CHAPTER 1 - THE NATURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS • CHR – then ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more

than P200,000.00 in favor of the private respondents to purchase light housing

materials and food under the Commission's supervision and again directed the
Case No. 01 petitioners to "desist from further demolition, with the warning that violation of said
Simon v. CHR - Ceballos order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest. the CHR also cited the
Ponente J. Vitug petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on
each of them.
SIMON VS CHR G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994 • Petitioners – filed a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the
petitioners, stating that the Commission's authority should be understood as being
Petitioner: confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that
• BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., "the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but)
• CARLOS QUIMPO, their privilege to engage in business."
• CARLITO ABELARDO, AND
• GENEROSO OCAMPO Issue
• WON there was a violation of rights?
Defendant:
• COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Ruling:
• ROQUE FERMO, AND • No violation of rights - In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil
• OTHERS AS JOHN DOES, that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and
carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a
Law: land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park". More than that, the
• Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial
notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is not
Fast Topic: thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is
• CHR has the power to investigate civil and political rights violated. claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be
• It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards
is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we
are not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari
Facts: stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the compartment of
• Petitioner Carlos Quimpo – issued a Demolition Notice to the private "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the
respondents, being members and officers of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Constitution.
Inc., where they were given a grace-period of three 3 days to vacate the • Power of CHR - Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution
questioned premises of North EDSA in order to give way to the “People’s Park”. empowers the Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on
• Respondent Roque Fermo – As the president of the said organization, led complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
a filling of a complaint with the CHR to stop the demolition of their stalls, sari-sari political rights. Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission,
stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on
• CHR - issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human
demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1)
vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the
to appear before the CHR. prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5)
• Petitioners - despite the order, still carried out the demolition of private salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious."
respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any preclusive effect,
more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for
the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in
peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial
jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may
provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the
authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation.
• Civil Rights – Those rights that belong to every citizen of the state or
country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the
organization or administration of the government. They include the rights of
property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as
otherwise defined civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his
citizenship in a state or community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense,
to rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.
• Political rights - to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to
hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to
citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government
Case No. 02
Soriao v. Pineda
CD: Manalili
Ponente J. Vitug
C.A. G.R. SP NO. 31546 August 10,1994
Fast Topic:
● Second Generation of Rights (Right to Education)
Law:
● Article XIV, Sections 1 and 2
● Article II, Sections 13 and 17 of the 1987 Constitution
Facts: Louie Soriao was a high school student in the sub province of Dinalungan,
Aurora (S.Y. 1993 to 1994). Due to his reputation of talking back to school
authority during the past years, he was refused readmission to complete his fourth
and final year of high school through a verbal notice not to readmit. Soriao
questioned the notice, averring that he was deprived of a hearing on the matter
and thus the verbal notice was a denial of his right to due process. The
administration ignored the student’s plea to reconsider its decision to deny him
readmission claiming, “it was their prerogative.” Seeking further remedies to no
avail, Soriao filed a petition for certiorari to the CA.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was denied his right to education.
Ruling: YES. The Court of Appeals ordered Pineda, Head Teacher of the Juan C.
Angara Memorial High School to allow Soriao to enroll and study after he was
meted out a disciplinary action without due process. The Court of Appeals invoked
the 1987 Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Article XIV, Sections 1 and 2 and Article II, Sections 13 and 17 of the 1987
Constitution provide:
Article XIV, Section 1: The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens
to quality education at all levels, and shall take appropriate steps to make such
education accessible to all.
Section 2: The State shall: (1) Establish, maintain, and support a complete,
adequate, and integrated system of education relevant to the needs of the people
and society; (2) Establish and maintain, a system of free public education in the
elementary and high school levels. Without limiting the natural right of parents to
rear their children, elementary education is compulsory for all children of school
age; (3) Establish and maintain a system of scholarship grants, student loan
programs, subsidies, and other incentives which shall be available to deserving
students in both public and private schools, especially to the under-privileged; (4)
Encourage non-formal, informal, and indigenous learning system, as well as self-
study programs particularly those that respond to community needs; and (5)
Provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with training in civics,
vocational efficiency, and other skills.
