Table of Contents

WHAT ARE YOU CHALLENGING? ............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 1

WHAT REMEDY ARE YOU APPLYING FOR?............................................................................................................................................................................................... 1
ADMINISTRATIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL CASES ............................................................................................................................................................................................................... 1
Mandatory Order ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 2
Prohibiting Order................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 2
Declaration ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 2
Quashing Order .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 2
*Note .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 2
CONSTITUTIONAL CASES ONLY (UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION)..................................................................................................................................................................................... 2
Arts 4 and 162 .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 2
Prospective Overruling ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 2
Advisory Opinions by a Constitutional Tribunal ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 3
THRESHOLD ISSUES ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 4
AMENABILITY ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 4
Source Test ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 4
Nature Test......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 4
STANDING (LOCUS STANDI) .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5
Private Right ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5
Public Right ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 6
Neither Private nor Public Right ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 6
PRIMA FACIE CASE ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 6
JUSTICIABILITY ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 6
ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 7
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – GROUNDS OF REVIEW ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 7
ILLEGALITY ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 7
Was the public authority empowered to make a decision? ............................................................................................................................................................................... 7
Simple ultra vires..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 7
Error of precedent fact ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 7
Did the public authority exercise its discretion wrongly?................................................................................................................................................................................... 8
 No evidence ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 8
Error of material fact ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 8
Relevant considerations .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 8
Irrelevant considerations ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 8
Improper purpose ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 9
Fettering discretion ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 9
IRRATIONALITY ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 9
Proportionality ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 9
PROCEDURAL IMPROPRIETY ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 10
Legitimate Expectations ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 10
Substantive Legitimate Expectations .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 10
Procedural Legitimate Expectations ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 10
Application ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 10
Non-Observance of Statutory Procedure ......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 11
Bias ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 12
Actual Bias ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 12
Imputed Bias ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 12
Apparent Bias ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 12
Fair Hearing...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 12
Breach of Fundamental Rules of Natural Justice ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 13
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – GROUNDS OF REVIEW ................................................................................................................................................................................... 13
RIGHTS TO EQUALITY AND EQUAL PROTECTION ............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 13
Prima facie stage.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 14
Limb (a) ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 14
Limb (b) ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 14
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 15
RIGHTS TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH, ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION....................................................................................................................................................................................... 15
Public Order ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 15
Defamation ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 15
RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 15
Step 1: Is it even a religion? ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 15
Step 2: Is it a profession, practice or propagation of the religion? .................................................................................................................................................................. 16
Step 3: Was the authority entitled to restrict this right under Art 15(4)? ........................................................................................................................................................ 16
 Administrative and Constitutional Law
WHAT ARE YOU CHALLENGING?
 Administrative decision
 Constitutionality of executive / legislative action
WHAT REMEDY ARE YOU APPLYING FOR?
Administrative and Constitutional Cases
 Where exercise of statutory or other discretionary power by public authorities violates administrative law rules, prerogative orders are available in a judicial review case

 Remedies that the High Court may grant are discretionary. As such, the effective scope of the principles of judicial review depends very much on how the Court chooses to exercise its discretion in
pursuance of its supervisory jurisdiction. In deciding whether to grant a remedy, the Court will take into account:
o Any prejudicial delay by the claimant in bringing the case;
o Whether the claimant has suffered substantial hardship;
o Any impact the remedy may have on third parties;
o Whether a remedy would have any practical effect or the matter has become academic;
o The merits of the case; and
o Whether remedy would promote good administration

 In Singapore, the power of the High Court to issue prerogative orders is expressed in s 18(2) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act read with the First Schedule
o Such orders cannot be issued by the State Courts as s 19(3) of the State Courts Act states that in general “a District Court’s jurisdiction... shall not include — (a) any supervisory jurisdiction...; (b)
any jurisdiction relating to the judicial review of any act done or decision made by any person or authority, including the issue of any of the following prerogative orders: (i) a Mandatory Order;
(ii) a Prohibiting Order; (iii) a Quashing Order; (iv) an Order for Review of Detention”
o The same restriction applies to Magistrate’s Courts since s 52(2) of the SCA provides that such a court “shall be subject to the same limitations and provisions as are applicable to a District Court
under this Act”. Furthermore, s 52(1A)(a) of the SCA provides that a Magistrate’s Court has no jurisdiction “to hear and try any action where... there is no claim for any sum of money”, which will
be the case for applications for prerogative orders

 Procedure for applying for prerogative orders is set out in O 53 of the Rules of Court
o First, one must be granted leave by the High Court in order to bring an application for judicial review
 To prevent unmeritorious applications from being taken against decision-makers and to prevent wastage of judicial time, and to protect public bodies from harassment, whether
intentional or otherwise
o Second, before the Court grants leave, it must find the existence of a proper public law issue and available grounds of review
o However, leave may be denied where the applicant fails to satisfy some threshold issue such as standing or justiciability, or it is clear that granting a remedy would be futile in the circumstances
o * Note: Leave for quashing order must generally be applied for within three months of the proceeding sought to be quashed (r 1(6)), but may be filed out of time if the delay “is accounted for to
the satisfaction of the Judge” (Chai Chwan v Singapore Medical Council [2009] SGHC 115); no time limit applies to mandatory and prohibiting orders, but such orders should be applied for without
undue delay (UDL Marine (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Jurong Town Corporation [2011] 3 SLR 94)

 Test for whether leave should be granted: [T]he duty of the court hearing an ex parte application... was not to embark upon any detailed and microscopic analysis of the material placed before it but...
to peruse the material before it quickly and appraise whether such material disclosed an arguable and a prima facie case of reasonable suspicion (expressed in Lai Swee Lin Linda v Public Service
Commission [2000] SGHC 162 and approved by CA in Public Service Commission v Lai Swee Lin Linda [2011] 1 SLR(R) 133)

Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v Attorney-General [2013] 4 SLR 1

The object of O 53 of the Rules of Court is “clearly a facilitative provision to enable the court which hears an application under O 53 to grant further relief to the applicant, relief which the applicant would
be entitled to obtain if he were to commence a separate action. The purpose of the rule is not to circumscribe the power of the court to grant declaratory relief in particular. It must be borne in mind that
the condition precedent to the grant of such further relief is where the court “has made a Mandatory Order, Prohibiting Order, Quashing Order or declaration”

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 Thus, the aim of this rule is obviously to make the court process friendlier to litigants so that an applicant who succeeds in obtaining a prerogative order or declaratory relief need not have to institute
further proceedings in order to obtain the further relief which he would be entitled to.

