Civil Liability for Violation of Rights

In their answer, defendants-appellees denied the material allegations

Lim vs. Ponce De Leon Case Digest August 29, 1975
TOPIC: ARTICLE 32 OF THE CIVIL CODE/ SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
 1962, forcibly taken with violence upon persons and with intent to
FACTS:Taha sold to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya a motor launch
named M/L "SAN RAFAEL". A year later or on April 9,
1962 Alberto Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Palawan alleging that after the sale Jikil Taha
forcibly took away the motor launch from him.
Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, upon being informed that the motor
launch was in Balabac, Palawan, wrote the Provincial Commander of
Palawan requesting him to direct the detachment commander-in
Balabac to impound and take custody of the motor launch.
On June 26, 1962, Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to the
Provincial Commander to impound the motor launch, explaining that
its subsequent sale to a third party, plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim,
cannot prevent the court from taking custody of the same. 2 So, on
July 6, 1962 upon order of the Provincial Commander, defendant-
appellee Orlando Maddela, Detachment Commander of Balabac,
Palawan, seized the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL" from plaintiff-
appellant Delfin Lim and impounded it.
Delfin Lim and Jikil Taha filed a case against Fiscal Francisco Ponce de
Leon and Orlando Maddela, alleging that on July 6, 1962 Orlando
Maddela entered the premises of Delfin Lim without
a search warrant and then and there took away the hull of the motor
launch without his consent; that he effected the seizure upon order
of Fiscal Ponce de Leon who knew fully well that his office was not
of the complaint and as affirmative defenses alleged that the motor
launch in question which was sold by Jikil Taha
to Alberto Timbangcaya on April 29, 1961 was sometime in April
gain by Jikil Taha from Alfredo Timbangcaya without the latter's
knowledge and consent, thus giving rise to the filing of a criminal
charge of robbery against Jikil Taha; that Fiscal Ponce de Leon, in his
capacity as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Palawan ordered Orlando
Maddela to seize and impound the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL", for
being the corpus delicti of the robbery; and that Orlando Maddela
merely obeyed the orders of his superior officer to impound said
launch. By way of counterclaim, defendants-appellees alleged that
because of the malicious and groundless filing of the complaint by
plaintiffs-appellants, they were constrained to engage the services of
lawyers, each of them paying P500.00 as attorney's fees; and that
they suffered moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00 each and
actual damages in the amount of P500.00 each. They also prayed that
each of them awarded exemplary damages in the amount of
P1,000.00.
ISSUES/HELD:
whether or not defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon had the
power to order the seizure of the motor launch in question without a
warrant of search and seizure even if the same was admittedly
the corpus delicti of the crime.
ANSWER: NEGATIVE. the power to issue a search warrant is vested in
a judge or magistrate and in no other officer and no search and

vested with authority to order the seizure of a private property; that seizure can be made without a proper warrant

