed by Altares conveying a parcel of land, and the house
thereon in favor of Criselda Cheesman. Thomas Cheesman, although aware of the deed, did
not object to the transfer being made only to his wife.
On 1981, Criselda sold the property to Estelita Padilla, without the knowledge or consent of
Thomas.Thomas brought suit against Criselda and Estelia praying for the annulment of the
sale on the ground that the transaction had been executed without his consent.
RTC: Melecio failed to establish claim that Anastacio did not sell the property to the
spouses Molina.
CA: affirmed RTC
ISSUE:
WON the contract of sale between Criselda and Estelita is valid
RULING:
YES. The fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Thomas acquired
no right whatever over the property by virtue of Criselda’s purchase, and in attempting to
acquire a right or interest over the land, he knowingly violated the Constitution.
In any event, he has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the
property by his wife on the theiry that in so doing, he is merely exercising the prerogative
of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such theory would permit indirect
controversion of the constitutional prohibition.
Socrates, Tomas
Jader-Manalo v. Camaisa
G.R. No. 147978, January 23, 2002
To dispose a conjugal property, a spouse must obtain the written consent of the other spouse,
otherwise, the disposition is void. The court may authorize the sale by one spouse without the
consent of the other only in cases where that other spouse is incapacitated to give consent to
the sale.
FACTS:
Spouses Norma Camaisa and Edilberto Camaisa have properties (conjugal properties) for
sale. Thelma Jader-Manalo saw an advertisement of the sale of such properties. Thelma
decided to negotiate to buy such properties thru a real estate broker authorized by the
spouses. Thereafter, Thelma met with Edilberto. They agreed on a price, and Edilberto
signed the contract to sell while Thelma handed over 2 checks for downpayment in the
presence of the real estate broker. The contracts were given to Edilberto so he can have her
wife sign it also. The next day, Norma called Thelma, wanting to clarify certain provisions.
The next meeting the spouses and Norma had, the spouses then communicated that they’re
backing out of the deal since they need the full payment of cash, and they returned to
Thelma the checks. Norma filed a specific performance for the wife to sign the contract
claiming that the contract was already perfected.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts may compel the performance of the sale.
RULING:
No. The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as
administrator in appropriate cases requires the written consent or the wife, otherwise, the
disposition is void.
The properties in question are conjugal properties, hence, the consent of both spouses
must be given for the contracts to sell can be effective. Norma didn’t give her consent.
Norma also denies being aware of the negotiations, and even if she were, being aware is not
consent for this purpose. Thelma argues that the court may give authorization if the
consent of the other spouse cannot be obtained, under Art. 124 of the Family Code. The SC
disagrees. The court may grant authorization only if the other spouse who doesn’t give
consent is incapacitated. This Thelma failed to establish. Hence, the contracts to sell of the
conjugal properties without Norma’s consent are not valid.
Surla, Kristine
Frenzel v. Catito
G.R. No. 143958, July 11, 2003
The petitioner, being a party to an illegal contract, cannot come into a court of law and ask to
have his illegal objective carried out.
FACTS:
Frenzel is an Australian citizen who is legally separated to his Filipina wife. In 1983, he met
Ederlina, a Filipina masseuse in Sydney. He bought Ederlina numerous properties in the
Philippines. Alfred was unaware that Ederlina was married to Klaus Muller. Ederlina had
not been able to secure a divorce from Klaus, thus, her relationship with Alfred started
deteriorating. To avoid complications, Alfred cut off all contacts with Ederlina.
Petitioner contends that:

1. he purchased the properties because of his desire to marry the respondent;
2. he was not aware of the constitutional prohibition against aliens;
3. he is entitled to recover the money used to purchase the properties; and
4. the respondent unjustly enriched herself at the expense of the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner could recover the money used in purchasing the several properties?
RULING:
No. A contract that violates the Constitution and the law, is null and void and vests no rights
and creates no obligations. Under Article 1412 of the NCC, the petitioner cannot have the
subject properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the
purchase thereof. Equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be
done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. Where the wrong
of one party equals that of the other, the defendant is in the stronger position ... it signifies
that in such a situation, neither a court of equity nor a court of law will administer a
remedy.
The petitioner’s claim that he acquired the subject properties because of his desire to
marry the respondent is belied by his own evidence. The petitioner admitted on cross-
examination that he legally married, while he was having an amorous relationship with the
respondent.
Article 1416 of the NCC applies only to those contracts which are merely prohibited, in
order to benefit private interests. It does not apply to contracts void ab initio. The sales of
three parcels of land in favor of the petitioner who is a foreigner is illegal per se. The
transactions are void ab initio because they were entered into in violation of the
Constitution.
Futile, too, is petitioner’s reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code. The provision is
expressed in the maxim: MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST (No person
should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another). An action for recovery of what
has been paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This
provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by
the application of the pari delicto doctrine.

Alinas v. Alinas
G.R. No. 158040, April 14, 2008
The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal property shall belong to the spouses jointly.
These powers of administration do not include the disposition of and encumbrance, which can
only be done by the authority of the court or with the written consent of the other spouse.
FACTS:
Spouses Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas (petitioners) separated sometime in 1982, with
Rosario moving to Pagadian City and Onesiforo moving to Manila. Respondent Victor Alinas
is the brother of Onesiforo. Petitioners alleged that they entrusted their properties to
respondent spouses. Sometime in 1993, petitioners discovered that their two lots were
already titled in the name of the respondent spouses. Onesiforo’s signature appeared in an
Absolute Deed of Sale selling one of the lots to respondent spouses. Records also show a
notarized document whereby petitioner acknowledged that his brother used his own
money to redeem one of the lots mortgaged and foreclosed and thus his brother became
the owner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale of conjugal property by Onesiforo Alinas to respondent spouses is
valid despite the lack of consent on the part of the wife.
RULING:
NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides that the administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In the event that one
spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance, which must have the
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
Pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code and jurisprudence, the sale of petitioners'
conjugal property made by petitioner Onesiforo alone is void in its entirety. It should be
noted that respondent spouses were well aware that the property is a conjugal property of
petitioners. They also knew that the disposition being made by Onesiforo is without the
consent of his wife, as they knew that petitioners had separated, and the sale documents do
not bear the signature of petitioner Rosario. The fact that Onesiforo had to execute the
Absolute Deed of Sale and a notarized Agreement reveals that they had full knowledge of
the severe infirmities of the sale. Such being the case, no injustice is being foisted on
respondent spouses as they risked transacting with Onesiforo alone despite their
knowledge that the subject property is a conjugal property.
Tec, Natasha Kim R.

Siochi v. Gozon
G.R. No. 169900, March 18, 2010
The absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale void, including the
portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale. Even if the
other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, that other
spouses written consent to the sale is still required by law for its validity.
FACTS:
While the legal separation case between Elvira and Alfredo Gozon was pending, Alfredo
entered into an agreement to buy and sell with petitioner Siochi a parcel of lan under the
name of both spouses for the price of P18 Million. The subject property during such
agreement had been annotated with a notice of lis pedens, while the agreement between
Siochi and Alfredo was also annotated on the title after Siochi made partial payments.
Subsequently the legal separation case was granted, and the lower court declared that the
CPG of the spouses be dissolved and liquidated with the land being identified as part of
conjugal property.
Alfredo executed a deed of donation over the property in favor of their daughter, Winifred,
afterwhich through an SPA, sold the same to IDRI. A new TCT was issed by the RD in favor
of IDRI. This prompted Siochi to file a complaint of Spcific Performance and damages,
annulment of donation and sale, with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction
and/or temporary restraining order.
The CA declared that the Agreeement between Siochi and Alfredo is VOID since it was
entered into without the consent of Elvira, Alfredo’s wife, and (2) Alfredo’s ½ undivided
share has been forfeited in favor of Winifred by the grant of legal separation. Mario alleges
that the Agreement should be treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by the
acceptance of the other spouse before the offer is withdrawn. Since Elviras conduct
signified her acquiescence to the sale, Mario prays for the Court to direct Alfredo and Elvira
to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property upon his payment of P9 million to
Elvira.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Alfredo may sell the conjugal property, being the sole administrator of the
same without obtaining the consent of Elvira
RULING:
NO. Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because Elvira, with whom Alfredo
was separated in fact, was unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
property. However, as sole administrator of the property, Alfredo still cannot sell the
property without the written consent of Elvira or the authority of the court. Without such
consent or authority, the sale is void. Even if the other spouse actively participated in
negotiating for the sale of the property, that other spouses written consent to the sale is
still required by law for its validity. As regards Marios contention that the Agreement is a
continuing offer which may be perfected by Elviras acceptance before the offer is
withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred
and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn.
It is only Alfredos share in the net profits which is forfeited in favor of Winifred. Article
102(4) of the Family Code provides that [f]or purposes of computing the net profits subject
to forfeiture in accordance with Article 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be
the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of
the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution. Clearly,
what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredos share in the conjugal partnership
property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property.

Aguete v. PNB
G.R. No. 170166, April 6, 2011
Where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes,
and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
FACTS:
On Oct. 14, 1974, Jose Ros obtained a loan of P115,000 from PNB secured by a real estate
mortgage on a parcel of land. The loan remained unpaid upon maturity so PNB instituted
foreclosure proceedings and acquired the property as the highest bidder. After the lapse of
1 year without the property having been redeemed, the title was consolidated in the name
of PNB.
Estrella Aguete, Ros’ wife, claimed that she had no knowledge of the loan obtained by Ros
and did not consent to the REM he executed on their conjugal property. A complaint was
filed to annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale, and consolidation of the
property, on the grounds that Aguete’s signature was forged and that the loan did not
redound to the benefit of the family.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA reversed the decision and ruled that assuming Aguete
did not give her consent to Ros’ loan, the conjugal partnership is still liable because its
proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family. Records of the case reveal that the loan
was used for the expansion of the family’s business, buy and sell of garlic and virginia
tobacco.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA ruled correctly.
RULING:
Yes. The Civil Code was the applicable law at the time of the mortgage. The husband cannot
alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent, express or implied, of
the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract is voidable. Art. 173 of the Civil Code
allows Aguete to question Ros’ encumbrance of the subject property. If the husband himself
is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the money and services to
be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term
"x x x x obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual benefit may
be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the
contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to
benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the
husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed.

Flores v. Lindo
G.R. No. 183984, April 13, 2011
Any encumbrance on the conjugal property requires the consent of both spouses, any
transaction contrary to the same is void. However, an adverse party may file suit against an
individual spouse under the provisions of unjust enrichment.
FACTS:
Edna Lindo obtained a loan from Arturo Flores amounting to P400,000 and secured it with
a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage. The mortgage covered property in the name of Edna and
her husband, Enrico Lindo, Jr. Edna likewise signed a Promissory Note and the Deed for
herself and for Enrico as his attorney-in-fact.
She issued three checks as partial loan payments, all of which were dishonored for
insufficiency of funds. Flores therefore filed a complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage
with damages.
The RTC ruled that petitioner was not entitled to judicial foreclosure as the Deed was
without consent and authority of Edna’s husband. The RTC, however, ruled that petitioner
may still recover the loan through a personal action against Edna.
Flores filed a complaint for sum of money and damages. The respondents alleged that
Enrico was not a party to the loan because it was contracted by Edna without Enrico’s
signature. They also prayed for the dismissal of the case on grounds of improper venue, res
judicata and forum-shopping. The RTC ruled that res judicata will not apply to rights,
claims or demands which, though growing out of the same subject matter, constitute
separate or distinct causes of action.
The Court of Appeals set aside the RTC ruling. It noted that petitioner allowed the earlier
decision of the RTC to become final and executory without asking the courts for an
alternative relief. The Court of Appeals stated that petitioner merely relied on the
declarations of these courts that he could file a separate personal action and thus failed to
observe the rules and settled jurisprudence on multiplicity of suits, closing petitioner’s
avenue for recovery of the loan.
ISSUES:
Whether the promissory note and deed of mortgage are void.

Whether there remains an available remedy for petitioner.
RULING:
The court says yes. Art. 124 of the Family code provides that the administration and
enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case
of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by
the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of
contract implementing such decision.
administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without
authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors
In the case at bar, the execution of the Special Power of Attorney is the acceptance by the
other spouse that perfected the continuing offer as a binding contract between the parties,
making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract.
As for the second issue, the court also rules in the affirmative.
Art. 22 of the civil code provides that every person who through an act of performance by
another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the
expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to prevent one from
enriching himself at the expense of another without just cause or consideration. The
principle is applicable in this case considering that Edna admitted obtaining a loan from
petitioners, and the same has not been fully paid without just cause.

Ko v. Aramburo
G. R. No. 190995, August 9, 2017
Simeon's sale of their conjugal property without his wife's conformity under the Old Civil Code
is merely voidable, not void. The imprescriptibility of an action assailing a void contract under
Article 1410 of the NCC, thus, does not apply in such case.
FACTS:
Subject of this case are seven parcels of land located in Tabaco City, Albay, under the name
of Corazon (Simeon’s sister). The complaint alleged that Virginia and her husband Simeon,
together with Corazon and her husband Felix, acquired the subject properties from
Spouses Eusebio and Epifania.
However, allegedly with the use of falsified documents, Corazon was able to have the entire
subject properties transferred exclusively to her name. She alleged that in 1974, Simeon
sold and conveyed his entire one-half share in the co-owned properties in her favor. Hence,
Corazon became the sole owner thereof and consequently, was able to transfer the titles of
the same to her name.
ISSUE:
Whether the sale, without Virginia’s consent is void
RULING:
No.
As far as Virginia is concerned, this case falls under the provisions of the Old Civil Code. The
CA erred in applying Article 1410 of the NCC stating that the action to question a void
contract is imprescriptible. It is error to hold the subject Deed of Absolute Sale as void for
lack of the wife's conformity Simeon's sale of their conjugal property without his wife's
conformity under the Old Civil Code is merely voidable, not void.
The imprescriptibility of an action assailing a void contract under Article 1410 of the NCC,
thus, does not apply in such case. The 10-year prescriptive period under Article 173 of the
Old Civil Code, therefore, should be applied in this case. Here, the invalid sale was executed
on December 14, 1974 while the action questioning the same was filed in 1993, which is
clearly way beyond the 10-year period prescribed under Article 173 of the Old Civil Code.
Virginia's recourse is, therefore, to demand only the value of the property, i.e., the one-third
portion of the subject properties invalidly sold by Simeon without Virginia's conformity
pursuant to the same provision.
11. Effect of separation de facto, FC 127, FC 100 cf. FC 239
Noveras v. Noveras
G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014
FACTS:
USA and in the Philippines. Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the
Philippines in. Leticia executed an SPA authorizing David to sell their property in Sampaloc
property. According to Leticia, sometime in September 2003, David abandoned his family
and lived with Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province. Upon learning that David had an
extra-marital affair Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from a court in California in
wherein the court awarded all the properties in the USA to Leticia. Leticia filed a petition
for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora. Leticia
anchored the filing of the instant petition for judicial separation of property on paragraphs
4 and 6 of Article 135 of the Family Code.
ISSUES:
1) WON David abandoned his family.

2) Whether or not the petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property should be
granted.
RULING:
1) NO. The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no abandonment in this case to
necessitate judicial separation of properties under paragraph 4 of Article 135 of the Family
Code. Abandonment must be for a valid cause and the spouse is deemed to have abandoned
the other when he/she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The
intention of not returning is prima facie presumed if the allegedly abandoning spouse failed
to give any information as to his or her whereabouts within the period of three months
from such abandonment.
Leticia knows that David has returned to and stayed at his hometown in Maria Aurora,
Philippines, as she even went several times to visit him there after the alleged
abandonment. Also, David has been going back to the US to visit Leticia and their children
until the relations between them worsened. The last visit of said respondent was in
October 2004 when he and the petitioner discussed the filing by the latter of a petition for
dissolution of marriage with the California court. Such turn for the worse of their
relationship and the filing of the said petition can also be considered as valid causes for the
respondent to stay in the Philippines.
2) YES. Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property
Family Code.
12. Effect of abandonment, FC 128 cf. FC 101
Yu, Karl Alen G.

Partosa-Jo v. CA
216 SCRA 693
Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent never to return,
followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and without in the meantime providing in
the least for one's family although able to do so. There must be absolute cessation of marital
relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. The physical
separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to
the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of
their conjugal property.
FACTS:
The private respondent Jose Jo admitted that he cohabited with three women and father
fifteen children. The petitioner Prima Pantosa-Jo claims to be the legal wife with whom he
had a daughter. Petitioner filed a case for judicial separation of conjugal property and
support claiming that Jose abandoned them. The RTC granted the support but did not rule
as to the separation of conjugal property. On appeal by both parties to the CA, the support
was affirmed but denied the petition for separation of conjugal property on the ground that
the separation of the parties was due to their agreement and not because of abondonment.
ISSUE:
Whether there was abandonment which warrants the separation of conjugal property
RULING:
Yes. Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent never to
return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and without in the meantime
providing in the least for one's family although able to do so. There must be absolute
cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation.
This idea is clearly expressed in the above-quoted provision, which states that "a spouse is
deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without
any intention of returning." The record shows that as early as 1942, the private respondent
had already rejected the petitioner, whom he denied admission to their conjugal home in
Dumaguete City when she returned from Zamboanguita. The fact that she was not accepted
by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal
relationship. Apart from refusing to admit his lawful wife to their conjugal home in
Dumaguete City, Jo has freely admitted to cohabiting with other women and siring many
children by them. It was his refusal to provide for the petitioner and their daughter that
prompted her to file the actions against him for support and later for separation of the
conjugal property, in which actions, significantly, he even denied being married to her.
Noveras v. Noveras
G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014
Abandonment, under Article 101 of the Family Code quoted above, must be for a valid cause
and the spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he/she has left the conjugal
dwelling without intention of returning. The intention of not returning is prima facie
presumed if the allegedly abandoning spouse failed to give any information as to his or her
whereabouts within the period of three months from such abandonment.
13. Dissolution of CPG, FC 126, 129

Cabreza v. Cabreza
G.R. No. 171260, September 11, 2009
Article 129 of the Family Code presupposes a situation where there are other properties aside
from the property subject of the motion that constitute the conjugal partnership.
FACTS:
Respondent Ceferino Cabreza filed with the RTC of Pasig a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage to Petitioner Amparo Cabreza based on Article 36 on the grounds of
Psychological incapacity. On January 3, 2001,RTC of Pasig granted the petition and ordered
that the Conjugal partnership be dissolved and liquidated in accordance with Article 129 of
the Family Code. On March 7, 2003 the respondent filed a motion for Execution (Re:
Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership). In said motion, respondent sought to implement the
order for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, which consisted solely in the real
property located at No. 20 United Street, Bo. Capitolyo, Pasig City.
RTC of Pasig granted the said motion and also granted the writ of possession in favor of the
buyer BJD Holdings Corporation.
On July 8, 2004, petitioner filed a Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Writ of Possession and
Notice to Vacate, arguing that Article 129(9) of the New Civil Code provides that, in the
partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and lot on which it is situated shall be
adjudicated to the spouse with whom majority of the children choose to remain. Hence,
since the majority of the children, albeit of legal age, opted to stay with petitioner, she
asserted that the family home should be given to her.
RTC rendered a decision denying the motion of the petitioner. Upon appeal to the CA, the
latter likewise denied the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision considering that the conjugal dwelling
should be awarded exlusively on her favor in accordance with Art. 129(9) of the NCC?
RULING:
The petition is bereft of merit.

Article 129 of the Family Code presupposes a situation where there are other properties
aside from the property subject of the motion that constitute the conjugal partnership. In
the instant case, there is only one (1) piece of property involved which is the real property
covered by TCT No. 17460 located at No. 20 United St., Bo. Capitolyo, Pasig City. Hence, the
property was properly sold.
While there is no prohibition for private parties to file a petition on their own behalf, it
necessarily follows that they take the risk of not having a lawyer who is well-versed in
appellate practice. After her failed petition in the CA, petitioner already had the
opportunity to rectify the situation by engaging the services of a lawyer when she filed her
petition before this Court; yet for some reason, she chose not to do so. Thus, she has no one
else to blame but herself.

Heirs of Go v. Servacio
G.R. No. 157537, Sept. 7, 2011
The disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal property by the surviving spouse without
the prior liquidation mandated by Article 130 of the Family Code is not necessarily void if said
portion has not yet been allocated by judicial or extrajudicial partition to another heir of the
deceased spouse. At any rate, the requirement of prior liquidation does not prejudice vested
rights.
FACTS:
Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land to Protacio B. Go, Jr. He later. executed an Affidavit
of Renunciation and Waiver, that it was his father Protacio, Sr, not he, who had purchased
the said land (the property). Thereafter, the Marta, mother of Protacio jr. died. Protacio, Sr.
and his son Rito sold a portion of the property Servacio. In 2001, the petitioners demanded
the return of the property but Servacio refused. They sued Servacio and Rito for the
annulment of the sale of the property. The petitioners averred that following Protacio, Jr.’s
renunciation, the property became conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to
Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property between Protacio, Sr. and
Marta was null and void. Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had exclusively
owned the property because he had purchased it with his own money.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale by Protacio, Sr., et al. to Servacio was void for being made without
prior liquidation.
RULING:
NO.
Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988, their property relation was properly characterized as one of conjugal partnership
governed by the NCC. Upon Marta’s death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved,
pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code,[15] and an implied ordinary co-ownership
ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the
assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation. Protacio, Sr., although becoming a
co-owner with his children in respect of Martas share in the conjugal partnership, could not
yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Marta’s share without an actual partition
of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all
that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Martas share. Nonetheless, a co-owner could
sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his
undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. Consequently, the sale by
Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other co-owners was not
necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively
transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Martas share. Thus, the appropriate
recourse of co-owners in cases where their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire
property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an
action for PARTITION.
Surla
Ugalde v. Ysasi
G.R. No. 130623, February 29, 2008
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:

Ko, Nikki Mei Q.
Dino v. Dino
G.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011
FACTS:
marriage.
ISSUE:
RULING:
XXXX
Yu v. Reyes-Carpio
G.R. No. 189207, June 15, 2011
It is more proper to rule first on the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of each
party’s psychological incapacity to perform their respective marital obligations. If the Court
eventually finds that the parties’ respective petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage is
indeed meritorious on the basis of either or both of the parties’ psychological incapacity, then
the parties shall proceed to comply with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code before a final
decree of absolute nullity of marriage can be issued. Pending such ruling on the declaration of
nullity of the parties’ marriage, the Court finds no legal ground, at this stage, to proceed with
the reception of evidence in regard the issues on custody and property relations, since these
are mere incidents of the nullity of the parties’ marriage.
FACTS:
Eric Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Caroline T. Yu with the
RTC of Pasig. Judge Suarez on May 30, 2006 issued an order stating that Eric’s partial offer
of evidence dated April 18, 2006 would be submitted for resolution after certain exhibits
have been remarked. But the exhibits were only relative to the issue of the nullity of the
marriage of Eric and Caroline. On September 12, 2006, Caroline moved to submit the case
for resolution, considering that the incidents on custody, support, and property relations
(incidental issues) were mere consequences of the declaration of nullity of the parties’
marriage.
Eric opposed this motion saying that the incident on declaration of nullity cannot be
resolved without presentation of evidence for the incidents on custody, support, and
property relations. Eric added that the incidental issues and the issue on declaration of
nullity can both proceed and be simultaneously resolved. RTC ruled in favour of Eric’s
opposition.
Caroline caused the inhibition of Judge Suarez, so that the case was re-raffled to another
branch presided by Judge Reyes-Carpio. While the case was being tried by Judge Reyes-
Carpio, Caroline filed an Omnibus Motion seeking the strict observation by the said judge of
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage as codified in A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC, and that the case on the declaration on nullity be already submitted for resolution
ahead of the incidental issues, and not simultaneously. Eric opposed this motion.
Judge Reyes-Carpio granted the Omnibus Motion, saying that the main cause of action is the
declaration of nullity of the marriage and the incidental issues are merely ancillary
incidents thereto. Eric moved for reconsideration, which was denied by Judge Reyes-
Carpio. Eric then filed for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65. CA affirmed the judgment of
the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether the main issue of nullity of marriage must be submitted for resolution first before
the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations (incidental issues) –
NO.
HELD:
It appears in the records that the Orders in question, or what are alleged to have been
exercised with grave abuse of discretion, are interlocutory orders. An interlocutory order is
one which “does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court’s task of
adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards
each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court. Eric
Yu to prove that the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion and that
those were patently erroneous. Considering that the requisites that would justify certiorari
as an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order have not been complied with, the
proper recourse for petitioner should have been an appeal in due course of the judgment of
the trial court on the merits, incorporating the grounds for assailing the interlocutory
orders.
It must be noted that Judge Reyes-Carpio did not disallow the presentation of evidence on
the incidents on custody, support, and property relations. It is clear in the assailed orders
that the trial court judge merely deferred the reception of evidence relating to custody,
support, and property relations. And the trial judge’s decision was not without basis. Judge
Reyes-Carpio finds support in the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages. Particularly, Secs. 19 and 21 of the Rule clearly allow the reception of evidence
on custody, support, and property relations after the trial court renders a decision granting
the petition, or upon entry of judgment granting the petition:
Section 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall
declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by
the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented
under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children
and delivery of their presumptive legitimes. – Upon entry of the judgment granting the
petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate court
granting the petition, the Family Court, on motion of either party, shall proceed with the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, including custody,
support of common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes pursuant to
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous
judicial proceedings.
Evidently, Judge Reyes-Carpio did not deny the reception of evidence on custody, support,
and property relations but merely deferred it, based on the existing rules issued by this
Court, to a time when a decision granting the petition is already at hand and before a final
decree is issued. Conversely, the trial court, or more particularly the family court, shall
proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common
children, and delivery of their presumptive legitimes upon entry of judgment granting the
petition. And following the pertinent provisions of the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, this act is undoubtedly consistent with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code,
contrary to what petitioner asserts. Particularly, Arts. 50 and 51 of the Family Code state:
Article 50. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in the previous judicial proceedings.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash,
property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved,
had already provided for such matters.
Also, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly allows the deferment of the reception of evidence on
custody, support, and property relations. Conversely, the trial court may receive evidence
on the subject incidents after a judgment granting the petition but before the decree of
nullity or annulment of marriage is issued. And this is what Judge Reyes-Carpio sought to
comply with in issuing the assailed orders. As correctly pointed out by the CA, Eric Yu’s
assertion that ruling the main issue without receiving evidence on the subject incidents
would result in an ambiguous and fragmentary judgment is certainly speculative and,
hence, contravenes the legal presumption that a trial judge can fairly weigh and appraise
the evidence submitted by the parties.
Therefore, it cannot be said at all that Judge Reyes-Carpio acted in a capricious and
whimsical manner, much less in a way that is patently gross and erroneous, when she
issued the assailed orders deferring the reception of evidence on custody, support, and
property relations. To reiterate, this decision is left to the trial court’s wisdom and legal
soundness. Consequently, therefore, the CA cannot likewise be said to have committed
grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Orders of Judge Reyes-Carpio and in ultimately
finding an absence of grave abuse of discretion on her part.
Jore, Ma. Jovi P.