Article II, Section 13: The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-
building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual,
and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and
encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs
Section 17: The State shall give priority to education, science and technology,
arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social
progress, and promote total human liberation and development.
Also since it is the Constitution which granted petitioner the right of education, he
may only deprived of such right with due process of law as stated in Art. III, Sec. 1
of the 1987 Constitution, “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the
laws.
Case No. 03
Oposa v. Factoran - Migallon
Ponente
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993
FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al.,
representing their generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their
parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that
judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to:
1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the
country;
2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or
appraising new TLAs;
and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises.” They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its
capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in
allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in
trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;
2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which
properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of the government.
ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit.
Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of
nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land,
waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end
that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the
present as well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that
rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.
Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generations to come.
Case No. 04
Baldoza v. Dimaano - Ruedas
Antonio, J.
FACTS:
● The municipal secretary of taal charges municipal judge Dimaano of the
same municipality, with abuse of authority in refusing to allow the
employees of the mun. mayor to examine the criminal docket records of
the mun. Court to secure in data connection with their contemplated report
on the peace and order conditions of the said min.
● Dimaano answered that:
○ there has never been an intention to refuse access;
○ court records are public documents open to inspection not only by
the parties directly involved but also by other persons who have
legitimate interest to such, YET it is always subject to a
reasonable regulation;
○ the court has the power to prevent an improper use or inspection
of its records and the furnishing of copies may be refused where
the person requesting is motivated out of whim or fancy, mere
curiosity, to gratify private spite, or to promote public scandal.
● He likewise observed that:
 ○ The restrictions are for the fear of an abuse in the exercise of the
right.
○ “Under the circumstances, to allow an indiscriminate and unlimited
exercise of the right to free access, might do more harm than good
to the citizenry of Taal.”
● A motion to dismiss was filed by the Mayor but it was denied by the
Investigating Judge. After the investigation, he recommended exoneration
of the respondent.
○ Complainant admitted that he was aware of the rules and
conditions imposed by the respondent when he went to his office
to view his docket books for the purpose mentioned in his
communication. He also agreed that he is amenable to such rules
and conditions which the respondent may impose. Under these
conditions, therefore, the Court finds that the respondent has not
committed any abuse of authority.
ISSUE: Whether or not the responded acted arbitrarily in the premises.
HELD: NO.
Access to judicial records may not be prohibited; however, a judge may regulate
examination of such records.—As found by the Investigating Judge, the
respondent allowed the complainant to open and view the docket books of
respondent under certain conditions and under his control and supervision. It has
not been shown that the rules and conditions imposed by the respondent were
unreasonable. The access to public records is predicated on the right of the people
to acquire information on matters of public concern. Undoubtedly in a democracy,
the public has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political significance. In
an earlier case, this Court held that mandamus would lie to compel the Secretary
of Justice and the Register of Deeds to examine the records of the latter office.
Predicating the right to examine the records on statutory provisions, and to a
certain degree by general principles of democratic institutions, this Court stated
that while the Register of Deeds has discretion to exercise as to the manner in
which persons desiring to inspect, examine or copy the records in his office may
exercise their rights, such power does not carry with it authority to prohibit.
While public is entitled to information on matters of public concern, restrictions on
access to certain records may be imposed by law.—The New Constitution now
expressly recognizes that the people are entitled to information on matters of
public concern and thus are expressly granted access to official records, as well as
documents of official acts, or transactions, or decisions, subject to such limitations
imposed by law. The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition
of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can
be no realistic perception by the public of the nation’s problems, nor a meaningful
democratic decision making if they are denied access to information of general
interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the
exigencies of the times. x x x However, restrictions on access to certain records
may be imposed by law. Thus, access restrictions imposed to control civil
insurrection have been permitted upon a showing of immediate and impending
danger that renders ordinary means of control inadequate to maintain order.