said motor launch was purchased by Delfin Lim from Jikil Taha
in consideration of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00), Two Thousand
Pesos (P2,000.00) of which has been given to Jikil Taha as advance
whether or not defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiffs-
payment; that as a consequence of the unlawful seizure of the motor
appellants for damages allegedly suffered by them granting that the
launch, its sale did not materialize; and that since July 6, 1962, the
seizure of the motor launch was unlawful.
said motor launch had been moored at the Balabac Bay, Palawan and
because of exposure to the elements it had become worthless and
beyond repair.
ANSWER. AFFIRMATIVE. To be liable under Article 32 of the New Civil
Code it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights
of the plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants should have
acted with malice or bad faith. Except for Madella who was merely
acting under orders.
RATIO DICIDENDI:
since in the present case defendants-appellees seized the motor
launch without a warrant, they have violated the constitutional right
of plaintiffs-appellants against unreasonable search and seizure.
Under the old Constitution 7 the power to issue a search warrant is
vested in a judge or magistrate and in no other officer and
no search and seizure can be made without a proper warrant. At the
time the act complained of was committed, there was no law or rule
that recognized the authority of Provincial Fiscals to issue
a search warrant. In his vain attempt to justify the seizure of the
motor launch in question without a warrant Fiscal Ponce de Leon
invoked the provisions of Republic Act No. 732, which amended
Sections 1674 and 1687 of the Revised Administrative Code. But there
is nothing in said law which confers upon the provincial fiscal; the
authority to issue warrants, much less to order without warrant the
seizure of a personal property even if it is the corpus delicti of a crime.
True, Republic Act No. 732 has broadened the power of provincial
fiscals to conduct preliminary investigations, but said law did not
divest the judge or magistrate of its power to determine, before
issuing the corresponding warrant, whether or not probable cause
exists therefor. 8
We are not prepared to sustain his defense of good faith. To be liable
under Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is enough that there was a
violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not
required that defendants should have acted with malice or bad faith.
But defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela cannot be held
accountable because he impounded the motor launch upon the order
of his superior officer. While a subordinate officer may be held liable
for executing unlawful orders of his superior officer, there are certain
circumstances which would warrant Maddela's exculpation from
liability. The records show that after Fiscal Ponce de Leon made his
first request to the Provincial Commander on June 15, 1962 Maddela
was reluctant to impound the motor launch despite repeated orders
from his superior officer. 21 It was only after he was furnished a copy
of the reply of Fiscal Ponce de Leon, dated June 26, 1962, to the letter
of the Provincial Commander, justifying the necessity of the seizure
of the motor launch on the ground that the subsequent sale of the
launch to Delfin Lim could not prevent the court from taking custody
of the same, 22 that he impounded the motor launch on July 6, 1962.
With said letter coming from the legal officer of the province,
Maddela was led to believe that there was a legal basis and authority
to impound the launch. Then came the order of his superior officer to
explain for the delay in the seizure of the motor launch. 23 Faced with
a possible disciplinary action from his Commander, Maddela was left
with no alternative but to seize the vessel. In the light of the above
circumstances. We are not disposed to hold Maddela answerable
for damages.
ROGELIO ABERCA, et al. vs. FABIAN VER, et al.
L-69866
April 15, 1988
FACTS:
Sometime in the early 1980s, various Intelligence units of the
AFP known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) were ordered by
respondents then Maj. Gen. Fabian Ver to conduct pre-emptive
strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses
in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in
Metro Manila. In compliance thereof, the TFM raided several places,
employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search
warrants. During these raids, certain members of the raiding TFM
confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to the 20
petitioners. Petitioners were arrested without proper arrest
warrants issued by the courts. For some period after their arrest, they
were arrested without denied visits of relatives and lawyers;
interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel, through
threats, torture and other forms of violence in order to obtain
incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them.
Plaintiffs then filed an action for damages before the RTC of
Quezon City against respondents-officers of the AFP headed by
Ver. Respondents, in their motion to dismiss, claimed that (1) the wrti
of habeas corpus was suspended, thus giving credence to petitioners’
detention; (2) respondents were immune from liability for acts done
in the performance of their official duties, and that (3) the complaint
did not state a cause of action against respondents.
On November 8, 1983, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss
the case. A motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint,
and a supplemental motion for reconsideration were filed by
petitioners. On May 11, 1984, the trial court, without acting on the
motion to set aside the Order of Nov. 8, 1983, declared the finality of
said Order against petitioners. After their motion for reconsideration
was denied by the RTC, petitioners then filed the instant petition for
certiorari, on March 15, 1985, seeking to annul and set aside the
respondent court’s resolutions and order.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches
conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and
liberties guaranteed under the Constitution;
(2) Whether or not respondents may invoke state immunity from
suit for acts done in the performance of official duties and functions;
(3) Whether or not a superior officer, under the notion of
respondeat superior, be answerable for damages jointly and severally
with his subordinates, to the person whose constitutional rights and
liberties have been violated.
HELD:
(1) The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus (PWHC) does not destroy petitioners’ right and cause of action
for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of
their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an
otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the
right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ
of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.
Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and
cause of action for damages are explicitly recognized in PD 1755
which amended Art. 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following
text: However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff
or for quasi-delict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of
any public officer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising
from martial law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the
plaintiff, the same must be brought within one year.
Even assuming that the suspension of the PWHC suspends
petitioners’ right of action for damages for illegal arrest and
detention, it does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of
action for injuries suffered because of respondents’ confiscation of
their private belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent
and to counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and
inhuman treatment.
The question became moot and academic since the
suspension of the PWHC had been lifted with the issuance of then
Pres. Corazon Aquino of Proclamation No. 2 on March 25, 1986.
(2) It may be that the respondents, as members of the AFP,
were merely responding to their duties, as they claim, “to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion” in
accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of Pres. Marcos, despite the
lifting of Martial Law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such
objective, to launch pre-emptive strikes against alleged CT
underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket
license or roving commission untrammeled by any constitutional
restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of
the individual citizen enshrined and protected by the Constitution.
Article 32 of the Civil Code, which renders any public officer
or employees, or any private individual, liable in damages for violating
the constitutional rights and liberties of another, does not exempt the
respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from
liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not
constitute a violation of the Revised Penal Code or other penal
statute.
This is not say that military authorities are restrained from
pursuing their assigned task or carrying out their mission with vigor,
to protect the Philippines from its enemies, whether of the left or of
the right, or from within or without, seeking to destroy or subvert our
democratic institutions and imperil their very existence. What is
meant is that in carrying out their task and mission, constitutional and
legal safeguards must be observed; otherwise, the very fabric of our
faith will start to unravel. In the battle of competing ideologies, the
struggle of mind is just as vital as the struggle of arms. The linchpin
in that psychological struggle is faith in the rule of law. Once that faith
is lost or compromised, the struggle may well be abandoned.
(3) The doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable in
this case. It has been generally limited in its application to principal
and agent or to master and servant relationships. No such
relationship exists superiors of the military and their
subordinates. However, the decisive factor in this case is the
language of Art. 32, Civil Code; the law speaks of an officer or
employee or person “directly” or “indirectly” responsible for the
violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it
is not the actor alone who must answer for damages under Art. 32;
the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages
or injury caused to the aggrieved party. Art. 32 makes the persons
who are directly as well as indirectly responsible for the transgression
joint tortfeasors.
Citizenship
G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO,
JR. vs.COMELEC, FPJ and VICTORINO X. FORNIER,
G.R. No. 161634 March 3, 2004
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ vs.FPJ
G. R. No. 161824 March 3, 2004
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
FPJ
Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poe’s disqualification in the
presidential elections for having allegedly misrepresented material
facts in his (Poe’s) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a
natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners.
Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino
Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending
that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case
under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding
“qualification of a candidate” for the presidency or vice-presidency
before the elections are held.
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection
with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, refers to
“contests” relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
"President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines which the Supreme
Court may take cognizance, and not of "candidates" for President or
Vice-President before the elections.
2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe
as a Filipino Citizen.
The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law
on respondent’s birth, provided that among the citizens of the
Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."
Tracing respondent’s paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as
evidenced by the latter’s death certificate was identified as a Filipino
Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the presumption that
having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born
in 1870. In the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzo’s place of
residence upon his death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of
residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill
had effected in 1902. Being so, Lorenzo’s citizenship would have
extended to his son, Allan---respondent’s father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allan’s son to Bessie,
though an American citizen, was a Filipino citizen by virtue of
paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondent’s birth certificate.
The 1935 Constitution on citizenship did not make a distinction on the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of bigamous
marriage and the allegation that respondent was born only before the
assailed marriage had no bearing on respondent’s citizenship in view
of the established paternal filiation evidenced by the public
documents presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively
that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the
evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold
that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of
Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.
REPUBLIC vs. LIM (GR no. 161656) - Digest
FACTS:
In 1938, the Republic instituted a special civil action for expropriation
of a land in Lahug, Cebu City for the purpose of establishing a military
reservation for the Philippine Army. The said lots were registered in
the name of Gervasia and Eulalia Denzon. The Republic deposited
P9,500 in the PNB then took possession of the lots. Thereafter, on
May 1940, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay
the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just compensation. The Denzons
appealed to the CA but it was dismissed on March 11, 1948. An entry
of judgment was made on April 5, 1948.
In 1950, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National
Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for the two lots, but it "denied
knowledge of the matter." On September 6, 1961, Lt. Cabal rejected
the claim but expressed willingness to pay the appraised value of the
lots within a reasonable time.
For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961,
the Denzons· successors-in-interest,Valdehueza and Panerio, filed
with the same CFI an action for recovery of possession with damages
against the Republic and AFP officers in possession of the property.
On November 1961, Titles of the said lots were issued in the names
of Valdehueza and Panerio with the annotation "subject to the
priority of the National Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels of
land, Lots 932 and939 upon previous payment of a reasonable market
value".
On July 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza
and Panerio, holding that they are the owners and have retained their
right as such over lots because of the Republic·s failure to pay the
amount of P4,062.10,adjudged in the expropriation proceedings.
However, in view of the annotation on their land titles, they were
ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic.
They appealed the CFI·s decision to the SC. The latter held that
Valdehueza and Panerio are still the registered owners of Lots 932
and 939, there having been no payment of just compensation by the
Republic. SC still ruled that they are not entitled to recover possession
of the lots but may only demand the payment of their fair market
value.
Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to
Vicente Lim, herein respondent, as security for their loans. For their
failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed in
1976. The lot title was issued in his name.
On 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title with
the RTC against the petitioners herein. On 2001, the RTC rendered a
decision in favor of Lim, declaring that he is the absolute and exclusive
owner of the lot with all the rights of an absolute owner including the
right to possession. Petitioners elevated the case to the CA. In its
Decision dated September 18, 2003, it sustained the RTC Decision
saying: ´... This is contrary to the rules of fair play because the concept