Hence, the proper construction of O 53 of the Rules of Court should be such that an applicant who wished to obtain a prerogative order and a declaration under this order had, first, to obtain leave to make
an application for a prerogative order (O 53 r 1(1)(b)). In the same application he could also apply for a declaratory relief. Once leave was granted, and upon hearing the parties on the substantive merits,
the court could grant (a) any prerogative order and a declaration; or (b) only a prerogative order without any declaration; or (c) only the declaration without any prerogative order
a
Mandatory Order Prohibiting Order Declaration
It basically prevents the authority to do a certain act or to make a It is a formal statement of the law based on the facts before the
certain decision. court.
It basically instructs the public authority to perform a certain act or
to make a certain decision. As per Re Fong Thin Choo [1991] 1 SLR(R) 774 at [17], the test as to A declaration has the effect of stating the law based on the facts
whether a body or tribunal was amenable to prohibition was before the court, thereby clarifying the legal position between the
Situations where a mandatory order will be denied: whether it was exercising a public duty. parties to the action.
 Prohibition will issue against any inferior court, tribunal or
Following Borissik v Urban Redevelopment Authority [2009] 4 SLR 92 public authority to carry out any order or decision which is The remedy in that way sets out the respective rights of the parties
at [21], courts do not, by mandamus, direct any public body or invalid under the law as being in excess of its authority to without directly affecting those rights, and it is for that reason that
anybody else upon whom a duty is cast how and in what manner make. the courts often prefer to grant a declaration rather than, for
they are to perform their duty (view in R v Justices of Kingston 86 instance, a quashing order and/or a mandatory order. Such a
Quashing Order
LTR 589 and endorsed in the local case of Re San Development Co’s remedy is non-coercive and a failure to act in accordance with it will
Application [1971–1973] SLR(R) 203). Hence, in applying this to the Nullifies an unlawful decision that an authority has made or a
direction that it has given; the matter may be remitted to the not give rise to a question of contempt of court.
present case, the court should not direct the <public authority> to
exercise his discretion in a particular manner, such as to order the decision-maker for a fresh decision to be made.
However, a declaration to the effect that a decision-maker has
<public authority> to <act to be done>. acted or would act illegally should prompt the decision-maker to
Usually, a quashing order to set aside a decision is coupled with a
mandatory order to obtain a fresh decision by getting <public modify its position. In the event that the decision-maker continues
OR to act contrary to the established legal position, a further coercive
authority> to reconsider its decision by factoring in <issues to be
factored>. remedy may thus be sought (Webster v Southwark London Borough
Following Muhammad Ridzuan bin Mohd Ali v AG [2014] 4 SLR 773 Council).
at [33], courts should not, in the exercise of its supervisory
Although wide-ranging, it is mainly applied to the decisions of public *Note
jurisdiction, substitute its decision for that of the original decision-
maker. Hence, in applying this to the present case, the court should bodies acting under statutory authority, and has the effect of
Vijaya Kumar s/o Rajendran v AG [2015] SGHC 244 at [25] stated
not direct the <public authority> to exercise his discretion in a invalidating the ultra vires decision of the body concerned. This may
that remedies cannot have a retrospective effect. In this case,
particular manner, such as to order the <public authority> to <act be a court, tribunal or other public authority, and the remedy can
<funds are already depleted (?)>, thus the court will only give a
to be done>. issue in respect of an abuse of power, to protect common law rights
declaration, which is of no practical impact.
of a public nature, and to curb any excess of authority in the use of
prerogative powers.
Constitutional Cases only (Unconstitutional Legislation)
 Where constitutional cases are concerned, Arts 4 and 162 of the Constitution and the power it confers on the courts are relevant
 Further, special remedies of prospective overruling and granting legislation temporary validity have been applied in constitutional cases
Arts 4 and 162 Prospective Overruling
Articles 4 and 162 of the Constitution assert its supremacy over ordinary laws. On its face,
A post-commencement law that is inconsistent with the Constitution is void ab initio (from the start) – it is as if it
Art 4 applies to laws enacted after the commencement of the Constitution (9 August
was never enacted by Parliament. Naturally, this can have far-reaching consequences for actions taken on reliance
according to the definition of commencement in Art 2(1)), while Art 162 is a transitional
of the law that is now invalid. To address the issue, the courts have developed the doctrine of prospective
provision stating that laws in existence before the Constitution’s commencement are to
overruling.
continue in force but must be construed in such a way as to bring them into conformity with
the Constitution.