Case No. 05
David v. Pres. GMA et al. - Wheiiy
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
FACTS: On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th
Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017,
implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of national emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the
Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine
Constitution which states that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary,
. . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in
my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or
suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or
rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in
Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents
stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the
conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s
Army, and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or
assassinate President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the
President and take-over the reins of government as a clear and present danger.
Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24,
2006 on their way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily
Tribune, which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched without warrant at
about 1:00 A.M. on February 25, 2006. Seized from the premises – in the absence
of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building – were
several materials for publication. The law enforcers, a composite team of PNP and
AFP officers, cited as basis of the warrantless arrests and the warrantless search
and seizure was Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of her constitutional power to call out the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
ISSUES: 1. Were the rights of petitioners David, et
al., made pursuant to PP 1017 violated by the warrantless arrests
2. Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily
Tribune’s offices conducted pursuant to PP 1017 violated human
rights
HELD:
1. NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP
1017, were NOT valid which are in violation of human rights.
Searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a
validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest.
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
x x x.
Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests]
justifies petitioner David’s warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of
inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers could
invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the
invective “Oust Gloria Now”and their erroneous assumption that petitioner David
was the leader of the rally.Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his
immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that
petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it,
such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition.
2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribune’s offices
conducted pursuant to PP 1017 was NOT valid.
The search and seizure in the Daily Tribune premise is illegal. A search warrant
must be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.
Moreover, it is in violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights with regards to Article 14:
“All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of
any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law,
everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent
and impartial tribunal established by law. The press and the public may be
excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order (ordre public)
or national security in a democratic society, or when the interest of the private lives
of the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the
court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of
justice;.... “
Case No. 06
Almario v. The executive Secretary - Ceballos
Ponente Leonardo De-Castro
ALMARIO VS EXEC SEC G.R. No. 189028 July 16, 2013
Petitioner: • NATIONAL ARTIST FOR LITERATURE VIRGILIO
ALMARIO, Et. Al
Defendant: • EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et. al
Fast Topic: • The president must faithfully execute laws
Facts
• NCCA BoT and CCP BoT – submitted a list of, May 6, 2009, a letter,
signed jointly by the Chairperson of the NCCA, Undersecretary Vilma Labrador,
and the President and Artistic Director of the CCP, Mr. Nestor Jardin, a list of
nominations for the conferment of the National Artist Award. The nominees were
Manuel Conde for Film, Ramon Santos for Music, Lazaro Francisco for literature,
and Federico Aguilar Alcuaz for Visual Arts.
• Office of the President - allegedly received nominations from various
sectors, cultural groups and individuals strongly endorsing private respondents
Cecile Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas, Francisco Mañosa and Jose
Moreno. The Committee on Honors purportedly processed these nominations and
invited resource persons to validate the qualifications and credentials of the
nominees.
• The Committee on Honors - thereafter submitted a memorandum to then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo recommending the conferment of the Order of
National Artists on the four recommendees of the NCCA and the CCP Boards, as
well as on private respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno.
• President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo - Acting on this recommendation,
issued different proclamations declaring Manuel Connde, Lazaro Francisco,
Federico Aguilar - Alcuaz and private respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas,
Mañosa and Moreno, respectively, as National Artists.
• Petitioners - claim that former President Macapagal-Arroyo gravely
abused her discretion in disregarding the results of the rigorous screening and
selection process for the Order of National Artists and in substituting her own
choice for those of the Deliberation Panels. According to petitioners, the
President’s discretion to name National Artists is not absolute but limited. In
particular, her discretion on the matter cannot be exercised in the absence of or
against the recommendation of the NCCA and the CCP.
Issue
• WoN the President’s discretion in conferring National Artists award limited
or absolute?
Ruling
• 1. Limited - the President may or may not adopt the recommendation or
advice of the NCCA and the CCP Boards. In other words, the advice of the NCCA
and the CCP is subject to the President’s discretion. Nevertheless, the President’s
discretion on the matter is not totally unfettered, nor the role of the NCCA and the
CCP Boards meaningless.
