INTRODUCTION TO POLICY

ANALYSIS

Section A of Manual - INTRODUCTION

CONTENTS

1. Policy Analysis a brief history

2. Why do policy-makers now want Policy analysis?

3. Is Policy Analysis not a luxury for Accession Countries?

4. What’s the situation in Slovakia?

5. How exactly does policy analysis fit into the wider system

6. What is Involved in Policy Analysis?

7. What skills are involved?

8. What can we learn from others?

- the British experience over the past 30 years – some 12 structures

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22 April 2002

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1. POLICY ANALYSIS – A BRIEF HISTORY

1.1 Social Science Rules OK!

In the “bad old days”, government policies came from the following sources -
 The governing party’s manifesto
 The “bowels” of a Ministry
 The lobbying of interest groups

As part of the new spirit of openness and optimism in the 1960s, this process came under fire –
for basically three reasons -
 Policy-making, it was argued, was too incestuous – often subject as a result to
“groupthink”
 The challenge of modernisation facing most countries in this period required a new
approach1
 New techniques were being developed – with which neither senior civil servants nor
politicians were familiar2.

The initial response was for Ministries to recruit the new breed of social scientists starting to be
produced by universities – either as individual advisors or as specialist officials; and to
commission research. Their task was to use more diagnostic and analytical work in order to -
 Ensure that the particular problem was clearly defined
 Identify all alternatives
 Assess all alternatives – particularly with cost-benefit analysis
 Select the optimal alternative

Optimism was very high in the 1960s and 1970s in America3 that the new technology would
allow a lot of data to be fed into computers and give answers on complex issues of, for example,
transport, land-use policy and budgeting. Cost-benefit analysis suffered from such hype.
Zero-based budgeting, for example, was very fashionable for a time – before its impossible
analytical demands became evident. (Such belief in numbers is still evident – in, for example, the
contemporary British fashion for performance auditing4.)
But, apart from the tenuous nature of some of the new tools, the individual analyst or unit got cut
off from the rest of the organisation and produced reports whose content or style was seen as
irrelevant or threatening. Taking two critical dimensions
 how closely integrated the analyst is with the organisation’s leadership
 how strong the analysts links were to outside organisations,

four types of policy analyst5 could be identified.

1
These arguments are captured in the 1968 Royal Commission Report on the British Civil Service – itself an
interesting example of policy analysis (see section 7). See also Peter Hall’s book on Policy Disasters
2
US Defence systems – ZBB - Roskill Report
3
House PW and Shull RD The Practice of Policy Analysis – Forty Years of Art and technology (Compass Press
1991) - two very experienced American policy analysts give an overview of the American experience.
4
see Boyle’s The Tyranny of Numbers – why counting can’t make us happy (Harper Collins 2000) for an excellent
critique
5
see Meltsner’s classic book on The Policy Analyst in the Bureaucracy (

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 Low Openness to outside world High

A B
High
Ministerial apologist ideas broker

Closeness to Power C D

Technical scribbler Marginalized rebel

Low

1.2 “But Government is Different!”

Few analysts made it to quadrant B and, with the concurrent realisation that new tools such as
cost-benefit analysis could not in fact replace human judgement, some disillusionment about the
possibility of rational analysis in government then set in on both sides. The problems facing
government, after all -
 are fuzzy and ill-defined;
 have political as well as purely technical aspects;
 often lack a good cause-effect knowledge base;
 may be solved only by producing new problems;
 often involve tradeoffs between cost and effectiveness;
 may be hard to measure adequacy of results;
 may be hard to measure fairness of results
 demand urgent solutions

The late 1970s also saw a loss of confidence in the ability of large organisations to plan ahead.
The first oil shock may have been the most visible symbol of this – but the writing had been on
the wall for the optimism of the social scientists for some years6.
Issues which can therefore make policy-makers unsympathetic to policy analysis include the
following -
 policy-makers operate in crisis management – and want quick answers in terms they
(the media and the public) will understand and find acceptable.
 Often they are boxed into policy commitments by prior electoral deals
 the critical approach taken by policy analysis could threaten their favoured projects
 They tend to assume that an open mind will be seen as a sign of weakness

1.3 But is it all that different?

Much of the argument about political (or human!) and environmental factors making rationality
impossible in government is actually just as true of business which continues, however, to favour
a “strategic” (or policy analysis) approach to management – if more flexible than was the case in
the 1970s. It is interesting to see how the terminology has changed from strategic “planning” in
the 1960s and 1970s to strategic “management” in the 1980s and 1990s and strategic “thinking”
now! Now the emphasis is on things like motivation, scenario planning (ie anticipating the
crisis!) and risk analysis

6
reflected in the books of Alvin Toffler – particularly his first - Future Shock

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And a similar sort of change has been evident in the business of government. The life-cycle,
pragmatism and attention-span of Ministers and local government leaders predispose them to adopt
what might be called a "blunderbuss" approach to change : that is they assume that desirable
change is achieved by one (or a mix) of the following approaches -
 making new appointments
 passing new laws
 ending previous policies and programmes and issuing new policy guidelines
 creating new agencies – or abolishing old ones
 giving existing programmes more money

These are the things which can be done quickly – to give the impression of being on top of a
situation. Once such appointments, laws, resources, guidelines or agencies have been set running,
politicians will move quickly on to the other issues that are queuing up for their attention.
Of course, they will wish some sort of guarantee that the actual policies and people selected will
actually enable the resources and structures used to achieve the desired state. But that is seen as a
simple implementation issue.
Increasingly, however, people have realised that large "hierarchic" organisations - such as
Ministries - have serious deficiencies which makes it difficult to develop or deliver relevant
policies eg
 they are structured around historical missions (such as the provision of education, law and
order etc) whose achievement now requires different skills and inter-agency work7.
 Many of them have been “captured” by the interests they are supposed to control
 their multiplicity of levels seriously interfere with, indeed pervert, information and
communications flows - particularly from the consumer or client.
 Their hierarchical structures discourage co-operation and initiative.