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The two articles are worded differently. While Art 4 states that post-commencement laws
inconsistent with the Constitution are void, Art 162 merely provides that pre-
commencement laws are to be construed “with such modifications, adaptations,
qualifications and exceptions as may be necessary to bring them into conformity” with the
Constitution.
For voiding of pre-commencement law:
It was held in Tan Eng Hong v AG [2012] 4 SLR 476 that the wording of Art 162 means that all
laws must be read in conformity with the constitution, as far as possible. But if construing a
modification into an unconstitutional law is impossible, the supremacy of the Constitution
must continue to be upheld, and Art 162 read with Art 4 will allow the court to declare that
pre-commencement law is void.
For rewriting of legislation:
It was held in Tan Eng Hong v AG [2012] 4 SLR 476 that the wording of Art 162 means that all
laws must be read in conformity with the constitution, as far as possible. As per Director of
Public Prosecutions of Jamaica v Mollison [2003] 2 AC 411, construing by the courts goes
beyond the usual rules of construction in statutory interpretation and involves substantial
amendment of the law (deleting parts, making additions, substituting new provisions for old)
or repealing of some provision in a statute or common law rule. This is further supported by
Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 557 where it was held that the court’s power to make
modifications/amendments/deletions as necessary was a quasi-legislative power and not a
purely interpretive one.
Hence, the court should amend the constitution by substituting “xxx” to “yyy”.
For doctrine of severability:
In Tan Eng Hong v AG [2012] 4 SLR 476, the CA observed that Art 4 of the Constitution
provides for the unconstitutional portion of a law to be severed while retaining the remaining
part in the statute (doctrine of severability). In the present case, for <impugned legislation>
to be construed by the courts in such a manner is contrary to the legislative intent of <intent>
that is underlying this provision. This would effectively confer upon the judiciary legislative
powers and violate the principle of separation of powers.
However, it must be shown to be Parliament’s intention behind the enactment of an Act that
is found to be partially in breach of the Constitution that it should nevertheless continue to
be given effect after the severance and invalidity of some portions.
As the amendments are not primarily intended to <insert intent that current case assumes>,
but to <insert actual intent>, any argument that <impugned legislation> can be severed and
the remainder of that provision should be allowed to be operative cannot be sustained.
Advisory Opinions by a Constitutional Tribunal
Instead of striking down the decision for unconstitutionality, <insert claimant> could also seek for advisory opinions by a constitutional tribunal.
However, according to Chan Sek Keong, this is only for resolving disputes between constitutional organs.
The doctrine of prospective overruling means that even if a law is unconstitutional, this ruling only takes effect
from the future. (Note: After PP v Hue An Li [2014] 4 SLR 661, the framework is that judicial pronouncements are,
by default, fully retroactive in nature, but with a discretion for appellate courts (HC in appellate capacity and the
CA) to apply prospective overruling.)
The interests which it seeks to promote are:
 People’s legitimate expectations (on the basis that people arrange their lives around what they understand
the law to be, so a retrospective change frustrates legitimate expectations)
o It is for this reason that J Raz requires laws to be prospective, open and clear  upholds rule of
law
 Promotes legal certainty as a result
Appellate courts’ discretion to apply prospective overruling should be guided by:
(1) Extent to which the law/legal principle is entrenched. The more entrenched, the greater the need for
prospective overruling.
 Measured by, e.g. position of the courts adopting the overruled law; number of cases that
have followed it; whether the courts had analysed several disparate positions before applying
that law
(2) Extent of change to the law. The greater the change, the greater the need for prospective overruling.
 E.g. Abandonment of legal position in Manogaran is a greater change than an evolutionary
reframing of the law (e.g. Sembcorp – building on foundations of earlier cases, but re-
examined the distinction between interpretation and implication in contract law)
(3) Extent to which change to the law is foreseeable. The less foreseeable the change, the more prospective
overruling is needed.
 E.g. The doctrine of marital immunity had progressively been collecting exceptions to the
principle by courts which expressed their distaste for the rule  change to the law was
eminently foreseeable [SW v UK]
(4) Extent of reliance on the law concerned. The greater the reliance, the more the need for prospective
overruling. Especially compelling the criminal context, where liberty is at stake.
*This is a factors-based test; no one is conclusive or necessary before PO can be adopted.
Application:
In the present case, the legal position is an entrenched state of law. However, a shift from the default sentence
of <initial default sentence> to default sentence of <new default sentence> is a significant change in law.
This change is not eminently foreseeable as there was no prior case that had questioned the continuing validity
of the legislation.
There was also reliance placed as numerous offenders would have pleaded guilty to or conducted defences on
the starting point of <initial default sentence>.
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 THRESHOLD ISSUES
Following Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew v AG [2014] 1 SLR 345, to obtain leave for judicial review, <insert claimant> must establish that:
 the decision is susceptible to judicial review (amenability and justiciability),
 <insert claimant> must have sufficient interest or locus standi in the subject matter,
 there is an arguable case or a prima facie case of reasonable suspicion in favour of granting the remedies sought by <insert claimant>
Amenability
The determination as to whether a decision is subject to judicial review has to be examined in regard to the source, as well as the nature, of the power behind the decision.
Source Test
 If the source of power of a body is derived from statute or subsidiary legislation, the body may be
susceptible to judicial review
 Following Yeap Wai Kong v Singapore Exchange Securities Trading Ltd [2012] 3 SLR 565, even if the source
of power is non-statutory, the body may be susceptible to judicial review if the body performs public
functions
 If the power can be traced back to a contractual source, it is not amenable
In the present case, we need to first determine if the source of <public authority> to <insert power> was statutory.
If yes:
It is true that <public authority> is a statutory body and has the relevant powers under the legislation in question.
However, the mere fact that the power to make the decision in question was statutory is not conclusive, and the
nature test must be applied to see whether the body was performing a public function.
If no:
As held in Public Service Commission v Lai Swee Lin Linda [2001] 1 SLR(R) 133 and Yip Man Hing Kevin v Gleneagles
Hospital [2014] 2 SLR 515, when statutory bodies make certain decisions, it does not invariably follow that the
statutory body is exercising a statutory power. Much depends on the circumstances.
The legislation only authorises <public authority> to <insert power that legislation intended for>. The source of
<public authority> power to <insert decision> is the <insert set of rules>, which is a set of rules that <insert power
that is adopted in question>. Hence, it seems to indicate that there is no statutory power on <public authority>
to <insert power that it adopted in question>.
It is more likely that its power is contractual, stemming from the contract where <e.g. S League manages the league
for FAS and is required to adhere to all rules it sets down / contract of employment and relationship is that of
employer and employee>.
Nonetheless, we should consider the nature test.
Nature Test
To determine whether the nature test is satisfied, we can look at the facts which were
considered in the case of Yeap Wai Kong v Singapore Exchange Securities Trading Ltd [2012]
3 SLR 565.
The nature test examines the:
1. Extent to which the body has been interwoven into a system of governmental
regulation;
2. Extent of statutory recognition of the authority or underpinning of the
body/function in question;
3. Nature of the function.
In Yeap Wai Kong, the nature test was satisfied as the SFA approved of SGX’s existence; SGX
regulated an entire market and was thus integral to the market; SGX’s functions were
intricately linked to a legislative framework, and its ordinary affairs monitored closely by
MAS.
If satisfied:
The <public authority> has been interwoven into <regulation>, since they must <insert
requirement>. The <regulation> also recognises the ability of <public authority> to <insert
decision>. Lastly, the function affects every member of the public. Hence, the nature test is
satisfied.
If not satisfied:
In the present case, no such framework exists and the government does not regulate <public
authority> ordinary affairs; it merely imposes <condition imposed>. Furthermore, <public
authority> decision would not affect the public in general as contrasted in Yeap Wai Kong
where the economic impact could potentially affect the entire country.
Looking at the factors in totality, it is unlikely that the nature test is satisfied, and <insert
claimant>’s case is unlikely to be amenable to judicial review.
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 Standing (Locus Standi)
Private Right
As per Tan Eng Hong v AG [2012] 4 SLR 476, to establish standing, <insert claimant> must show that he has a real interest in bringing the action, there is a real controversy and that his private right has been
interfered with.

Real interest:
If right infringed was a personal right
All <class of people> will have a real interest in the decision by <public authority>, given their function.

If right infringed was a constitutional right

As held in Chan Hiang Leng Colin v Ministry of Information and the Arts [1995] 2 SLR(R) 627, given the importance of constitutional rights, a citizen prima facie has sufficient interest to see that his constitutional
rights are not violated. Once <insert claimant> shows an actual or arguable violation of personal rights, this prima facie fulfils “real interest”.

Real controversy:
If there is a real interest
The real controversy is evident in <insert controversy>.

If there is no real interest

While the real controversy requirement must be met, the court has discretion to hear the case in the absence of a real controversy, provided some conditions are fulfilled. To convince the court to exercise its
discretion to hear a hypothetical case, it is a “critical requirement that an academic appeal is in the public interest. This is determined by – (a) whether all sides of the argument have been fully and properly
put; and (b) counsel must be instructed by solicitors instructed by those with a real interest in the outcome of the appeal.

Infringement of private right:

Constitutional Rights
Art 9 Liberty of the person
Art 10 Slavery and forced labour prohibited
Art 11 Protection against retrospective criminal laws and repeated trials
Art 12 Equal protection
Art 13 Prohibition of banishment and freedom of movement
Art 14 Freedom of speech, assembly and association
Art 15 Freedom of religion
Art 16 Rights in respect of education

If infringed
Here, <public authority> has allegedly infringed <insert Article> as <insert reason>.

Art 12
There are two ways in which Art 12, which grants equal protection to all persons, can be violated. Firstly, it can be violated by a discriminatory law. The reasonable classification test is used to determine
whether the law is discriminatory. <insert reasons for law to be discriminatory or not>

Although a law is neutral on its face, its application or enforcement might be discriminatory in nature, resulting in a breach of Art 12(1). The reasonable nexus test as elucidated in Eng Foong Ho v AG [2009]
2 SLR(R) 542 is applied in such cases. <insert claimant> is likely to argue that <public authority> decision for <intention> is discriminatory towards <insert class of people>.
Art 14
Here, under Art 14, <insert claimant> being a citizen, has a constitutional right freedom of expression. <Public authority> decision infringes on <insert claimant> right.

5
 Art 15
Here, under Art 15, <insert claimant> being a citizen, has a constitutional right to profess, practice and propagate his religion, and <claimant’s actions> are essential for him to carry out these activities.
<Public authority> decision infringes on <insert claimant> right.

If not infringed
No violation of <insert article> as the decision was <not discriminatory if Art 12>. <insert reasons to support>.
Public Right
Following Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v AG [2013] 4 SLR 1, it must be shown that <public authority> has breached a public right and that <insert claimant> had suffered special damage.