By virtue of their respective statutory mandates in connection with the conferment
of the National Artist Award, the NCCA and the CCP decided to work together and
jointly administer the National Artist Award. They reviewed the guidelines for the
nomination, selection and administration of the National Artist Award, created a
National Artist Award Secretariat, centralized all financial resources and
management for the administration of the National Artist Award, and added
another layer to the selection process so that more members of the arts and
culture sector of the Philippines may be involved and participate in the selection of
National Artists.
We have held that an administrative regulation adopted pursuant to law has the
force and effect of law. Thus, the rules, guidelines and policies regarding the Order
of National Artists jointly issued by the CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA
pursuant to their respective statutory mandates have the force and effect of law.
Until set aside, they are binding upon executive and administrative agencies,
including the President himself/herself as chief executor of laws.
Pursuant to the provisions of the implementing rules of Executive Order No. 236,
s. 2003, the authority of the Committee on Honors is limited to determining
whether the nominations submitted by a particular awards committee, in this case,
the joint NCCA and CCP Boards, have been tainted by abuse of discretion, and
whether the nominees are in good standing. Should the nominations meet these
two criteria, the Committee on Honors shall make a recommendation to the
President for conferment of the Order of National Artists.
Applying this to the instant case, the former President could not have properly
considered respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno, as their
names were not recommended by the NCCA and the CCP Boards. Otherwise, not
only will the stringent selection and meticulous screening process be rendered
futile, the respective mandates of the NCCA and the CCP Board of Trustees under
relevant laws to administer the conferment of Order of National Artists, draft the
rules and regulations to guide its deliberations, formulate and implement policies
and plans, and undertake any and all necessary measures in that regard will also
become meaningless.
• Discretion is not a free-spirited stallion that runs and roams wherever it
pleases but is reined in to keep it from straying. In its classic formulation,
"discretion is not unconfined and vagrant" but "canalized within banks that keep it
from overflowing."
• The President’s power - must be exercised in accordance with existing
laws. Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution prescribes faithful execution of the
laws by the President:
o Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied.)
The faithful execution clause is best construed as an obligation imposed on the
President, not a separate grant of power. It simply underscores the rule of law and,
corollarily, the cardinal principle that the President is not above the laws but is
obliged to obey and execute them.This is precisely why the law provides that
"administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when
they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution."
Case No. 07
Vivares v. St. Theresa's College - Manalili
Ponente J. Velasco Jr.
G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014
Fast Topic:
● First Generation of Rights (Right to Privacy).
Facts:
Julia and Julienne, both minors, were, during the period material, graduating high
school students at STC. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their
swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along
with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their
undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela on her Facebook
profile. Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high school department, learned
from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting
themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Upon discovery,
Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her student’s Facebook page,
showed the photos to Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for
appropriate action. Thereafter, following an investigation, STC found the identified
students to have deported themselves in a manner proscribed by the school’s
Student Handbook.
On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures in
question, reported, as required, to the office Sr. Purisima, STC’s high school
principal and. They claimed that during the meeting, they were castigated and
informed their parents the following day that, as part of their penalty, they are
barred from joining the commencement exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012. A
week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M.
Tan (Tan), filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages before the RTC and
command the respondent not to implement the said sanction which the RTC
issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) allowing the students to attend the
graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a motion for reconsideration. Despite the
issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned students from
participating in the graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of the
commencement exercises, its adverted motion for reconsideration on the issuance
of the TRO remained unresolved.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a
Writ of Habeas Data, Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC
issued the writ of habeas data. Through the same Order, herein respondents were
directed to file their verified written return, together with the supporting affidavits,
within five (5) working days from service of the writ. In time, respondents complied
with the RTC’s directive and filed their verified written return, laying down the
following grounds for the denial of the petition. the RTC rendered a Decision
dismissing the petition for habeas data. Hence the petition.
adrianantazo.wordpress.com
Issues: Whether the Respondents violated the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or
security of the minors involved in this case.