But how do you move against such problems? Critical policy analysis and administrative reform
challenge the powerful interests of bureaucracy itself - on which political leaders depend for
advice and implementation. Change therefore seems to require an eccentric mixture of –
 policy conviction,
 single-mindedness
 political security
which few leaders possess. Whatever the appearance of unity and coherence at election time, a
Government is a collection of individually ambitious politicians whose career path demands
making friends and clients rather than the upsetting of established interests which reform generally
requires.
The machinery of government consists of a powerful set of "baronies" (Ministries/ Departments),
each with their own (and client) interests to protect or favour. And Governments can - and do -
always blame other people for "failure": and distract the public with new games - and faces.
What one might call the "constituency of reform" seemed, therefore, simply too small for major
reforms even to be worth attempting. For politicians, the name of the game is reputation and
survival.
Increasingly in the last two decades leaders have known that something was wrong - although the
nature of the problem and solution eluded them. The problem was, between the 1960s and 1980s,
variously diagnosed as
 poor quality advice
 lack of management skills
 lack of inter-Ministerial co-operation
 over-centralisation
7
See JQ Wilson’s classic Bureaucracy - what Government Agencies do and why they do it (Basic
Books 1989)

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  institutional “capture”
A variety of reforms got underway from the late 1960s8; and were accelerated when it was clear
later in the 1970s that no new resources were available for government spending and, indeed, that
there would have to be significant cutbacks. Encouraged by the examples set by countries such as
Britain, New Zealand, Australia and Finland, government reform has become all the rage
throughout the world in the past ten years9. Initially this involved governments selling off
industries such as Steel, Gas and Telecommunications. The reform of government has, however,
now spread deep into the thinking about how the basic system of government and of social services
should be managed – and whether policies give value for money.
For the last decade the talk has been of the "ENABLING" state - of government no longer trying
itself to produce things and to run services but rather focussing on strategic purposes and trying
to achieve them by giving independent public agencies - national and local - budgets and
guidelines10. Then relying on a mixture of audit regulation, citizen voice, quasi-market forces and
arm-twisting to keep them on target.
But this can be done only if central government has -
 taken the trouble properly to map out the dimensions and causes of the problem
 developed a realistic strategy
 selected appropriate tools
This is the task which policy analysts have increasingly been called in to do in recent years

2. WHAT DO POLICY-MAKERS WANT FROM POLICY ANALYSIS?

2.1 Some Advantages

A more systematic approach to policy-making in government has been evident in the past decade
– since it offers governments various benefits, such as -
 It can save subsequent time (further clarifying amendments) and confusion and,
ultimately, prevent policy disasters (eg the UK Poll Tax and rail privatisation fiascos –
both of which were imposed without critical and open analysis11 )
 it can be a useful device in deflecting some of the pressures on government (Setting up a
Task Force is a positive government response to a problem – but by the time it reports the
pressure for action may be less!)
 It often challenges the “conventional wisdom” of departments which are required to
focus on narrow issues and find cooperation difficult; problems don’t respect
departmental boundaries.
 (depending on how inclusively the work is structured) it can silence if not convert
potential critics
 it can win friends by proving that the government is really serious about tackling an issue
– and not just “playing politics”
 it can tackle the problem of public alienation – by making problems comprehensible and
politics more inclusive.
 Indeed it can lessen the burden on itself by emphasising that problem-solving requires
public involvement.
Studies done on public policy changes indicate that the successes are where a few determined
people were well prepared to take advantage of a “window of opportunity”12 Policy analysts are
people who prepare themselves for that opportunity

8
Pollitt
9
although economic and organisational rather than PA. SIGMA
10
Beating the Bureaucracy
11
see Travis on first; Wolmar on second
12
eg New Zealand PAR

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History is littered with examples of reform efforts that fell into one of the following pitfalls
 did not take the trouble clearly to identify the key problems
 didn’t put enough staff onto the task of developing a strategy
 did not properly explore all the possible options
 failed to involve the people who would later be responsible for making the system work
 underestimated the scale of resistance
 did not allocate clear resources
 failed to draw up an action plan – with clear responsibilities
 failed to communicate
Generally all this leads to lost reputations and votes. Good policy analysis can help avoid that

2.2 A Recent Government View

A very useful study of “Professional Policy-making in the Twenty First Century” was published
in 1999 by the UK Cabinet Office13. This clearly signalled the commitment (demand) of
contemporary government for better policy analysis and identified the need for the following
improvements in the policy-making process -
 designing policy around outcomes
 dealing with causes – not symptoms
 making sure that policies are evidence-based
 avoiding unnecessary burdens on businesses
 involving others in policy-making
 becoming more forward and outward looking
 learning from experience

An Audit of good practice identified a few cases which stood out as being exemplary. One
distinguishing feature of these cases was the fact that they were run on project management
lines– ie
 the need to plan systematically and identify outcomes and outputs gives greater clarity
about the purpose of the work.
 Stakeholder analysis helps policy makers to ensure that they have identified and thought
about the role of all those with an interest in the policy.
 Having a project board and steering group provides a mechanism for bringing in a range
of views and cooperating across institutional boundaries
 Techniques such as risk assessment and management helps provide a less risk averse
environment in which innovative and creative ideas can come to the fore
 Having to specify precise outcomes, products and milestones early on helps policy
makers to build evaluation into the policy making process from the outset
 Having in-built mechanisms for monitoring the progress of work helps to keep the policy
process on track”

2.3 But how is it possible to reconcile the “rational” approach required by policy analysis
with the messy, stressful world managers occupy?
One of the wisest books on the subject14 compared the first two models in the following rather
provocative way -

13
as part of the 1997 Modernising Government commitment of the new Blair Government
14
Policy Paradox – the art of political decision-making by Deborah Stone (Norton 1997)

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Decision Strategies
Rational-analytical model
1. State goals/objectives explicitly and precisely
2. Adhere to the same goal throughout the
analysis and decision-making process
Political model
State goals ambiguously, and possibly keep some
goals secret or hidden
Be prepared to shift goals and redefine goals as
the political situation dictates

3. Try to imagine and consider as many
alternatives as possible
4. Define each alternative clearly as a distinct
course of action
5. Evaluate the costs and benefits of each course
of action as accurately and completely as
possible
6. Choose the course of action that will
maximize total welfare as defined by your
objective
Keep undesirable alternatives off the agenda by
not mentioning them.
Make your preferred alternative appear to be the
only feasible or possible One.
Focus on one part of the causal chain and ignore
others that would require politically difficult or
costly policy actions
Use rhetorical devices to blend alternatives; don’t
appear to make a clear decision that could trigger
strong opposition
Select from the infinite range of consequences
only those whose costs and benefits will make
your preferred course of action look "best."
Choose the course of action that hurts powerful
constituents the least, but portray your decision
as creating maximum social good for a broad
public

Diagnostic tools and managerial authority are effective only when they are sensitive to the
perceptions of those whose behaviour they are trying to change. The literature on managing
change has emphasised the importance of people feeling a “sense of ownership” – and the
existence of politics in companies has slowly been recognised15.

An excellent book which looks at the literature on managing change in order to try to identify the
necessary skills of the change agent16 uses the metaphor of the theatre in arguing that the change
agent has to support the “public performance” of rationally constructed, logically phased and
apparently participative change – with “backstage” activity in the recruitment of support and
blocking of resistance.

The effective change agent is someone who is skilled in three areas

 Analytical skills
 Managerial skills
 Political skills
This combination becomes more apparent in the discussion in para 5.1 below.