of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of
the amount to be paid to the owners of the land,but also the payment
for the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt
payment, compensation cannot be considered "just"...”
Petitioner, through the OSG, filed with the SC a petition for review
alleging that they remain as the owner of Lot 932.
ISSUE:
Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its
failure to pay respondent’s predecessors-in-interest the just
compensation therefor pursuant to the judgment of the CFI rendered
as early as May 14, 1940.
HELD:
One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no
person shall be deprived of his private property without due process
of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential element of due
process is that there must be just compensation whenever private
property is taken for public use. Accordingly, Section 9, Article III, of
our Constitution mandates: "Private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation." The Republic disregarded the
foregoing provision when it failed and refused to pay respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest the just compensation for Lots 932 and 939.
The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republic’s delay is
contrary to the rules of fair play. In jurisdictions similar to ours, where
an entry to the expropriated property precedes the payment of
compensation, it has been held that if the compensation is not paid
in a reasonable time, the party may be treated as a trespasser ab
initio.
As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza, this Court mandated the
Republic to pay respondent’s predecessors-in- interest the sum of
P16,248.40 as "reasonable market value of the two lots in question."
Unfortunately, it did not comply
and allowed several decades to pass without obeying this Court’s
mandate. It is tantamount to confiscation of private property. While
it is true that all private properties are subject to the need of
government, and the government may take them whenever the
necessity or the exigency of the occasion demands, however from the
taking of private property by the government under the power of
eminent domain, there arises an implied promise to compensate the
owner for his loss.
There is a recognized rule that title to the property expropriated shall
pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of
the just compensation. So, how could the Republic acquire ownership
over Lot 932 when it has not paid its owner the just compensation,
required by law, for more than 50 years? Clearly, without full payment
of just compensation, there can be no transfer of title from the
landowner to the expropriator.
SC ruled in earlier cases that expropriation of lands consists of two
stages. First is concerned with the determination of the authority of
the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the
propriety of its exercise. The second is concerned with the
determination by the court of "the just compensation for the
property sought to be taken." It is only upon the completion of these
two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed In
Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation, we ruled that, "the
process is not completed until payment of just compensation." Thus,
here, the failure of the Republic to pay respondent and his
predecessors-in-interest for a period of 57 years rendered the
expropriation process incomplete.
Thus, SC ruled that the special circumstances prevailing in this case
entitle respondent to recover possession of the expropriated lot from
the Republic.
While the prevailing doctrine is that "the non-payment of just
compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover
possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the
government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from
the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the
owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their
property. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes
property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the
payment of just compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals, we
defined just compensation as not only the correct determination of
the amount to be paid to the property owner but also the payment of
the property within a reasonable time. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered "just."
CASE DIGEST : FRIVALDO VS COMELEC
JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES,
SORSOGON CHAPTER, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT,
SALVADOR NEE ESTUYE, respondents.
FACTS : Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of
the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in
due time. On October 27, 1988. the League of Municipalities,
Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter, League), represented by its President,
Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed
with the Commission on Elections a petition for the annulment of
Frivaldo
In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was
naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and
affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to
protect himself against President Marcos
Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses
but the respondent Commission on Elections decided instead by its
Order of January 20, 1988, to set the case for hearing on the merits.
His motion for reconsideration was denied in another Order dated
February 21, 1988. He then came to this Court in a petition for
certiorari and prohibition to ask that the said orders be set aside on
the ground that they had been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion. Pending resolution of the petition, we issued a temporary
order against the hearing on the merits scheduled by the COMELEC
and at the same time required comments from the respondents.
ISSUE : WON Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the
time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of
Sorsogon. All the other issues raised in this petition are merely
secondary to this basic question.
HELD : The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section
9, of the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the
State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific
requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a
candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the
Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is
running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a
qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the
Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage
under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo
described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines,
omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence
shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United
States in 1983 per the following certification from the United States
District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by
Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in
San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of
the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State
and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific
requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a
candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the
Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is
running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a
qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the
Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage
under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo
described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines,
omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence
shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United
States in 1983 per the following certification from the United States
District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by
Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in
San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire
Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in
accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as
amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may
be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation.