Quiao v. Quiao
G. R. No. 183622, July 4, 2012
FACTS:
ISSUES:
RULING:
laws”

Barrido v. Nonato
G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014
Although Article 129 provides for the procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal
partnership regime, Article 147 specifically covers the effects of void marriages on the
spouses’ property relations.
The rules which are set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable
marriages, are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-
law spouses or spouses of void marriages.
FACTS:
Marietta N. Barrido (petitioner) married Leonardo V. Nonato (respondent). They were able
to acquire a property (house and lot) situated in Eroreco, Bacolod City. On March 15, 1996,
their marriage was declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since there
was no more reason to maintain their co-ownership over the property, respondent asked
petitioner for partition, but the latter refused. Thus, on January 29, 2003, respondent filed a
Complaint for partition before the MTCC Bacolod. Petitioner claimed that the subject
property had already been sold to their children and moved for the dismissal of the
complaint due to MTCC’s lack of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, MTCC applied Article 129 of the
Family Code and ordered that the conjugal property (house and lot) of the former Spouses
be adjudicated to the petitioner, the spouse with whom the majority of the common
children choose to remain. Respondent appealed before RTC Bacolod and the latter
reversed the ruling of MTCC. It found that even though the MTCC aptly applied Article 129
of the Family Code, it nevertheless made a reversible error in adjudicating the subject
property to the petitioner. Upon appeal, the CA ruled that although RTC erred in applying
Article 129, instead of Article 147, it still correctly ordered the equitable partition of the
property. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the rules on co-ownership govern the conjugal dwelling (house and lot).
RULING:
YES. In the analogous case of Valdez, the Court held that the court a quo did not commit a
reversible error in utilizing Article 147 of the Family Code and in ruling that the former
spouses own the family home and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in
concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property that they owned in
common, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code should aptly prevail. The
rules which are set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable
marriages, are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between
common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages.
Here, the former spouses both agree that they acquired the subject property during the
subsistence of their marriage. It shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares. Therefore, the
subject property remains to be owned in common by Nonato and Barrido, which should be
divided in accordance with the rules on co-ownership.
Socrates, Tomas
Uy v. Estate of Fernandez
G.R. No. 200612, April 5, 2017
Upon the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains due to the death of either spouse,
the surviving spouse has an actual and vested one-half undivided share of the properties,
which does not consist of determinate and segregated properties until liquidation and
partition of the conjugal partnership. The surviving spouse becomes a co-owner of the
properties with the other heirs. A co-owner could sell his undivided share.
FACTS:
Vipa Fernandez-Lahaylahay and Levi Lahaylahay got married in 1961 without any
agreement on the property relations. Sometime in 1990, Rafael Uy started to lease a
property of Vipa in Iloilo. In 1994, Vipa died, and the daughter of Vipa, Grace, became the
administrator of the estate of Vipa. As to Levi, he lived in Aklan. In 1998, Rafael stopped
paying the rent. In 2003, Grace, representing the Estate of Vipa, filed an unlawful detainer
case against Rafael Uy. The MTCC of Iloilo ruled in favor of Grace in 2008, but upon appeal,
the RTC reversed the MTCC in 2009. The case went to the CA and reinstated the MTCC’s
decision ordering Uy to vacate, despite Uy’s contention that the land was already sold to
him in 2005.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Uy must leave the leased premises for failure to pay the rent.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that Uy may not be ordered to vacate. Upon the death of Vipa, half
of the subject property was automatically reserved for the surviving spouse, Levy. The
other half is transmitted to Vipa’s heirs, the children and Levy himself. It results to implied
co-ownership. None of the co-owners may assert claim on a specific property prior to
actual partition. Nevertheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share. Here, the sale of
the share of Levy in favor of Uy is valid, making Uy a co-owner of the property. Hence, since
the sale was consummated on December 29, 2005, from that date on, Uy is a co-owner of
the property and not a mere lessee. He cannot be ordered to vacate thru an unlawful
detainer action. However, from 1998 to December 28, 2005, Uy was a lessee, and he still
has the obligation to pay the unpaid rentals for that period plus interest.
D. Regime of separation of property

(a) In the marriage settlements, FC 143-146
(b) When mandatory, FC 103 & FC 130
(c) Reconciliation in legal separation, FC 66(2)
(d) Judicial separation of property, 134 - 146
Surla, Kristine
Ugalde v. Ysasi
G.R. No. 130623, February 29, 2008
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:

Noveras v. Noveras
G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014
FACTS:
USA and in the Philippines. Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair Leticia
obtained a decree of divorce from a court in California in wherein the court awarded all the
properties in the USA to Leticia. Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal
Property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora. Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition
for judicial separation of property on paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article 135 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property should be granted.
RULING:
YES. Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property
Family Code.
E. Property regime of unions without marriage

1. Unions under FC 147, 6, 35, 36, 53
Valdes v. QC RTC
G.R. No. 122749, July 31, 1996
The liquidation of the common property of a marriage void under Art 36 shall be governed by
Art 147 of the Family Code.
FACTS:
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married and soon, Valdes filed a petition for a
declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Art 36 of the Family Code, which was
granted on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity. They were ordered to start
proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the
Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with
Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the FC. She asserted that the FC contained no provisions on the
procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage." The RTC
then said: "Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property
regime of petitioner and respondent shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. The
provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code find no application since Article 102
refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership property and Article
129 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the absolute community of property."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC correctly applied the law.
RULING:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof,
the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the
provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. This
peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal
impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a
void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the first par. of
Art 147 refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage. Under this property
regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did
not participate in the acquisition shall still be considered as having contributed thereto
jointly if said parties’ efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household.
Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not
included in the co-ownership. A court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a
nullity is likewise clothed with authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters.
Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that the parties own the "family home" and all
their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and
partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership
under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the
Family Code, should aptly prevail.
Arriesgado
Carino v. Carino
G.R. No. 132539, February 3, 2001
Article 147 Family Code-Property Regime of Union Without Marriage; Article 148 - Rules on
Co-ownership regarding polygamous/bigamous marriages, adulterous or concubinage
relationships; Article 40 - Judicial Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
FACTS:
SPO4 Santiago Cariño married Susan Nicdao in 1969 without marriage license. They had
two children. He then married Susan Yee on November 10 1992, with whom he had no
children in their almost 10 year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
He passed away on November 23 1992. The two Susans filed with the RTC of Quezon City
the claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from
various government agencies. Nicdao collected a total of P146,000 while Yee received a
total of P21,000.
Yee filed an instant case for collection of half the money acquired by Nicdao, collectively
denominated as "death benefits." Yee admitted that her marriage with the SPO4 took place
during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity, the
marriage between Nicdao and the SPO4. She however claimed that she became aware of
the previous marriage at the funeral of the deceased.
In 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of Yee. Nicdao appealed to the CA, which the CA
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Yee can claim half the amount acquired by Nicdao.
RULING:
No. SC held that the marriage between Yee and Cariño falls under the Article 148 of the
Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous or polygamous marriages,
adulterous or concubinage relationships.
Yee cannot claim the benefits earned by the SPO4 as a police officer as her marriage to the
deceased is void due to bigamy. She is only entitled to the properties acquired with the
deceased through their actual joint contribution. Wages and salaries earned by each party
belong to him or her exclusively. Hence, they are not owned in common by Yee and the
deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and Yee has no right whatsoever to claim the
same. By intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of the deceased shall pass to his
legal heirs. And, Yee, not being the legal wife, is not one of them.
As regards to the first marriage, the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void
due to absence of a valid marriage license. Nicdao can claim the death benefits by the
deceased even if she did not contribute thereto. Article 147 creates a co-ownership in
respect thereto, entitling Nicdao to share one-half of the benefits. As there is no allegation
of bad faith in the first marriage, she can claim one-half of the disputed death benefits and
the other half to the deceased' to his legal heirs, by intestate succession.
The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been
solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao
and SPO4. Under Article 40, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a
second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage
void, before he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage
would be void. However, for purposes other than to remarry, no prior and separate judicial
declaration of nullity is necessary.

Gonzales v. Gonzales (2005)
478 SCRA 327
Article 147 creates a presumption that properties acquired during the cohabitation of the
parties have been acquired through their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by
them in equal shares.
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent started living together as husband and wife. After 2 yrs. they got
married. On October 1992, respondent filed a complaint with the RTC for annulment of
marriage. It alleges that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
obligations of marriage. During the time they lived together, they acquired properties. She
managed their pizza business and worked hard for its development. She prays for the
declaration of the nullity of their marriage and for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains. Petitioner denied that she was the one who managed the pizza
business and claimed that he exclusively owns the properties existing during their
marriage. The trial court rendered a decision declaring the marriage void ab initio and
order the division of the conjugal properties equally.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the properties should be divided equally between the parties
RULING:
YES. Art. 147 enumerate the two instances when the property relations between spouses
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. These are: (1) when a man and woman
capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage; and (2) when a man and woman live together under a void
marriage. Under this property regime of co-ownership, properties acquired by both parties
during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been
obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares.
It further provides that a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party
of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the
formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
While it is true that all the properties were bought from the proceeds of the pizza business,
petitioner himself testified that respondent was not a plain housewife and that she helped
him in managing the business. It appeared that before they started living together,
petitioner offered respondent to be his partner in his pizza business and to take over its
operation.
Ko, Nikki Mei Q.

Diño v. Diño
G.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011
FACTS:
marriage.
ISSUE:
RULING:
XXXX

Barrido v. Nonato
G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014
Although Article 129 provides for the procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal
partnership regime, Article 147 specifically covers the effects of void marriages on the
spouses’ property relations.
For Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each
other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without
the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. Under this property regime, property
acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on
equal co-ownership.
FACTS:
Marietta N. Barrido (petitioner) married Leonardo V. Nonato (respondent). They were able
to acquire a property (house and lot) situated in Eroreco, Bacolod City. On March 15, 1996,
their marriage was declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since there
was no more reason to maintain their co-ownership over the property, respondent asked
petitioner for partition, but the latter refused. Thus, on January 29, 2003, respondent filed a
Complaint for partition before the MTCC Bacolod. Petitioner claimed that the subject
property had already been sold to their children and moved for the dismissal of the
complaint due to MTCC’s lack of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, MTCC applied Article 129 of the
Family Code and ordered that the conjugal property (house and lot) of the former Spouses
be adjudicated to the petitioner, the spouse with whom the majority of the common
children choose to remain. Respondent appealed before RTC Bacolod and the latter
reversed the ruling of MTCC. It found that even though the MTCC aptly applied Article 129
of the Family Code, it nevertheless made a reversible error in adjudicating the subject
property to the petitioner. Upon appeal, the CA ruled that although RTC erred in applying
Article 129, instead of Article 147, it still correctly ordered the equitable partition of the
property. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 147 of the Family Code applies in this case.
RULING:
YES. The records reveal that Spouses Nonato’s marriage had been declared void for
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. During their marriage,
however, the conjugal partnership regime governed their property relations. Although
Article 129 provides for the procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal partnership
regime, Article 147 specifically covers the effects of void marriages on the spouses’
property relations.
For Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each
other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is
without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. Under this property regime,
property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by
the rules on equal co-ownership.
In this case, the term "capacitated" in the first paragraph of the provision pertains to the
legal capacity of a party to contract marriage. Any impediment to marry has not been
shown to have existed on the part of either Nonato or Barrido. They lived exclusively with
each other as husband and wife. However, their marriage was found to be void under
Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
2. Unions under FC 148, 35, 37, 38
Bernardez, Jairus Vincent Z.

Belcodero v. CA (1993)
227 SCRA 303
As regards the property relations between common-law spouses, Article 144 NCC merely
codified the law established through judicial precedents under the old code. In both regimes,
the co-ownership rule had more than once been repudiated when either or both spouses
suffered from an impediment to marry.
FACTS:
Alayo Bosing was married to Juliana Oday, with whom he had three children. He later left
the conjugal home and started to live instead with Josefa Rivera with whom he later begot
one child.
While with Josefa, Alayo purchased a parcel of land on installment basis. In 1959, he
authorized the vendor to transfer the lot in the name of his "wife Josefa R. Bosing." Hence,
TCT No. 48790 was issued in the name of "Josefa R. Bosing, married to Alayo Bosing.
Thereafter, Alayo married Josefa even while his prior marriage was still subsisting.
After Alayo’s death in 1967, Josefa executed a document of extrajudicial partition and sale
of the lot in question in favor of her daughter Josephine hence new Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 198840 was issued in the name of Josephine.
Juliana and her three legitimate children then filed an action for reconveyance of the
property.
ISSUE:
Whether the property belongs exclusively to Josefa (the second wife)
RULING:
No. Under the New Civil Code (Article 160) "all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife." This presumption has not been convincingly rebutted. It cannot be
seriously contended that, simply because the property was titled in the name of Josefa at
Alayo's request, she should thereby be deemed to be its owner. The property
unquestionably was acquired by Alayo.
As regards the property relations between common-law spouses, Article 144 NCC merely
codified the law established through judicial precedents under the old code. In both
regimes, the co-ownership rule had more than once been repudiated when either or
both spouses suffered from an impediment to marry. From the foregoing, the property
really belonged to the lawful conjugal partnership between Alayo and his true spouse
Juliana.

Agapay v. Agapay
276 SCRA 340
Only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions.
FACTS:
Miguel Palang married Calina Vellesterol with whom he had 1 child. He then contracted his
second marriage with Erlinda Agapay, with whom he had a son. The couple purchased a
parcel of agricultural land and the transfer certificate was issued in their names. She also
purchased a house and lot in Binalonan, where the property was later issued in her name.
Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation, wherein they agreed to donate their
conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their only child, Herminia. Carlina filed a
complaint against Miguel and Erlinda for bigamy.
Miguel died, and Carlina and Herminia instituted an action for recovery of ownership and
possession with damages against Erlinda. They sought to get back the rice land and house
and lot allegedly bought by Miguel during his cohabitation with Erlinda. RTC dismissed the
complaint and ordered the respondents to provide for the intestate shares of the parties,
particularly of Erlinda's son. CA reversed the trial court's decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the properties from Miguel's second marriage be granted to Erlinda.
RULING:
No. SC held that the agricultural land and house and land cannot be granted to Erlinda.
The sale of the rice land was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law
applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a
man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. The
marriage of Miguel and Erlinda was null and void because the earlier marriage of Miguel
and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the latter's de facto separation.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is
required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care
and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as contributions to the
acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or
industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-
ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the
business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade SC that she actually
contributed money to buy the subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of
conveyance, when she was only around 20 of age and Miguel Palang was already 64 and a
pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to
conclude that she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject
property, there being no proof of the same.
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 when
she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed of
conveyance for the property testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for the
purchase price and directed that Erlinda’s name alone be placed as the vendee.
Since Erlinda failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the
riceland, we find no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the
same. Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by the CA, revert to the conjugal
partnership property of the deceased Miguel and Carlina Palang.
The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda was void. Article 87 of
the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between
spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife
without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would
turn out to be better than those in legal union.
As regards to the donation of their conjugal property executed by Miguel and Carlina in
favor of their daughter, was also void. Separation of property between spouses during the
marriage shall not take place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when
there is an express stipulation in the marriage settlements. The judgment which resulted
from the parties’ compromise was not specifically and expressly for separation of property
and should not be so inferred.
Calimlim
Tumlos v. Sps. Fernandez
G.R. No. 137650, April 12, 2000
Art. 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a relationship between a man and a woman who are
not incapacitated to marry each other, or to one in which the marriage of the parties is void
from the beginning.
FACTS:
Fernandez spouses are the absolute owners of an apartment building. At first, they had
allowed the Tumloses to occupy the same without the payment of any rent but they later
agreed that the Tumloses will pay rental. However this agreement was not complied with.
The spouses then demanded the Tumloses to vacate the premises as they are in need of the
property for the construction of a new building; and also demanded payment of unpaid
rentals, but the said demands went unheeded. Therefore, they filed this present action for
ejectment against the Tumloses.
Guillerma Tumlos claims, for her part, that she could not be ejected since she is a co-owner
of the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that she is a
co-vendee of the property together with Mario Fernandez. Guillerma alleged that she and
Mariano had an amorous relationship, and that they acquired the property during their
cohabitation as husband and wife, although without the benefit of marriage.
ISSUES:
Is Guillerma a co-owner of the property?
RULING:
No. We cannot accept petitioner's submission that she is a co-owner of the disputed
property pursuant to Art. 144 of the Civil Code. The applicable law is not Art. 144 of the
Civil Code, but Art. 148 of the Family Code.
Art. 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a relationship between a man and a woman who
are not incapacitated to marry each other, or to one in which the marriage of the parties is
void from the beginning. It does not apply to a cohabitation that amounts to adultery or
concubinage, for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there exists a prior
conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful wife.
Here, Mario Fernandez was incapacitated to marry Guillerma because he was legally
married to Lourdes Fernandez. Also, as admitted by Guillerma, she cohabited with Mario in
a state of concubinage. Therefore, Art. 144 of the Civil Code is inapplicable.
Another consideration militates against Guillerma’s claim that she is a co-owner of the
property. Art. 148 requires actual contribution; if the actual contribution of the party is not
proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares. In this case,
Guillerma fails to present any evidence that she had made an actual contribution to
purchase the subject property. Likewise, her claim of having administered the property
during the cohabitation is unsubstantiated. In any event, this fact by itself does not justify
her claim, for nothing in Art. 148 of the Family Code provides that the administration of the
property amounts to a contribution in its acquisition.
Clearly, there is no basis for Guillerma’s claim of co-ownership. The property in question
belongs to the conjugal partnership of respondents.
Atienza v.de Castro

G.R. No. 1695698, Nov. 29, 2006
Under the property regime governed by Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions…..Proof of actual
contribution is required.
FACTS:
Despite being a married man, petitioner Lupo developed a relationship with respondent
Yolanda and they eventually lived together in consortium. After the birth of their second
child, their relationship turned sour. Lupo filed in the RTC a complaint against Yolanda for
the judicial partition between them of a parcel of land with improvements located in Bel-
Air Subdivision alleging that the subject property was acquired during his union with
Yolanda as common-law husband and wife, hence the property is co-owned by them. Lupo
averred in his complaint that the property in question was acquired by Yolanda using his
exclusive funds and that the title was transferred by the seller in Yolanda’s name without
his knowledge and consent. On the other hand, Yolanda claimed that she acquired the
property using her exclusive funds. RTC ruled that the property are owned in common. CA
reversed the decision ruling that disputed property is exclusively owned by Yolanda.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the disputed property is exclusively owned by Yolanda.
RULING:
YES. Petitioner’s claim of co-ownership in the disputed property is without basis because
not only did he fail to substantiate his alleged contribution in the purchase but likewise the
very trail of documents pertaining to its purchase as evidentiary proof redounds to the
benefit of the respondent. In contrast, aside from his mere say so and voluminous records
of bank accounts, which find no relevance in this case, the petitioner failed to overcome his
burden of proof. Allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence. Petitioner’s evidence in
support of his claim is either insufficient or immaterial to warrant the trial courts finding
that the disputed property falls under the purview of Article 148 of the Family Code. In
contrast to petitioner’s dismal failure to prove his cause, the respondent was able to
present preponderant evidence of her sole ownership. There can clearly be no co-
ownership when, as here, the respondent sufficiently established that she derived the
funds used to purchase the property from her earnings, not only as an accountant but also
as a businesswoman engaged in foreign currency trading, money lending and jewelry retail.

Signey v. SSS
G.R. No. 173582, Jan. 28, 2008
The existence of a prior subsisting marriage between the deceased and Editha is supported by
substantial evidence. Petitioner, who has fully availed of her right to be heard, only relied on
the waiver of Editha and failed to present any evidence to invalidate or otherwise controvert
the confirmed marriage certificate.
FACTS:
Rodolfo Signey Jr. a member of the SSS, died on May 21, 2001. In his member’s records, he
had designated petitioner Yolanda Signey as primary beneficiary and his four children with
her as secondary beneficiaries. Petitioner filed a claim for death benefits with the public
respondent SSS.
She revealed in her SSS claim that the deceased had a common-law wife, Gina Servano, with
whom he had two minor children.
Petitioner’s declaration was confirmed when Gina herself filed a claim for the same death
benefits which declared that Editha Espinosa was the legal wife. In addition, in October
2001, Editha also filed an application for death benefits with the SSS. SSS denied the death
benefit claim of the petitioner and found that the marriage between the deceased and the
petitioner is null and void because of a prior subsisting marriage contracted between the
deceased and Editha as confirmed by the local civil registry of Cebu. However, it recognized
Ginalyn and Rodelyn, the minor children of the deceased with Gina, as the primary
beneficiaries under the SSS Law. Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition with the SSC in
which she attached a waiver of rights executed by Editha whereby the latter waived any/all
claims from Social Security System (SSS), among others due to the deceased Rodolfo Signey
Sr. SSC affirmed the decision of the SSS. The SSC gave more weight to the SSS field
investigation and the confirmed certification of marriage showing that the deceased was
married to Editha, than to the aforestated declarations of Editha in her waiver of rights.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner has a superior legal right over the SSS benefits as against the
illegitimate minor children of the deceased?
RULING:
NO. In the case at bar, the existence of a prior subsisting marriage between the deceased
and Editha is supported by substantial evidence. Petitioner, who has fully availed of her
right to be heard, only relied on the waiver of Editha and failed to present any evidence to
invalidate or otherwise controvert the confirmed marriage certificate registered under LCR
Registry No. 2083 on 21 November 1967. She did not even try to allege and prove any
infirmity in the marriage between the deceased and Editha.
Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her
right thereto by substantial evidence. Since petitioner is disqualified to be a beneficiary and
because the deceased has no legitimate child, it follows that the dependent illegitimate
minor children of the deceased shall be entitled to the death benefits as primary
beneficiaries. The SSS Law is clear that for a minor child to qualify as a dependent, the only
requirements are that he/she must be below 21 years of age, not married nor gainfully
employed.
In this case, the minor illegitimate children Ginalyn and Rodelyn were born on 13 April
1996 and 20 April 2000, respectively. Had the legitimate child of the deceased and Editha
survived and qualified as a dependent under the SSS Law, Ginalyn and Rodelyn would have
been entitled to a share equivalent to only 50% of the share of the said legitimate child.
Since the legitimate child of the deceased predeceased him, Ginalyn and Rodelyn, as the
only qualified primary beneficiaries of the deceased, are entitled to 100% of the benefits.
Dizon
Borromeo v. Descallar
G.R. No. 159310, Feb. 24, 2009
In such an adulterous relationship, no co-ownership exists between the parties. It is necessary

for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property
in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal
contribution do not apply.
FACTS:
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, arrived in the Philippines in 1983. He met Antonietta
Opalla-Descallar, a separated mother of two boys who was working as a waitress. Jambrich
befriended respondent and asked her to tutor him in English. Respondent agreed. They fell
in love and decided to live together.
They transferred to their own house and lots at Agro-Macro Subdivision, Mandaue City. A
Deed of Absolute Sale (DAS) was issued in their favor. However, when the DAS was
presented for registration before the RD, it was refused on the ground that Jambrich was an
alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain. Consequently, Jambrich’s
name was erased from the document but it could be noted that his signature remained. TCT
over the properties were issued in respondent’s name alone. Jambrich also formally
adopted respondent’s two sons. In 1991, they broke up.
Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F. Borromeo in 1986 who was engaged in real estate and
building speedboats. In 1989, Jambrich purchased an engine and some accessories for his
boat from petitioner, for which he became indebted to the latter for about ₱150,000.00. To
pay for his debt, he sold his rights and interests in the Agro-Macro properties to petitioner
for ₱250,000. When petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment, he discovered
that titles to the three lots have been transferred in the name of respondent, and that the
subject property has already been mortgaged.
Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of real property. The RTC
ruled in favour of petitioner which the CA reversed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON Wilhem Jambrich has the authority to transfer all his rights, interests and
participation over the subject properties to petitioner - YES
2. WON the registration of the properties in the name of respondent will be cancelled –
YES.
RULING:
1. Jambrich is the real purchaser of the properties. The evidence clearly shows that it
was Jambrich who possessed the financial capacity at the time of the acquisition of the
properties in 1985 to 1986. Furthermore, in the DSWD Home Study Report (for adoption),
Descallar herself affirmed under oath that Jambrich was the owner of the properties in
question, but that his name was deleted in the Deed of Absolute Sale because of legal
constraints. Nonetheless, his signature remained in the deed of sale, where he signed as
buyer. The money used to pay the subject parcels of land in installments was in postdated
checks issued by Jambrich. Jambrich executed a Last Will and Testament, where he, as
owner, bequeathed the subject properties to respondent.
The fact that the disputed properties were acquired during the couple’s cohabitation also
does not help respondent. The rule that co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but are
otherwise capacitated to marry each other, does not apply. In the instant case, respondent
was still legally married to another when she and Jambrich lived together. In such an
adulterous relationship, no co-ownership exists between the parties. It is necessary for
each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in
order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal
contribution do not apply.
2. The transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich, would

have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the properties to
petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. RTC said that while the acquisition and the purchase of
Wilhelm Jambrich of the properties under litigation werevoid ab initio since they were
contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines, he being a foreigner, yet, the acquisition of
these properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from him, has cured the flaw in the
original transaction and the title of the transferee is valid. The trial court upheld the sale by
Jambrich in favor of petitioner and ordered the cancellation of the TCTs in the name of
respondent.