Held: No, the respondents failed to established that the uploading or showing the
photos to Tigol constitute a violation of their privacy. the showing of the said photo
to Tigol disproves their allegation that the photos were viewable only by the five of
them. Without any evidence to corroborate their statement that the images were
visible only to the five of them, and without their challenging Escudero’s claim that
the other students were able to view the photos, their statements are, at best, self-
serving, thus deserving scant consideration. adrianantazo.wordpress.com
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that
her students, who are the minors’ Facebook “friends,” showed her the photos
using their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special means
to be able to view the allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s
students, and that it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in
reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be
surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on
Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the
disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke the
protection attached to the right to informational privacy. That the photos are
viewable by “friends only” does not necessarily bolster the petitioners’ contention.
It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to
“Friends” is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is
not Facebook friends with the source of the content. The user’s own Facebook
friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto,
regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with
the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the
respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged
can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at “Friends.”
Case No. 08
Pestilos v. Generoso - Migallon
Ponente
FACTS: On February 20, 2005, there was an altercation ensued between the
petitioners and the defendant, Atty. Generoso. The defendant then called the
Central Police District to report the incident. The police then acted on the report
and dispatched officers to go to the scene of the crime and to provide assistance.
Upon arriving at the scene of the crime, they saw the defendant badly beaten.
The defendant pointed the petitioners as those who mauled him which prompted
the police officers to “invite” the petitioners to go to the police station for
investigation. At the inquest proceeding, it was found out that the petitioners
stabbed the defendant with a bladed weapon.
On February 22, 2005, the petitioners were then indicted for attempted murder. On
March 07, 2005, the petitioners filed for an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation on the ground that they had not been lawfully arrested since there
was no valid warrantless arrest that took place because the police officers did not
personally know that they were the perpetrators of the crime.
The Regional Trial Court denied the petitioners’ Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation and likewise denied their motion for reconsideration. The
petitioners then challenged the decision of the RTC before the Court of Appeals
but the CA issued its decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The CA
recognized that the arrest was pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest.
ISSUES:
WON the petitioners were validly arrested without a warrant.
WON the petitioners were lawfully arrested when they were merely invited to the
police precinct.
RULINGS:
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which
they have personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have
arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, it is
deemed reasonable to conclude that the police officers have personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners’ warrantless arrests. Section
5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:
When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it.
The circumstances qualify as the police officers’ personal observation, which are
within their personal knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.
The term “invited” is construed to mean as an authoritative command. Arrest is
defined as the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense. An arrest is made by an actual restraint
of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person
making the arrest. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the
parties to arrest the other and the intent of the other to submit, under the belief and
impression that submission is necessary. The application of actual force would
only be an alternative if the petitioners had exhibited resistance.
There is no taint of impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in this Order. The
RTC, in resolving the motion, is not required to state all the facts found in the
record of the case. Detailed evidentiary matters, as the RTC decreed, is best
reserved for the full-blown trial of the case, not in the preliminary incidents leading
up to the trial. Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the
decision that should state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based. In resolving a motion, the court is only required to state clearly and
distinctly the reasons therefore. A contrary system would only prolong the
proceedings, which was precisely what happened to this case. Hence, the court
upholds the validity of the RTC’s order as it correctly stated the reason for its
denial of the petitioners’ Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.
Section 1(3), Article III- The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The Supreme Court denies the petition and affirms the decision of the Court of
Appeals. The City Prosecutor of Quezon City is hereby ordered to proceed with
the criminal proceedings against the petitioners.
Case No. 09
Sen. Jinggoy Estrada v. Ombudsman - Oasan
Ponente
FACTS: Sometime in November and December 2013, the Ombudsman served on
Sen. Estrada two (2) criminal complaints for plunder, among others. Eighteen (18)
of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints filed their counter-affidavits
between 9 December 2013 and 14 March 2014.
On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be Furnished with Copies of
Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and
Other Filings” (the “Request”). Sen. Estrada’s request was made “pursuant to the
right of a respondent ‘to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which
he may not have been furnished’ (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court)
and to ‘have access to the evidence on record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman).”
The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s Request, which is not the subject of the
present certiorari case.