It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He
contends that by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had,
without more, already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship.
But that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions — surely,
Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply
recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet been convened, what
that meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this was
done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings.
The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on
Elections should be dismissed for tardiness is not well-taken. The
herein private respondents are seeking to prevent Frivaldo from
continuing to discharge his office of governor because he is
disqualified from doing so as a foreigner. Qualifications for public
office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only
at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but
during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. If, say, a
female legislator were to marry a foreigner during her term and by
her act or omission acquires his nationality, would she have a right to
remain in office simply because the challenge to her title may no
longer be made within ten days from her proclamation? It has been
established, and not even denied, that the evidence of Frivaldo's
naturalization was discovered only eight months after his
proclamation and his title was challenged shortly thereafter.
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial
governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another
country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does
not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public
office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The
qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the
electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the
ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly
believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously,
this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of
citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the
Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring
and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.
It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-
born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all
the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great price.
But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot
be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and
limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it
is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant
children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and
unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.
Bengson v HRET G.R. No 142840, May 7, 2001
Bengson v House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
G.R. No 142840, May 7, 2001
Facts: The citizenship of Teodoro Cruz, a member of the HOR, is being
questioned on the ground that he is not a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.
Cruz was born in the Philippines in 1960, the time when the
acquisition of citizenship rule was still jus soli. However, he enlisted
to the US Marine Corps and he was naturalized as US citizen in
connection therewith. He reacquired Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under RA 2630 and ran for and was elected as a
representative. When his nationality was questioned by petitioner,
the HRET decided that Cruz was a natural born citizen of the
Philippines.
Issue: WON Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
Held: YES. Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citezenship." On the other hand, naturalized citizens are
those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization,
generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the
Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization
Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized,
an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications12
and none of the disqualification.
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however
reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth
Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by
naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine
citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No.
473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for
reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act
No. 63.16 Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to
reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications
and none of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes
by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed
forces; services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War
II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other
time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political
economic necessity.
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization,
repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local
Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last
resided.
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his
former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he
rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However,
he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No.
2630.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and
having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem,
Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent
Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born
citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to
recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship
CASE DIGEST : CORDORA VS TAMBUNTING
G.R. No. 176947 February 19, 2009
GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and GUSTAVO S.
TAMBUNTING, Respondents.
FACTS : In his complaint affidavit filed before the COMELEC Law
Department, Cordora asserted that Tambunting made false
assertions. Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for
local public office because Tambunting lacked the required
citizenship and residency requirements.
To disprove Tambunting’s claim of being a natural-born Filipino
citizen, Cordora presented a certification from the Bureau of
Immigration which stated that, in two instances, Tambunting claimed
that he is an American: upon arrival in the Philippines on 16 December
2000 and upon departure from the Philippines on 17 June 2001.
According to Cordora, these travel dates confirmed that Tambunting
acquired American citizenship through naturalization in Honolulu,
Hawaii on 2 December 2000. Cordora concluded:
The COMELEC Law Department recommended the dismissal of
Cordora’s complaint against Tambunting because Cordora failed to
substantiate his charges against Tambunting. Cordora’s reliance on
the certification of the Bureau of Immigration that Tambunting
traveled on an American passport is not sufficient to prove that
Tambunting is an American citizen.
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and the resolution of the
COMELEC Law Department. The COMELEC En Banc was convinced
that Cordora failed to support his accusation against Tambunting by
sufficient and convincing evidence.
Cordora filed a motion for reconsideration which raised the same
grounds and the same arguments in his complaint. In its Resolution
promulgated on 20 February 2007, the COMELEC En Banc dismissed
Cordora’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
ISSUE : WON there is Probable Cause to Hold Tambunting for Trial for
Having Committed an Election Offense
HELD : Probable cause constitutes those facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed. Determining probable cause is
an intellectual activity premised on the prior physical presentation or
submission of documentary or testimonial proofs either confirming,
negating or qualifying the allegations in the complain
Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother and an
American father. Neither does he deny that he underwent the
process involved in INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) because of
his father’s citizenship. Tambunting claims that because of his
parents’ differing citizenships, he is both Filipino and American by