15
Pfeffer
16
The Expertise of the Change Agent - public performance and backstage activity by Buchanan and Boddy (Prentice
Hall 1992)

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3. GETTING THE BALANCE RIGHT - A good report – or an effective
result?17
All governments are judged by how well they deliver results – whether they leave children better
educated, trains more punctual, the population healthier and safer. The capacity to deliver is part
of the implicit contract between the state and its citizens. Many policies are successfully
implemented. But too often, policies that appear impressive on paper are poorly implemented.
Implementation tends to get insufficient attention or status.

The traditional model of delivery

Delivery by central government has traditionally been understood as a relatively simple linear
process:
Politicians identify a priority and the broad outlines of a solution (eg in the form of a manifesto
commitment)
Policy-makers at the centre design a policy to put this into effect, assembling the right
collection of tools: legislation, funding, incentives, new institutions and directives
The job of implementation is then handed over to a different group of staff, an agency or local
government
… the goal is (hopefully) achieved
The implication of this model is that implementation and delivery are more likely to succeed if
there is:
a tight process with few intermediaries
simple lines of accountability
clear prescription
tough penalties and rewards on each link in the chain to perform their task

If these conditions are in place, with the right people in the right jobs, and adequate funding,
success should be assured.

Delivery in the real world

In some fields, and at some times, this model works. But in important respects it doesn’t
accurately describe the real world that governments operate in, and its application often leads to
failure and frustration. Why is this?

First, because central government has only limited control over many of the people and
institutions responsible for delivery. Even in executive agencies – such as the UK Prisons
Service or Benefits Agency –which are directly accountable to central government, professional
groups and staff organisations can play a critical role in helping or hindering delivery. The health
service is in some respects a vertically integrated organisation, but in other respects power is
widely distributed to health authority managers, doctors, nurses, regulators and others. In many
key areas of policy, governments wanting to improve results for the citizen depend on the
behaviour of third parties - local authorities, police, judiciary, voluntary sector or private
contractors – which may not respond in straightforward ways to legislative commands or
financial incentives. Excessively directive methods of government that appear to treat front-line
deliverers as unable to think for themselves, untrustworthy or incompetent, undermine the very
motivation and adaptability on which real-world success depends.

17
This section is reproduced from the Cabinet Office Report on Policy Delivery and Design (www.cabinet-
office.gov.uk/innovation/about/impacts)

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Second, because few policies are implemented fully formed. The traditional model assumes
that policy-makers have complete knowledge about what will work. The ideal of policy fully
informed by an evidence-base is rarely attainable; most research gives pointers rather than
definitive answers, and in the real world it is not easy to predict how institutions and people will
respond. As a result in practice ideas are tested either in pilots – with no guarantee that the results
can be applied nationally – or prototypes and pathfinders where policies have to be rapidly
adapted in the light of early experience. The more quickly policies are adapted in the light of
experience, drawing lessons from the frontline, the more chance they have of succeeding.

Third, because decision-makers at the top of hierarchies inevitably know less about the operating
environment than those at the front line. This is why in many fields (such as the military or
business), leaders prefer to use what are sometimes called ‘loose-tight’ frameworks: a
combination of clear objectives and freedom for those with local knowledge to adapt to
circumstances: very different to the model of ‘delivering’ a centrally defined solution.

Fourth, because successful delivery depends on systems and how they develop and interact
 institutions
 funding
 regulation
 human resources and motivation
 increasingly, technologies and IT systems
Unless account is taken of each of these elements in the policy design phase, there is a high risk
of delivery problems.

Fifth, because many of the top priorities of modern governments (particularly in crime,
education, health, the environment and welfare) depend on changing behaviour and cultures as
well as improving services: for example changing motivations to learn; attitudes to health and
diet; attitudes to welfare and work.

Sixth, because delivery involves at least three closely related, but different, elements:
Implementation of policy – for example the introduction of a cancer screening service or a
literacy programme
Achievement of targets – for example an objective for waiting lists or exam results
Achievement of better outcomes – for example lower mortality or better employability
In many cases these three reinforce each other, as successive stages in a single process. But
sometimes they can be in tension. Effective implementation of a flawed policy can worsen
outcomes (for example the initial introduction of the new English National Curriculum), as can
too great an emphasis on the wrong targets. Too many new policies and initiatives can wreck
delivery by diverting management time – carrying out instructions gets in the way of better
outcomes. Successful delivery therefore depends on a rounded understanding of the links
between implementation, targets and outcomes.

Seventh, because of interdependencies between policies. Single policies, however well

implemented, are unlikely to have much effect on the biggest challenges to government – such as
improving competitiveness or tackling social exclusion. Instead it is the combination of policies
that is likely to be decisive.

You need to think very carefully about the implications of these remarks for any policy
assignment you are taking up. For example -
 you should pay particular attention to actors other than central Government
 legislation is only the tip of the iceberg
 the Action Plan is crucial
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3. IS POLICY ANALYSIS NOT A LUXURY FOR ACCESSION
COUNTRIES?

3.1 Present realities

A film of the early eighties starring Robert Redford - "The Candidate" - covered his campaign and
eventual victory, against the odds, to become an American Senator.
The film ends on the victory night and the final words we hear him utter in some horror to himself
as he begins to confront the reality beyond the campaigning and the ever-present advice of his spin
doctors are - "What the hell do I do now?"
A lot of people in Central Europe have found themselves in this situation in the last ten years as
successive waves of elections surged around Central Europe. In their case there is only too much
immediately to do - at least in the way of negotiations, appointments and draft legislation since,
in Central Europe,
 Governments (and parties!) are often coalitions created only after complex negotiations.
 And there is not yet the trusted professional civil service with experience of transfers of
government power and able therefore to present the "new masters" with policy options
based on a winning manifesto: indeed the new masters will often bring with them a new set
of civil servants.
 The Acquis Commaunitaire requires so many new laws and agencies that there seems no
room (or need!) for anything else18

But Redford’s question remains - particularly for newly-appointed Ministers and advisers –
although it might be rephrased
 what can we do with this power to make a positive difference?
 How can we be confident that we can develop the right policies?
 and that it will be implemented in a way that achieves positive results?

Policy-making in Accession and Transition countries is characterised by the following features–

 the first document to appear tends to be a legal draft – rather than a statement about the
problem and the key features which need to be changed.
 Initial discussion therefore focuses on technical detail (which is more liable to produce
dispute)– rather than the broad picture (which can bring consensus)
 tasks are often general and unclear (“wishlists”) – in some cases because such fudge is
necessary in a coalition situation.
 they are rarely sequenced
 they are not agreed in advance with the body which is expected to carry them out
 resources (inputs) are rarely specified
 the expected results (outputs) are rarely expressed in measurable terms
 responsibilities are often shared and therefore confused. If everyone is responsible, noone
is!
 Monitoring is not continuous – but one-off and generally too late

4. The Slovak Situation

18
the section on the British experience of policy analysis indicates the scope which still remains for indpenent
policy-making.