Heirs of Maramag v. De Guzman
G.R. No. 181132, June 5, 2009
FACTS:
Loreto Maramag designated as beneficiary his concubine Eva de Guzman Maramag Vicenta
Maramag and Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie (heirs of Loreto Maramag) and his
concubine Eva de Guzman Maramag, also suspected in the killing of Loreto and his
illegitimate children are claiming for his insurance. Vicenta alleges that Eva is disqualified
from claiming. RTC ruled that civil code does not apply. However, CA dismissed the case for
lack of jurisdiction for filing beyond reglementary period.
ISSUE:
W/N Eva can claim even though prohibited under the civil code against donation.
HELD:
NO. Any person who is forbidden from receiving any donation under Article 739 cannot be
named beneficiary of a life insurance policy of the person who cannot make any donation
to him.
If a concubine is made the beneficiary, it is believed that the insurance contract will still
remain valid, but the indemnity must go to the legal heirs and not to the concubine, for
evidently, what is prohibited under Art. 2012 is the naming of the improper beneficiary.
It is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary, or when the
designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds, that the insurance
policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured
Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular and Grepalife and, thus,
are not entitled to the proceeds thereof. Accordingly, respondents Insular and Grepalife
have no legal obligation to turn over the insurance proceeds to petitioners. The revocation
of Eva as a beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification as such in another are of no
moment considering that the designation of the illegitimate children as beneficiaries in
Loretos insurance policies remains valid. Because no legal proscription exists in naming as
beneficiaries the children of illicit relationships by the insured,[22] the shares of Eva in the
insurance proceeds, whether forfeited by the court in view of the prohibition on donations
under Article 739 of the Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons based on the
insurance contracts, must be awarded to the said illegitimate children, the designated
beneficiaries, to the exclusion of petitioners. It is only in cases where the insured has not
designated any beneficiary,[23] or when the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to
receive the proceeds,[24] that the insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of
the estate of the insured.
Lacbayan v, Samoy
G.R. No. 165427, March 21, 2011
Until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be
premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties.
FACTS:
Betty Lacbayan and Bayani Samoy’s illicit relationship, they, together with three more
incorporators, were able to establish a manpower services company, by which they
acquired 5 parcels of land, registered in their names, ostensibly as husband and wife.
Having parted ways eventually, both of them agreed to divide the said properties and
terminate their business partnership by executing a partition agreement.
Initially, Samoy agreed to Lacbayan’s proposal that the properties in Malvar St. and Don
Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter, while the ownership over the three other
properties will go to Samoy. However, when Lacbayan wanted additional demands, Samoy
refused.
Thus, Lacbayan filed a complaint for judicial partition of the said properties before the QC
RTC. In his answer however, Samoy denied Lacbayan’s claim of cohabitation and said that
properties were acquired out of his own personal funds without any contribution from her.
ISSUES:
Whether an action for partition precludes a settlement on the issue of ownership.

Whether respondent is estopped from repudiating co-ownership over the subject realties.
RULING:
NO. While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is
premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties.
Petitioner insists she is a co-owner pro indiviso of the five real estate properties based on
the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering the subject properties. Respondent
maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of co-ownership is
definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed
properties. More importantly, the complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner
in this case, does not even have any rightful interest over the subject properties.
A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement indicates that the
document involves matters which necessitate prior settlement of questions of law, basic of
which is a determination as to whether the parties have the right to freely divide among
themselves the subject properties. Moreover, to follow petitioners argument would be to
allow respondent not only to admit against his own interest but that of his legal spouse as
well, who may also be lawfully entitled co-ownership over the said properties. Respondent
is not allowed by law to waive whatever share his lawful spouse may have on the disputed
properties. Basic is the rule that rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law,
public order, public policy, morals, good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a
right recognized by law.
YES. Petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to the Partition Agreement after
seeing the need to amend the same to include other matters. Petitioner does not have any
right to insist on the contents of an agreement she intentionally refused to sign.
Moreover, to follow petitioner’s argument would be to allow respondent not only to admit
against his own interest but that of his legal spouse as well, who may also be lawfully
entitled co-ownership over the said properties.
Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan
G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties
acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions.
FACTS:
Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally Go-Bangayan, after Azucena (his
first wife) left for the US. Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife. Sally then
brought Benjamin to an office in Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage
contract.
After leaving for Canada, Sally filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public
documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence.
Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to
Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin
also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in
accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as administrator of the
properties during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of their children as
illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered properties became the subject of the partition
before the trial court. Aside from the seven properties enumerated by Benjamin in his
petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.
ISSUE:
WON Art. 148 should govern Benjamin and Sally’s property relations
RULING:
YES. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally
is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code.
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, a Registration Officer of the Local Civil
Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage license issued to Benjamin
and Sally. If indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a marriage contract, the marriage was
void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license. As pointed out by the trial court, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in jest" and "a simulated marriage,
at the instance of Sally. Thus, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void
ab initio and non-existent.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties
acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Both
the RTC and the CA correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were
given by Benjamin’s father to his children as advance inheritance.
As regards the 7 remaining properties, only 1 property is registered in the names of

Benjamin and Sally as spouses. There are 2 properties which are in the name of
Benjamin with the descriptive title "married to Sally." And 2 properties which is registered
in the name of Sally with the descriptive title "married to Benjamin" while another 2
properties which are registered in the name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled
that the words "married to" preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the
civil status of the registered owner. Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof
of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under
Article 148 of the Family Code.
Lavadia v. Heirs of Luna
G.R. No. 171914, July 23, 2014
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by
Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first marriage
involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks
competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who
contracts a subsequent marriage.
FACTS:
Atty. Luna, a practicing lawyer, married Eugenia in 1947. Their marriage begot seven
children. After two decades of marriage, Atty. Luna and his wife agreed to live separately as
husband and wife, and executed an Agreement For Separation and Property Settlement”
whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve their conjugal property. On January
2, 1076, Atty. Luna obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with Eugenia from the
Dominican Republic. On the same day, he married Soledad. In 1977, Atty. Luna organized a
new law firm with several other lawyers. The new law office thru Atty. Luna obtained a
condominium unit which they bought on an installment basis. After full payment, the
condominium title was registered in the names of the lawyers with pro-indivisio shares.
When the law office was dissolved, the condominium title was still registered in the names
of the owners, with Atty.Luna’s share fixed at 25/100. Atty. Luna established a new law
firm with Atty. Dela Cruz. After Atty.Luna’s death in 1997, his share in the condominium
unit, his law books and furniture were taken over by Gregorio, his son in the first marriage.
His 25/100 share in the condominium was also rented out to Atty. Dela Cruz. Soledad, the
second wife, then filed a complaint against the heirs of Atty. Luna. According to her, the
properties were acquired by Atty. Luna and her during their marriage, and because they
had no children, 3/4 of the property became hers, 1/2 being her share in the net estate, and
the other half bequeathed to her in a last will and testament of Atty. Luna. The RTC ruled
against her, and awarded the properties to the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first marriage,
except for the foreign law books, which were ordered turned over to her. Both parties
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals modified the RTC judgment by
awarding all the properties, including the law books to the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first
marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce decree between Atty. Luna and Eugenia was valid, which will
decide who among the contending parties were entitled to the properties left behind by
Atty. Luna.
RULING:
No, divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia was void and ineffectual under the nationality
rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of
the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a
foreign country lacks competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the
assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.
Given the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the
presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of his own personal funds and
effort remained. It should then be justly concluded that the properties in litis legally
pertained to their conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of his death. Consequently,
the sole ownership of the 25/100pro indiviso share of Atty. Luna in the condominium unit,
and of the law books pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.
Jairus Vincent Z. Bernardez

Tambuyat v. Tambuyat
G.R. No. 202805, March 23, 2015
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that [common law marriages]
are present in our society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests
which is governed by law, authority exists to the effect that such form of co-ownership
requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to
contract marriage.
FACTS:
Adriano Tambuyat was married to Wenifreda Balcom-Tambuyat (respondent). During

their marriage, Adriano bought a property located in Bulacan. The deed of sale was signed
by Adriano as vendee and Rosario Banguis-Tambuyat (petitioner) as witness. However,
when the Transfer Certificate of Title was issued, it was made under the name of “ADRIANO
M. TAMBUYAT married to ROSARIO E. BANGUIS.”
When Adriano died, respondent filed a Petition to cancel the TCT and prayed that a new
one be issued indicating her to be Adriano’s spouse. She presented in evidence contract of
marriage evidencing her marriage with Adriano. She also presented another contract of
marriage evidencing petitioner’s marriage with Eduardo Nolasco. In her defense, Rosario
contended that she co-owned the property with Adriano since the same was bought using
her own funds and during her cohabitation with Adriano.
ISSUE:
Whether Rosario co-owned the property together with Adriano
RULING:
No. Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not
legally married who publicly cohabit for many years as husband and wife may be
considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. While it
is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in
our society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is
governed by law, authority exists to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that
the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract
marriage. In this case, there can be no co-ownership between Adriano and Rosario in view
of the subsisting marriage of Adriano to respondent.
Moreover, Rosario failed to prove that the subject property belongs to her exclusively. She
failed to support her claim that she alone paid the property. On the contrary, she
acknowledges that Adriano is a co-owner thereof, thus implying that he contributed to its
acquisition. Such contradicting assertions cast serious doubts on her claim. If she really
were the owner of the property, it would be logical that her name be included as co-vendee
and not as witness.

Fullido v. Grilli
G.R. No. 215014, February 29, 2016
In Llantino v. Co Liong Chong, however, the Court clarified that a lease contract in favor of
aliens for a reasonable period was valid as long as it did not have any scheme to circumvent
the constitutional prohibition, such as depriving the lessors of their right to dispose of the
land.
FACTS:
Grilli, an Italian national, met Fullido in Bohol and courted her. Grilli decided to build a
residential house. He financially assisted Fullido in procuring a lot from her parents. They
constructed a house funded by Grilli and upon completion, they maintained a common law
relationship and live there whenever Grilli was on vacation in the Philippines.
Grilli and Fullido executed a contract of lease, memorandum of agreement, and a special
power of attorney to define their rights over the house and lot. It stipulated among others
that Grilli, as lessee, would rent the lot registered in Fullido’s name for 50 years. Fullido, as
lessor, was prohibited from selling, donating or encumbering the lot with written consent
of Grilli. The SPA allowed Fullido to administer, manage and transfer the property.
Their relationship turned sour after 16 years. They could not agree on who should leave
the property. Grilli sent formal demand letters to Fullido, demanding her to vacate the
property. Grilli then filed a complaint for unlawful detainer with a [rayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction. When he discovered that Fullido was pregnant, he allowed
Fullido to stay in the house without rent even if the child wasn’t his. She let he 2 children,
siblings and parents stay. He lost his personal belongings in the house and Fullido and her
family was hostile towards him. When he asked her to leave, she refused.
The MCTC dismissed the complaint as Fullido was a co-owner who cannot be ejected. RTC
reversed the ruling, holding that Grilli had the exclusive right to use and possess the
property by virtue of the contract of lease. CA upheld RTC’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Grilli can compel Fullido to vacate the property.
RULING:
The prohibition on the transfer of lands to aliens was adopted in the present 1987
Constitution, under Sections 2, 3 and 7 of Article XII thereof. Agricultural lands, whether
public or private, include residential, commercial and industrial lands. The purpose of
prohibiting the transfer of lands to foreigners is to uphold the conservation of our national
patrimony and ensure that agricultural resources remain in the hands of Filipino citizens.
The prohibition, however, is not limited to the sale of lands to foreigners. It also covers
leases of lands amounting to the transfer of all or substantially all the rights of dominion. if
an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land by virtue of
which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property, this to last for 50
years, then it becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of
ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy the
land but also of the right to dispose of it — rights which constitute ownership. If this can be
done, then the Constitutional ban against alien landholding in the Philippines, is indeed in
grave peril.
The Court finds that the lease contract and the MOA in the present case are null and void
for virtually transferring the reigns of the land to a foreigner.
As can be gleaned from the contract, the lease in favor of Grilli was for a period of fifty (50)
years, automatically extended for another fifty (50) years upon the expiration of the
original period. Moreover, it strictly prohibited Fullido from selling, donating, or
encumbering her land to anyone without the written consent of Grilli. For a measly
consideration of P10,000.00, Grilli would be able to absolutely occupy the land of Fullido
for 100 years, and she is powerless to dispose the same. The terms of lease practically
deprived Fullido of her property rights and effectively transferred the same to Grilli.
The title of Fullido over the land became an empty and useless vessel, visible only in paper,
and was only meant as a dummy to fulfill a foreigner’s desire to own land within our soils.
It is disturbing how these documents were methodically formulated to circumvent the
constitutional prohibition against land ownership by foreigners. The said contracts
attempted to guise themselves as a lease, but a closer scrutiny of the same revealed that
they were intended to transfer the dominion of a land to a foreigner in violation of Section
7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Even if Fullido voluntary executed the same, no
amount of consent from the parties could legalize an unconstitutional agreement. The lease
contract and the MOA do not deserve an iota of validity and must be rightfully struck down
as null and void for being repugnant to the fundamental law. These void documents cannot
be the source of rights and must be treated as mere scraps of paper.
XII. THE FAMILY, FC 149- 151, NCC 2035

Tribiana v. Tribiana
G.R. No. 137359, Sept. 13, 2004
Mere failure to allege compliance with Article 151 of the Family Code does not warrant the
dismissal of the case. The complaint must be amended accordingly.
FACTS:
Edwin and Lourdes were husband and wife. They have been living together as husband and
wife from 1996, and decided to formalize their union in 1997. They were blessed with a
daughter, Khriza. In 1998, Lourdes filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus against Edwin, alleging that the latter has deprived her of custody of their daughter.
It was later discovered that Edwin’s mother had custody of Khriza.
Edwin filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Lourdes failed to allege that there were
earnest efforts of compromise were made before filing the petition. Both the RTC and CA
denied the motion to dismiss, since there were earnest efforts and that said requirement is
not necessary in petitions of habeas corpus.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial and appellate courts should have dismissed the petition for habeas
corpus on the ground of failure to comply with the condition precedent under Article 151
of the Family Code.
RULING:
NO.
Lourdes has complied with the condition precedent under Article 151 of the Family
Code. A dismissal under Section 1(j) of Rule 16 is warranted only if there is a failure to
comply with a condition precedent. Given that the alleged defect is a mere failure to allege
compliance with a condition precedent, the proper solution is not an outright dismissal of
the action, but an amendment under Section 1 of Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. It would have been a different matter if Edwin had asserted that no efforts to
arrive at a compromise have been made at all.
Hiyas Savings v. Acuña

G.R. No. 154132, August 31, 2006
Once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family, the law no
longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a compromise
before the action can prosper.
FACTS:
Alberto Moreno filed with the RTC a complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank
(Hiyas), his wife Remedios, the spouses Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for
cancellation of mortgage contending that he did not secure any loan from Hiyas, nor did he
sign or execute any contract of mortgage in its favor; that his wife, acting in conspiracy with
Hiyas and the spouses Owe, who were the ones that benefited from the loan, made it
appear that he signed the contract of mortgage; that he could not have executed the said
contract because he was then working abroad.
Hiyas filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Moreno failed to comply with Article
151 of the Family Code (FC) wherein it is provided that no suit between members of the
same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition
that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed.
Moreno argues that in cases where one of the parties is not a member of the same family as
contemplated under Article 150 of FC, failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts
toward a compromise had been made by the plaintiff before filing the complaint is not a
ground for a motion to dismiss. RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. As aptly pointed out in
Magbaleta v. Gonong, if one of the parties is a stranger, failure to allege in the complaint
that earnest efforts towards a compromise had been made by plaintiff before filing the
complaint, is not a ground for motion to dismiss.
ISSUE:
Whether or not lack of earnest efforts toward a compromise is not a ground for a motion to
dismiss in suits between husband and wife when other parties who are strangers to the
family are involved in the suit.
RULING:
Once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family, the law no
longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a compromise
before the action can prosper. The Court finds no cogent reason why the ruling in
Magbaleta should not equally apply to suits involving husband and wife. Hiyas claim that
the present case involves a husband and his wife while Magbaleta is a case between
brothers. However, the Court finds no specific, unique, or special circumstance that would
make the ruling in Magbaleta cases inapplicable to suits involving a husband and his wife,
as in the present case. In the first place, Article 151 of FC and Article 222 of the Civil Code
are clear that the provisions therein apply to suits involving "members of the same family"
as contemplated under Article 150 of the FC, to wit:
ART. 150. Family relations include those: (1) Between husband and wife; (2) Between
parents and children; (3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and (4) Among
brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
Suffice it to say that since the Court has ruled that the requirement under Article 151 of the
Family Code is applicable only in cases which are exclusively between or among members
of the same family, it necessarily follows that the same may be invoked only by a party who
is a member of that same family.
XIII. FAMILY HOME, FC 152-162 [exclude FC 157, 161, 162]
Jacinto
Patricio v. Dario
G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006
If there are beneficiaries who survive living in the family home, it will continue for ten years,
unless at the expiration of the ten years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in which case the
family home continues until that beneficiary becomes of age. However, the three (3) requisites
to be considered as a beneficiary of a family home must be met.
FACTS:
In 1987, Marcelino Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife Perla Patricio, and two
sons, Marcelino Marc and private respondent Marcelino III. One of the properties he left
was a parcel of land with a residential house and pre-school building. The three heirs
extrajudicially settled the estate of Marcelino Dario. Thereafter, Patricio and Marcelino
Marc informed private respondent of their intent to terminate the co-ownership by
partitioning the same. Private respondent refused which forced the two to institute an
action for partition. Private respondent contends that since his son Marcelino Lorenzo IV, a
minor, is still residing at the family home, the subject property cannot be subject to
partition.
ISSUE:
Whether partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners refuse to
accede to such partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said
home.
RULING:
Yes, partition in this case is proper. To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites
must concur: (1) they must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the
Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support
upon the head of the family.
Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the beneficiaries of a family home: (1)
The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their
parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be
legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head
of the family for legal support.
Article 159, Family Code provides that the family home shall continue despite the death of
one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or for as
long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the
court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns
the property or constituted the family home.
Marcelino IV falls within the definition of a beneficiary of a family home as a descendant,

specifically the grandchild of the decedent. He also complied with the second qualification,
for he is actually living in the family home. However, he is not dependent for legal support
to his grandparents (decedent and Patricio), but is actually dependent upon his own father,
Marcelino III.
Joaquin
Arriola v. Arriola
G.R. No. 177703, January 28, 2008
Even if the family home has passed by succession to the co-ownership of the heirs, or has been
willed to any one of them, this fact alone cannot transform the family home into an ordinary
property, much less dispel the protection cast upon it by the law.
FACTS:
Respondent filed Special Civil Action petitioners for judicial partition of the properties of
decedent Fidel Arriola. Respondent is the son of Fidel with his first wife while petitioner is
the son of Fidel with his second wife. As the parties failed to agree on how to partition
among them the land respondent sought its sale through public auction. However, it had to
be reset when petitioners refused to include in the auction the subject house standing on
the subject land.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject house and land should be included in the public auction.
RULING:
No, since it is considered as a Family Home and the same is shielded from immediate
partition under Art. 159. There are restrictions on its partition: first, that the heirs cannot
extra-judicially partition it for a period of 10 years from the death of one or both spouses or
of the unmarried head of the family, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor
beneficiary residing therein; and second, that the heirs cannot judicially partition it during
the aforesaid periods unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. No compelling
reason has been alleged by the parties; nor has the RTC found any compelling reason.
Article 159 imposes the proscription against the immediate partition of the family home
regardless of its ownership. This signifies that even if the family home has passed by
succession to the co-ownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any one of them, this fact
alone cannot transform the family home into an ordinary property, much less dispel the
protection cast upon it by the law.
A claim for exception from execution or forced sale under Article 153 should be set up and
proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Herein petitioners
timely objected to the inclusion of the subject house although for a different reason.
Jore, Ma. Jovi P.

Modequillo v. Breva (1990)
185 SCRA 766
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time
it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extra-
judicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is,
therefore, a family home as contemplated by law.
FACTS:
Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay were ordered to pay jointly and severally for damages
arising from a vehicular accident killing Salinas and injuring Culan. As the said judgment
became final, a writ of execution was issued by the RTC of Davao to satisfy judgment on the
goods and chattels of the Modequillo and Malubay.
On 07 July 1988, the sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land registered in the name of
now herein petitioner Modequillo. The latter filed a motion to quash the levy of execution
alleging therein that the residential land is where the family home is built in 1969 and that
such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment, provided in Articles 152 and 153
of the Family Code. However, in 1988, the RTC denied the motion. A Motion for
Reconsideration was filed thereof but was again denied. Hence, the present case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the subject property is deemed to be a family home.

2. Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the money judgment?
RULING:
1. Yes, the subject property is deemed to be a family home. It was not constituted as a
family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code but it became a
family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed
constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it
was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well- taken. Under Article 162 of
the Family Code, it is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern
existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable." It does not mean that
Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family
residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for
the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162
simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family
Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded
to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the provisions of
Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
2. No, the family home is not exempt from the money judgment. The debt or liability
which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular
accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by
the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code
on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in
the Family Code.
Ko, Nikki Mei Q.