birth. Cordora, on the other hand, insists that Tambunting is a
naturalized American citizen.
We agree with Commissioner Sarmiento’s observation that
Tambunting possesses dual citizenship. Because of the circumstances
of his birth, it was no longer necessary for Tambunting to undergo the
naturalization process to acquire American citizenship. The process
involved in INS Form I-130 only served to confirm the American
citizenship which Tambunting acquired at birth. The certification from
the Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented contained two
trips where Tambunting claimed that he is an American. However, the
same certification showed nine other trips where Tambunting
claimed that he is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual
citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy before the
2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did not
disqualify him from running for public office.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The
former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the
different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation
may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which
follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without
any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of
both states
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a
person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or
more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is
the result of an individual’s volition.
in Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the framers were not concerned
with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens
who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after
their naturalization.12 Section 5(3) of R.A. No. 9225 states that
naturalized citizens who reacquire Filipino citizenship and desire to
run for elective public office in the Philippines shall "meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of filing the certificate
of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer
an oath" aside from the oath of allegiance prescribed in Section 3 of
R.A. No. 9225. The twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of
Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship served
as the bases for our recent rulings in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC,13
Velasco v. COMELEC,14 and Japzon v. COMELEC,15 all of which
involve natural-born Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens
of another country and thereafter ran for elective office in the
Philippines. In the present case, Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino,
did not subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another
country. Hence, the twin requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply
to him.
Cordora concluded that Tambunting failed to meet the residency
requirement because of Tambunting’s naturalization as an American.
Cordora’s reasoning fails because Tambunting is not a naturalized
American. Moreover, residency, for the purpose of election laws,
includes the twin elements of the fact of residing in a fixed place and
the intention to return there permanently,16 and is not dependent
upon citizenship.
In view of the above, we hold that Cordora failed to establish that
Tambunting indeed willfully made false entries in his certificates of
candidacy. On the contrary, Tambunting sufficiently proved his
innocence of the charge filed against him. Tambunting is eligible for
the office which he sought to be elected and fulfilled the citizenship
and residency requirements prescribed by law.
David vs. Agbay G.R. No. 199113 March 18, 2015 Retroactivity of
laws, Citizenship, R.A. 9225
AUGUST 4, 2018
FACTS:
Petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen
by naturalization. Upon retirement, petitioner and his wife returned
to the Philippines and purchased a lot along the beach in Oriental
Mindoro where they constructed a residential house. However, the
portion where they built their house is public land and part of the
salvage zone.
Petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the
subject land with the DENR. In the said application, petitioner
indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.
Private respondent Editha Agbay opposed the application on the
ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land.
She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public
documents under Article 172 of the RPC against the petitioner.
Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the
provisions of Republic Act No. 9225.
The CENRO rejected petitioner’s MLA, ruling that petitioner’s
subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the
defect in his MLA which was void ab initio.
An information for Falsification of Public Document was filed before
the MTC and a warrant of arrest was issued against the petitioner.
Since the crime for which petitioner was charged was alleged and
admitted to have been committed before he had re- acquired his
Philippine citizenship, the MTC concluded that petitioner was at that
time still a Canadian citizen.
Petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
MTC. The petition was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may be indicted for falsification for
representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land Application
despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under
the provisions of R.A. 9225.
RULING:
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior
to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of
natural- born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost
Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the
new law allows dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his
Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance.
For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the
time of filing his MLA, it is not necessary to discuss the rulings
in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such reacquisition
because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having already
lost Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those natural-born
Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force.
In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos
who became foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the second
paragraph of which clarifies that such policy governs all cases after
the new law’s effectivity.
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public
document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said
application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen.
Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as
Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those
ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship.
While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six
months later, the falsification was already a consummated act, the
said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship
status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable
cause for falsification of public document under Article 172,
paragraph 1.
CASE DIGEST: GRACE POE vs. COMELEC,et al
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S POE- LLAMANZARES vs.
COMELEC,et al.
GR Nos. 221697 , GR No. 221698-700
March 8,2016
Perez, J.:
FACTS:
In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe
declared that she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and that
her residence up to day before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11
months counted from May 24, 2005.
Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo
and was legally adopted by RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS
SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to the US in
1991 after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then
based at the US. Grace Poe then became a naturalized American
citizen in 2001.
On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s
deteriorating medical condition, who then eventually demice on
February 3,2005. She then quitted her job in the US to be with her (3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born
grieving mother and finally went home for good to the Philippines citizenship as to the country where they are being found, as covered
on MAY 24, 2005. and supported by the UN Convention Law.