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5. HOW EXACTLY DOES THE POLICY ANALYST FIT INTO THE
WIDER SYSTEM?

5.1 A Profusion of Actors

A lot of groups are generally involved in the development of new policies. Indeed one of the
challenges for the machinery of government in every country is to develop structures of
constructive dialogue which recognise the legitimacy not only of
 The decision-taker (central or local politicians)
 gatekeepers (the senior administrator who screens the information and perspectives for
the Minister)
 specialist advisers in the Department (often the senior administrator)
 policy analysts
but also of a whole range of other people who have important perspectives on policy issues
which are denied those at the top of Ministries. These include professional practitioners (for
example doctors and teachers); middle-managers; pressure group members; journalists;
academics – let alone customers; and citizens19.
Let us look more closely at how the work of the policy analyst compares with those of policy and
political advisors in EU countries in order better to understand roles and skills –
 Policy advice comes from inside the civil service system - and is limited to choosing between
given options.
 Political advice is more tactical – and concerned with political impact
 Policy analysis is (or should be) strategic – that is to say rigorous in its search for causation
and relevant options; firmly tested for relevance, feasibility and impact.

Policy Advisor Political advisor Policy analyst

Relationship with
policy maker
Scope of the work
Timescale of work
Formal - part of the Close and trusted –
Civil Service personal appointment of
Minister
Focussed on routine Broad –with focus on
professional issues immediate political
impact
Routine Urgent
More distant and neutral
– (in)formally appointed
by Government to carry
out clearly defined, time-
limited work
Focussed on outputs
Medium-term

Structure of work Meetings with generally done on a one- In a group structure

departments and to-one basis
interest groups
Search for options Very limited – to wider widest
existing options
Transparency confidential Informal and confidential Open - involves
extensive consultation
and publication of final
report
Rigour and impact weak Weak – often built on Strong – agnostic -
testing hidden assumptions and holistic
narrow options (“back of
envelope”) – with
political considerations
very high
Skills Specialist and Political – although the Analytical
19
Curiously it is only in the past decade that it has been appreciated that the individual citizen is effectively the most
important commentary on the workings of the state system.

12
 managerial individual is often from a
specialist background
Professional Concern Standards of Civil Ministerial survival Standards of academic
Service conduct probity

In fact, it is probably more helpful to see the three terms as points in a spectrum.
 At one end of the spectrum is the political advisor - with an emphasis on political skills
 At the other end, the policy analyst – with an emphasis on analytical skills
 In between is the policy advisor – who combines the two with a particular emphasis on the task
of implementation (managerial skills)
This very much relates to the discussion in para 2.3 above the balance of skills required in the effective
change agent.
Whether such roles are formally distinguished will depend on the institutional conventions of each
country. And countries such as Slovakia which have a very recent tradition of Statehood and skills of
Statecraft will naturally find themselves at a distinctive point in the spectrum – which will combine
elements of the three roles. This makes it all the more important to appreciate the choices of emphasis
– and to watch out for the deficiencies which each role is prone to!

Policy advice is given by “policy specialists” in Ministries who have been trained in particular
disciplines with a particular way of looking at the world and with certain policy inclinations and
tools.
The role of the policy analyst is to:
 Produce arguments for debates about public policy
 Produce evidence for decisions about public policy
 Act as internal organizational consultants
 Handle both technical and people aspects

5.2 What precise activities are involved in Policy Development?

When a problem forces its way near the government agenda – the first step is to decide whether
to ignore it and pretend that it either doesn’t exist – or is someone else’s responsibility.

If this won’t work and it becomes an issue for government, the next step is whether it warrants a
quick ad-hoc response – or more systematic treatment. Only in the latter case does it come near
the policy analyst.

If the policy analyst is interested only in a good report (and not an effective change), (s)he will
be interested in the first eight of the following stages.

The analyst who is concerned to see an outcome will be interested in all fourteen!

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Activity
1. Deciding a structure for the
work
Drafting its terms of reference
2. Defining the problem -
Understanding it
Who should be Issues (Sections B and C give more
involved? detail)
Key policy-maker These two decisions have a profound effect on the
outcome. The exclusion of issues and individuals
can be deliberate - or a dangerous oversight.
If a task-force is set up, it needs to work as a team
(see Belbin)
Read section on objectives, criteria and measures
 Systems thinking and modelling
analysts  use of diagrams
 Consultation processes

3. identifying potential  Stakeholder analysis

support and resistance Task force leadership  Identifying and dealing with resistance

4. Developing criteria and
principles
5. Searching for options
The analyst Needs to be done explicitly and in advance –
otherwise unconscious biases creep in
 Avoiding GroupThink
Many people  Consultation techniques
 Brainstorming
 Using search technique (websites)s

6. Testing them The analyst Various appraisal techniques covered in Sections B

and C
Opportunity to identify (a) practical issues for
7. Developing a draft action The analyst decision-makers and (b) people who need to be
plan. “Imagining” lobbied.
This should use such techniques of Project
Management as Critical Path Analysis and Gantt
chart.
For “imagining” see G Morgan book.
8. Presenting the The analyst  Lobbying
Recommendations  Report-writing (see relevant text from
book)
9. Deciding Cabinet
10. Action Plan Project management techniques

11. Implementing Change agents Major change does not implement itself – key
Managers appointments should be made and Leaders need to
“walk the talk”.
Communications needed to ensure staff understand
12. Monitoring Managers Ongoing – and corrective action taken

13. Evaluation independents

14. Reviewing Key policy-makers

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6. WHAT SKILLS ARE NEEDED?
The necessary skills of the policy analyst include –
 Intellectual curiosity
 Inter-personal skills
 Systems thinking
 good analysis skills,
 good project management skills,
 good relationship-building skills (team skills)
 tolerance for ambiguity,
 creative approach to tasks.

The analyst should feel comfortable in the following roles:

 a team coordinator
 an information gatherer
 an information analyser
 a report writer
 a report presenter

SKILLS THAT a GOOD ANALYST NEEDS

The good analyst should posses the following skills:

 skills to identify problems. A good analyst sees more problems than the person who
called for his assistance may have thought of. To make sure that the work focuses on the
problem not a symptom, it is good to ask a lot of questions like: why is this a problem?
who are the stakeholders in the problem? who would like to see it solved? where is it a
problem? when is it a problem? how long has it been a problem? what would happen if
nothing is done to solve the problem?