Cabang v. Basay
G.R. No. 180587, March 20, 2009
There can be no question that a family home is generally exempt from execution, provided it
was duly constituted as such. It is likewise a given that the family home must be constituted on
property owned by the persons constituting it.
FACTS:
Deceased Felix Odong (Odong) was the registered owner of Lot No. 7777 located in Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur. However, Odong and his heirs never occupied nor took possession of
the lot.
Plaintiff-appellants (Cabang) bought said real property from the heirs of Odong. The latter
also did not occupy the said property. Sps. Basay, on the other hand, had been in
continuous, open, peaceful and adverse possession of the same parcel of land since 1956 up
to the present. They were the awardees in the cadastral proceedings. During the said
cadastral proceedings, Basay claimed Lot No. 7778 on the belief that the area they were
actually occupying was Lot No. 7778. As it turned out, however, when the Municipality of
Molave relocated the townsite a big portion of Lot No. 7778 was used by the government as
a public road and as there were many discrepancies in the areas occupied, it was then
discovered that defendant-appellees were actually occupying Lot No. 7777.
During the hearing, Cabangs offer to pay P21,000.00 for the improvement of the lot in
question was rejected by Basays. The court a quo disclosed its difficulty in resolving
whether or not the houses may be subject of an order of execution it being a family home.
Cabangs filed their Manifestation alleging therein that defendant-appellees refused to
accept payment of the improvements thus, they should now be ordered to remove said
improvements at their expense.
Respondents thereafter elevated their cause to the appellate court.
ISSUE:
Whether the subject property is a duly constituted family home which is not subject to
execution.
RULING:
There can be no question that a family home is generally exempt from execution, provided
it was duly constituted as such. It is likewise a given that the family home must be
constituted on property owned by the persons constituting it. In the case at bar, the
property is owned by the Cabangs.
As defined, "[T]he family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of
cherished memories that last during one’s lifetime. It is the dwelling house where the
husband and wife, or an unmarried head of a family reside, including the land on which it is
situated.
The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is occupied as a family residence.
From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides
therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
There can be no question that a family home is generally exempt from execution, provided
it was duly constituted as such. It is likewise a given that the family home must be
constituted on property owned by the persons constituting it.

Ramos v. Pangilinan
G.R. 185920, July 20, 2010
For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law
applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by
the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege and on both instances, the
exemption must be proved.
FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a
company owned by Ernesto M. Ramos (Ramos), the patriarch of herein petitioners. The
labor arbiter ordered Ramos and the company to pay the respondents’ back-wages,
separation pay, 13th month pay & service incentive leave pay. The decision became final
and executory so a writ of execution was issued which the Deputy Sheriff of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) implemented by levying a property in Ramos’ name
situated in Pandacan. Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family home, hence,
exempt from execution to satisfy the judgment award, Ramos and the company moved to
quash the writ of execution. Respondents argued that it is not the family home there being
another one in Antipolo and that the Pandacan address is actually the business address.
The motion was denied and the appeal was likewise denied by the NLRC. Ramos and the
company appealed to the Court of Appeals during the pendency of which Ramos died and
was substituted by herein petitioners. The appellate court, in denying petitioners’ appeal,
held that the Pandacan property was not exempted from execution, for while “Article 153
of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot
from the time it is occupied as a family residence, it did not mean that the article has a
retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been
constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the levy upon the Pandacan property was valid.
HELD
YES. The general rule is that the family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable
and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is
situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which
must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors
except in certain special cases.
For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law
applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by
the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are
applicable.
If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before
August 3, 1988, then it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as
provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. Meanwhile, extrajudicial
constitution is governed by Articles 240 to 242.
On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extra judicially or judicially, and the
exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its
beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually resides therein. Moreover, the family home should
belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse,
its constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed
certain amounts depending upon the area where it is located. Further, the debts incurred
for which the exemption does not apply as provided under Art. 155 for which the family
home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. In both instances,
the claim for exemption must be proved. In the present case, since petitioners claim that
the family home was constituted prior to August 3, 1988, or as early as 1944, they must
comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code. There being absolutely no proof
that the Pandacan property was judicially or extra judicially constituted as the Ramos’
family home, the law protecting the family home cannot apply thereby making the levy
upon the Pandacan property valid.

Equitable v. OJ Mark Trading Inc.
G.R. No. 165950, August 11 2010
“We note that the claim of exemption under Art. 153 of the Family Code, thereby raising issue
on the mortgaged condominium unit being a family home and not corporate property, is
entirely inconsistent with the clear contractual agreement of the
REM. Assuming arguendo that the mortgaged condominium unit constitutes respondents
family home, the same will not exempt it from foreclosure as Article 155 (3) of the
same Code allows the execution or forced sale of a family home for debts secured by
mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution. Respondents thus failed to show
an ostensible right that needs protection of the injunctive writ. Clearly, the appellate court
seriously erred in sustaining the trial courts orders granting respondents application for
preliminary injunction.”
FACTS:
Respondent-spouses Oscar and Evangeline Martinez obtained loans from petitioner

Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. in the aggregate amount of Four Million Forty-Eight Thousand
Eight Hundred Pesos (P4, 048,800.00). As security for the said amount, a Real Estate
Mortgage was executed over a condominium unit in San Miguel Court, Valle Verde 5, Pasig
City, Metro Manila where the spouse are residing.
Respondent Oscar Martinez signed the REM both as principal debtor and as President of
the registered owner and third-party mortgagor, respondent OJ-Mark Trading, Inc. The
REM was annotated on Condominium Certificate of Title No. PT-21363 of the Registry of
Deeds of Pasig City. The Spouses defaulted in the payment of their outstanding loan
obligation. In a letter, they offered to settle their indebtedness “with the assignment to the
Bank of a commercial lot of corresponding value and also requested for re-computation at
a lower interest rate and condonation of penalties. While the Bank’s officers held a meeting
with Mr. Martinez, he failed to submit the required documents such as certificates of title
and tax declarations so that the bank can evaluate his proposal to pay the mortgage debt
via dacion en pago.
Consequently, the Bank initiated the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate Mortgage.
The Spouses filed a civil action for “Temporary Restraining Order (‘TRO’), Injunction and
Annulment of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale” in the RTC of Pasig City, which the RTC
granted by issuing a TRO for 20 days. In their Complaint with Application for Temporary
Restraining Order, Respondents sought to enjoin the impending foreclosure sale alleging
that the same was hasty, premature, unreasonable and unwarranted, and also claiming
defects in the execution of the REM. Respondents imputed bad faith on the part of
petitioner who did not officially inform them of the denial or disapproval of their proposal
to settle the loan obligation by "dacion via assignment of a commercial property."
Respondent’s maintained that aside from the REM being illegally notarized, incomplete and
unenforceable, the obligation subject thereof had been extinguished by the dacion proposal
considering that the value of the property offered was more than sufficient to pay for
the mortgage debt.
It was further averred that the subject property is being used and occupied by respondent-
spouses as a family home. The Spouses on the other hand claims that the said unit being a
Family Home is exempt from foreclosure as provided under Art. 153 of the Family Code
and that if the injunctive relief would not be granted, they will suffer an irreparable injury,
as well as their children. It is alleged by the petitioner Equitable Bank that while the
condominium unit is supposedly a family home, it is admittedly owned by the corporation
and not by the conjugal partnership or absolute community of the Spouses and that even
assuming that OJ-Mark Trading, Inc. is a family corporation, the Spouses’ stance
contravenes the established rule that properties registered in the name of the corporation
are owned by it as an entity separate and distinct from its members or stockholders.
The RTC granted the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. The CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents have shown a clear legal right to enjoin the foreclosure
and public auction of the third-partymortgagor’s property (which is being used as family
home) while the case for annulment of REM on said property is being tried.
HELD:
NO. The claim of exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code, thereby raising issue on
the mortgaged condominium unit being a family home and not corporate property, is
entirely inconsistent with the clear contractual agreement of the REM. Assuming arguendo
that the mortgaged condominium unit constitutes respondents’ family home, the same will
not exempt it from foreclosure as Article 155 (3) of the same Code allows the execution or
forced sale of a family home “for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before
or after such constitution.”
Macuha
De Mesa v. Asero (2011)
Rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from execution:
First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August
3, 1988 must be constituted as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance
with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from execution;
Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988 are automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from execution from the
time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein;
Third, family residences which were not judicially orextrajudicially constituted as a family
home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter, are considered
as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to
a family home under the Family Code.
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family
Code is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed
not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction. It
is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is
a family home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff.
FACTS:
On April 17, 1984 petitioner spouses Araceli and Ernesto De Mesa jointly purchased a
parcel of land in Bulacan while they were still merely cohabiting before their marriage. A
house was constructed in the said property which the petitioners then occupied as their
family home after they got married sometime in January 1987.
In September 1988, Aracelli obtained a loan from Claudio D. Acero, Jr. in the amount of
100,000 pesos which was secured by a mortgage over the subject property. As payment,
Araceli issued a check drawn against China Banking Corporation payable to Claudio. The
said check was dishonored when it was presented for payment as the account from which
it was drawn had already been closed. The petitioners failed to heed Claudio’s subsequent
demand for payment.
On April 26, 1990 respondent Claudio Acero filed a complaint for violation of (B.P. 22)
against the petitioners. On October 21, 1992, the RTC acquitted the petitioners but
ordered them to pay Claudio the amount of P100,000 from the date of demand until fully
paid.
On March 15, 1993, a writ of execution was issued and Sheriff Felixberto Samonte levied
upon the subject property. On March 9, 1994, the said property was sold on a public
auction. Claudio D. Acero Jr., being the highest bidder, acquired the ownership of a parcel of
land formerly owned by petitioners Araceli Oliva-De Mesa and Ernesto S. De Mesa (Spouses
De Mesa).. Thereafter, respondents Acero and his wife Rufina (Spouses Acero) leased the
subject property to its former owners who then defaulted in the payment of the
rent. Unable to collect the rentals due, Spouses Acero filed a complaint for ejectment with
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) against Spouses De Mesa. The MTC ruled in Spouses
Acero’s favor.
In their defense, Spouses De Mesa filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
seeking to nullify TCT No. T-221755 (M) on the basis that the subject property is a family
home which is exempt from execution under the Family Code, and thus, could have not
been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying their unpaid loan. However, the RTC
dismissed their complaint. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC’s Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property, as a family home, may be subject to execution in this
case.
HELD:
YES, the subject property is family home but is subject to execution.In general, the family
home is exempt from execution. However, the person claiming this privilege must assert it
at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter.
Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987 when
Spouses De Mesa got married. There was no showing, however, that the same was judicially
or extrajudicially constituted as a family home in accordance with the provisions of the
Civil Code. Still, when the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property
became a family home by operation of law and was thus prospectively exempt from
execution. The petitioners were thus correct in asserting that the subject property was
a family home.
Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home and, thus, should have been
exempt from execution, Spouses De Mesa should have asserted the subject property being
a family home and its being exempted from execution at the time it was levied or within a
reasonable time thereafter. They are stopped from claiming the exemption of the property
from execution.
Magaoay
Fortaleza v. Lapitan
G.R. 178288, August 15, 2012
As a rule, the family home is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment. However,
Article 155(3) of the Family Code explicitly allows the forced sale of a family home "for debts
secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution."
FACTS:
Spouses Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza (spouses Fortaleza) obtained a loan from spouses
Rolando and Amparo Lapitan (creditors) in the amount of P1.2 million subject to 34%
interest per annum. As security, spouses Fortaleza executed on January 28, 1998 a Deed of
Real Estate Mortgage over their residential house and lot and registered under TCT No. T-
412512.
When spouses Fortaleza failed to pay the indebtedness including the interests and
penalties, the creditors applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage.
The public auction sale was set on May 9, 2001. At the sale, the creditors son Dr. Raul
Lapitan and his wife Rona (spouses Lapitan) emerged as the highest bidders with the bid
amount of P2.5 million. Then, they were issued a Certificate of Sale which was registered
and annotated at the back of TCT No. T-412512. The one-year redemption period expired
without the spouses Fortaleza redeeming the mortgage. Thus, spouses Lapitan executed an
affidavit of consolidation of ownership on November 20, 2003 and caused the cancellation
of TCT No. T-412512 and the registration of the subject property in their names under TCT
No. T-535945 on February 4, 2004. Despite the foregoing, the spouses Fortaleza refused
spouses Lapitan s formal demand to vacate and surrender possession of the subject
property.
On August 27, 2004, spouses Lapitan filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of writ of
possession as new registered owners of the subject property. In their opposition, spouses
Fortaleza questioned the validity of the real estate mortgage and the foreclosure sale. They
argued that the mortgage was void because the creditors bloated the principal amount by
the imposition of exorbitant interest. Spouses Fortaleza added that the foreclosure
proceeding was invalid for non-compliance with the posting requirement. The RTC
ordered the issuance of a writ of possession explaining that it is a ministerial duty of the
court especially since the redemption period had expired and a new title had already been
issued in the name of the spouses Lapitan, Spouses Fortaleza moved for
reconsideration, claiming that the subject property is their family home and is exempt from
foreclosure sale.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property is exempt from forced sale because it is a family home.
RULING:
No, spouses Fortaleza’s argument that the subject property is exempt from forced sale
because it is a family home deserves scant consideration. As a rule, the family home is
exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment. However, Article 155(3) of the Family
Code explicitly allows the forced sale of a family home "for debts secured by mortgages on
the premises before or after such constitution." In this case, there is no doubt that spouses
Fortaleza voluntarily executed on January 28, 1998 a deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the
subject property which was even notarized by their original counsel of record. And
assuming that the property is exempt from forced sale, spouses Fortaleza did not set up
and prove to the Sheriff such exemption from forced sale before it was sold at the public
auction.
Merrera
Eulogio v. Bell
G.R. No. 186322, July 08, 2015
It has been said that the family home is a real right that is gratuitous, inalienable and free
from attachment. The family home cannot be seized by creditors except in special cases.
Certainly, the humane considerations for which the law surrounds the family home with
immunities from levy do not include the intent to enable debtors to thwart the just claims of
their creditors.
FACTS:
The Complaint sought the annulment of the contract of sale executed by Spouses Bell over
their 329-sqm. residential house and lot, as well as the cancellation of the title obtained by
petitioners by virtue of the Deed.
RTC issued a Writ of Execution, as a result of which respondents’ property covered by the
newly reconstituted TCT was levied on execution. Upon motion by respondents, the trial
court ordered the lifting of the writ of execution on the ground that the property was a
family home.
The CA ruled that the RTC Decision, which had become final and executory, only declared
respondents’ house and lot as a family home. Still, the CA found that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the execution sale of the subject family
home after finding that its present value exceeded the statutory limit. The basis for the
valuation of a family home under Art. 160, according to the CA, is its actual value at the
time of its constitution and not the market/present value; therefore, the trial court’s order
was contrary to law. Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents’ family home may be sold on execution under Art. 160 of the
FC.
RULING:
No. The trial court had already determined with finality that the property was a family
home, and there was no proof that its value had increased beyond the statutory limit due to
voluntary improvements by respondents. Yet, it ordered the execution sale of the property.
It has been said that the family home is a real right that is gratuitous, inalienable and free
from attachment. The great controlling purpose and policy of the Constitution is the
protection or the preservation of the homestead — the dwelling place. A houseless,
homeless population is a burden upon the energy, industry, and morals of the community
to which it belongs. No greater calamity, not tainted with crime, can befall a family than to
be expelled from the roof under which it has been gathered and sheltered. The family home
cannot be seized by creditors except in special cases.
The exemption of the family home from execution, forced sale or attachment is limited to
P300,000 in urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas, unless those maximum values are
adjusted by law. If it is shown, though, that those amounts do not match the present value
of the peso because of currency fluctuations, the amount of exemption shall be based on the
value that is most favorable to the constitution of a family home. Any amount in excess of
those limits can be applied to the payment of any of the obligations specified in Arts. 155
and 160.
Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by the persons

constituting it, its owners, or any of its beneficiaries will still be exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment provided the following conditions obtain: (a) the actual value of
the property at the time of its constitution has been determined to fall below the statutory
limit; and (b) the improvement or enlargement does not result in an increase in its value
exceeding the statutory limit. Otherwise, the family home can be the subject of a forced
sale, and any amount above the statutory limit is applicable to the obligations under Arts.
155 and 160. Certainly, the humane considerations for which the law surrounds the family
home with immunities from levy do not include the intent to enable debtors to thwart the
just claims of their creditors.
To warrant the execution sale of respondents’ family home under Art. 160, petitioners
needed to establish these facts: (1) there was an increase in its actual value; (2) the
increase resulted from voluntary improvements on the property introduced by the persons
constituting the family home, its owners or any of its beneficiaries; and (3) the increased
actual value exceeded the maximum allowed under Article 157. During the execution
proceedings, none of those facts was alleged — much less proven — by petitioners. The
sole evidence presented was the Deed of Sale, but the trial court had already determined
with finality that the contract was null, and that the actual transaction was an equitable
mortgage.
XIV. PATERNITY AND FILIATION
A. Concept of paternity, filiation and legitimacy, FC 163

B. LEGITIMATE CHILDREN, FC 164
Palafox
Angeles v. Maglaya
469 SCRA 363
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove
the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and
child.
The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 FC may be availed only upon convincing
proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the childs parents were legally married and that
his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage.
Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered as validating proof of paternity

and as an instrument of recognition, must be signed by the father and mother jointly, or by
the mother alone if the father refuses.
FACTS:
On March 25, 1998, respondent filed a petition for letters of administration and her
appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco M. Angeles before RTC
Caloocan. In the petition, respondent alleged that Francisco died intestate leaving 4 parcels
of land and a building. She is the sole legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado,
and together with petitioner, decedent’s wife by his 2nd marriage, are the surviving heirs of
the decedent.
Petitioner opposed the petition and prayed that she, instead of respondent, be made the
administratrix of Francisco’s estate. She alleged that at the time of their marriage, Francisco
represented in their marriage contract that he was single. She also averred that respondent
could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Francisco’s
legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him and also
respondent, despite her claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva, has
not presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any
acceptable document to prove such union.
Respondent, testified having been born on November 20, 1939 as the legitimate child of
Francisco and Genoveva, have been in open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child. She also offered in evidence her birth certificate which contained an entry
stating that she was born to Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado and whereon the
handwritten word Yes appears on the question Legitimate?.
Eventually, RTC finding that respondent failed to prove her filiation as legitimate child of
Francisco, dismissed the petition. It also dismissed respondent’s MR.
On appeal, CA reversed and set aside RTC’s order of dismissal and directed it to appoint
respondent as administratrix of the estate of Francisco. Also, CA ruled that respondent has
sufficiently established her legitimate filiation with Francisco.
ISSUE:
WON respondent is a legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva.
RULING:
SC are unable to lend concurrence to CA’s conclusion on the legitimate status of
respondent, or on her legitimate filiation to the decedent. Article 164 FC cannot be more
emphatic on the matter: Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are
legitimate.
It seems that both RTC and CA have regrettably overlooked the universally recognized
presumption on legitimacy. There is no presumption of the law more firmly established
and founded on sounder morality and more convincing than the presumption that children
born in wedlock are legitimate. And well-settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy
cannot be attacked collaterally.
A party in whose favor the legal presumption exists may rely on and invoke such legal
presumption to establish a fact in issue. He need not introduce evidence to prove that fact.
For, a presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed. However, it cannot be over-
emphasized, that while a fact thus prima facie established by legal presumption shall,
unless overthrown, stand as proved, the presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 FC may
be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the childs parents
were legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of
that marriage. Else, the presumption of law that a child is legitimate does not arise.
Petitioner, however, contends, citing jurisprudence, that it was error for CA to have ruled
that respondent’s Birth Certificate indubitably establishes that she is the legitimate
daughter of Francisco and Genoveva who are legally married.
The contention commends itself for concurrence. The reason is as simple as it is

elementary: the Birth Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco against whom
legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by Genoveva. It was signed by the attending
physician, one Rebecca De Guzman, who certified to having attended the birth of a child.
Such certificate, albeit considered a public record of a private document is, under Sec. 23,
Rule 132 ROC, evidence only of the fact which gave rise to its execution: the fact of birth of
a child.
It cannot be over-emphasized that the legitimate filiation of a child is a matter fixed by law
itself. It cannot, as the decision under review seems to suggest, be made dependent on the
declaration of the attending physician or midwife, or that of the mother of the newborn
child. For then, an unwed mother, with or without the participation of a doctor or midwife,
could veritably invest legitimate status to her offspring through the simple expedient of
writing the putative fathers name in the appropriate space in the birth certificate. A long
time past, SC cautioned against according a similar unsigned birth certificate prima facie
evidentiary value of filiation.
In the case at bench, other than the self-serving declaration respondent, there is nothing in
the record to support her claim that she is indeed a legitimate child of Francisco and
Genoveva. In other words, Francisco was never married before or at anytime prior to his
marriage to Belen Sagad, contrary to the claim of respondent that Francisco M. Angeles and
Genoveva Y. Mercado were married in 1938.
SSS v. Aguas
G.R. 165546, Feb. 27, 2006
There presumption that children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are
legitimate is conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access
between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the
birth of the child.
FACTS:
Pablo Aguas, a member and pensioner of the SSS died. Pablo’s surviving spouse, Rosanna
H. Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits on indicating in her claim that Pablo
was survived by his minor child, Jeylnn. Her claim for monthly pension was settled.SSS
received a sworn from Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac, Pablo’s sister, contesting Rosanna’s claim
for death benefits. She alleged that Rosanna abandoned the family abode approximately
more than 6 years before, and lived with another man on whom she has been dependent
for support. She further averred that Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna. SSS denied
the benefit and pension claims of the Rosanna Aguas.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the children are legitimate daughters of Pablo hence, entitled to a monthly
pension.
HELD:
The Court has reviewed the records of the case and finds that only Jeylnn has sufficiently
established her right to a monthly pension.
Jeylnn’s claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate which bears the signature
of Pablo. Petitioner was able to authenticate the certification from the Civil Registry
showing that she was born on October 29, 1991. The records also show that Rosanna and
Pablo were married on December 4, 1977 and the marriage subsisted until the latter’s
death on December 8, 1996. It is therefore evident that Jeylnn was born during Rosanna
and Pablo’s marriage.
It bears stressing that under Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived or born
during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. This Court, in De Jesus v. Estate of
Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon, extensively discussed this presumption –
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on
sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in
wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of
proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120
days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the
physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that
the husband and wife are living separately in such way that sexual intercourse is not
possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual
intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170,44
and in proper cases Article 171,45 of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August
1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of the child would no longer be legally feasible
and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.Indeed,
impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in
exceptional cases, his heirs.47 In this case, there is no showing that Pablo challenged the
legitimacy of Jeylnn during his lifetime. Hence, Jeylnn’s status as a legitimate child of Pablo
can no longer be contested.