If infringed:
As <insert claimant> falls within <class of persons> to benefit, there is a shared public right. His standing accrues as <insert claimant> suffered special damage and there is a nexus between him and the desired
remedy. (special damage refers to more damage than others; or different damage. It does not need to be monetary)
Neither Private nor Public Right
As held in Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew v AG [2014] 1 SLR 345, where there was a grave and exceptional illegality involving egregious breaches of the law, individuals whose rights were not directly affected
might have locus standi to bring judicial review proceedings against such obvious and flagrant disregard for the law as it would be in the public interest.
Prima facie Case
 Low threshold, easily satisfied
 Just state that the other criteria were satisfied, and prima facie case is met out
Justiciability
Non-Justiciable:
In the present case, <public authority> balanced <financial / safety / national defence / macro-economic policies and their social effects / making of treaties, defence of the realm, prerogative of mercy, grant
of honours (GCHQ) / generally, where there are matters of policy or subjective preference, or polycentric public policy issues considerations> with <insert decision>. Following Lee Hsien Loong v Review
Publishing Company Ltd [2007] 2 SLR(R) 453, such a decision involves matters of government policy and requires the intricate balancing of various competing policy considerations that judges are ill-equipped
to adjudicate because of their limited training, experience and access to materials, and the court should shy away from reviewing its merits. Hence, <public authority> decision should be non-justiciable.

OR

It was held in Lee Hsien Loong v Review Publishing Company Ltd [2007] 2 SLR(R) 453 that where a judicial pronouncement could embarrass some other branch of government or tie its hands in the conduct of
affairs traditionally regarded as falling within its purview, the courts should abstain from doing so. Hence, <public authority> decision should be non-justiciable.

OR

As held in International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] 1 QB 728, a greater degree of deference should be given to <acts of Parliament / where the right is qualified
/ where the subject matter lies within democratic branches’ responsibility or expertise>. Hence, <public authority> decision should be non-justiciable.

Justiciable:
Notwithstanding polycentric matters that are non-justiciable, Tan Seet Eng v AG [2016] 1 SLR 779 (or Chng Suan Tze v Minister for Home Affairs [1988] 2 SLR(R) 525) stated that courts could still inquire into
whether the decision was made “within the scope of the relevant legal power…and arrived at it in a legal manner”. Declaring an issue non-justiciable is not a plea in bar.

OR

Following Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239, as <public authority> use of power was <in bad faith for an extraneous purpose / to contravene constitutional rights>, even
though the subject-matter of the case is generally regarded as non-justiciable, judicial review in the present case would be appropriate.

6
 Alternative Remedies
As held in Borissik v Urban Redevelopment Authority [2009] 4 SLR(R) 92, a general rule is that a person seeking judicial review of a decision by a public body must exhaust all alternative remedies before invoking
the jurisdiction of the court for judicial review.

If claimant has exhausted all:

This is apparent as <insert reasons such as a lack of statutory appeal process>. Therefore, leave will likely be granted.

If claimant has not exhausted all:

On the facts, <insert claimant> had failed to <insert alternative remedy provided for in question>. Hence, it is improper for <insert claimant> to circumvent the process of <insert alternative remedy>, and
leave should not be granted.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – GROUNDS OF REVIEW
It was held in Puhlhofer v Hillingdon London Borough Council [1986] AC 484 that where Parliament intended the local authority to be the judge of fact, while the action or inaction of a local authority is clearly
susceptible to judicial review where they have misconstrued the Act, or abused their powers or otherwise acted perversely, great restraint should be exercised in giving leave to proceed by judicial review. The
ground upon which the courts will review the exercise of an administrative discretion is abuse of power – e.g. bad faith, a mistake in construing the limits of the power, a procedural irregularity, or
unreasonableness in the Wednesbury sense.
Illegality
Was the public authority empowered to make a decision?
Simple ultra vires Error of precedent fact
A decision maker acts ultra vires when it does not have Precedent fact – one that must exist before the authority has power to make its decision. If it does not exist, authority has no power to act.
the power it purported to have to make the decision.  Is there a precedent fact (that must exist before authority has the power it purported to have)?
Two questions: o Interpret the statute
 Statutory interpretation: What was the power o If no precedent fact required  the decision is out of the “precedent fact category”.
conferred on the authority?  Was the precedent fact fulfilled?
 Did the authority act beyond the scope of its o Where existence or non-existence of a fact involves a broad spectrum, courts should leave it to the public body to decide if it exists
power? [Puhlhofer]
Where courts decide there is neither express nor implied
power to make a decision, a finding of illegality should A line of authorities have consistently affirmed the principle that where the exercise of an executive power depends upon the precedent
follow. establishment of an objective fact, it is for the court, if there be a challenge by way of judicial review, to decide whether the precedent requirement
has been satisfied. Following the CA’s approach in Chng Suan Tze v Minister for Home Affairs [1988] 2 SLR(R) 525, the wording of the statue, object
As held in Tan Seet Eng v AG [2016] 1 SLR 779, the of the statute and nature of the subject matter are relevant considerations when determining if a fact is a precedent fact.
boundaries of a decision-maker’s jurisdiction, laid down
in statute, are solely for the court to decide. The executive Wording of statute:
is “responsible to the court of justice for the lawfulness of In the present case, the statue itself expressly confers decision making power in an executive agency alone, and thus falls outside the precedent fact
what they do, and of that the court is the only judge”. principle of review.
Hence, when discretion is vested in the Executive branch,
the courts should decide (a) what the boundaries of the Object of the statute:
Executive’s power are; and (b) whether the Executive has In the present case, adopting a purposive approach, Parliament could not have intended for <public authority> to make such decisions and thus
acted within the ambit of that power. <public authority> was acting ultra vires.

In the present case, <public authority> was empowered
under <insert legislation> to <insert intended act> so
that they could <insert purpose of legislation>. However,
<public authority> introduced <insert act performed>,
which is a completely different enterprise than what it
was originally tasked to do under the statute.
Nature of subject matter:
In the present case, the subject matter involves a complex decision making process which involves statutory rules and regulations as <insert process>,
thus, following Zamir v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1980] 1 AC 930, the fact is probably not a precedent fact.
OR

7
 In the present case, as the decision is a very simple one, it is highly likely that the fact is a precedent fact.
Hence, following Attorney General v Fulham Corporation
[1921] 1 Ch 440, <public authority> did not have power OR
to <insert act performed> and was acting ultra vires.
In the present case, as the administrative curtails an individual’s fundamental rights, following Khawaja v Secretary of State for the Home Department
[1984] AC 74, it is highly likely that a precedent fact will be established.
Did the public authority exercise its discretion wrongly?
Even if <public authority> is empowered to make a decision, the law often imposes limits on the extent of the decision-making and rule-making powers. Indeed, this is congruent with the rule of law which
requires discretionary power to be controlled or regulated.
No evidence Error of material fact
A public authority’s decision may be challenged on the ground that it is based on no or insufficient evidence. Where there is misunderstanding or ignorance of an established and relevant fact, and/or
where the public authority acts ‘upon an incorrect basis of fact’, the decision can be
As held in Re Fong Thin Choo [1991] 1 SLR(R) 774, which endorsed the view in Secretary of State for Education challenged.
and Science v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council [1977] 1 AC 1014, the court is “entitled to inquire into the
existence of facts upon which the evaluation was made”. Following Re Fong Thin Choo [1991] 1 SLR(R) 774, which arguably endorsed Secretary of State
for Education and Science v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council [1977] 1 AC 1014, as the
In the present case, <public authority> could not have reasonably come to the decision on the evidence before decision by <public authority> was not made upon a proper self-direction as to <material
it. facts>, he has acted "upon an incorrect basis of fact".
Relevant considerations Irrelevant considerations
A public authority must take into account all relevant considerations that it is required to take into account, and disregard the irrelevant A public authority must take into account all relevant considerations
ones in making its decision. that it is required to take into account, and disregard the irrelevant
ones in making its decision.
The court in R v Somerset County Council, ex parte Fewings [1995] 1 WLR 1037 identified three categories of consideration of factors:
1) Those clearly (expressly or impliedly) identified by the statute as considerations to which regard must be had; The court in R v Somerset County Council, ex parte Fewings [1995] 1
2) Those clearly identified by the statute as considerations to which regard must not be had; WLR 1037 identified three categories of consideration of factors:
3) Those to which the decision maker may have regard if in his judgment and discretion he thinks it right to do so. 1) Those clearly (expressly or impliedly) identified by the
 Here, there is a “margin of appreciation” within which the decision maker may decide just what considerations should statute as considerations to which regard must be had;
play a part in his reasoning process 2) Those clearly identified by the statute as considerations to
which regard must not be had;
In the present case, due to <express wording of the statute / implied by the court as per Vasiliou v Secretary of State for Transport 3) Those to which the decision maker may have regard if in his
[1991] 2 All ER 77>, <insert consideration> is a mandatory consideration that has to be considered. As <public authority> failed to judgment and discretion he thinks it right to do so.
consider it, the decision should be struck down.  Here, there is a “margin of appreciation” within which
the decision maker may decide just what considerations
OR should play a part in his reasoning process