 Skills to analyse the stakeholders – and the way in which decision-making occurs
within the organization. Understanding the possibilities open to the organization and
devising ways in which those possibilities can be exploited is only the first half of the
consultant’s responsibilities. If the analyst is to offer real value then he or she must also
help the organization make those possibilities a reality. Usually an analyst must convince
the client that what he or she is suggesting is a real opportunity. To do this an effective
analyst understand decision making in the organization, and use this knowledge to frame
recommendations that fit the organization

 skills to identify what information is needed in a particular situation Often in a

advising process it is not a lack of information which presents a problem. Quite the
reverse in fact: it is that too much is available. The analyst always walks a tightrope
between not gaining enough information and so providing uninformed advice and having
so much that focused advice is impaired. The information that is needed to produce useful
advice must be distinguished from that which is merely a distraction. The balance will lie
in the nature of the advice and the type of information available.

 skills to identify what information about the problem is available - the more
information that is taken into account the more confidence there can be in the advice
made. A good analyst is active in auditing the information that is available to be used in a
providing advice to the client.

15
  questioning and consultation skills to locate information resources and get information.
Questioning skills are a critical communication skill. Questioning is not only a way to get
information (though this is important). It is also a way to build rapport and to control the
direction of discussions.

 Problem-solving skills; this will require an understanding not only of various techniques
but also of how a team works – the various roles needed for an effective team (shaper;
coordinator; team worker; completer; implementer; resource investigator; innovator;
monitor). You also need an understanding of the role you generally play in a team. Often
people don’t know about this – see the Belbin questionnaire (in a separate pdf file).

 Skills to process and draw meaning from information. Information on its own is not
much use. It must be processed in order to identify the important relationships within it.

 Skills to convince through verbal, written and visual mediums (briefing). Having
knowledge, expertise, and good ideas is not enough. The conviction comes from the form
of the communication as well as its content. Conviction results if ideas are communicated
in a manner, which is appropriate to the audience; for example if the communication uses
the right language, is of the right length and adopts a proper style. This applies to
communication in any situation and whether the medium is verbal, visual or written.

 Project management skills

 Understanding of managing change

7. WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM OTHERS?

Building a strategic capacity for government requires such key issues to be addressed as –
 Who is involved – the mix of civil servants; academics; practitioners; users
 How their work is structured – accountability; terms of reference; timescales;
resources; evidence seeking; degree of openness

Governments vary in the coherence of their approach to this issue – with the European
“consensual” or “rational” States (Scandinavia and France) having very clear and long-
standing systems of policy development – and others being more dependent on the whim of
specific leaders.
This note gives an overview of the British experience of the past 35 years – which has seen
probably most possible models used at one time or another!
It focuses on the processes used to develop coherent responses to new challenges – rather than
the way Departments attempt to ensure managerial coherence in their use of resources for
normal service delivery.
The formal apparatus of Cabinet, Departments, inter-Ministerial committees are those which
receive the support of public servants and experts. That system focussed on narrow sectoral
concerns – rather than wider societal issues (eg poverty) and had difficulties, until recent times,
recognising that Ministers were also political animals with legitimate political concerns.
Policy development by Ministries was heavily criticised in the 1960s as being too cautious – and
tied to the producer interests associated with the Ministry20. For recent development see 10.2

20
See The Fulton Royal Commission report of 1966

16
A diagram would be useful here to show the various points in the system of government – and
outside it – where policy work is done.

1. INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONS - Waiting for Godot

When a new issue forced itself on a government, the traditional response was to appoint an
independent “Royal Commission”. A group of independent men and women were appointed
by government to take 2-3 years out to research and consult widely and produce an analysis
and recommendations. Subjects covered during the modernisation years of British society
(1960s and 1970s) included–
 Labour relations
 Reform of the Civil Service
 Broadcasting
 Reorganisation of Local Government
 Local Government Finance

These reports (and the evidence they received) were public; and led eventually to legislative
changes – although generally some 5-10 years from the issue first arising.
This very much represents the consensual approach to policy development, with politicians
being willing to take time and to listen to independent advice from a variety of social partners.
Political timescales are less patient these days!

2. The Maverick approach – the THINK TANK (1971-1983)

An interesting initiative in 1971 was the Cabinet's Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS) - or
"Think Tank". The CPRS had 12 or so staff (mixture of individuals seconded from industry,
academia and the civil service) and would itself select 3-4 key issues to look at in depth -
independent of all interests. Their reports were produced reasonably quickly (within a year)
and were confidential. In theory this gave the Prime Minister a new capacity to challenge
departmental interests – but, despite being located in the Cabinet Office, the unit’s approach
neglected the political aspects of change21. In several cases (eg review of the Foreign service)
the challenge was so radical that nothing happened!

3. MINISTERIAL POLITICAL ADVISORS

In the past few decades Ministers have felt the need to have their own sources of advice –
 partly because of suspicions about the commitment of civil servants to their political
agenda
 partly because the skills, expertise and perspectives they felt they needed were not
properly represented in the system.
Hence, for example, the "cabinets" of the French system. And the development in Britain of a new
system of political advisors (now almost 100 in number 22). This reflects the change in approach to
policy-making to that of centrally-driven change.

As a “conviction” politician who took her advice on policy change from several right-wing
Foundations23, Margaret Thatcher did away with the consensual approach – appointing no
Royal Commissions and abolishing the CPRS (in 1983). She needed advisers only to tell her

21
see Inside The Think-Tank - Advising the Cabinet 1971-1983 (Mandarin 1990) for an insider’s view. For a brief
overview see pages 227-236 of S. James book
22
for an assessment see pages 221-227 of S James’ book on British Cabinet Government.
23
see Cockett’s book Thinking the Unthinkable for a very useful analysis

17
how to implement her own radical commitments. Thus various business-men were brought in
to help her initiate and carry out the radical reforms of the civil service and health systems24.
The penalties of inadequate and overly ideological policy development were revealed in the
early 1990s by a series of policy fiascos – such as the introduction and repeal of the new poll
tax for local government ; and of railway privatisation25.

4. The Prime Minister’s POLICY UNIT

First set up in 1974 to assist the Prime Minister “extend the list of options from which the
Government (Prime Minister) can choose – and to propose and pursue policies to further the
government’s political goals”, the Unit has grown to some 12 members who are generally a
mix of academic; business and civil service. It performs three functions –
 To vet and comment on proposals coming up from cabinet ministers from a political
perspective (the Cabinet Secretariat does so from legal and other perspectives)
 To work (less frequently) with Departments on the detail of a policy
 To put up its own ideas
Although these activities can bring the Unit into conflict with Ministers, the concept has
survived – and is paralleled in other countries such as Canada and New Zealand.