ISSUE: WON petitioner Estrada was denied due process of law
HELD: NO. The denial did not violate Sen. Estrada’s constitutional right to due
process. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to specify a law or rule which states that it is
a compulsory requirement of due process in a preliminary investigation that the
Ombudsman furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of his co-
respondents. Furthermore, There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman
to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.
Moreover, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited to
those granted by procedural law.
Thus, Sen. Estrada's present Petition for Certiorari is not only premature, it also
constitutes forum shopping. WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the Petition for Certiorari
in G.R. Nos. 212140-41.
CHAPTER 2 - SOURCES AND FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Case No. 01
Mejoff v. Director of Prisons - Ceballos
Ponente Tuason
Mejoff Vs. Director of Prisons G.R. No. L-4254 September 26, 1951
Petitioner: • Boris Mejoff
Defendant: • Director of Prisons
Fast Topic: • All rights apply even to aliens
Facts
• Boris Mejoff - is an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this
country from Shanghai as a secret operative by the Japanese forces during the
latter's regime in these Islands. Upon liberation he was arrested as a Japanese
spy, by U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps. Later he was handed to the
Commonwealth Government for disposition in accordance with Commonwealth
Act No. 682. Thereafter, the People's Court ordered his release.
But the deportation Board taking his case up, declared him as an illegal alien,
because of the lack of proper travel papers, and ordered that he be deported on
the first available transportation to Russia. The petitioner was then under custody,
he having been arrested on March 18, 1948.
After repeated failures to ship this deportee abroad because no ship would take
him back to Russia, the authorities removed him to Bilibid Prison at Muntinglupa
where he has been confined up to the present time, inasmuch as the
Commissioner of Immigration believes it is for the best interests of the country to
keep him under detention while arrangements for his departure are being made.
• In 1949 – Mejoff filed a first writ of Habeas Corpus was filed but it was
denied by the SC stating that the detention temporary and said that "temporary
detention is a necessary step in the process of exclusion or expulsion of
undesirable aliens and that pending arrangements for his deportation, the
Government has the right to hold the undesirable alien under confinement for a
reasonable lenght of time."
• In 1951 - Over two years having elapsed since the decision aforesaid was
promulgated, the Government has not found way and means of removing the
petitioner out of the country, and none are in sight, although it should be said in
justice to the deportation authorities, it was through no fault of theirs that no ship or
country would take the petitioner. Hence, this present petition for Habeas Corpus.
Issue
• WoN the writ should issue?
Ruling
• 1. Granted - Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right of
asylum therein (Sowapadji vs. Wixon, Sept. 18, 1946, 157 F. ed., 289, 290), even
if they are "stateless," which the petitioner claims to be.
It is no less true however, as impliedly stated in this Court's decision, supra, that
foreign nationals, not enemy against whom no charge has been made other than
that their permission to stay has expired, may not indefinitely be kept in detention.
The protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law and except
for crimes committed against the laws of the land is not limited to Philippine
citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality.
Whether an alien who entered the country in violation of its immigration laws may
be detained for as long as the Government is unable to deport him, is a point we
need not decide. The petitioner's entry into the Philippines was not unlawful; he
was brought by the armed and belligerent forces of a de facto government whose
decrees were law furing the occupation.
• Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 3) the Philippines "adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of Nation." And
in a resolution entitled "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" and approved by
the General Assembly of the United Nations of which the Philippines is a member,
at its plenary meeting on December 10, 1948, the right to life and liberty and all
other fundamental rights as applied to all human beings were proclaimed.
It was there resolved that "All human beings are born free and equal in degree and
rights" (Art. 1); that "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in
this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social origin, property,
birth, or other status" (Art. 2): that "Every one has the right to an effective remedy
by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights
granted him by the Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that "No one shall be subjected
to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile" (Art. 9); etc.