Basbas v. Basbas
G.R. No. 188773, September 10, 2014
Not all rights to property and incidents thereof, such as titling, ought to be preceded by a
declaration of heirship, albeit supposedly traced to a single decedent and original titleholder.
FACTS:
Severo Basbas was married to Ana Rivera. They had a child named Valentin. During his
lifetime, Severo acquired Lot 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate. Petitioners Heirs of
Valentin (great grandchildren) discovered that Respondent Ricardo Basbas through
Crispiniano Basbas (claiming to also be Severo’s great grandchildren through Severo’s
purported son named Nicolas), was able to secure a TCT over Lot 39. Thereafter,
Respondents, claiming to be the only heirs of Severo, executed an extrajudicial settlement
over Lot 39.
Petitioners disputed this before the RTC in an action for annulment of title, reconveyance
and damages. RTC ruled in petitioners’ favor and the title to Lot 39 was reconveyed to
them. CA reversed the decision and applied the Court’s ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay v Del
Rosario, which stated that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special
proceeding inasmuch as it involves the establishment of a status or right.
ISSUE:
Whether the application of such ruling is proper.
RULING:
No. Petitioners’ heirship to Severo was uncontroverted while Respondents miserably fail to
establish the status of their ascendant and purported predecessor-in-interest, Nicolas.
Valentin’s long-possessed status as a legitimate child and thus, heir of Severo, need no
longer be the subject of a special proceeding for declaration of heirship as envisioned by
the CA. There is no need to re-declare his status as an heir of Severo. And, contraposed to
the fact that Valentin’s status as a legitimate child of Severo is already established, Nicolas’
status as a purported heir of Severo can no longer be established, Nicolas’ right thereto
expiring upon his death. Even if Respondents were minded to establish the status of
Nicolas, whether he is a legitimate or an illegitimate child of Severo, such can no longer be
done. Valentin’s rights to the succession vested from the moment of death of the decedent
Severo. In turn, petitioners’, as Heirs of Valentin, who is an uncontested heir of decedent
Severo, rights to the succession vested from the moment of Valentin’s death. As such, they
own Lot No. 39, undisputedly titled in Severo’s name and forming part of Severo’s estate,
and are entitled to the titling thereof in their names.
1. Who are considered legitimate children

A. LEGITIMATE PROPER, FC 164
(a) Conceived during marriage
cf. ROC Rule 131 Sec. 3(dd)
FC Art. 168

Arbolario v. CA
G.R. No. 129163, April 22, 2003
Once a valid marriage is established, it is deemed to continue until proof that it has been
legally ended is presented. Thus, the mere cohabitation of the husband with another woman
will not give rise to a presumption of legitimacy in favor of the children born of the second
union, until and unless there be convincing proof that the first marriage had been lawfully
terminated; and the second, lawfully entered into.
FACTS:
The original owners of the disputed lot, Spouses Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan had
five (5) children, namely: (1) Agueda Colinco, (2) Catalina Baloyo, (3) Eduardo Baloyo, (4)
Gaudencia Baloyo, and (5) Julian Baloyo.
The first child, Agueda was survived by her two children, namely, Antonio Colinco and
respondent Irene Colinco. Antonio Colinco predeceased his three daughters, herein
respondents Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina, all surnamed Colinco. The second child, Catalina ,
was married to Juan Arbolario and was blessed with the birth of only one child, Purificacion
Arbolario. Records disclosed however that Purificacion’s father, Juan, consorted with
another woman by the name of Francisca Malvas. From this cohabitation was born the
Arbolarios, herein petitioners.
The Colincos, herein respondents, believing themselves to be the only surviving heirs of
Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan, executed a ‘Declaration of Heirship and Partition
Agreement’. The Colincos then filed a case against Spouses Salhays to recover possession of
a portion of the disputed lot. The latter, however, argued that they have been the lawful
lessees of the late Purificacion Arbolario.
Subsequently, the Arbolarios and Spouses Salhays filed a case for Cancellation of Title with
Damages against the Colincos contending that the the ‘Declaration of Heirship and Partition
Agreement’ executed by the latter was defective and thus voidable as they (Arbolarios)
were excluded therein. The RTC ruled in favor of the Arbolarios. On appeal, however, the
CA held that when Juan Arbolario cohabited with Francisca Malvas, their union was
presumably extramarital since the first marriage of Juan with Catalina was not shown to be
judicially annulled or lawfully ended. Consequently, their children are illegitimate half-
brothers and half-sisters of Purificacion, the daughter of Juan and Catalina.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in considering the Arbolarios illegitimate children.
RULING:
No. In the absence of any fact that would show that conjugal union of Juan Arbolario and
Catalina Baloyo had been judicially annulled before 1951, or before Juan Arbolario
cohabited with Francisca Malvas, it would only be reasonable to conclude that the
foregoing union which resulted in the birth of the Arbolarios was extra-marital.
Consequently, the Arbolarios are illegitimate children of Juan Arbolario.
1. valid marriage
2. terminated marriage under FC 42 in rel. to FC 43(1)
3. void marriages under FC 53, 36
4. voidable marriages, FC 45
Prudente, Maica A.
Suntay v. Suntay
G.R. No. 132524, Dec. 29, 1998
A voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by
final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the annulment of
a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the law
makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped
out. The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of
Article 89 which provides that: Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of
annulment shall be considered legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the
same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also called
natural children by legal fiction.
FACTS:
Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (son of petitioner Federico Suntay) and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
were married in the Portuguese Colony of Macao. Out of this marriage, three children were
born namely: Margarita Guadalupe, Isabel Aguinaldo and Emilio Aguinaldo all surnamed
Cojuangco Suntay. After 4 years, the marriage soured so that in 1962, Isabel Cojuanco-
Suntay filed a criminal case against her husband Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay. In retaliation,
Emilio Aguinaldo filed before the then CFI a complaint for legal separation against his wife,
charging her, among others, with infidelity and praying for the custody and care of their
children who were living with their mother. CFI declared their marriage null and void. The
basis of nullity was the opinion of Dr. Aramil in the parricide case against Emilio Suntay
and that the symptoms of the mental aberration classified as schizophernia had made
themselves manifest.
Emilio Suntay predeceased his mother, the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay. The latter
is respondent Isabel’s paternal grandmother. Isabel filed before the trial court a petition for
issuance in her favor of Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of her late
grandmother. However, Federico Suntay, claiming that he is the surviving spouse of the
decedent, filed for opposition and that he has been managing the conjugal properties even
while the decedent has been alive. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case alleging that an
illegitimate child has no right to succeed by right of representation the legitimate relatives
of her father or mother. Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, respondent Isabel’s father predeceased
his mother, the late Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay and thus, opened succession by
representation. Petitioner contends that as a consequence of the declaration by the then
CFI of Rizal that the marriage of the respondent Isabel’s parents is null and void, the latter
is an illegitimate child, and has no right nor interest in the estate of her paternal
grandmother the decedent. RTC favored Isabel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is an legitimate child amd may invoke their successional right of
representation in the estate of their grandmother Cirstina Aguinaldo Suntay.
RULING:
YES. Per decision of the Court of First Instance, the marriage of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay
and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay was annulled on the basis of Art. 85 par. 3 of the Civil Code
which refers to marriages which are considered voidable. Petitioner being conceived and
born of a voidable marriage before the decree of annulment, she is considered legitimate.
The legal basis for setting aside the marriage of respondent Isabel’s parents is clear under
paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code, the law in force prior to the enactment of the
Family Code. It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental
aberration classified as schizophernia had made themselves manifest even as early as
1955; that the disease worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed under
expert neuro-psychiatrict treatment; that even if the subject has shown marked progress,
he remains bereft of adequate understanding of right and wrong.
There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July 9, 1958,
years after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a declaration of nullity
of the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which provides:
There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the mental
condition of plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to be without sound
reason. The charges in this very complaint add emphasis to the finding of the neuro-
psychiatrist handling the patient, that plaintiff really lives more in fancy than in reality, a
strong indication of schizophernia (sic).
Inevitably, the decision of the CFI of Rizal declared null and void the marriage of
respondent Isabelss parents. The legal consequences as to the rights of the children are
therefore governed by the first clause of the second paragraph of Article 89. A contrary
interpretation would be anathema to the rule just above-mentioned. Based on said
provision the children of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay who were
conceived and born prior to the decree of the trial court setting aside their marriage are
considered legitimate. For purposes of seeking appointment as estate administratrix, the
legitimate grandchildren, including respondent Isabel, may invoke their successional right
of representation in the estate of their grandmother Cirstina Aguinaldo Suntay after their
father had predeceased their grandmother.
(b) Born during marriage
(c) Conceived by artificial insemination cf. NCC 40, FC 164

2. Proof of Filiation Of legitimate children, FC 172-173

Trinidad v. CA
289 SCRA 188, April 20, 1998
A baptismal certificate though not a conclusive proof of filiation, is one of “the other means
allowed under the Rules of Court an special laws” to show pedigree.
FACTS:
Petitioner Arturio Trinidad filed with the CFI of Aklan, an action for partition of 4 parcels of
land, claiming that he was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, one of 3 children of
Patricio Trinidad, who was the original owner of the parcels of land. Patricio Trinidad died
in 1940, leaving the 4 parcels of land to his 3 children, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. In
1970, petitioner demanded from Lourdes and Felix Trinidad to partition the land into 3
equal shares and to give him the 1/3 individual share of his late father, but the respondents
refused. Respondents contended that Inocentes was single when he died in 1941.
Respondents also denied that petitioner had lived with them. Petitioner was not able to
present his birth certificate.
ISSUE:
In the absence of a birth certificate, how may filiation be proven?
RULING:
Filiation may be proven by the following: (now Article 171 of the Family Code)
ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in
the Civil Register, or by an authentic document or a final judgment.
ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be
proved by the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.
ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or
possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws.
Petitioner submitted in evidence a certification that records relative to his birth were
either destroyed during the last world war or burned when the old town hall was razed to
the ground on June 17, 1956. To prove his filiation, he presented in evidence two family
pictures, his baptismal certificate and Jovita Gerardo’s testimony.
The family pictures were taken before the case was instituted. Although they do not
directly prove petitioners filiation to Inocentes, they show that petitioner was accepted by
the private respondents as Inocentes legitimate son ante litem motam.
Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof of filiation, it is one of the
other means allowed under the Rules of Court and special laws to show pedigree, as this
Court ruled in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals: “What both the trial court and the respondent
court did not take into account is that an illegitimate child is allowed to establish his
claimed filiation by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,
according to the Civil Code, or by evidence of proof in his favor that the defendant is her
father, according to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate,
a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common
reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and
other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Furthermore, petitioner consistently used Inocentes surname (Trinidad) without objection

from private respondents -- a presumptive proof of his status as Inocentes legitimate child.
The totality of petitioner’s positive evidence clearly preponderates over private

respondent’s self- serving negations.
De Jesus v. Estate of Juan Gamboa Dizon

366 SCRA 499
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder
morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are
legitimate.
FACTS:
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was during
this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners,
were born. In a notarized document, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de
Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died
intestate leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various
corporations and some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized
acknowledgement that petitioners filed a complaint for "Partition with Inventory and
Accounting" of the Dizon estate with the Regional Trial Court. Respondent, the surviving
spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon sought the dismissal of the
case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would
nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of
the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of
Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon.
ISSUE:
W/N the petioners are illegitimate children of the deceased
RULING:
No. The issue whether the petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings
of the decedent cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having first been instituted
to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of some other couple born in lawful
wedlock.—The rule that the written acknowledgment made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon
establishes petitioners’ alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly
invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the
paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, one that can
only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose.
Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an
adulteress.
Sarangay, Jossa M.
Ong vs. Diaz (2007)
“Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a
legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in the present case), or
inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative
father is the biological father of the child. ”
FACTS:
Minor Joanne Diaz, represented by her mother and guardian, Junky Diaz, filed a complaint
for compulsory recognition with prayer for support before the RTC of Tarlac City. As
alleged by Jinky, she and Rogelio got acquainted, which developed into friendship and later
blossomed into love. At this time, Jinky was already married to a Japanese national,
Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil wedding solemnized on 19 February 1993 by an MTC Judge.
They cohabited and lived together in 1994 to September 1998. From this live-in
relationship, minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz was conceived and on 25 February 1998. However,
Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and stopped supporting minor Joanne, falsely
alleging that he is not the father of the child.
The RTC ruled that Joanne Diaz is an illegitimate child of defendant Rogelio Ong with Jinky
Diaz. The CA remanded the case to the RTC for the issuance of an order directing the
parties to make arrangements for DNA analysis for the purpose of determining the
paternity of minot Joanne.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in remanding the case for DNA analysis despite the fact that it
is no longer feasible due to Rogelio’s death.
HELD:
NO.
Petitioner's argument is without basis especially as the New Rules on DNA Evidence allows
the conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or upon application of any person who has
a legal interest in the matter in litigation, thus:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order– The appropriate court may, at any time, either
motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the
parties upon a showing of the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;

(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now
requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant
to the proper resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially
affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.
From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate
the application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of
his DNA.
Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as enumerated above as
may be available, may be used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown the
impossibility of obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for the
conduct of DNA testing.

Tison v. CA
276 SCRA 582, July 31, 1997
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the onedirectly
confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he
should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moraland
economic interest involved.
FACTS:
The petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are niece and nephew of the deceased
Tedora Dezoller Guerrero, the sister of their father Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero died without any ascendant ordescendant, and was survived only by her
husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes also
died. Hence they seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of
representation. The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her
surviving spouse executed an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto
himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute. Martin sold the lot to herein private
respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter, a TCT was issued in the latter’s name. Martin
Guerrero died.
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for reconveyance claiming that they are
entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question by right of representation.
Tedoro Domingo however, attacks the legitimacy of Hermogenes. During the hearing,
petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented as the lone witness, the baptismal, death
and marriage certificates, the various certifications from the civil registrar, a family picture,
and several joint affidavits executed by third persons all of which she identified and
explained in the course and as part of her testimony.Subsequently, private respondent filed
a Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Evidence on the ground that petitioners failed to prove their
legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero.
ISSUES:
Whether or not a third person, not the father nor an heir, may attack the legitimacy of the
petitioners; and whether or not the petitioners are entitled to inherit one-half of the
property in question by right of representation.
RULING:
NO. There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on
soundermorality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in
wedlock are legitimate. And well settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot
beattacked collaterally. Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his
wife. He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of
his wife produces and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in
view of the moraland economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his
heirs are allowedto contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none — even his heirs
— can impugnlegitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory.
YES. Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, one-half of the subject property was
automatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Martin Guerrero, as his share in the
conjugal partnership. Applying the aforequoted statutory provisions, the remaining half
shall be equally divided between the widower and herein petitioners who are entitled to
jointly inherit in their own right. Hence, Martin Guerrero could only validly alienate his
total undivided three-fourths (3/4) share in the entire property to herein private
respondent. Resultantly, petitioners and private respondent are deemed co-owners of the
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 in the proportion of an
undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share thereof, respectively.
Aguilar v. Siasat
G.R. No. 200169, January 28, 2015
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic
writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.
FACTS:
Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar died intestate and without debts.
Included in their estate are two parcels of land. Rodolfo Aguilar filed with the Bacolod RTC
a civil case for mandatory injunction with damages against Edna Siasat. Rodolfo alleged
that he is the only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses. He asked the court to
order Edna to surrender to him the owner’s duplicate copies of the titles to the properties
in her possession. Edna, on the other hand, claimed that Rodolfo is not the son and sole
surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses, but a mere stranger who was raised by the latter out
of generosity and kindness of heart. To prove filiation, Rodolfo presented the following
documents, among others:
1. His grade school records wherein it is stated that Alfredo Aguilar is Rodolfo’s parent;
2. His ITR indicating that Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar is his mother;
3. Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1, a public instrument subscribed and made under oath
by Alfredo Aguilar during his employment with BMMC, which bears his signature and
thumb marks and indicates that Rodolfo, is his son and dependent;
4. Alfredo Aguilar’s Information Sheet of Employment indicating that Rodolfo is his son;
5. His Certificate of Marriage to Luz Abendan, where it is declared that the Aguilar
spouses are his parents; and
6. Letter of the BMMC Secretary addressed to a BMMC supervisor introducing
petitioner as Alfredo Aguilar’s son and recommending him for employment.
7. Certification by the Bacolod City Civil Registry to the effect that the record of births
during the period 1945 to 1946 were "all destroyed by nature," hence no true copies of
the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner could be issued as requested.
ISSUE:
Whether Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and
relationship under Art. 172 of the Family Code.
RULING:
YES. In De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon, the SC has held that, “The due recognition of an
illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no
further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground
for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a
separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated
on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will,
a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the
applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child’s
acknowledgment.”
Rodolfo – who was born on March 5, 1945, or during the marriage of the Aguilar
Spouses and before their respective deaths – has sufficiently proved that he is the
legitimate issue of the latter. As he correctly argues, Alfredo’s SSS Form E-1 satisfies the
requirement for proof of filiation and relationship under Article 172 of the Family Code; by
itself, said document constitutes an "admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned."
Petitioner has shown that he cannot produce his Certificate of Live Birth since all the
records covering the period 1945-1946 of the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod City were
destroyed, which necessitated the introduction of other documentary evidence –
particularly Alfredo’s SSS Form E-1 to prove filiation.
3. Rights of legitimate children, FC 173-174, NCC 364, 374, 376, NCC 888, NCC 979
4. Grounds to impugn legitimacy, FC 166
(a) Physical impossibility of access
Socrates
Andal v. Macaraig (1951)
89 Phil 165
When the husband and wife are living together, or at least had access to one another, and the
husband is not impotent, and the child was born within 300 days following the dissolution of
the marriage, the presumption is that the child is legitimate. The presumption can only be
rebutted by clear proof that it was physically or naturally impossible for the spouses to
indulge in carnal intercourse. The fact that the wife committed adultery cannot also overcome
this presumption.
FACTS:
Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Dueñas as guardian ad litem, brought an
action for recovery of the ownership and possession of a parcel of land. Mariano claims
ownership of the land by succession from his father Emiliano Andal. The land in question
was donated by the defendant Eduvigis Macaraig (who is the mother of Emiliano) as
donation propter nuptias to Emiliano and Dueñas on their marriage. When Emiliano died,
Macaraig claims the land, saying that Mariano Andal was not a legitimate child of Emiliano
Andal, hence the property should revert to Macaraig as the next of kin entitled to succeed.
The following facts were established: That Emiliano, married to Dueñas, became sick with
tuberculosis in January 1941. On September 10, 1942, he became too sick to even move or
get out of bed, then Maria Dueñas and Felix Andal (brother of Emiliano) eloped with
Dueñas. But, since May 1942, Felix and Dueñas are already living as husband and wife.
Emiliano died on January 1, 1943. In June 17, 1943, Dueñas gave birth to Mariano Andal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mariano Andal is a legitimate child of Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueñas.
RULING:
Yes. The marriage was dissolved upon Emiliano’s death (January 1943), and Mariano was
born in June 1943. This means the child was born within 300 days after the dissolution of
marriage. Therefore, the child born is presumed as legitimate child of Emiliano and Maria
Dueñas. It can be rebutted however by proof that it was physically impossible for the
husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 next preceding
the birth of the child. That 120 days includes August 21, 1942 to September 10, 1942.
During that period, even though Felix and Maria Dueñas were already having illicit carnal
relations and that Emiliano was sick of tuberculosis, it does not preclude the cohabitation
or carnal intercourse between Maria Dueñas and Emiliano. There is neither evidence to
show that Emiliano was suffering from impotency, patent, continuous and incurable, nor
was there evidence that he was imprisoned. The presumption of legitimacy under the Civil
Code in favor of the child has not, therefore, been overcome. Hence, Mariano Andal is
presumed to be a legitimate child of Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueñas.
Surla, Kristine
Concepcion v. CA
G.R. No. 123450, Aug. 31, 2005
Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved, unless such
presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary.
FACTS:
Concepcion and Almonte were married in 1989. They had a child a year after. In 1991,
Concepcion filed a petition to have his marriage annulled on the ground of bigamy. He
alleged that nine years before he married Almonte, she had married Gopiao.
The trial court annulled the marriage for being bigamous; declared the child an illegitimate
child; awarded to Almonte the child’ custody; granted Concepcion visitation rights.
Almonte argued that there was nothing in the law granting visitation rights in favor of the
putative father of an illegitimate child and that the child’s surname should be changed to
Almonte.
ISSUE:
Whether the child is the legitimate child of Almonte and Gopiao or the illegimate child of
Almonte and Concepcion.
RULING:
The child is the legitimate child of Almonte and Gopiao. Article 167 of the FC provides: The
child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
Concepcion cannot invoke Article 166 (1)(b) of the FC because only Almonte’s husband
or his heirs, can contest the legitimacy of the child born to his wife. Since the marriage of
Concepcion and Almonte was void from the very beginning, he never became her husband and
thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly
during the period of conception. To overthrow this presumption, it must be shown beyond
reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have enabled the husband to father
the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved,
unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary.
The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical
impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days
which immediately preceded the birth of the child. To rebut the presumption, the
separation between the spouses must be such as to make marital intimacy impossible. This
may take place, for instance, when they reside in different countries or provinces and they
were never together during the period of conception. Or, the husband was in prison during
the period of conception, unless it appears that sexual union took place through the
violation of prison regulations.
Here, during the period that Concepcion and Almonte were living together in Fairview,
Quezon City, Gopiao was living in Loyola Heights which is also in Quezon City. Further, no
evidence was presented to disprove personal access between Almonte and Gopiao.
Considering the above, the separation between Almonte and Gopiao was certainly not such
as to make it physically impossible for them to engage in the marital act. All she said was
that she never lived with Gopiao but never claimed that nothing ever happened between
them. Thus, the impossibility of physical access was never established beyond reasonable
doubt.
(b) Biological or other scientific grounds, FC 170, 171
Tec, Natasha Kim R.
Estate of Rogelio Ong v. Minor Joanne Diaz

G.R. No. 171713, Dec. 17, 2007
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be

difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to.
FACTS:
Trial court rendered a decision and declared the minor to be the illegitimate child of
Rogelio Ong with Jinky Diaz, and ordering him to support the child until she reaches the age
of majority. Despite Jinky’s marriage to a Hasegawa Katsuo, the latter was proven to not
have been in the Philippines during the year that the minor was born. The fact that Rogelio
acknowledged his giving support to the family and paying for the mother and minor child’s
hospital bills added to such presumption.
Rogelio died during the pendency of the case with the CA. The Estate of Rogelio Ong
opposed on the CA order directing the Estate and Joanne Rodgin Diaz for DNA analysis for
determining the paternity of the minor Joanne. The Estate filed a motion for
reconsideration with the CA. They contended that a dead person cannot be subject to
testing. CA justified that "DNA paternity testing, as current jurisprudence affirms, would be
the most reliable and effective method of settling the present paternity dispute."
ISSUE:
Whether or not DNA analysis can still be done despite the death of Rogelio.
RULING:
Yes. Petitioners argument is without basis especially as the New Rules on DNA Evidence
allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or upon application of any person
who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, The death of Rogelio does not ipso facto
negate the application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological
samples of his DNA. New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing by
using biological samples--organic material originating from the person's body, ie., blood,
saliva, other body fluids, tissues, hair, bones, even inorganic materials- that is susceptible to
DNA testing.
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would

be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells
of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted
to.

Lucas v. Lucas
G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011
There must be prima facie evidence must be presented by a person wishing to subject another
party to DNA testing.
FACTS:
On July 26, 2007, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with
Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing) at the Valenzuela RTC. (In other
words, he also wants his father to be subjected to DNA testing, -it wasn’t stressed clearly in
the case which is why it was a bit confusing.)
He claims that his mother, Elsie Uy used to accompany a certain woman named Belen at her
work at a certain “night spot” in Manila where she met his alleged father Jesus Lucas.
In 1969, the petitioner was born as a product of their love. However Jesus’ name was not
included in his birth certificate. He also claims that Elsie informed him that Jesus was his
father.
The RTC the case for hearing and urging anyone who has any objection to the petition to
file his opposition. The court also directed that the Order be published once a week for
three consecutive weeks in any newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, and
that the Solicitor General be furnished with copies of the Order and the petition in order
that he may appear and represent the State in the case.
On September 4, 2007, unaware of the issuance of the September 3, 2007 Order,

respondent filed a Special Appearance and Comment. He declared that he did not receive
the summons and a copy of the petition along with other manifestations.
The RTC, acting on respondent’s motion for reconsideration, dismissed the case.
The court remarked that, based on the case of Herrera v. Alba, there are four significant
procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which the parties have to face:
1. a prima facie case,
2. affirmative defenses,
3. presumption of legitimacy, and
4. physical resemblance between the putative father and the child.
The court opined that petitioner must first establish these four procedural aspects before
he can present evidence of paternity and filiation, which may include incriminating acts or
scientific evidence like blood group test and DNA test results. It further stated that Jessie
failed to prove the following requirements:
(a) his mother did not personally declare that she had sexual relations with respondent,
and petitioner’s statement as to what his mother told him about his father was clearly
hearsay;
(b) the certificate of live birth was not signed by respondent; and
(c) although petitioner used the surname of respondent, there was no allegation that he
was treated as the child of respondent by the latter or his family. The court opined that,
having failed to establish a prima facie case, respondent had no obligation to present any
affirmative defenses.
The CA affirmed the same, Jessie now asserts that the motion for DNA testing should not be
a reason for the dismissal of the petition since it is not a legal ground for the dismissal of
cases.
ISSUE:
Is a prima facie showing necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order?
RULING:
The court says yes, a DNA testing order is not issued as a matter of right. the applicant must
first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of
paternity or good cause for the holding of the test.
It should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon
the court. The court may, for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the
DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the
DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a
DNA testing.
(c.) FC 166(3)
5. Action to impugn legitimacy
Reyes v. Mauricio
G.R. No. 175080, November 24, 2010
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in
another action for a different purpose.
FACTS:
A complaint was filed before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) of Malolos, Bulacan by Mauricio and her daughter, Leonida for annulment of
contract entered into by Reyes.
Eugenio Reyes was the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Turo, Bocaue,
Bulacan. Respondents alleged that they are the legal heirs of the late Godofredo Mauricio,
who was the lawful and registered tenant of Eugenio through his predecessors-in-interest
to the subject land; that through fraud, deceit, strategy and other unlawful means, Eugenio
caused the preparation of a document to eject Respondents from the subject property.
On appeal with the CA, Reyes assailed the status of Leonida as a legal heir and her capacity
to substitute Mauricio who died during the pendency of the case. He averred that Leonida
is merely a ward of Librada.
ISSUE:
Whether Leonida’s filiation may be attacked collaterally
RULING:
No.
It is settled that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked. The legitimacy of the child cannot
be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different
purpose. This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the Code
confirm this view, because they refer to the action to impugn the legitimacy. This action can
be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present
articles.
Yu, Karl Alen G.

Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo
G.R. No. 189476, Feb. 2, 2011
The change being sought in respondent’s petition (for change of name) goes so far as to affect
his legal status in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of
illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant respondent’s supplication. Since
respondent’s desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, Rule 108
applies.
FACTS:
Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo

(respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim
Coseteng who, as respondent’s certificate of live birth shows, contracted marriage on
March 26, 1972. Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married,
respondent filed in 2008 with the RTC a Petition to change his name to Julian Edward
Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. He provided as evidence a certification from NSO that his
mother was not married in their records. The RTC granted the petition. However, the OSG
opposed the decision on the ground that the change of his name also in effect changes his
status from being legitimate to illegitimate thus the applicable rule is not Rule 103 but Rule
108 which is adversarial. Respondent argued that the proceedings were adversarial since it
sent notice to the offices required but there was no opposition.
ISSUE:
Whether the Petition for change of Name affects the legal status of the petitioner which
warrants adversarial proceedings under Rule 108 and not Rule 103
RULING:
Yes. The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as to affect his legal
status in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy.
Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant respondent’s supplication. Labayo-Rowe v.
Republic, categorically holds that "changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate
to illegitimate . . . are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed
after appropriate adversary proceedings . . ." Since respondent’s desired change affects his
civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, Rule 108 applies. What is clear is the mandatory
directive under Section 3 of Rule 108 to implead the civil registrar and the parties who
would naturally and legally be affected by the grant of a petition for correction or
cancellation of entries. When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register involves substantial and controversial alterations including those on citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the
requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.

Geronimo v. Santos
G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015
Petitioner is correct that proof of legitimacy under Article 172, or illegitimacy under Article
175, should only be raised in a direct and separate action instituted to prove the filiation of a
child.
FACTS:
On April 17, 2001, plaintiff Karen Santos, claiming to be the only child of deceased Rufino
and Caridad Geronimo filed a complaint for annulment of document and recovery of
possession against the defendants Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo who are the brothers of
her father. In an amended answer, the defendants denied the allegation that plaintiff was
the only child and sole heir of their brother. They disclosed that the deceased Rufino and
Caridad Geronimo were childless and took in as their ward the plaintiff who was in truth,
the child of Caridad's sister. They claimed that the birth certificate of the plaintiff was a
simulated document. Eugenio was able to obtain a copy of the plaintiffs alleged birth
certificate. It had irregular features. Plaintiff further averred that the respondent had no
personality to impugn her filiation as the Family Code requires that an action to impugn
legitimacy contemplates a direct action and mmay not be assailed indirectly or collaterally.
RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiff and declare her to be the legitimate child of the deceased
spouses Rufino and Caridad Geronimo. Further the trial court declares that the respondent
had no personality to impugn the legitimacy of the plaintiff as provided under Art. 170 and
171 of the Family Code. On appeal, the CA ruled adopting the RTC decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA gravely erred and abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when it ruled that he does not have personality to impugn respondent's legitimate filiation?
RULING:
Yes. Petitioner is correct that proof of legitimacy under Article 172, or illegitimacy under
Article 175, should only be raised in a direct and separate action instituted to prove the
filiation of a child.
What petitioner failed to recognize, however, is that this procedural rule is applicable only
to actions where the legitimacy - or illegitimacy - of a child is at issue. This situation does
not obtain in the case at bar.
In the instant case, the filiation of a child - herein respondent - is not at issue. Petitioner
does not claim that respondent is not the legitimate child of his deceased brother Rufino
and his wife Caridad. What petitioner alleges is that respondent is not the child of the
deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad at; all.
It is clear in the case at bar that the ruling of both courts a quo declaring respondent as a
legitimate child and sole heir of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad is one based on a
misapprehension of facts.
A mere cursory reading of the birth certificate of respondent would show that it was
tampered specifically on the entries pertaining to the date of birth of respondent and the
name of the informant. Using pentel ink, the date of birth of respondent - April 6, 1972 -
and the name of the informant -Emma Da�o - were both superimposed on the document.
Despite these glaring erasures, the trial court still relied on the prima facie presumption of
the veracity and regularity of the birth certificate for failure of petitioner to explain how the
erasures were done and if the alterations were due to the fault of respondent. It thus ruled
that respondent's filiation was duly established by the birth certificate.
We do not agree with the conclusion of both courts a quo. The appellate court itself ruled
that the irregularities consisting of the superimposed entries on the date of birth and the
name of the informant made the document questionable. The corroborating testimony of
Arturo Reyes, a representative of the NSO, further confirmed that the entries on the date of
birth and the signature of the informant are alterations on the birth certificate which
rendered the document questionable. To be sure, even the respondent herself did not offer
any evidence to explain such irregularities on her own birth certificate. These irregularities
and the totality of the following circumstances surrounding the alleged birth of respondent
are sufficient to overthrow the presumption of regularity attached to respondent's birth
certificate.
6. Effect of a mother’s declaration, FC 167 26

7. In subsequent marriages, FC 168, 169
8. Presumptions, FC 170, 171
4. ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
1. Who are considered illegitimate, FC 165

Uy v. Ngo Chua
G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009
It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a child cannot be
compromised. Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation
of a child. Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be
judicially established, and it is for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be
left to the will or agreement of the parties.
FACTS:
Petitioner Joanie Surposa Uy (petitioner) filed before the RTC a Petition for the issuance of
a decree of illegitimate filiation against Jose Ngo Chua (respondent). The Complaint was
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB, assigned to RTC-Branch 24. Petitioner
alleged in her Complaint that respondent, who was then married, had an illicit relationship
with Irene Surposa (Irene), her mother. Respondent and Irene had two children, namely,
petitioner and her brother, Allan. Respondent attended to Irene when the latter was giving
birth to petitioner and instructed that petitioner’s birth certificate be filled out with the
following names: "ALFREDO F. SURPOSA" as father and "IRENE DUCAY" as mother.
Actually, Alfredo F. Surposa was the name of Irene’s father, and Ducay was the maiden
surname of Irene’s mother. Respondent financially supported petitioner and Allan. He also
provided her with employment. Petitioner and Allan were introduced to each other and
became known in the Chinese community as respondent’s illegitimate children. During
petitioner’s wedding, respondent sent his brother Catalino Chua (Catalino) as his
representative, and it was the latter who acted as father of the bride. Respondent’s
relatives even attended the baptism of petitioner’s daughter. In his Answer to the
Complaint respondent denied that he had an illicit relationship with Irene, and that
petitioner was his daughter. Hearings then ensued and petitioner presented documentary
evidence to prove her claim of illegitimate filiation. Thereafter, respondent filed a
Demurrer to Evidence. It turned out that prior to the instituted special proceeding,
petitioner had already filed a similar Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate
affiliation against respondent. Petitioner and respondent eventually entered into a
Compromise Agreement in the Special Proceeding which was approved by RTC-Branch 9.
ISSUE:
Whether the Compromise Agreement entered into between petitioner and respondent,
constitutes res judicata in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB which is still pending before
RTC-Branch 24.
RULING:
NO. The Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before RTC-Branch 24 is not barred by res
judicata, since RTC-Branch 9 had no jurisdiction to approve, in its Decision in Special
Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, petitioner and respondent’s Compromise Agreement was
contrary to law and public policy.
It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a child cannot be
compromised. Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and
filiation of a child. Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must
be judicially established, and it is for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot
be left to the will or agreement of the parties.
Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February
2000 between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests no rights and creates
no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The void agreement cannot be rendered
operative even by the parties' alleged performance (partial or full) of their respective
prestations.
Note: Article 2035 of the Civil Code
2. Rights of illegitimate children, FC 173, 172, 175-176

Heirs of Maramag v. De Guzman
G.R. No. 181132, June 5, 2009
FACTS:
Loreto Maramag designated as beneficiary his concubine Eva de Guzman Maramag Vicenta
Maramag and Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie (heirs of Loreto Maramag) and his
concubine Eva de Guzman Maramag, also suspected in the killing of Loreto and his
illegitimate children are claiming for his insurance. Vicenta alleges that Eva is disqualified
from claiming. RTC ruled that civil code does not apply. However, CA dismissed the case for
lack of jurisdiction for filing beyond reglementary period.
ISSUE:
W/N Eva can claim even though prohibited under the civil code against donation.
HELD:
NO. Any person who is forbidden from receiving any donation under Article 739 cannot be
named beneficiary of a life insurance policy of the person who cannot make any donation
to him.
If a concubine is made the beneficiary, it is believed that the insurance contract will still
remain valid, but the indemnity must go to the legal heirs and not to the concubine, for
evidently, what is prohibited under Art. 2012 is the naming of the improper beneficiary.
It is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary, or when the
designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds, that the insurance
policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured
Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular and Grepalife and, thus,
are not entitled to the proceeds thereof. Accordingly, respondents Insular and Grepalife
have no legal obligation to turn over the insurance proceeds to petitioners. The revocation
of Eva as a beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification as such in another are of no
moment considering that the designation of the illegitimate children as beneficiaries in
Loretos insurance policies remains valid. Because no legal proscription exists in naming as
beneficiaries the children of illicit relationships by the insured,[22] the shares of Eva in the
insurance proceeds, whether forfeited by the court in view of the prohibition on donations
under Article 739 of the Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons based on the
insurance contracts, must be awarded to the said illegitimate children, the designated
beneficiaries, to the exclusion of petitioners. It is only in cases where the insured has not
designated any beneficiary,[23] or when the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to
receive the proceeds,[24] that the insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of
the estate of the insured.

De la Cruz v. Gracia
G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009
A private handwritten instrument accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence
shall be sufficient to establish filiation.
FACTS:
Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and Dominique Aquino (Dominique) lived together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage with the latter’s parents. Two months
before Jenie gave birth, Dominique died. Jenie applied for registration of the child’s birth,
using Dominique’s surname, with the Civil Registrar, in support of which, she submitted the
child’s Certificate of Live Birth, Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) which she
attached the handwritten autobiography of Dominique, which read: “as of now I have my
wife named Jenie Dela Cruz…as of now she is pregnant.” The Civil Registrar, denied such
saying that, the child cannot use the surname of his father because he was born out of
wedlock and the father died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his
paternity to the child. Jenie assailed the denial contending that: the denial of registration of
the childs name is a violation of his right to use the surname of his deceased father under
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. No. 9255 that provides, Article 176.
“However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has
been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is
made by the father” She maintained that the Autobiography constitutes an admission of
paternity in a private handwritten instrument. The trial court held that even if Dominique
was the author of the handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any express
recognition of paternity nor the deceased’s signature.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the autobiography can be considered as recognition of paternity in a

private handwritten instrument
RULING:
Yes, it substantially satisfies the requirement of the law. First, Dominique died about two
months prior to the child’s birth. Second, the Autobiography, handwritten by Dominique,
corresponds to the facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered. Third, Jenie’s
testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominique’s father and
his brother whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned
recognition of the child. The Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting the
requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private
handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate
child is made: Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence
submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that
the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and Where the private handwritten
instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the
claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the
acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence. The welfare of
the child shall be the paramount consideration in resolving questions affecting him. It is
thus the policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity
and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children.
Arriesgado
Gotardo v. Buling
G.R. No. 165166, August 15, 2012
Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is

obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
FACTS:
Charles Gotardo and Divina Buling became a couple in in the last week of January 1993.
They started intimate sexual relations sometime in September 1993. By August 1994
Divina found out she was pregnant. The couple made plans to marry but later on Charles
backed out of the wedding plan. Divina filed a complaint for damages against the petitioner
for breach of promise to marry. This was later on amicably settled.
Divina gave birth to Gliffze on March 1995. Charles failed to show up and support the child.
Divina sent him a demand letter on July 1995 demanding recognition and support. When
Charles did not answer, she filed her complaint for compulsory recognition and
support pendente lite. Charles denied the imputed paternity.
“RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence proving Gliffze’s filiation. It
found the respondent’s testimony inconsistent on the question of when she had her first
sexual contact with the petitioner, i.e., “September 1993” in her direct testimony while “last
week of January 1993” during her cross-testimony, and her reason for engaging in sexual
contact even after she had refused the petitioner’s initial marriage proposal. It ordered the
respondent to return the amount of support pendente lite erroneously awarded, and to pay
P 10,000.00 as attorney’s fees.”
“CA departed from the RTC’s appreciation of the respondent’s testimony, concluding that
the latter merely made an honest mistake in her understanding of the questions of the
petitioner’s counsel. It noted that the petitioner and the respondent had sexual relationship
even before August 1994; that the respondent had only one boyfriend, the petitioner, from
January 1993 to August 1994; and that the petitioner’s allegation that the respondent had
previous relationships with other men remained unsubstantiated. The CA consequently set
aside the RTC decision and ordered the petitioner to recognize his minor son Gliffze. It also
reinstated the RTC order granting a P 2,000.00 monthly child support.”
ISSUE:
The sole issue before us is whether the CA committed a reversible error when it set aside
the RTC’s findings and ordered the petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to his
minor son Gliffze.
RULING:
We have recognized that "[f]iliation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate
paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship,
support (as in this case) or inheritance. [In paternity cases, the burden of proof] is on the
person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child. n this case,
the respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the putative father of
Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually involved only with one man, the
petitioner, at the time of her conception. Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that the
petitioner and the respondent had intimate relationship.

obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of
everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education
and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.Thus, the amount of
support is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on the amount of support is made
as the amount shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the
necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to
the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of
the person obliged to support.

Grande v. Antonio
G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014
Article 176 lodges parental authority over minor children on the mother unless shown to be
unfit.
Article 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of
their father or not. It is not the father or the mother who is granted by law the right to dictate
the surname of their illegitimate children.
FACTS:
Grande and Antonio lived together as husband and wife for a period of time, although
Antonio was at that time already married to someone else. Out of this illicit relationship,
two sons were born. The children were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own
in the Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The parties’ relationship
eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the US with her two children. This prompted
respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to
take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of
Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the RTC, appending a
notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children. Grande posits that
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, may not be
invoked by a father to compel the use by his illegitimate children of his surname without
the consent of their mother.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the father has the right of custody over the children
2. Whether or not the father has the right to compel the use of his surname by his
illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation.
RULING:
1. NO. Article 176. – Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this
Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation
has been expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing in the
civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action
before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence,
respondent’s prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the mother,
then custody over the minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be
unfit.
2. NO. On the matter of children’s surnames, this Court has, time and again, rebuffed the
idea that the use of the father’s surname serves the best interest of the minor child. The use
of the word “shall” in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no moment. The clear, unambiguous, and
unequivocal use of “may” in Art. 176 rendering the use of an illegitimate father’s surname
discretionary controls, and illegitimate children are given the choice on the surnames by
which they will be known.
3. Proof of filiation, FC 175
Bernardez, Jairus Vincent Z.

Jison v. CA (1993)
286 SCRA 495
To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be
evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider
the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which
cannot be attributed to pure charity
FACTS:
Monina Jison filed an action for judicial declaration of her status as an illegitimate child of
Francisco Jison with one of the latter’s househelpers.
In support of her claim, Monina presented 11 witnesses comprising Francisco’s former

househelpers and employees. They testfied as to Francisco’s admission and conduct like
sending Monina to school, paying for her tuition fees, school uniforms, books, board and
lodging, defraying her hospitalization expenses, providing her with monthly allowance,
paying for the funeral expenses of her mother, acknowledging her paternal greetings and
calling her as his “Hija” or child, instructing his office personnel to give her monthly
allowance, recommending her for employment, allowing her to use his house in Bacolod
and paying for her long distance telephone calls, having her spend her vacation in his
apartment in Manila and also at his Forbes residence, allowing her to use his surname in
her scholastic and other records.
In his defense, Francisco alleged the impossibility of sexual relations with Monina’s mother
since she had ceased to be in his employ years before Monina’s birth. He also presented 7
witnesses who testified as to the inconsistencies of Monina’s witnesses. Lastly, Francisco
presented an affidavit signed by Monina whereby the latter attested to the fact that
Francisco is not her father. Monina did not deny signing the affidavit but claimed to have
done so only upon Francisco’s representation that the same was only for the consumption
of his wife.
ISSUE:
Whether Monina sufficiently proved her illegitimate filiation with Francisco
RULING:
Yes. Monina seeks to establish illegitimate filiation under the second paragraph of Art. 172
in relation to Art. 175 of the Family Code. As such, a “high standard of proof” is required.
Specifically, to prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child,
there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed
father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental
affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a
nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to
have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but
continuously.
In this case, the Court held that Monina’s evidence is coherent, logical and natural. Her
testimonial evidence, woven by her narration of circumstances and events that occurred
through the years, coupled with the testimonies of her witnesses, overwhelmingly
established the fact that she was conceived at the time her mother was still in Francisco’s
employ; that Francisco recognized Monina as his child through his conduct and over acts
and that such recognition was manifested through the years publicly, spontaneously,
continuously and in uninterrupted manner.
With respect to the affidavit, the Court affirmed the CA in stating that the same was
uncalled for and absurd for if Monina were truly not Francisco’s illegitimate daughter, it
would have been unnecessary for him to have gone to such great lengths in order that
Monina denounce her filiation.
All told, Monina’s evidence hurdled “the high standard of proof” required for the success of
an action to establish one’s illegitimate filiation when relying upon the provisions
regarding “open and continuous possession” or “any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws;” moreover, Monina proved her filiation by more than mere
preponderance of evidence.

Rivero v. CA
G.R. No. 141273, May 17, 2005
No compromise upon the civil status of persons shall be valid.
FACTS:
In behalf of her minor child, Benedick Arevalo, her mother filed a complaint against
defendants for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate child of their deceased father.
During trial, Mary Jane Dy-Chiao De Guzman, one of the sister entered a compromised
agreement with plaintiff whereby she is acknowledging the petitioner as the illegitimate
son of her father and pay petitioner P6M as a share in the estate of
their deceased father. RTC granted the compromised agreement.
Meanwhile, the Dy Chiao Brothers represented by their uncle filed for annulment
of judgment and TRO for the writ of execution of judgment and motion to dismiss.
CA directed Mary Jane on the other hand to file a comment on the opposition of her uncle.
In her reply, she question assailed decision of RTC since the illegitimate filiation
of Benedick could not be the subject of a compromise agreement. She further alleged that
the parties thereunder did not recognize the validity of the compromise agreement, as in
fact she and the petitioners were exploring the possibility of modifying their extrajudicial
settlement. CA ruled in favor of the defendants, hence a petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not compromise regarding filiation is valid.
RULING:
NO. The ruling of RTC based on the compromise agreement executed by Mary Jane is null
and void.
Article 2035(1) of the New Civil Code provides that no compromise upon the civil status
of persons shall be valid. As such, paternity and filiation, or the lack of the same, is a
relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the court to determine
its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Such
recognition by Mary Jane, however, is ineffectual, because under the law, the recognition
must be made personally by the putative parent and not by any brother, sister or relative.
Calimlim
Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA and Pacana
G.R. No. 150206, March 13, 2009
Our laws dictate that the best evidence of such familial tie was the record of birth appearing
in the Civil Register, or an authentic document or a final judgment. In the absence of these,
respondent should have presented proof that her mother enjoyed the continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child. Only in the absence of these two classes of evidence is the
respondent allowed to present other proof admissible under the Rules of Court of her mother’s
relationship to Juan Gabatan.
FACTS:
Lourdes Evero Pacana filed an action for Recovery of Property and Ownership and
Possession against petitioners, heirs of Teofilo Gabatan. Subject of the present action is a
parcel of land owned by Juan Gabatan. Pacana alleged that she is the sole owner of the lot,
having inherited the same from her deceased mother, Hermogena, who according to her
was the only child of Juan Gabatan. Pacana alleged that upon the death of Juan Gabatan,
petitioners refused to surrender the subject property.
Pacana presented and identified a purported certified true copy of her typewritten birth
certificate which indicated that her mother’s maiden name was "Hermogena Clarito
Gabatan." Petitioners, on the other hand, presented a certified true copy of her handwritten
birth certificate which differed from the copy she presented. Among the differences was
Pacana’s mother’s full maiden name which was indicated as "Hermogena Calarito" in the
handwritten birth certificate.
ISSUE:
Whether Pacana was able to prove that she is the sole heir of Juan Gabatan and thus,
entitled to the property under litigation.
RULING:
No. Having carefully examined the questioned birth certificates, that which was presented
by petitioners deserves to be given greater probative weight. Even assuming purely for the
sake of argument that the birth certificate presented by Pacana is a reliable document, the
same on its face is insufficient to prove respondent’s filiation to her alleged grandfather,
Juan Gabatan. All that the document would have proven was that Pacana’s mother was a
certain "Hermogena Clarito Gabatan." It does not prove that same "Hermogena Clarito
Gabatan" is the daughter of Juan Gabatan.
Hermogena’s birth certificate, which would have been the best evidence of Hermogena’s
relationship to Juan Gabatan, was never offered as evidence at the RTC. Neither did Pacana
present any authentic document or final judgment categorically evidencing Hermogena’s
relationship to Juan Gabatan.

De la Cruz v. Gracia
G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009
A private handwritten instrument accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence

shall be sufficient to establish filiation.
FACTS:
Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and Dominique Aquino (Dominique) lived together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage with the latter’s parents. Two months
before Jenie gave birth, Dominique died. Jenie applied for registration of the child’s birth,
using Dominique’s surname, with the Civil Registrar, in support of which, she submitted the
child’s Certificate of Live Birth, Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) which she
attached the handwritten autobiography of Dominique, which read: “as of now I have my
wife named Jenie Dela Cruz…as of now she is pregnant.” The Civil Registrar, denied such
saying that, the child cannot use the surname of his father because he was born out of
wedlock and the father died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his
paternity to the child. Jenie assailed the denial contending that: the denial of registration of
the childs name is a violation of his right to use the surname of his deceased father under
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. No. 9255 that provides, Article 176.
“However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has
been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil
made by the father” She maintained that the Autobiography constitutes an admission of
paternity in a private handwritten instrument. The trial court held that even if Dominique
was the author of the handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any express
recognition of paternity nor the deceased’s signature.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the autobiography can be considered as recognition of paternity in a

private handwritten instrument
RULING:
Yes, it substantially satisfies the requirement of the law. First, Dominique died about two
months prior to the child’s birth. Second, the Autobiography, handwritten by Dominique,
corresponds to the facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered. Third, Jenie’s
testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominique’s father and
his brother whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned
recognition of the child. The Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting the
requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private
handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate
child is made: Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence
submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that
the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and Where the private handwritten
instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the
claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the
acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence. The welfare of
the child shall be the paramount consideration in resolving questions affecting him. It is
thus the policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity
and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children.
Villanueva
Lucas v. Lucas
G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011
There must be prima facie evidence must be presented by a person wishing to subject another
party to DNA testing.
FACTS:
On July 26, 2007, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with
Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing) at the Valenzuela RTC. (In other
words, he also wants his father to be subjected to DNA testing, -it wasn’t stressed clearly in
the case which is why it was a bit confusing.)
He claims that his mother, Elsie Uy used to accompany a certain woman named Belen at her
work at a certain “night spot” in Manila where she met his alleged father Jesus Lucas.
In 1969, the petitioner was born as a product of their love. However Jesus’ name was not
included in his birth certificate. He also claims that Elsie informed him that Jesus was his
father.
The RTC the case for hearing and urging anyone who has any objection to the petition to
file his opposition. The court also directed that the Order be published once a week for
three consecutive weeks in any newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, and
that the Solicitor General be furnished with copies of the Order and the petition in order
that he may appear and represent the State in the case.
On September 4, 2007, unaware of the issuance of the September 3, 2007 Order,
respondent filed a Special Appearance and Comment. He declared that he did not receive
the summons and a copy of the petition along with other manifestations.
The RTC, acting on respondent’s motion for reconsideration, dismissed the case.
The court remarked that, based on the case of Herrera v. Alba, there are four significant
procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which the parties have to face:
1. a prima facie case,
2. affirmative defenses,
3. presumption of legitimacy, and
4. physical resemblance between the putative father and the child.
The court opined that petitioner must first establish these four procedural aspects before
he can present evidence of paternity and filiation, which may include incriminating acts or
scientific evidence like blood group test and DNA test results. It further stated that Jessie
failed to prove the following requirements:
(a) his mother did not personally declare that she had sexual relations with respondent,
and petitioner’s statement as to what his mother told him about his father was clearly
hearsay;
(b) the certificate of live birth was not signed by respondent; and
(c) although petitioner used the surname of respondent, there was no allegation that he
was treated as the child of respondent by the latter or his family. The court opined that,
having failed to establish a prima facie case, respondent had no obligation to present any
affirmative defenses.
The CA affirmed the same, Jessie now asserts that the motion for DNA testing should not be
a reason for the dismissal of the petition since it is not a legal ground for the dismissal of
cases.
ISSUE:
Is a prima facie showing necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order?
RULING:
The court says yes, a DNA testing order is not issued as a matter of right. the applicant must
first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of
paternity or good cause for the holding of the test.
It should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon
the court. The court may, for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the
DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the
DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a
DNA testing.
Arriesgado
Gotardo v. Buling
G.R. No. 165166, August 15, 2012

obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
FACTS:
Charles Gotardo and Divina Buling became a couple in in the last week of January 1993.
They started intimate sexual relations sometime in September 1993. By August 1994
Divina found out she was pregnant. The couple made plans to marry but later on Charles
backed out of the wedding plan. Divina filed a complaint for damages against the petitioner
for breach of promise to marry. This was later on amicably settled.
Divina gave birth to Gliffze on March 1995. Charles failed to show up and support the child.
Divina sent him a demand letter on July 1995 demanding recognition and support. When
Charles did not answer, she filed her complaint for compulsory recognition and
support pendente lite. Charles denied the imputed paternity.
“RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence proving Gliffze’s filiation. It
found the respondent’s testimony inconsistent on the question of when she had her first
sexual contact with the petitioner, i.e., “September 1993” in her direct testimony while “last
week of January 1993” during her cross-testimony, and her reason for engaging in sexual
contact even after she had refused the petitioner’s initial marriage proposal. It ordered the
respondent to return the amount of support pendente lite erroneously awarded, and to pay
P 10,000.00 as attorney’s fees.”
“CA departed from the RTC’s appreciation of the respondent’s testimony, concluding that
the latter merely made an honest mistake in her understanding of the questions of the
petitioner’s counsel. It noted that the petitioner and the respondent had sexual relationship
even before August 1994; that the respondent had only one boyfriend, the petitioner, from
January 1993 to August 1994; and that the petitioner’s allegation that the respondent had
previous relationships with other men remained unsubstantiated. The CA consequently set
aside the RTC decision and ordered the petitioner to recognize his minor son Gliffze. It also
reinstated the RTC order granting a P 2,000.00 monthly child support.”
ISSUE:
The sole issue before us is whether the CA committed a reversible error when it set aside
the RTC’s findings and ordered the petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to his
minor son Gliffze.
RULING:
We have recognized that "[f]iliation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate
paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship,
support (as in this case) or inheritance. [In paternity cases, the burden of proof] is on the
person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child. n this case,
the respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the putative father of
Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually involved only with one man, the
petitioner, at the time of her conception. Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that the
petitioner and the respondent had intimate relationship.

obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of
everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education
and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.Thus, the amount of
support is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on the amount of support is made
as the amount shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the
necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to
the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of
the person obliged to support.
Perla v. Baring
G.R. No. 172471, November 12, 2012
An order for support must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and
convincing evidence.
FACTS:
Mirasol and her then minor son Randy filed before the RTC a complaint for support against
Antonio. Mirasol alleged that she and Antonio lived together as common-law spouses for 2
years, as a result, Randy was born. However, when Antonio landed a job as seaman, he
abandoned them and failed to give any support to his son. Antonio, who is now married
and has a family of his own, denied having fathered Randy. Mirasol presented Randy’s
Certificate of Live Birth and Baptismal Certificate indicating her and Antonio as parents of
the child. Mirasol testified that she and Antonio supplied the information in the said
certificates. Randy recalled that he used to call Antionio “Papa” and kissed him while the
latter hugged him. When Randy asked him for support, Antonio promised that he would
support him. Randy further testified that during his one-week stay in his Aunt Lelita’s place,
the latter treated him as member of the family. When Antonio was shown Randy’s
Certification of Live Birth, he disclaimed having a hand in the preparation of such. Antonio
likewise alleged that Mirasol only made up the entries with respect to their marriage. RTC
ordered Antonio to support Randy. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Antonio is liable to support Randy.
RULING:
NO. Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and
filiation. An order for x x x support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an
irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or
filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence. Mirasol failed to establish Randy’s
illegitimate filiation to Antonio. The Certificate of Live Birth and the Baptismal Certificate of
Randy identifying Antonio as the father have no probative value since they were not signed
by Antonio. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a
hand in the preparation of said certificate. Neither does the testimony of Randy establish
his illegitimate filiation. The single instance that Antonio allegedly hugged Randy and
promised to support him cannot be considered as proof of continuous possession of the
status of a child. The respondents failed to establish Randy’s illegitimate filiation to
Antonio. Hence, the order for Antonio to support Randy has no basis.
Calimag v. Heirs of Macapaz

G.R. No. 191936, June 27, 2016
It is well settled that other proof can be offered to establish the fact of a solemnized marriage.
Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other
than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person's birth certificate may be recognized as
competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.
FACTS:
Virginia D. Calimag (petitioner) co-owned the property, the subject matter of this case, with
Silvestra N. Macapaz (Silvestra).
On the other hand, Anastacio P. Macapaz, Jr. (Anastacio, Jr.) and Alicia Macapaz-Ritua
(Alicia) (respondents) are the children of Silvestra's brother, Anastacio Macapaz, Sr.
(Anastacio, Sr.) and Fidela O. Poblete Vda. de Macapaz (Fidela).
The subject property, was duly registered in the names of the petitioner (married to
Demetrio Calimag) and Silvestra. In said certificate of title, appearing as Entry No. 02671 is
an annotation of an Adverse Claim of Fidela asserting rights and interests over a portion of
the said property measuring 49.5 sq m.
On November 11, 2002, Silvestra died without issue. On July 7, 2005, a new certificate of
title, was issued in the name of the petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated January 18,
2005 whereby Silvestra allegedly sold her 99-sq-m portion to the petitioner for
P300,000.00. On September 16, 2005, Fidela passed away.
On March 2, 2006, the respondents, asserting that they are the heirs of Silvestra, instituted
the action for Annulment of Deed of Sale and Cancellation with Damages against the
petitioner.
In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, the petitioner averred that the respondents
have no legal capacity to institute said civil action on the ground that they are illegitimate
children of Anastacio, Sr. As such, they have no right over Silvestra's estate pursuant to
Article 992 of the Civil Code which prohibits illegitimate children from inheriting intestate
from the legitimate children and relatives of their father and mother.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra?
RULING:
YES. It is well settled that other proof can be offered to establish the fact of a solemnized
marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant
evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person's birth certificate may
be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.
A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries (regarding the facts of
birth) in public records (Civil Registry) made in the performance of a duty by a public
officer (Civil Registrar)." Thus, being public documents, the respondents' certificates of live
birth are presumed valid, and are prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated in
them.
The petitioner's assertion that the birth certificate must be signed by the father in order to
be a competent evidence of legitimate filiation does not find support in law and
jurisprudence.
Forsooth, the Court finds that the respondents' certificates of live birth were duly executed
consistent with the provision of the law respecting the registration of birth of legitimate
children. The fact that only the signatures of Fidela appear on said documents is of no
moment because Fidela only signed as the declarant or informant of the respondents' fact
of birth as legitimate children.
Nonetheless, the respondents' certificates of live birth also intimate that Anastacio, Sr. and
Fidela had openly cohabited as husband and wife for a number of years, as a result of which
they had two children—the second child, Anastacio, Jr. being born more than three years
after their first child, Alicia. Verily, such fact is admissible proof to establish the validity of
marriage.
Dizon
San Agustin v. Sales
G.R. No. 189289, August 31, 2016
The requirements to establish the legitimate filiation of a child is likewise applicable in

establishing the filiation of illegitimate children.
FACTS:
Brothers Teodoro Sales (now deceased) and Ernesto Sales filed an action for the judicial
approval of their recognition as the illegitimate children of the late Louis C. Fernandez
before the RTC. They allege that (a) they are the illegitimate children of Louis and his
common-law wife named Epitacia Sales who was a house helper in the Fernandez
household and (b) Louis formally recognized them as his children by Epitacia in two public
documents (Acknowledgement of Children).
The petitioner, Gloria San Agustin, raised her opposition (niece of Louis; informally
adopted her as their child). She insisted that (a) the father of the plaintiffs is Corpus
Micabalo, the former houseboy of the Fernandez household and (b) documents presented
by the plaintiffs to sustain the complaint were spurious. The documents were forwarded
for examination and was concluded to be authentic. Petitioner’s request for DNA testing
was dismissed.
RTC ruled in favor of the recognition of the plaintiffs as the illegitimate children of Louis.
CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
WON the public documents (Acknowledgement of Children) presented were spurious – NO.
RULING:
The legitimate filiation of a child may be established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the present concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proven by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws
These requirements likewise apply to establish the filiation of illegitimate children.
The petitioner claimed that during the execution and notarization of the documents, Louis
could still write, rendering incredible the mere affixing of his thumbprints to the contested
documents. However, Ernesto testified before the RTC that Louis was no longer capable of
writing his name as he was already blind and bedridden at the time he affixed his thumb
mark to the document. There were witnesses to the document. A thumb mark has been
repeatedly considered as a valid mode of signature.
There being no cogent reason to deviate from the conclusion of the RTC finding the
testimony of Ernesto worthy of belief, the Court adopts such testimony and considers it
against the contention of the petitioner. A notarized document is a public document and as
such it enjoys the presumption of regularity which can only be overthrown by clear and
convincing evidence. It serves as a prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated
therein and a conclusive presumption of its existence and due execution. The bare
allegations of the petitioner cannot qualify as clear and convincing evidence to overturn
such presumption.
The petitioner maintained that the real father of Teodoro and Ernesto is Corpus. She
presented various evidence Teodoro's surname followed that of Corpus. The use of Corpus'
surname by Teodoro does not in itself negate the illegitimate filiation of Teodoro and
Ernesto. As correctly observed by the CA, Louis' existing marriage to Marie Louise must
have prevented him from making any declaration. The use of Louis' surname by his
children during the lifetime of his wife would run counter to his intention to cover such
relationship. It is no less than the putative father who voluntary recognized that Teodoro
and Ernesto are his illegitimate children. It is emphatically underscored that it is the law
and only the law that determines who are the legitimate or illegitimate children for one's
legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised.
Dy
Barcelote v. Republic
G.R. No. 222095, August 7, 2017
FACTS:
Petitioner Jonna Karla Baguio Barcelote (Barcelote) bore a child out of wedlock with a
married man named Ricky O. Tinitigan (Tinitigan) in her relative's residence in Sibulan,
Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur. She was not able to register the birth of their child, whom she
named Yohan Grace Barcelote, because she did not give birth in a hospital. To hide her
relationship with Tinitigan, she remained in Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur while Tinitigan lived
with his legitimate family in Davao City and would only visit her. Later on, she bore another
child with Tinitigan, whom she named as Joshua Miguel Barcelote. Again, she did not
register his birth to avoid humiliation, ridicule, and possible criminal charges. Thereafter,
she lost contact with Tinitigan and she returned to Davao City.
When her first child needed a certificate of live birth for school admission, Barcelote finally
decided to register the births of both children. She, then, returned to Santa Cruz, Davao del
Sur to register their births. The Local Civil Registrar of Santa Cruz approved the late
registration of the births of Yohan Grace Barcelote and Joshua Miguel Barcelote, after
submitting proof that the National Statistics Office (NSO) has no record of both births on
file. However, upon submission of the copies of the late registration of the births to the
NSO, Barcelote was informed that there were two certificates of live birth (subject birth
certificates) with the same name of the mother and the years of birth of the children in
their office.
Thus, Barcelote filed a petition with the RTC for the cancellation of the subject birth
certificates registered by Tinitigan without her knowledge and participation, and for
containing erroneous entries. After complying with the jurisdictional requirements,
Barcelote was allowed to present evidence ex parte. In her testimony, Barcelote reiterated
her allegations in the petition and emphasized that the subject birth certificates were
registered by her children's biological father, Tinitigan, without her knowledge. She also
testified that the subject birth certificates reflected wrong entries, but she did not present
any other evidence.
RTC ruled in favor of Barcelote and ordered the cancellation of the subject birth
certificates. However, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
W/N children born out of wedlock shall use the surname of their mother.
HELD:
YES. Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, provides:

Illegitimate children “shall” use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.
However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has
been expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing in the civil
made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the
regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate
child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the undisputed facts show that the children were born outside a valid marriage after
3 August 1988, specifically in June 2008 and August 2011, respectively, then they are the
illegitimate children of Tinitigan and Barcelote. The children shall use the surname of their
mother, Barcelote. The entry in the subject birth certificates as to the surname of the
children is therefore incorrect; their surname should have been "Barcelote" and not
"Tinitigan."
The subject birth certificates are not the express recognition of the children's filiation by
Tinitigan, because they were not duly registered in accordance with the law. In case of an
illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the
parents of the infant or only the mother if the father refuses.
The mother must sign and agree to the information entered in the birth certificate because
she has the parental authority and custody of the illegitimate child. An illegitimate child is
under the sole parental authority of the mother, and the mother is entitled to have custody
of the child. The right of custody springs from the exercise of parental authority. Parental
authority is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the
purpose of the children's physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation
of their intellect and the education of their heart and senses.
Since it appears on the face of the subject birth certificates that the mother did not sign the
documents, the local civil registrar had no authority to register the subject birth
certificates. Under the IRR of Act No. 3753, the civil registrar shall see to it that the
Certificate of Live Birth presented for registration is properly and completely filled up, and
the entries are correct. In case the entries are found incomplete or incorrect, the civil
registrar shall require the person concerned to fill up the document completely or to
correct the entries, as the case may be.
Clearly, the subject birth certificates were not executed consistent with the provisions of
the law respecting the registration of birth of illegitimate children. Aside from the fact that
the entry in the subject birth certificates as to the surname of the children is incorrect since
it should have been that of the mother, the subject birth certificates are also incomplete as
they lacked the signature of the mother.
Accordingly, we declare the subject birth certificates void and order their cancellation for
being registered against the mandatory provisions of the Family Code requiring the use of
the mother's surname for her illegitimate children and Act No. 3753 requiring the signature
of the mother in her children's birth certificates.
In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests
of the child shall be the primary consideration.
4. Compulsory recognition, cf. RPC 345
People v. Magtibay
G.R. No. 142985. Aug. 6, 2002
Since parental authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother and
considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses parental
authority over his children, no further positive act is required of the parent as the law itself
provides for the child’s status. Hence, accused-appellant should only be ordered to indemnify
and support the victims child.
FACTS:
Magtibay raped Rachelle. Rachelle kept silent about the incident. It was not until she
became pregnant that she was constrained to tell her mother what happened. She
eventually gave birth to a baby boy.
ISSUE:
Concerning the acknowledgment and support of the offspring of rape.
RULING:
Concerning the acknowledgment and support of the offspring of rape, Article 345 of the
Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of civil liability that may be imposed on the
offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgment of the offspring, unless the law should
prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring. With the passage
of the Family Code, the classification of acknowledged natural children and natural children
by legal fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the specie of illegitimate
children. Since parental authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon the
mother and considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically
loses parental authority over his children, no further positive act is required of the parent
as the law itself provides for the childs status. Hence, accused-appellant should only be
ordered to indemnify and support the victims child. However, the amount and terms of
support shall be determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance
with Article 201 of the Family Code.
Accused-appellant is further ordered to provide support to the victims child born out of the
rape, subject to the amount and terms to be determined by the trial court in a proper
proceeding.
People v. Abella
G.R. No. 177295, January 6, 2010
The order to acknowledge and support accused-appellant’s offspring is in accordance with

Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
The accused-appellant, Abella, is being charged with the rape of AAA, a 38 year old woman
who manifested a mental age of between 7-8 years old. AAA’s intelligence quotient was
only 51, which is classified as a moderate mental retardation. Aside from her mental
disadvantage AAA also suffers from dwarfism. AAA later gave birth to a baby girl due to the
alleged rape.
The accused-appellant merely denied the accusations against him. After trial, the RTC
convicted the accused-appellant. It further ruled that the child conceived and delivered by
AAA was fathered by the accused-appellant and that he is directed to recognize as his
illegitimate daughter, and provide for her support as soon as his financial means permit.
The CA agreed with the findings of the RTC and affirmed the conviction of the accused-
appellant.
ISSUE:
WON the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
YES. In People v. Andaya, it was held that "sexual intercourse with a woman who is a
mental retardate with the mental age of a child below 12 years old constitutes statutory
rape" with or without the attendance of force, threat, or intimidation.
In the present case, the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA, a demented person, through force, threat
or intimidation. AAA was psychiatrically evaluated as an adult woman with the mental age
of a 7 to 8-year old child and that she gave birth to a child despite her mental inability to
give her consent to a sexual relationship. These facts support the allegation of sexual abuse.
The Court upheld the ruling of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, that the accused-
appellant was the biological father of the two-year old daughter of AAA as a result of the
rape incident and in view of their "striking facial similarities and features." The order to
acknowledge and support accused-appellant’s offspring is in accordance with Article 345 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Art. 345. Civil liability of persons guilty of crimes against chastity. — Person guilty of rape,
seduction or abduction, shall also be sentenced:
1. To indemnify the offended woman.
2. To acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing.
3. In every case to support the offspring.
The adulterer and the concubine in the case provided for in Articles 333 and 334 may also
be sentenced, in the same proceeding or in a separate civil proceeding, to indemnify for
damages caused to the offended spouse.

People v. Gersamio
G.R. No. 207098, July 08, 2015
The SC affirms the deletion of the portion of the trial court’s decision ordering Gersamio to
acknowledge paternity and to support AAA’s child in the absence of evidence. In this case, AAA
was already five and a half months pregnant when she was medically examined in September
2002. Obviously, the rape that happened on August 28, 2002 was not the cause of that
pregnancy. With these, Gersamio cannot be ordered to recognize and to support AAA’s child.
FACTS:
Gersamio raped AAA, a 15-year-old in 1999 when the victim was only 13 years old. This
incident was repeated several times and the incident of rape occurred on 28 August 2002
when AAA was about to enter their house. Gersamio hid behind a coconut tree and
suddenly dragged her towards the back of the house which was a banana plantation. He
threatened her with a knife to her neck and kicked her on the thigh when she refused to lie
down. When he was done with his crime he also warned AAA that he would kill her if she
told anyone what had happened.
AAA’s grandmother, BBB, discovered her pregnancy due to the physical changes in her
body. AAA disclosed that the accused was the father and of her harrowing experiences with
him since 1999. BBB confronted Gersamio but in order to save their family from shame,
with Gersamio being the first cousin of AAA’s mother, BBB would just like to keep the
matter among themselves and merely asked him to acknowledge and support the child of
AAA. Gersamio denied the accusations so AAA, accompanied by BBB, reported the incident
to the Barangay.
The trial court found Gersamio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged,
ordering him to pay moral damages, and to acknowledge or recognize AAA’s offspring
resulting from the rape, as well as support AAA’s child.
CA deleted the portion ordering the acknowledgment of paternity and support as the issue
of whether the child is Gersamio’s is yet to be resolved in a full-blown trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the child should be recognized and supported by Gersamio.
RULING:
NO. A meticulous perusal of the records shows no compelling reason to overturn the
findings of both lower courts on the matter of AAA’s credibility and that, indeed, Gersamio
raped her and his guilt was sufficiently proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable
doubt.
Even though the result of AAA’s physical examination conducted in September 2002
showed that she was already five and a half months pregnant at that time, it does not
necessarily follow that the appellant could not have authored the 28 August 2002 rape
against her. Contrary to Gersamio’s view, AAA’s pregnancy is immaterial to the issue
since pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape. So, whether the child
whom the rape victim bore was fathered by the accused, or by some unknown individual, is
of no moment. What is important and decisive is that the accused had carnal knowledge of
the victim against the latter’s will or without her consent, and such fact was testified to by
the victim in a truthful manner.
The SC affirms the deletion of the portion of the trial court’s decision ordering the appellant
to acknowledge paternity and to support AAA’s child in the absence of evidence thereof. In
this case, AAA was already five and a half months pregnant when she was medically
examined in September 2002. Obviously, the rape that happened on 28 August 2002 was
not the cause of that pregnancy. Though there were allegations of repeated rape from 1999
up to 28 August 2002, only two Informations for rape was filed, i.e., the rape incidents in
1999 and on 28 August 2002. And, the appellant was acquitted for the rape committed in
1999 for prosecution’s failure to specify with certainty the exact month in 1999 the offense
was committed. With these, Gersamio cannot be ordered to recognize and to support
AAA’s child.
Needless to say, the foregoing does not affect the earlier findings of this Court on the guilt
of the appellant for the crime of rape committed on 28 August 2002. To repeat, not only is
the impregnation of the rape victim not an element of rape; it must also be stressed that
AAA stated that the appellant repeatedly rape her since 1999 until 28 August 2002.
Although the appellant cannot be held liable for such alleged rapes, as this case does not
cover other incidents of rape prior to 28 August 2002, AAA’s testimony on this point
provides a possible explanation for her childbirth on 5 January 2003 as her child turned
one on 5 January 2004.
5. LEGITIMATED CHILDREN
1. Who may be legitimated, FC 177, RA 9858

Abadilla v. Tabiliran (1995)
249 SCRA 447
Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous
relations.
FACTS:
Judge Jose Tabiliran was married to Teresita Banzuela, however, the former cohabited and
eventually married one Priscilla Baybayan. In his second marriage, Judge Tabiliran
represented himself as single and was able to marry Baybayan without marriage license by
alleging 5-year cohabitation with her. The second marriage produced three “legitimate”
children. Tabiliran attempted to make them his legitimated children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of deceitful conduct for causing the registration of his
three children to the second marriage as legitimated.
RULING:
YES. Under Art. 269 of the Civil Code, only natural children can be legitimated. Children
born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were
not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural. Legitimation is
limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous relations. The
Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, reiterated the above-mentioned
provision thus:
Art. 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time
of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each
other may be legitimated.
The reasons for this limitation are given as follows: 1) The rationale of legitimation would
be destroyed; 2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional
rights; 3) There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change; 4) It is
too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy the
sanctity of marriage; 5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many
years after the birth of the child. It is clear, therefore, that no legal provision, whether old
or new, can give refuge to the deceitful actuations of the respondent.
2. How legitimation takes place, FC 178, FC 180

3. Retroactivity and effects, FC 180-181
4. Action to impugn legitimation, FC 182
5. Rights of legitimated children, FC 179
6. ADOPTED CHILDREN

Lazatin v. Campos
92 SCRA 250
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an
adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule
99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction.
FACTS:
Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin died intestate in Pasay City, survived by his wife, Margarita de Asis,
and his adopted twin daughters, respondent Nora L. de Leon and respondent Irma Lazatin.
Margarita de Asis commenced an intestate proceeding. Two months after, Margarita de
Asis also died, leaving a holographic will. Private respondents filed a petition to probate the
will of the late Margarita de Asis.
On November 22, 1974, or seven months after, the death of Margarita de Asis, petitioner
intervened for the first time in the proceedings to settle the estate of the late Dr. Mariano
M. Lazatin, as an admitted illegitimate (not natural) child.
On August 20, 1975, petitioner Renato to Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara filed a motion to
intervene in the estate of Margarita de Asis, as an adopted child, on the basis of an affidavit
executed by Benjamin Lazatin, brother of the deceased Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin, the
petitioner was an "illegitimate son" of Dr. Lazatin and was later adopted by him. This
affidavit was later modified to state that petitioner was adopted by both Mariano M.
Lazatin and his wife Margarita de Asis.
Respondent court heard petitioner's motion to intervene as an adopted son in the estate of
Margarita de Asis, at which hearings petitioner presented no decree of adoption in his,
favor. Instead, petitioner attempted to prove, over private respondents' objections, that he
had recognized the deceased spouses as his parents; he had been supported by them until
their death; formerly he was known as "Renato Lazatin" but was compelled to change his
surname to "Sta. Clara" when the deceased spouses refused to give consent to his marriage
to his present wife; that at first, he and his wife stayed at the residence of Engracio de Asis,
father of Margarita, but a few months later, they transferred to the Mercy Hospital at Taft
Avenue, Manila, owned by the deceased spouses, where they continuously resided up to the
present. Photographs were also intended to be presented by petitioner, e.g., photograph of
Irma Veloso where she addressed herself as sister of petitioner; photograph of deceased
Margarita de Asis and petitioner when he was a boy; document showing that petitioners
real name is "Renato Lazatin."
On March 4, 1976, respondent court barred the introduction of petitioner's evidence

because all the evidence submitted do not prove or have no tendency to prove the existence
of any judicial proceeding where the adoption of the parties above named were taken up by
any court. The evidence, however, tends to prove a status of a recognized natural child which,
however, is not the legal basis for which Renato and Ramon seek to intervene in this
proceedings.
Petitioner then filed on March 16, 1976, in both cases, a motion to declare as established
the fact of adoption. Respondent court denied the motion because he has failed to establish
such status. The judge ruled that he could not allow petitioner, to introduce evidence that
he had "enjoyed the status of an adopted child” without his first producing competent and
documentary that there had been judicial proceedings for his adoption by the said spouses
which resulted in the final judgment of a competent court decreeing his adoption.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court erred in not allowing Renato Lazatin to introduce evidence that
he had "enjoyed the status of an adopted child” without his first producing competent and
documentary evidence that there had been judicial proceedings for his adoption by the said
spouses which resulted in the final judgment of a competent court decreeing his adoption.
RULING:
No. Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an
adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under
Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is
wholly and entirely artificial. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be
affirmatively proved by the person claiming its existence. The absence of a record of
adoption has been said to evolve a presumption of its non-existence. Where, under the
provisions of the statute, an adoption is effected by a court order, the records of such court
constitute the evidence by which such adoption may be established.
Petitioner's proofs do not show or tend to show that at one time or another a specific court
of competent jurisdiction rendered in an adoption proceeding initiated by the late spouses
an order approving his adoption as a child of the latter. No judicial records of such adoption
or copies thereof are presented or attempted to be presented. If there was really such
adoption, petitioner could have conveniently secured a copy of the newpaper publication of
the adoption as required under Section 4, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court (formerly Section 4,
Rule 100) or a certification of the publishing house to that effect. Petitioner's failure on this
point is another strong indication of the non-existence of the one who gave the written
consent of the non-existence of the adoption paper.
The fact that the deceased spouses fed, clothed, educated, recognized and referred to one
like petitioner as an adopted child, recognized and referred to one like petitioner as an
adopted child, necessarily establish adoption of the child. The attempts of petitioner to
prove his adoption by acts and declarations of the deceased do not discharge the
mandatory presentation of the judicial decree of adoption.
As a necessary consequence, petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara cannot
properly intervene in the settlement of the estate of Margarita de Asis as an adopted child
because of lack of proof thereof. For one to intervene in an estate proceeding, it is a
requisite that he has an interest in the estate, either as one who would be benefited as an
heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor.
Jacinto
Cervantes v. Fajardo (1989)
169 SCRA 575
In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral,
physical and social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and
moral as well as social standing of the contending parents.
FACTS:
Angelie Anne Fajardo was born to Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are common-
law husband and wife. Respondents offered the child for adoption to Carreon’s sister and
brother-in-law, the spouses Cervantes. Carreon executed an affidavit of consent to the
adoption in favor of the Cervantes. Further, Spouses Cervantes managed to secure a
favorable decision from their petition for adoption, freeing the child from the parental
control of Fajardo and Carreon and declared the same as the child of spouses Cervantes.
Said child then became known as Angelie Ann Cervantes.
In 1987, Fajardo and Carreon sent a letter to Spouses Cervantes, demanding to be paid
P150,000.00 otherwise they would get Angelie back. The Spouses Cervantes did not heed
the demand and within the same year, Carreon managed to take away Angelie. Spouses
Cervantes demanded Angelie’s return but Carreon refused, saying she had no intention to
give up her child for adoption and that the affidavit she executed was not fully explained to
her. She however said that she’s willing to return the child provided she be given
P150,000.00.
ISSUE:
Whether the adoption of Angelie is valid and lawful.
RULING:
Yes, Angelie’s adoption is valid. Felisa Tansingco, the social worker who conducted the case
study on the adoption of Angelie, testified that she previously interviewed Carreon wherein
she manifested her desire to have her child be adopted by Spouses Cervantes. The
provision that no mother shall be separated from her child who is under 5 years of age is
not absolute if the court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all controversies
regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and
social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well
as social standing of the contending parents. The common-law relationship of Fajardo and
Carreon, in the mind of the court, will not produce the desirable atmosphere where the
child can grow and develop into a moral-minded person. Further, the fact of unemployment
of Carreon and maintenance of an illicit relationship with a married man like Fajardo fails
to persuade the court that Carreon can properly rear and support her child.
As to the effect of a decree of adoption, it has the effect of dissolving the authority vested in
natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of
the natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall
be exercised jointly by both spouses. The adopting parents have the right to the care and
custody of the adopted child and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him.
R.A. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Law)