5. Cabinet Office
A longstanding criticism of the Cabinet Office was that it lacked a strategic capacity. This has
been rectified with a vengeance by the new Labour Government which, very quickly in 1997,
set up, within the Cabinet Office, the under-noted units.
 Modernising Government Unit
 Performance and Innovation Unit
 Regulatory Impact Unit
 Social Exclusion Unit

5.1 Modernising Government Unit

Late in 1997 a detailed statement about the new Labour Government’s commitment to – and
priorities in - the continued reform of public services and their management appeared in a
major paper entitled Modernising Government26
In the White Paper that finally emerged in March 1999, under the title of Modernising Government,
the government announced three aims:
 ensuring that policy-making is more joined-up and strategic;
 making sure that public service users are the focus;
 delivering public services that are high quality and efficient.

Their programme of reforms has five key commitments:

 policy-making: to be forward-looking in developing policies to deliver results that matter,
not simply reacting to short-term pressures;
 responsive public services: to deliver public services to meet the needs of citizens, not the
convenience of service providers;
 quality public services: to deliver efficient, high-quality public services and not to
tolerate mediocrity;
 information-age government: to use new technology to meet the needs of citizens and
business, and not trail behind technological developments;
24
for a description and critique of this system see Simon Jenkins’ book Accountable to Noone
25
Tony Travers has authored an excellent analysis of the poll-tax fiasco; C Wolmar of railway privatisation
26
detailed information on the work of this Unit (and all reports) can be obtained at www.cabinet-
office.gov.uk.moderngov.

18
  public service: to value public service, not denigrate it. (Cm 4310 1999: 6 and 13)2

In 1999 the Unit published an interesting report on “Professional Policy-making in the Twenty
First Century” which reviewed the policy-making capacity of the government27. One of its
observations was that “one distinguishing feature of these few cases which stood out as being
exemplary was the fact that they were run on project management lines– ie
 the need to plan systematically and identify outcomes and outputs gives greater clarity
about the purpose of the work.
 Stakeholder analysis helps policy makers to ensure that they have identified and thought
about the role of all those with an interest in the policy.
 Having a project board and steering group provides a mechanism for bringing in a range
of views and cooperating across institutional boundaries
 Techniques such as risk assessment and management helps provide a less risk averse
environment in which innovative and creative ideas can come to the fore
 Having to specify precise outcomes, products and milestones early on helps policy
makers to build evaluation into the policy making process from the outset
 Having in-built mechanisms for monitoring the progress of work helps to keep the policy
process on track”

Late in 2001 the National Audit Office published a detailed review of the British policy-making
process based on the huge volume of audits that body has done of good and bad practice in
public policies. Its exhortations for the various stages of the policy cycle to be take more
seriously have therefore particular power and practicality.

5.2 Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU)

This Unit was established in 1999 to provide PM and Ministers with a capacity to analyse
major policy issues – and design strategic solutions. It works on individual projects, using
small teams drawn from within government and the wider public, private and voluntary
sectors. It purports to “bring a distinctive approach to bear viz rigorous analysis of the
evidence; extensive consultation particularly with practitioners; and creative thinking to break
out of the confines of conventional wisdom”28. It has about 60 staff and has completed studies
on such subjects as -
 E-Commerce
 Rural Economies
 Improving Coordination (“Wiring it Up”)
 Role of Analysis and Modelling in policy-making (“Adding it Up”)
 Coordination of central government activity at a local and regional level
 Implications for government of sharp decline on over-50s who are working
 Recovering the proceeds of crime
 Adoption
 E-government
 Migration
 Leadership in the public sector
The PIU website gives a summary of these reports – and assesses their outcome.

Current projects (at Feb 2002) include –

 Privacy and personal data
27
Professional Policy-making in the Twenty First Century (UK Cabinet Office 1999) obtainable at www.cabinet-
office.gov.uk.moderngov.policy
28
from their website www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/innovation/about/impacts

19
  Renewable energy
 Workforce development
 Strategic challenges which UK Government likely to encounter in the next 10-20 years29
 Sport
 Childcare
 Waste management

5.3 Regulatory Impact Assessment Unit (RIU)

European Governments have been concerned for some time about the burden of regulations on
the private sector – particularly on SMEs. In 1998 the British Government announced that no
proposal for regulation which had an impact on businesses, charities or voluntary bodies would
be considered by Ministers without a regulatory impact assessment being carried out. To
indicate the seriousness of this issue this Unit was established within the Cabinet Office and
has produced a Guide for the production of these assessments30. The structure follows the basic
logic of the policy analysis cycle.

5.4 Social Exclusion Unit (SEU)

The Labour Government has recognised that major political commitment and integrated action
is needed to make an impact on social exclusion. One of the early actions of the new 1997
government was therefore to establish this Unit – which quickly produced an important holistic
strategy31. In some ways, the Scottish Office strategy on the same subject is a more interesting
one – being based on 20 years of real partnership work and emerging from an intensive and
open consultative process32.

5.5 In June 2001 a number of new units were established as part of the Cabinet Office to
improve policy-making and service delivery –
 The Forward Strategy Unit will undertake (with PIU) “blue sky policy thinking”
 The Delivery Unit will help departments (particularly health, education, law and order
and transport) deliver their key objectives and ensure that there are real tangible results
on the ground
 The Office of Public Services Reform will advise on implementation of the reform –
and cover both national and local government. They will look fundamentally at
structures, systems, incentives and skills.

6. Task-Forces
When the new Labour Government came into power in May 1997, it had been out of office for
18 years and a major revolution had taken place both in the structure of the Civil service and in
the management of public services. The party had used its period in opposition (and the new
Foundations referred to above) to develop its own new approaches, one of which was a stress
on “inclusiveness” – both in policy-making and in citizenship.
As part of its move away from the Thatcher agenda, an amazing one-off exercise in policy
development was embarked upon - which is detailed and assessed in a book by Barker 33 No

29
A preliminary report can be downloaded from www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/innovation/2001/futures/challenges
30
www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/regulation/2000/risguide
31
32

33
Barker A; Ruling by Task Force (Politico 1999) which can be downloaded from

20
less than 500 “task-forces”34 (various types of internal and external reviews - involving 2500
outsiders) were set up on the issues which concerned the government – such as
 Education for citizenship
 Adult learning
 The family
 Careers service
 Cleaner vehicles
 Integrated transport
 Fire safety
 Company law revision
 Competitiveness
 Roads review
 European structural funds
 Film policy
 Future of social housing
 Review of the banking sector
 Fuel poverty
 literacy

Apart from the Ministerial or Departmental Reviews, the task-forces were groups of a dozen or so
individual, mainly practitioners from local authorities, community groups, NGOs, Foundations,
business and academia and, unusually, sometimes led by a politician.
One of the very serious criticisms is that, as a result, the business sector has become too
powerful – particularly in such fields as biologically-modified foods 35

7. Parliamentary Scrutiny
As part of the initial modernising phase of British society in the 1960s, a system of Select
Committees was established in the House of Commons. These gave MPs the authority to call
for papers and witnesses to carry out a critical examination of the workings of particular
policies and policy systems. For the first time “backbench” members of parliament were able
to develop a policy (as distinct from legal) expertise. The committees have external advisers
selected by the Committee. Although the atmosphere in such committees is bipartisan – and
reports critical – the Chairmen of the Committees are appointed by the Government of the day
(although that now looks to be changing). Governments do take the reports seriously – to the
extent of issuing their own subsequent reports which go through each of the Select
Committee’s recommendations. General opinion, however, is that the work does not have an
immediate impact. Clearly, however, the system is a good training ground for aspiring
Ministers!