• In U. S. vs. Nichols, 47 Fed. Supp., 201, it was said that the court "has the
power to release from custody an alien who has been detained an unreasonably
long period of time by the Department of Justice after it has become apparent that
although a warrant for his deportation has been issued, the warrant can not be
effectuated;" that "the theory on which the court is given the power to act is that
the warrant of deportation, not having been able to be executed, is functus officio
and the alien is being held without any authority of law." The decision cited several
cases which, it said, settled the matter definitely in that jurisdiction, adding that the
same result had reached in innumerable cases elsewhere.
The most recent case, as far as we have been able to find, was that of
Staniszewski vs. Watkins (1948), 90 Fed. Supp., 132, which is nearly foursquare
with the case at hand. In that case a stateless person, formerly a Polish national,
was ordered excluded from the United States and detained at Ellis Island because
he had no papers, and that in 1937 had been convicted of perjury because in
certain documents he presented himself to be an American citizen. Upon his
application for release on habeas corpus, the Court released him upon his own
recognizance
Although not binding upon this Court as a precedent, the case aforecited affords a
happy solution to the quandry in which the parties here finds themselves, solution
which we think is sensible, sound and compatible with law and the Constitution.
For this reason, and since the Philippine law on immigration was patterned after or
copied from the American law and practice, we choose to follow and adopt the
reasoning and conclusions in the Staniszewski decision with some modifications
which, it is believed, are in consonance with the prevailing conditions of peace and
order in the Philippines.
• It was an issu that the petitioner was engaged in subversive activities, and
fear was expressed that he might join or aid the disloyal elements if allowed to be
at large.
If we grant, for the sake of argument, that such a possibility exists, still the
petitioner's unduly prolonged detention would be unwarranted by law and the
Constitution, if the only purpose of the detention be to eliminate a danger that is by
no means actual, present, or uncontrolable. After all, the Government is not
impotent to deal with or prevent any threat by such measure as that just outlined.
• Premises considered, the writ will issue commanding the respondents to
release the petitioner from custody upon these terms: The petitioner shall be
placed under the surveillance of the immigration authorities or their agents in such
form and manner as may be deemed adequate to insure that he keep peace and
be available when the Government is ready to deport him. The surveillance shall
be reasonable and the question of reasonableness shall be submitted to this Court
or to the Court of First Instance of Manila for decision in case of abuse. He shall
also put up a bond for the above purpose in the amount of P5,000 with sufficient
surety or sureties, which bond the Commissioner of Immigration is authorized to
exact by section 40 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.
Case No. 02
Kuroda v. Jalandoni - Manalili
Ponente J. C. Moran
G.R. No. L-2662 March 26, 1949
Fast Topic:
● Incorporation Clause- found in Art II, Sec 2 of the Constitution stating
that the Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy,
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
land...”
Facts:
Petitioner Sheginori Kuroda was the former Lt. General of the Japanese Army and
commanding general of the Japanese forces during the occupation (WWII) in the
country. He was tried before the Philippine Military Commission for War Crimes
and other atrocities committed against military and civilians. The military
commission was establish under Executive Order 68.
Petitioner assails the validity of EO 68 arguing it is unconstitutional and hence the
military commission did not have the jurisdiction to try him on the following
grounds: that the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention (War
Crimes). Petitioner likewise assails that the US is not a party of interest in the case
hence the 2 US prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not EO 68 is constitutional thus the military tribunal jurisdiction
is valid
HELD:
EO 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda. EO 68
was enacted by the President and was in accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of
Constitution which renounces war as an instrument of national policy. Hence it is in
accordance with generally accepted principles of international law including the
Hague Convention and Geneva Convention, and other international jurisprudence
established by the UN, including the principle that all persons (military or civilian)
guilty of plan, preparing, waging a war of aggression and other offenses in
violation of laws and customs of war. The Philippines may not be a signatory to the
2 conventions at that time but the rules and regulations of both are wholly based
on the generally accepted principles of international law. They were accepted even
by the 2 belligerent nations (US and Japan).
As to the participation of the 2 US prosecutors in the case, the US is a party of
interest because its country and people have greatly aggrieved by the crimes
which petitioner was being charged of. Moreover, the Phil. Military Commission is
a special military tribunal and rules as to parties and representation are not
governed by the rules of court but the provision of this special law.