R.A. 8043 (Inter-Country Adoption Law)
Bartolome v. SSS
G.R. No. 19253, November 12, 2014
Section 20 of Republic Act No. 855222 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption
Act, provides: “If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted, the parental authority of
the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be
restored if the adoptee is still a minoror incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations
of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.”
FACTS:
John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was covered
by the government’s Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP). Unfortunately, he met an
accident on board the vessel, wherein steel plates fell on him resulting in his death. John
was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Bernardina Bartolome, John’s
biological mother and gave him up for adoption, initiated a claim for death benefits under
P.D. 626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union, alleging that
she was the sole remaining beneficiary of John. The SSS denied the claiim stating that she
was no longer the parent of John as he was legally adopted by Cornelio Colocol based on
the documentary evidence submitted by Bartolome herself. On appeal, the Employees’
Compensation Commission (ECC) affirmed the SSS ruling citing, stating that the adoption
decree severed the relation between John and Bartolome, effectively divesting her of the
status of a legitimate parent, and, consequently, that of being a secondary beneficiary.
ISSUE:
Are the biological parents of the covered, but legally adopted, considered secondary
beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in appropriate cases, to receive the benefits under the
ECP?
RULING:
YES. Nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that "legitimate parents" pertain to
those who exercise parental authority over the employee enrolled under the ECP. In
addition, assuming arguendo that the ECC properly equated legitimacy to parental
authority, Bartolome can still qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary.
When the Cornelio (the adoptive parent) died less than three (3) years after the adoption
decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age. John’s minority at the time of
his adopter’s death is a significant factor. Under such circumstance, parental authority
should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents.
Reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological parents is not a
novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 855222 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the
Domestic Adoption Act, provides:
Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is

granted, the parental authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the
legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minoror
incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the
adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.
The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the restoration of

custody is concerned. The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority,
unlike the grounds for rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations
between the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental
authority in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who
is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.
To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy, especially since RA 8552 was enacted
after Cornelio’s death. Truth be told, there is a lacuna in the law as to which provision shall
govern contingencies in all fours with the factual milieu of the instant petition.
Nevertheless, We are guided by the catena of cases and the state policies behind RA
855224 wherein the paramount consideration is the best interest of the child, which We
invoke to justify this disposition. It is, after all, for the best interest of the child that
someone will remain charged for his welfare and upbringing should his or her adopter fail
or is rendered incapacitated to perform his duties as a parent at a time the adoptee isstill in
his formative years, and, to Our mind, in the absence or, as in this case, death of the
adopter, no one else could reasonably be expected to perform the role of a parent other
than the adoptee’s biological one.
Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority is
severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the biological parents are
not entirely eliminated. In accordance with Art. 190 of the FC, the biological parents retain
their rights of succession to the estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While
the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the
estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least
reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the
right to receive benefits from the adopted.
Oribello v. CA
G.R. No. 163504, Aug. 5, 2015
FACTS:
Toribio Oribello was twice married. His marriage to Emilia, his first wife, was dissolved in
1981 pursuant to the decision of the Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento,
U.S.A. In 1982, Toribio married Berlinda. He then died intestate in 1993.
Before the RTC La Union was an action for partition and damages involving 12 parcels of
land owned by Toribio Oribello and his former wife Ma. Emilia Oribello. Remedios Oribello,
represented by her natural father Alfredo Selga, filed an action against Berlinda, claiming to
be a co-owner of the said properties. Remedios alleged that she is an adopted daughter of
Toribio per decision of the then CFI of Occidental Mindoro (Branch II) in Sp. Proc. No. R-94
granting the petition of Toribio and Emilia, who were childless, for adoption of Remedios,
then eight years old.
Denying that Remedios is an adopted daughter of Toribio, Berlinda averred among others
that the adoption decree was fraudulently secured by Alfredo; that Toribio could not have
filed the first adoption case in Occidental Mindoro because he was a resident of Agoo, La
Union throughout his life; that the Toribio referred to in the first adoption case and
Berlinda’s husband, Toribio, are two different persons; and that Alfredo's fraudulent
scheme was shown by his filing of another petition for adoption in 1983 in the RTC of
Occidental Mindoro (Branch 45), docketed as Sp. Proc. No. R-274.
ISSUE:
Whether Remedios was able to prove that she was adopted by Toribio Oribello, thus
entitled to the judicial partition.
RULING:
NO. In its assailed judgment, the RTC found that Remedios did not satisfactorily establish
her co-ownership of the properties left by the late Toribio. The petitioner Toribio Orivillo
who testified in Special Proceeding No. R-94 was not the real Toribio Oribello who was
born on April 16, 1910 in Agoo, La Union and who died on August 18, 1993 in Agoo, La
Union. Somebody with the name Toribio Orivillo or purporting to be such stood for him
and testified for him in the then CFI of Occidental Mindoro.
Toribio did not know about the first and second adoptions. Under the circumstances, these
were machinations orchestrated by Alfredo Selga as he himself expressly admitted with
respect to the second adoption case. Moreover, the Tomas Orivillo who had legally adopted
Remedios Oribello under the CFI's decree of adoption was not the same person as the
Tomas Oribello.
1. Who may adopt – Sec. 7, 8552
Joaquin
In re: Petition for Adoption Michelle Lim
G.R. No. 168992, May 21, 2009
Joint adoption of the husband and wife is mandatory.
FACTS:
Petitioner married Primo Lim and were childless. Minor children, whose parents were
unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban. Being so eager to have a child
of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear that they were
the children’s parents. The children were named Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim.
After Primo died petitioner married Angel Olario, an American citizen. Thereafter,
petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to
those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. At the time of the filing of the petitions
for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was 18 years
and seven months old. Michelle, Michael and Angel gave their consent through an Affidavit
of Consent. RTC denied the petition for adoption.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.
RULING:
No, joint adoption of the husband and wife is mandatory. The use of the word "shall" means
that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with
the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the
child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require
the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. The law
is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the
petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Neither does petitioner fall under any
of the three exceptions enumerated.
The Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must
comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of
RA 8552. These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to
adopt cannot likewise be waived.
Petitioner insists that subsequent events would show that joint adoption could no longer
be possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in
the Los Angeles Superior Court. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between
petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of
marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage
between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is required.
Jore, Ma. Jovi P.

Republic v. Toledano (1994)
233 SCRA 9
Under the Family Code, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child, which is the ideal
situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but
natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the
spouses.
FACTS:
A verified petition was filed before the RTC of Iba, Zambales by spouses Alvin A. Clouse and
Evelyn A. Clouse, both aliens, seeking to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the
younger brother of Evelyn who has been under their care and custody for quite a time.
Alvin is a natural born US citizen. He married Evelyn, a Filipino, who thereafter became a
naturalized citizen of the US in Guam. They are physically, mentally, morally, and
financially capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor. Solomon gave his
consent to the adoption, and so did his mother Nery Alcala, a widow, due to poverty and
inability to support and educate her son. The social worker assigned to conduct the Home
and Child Study, favorably recommended the granting of the petition for adoption.
Consequently, respondent judge rendered a decision granting the petition for adoption and
decreeing that said minor be considered as their child by adoption. Petitioner, through the
OSG appealed for relief via a Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the lower
court, contending that it erred in granting the petition for adoption because spouses Clouse
are not qualified to adopt under Philippine law as they are both American citizens at the
time of the filing of petition for adoption.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the spouses, both aliens, have the right or are qualified to adopt under
Philippine law.
RULING:
No. The spouses, both aliens, are not qualified to adopt under Philippine law.
Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons
who are not qualified to adopt, viz.:
“(3) An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by
consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse;
or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her
spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance
with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.”
Alvin is not qualified to adopt Solomon under any of the exceptional cases in the
aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural
born citizen of the United States of America. In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is
neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third
place, when private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon
Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a
Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the
United States in 1988.Evelyn, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to
paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to
adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in
her favor alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the
husband and wife.
2. Who may be adopted – Sec. 8
3. Need for consent – Sec. 9
Ko, Nikki Mei Q.

Landingin v. RP
G.R. No. 164948, June 27, 2006
If the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the
legal guardian of the minors will suffice.
FACTS:
Diwata Ramos Landingin (Landingin), a citizen of US, of Filipino parentage and a resident of
Guam, filed a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos
and Eugene Dizon Ramos. The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos,
petitioner’s brother.
Landingin alleged that when Manuel died the children were left to their paternal
grandmother. Their biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married. The minors are
being financially supported by the petitioner and her children, and relatives abroad; as
Maria passed away, petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors have given their
written consent to the adoption. Petitioner’s brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns
substantial income, signified his willingness and commitment to support the minors while
in petitioner’s custody.
The court ordered DSWD to conduct a case study and to submit a report. DSWD’s report
indicated that the children are eligible for adoption.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of their
biological mother, Amelia Ramos
RULING:
Consent of their legal guardian is necessary. Petitioner, argues that the written consent of
the biological mother is no longer necessary because when Amelia’s husband died, she left
for Italy and never came back. The children were then left to the guidance and care of their
paternal grandmother. It is the paternal relatives, including petitioner, who provided for
the children’s financial needs. Hence, Amelia, the biological mother, had effectively
abandoned the children.
Petitioner’s contention must be rejected. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written
consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal
guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of
the minors had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written consent
of their legal guardian.
4. Effects of a decree of adoption, Secs. 13, 16, 17 and 18, FC Arts. 189-190

Tamargo v. CA (1992)
209 SCRA 518
FACTS:
In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, a minor, shot and killed Jennifer Tamargo with an air
rifle. Jennifer's natural parents filed civil complaints for damages with the RTC against
Bundoc's natural parents. In December 1981, spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt
Adelberto. The petition was granted in November 1982.
Adelberto's parents, in their Answer, claimed that the spouses Rapisura were indispensable
parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to them from the moment the
petition for adoption was decreed. Spouses Tamargo contended that since Adelberto was
then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased by mere
filing and granting of the petition for adoption. Trial court dismissed the spouses
Tamargo's petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the spouses Rapisura are the indispensable parties to actions committed by
Adelberto.
RULING:
No. In Article 221 of the Family Code states that: "Parents and other persons exercising
parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or
omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their
parental authority subject to the appropriate defences provided by law." In the case at bar,
parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents at the time the
shooting incident happened. It follows that the natural parents are the indispensable
parties to the suit for damages.
SC held that parental authority had not been retroactively transferred to and vested in the
adopting parents, at the time the shooting happened. It do not consider that retroactive
effect may be given to the decree of the adoption so as to impose a liability upon the
adopting parents accruing at the time when adopting parents had no actual custody over
the adopted child. Retroactive affect may be essential if it permit the accrual of some
benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child.
Jacinto
Cervantes v. Fajardo (1989)
169 SCRA 575
In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral,
physical and social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and
moral as well as social standing of the contending parents.
FACTS:
Angelie Anne Fajardo was born to Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are common-
law husband and wife. Respondents offered the child for adoption to Carreon’s sister and
brother-in-law, the spouses Cervantes. Carreon executed an affidavit of consent to the
adoption in favor of the Cervantes. Further, Spouses Cervantes managed to secure a
favorable decision from their petition for adoption, freeing the child from the parental
control of Fajardo and Carreon and declared the same as the child of spouses Cervantes.
Said child then became known as Angelie Ann Cervantes.
In 1987, Fajardo and Carreon sent a letter to Spouses Cervantes, demanding to be paid
P150,000.00 otherwise they would get Angelie back. The Spouses Cervantes did not heed
the demand and within the same year, Carreon managed to take away Angelie. Spouses
Cervantes demanded Angelie’s return but Carreon refused, saying she had no intention to
give up her child for adoption and that the affidavit she executed was not fully explained to
her. She however said that she’s willing to return the child provided she be given
P150,000.00.
ISSUE:
Whether the adoption of Angelie is valid and lawful.
RULING:
Yes, Angelie’s adoption is valid. Felisa Tansingco, the social worker who conducted the case
study on the adoption of Angelie, testified that she previously interviewed Carreon wherein
she manifested her desire to have her child be adopted by Spouses Cervantes. The
provision that no mother shall be separated from her child who is under 5 years of age is
not absolute if the court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all controversies
regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and
social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well
as social standing of the contending parents. The common-law relationship of Fajardo and
Carreon, in the mind of the court, will not produce the desirable atmosphere where the
child can grow and develop into a moral-minded person. Further, the fact of unemployment
of Carreon and maintenance of an illicit relationship with a married man like Fajardo fails
to persuade the court that Carreon can properly rear and support her child.
As to the effect of a decree of adoption, it has the effect of dissolving the authority vested in
natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of
the natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall
be exercised jointly by both spouses. The adopting parents have the right to the care and
custody of the adopted child and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him.
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia

454 SCRA 541
“It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally
construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the
adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration hence, every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:
In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the

lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
This provision, according to the Code Commission, is necessary so that it may tip the scales in
favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the
determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by
some way of interpreting the law. “
FACTS:
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia. He prayed that the child's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her
mother's surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname. Trial
court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir, and
pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family Code, she is now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should be
allowed to use the surname Garcia as her middle name. The Republic, through the OSG,
agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her natural mother should be maintained
and preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship in the future, and under Article 189
she remains to be an intestate heir of her mother.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname
of her natural mother as her middle name.
RULING:
Yes. There is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like
Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should
not be allowed to do so.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing
Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a
child may use. Article 365 of the CC merely provides that “an adopted child shall bear the
surname of the adopter.” Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of
adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.
Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) a legitimate child by virtue of her
adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her
mother.
Macuha
Bagayas v. Bagayas
G.R. Nos. 187308, Sept. 18, 2013
A registered owner [sic] of other person having an interest in registered property, or, in
proper cases, the [sic] Register of Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner of Land
Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon the ground that x x x new interest not
appearing upon the certificate have arisen or been created; x x x; or upon any other
reasonable ground.
FACTS:
On June 28, 2004, petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of sale and partition, claiming
that Rogelio, Felicidad, Rosalina, Michael, and Mariel, all surnamed Bagayas (respondents)
intended to exclude her from inheriting from the estate of her legally adoptive parents,
Maximino Bagayas (Maximino) and Eligia Clemente (Eligia), by falsifying a deed of absolute
sale (deed of absolute sale) purportedly executed by the deceased spouses (Maximino and
Eligia) transferring two parcels of land (subject lands) registered in their names to their
biological children, respondent Rogelio and Orlando Bagayas6 (Orlando). Said deed, which
was supposedly executed on October 7, 1974, bore the signature of Eligia who could not
have affixed her signature thereon as she had long been dead since August 21, 1971. 9 By
virtue of the same instrument, however, the Bagayas brothers were able to secure in their
favor TCT Nos. 37565710 and 37565811 over the subject lands.
As a matter of course, trial ensued on the merits of the case. Petitioner presented herself
and five other witnesses to prove the allegations in her complaint. Respondents likewise
testified in their defense denying any knowledge of the alleged adoption of petitioner by
Maximino and Eligia, and pointing out that petitioner had not even lived with the
family. Furthermore, Rogelio claimed that after their parents had died, he and Orlando
executed a document denominated as Deed of Extrajudicial Succession (deed of
extrajudicial succession) over the subject lands to effect the transfer of titles thereof to
their names. Before the deed of extrajudicial succession could be registered, however, a
deed of absolute sale transferring the subject lands to them was discovered from the old
files of Maximino, which they used by reason of convenience to acquire title to the said
lands.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the determination of the RTC in Civil Case No. 04-42 that she is an adopted
child and that the signature of her adoptive mother Eligia in the deed of absolute sale
transferring the subject land to Rogelio and Orlando was forged amounts to a new interest
that should be reflected on the certificates of title of said land, or provides a reasonable
ground for the amendment thereof.
HELD:
No. While the RTC may have made a definitive ruling on petitioner's adoption, as well as
the forgery of Eligia's signature on the questioned deed, no partition was decreed, as the
action was, in fact, dismissed. Consequently, the declaration that petitioner is the legally
adopted child of Maximino and Eligia did not amount to a declaration of heirship and co-
ownership upon which petitioner may institute an action for the amendment of the
certificates of title covering the subject land. More importantly, the Court has consistently
ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in an ordinary civil action,
for matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in a special
proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights.
Petitioner cannot avail of the summary proceedings under Section 108 of PD 1529 because
the present controversy involves not the amendment of the certificates of title issued in
favor of Rogelio and Orlando but the partition of the estate of Maximino and Eligia who are
both deceased. As held in Philippine Veterans Bank v. Valenzuela, 50 the prevailing rule is
that proceedings under Section 108 of PD 1529 are summary in nature, contemplating
corrections or insertions of mistakes which are only clerical but certainly not controversial
issues.51 Relief under said legal provision can only be granted if there is unanimity among
the parties, or that there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in
interest. This is now the controlling precedent, and the Court should no longer digress from
such ruling.52 Therefore, petitioner may not avail of the remedy provided under Section
108 of PD 1529.
In fine, while LRC Nos. 08-34 and 08-35 are technically not barred by the prior judgment in
Civil Case No. 04-42 as they involve different causes of action, the dismissal of said
petitions for the amendment of TCT Nos. 375657 and 375658 is nonetheless proper for
reasons discussed above. The remedy then of petitioner is to institute intestate
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses Maximino and Eligia.
5. Rescission of adoption, Sec. 19, 20
Magaoay
Lahom v. Sibulo
G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003
Adoption is a privilege that is governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to
be for the best interest and welfare of the child.26 Matters relating to adoption, including the
withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation
by the State.
FACTS:
A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their own. In 1972,
the trial court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to change
the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to
rescind the decree of adoption, in which she averred, that, despite the her pleas and that of
her husband, their adopted son refused to use their surname Lahom and continue to use
Sibulo in all his dealing and activities. Prior to the institution of the case, in 1998, RA No.
8552 went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind
a decree of adoption (Section 19 of Article VI).
These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of care and
concern prompted Lahom to file a petition in Court in December 1999 to rescind the decree
of adoption previously issued way back on May 5, 1972. When Lahom filed said petition
there was already a new law on adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known as the
Domestic Adoption Act passed on March 22,1998, wherein it was provided that: "Adoption,
being in the interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s).
However the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of
the Civil Code" (Section 19).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject adoption may still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after
the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the adopter’s action
prescribed.
RULING:
In this case, it was months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to
revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1972. By then the new law had already abrogated
and repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil Code and the family Code to rescind a
decree of adoption. So the rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by
Lahom after RA 8552 had come into force, could no longer be pursued.
Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to
the five year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose
the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the
right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a
vested right entitled to protection. Rights are considered vested when the right to the
enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional and perfect or fixed and
irrefutable. The concept of a "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guarantee
of due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural
justice is protected against arbitrary state action. While adoption has often been referred to
in the context of a "right", it is not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely
created by statute. It is more of a privilege that is governed by the state's determination on
what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to
adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify the adoption
decree, are subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of action given by a statute
may be taken away at any time before it has been exercised.
But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid
reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child,
like denying him his legitime, and by will and testament, may expressly exclude him from
having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.

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XI.

PROPERTY RELATIONS OF THE SPOUSES

Lucero, Mark Joey S.

Petitioners Romana and Constancia countered with a Complaint against respondents

1. WON Article 1279 is applicable.

2. No, the donation propter nuptias is not valid.

Mateo v. Lagua (1969)

Is the court of appeals ruling on the inofficiousness of the donation proper?

B. Absolute community of property (ACP) – FC 88, 91, 92, 93

Pascual, Aizen Paula DS.

Whether or not respondent Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement.

No.Respondent Helmut Muller is not entitled to reimbursement.There is an express

Perez, Carla Patricia S.

Whether Beumer’s petition for reimbursement should be granted.

7. What is excluded from ACP, FC 92; FC 95

Perez, Mark Josep R.

Whether Joena’s right to due process was violated.

No, Joena’s right to due process was not violated.

8. Charges upon ACP, FC 94

(d) Sole obligations of a spouse, Art. 94

Racadio, Marie Bernadette M.

Riguerra, Paolo Miguel

(b) Sole administration

Senique, Alyssa Paulina R.

Sobrepena, Kim Angeli

WON the sale of land belonging to the conjugal partnership is valid.

(b) Legal separation, FC 63(2); FC 66

What is the effect of the 6 June 1961 Order of the CFI?

Art. 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:

14. Effects of dissolution

Jore, Ma. Jovi P.

Ko, Nikki Mei Q.

Lazaro, Aprille Keith M.

C. Conjugal partnership of gains

Jore, Ma. Jovi P.

Tec, Natasha Kim R.

1. When CPG commences and applies

Villanueva, Manuel Jejomar M.

The CA affirmed the same.

Vitug, Loisse Danielle D.

Whether or not the property is conjugal.

Yu, Karl Alen G.

Abasta, Benazir Faye V.

Article 160 of the Civil Code provides as follows:

Allorde, Channelle Anne B.

Aranas, Janine Karla A.

Whether or not the lots are conjugal property.

Arriesgado, Mark Reynold M.

De La Pena v. Avila (2012)

3. What is excluded from CPG, FC 109

Bassig, Ma. Karina A.

Jairus Vincent Z. Bernardez

Brito, John Patrick T.

WON the subject properties are Conjugal in nature.

Whether Lucia was entitled to recover from Mariano the jewelry.

Chua Cheng, Ma. Lawreine Francesca C.

Whether or not GSIS’ distribution was correct.

Dioquino, Apriljo Frances B.

Whether petitioner is bound by the detainer judgment against Begosa?

4. Administration of exclusive property

Whether Lucia was entitled to recover from Mariano the jewelry.

Dy, Czara Loraine F.

W/N the parcel of land is exclusive property of the wife.