8. FOUNDATIONS
An interesting feature of the last decade has been the growth of politically-oriented but
independent policy Foundations. Shaped by the profound influence exerted over a 25-year
period by the libertarian Institute for Economic Affairs, these now supply a large number of
both policy ideas and personnel for government policy development.
Independent agencies (academia; policy institutes; professional associations and NGOs) also
make an important contribution to the debate about the effectiveness of policies – and the
alternatives. Consumers are often surveyed as part of this work

34
for a comprehensive list see pp172-176 of ibid
35
George Monbiot; The Captive State (2001)

21
9. LINK WITH THE BUDGETARY PROCESS
The introduction since 1999 of Annual Public Service Agreements36 by every UK Ministry
indicates the impact it has had on the budgetary process.
37

10. Learning from AUDIT

In the past, it generally required a policy breakdown, crisis or change of government to lead to a
policy change. The last decade has, however, seen EU countries set up systems to explore the
cost-effectiveness (or “Value-for-money”) of programmes of spending. Such studies ask not
whether governments are on the agreed path – but whether they are on the right path! What, in
other words, are programmes actually achieving in the way of real improvements to things the
public care about – eg safer neighbourhoods; jobs; better health and social care for old and
handicapped people? These increasingly look at an issue which involves several Ministries and
public organisations eg how effectively those with mental illness are cared for. The UK’s Audit
Commission for Local Government and Health Service in England and Wales has, over the
past decade, analysed each year about 10 significant aspects of public services against specially
developed performance indices
These bodies explore the operations of services from many perspectives. The attached diagram
indicates some of the questions which might be asked about activities in the health service - and
therefore identify the sort of data which needs to be collected for effective monitoring.

Apart from the increased use of polls and complaint systems, quasi-market systems have been
widely introduced. And comparative league tables on the performance of schools and hospitals
gives the citizen the power to vote with his/her feet

36
see Cmnd ??
37
SIGMA Budgeting and Policy-Making

22
11. STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS for LOCAL development
Between 1945 and 1985 the British welfare system was a delicate balance between three
powerful sets of players –
 central government,
 local government
 the professional systems (eg education, health) delivering the services.

11.1 a decade of Local Government leadership (1975-1985)

The new local government system created in the mid-1970s was meant to increase the role of local
government – with central government basically ensuring there was a strategic framework and
guaranteeing core funding. In the 1970s various strategic frameworks were therefore developed by
national government – which basically laid down procedures of strategic analysis and
consultation local authorities had to follow if they wished to access resources. Initially this was
in the field of Land-use planning – but soon spread to housing and social development.
Initially this released a lot of local energy – but gave central government both the tools and
information with which to boost its own power. At the latest count 38 these systems were almost 50
in number

11.2 Central Takeover

With strong Prime Ministers either hostile to (Thatcher 1980-1990) or impatient with (Blair 1997-)
local government, completely new local strategic systems are now in place for both the strategic
development of such services as
 training and local economic development
 health
 education

Although these look decentralised systems (with their local structures being managed by local
partnerships of business and professional people), they are in fact accountable to the centre
with appointments made by central government and centrally-allocated budgets.

11.3 Grassroots Initiatives

Government usually assumes that the “experts” needed for developing new policies are to be
found in such places as –
 Universities
 Policy Institutes and Foundations
 Government
 business
Some unusual humility was evident in the mid-1960s when new programmes were developed for
social development problems which recognised that the answers could come from local people.
The Urban Programme was started then – this laid down some brief guidelines and invited local
community group to bid for resources for local initiatives dealing with what is now called social
exclusion. In the following 20 years, thousands of projects in education, social welfare, economic
development and training, health and community safety have been developed and inspired new
strategic developments nationally39.

38
in a Cabinet Office Review of central government’s role in local development published in 1999
39
see the book by Joan Higgins for details – and also the comprehensive government review in the mid 1990s

23
12. ANALYSES of COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY
In particularly serious cases – where an individual failure seems to go beyond the particular case
and suggest a failure of policy or management system - the Government will set up an independent
Tribunal to examine the facts surrounding a case - and to assess the implications for practice and
management.
There have been many such reviews in Britain involving the decisions and behaviour of care-staff
in Child Care.Two recent examples of medical practice in Britain have horrified the nation and led
to a critical reappraisal of review systems40.
 A family doctor (Dr Shipley) was found to have systematically murdered about 20 of his
older patients over a long period41.
 A recent Tribunal report was very critical of the management systems which had allowed
an incompetent surgeon to maim many women over a period of more than a decade. The status
of surgeons discouraged people form complaining - and the culture of professional self-defence
meant that his colleagues did not articulate their own anxieties. Strong recommendations were
made for an independent Institute for Clinical Standards42.

But the most serious issue which has shocked countries throughout Europe and forced
reassessments of government systems has been the BSE outbreak which has killed about one
hundred people – and affected another 100,000 in Britain.
An Independent Inquiry into BSE (or Mad Cow) crisis was set up by the British Government in
December 1997. It was chaired by a High Court Judge and produced on October 26 2000 a
report of 16 volumes and 4,000 pages – at a cost of $20 million (the cost to the economy of the
BSE outbreak has been put at almost 9 billion dollars!43)
The report looked at the history of scientific advice and ministerial responses over a ten year
period and identified a range of professional, bureaucratic and political errors
Amongst the features identified as contributing to the failure to take appropriate action in time
were –
 Culture of secrecy in the senior civil service – the failure to share information
 The ability of the system to deliver well-drafted reports but inability to recognise a crisis
and the need to take urgent action (that is the continued lack of emphasis in the senior civil
service given to implementation44)
 Political concern to avoid panic
 The inclination to set up advisory committees (which delayed action and confused
responsibility)
 Overlap of departmental responsibilities (Agriculture and Health)
 Poor communications between departments

Rail Accidents
A spate of railway accidents in Britain in the late 1990s (caused in general by investment
starvation of the state railways in Britain during the 1980s led to a major and long Public
Inquiry (The Cullen Inquiry) which produced a voluminous and detailed analysis of the
structure of the railway system and the role of that complex structure in the accidents. 45