In the present case, <insert consideration> is a discretionary consideration, hence <public authority> failure to take it into consideration Following Tan Gek Neo Jessie v Minister for Finance [1991] 1 SLR(R) 1,
is not fatal to the decision. <insert consideration> for <decision> is legally irrelevant, and may not
be taken into account by <public authority>. Hence, the decision
OR should be set aside.

Similar to Tesco Stores Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] 1 WLR 759, as <public authority> has had regard to all material
considerations, it can give them whatever weight it thinks fit or no weight at all.

*Note: It is still open to the court to find that putting little / no weight to this consideration is Wednesbury unreasonable.
*Note: If the court interprets a statute to impose a duty on a public authority, resources are an irrelevant consideration. Conversely, if
the court interprets a statute to confer a discretionary power on a public authority, then resources are a relevant consideration.
8
 Improper purpose
A public authority must only exercise his statutorily-given power for the purpose for
which it was given.
In the present case, the purpose of the statute is to <insert purpose by looking at long
title of the Act, construing the purpose of the specific impugned provision>. However,
<public authority> by <decision/act> acted contrary to the statute, and will be held to
be an improper purpose of the <public authority> powers.
If there are mixed purposes:
Following Westminster Corporation v London and North Western Railway Co [1905] 1
AC 426, the court must decide whether the dominant purpose of the executive’s
decision was lawful; or whether the unlawful or improper purposes were merely
“incidental”.
In the present case, the dominant was still to <insert purpose of the statute>. The fact
that there was the “incidental advantage” of <insert incidental advantage> did not
constitute an improper purpose.
OR
In the present case, <public authority> had <act> “under the colour and pretence of
<insert purpose of the statute>”. Hence, there was an improper purpose of the <public
authority> powers.
Tan Seet Eng v AG [2016] 1 SLR 779 endorsed Lord Diplock’s definition of Wednesbury unreasonableness in GCHQ, that is “decisions which were so outrageously defiant of logic or accepted moral standards
that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question would arrive at the impugned decision.”
Fettering discretion
A public authority must not fetter its own decision-making power. Two rules: (i) An authority must not adhere too
strictly to a policy; and (ii) Cannot base its decision upon another’s instruction or delegate the responsibility of a
decision-making process to another.
Application of a rigid policy
Following Lines International Holding (S) Pte Ltd v Singapore Tourist Promotion Board [1997] 1 SLR(R) 52, the adoption
of a general policy by a body exercising an administrative discretion is perfectly valid provided that:
a) The policy is not Wednesbury unreasonable;
 i.e. it is not a decision that is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no
sensible person who applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it
b) Courts are not entitled to substitute their views of how the discretion should be exercised with that actually
taken
c) Policy is made known to affected persons;
d) Administrative body is “prepared to hear out individual cases… or exceptional cases”.
On the facts, <public authority> had not fettered its discretion because <fulfil above criteria>.
Acting under dictation / improper delegation of power
Following Lines International Holding (S) Pte Ltd v Singapore Tourist Promotion Board [1997] 1 SLR(R) 52, if <public
authority> had duty to exercise its discretion, it would have acted unlawfully if it had indeed taken orders from other
public authorities.
On the facts, it was <public authority> alone that had taken the decision to <act>.
Irrationality

If Wednesbury unreasonable:
<Insert claimant> might seek to argue that the use of <insert policy> to justify <act> is Wednesbury unreasonable. This is because <insert reasoning as to why it is Wednesbury unreasonable>. Hence, no sensible
person could logically have relied on <insert policy> to <act>.

If not Wednesbury unreasonable:

<Public authority> has taken into account all relevant considerations in its decision-making. The <insert policy> was not the driving reason for <act>. <insert reasons as to why it is not Wednesbury unreasonable
such as interpretation of statute, financial considerations, policy considerations>. Thus, the <insert policy> was not unreasonably applied as it served as proper consideration, inter alia, towards the manner in
which <public authority> <original intention>.
Proportionality
Assuming that proportionality is accepted as a distinct ground of judicial review in Singapore, Elloy De Freitas v Permanent Secretary Of Ministry Of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands And Housing And Others [1999]
1 AC 69 suggested a three stage test to determine whether the decision is arbitrary or excessive: (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right; (ii) the measures
designed to meet the legislative objective are rationally connected to it; and (iii) the means used to impair the right or freedom are no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective.

Moreover, as opposed to the traditional grounds of review, R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 2 AC 532 cited in Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] 1 WLR
1591 stated that
(i) Proportionality may require the court to assess the balance that the decision maker has struck – not just to see whether it is within the range of rational or reasonable decisions
(ii) May require attention to be directed to the relative weight given to interests and considerations

9
 (iii) Even the heightened scrutiny test is not necessarily appropriate to protection of human rights. Intensity of proportionality review is guaranteed by the twin requirements – (i) that limitation of the
right was necessary, in the sense of meeting a pressing social need; (ii) whether the interference was really proportionate to the legitimate aim being pursued.
Procedural Impropriety
Legitimate Expectations
Substantive Legitimate Expectations Procedural Legitimate Expectations
Why should there be SLE: Similar to GCHQ [1985] AC 374, a procedural legitimate
Following Chiu Teng @ Kallang Pte Ltd v Singapore Land Authority [2014] 1 SLR 1047, the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectations exists expectation had arisen because <public authority> had
in Singapore as a stand-alone head of judicial review. According to the English Court of Appeal in R v North and East Devon Health Authority, ex previously <insert existence of regular practice>. As the
parte Coughlan [2001] 1 QB 213, in the context of legitimate expectations, where a public authority’s decision was substantively unfair such that practice of <insert regular practice> was so established by
it amounted to an abuse of power, such a decision may be unlawful. <insert date>, it would have been unfair or inconsistent with
good administration for <public authority> to depart from
Why should there not be SLE: the practice.
Sundaresh Menon, in SGB Starkstrom Pte Ltd v Commissioner for Labour [2016] 3 SLR 598, cast doubt on the issue as to whether the doctrine of
substantive legitimate expectation was a part of Singapore law. It is argued that the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation should not OR
be established locally because when additional protection is to be granted to the public in relation to public authorities, it entails a more searching
scrutiny of executive action, which is beyond what is currently contemplated under the framework of irrationality, illegality and procedural Similar to Re Siah Mooi Guat [1988] 2 SLR(R) 165, no promise
impropriety. And to extend the court’s role in this manner could, raise questions regarding the separation of powers, and the institutional whatsoever was made to <insert claimant> that <insert
competence of the court to decide on issues that may often involve considerations of a polycentric nature, affecting third parties who may be scenario>. Hence, there was no basis to find a legitimate
direct or indirect beneficiaries of the public authority’s intended change of stance. expectation on the part of <insert claimant> to stay.
Application
Assuming that the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation applies in Singapore, there was <no breach> of legitimate expectations. The legal test to establish that an aggrieved person should be entitled
to have a public authority substantively fulfil a legitimate expectation is set out in Chiu Teng @ Kallang Pte Ltd v Singapore Land Authority [2014] 1 SLR 1047.