On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had
reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a
voter and obtained a new Philippine Passport.
In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes Chairperson of the
MTRCB , she renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA
9225 requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship. From
then on, she stopped using her American passport.
As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency
because she satisfied the requirements of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent
to remain permanently) coupled with ANIMUS NON
REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to US) in acquiring a new
domicile in the Philippines. Starting May 24,2005, upon returning to
the Philippines, Grace Poe presented overwhelming evidence of her
actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US,
coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Filipino Citizenship
under RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy for Presidency was granted by
the SC.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her

candidacy on the ground particularly among others, that she cannot
be considered a natural born Filipino citizen since she was a
FOUNDLING and that her bioligical parents cannot be proved as
Filipinos. The Comelec en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground
that she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements and that
she committed misrepresentation in her COC.

On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a

vote of 9-6 that POE is qualified as candidate for Presidency.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino

citizen

(2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement.

HELD:

YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For

that, she satisfied the constitutional reqt that only natural-born
Filipinos may run for Presidency.

(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being
shown in her physical features which are typical of Filipinos, aside
from the fact that she was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a
municipality wherein there is 99% probability that residents there are
Filipinos, consequently providing 99% chance that Poe’s bilogical
parents are Filipinos. Said probability and circumstancial evidence are
admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence.

(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born-

citizens as based on the deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional
Convention, wherein though its enumeration is silent as to
foundlings, there is no restrictive language either to definitely exclude
the foundlings to be natural born citizens.