40
see "Doctors' errors cost NHS £2billion a year" in Guardian 14 June 2000 - and "Blair gets tough with doctors -
"consultant is king " culture must end" in Guardian 5 June 2000
41
investigations in late 2000 have put the figure at more than 200
42
43
almost half of this from the ban on use of cattle over a 3 year period; 3 billion in lost exports
44
see the project
45
The Ladbroke Grove Rail Inquiry (The Cullen Report HMSO 2001)

24
ISSUES AND IMPLICATION FOR SLOVAKIA
After this quick tour, certain questions raise their head for further exploration eg -
 What impact has this work had on government agendas.
 What evidence is there of these structures and processes producing “superior” products
– and how, anyway, does one measure that?
 How systematically have such questions been explored – and what conclusions
(however tentative) are emerging?
 What are the implications for a country (like Slovakia) which is setting the sytem up
from scratch?
There is little doubt but that public organisations now recognise they need strategies. No self-
respecting public body would be seen without a mission statement and a coherent strategy
which explicitly tries to use the whole variety of “Tools of Government”46.
It is not for this paper to try to assess current British thinking on these issues – rather to explore
their possible relevance for Slovakia. Some of the issues which seem to me worth discussion
are -

Don’t reinvent the wheel

Although contexts are obviously very different, literally hundreds of policy analyses reports are
available on the web. These give both structures, issues and options which would help ensure
that policy work in Slovakia is logical and informed.

Develop a demand
Unless the political leadership is persuaded of the need for a rigorous approach to policy
development, very little can happen. Transition countries suffer from overload – and the
leadership is often cynical or unpersuaded of the benefits to it of activities whose payoff will
often be longer than their time horizons. A modest, selective and pragmatic approach will
normally be needed – with some “quick and dirty” analyses.
Political structures should be established which increase the demand for this strategic
approach.

Develop the skills

Policy analysis is not as complicated as some of the Gurus47 in the field would have us believe.
As long as experience is in short supply, the strategic agenda will need to be tightly controlled.

Ensure implementability
A lot of strategy work can be “pie in the sky”. It needs to be rooted in practice – with the
involvement of practitioners – and linked to the budget process.

Minimise “capture”
The involvement of practitioners, of course, runs the risk of producer “capture”. This can be
minimised not only by careful selection of policy groups – but by the sort of institutionalised
system of Devil’s Advocacy outlined in the attached paper for the Romanians.

46
see an excellent paper on this by Peri 6 in Mulgan G. Life After Politics - New Thinking for the 21st Century
(Demos Foundation - Fontana 1997)
47
particulary Y Dror!

25
A very interesting workbook on Learning from Policies in other countries has just been put on
the website of what used to be the Civil Service College (policyhub@cmps.gov.uk)

Appropriate training for policy-makers

"Professional Policy Making for the Twenty First Century" set out the key skills needed to meet
the demands of modern policy-making, such as well developed presentation skills, a broad
understanding of information technology, an understanding of project management disciplines to
keep policy work on track, an ability to manage risks, and a grounding in economics, statistics
and relevant scientific disciplines in order to act as 'intelligent customers' for complex policy
evidence.
Key skills needed for successful policy-making included:
 Characteristics such as political instinct, experience and good judgement;
 The ability to draw on many sources of information and analytical skills such as analysis
of trends in quantitative and qualitative data;
 Foresight and insight to identify problems;
 Creativity and the ability to contribute ideas to tackle
 policy problems; and
 Identifying practical solutions.

The Corporate Development and Training Directorate of the Cabinet Office provide training for
the 3,500 senior civil servants in the public sector. Since 1999 there have been some 2,220
participants at seminars, conferences and training events organised by the Directorate. The Civil
Service College as part of the Centre for Management and Policy Studies also provide a number
of training courses to develop policy-making skills. The courses are mainly attended by civil
servants early in their career (usually when they are grade 7 and below). Generally, however, the
departments we examined considered policy-making a "black box" process, something which is
somewhat intuitive and happens as a matter of course rather than a separate discipline with its
own technical skills and professionalism. There is a substantial amount of guidance on policy-
making developed centrally by the Treasury and the Cabinet Office and departments such as the
Regulatory Impact Unit guidance on Good Policy-Making, and some departments have made
guidance available electronically to civil servants. Some of this guidance is becoming an integral
part of policy-making such as the need for better stakeholder consultation and the guidance on
the preparation of regulatory impact assessments where policies are likely to impose costs on
businesses, Charities or voluntary organisations.
The departments we examined said that guidance on policy-making was not well used for a
number of reasons:
 The volume of the guidance makes it difficult for policy-makers to consult it quickly;
 The different pieces of guidance do not fit together very well;
 The guidance tends to be inaccessible;
 Policy-makers are often too busy to refer to guidance; and
 Guidance reduces policy-making to a structured, logical, methodical process that does not
reflect reality. This reluctance to take advantage of existing guidance may have an impact
on policy-making with the consequence that policy decisions are not made on the most
robust analyses or make best use of analytical approaches.

Examples of departments' use of electronic networks for sharing guidance and information
Department for Education and Skills has established an electronic network which
disseminates to their staff information and guidance on policy-making.
Department of Trade and Industry is developing guidance which will be accessible through
desktop computers to allow staff to identify and draw down information and guidance on policy-
making.

26
Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions has set up on their intranet a
customised version of the Cabinet Office's Policy-Maker's Rapid Checklist.
The Cabinet Office has established a good practice website on service delivery.
(www.goodpractice.org.uk)

2.4 Some Practical Guides

There is now a small but growing number of practical guides to policy-making in the messy
world of politics and government. Until recently the only literature you could find was either dry
academic texts on the techniques48 or memoirs or accounts by partial insiders49 but Brysen’s
book50 marked a turning point in applying political and managerial practice and theory to the
question of how to get improved policy-making out of the American system – marked, as it is, by
strongly organised group interests.
And the need of the new British Labour Government to distinguish itself from its conservative
predecessors is best seen in its commitment to a new style of policy-making. This is detailed in
section Eight – but we should note a series of documents which appeared on the internet during
2001-2002
Better Policy delivery and design – a Discussion Paper (Performance and Innovation Unit,
March 2001)
Better Policy-Making (Centre for Management and Policy Studies, November 2001)
Modern Policy-Making – ensuring policies deliver Value for Money (2001 by the National Audit
Office). The Audit Office (with 700 staff and hundreds of well-presented and disseminated
examples of good and bad practice) is perhaps best placed to demonstrate the very real costs of
ignoring the precepts of policy analysis.

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see bibliography?
49
Plowden
50
Bryson J and Crosby’s Leadership for the Common Good – tackling public problems in a shared-power world (Jossey
Bass 1992).

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