In the present case, <insert claimant> must prove the six cumulative requirements that (a) an unequivocal and unqualified statement or representation (b) was made by someone with actual or ostensible
authority to do so on behalf of the public authority. (c) And that this statement was made to him or to a class of persons to which he clearly belongs, (d) and it was reasonable for him to have (e) suffered
detrimental reliance. (f) Even if all the above requirements are met, <insert claimant> will not be granted relief if <public authority> can show an overriding national or public interest which justifies the
frustration of his expectation.

Requirement (a)
The statement <insert statement> cannot be said to be unequivocal as it provides more than one natural interpretation. The statement is not, in any way, a promise to <insert supposed promise>. When the
representation is capable of multiple meanings, <public authority>’s interpretation should be preferred.

OR

There was clear and unambiguous representation by <public authority> that it will / will not act in a certain way.

OR

Following GCHQ, the practice of <insert practice> was so well-established that it would be unfair for <public authority> to depart from it.

OR

Following ex parte Unilever, <public authority> cannot change a long-standing practice that it is aware that an individual such as <insert claimant> has acted upon and benefited from, without prior warning.

OR

10
Following Borissik v Urban Redevelopment Authority [2009] 4 SLR(R) 92, <public authority> can only expect to be treated in accordance with existing guidelines, not old policies that have been superceded.

OR

Following Chiu Teng @ Kallang Pte Ltd v Singapore Land Authority [2014] 1 SLR 1047, the presence of the disclaimer / non-reliance clause should have prevented the expectation from arising.

Requirement (b)
Seeing that <decision maker> was the <position> of <public authority>, the statement is said to have been made by someone with actual authority to do so on behalf of <public authority>.

Requirement (c)
The statement <insert statement> shows that the statement was made to <insert claimant or class of persons>, which is the class of persons to which <insert claimant> belongs to. Hence, requirement (c) is
fulfilled.

*Note: Generally, the smaller / more defined the class, the more likely that the authority will be bound by that representation.

Requirement (d)
<Decision maker>’s statement was ambiguous, as it was not a direct answer to <insert claimant>’s question. <insert claimant> should have used the opportunity to clarify. Seeing that there was reason and
opportunity for <insert claimant> to make queries, his failure to do so would not entitle him to a relief.

OR

<Insert claimant> being a <insert profession> ought to have been aware of <insert clause> as <insert reason>. Consequently, it is not reasonable for him to rely on any representations that might have arisen.

Requirement (e)
The case of R (Patel) v General Medical Council [2013] 1 WLR 2801 offers that detrimental reliance took the form of investment in time, effort and money. In this case, <insert claimant> cannot be said to have
made such investments in reliance on <decision maker>’s statement. / Furthermore, <insert claimant> remained in the same position, or even gained a benefit. Hence, he cannot be said to have suffered a
detrimental reliance.

The UK case of R (Patel) v General Medical Council (CA) [2013] 1 WLR 2801 at [84] rejected detrimental reliance as a condition precedent as authorities such as <public authority> must be “held to their word
irrespective of whether the applicant has been relying specifically on it” (ex parte Bebgie).

Requirement (f)
In the unlikelihood that <insert claimant> is said to satisfy all the aforementioned requirements, <insert claimant> will not be granted relief due to an overriding public interest which justifies the frustration of
his application.

<insert overriding public interest which can be safety considerations, financial considerations, decision for the supposed act, breach of law, infringement of some other person’s accrued rights etc.>

Hence, the decision was reached after balancing public safety considerations … and public interests will be likely to be deemed to be overriding.
Non-Observance of Statutory Procedure
As per Yong Vui Kong v AG, [2011] 2 SLR 1189, a public authority acts in a procedurally improper manner if it fails to observe any statutory procedural requirements for the exercise of its powers, and the failure
to comply with these mandatory requirements may render an administrative decision invalid.

In the present case, <statute> sets out specific procedural safeguards. There is conclusive evidence to show that <public authority> did not <insert statutory procedure>. Hence, it acted in breach of <statute>.

OR

11
While statutory requirements are presumed to be mandatory, this presumption is rebutted in the present case as the requirement is trivial or technical such that the breach of <insert required procedure>
does not defeat the purpose of the statute or unfairly affect the public. (In such a case, the requirement will be deemed to be ‘directory’ and a failure to comply with the statutory requirements will not necessarily
be fatal to the decision.)
Bias
Actual Bias Imputed Bias Apparent Bias
Actual bias is taken to exist where Being a party to a case, or Bias arising out of pecuniary/proprietary The test for apparent bias in Singapore is the “reasonable suspicion” test found in Re Shankar
the decision maker is (i) influenced interest Alan s/o Anant Kulkarni [2007] 1 SLR(R) 85. This test is met if the court is satisfied that a
by partiality or prejudice in reaching Similar to Dimes v Grand Junction Canal Proprietors (1852) 3 HL Cas 759, reasonable number of the public could harbour a reasonable suspicion of bias even though
the decision; or (ii) actually the fact that there was evidence showing that <decision maker> had a the court itself thought there was no real danger of this on the facts.
prejudiced in favour of or against a pecuniary interest in this would warrant automatic disqualification.
party. In the present case, on the facts that <insert relevant facts>, a reasonable number of the
Bias arising out of non-pecuniary (personal) interest public would understand that <public authority> has its limitations. It is reasonable to expect
In the present case, the facts that Following R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte that <considerations that public authority had> would result in <public authority final
<public authority / decision maker Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) [2000] 1 AC 119, as <insert relevant facts> show decision>.
acts> are substantially true and that <decision maker> is himself a party to the cause, or has a relevant
accurate. Thus, actual bias can be interest in its subject matter, imputed bias will be found, and he will be OR
found. disqualified.
Following Yong Vui Kong v AG [2011] 2 SLR 1189, no reasonable suspicion of bias can be found
*Note: Proof of actual bias is often OR in the present case merely because <third party> had mentioned <insert what was
very difficult to come by. mentioned>.
Following R v Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council, ex parte Hook, the
act that <decision maker> was involved at an earlier stage, and at the <Third party>’s statement only reiterated the current stand, and was not a comment on the
later stage, imputed bias will be found, and he will be disqualified. current case. To treat <third party>’s statement as having pre-judged the case would mean
that no <position of third party e.g. government Minister> could ever say anything in public
No imputed bias without creating a spectre of bias. Further, any such pre-judgment of cannot automatically be
In the present case, the mere fact that <decision maker> is <alleged attribute to the other 20 Ministers in the Cabinet.
factor for bias> does not indicate the same level of involvement sufficient
to impute bias. Thus, there is no apparent bias, and thus no ground of illegality.
Fair Hearing
<Insert claimant> did not have a fair hearing as. A fair hearing may involve any or all of the following elements:
 The right to be heard
o Dow Jones Publishing Co (Asia) Inc v AG [1989] 1 SLR(R) 637, Kay Swee Pin v Singapore Island Country Club [2008] 2 SLR(R) 802, Yong Vui Kong v AG [2011] 2 SLR 1189
 The right to be informed in advance of the case to be met (notice of charge)
o Chiam See Tong v Singapore Democratic Party [1993] 3 SLR(R) 774, Chng Wei Meng v PP [2002] 2 SLR(R) 566, Mohammed Aziz bin Ibrahim v Pertubohan Kebangsaan Melayu Singapura [2004] 1
SLR(R) 191
 The right to sufficiency of time to prepare a response
o Mohammed Aziz bin Ibrahim v Pertubohan Kebangsaan Melayu Singapura [2004] 1 SLR(R) 191
 The right to access to documentation (reciprocity)
o Teng Cheng Sin v Law Fay Yuen [2003] 3 SLR(R) 356, Yong Vui Kong v AG [2011] 2 SLR 1189
 The right to an oral or written hearing
o PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero) v Dexia Bank SA [2007] 4 SLR(R) 676
 The right to legal representation
o Kok Seng Chong v Bukit Turf Club [1992] 3 SLR(R) 772, HC
 A fair conduct of the hearing
o Yeap Wai Kong v Singapore Exchange Securities Trading Ltd [2012] 3 SLR 565, Ho Paul v Singapore Medical Council [2008] 2 SLR(R) 780

