Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Filipino farmers, the impact of natural disasters and other agricultural risks cannot be taken
lightly.
A perusal from the World Risk Report of 20161 would dictate that the Philippines is
the third most disaster-prone country in the world. The country suffers an average of 20
typhoons per annum. As our country’s economy is highly reliant on the agribusiness sector2,
agricultural insurance is vital. To elucidate the problem, when Typhoon Pablo made a
landfall on the island of Mindanao in 2012, it poured heavy rains with winds of 175 mph or
280 km/h. It was the strongest hurricane to ever hit the southern island of Mindanao to
date3. With a Category 5 classification, Pablo has destroyed P36.95 billion worth of
infrastructure including private properties and agricultural products. P26.5 billion thereof
Taking this into consideration, let us recapitulate the status of the agricultural and
crop insurance in the Philippines. Crop insurance is a risk management mechanism designed
1 Garschagen, Matthias, Hagenlocher, Michael, Comes, Martina, Dubbert, Mirjam, Sabelfeld, Robert, Lee, Yew Jin,
Grunewald, Ludwig, Lanzendörfer, Matthias, Mucke, Peter, Neuschäfer, Oliver, Pott, Simone, Post, Joachim,
Schramm, Stephanie, Schumann-Bölsche, Dorit, Vandemeulebroecke, Bruno, Welle, Torsten and Birkmann,
Joern. (2016). World Risk Report 2016. Bündnis Entwicklung Hilft and UNU-EHS.
2 Philippines Statistics Authority. (2018). Performance of Philippine Agriculture January-March 2018.
3 Masters, J. (December 4, 2012). Dr. Jeff Masters' WunderBlog. Retrieved http://www.wunderground.com.
4 National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council. (2012).
Pa ge | 1
to even out agricultural risks and blunt the consequences of natural disasters to make losses,
loss of the crops, livestock and agricultural assets on account of natural calamities, plant
pests and disease and/or other perils. The Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation (PCIC) is
There are only four agricultural or crop insurance products approved in the
Philippines by the Insurance Commission (IC). These products were applied for by: a) PGA
Western Guaranty. Of these four products, only two, belonging to Bankers Assurance and to
Microinsurance which may be used to insure all assets and economic activities related to the
agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and agro-processing sectors in the Philippines. 7 They were,
The offer of the two aforementioned parametric-based and MicroAgri products lived
shortly. Bankers Assurance’s product lasted for only two to three months, while Western
Guaranty’s product was run for only six months in the market. The marketing of these
Pa ge | 2
products was hampered by the lack of efficient channels for distribution of their products
and the high cost of evaluating and approving claims.8 In addition, farmers simply lacked the
Philippines Institute of Philippine Studies even provides that about 95% of insured farmers
did not pay any premium and most of the farmers were not aware that they were actually
not, it was because these were farmers availed of the free insurance provided by the
government.
particularly those with parametric and microinsurance MicroAgri features, the IC issued
Circular Letter 2015-53 on October 15, 2015, adopting the Agriculture Microinsurance
Framework or MicroAgri Framework. This was done mainly under the microinsurance
predefined parameters or indices have been breached within the term specified in the policy
contracts. Instead of indemnification based on actual loss measurement, the benefit amounts
are determined by one or more parametric formulas or indices, which yield proxy estimates
that are correlated to the actual losses. However, these yielded to other branches of problems
as well.
8 Hazell, P., Pomareda, C. and Valdez, A. (1986). Crop insurance for agricultural development: Issues and
experience. John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD
9 Philippine Institute of Development Studies. (2016). Evaluation of Agricultural Insurance Programs.
Pa ge | 3
With its dire situation, it has become imperative for the government to act on it. The
principal government instrumentality in this regard is the Philippine Crop Insurance Corp.
(PCIC), established on June 11, 1978 by Presidential Decree (PD) 1467, as amended by PD
1733 and Republic Act No. 8175. PCIC is an attached agency of the Department of
against losses arising from natural calamities, plant diseases and pest infestations of crops10.
It also provides protection for non-crop agricultural assets, such as machineries, equipment,
transport facilities and other assets. It offers livestock and fisheries insurance. It operates
However, PCIC claimed that the operation of the agricultural insurance program is
and the casual empiricism that the elasticity of demand for agricultural insurance with
respect to price is highly elastic going up (and relatively inelastic going down)”. 11 The
following elaborate on the constraints in operating the Philippine crop insurance program.
First, there is a need for Larger Investment Fund. PCIC is not allowed to load its
overhead and profit margins to the price of insurance particularly for the rice and corn lines.
Because of this, PCIC was authorized under RA 8175 to increase its capitalization to P2B so
that earnings on its investments will answer for its overhead expenses. 12 Unfortunately, the
National Government was unable to fully fulfill its financial obligation to the program. Capital
contribution from the government came in trickles and far between and as of June 2001, only
Pa ge | 4
amounted to P 905M. This was complicated by the non-remittance and/or late remittance of
the government’s share in the premium for the traditional lines resulting in illusory premium
rates. Total premium arrears due the national government has been growing. These
shortfalls in capital contribution and premium shares greatly diminished PCIC's investment
management's efforts, the funding gap between overhead cost and investment earnings still
persisted.13
Second, as stated earlier, the current operation demands for high overhead costs.
High Overhead Cost. A study from the John Hopkins University14 suggested that the
reasonable claims figure for crop insurance programs worldwide should be around 15% of
the total sum insured whilst overhead cost should be around 5%. In the case of PCIC, the
damage rates for rice and corn ranged from 2.68% (1991) to 18.51% (1988), or an annual
average of 8.2%. Or in terms of loss ratio, the national composite rate over the last 10 years
is 0.82:1 - meaning, PCIC is doing well and within worldwide norms on the underwriting
side. Cost wise, however, the delivery of agricultural insurance to the countryside is quite
staggering. Cost-trimming measures could have been easily adopted if PCIC were a private
entity, but the organization is bound by its legal mandate to serve the small marginalized
farmers, even in the out-of-the-way places. The huge operational overhead is further
aggravated by the individual underwriting and claims approach PCIC has been using. Cost-
cutting measures had been instituted by PCIC in response to financial pressures, including
Pa ge | 5
the drastic downsizing of its personnel from over 500 to 222 in mid2000. Benefits from the
measures were significant but not enough to pull PCIC out of the bind.15
Lastly, there is an underlying question for its stability. There is a growing realization
in the agriculture sector that agricultural insurance is important in yield risk management
owing to the ill-effects of the vagaries of nature as well as pests and diseases. However,
intervention is needed to bring down insurance cost to their level of affordability. With
insufficient government support, the viability and sustainability of the program seems to be
in peril.16
With the PCIP’s existence for almost three decades and with its operational
fluctuations, it still has relatively slight impression to display. Its mandate of providing
security for agricultural producers, particularly subsistence farmers, has been met with
logistical and operational trials over the past decades. For the reason that its operation is
based on the captured market of formal lenders, it effectively operated as a supporting body
PCIC should have been more efficient and effective to cajole more farmers. PCIC must
go after its mandated target market—the small farmers and the implementation of the
MicroAgri because that is where the majority of our farmers are. If the insurance program is
not allowed by law to impose commercially competitive rates and profit from smallholder
farmers, then the program has no choice but to stick close to formal lenders and avail of
Pa ge | 6
promised subsidies. The program just has to find resourceful ways to enlarge its share of the
market.
Pa ge | 7