12
  Private communication with material witness
o Re Low Fook Cheng Patricia (a solicitor) [1998] 3 SLR(R) 214
 Excessive intervention by tribunal
o Wong Kok Chin v Singapore Society of Accountants [1989] 2 SLR(R) 633, Chiam See Tong v Singapore Democratic Party [1993] 3 SLR(R) 774, Ng Chee Tiong Tony v PP [2008] 1 SLR(R) 900, Mohammed
Ali bin Johari v PP [2008] 4 SLR(R) 1058
o Excessive judicial intervention in the conduct of a trial can present at least four distinct (though inter-related) grounds of challenge (PP v Chua Siew Wei Kathleen [2016] 2 SLR 713):
 The first is where it gives rise to a finding of apparent bias. This arises when the extent of the court’s interventions are such that a fair-minded reasonable person with knowledge of the
relevant facts observing the proceedings might reasonably apprehend that the court was biased
 The second is where the interruptions are so numerous and so intrusive that they unduly hamper a party in the conduct of his case.
 The third is where a judge “descends into the arena” by assuming a quasi-inquisitorial role and engages in such sustained questioning that he impairs his ability to evaluate and weigh the
case presented by each side dispassionately and disinterestedly
 The fourth is where the extent of intervention discloses that the judge has prejudged the outcome of the case by determining the issues adversely against one of the parties before their
case had been fully presented
 Duty to give reasons for the decision
o While not really a ground of review, the CA in Ramalingam Ravinthran v AG [2012] 2 SLR 49 said that there was no duty to give reasons for prosecutorial decision to charge, except in situations
involving the most fundamental of human rights, e.g. right to life
o Manjit Singh s/o Kirpal Singh v AG [2013] 2 SLR 844
Breach of Fundamental Rules of Natural Justice
Following Ong Ah Chuan v PP [1979-1980] SLR(R) 710, some concepts of common law can be read into the Constitution from the common law as references to “law” in such contexts as in as ‘in accordance with
law’ and the like, refer to a system of law which incorporates those fundamental rules of natural justice that had formed part and parcel of the common law of England that was in operation in Singapore at the
commencement of the Constitution. This is in line with the Westminster model, that purports to assure all individuals the continued enjoyment of fundamental liberties.

In the present case, the right <is / is not> a fundamental rule of natural justice.

Fundamental Rules of Natural Justice Not Fundamental Rules of Natural Justice

Conviction after trial by unbiased court – Ong Ah Chuan v PP [1979–1980] SLR(R) 710 Privilege against self-incrimination – Haw Tua Tau v PP [1981-1982] SLR(R) 133
Presumption of innocence – Haw Tua Tau v PP [1981-1982] SLR(R) 133 Rule against placing burden of proving innocence on accused – Ong Ah Chuan v PP [1979–1980] SLR(R) 710
Right to legal representation – Haw Tua Tau v PP [1981-1982] SLR(R) 133 Right to silence – PP v Mazlan bin Maidun [1992] 3 SLR(R) 968 at 973–974
Right to give evidence on one’s own behalf – Haw Tua Tau v PP [1981-1982] SLR(R) 133
Extra:
When is a principle a fundamental rule of natural justice? According to Haw Tua Tau v PP, the principle must not be “obviously unfair”, and we must look at how the principle fits into the judicial process. In
addition, we should note that fundamental rules of natural justice change with the times (Haw Tua Tau v PP).
a
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – GROUNDS OF REVIEW
Rights to Equality and Equal Protection
 Article 12 is the main provision in the Constitution guaranteeing equality to all persons
o Article 12(1) declares that “[a]ll persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law”.
o Article 12(2) prohibits discrimination “on the ground only of religion, race, descent or place of birth” in specified situations.
o Article 12(3) sets out exceptions to the equality principle:
 It does not invalidate or prohibit any provision regulating personal law
 It does not invalidate or prohibit any provision or practice restricting office or employment connected with the affairs of any religion, or of an institution managed by a group professing
any religion, to persons professing that religion
 Article 16 prohibits discrimination on specified grounds where education is concerned.
 Articles 152 and 153 place on the Government a responsibility to care for the interest of racial and religious minorities.

13
  Article 154 provides that all persons who are in the same Government service grade must be treated impartially regardless of their race, subject to the terms and conditions of their employment and to
other provisions of the Constitution.

In the present case, <insert claimant> is likely to contend that <public authority’s policy (Brown v Board of Education 347 US 483 (1954)) / administration of the law (Yick Wo v Hopkins 118 US 356 (1886)) /
degree of involvement by public authority (Mohamed Emran bin Mohamed Ali v PP [2008] 4 SLR(R) 411)> is discriminatory.

Following Lim Meng Suang v AG [2015] 1 SLR 26, upon identifying that the <act / impugned statute> is discriminatory, the applicable test to determine if the <act> contravenes Art 12(1) is the reasonable
classification test. Under the the “reasonable classification” test, a <statute which prescribes a differentiating measure> will be consistent with Art 12(1) only if: (a) the classification prescribed by the statute
is founded on an intelligible differentia; and (b) that differentia bears a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute.

As it is evident that the impugned statute is discriminatory, <insert claimant> must show that the <act> fails at either of the above stages.
Prima facie stage
In the present case, <public authority>’s act treats <insert claimant> differently from people in comparable classes. <insert facts and reasons>
Limb (a)
<Public authority> differentiated between <different classes>. This is an intelligible differentia as (1) it is able to be apprehended and (2) it is a consistent means of identifying people. Moreover, as a relatively
low threshold is set at this stage, it is unlikely that <insert claimant> will be successful in arguing that the classification is not founded on an intelligible differentia.

OR

As in Lim Meng Suang v AG [2015] 1 SLR 26, even though the differentia in the present case is capable of being understood, it is unintelligible as it is so unreasonable as to be illogical and/or incoherent. Hence,
due to the extreme nature of the illogicality and/or incoherence, no reasonable person would have ever contemplated the differentia concerned as being functional as intelligible differentia. Thus, <insert
claimant> is likely to be successful in arguing that the classification is not founded on an intelligible differentia.
Limb (b)
Object of statute:
Following Taw Cheng Kong v PP [1998] 1 SLR(R) 78, s9A of the Interpretation Act should be applied when determining the scope of the statute for the purposes of the reasonable classification test. Hence, using
a purposive approach, the broad interpretation of the <impugned statute> is <insert broad interpretation>.

(if applicable)
Subsequent legislation must, where inconsistent with past legislation, prevail over it. Legislation should not be construed as if Parliament was in some way bound by its intentions when it first passed the Act.
It is to construe why Parliament has seen fit to amend that Act in the light of the inadequacies that the passage of time has revealed or new needs carried by the tide of progress. Hence, <impugned statute>
should be interpreted as <insert relevant interpretation>.

(if applicable)
In Lim Meng Suang v AG, it is not appropriate to take into account fresh objects proffered by the Government, unless this was expressly stated in the Parliamentary Debates that they are retaining the existing
law but for a new objective. Hence, <impugned statute> should be interpreted as <insert relevant interpretation>.

OR

To prevent over-inclusiveness and to ensure a better alignment with parliamentary intention, the narrow interpretation is used to interpret the <impugned statute> as <insert narrow interpretation>.

Rational relation:
Following Lim Meng Suang v AG [2013] 3 SLR 118, there is no need for a perfect relation or complete coincidence between the differentia and the object/purpose of the statute concerned.

OR

14
In the present case, there is a clear disconnect between the purpose and object of the statute on hand, and the relevant differentia on the other. Hence, the reasonable classification test would not be satisfied.

Status and role of extra-legal arguments:

There is a line of case authorities, such as that in Lim Meng Suang v AG [2015] 1 SLR 26, that has held that courts are not equipped to handle extra-legal arguments such as <insert extra-legal argument>. Hence,
such arguments should not be dealt with by the court, but by the Legislature. (Remedy for this can be found under Arts 4 and 162 to strike down any pre- or post-commencement laws that are inconsistent
with the Constitution)
Conclusion
In summary, <public authority>’s act is differentiating but not discriminatory. Although <public authority>’s act differentiates between <different classes of people>, Art 12(1) is not violated as an intelligible
differentia is used and the differentia bears a rational relation with the statutory object.
Rights to Freedom of Speech, Assembly and Association
 Article 14 provides that every Singaporean citizen has the right to freedom of speech and expression / to assemble peacefully and without arms / to form associations.
 Such rights are subjected to restrictions found in clauses (2) and (3)
o Eight exhaustive restrictions: Art 14(2)(a)
o Parliament may enact restrictive legislation as it considers necessary or expedient provided this is in the interest of…
 The security of Singapore
 Friendly relations with other countries
 Public order
 Public morality
 Parliamentary privileges
 Contempt of court
 Defamation
 Incitement of any offence

In the present case, <insert claimant> is likely to contend that his right to freedom of speech has been unfairly encroached on.
Public Order
It was decided in Chee Siok Chin v Minister for Home Affairs [2006] 1 SLR(R) 582 that public order is synonymous with public peace, safety and tranquillity. In addition, the legislative power to circumscribe the
rights conferred by Art 14 of the Constitution is, inter alia, delineated by what is “in the interest of public order” and not confined to “the maintenance of public order”. This is a much wider legislative remit
that allows Parliament to take a prophylactic approach in the maintenance of public order.

Hence, in the present case, it is in the interest of public order to prohibit and regulate <speech> for such behaviour in the public place would endanger safety.
Defamation
It was decided in Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v Lee Kuan Yew [1990] 1 SLR(R) 337 that the right of free speech under Art 14 is subject, inter alia, to the common law of defamation as modified by the Defamation
Act. In the present case, <insert claimant> had <evidence of defamation>. Thus, his right to freedom of speech is rightly curtailed.
Right to Freedom of Religion
 Article 15(1) protects the right to profess, practise and propagate one’s religion
 According to Article 15(4), such rights are not absolute

In the present case, <insert claimant> is likely to contend that <authority>’s decision to disregard <insert claimant’s decision> on account of their religious beliefs amounted to a violation of Art 15.
Step 1: Is it even a religion?
Not a religion:
Following the definition of religion in Nappalli Peter Williams v Institute of Technical Education [1999] 2 SLR(R) 529, a religion must be “a faith in a personal God or supernatural being”. Moreover, “not every
conviction or belief qualifies as a religious belief, even those held with ‘religious fervour’”. In the present case, <insert fake religion> does not believe in a God or other deities, but in <insert type of entity>.
Hence, it is not accepted as “religious” and is not entitled to protection under the Singapore Constitution.

OR
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As the members of <insert fake religion> did not consider themselves as adherents to a religion, this lack of self-identification as a religion means that it should not be entitled to protection under the Singapore
Constitution.
Religion:
While religion is narrowly defined in Nappalli Peter Williams v Institute of Technical Education [1999] 2 SLR(R) 529 as “a faith in a personal God or supernatural being”, a wider definition of religion such as that
found in R (Hodkin) v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2014] AC 610 should apply. In today’s context, religion should not be confined to those which recognise a supreme deity as it would be
unacceptable religious discrimination and exclude modern religions such as Buddhism and Scientology. Hence, in the present case, <insert fake religion> should be recognised as a religion.
Step 2: Is it a profession, practice or propagation of the religion?
Does not amount to practice of religion:
Following the line of cases involving Jehovah Witnesses, <insert act such as blood transfusion> is entirely medical and not religious in nature. Hence, it falls outside the scope of Article 15.

OR

It was held in Ebralinag v Superintendent of Schools of Cebu [1993] 219 SCRA 256 that only the members of the religion can decide whether <particular act> is a practice. While the facts show that members of
the religion have held that the <particular act> is a practice of the religion, leaders of <insert fake religion> have stated otherwise. Hence, this <particular act> cannot be said to be a practice of the religion.

OR

Similar to the situation in Halimatussaadiah v Public Service Commission, Malaysia [1992] 1 MLJ 513, the act of <claimant’s decision or act> is neither required nor prohibited by <insert fake religion> , hence
it does not amount to “practice” of the religion.
Amounts to a practice of religion:
It was held in Ebralinag v Superintendent of Schools of Cebu [1993] 219 SCRA 256 that only the members of the religion can decide whether <particular act> is a practice. On the facts, it is evident that members
of the religion have held that the <particular act> is a practice of the religion.

OR

Following Commissioner of Police v Acharya Jagadishwaranada Avadhuta [2004] 2 LRI 39, the essential quality of a religious practice is ascertained by reference to “whether a particular religious practice is
regarded by the community practicing it as an integral part of the religion or not”. On the facts, it is evident that <particular act> is one which the general religious community regard as central to the religion.
Step 3: Was the authority entitled to restrict this right under Art 15(4)?
What does public order mean?
Following Chan Hiang Leng Colin v PP [1994] 3 SLR(R) 209, “public order” is given a wide interpretation and is analogous to “public peace, welfare and good order” under s 24 of the Societies Act.

Is the authority entitled to restrict the right?

Applying the test in Chan Hiang Leng Colin v PP [1994] 3 SLR(R) 209, a “clear and immediate danger” to public order and health is not required. Instead, the test is satisfied if <public authority> perceives the
possibility of trouble over the religious beliefs.

In the present case, the restriction of right <is / is not> appropriate as <insert facts of “possibility of trouble”>.

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