American Geographical Society

The Cyberspace "War of Ink and Internet" in Chiapas, Mexico

Author(s): Oliver Froehling
Source: Geographical Review, Vol. 87, No. 2, Cyberspace and Geographical Space (Apr., 1997), pp.
291-307
Published by: American Geographical Society
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 THE CYBERSPACE"WAROF INK AND INTERNET"
IN CHIAPAS, MEXICO*
OLIVER FROEHLING

ABSTRACT. The Chiapasuprisingof 1994 ralliedan internationalcommunity of supporters,

largelyorganizedthrough activitieson the Internet,that provided an example of the possi-
bilities and limitations of the Net as a tool for social movements. This article models the
Internetas a form of rhizome:an intermediateand contestedsocial spacecomposed of flows
that transcendboundaries and forge new connections between events and places.The suc-
cess of Internetorganizingin southern Mexico is due to the constantand reciprocalconnec-
tions between cyberspaceand other social spaces,which avoidedthe restrictionof events to a
contained space and scale.Keywords:cyberspace,Mexico,social movements,Zapatistas.

On the first day of January1994the Ej6rcitoZapatistade la Liberaci6nNacional

(EZLN, or Zapatistas),composed mainly of Mayan Indians, burst onto the world
scene when it occupied seven towns in the Mexicanstate of Chiapas,among them
SanCrist6balde las Casas,the second largesttown in the state.This uprisingcameas
a shock to the governmentof Mexico,which had expectedthe dayto markMexico's
investitureinto the FirstWorldwith the kickoffof the North AmericanFreeTrade
Agreement (NAFTA). With the Chiapas revolt, a minor province in Mexico made
headlines and refocusedworld attention for a few days on the problems of indige-
nous people, takingthe spotlight at a time of celebratedglobalization.The Internet
rapidly became an important tool for disseminating information and organizing
support on an internationallevel, and it provided a forum in which events were
watchedby a varietyof civil organizations,therebylimiting the possible rangeof ac-
tions for a government concerned about its internationalimage.
The role of the Internetis in some ways surprising,because Internetaccess in
Chiapasis scarceindeed, with Internethubs in only the towns of TuxtlaGuti6rrez
and San Cristobalde las Casasand no telephones or electricityat all in most of the
rural areas.The southernmost state in Mexico has been aptly describedas "a rich
land and a poor people" (Benjamin 1989). Rich in resourceslike oil and tropical
hardwoods,and a majorproducerof hydroelectricityand coffee, Chiapasreignsat
the bottom of most Mexicansocial indicators,exhibitinga severepolarizationbe-
tween a small, rich, urban minority who benefit from the resourcesand a severely
marginalizedruralpopulation (Schmidt1996,30-35). The uprisingoffersthe appar-
ent contradictionof a high-tech medium brought to aid an insurrectionof indige-
nous peasantswho are hardlyawareof its existence.

*
I thank PaulAdams,BarneyWarf,the anonymous reviewers,and, especially,SusanRobertsfor their invaluable
help in preparingthis article.
*t' MR.FROEHLING is a doctoral candidate in geographyat the Universityof Kentucky,Lexington,
Kentucky 40506-0027 and a member of the Centro Intercultural de Encuentros y Didlogo, Oaxaca,
Mexico.

The GeographicalReview87 (2): 291-307,April 1997

Copyright ? 1997 by the American GeographicalSociety of New York

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292 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW

After situatingthe concept of cyberspacewithin social theory,I present a brief

history of the uprising,with emphasison the role of the Internet.I concentrateon
the interactionbetweeninformationmovementsin cyberspaceand the effectsof the
interactionin the social spacesoutside this limited technospace.It is my contention
that cyberspacehasbecome partof our realityand that,as such,it embodies manyof
the traditionalcontradictions,as well as possibilities,found in other socially pro-
duced spaces.The role of the Internetis to enhancethe scale of an event in orderto
increaseits visibilityand drawin actorsfrom outsidethe immediateareaof struggle.
Scaletherebybecomes an objectof the struggle,partof which is carriedon in cyber-
space.
RHIZOMES OF CYBERSPACE

The technologyof the Internetis easilydescribed.It is a connection among comput-

ers (servers)that communicatewith each otherthroughstandardizedprotocols.No
central facility organizes communication; rather,each server is connected to a
number of other servers, so connections between two servers are often routed
through a number of differentintermediatecomputers.Users of the Internetcan
connect theircomputerto these servers,usuallyviatelephoneserviceand modem, if
they lack directaccessto them. This design began as the militaryArpanet,a project
whose task was to build a communications net that was invulnerableto strikes
againsta centrallocation.The solution was found in the presentarchitectureof a net
with multiple connectionsand no centralserver,in which messagescan easilybe re-
routed if one or more serversis destroyed (Cleaver1996). The Internetwas then
opened up to allow for scientific communication among universities,and recently
more andmoreprivatecorporationshaveextendedthe Net. Theoretically,its growth
has no limit, for it can alwaysaccommodatenew servers.Additions simply have to
makethemselvesknown to at least one other serverthroughoutthe domain name-
server registry.Once the connections are made, physical distances and national
boundariesmatterlittle,becauseinformationtravelsbetweenserversat the speed of
light, linking computerusers around the world.
The results of this new technology are routinely presentedboth as absolutely
positive and absolutelynegative.On the one hand, the new spaceis lauded as a new
frontier,as constitutiveof new communities,as a tool for democratizationthrough
dissemination of information,as the portent of a technological globalizationthat
will invokeglobalcitizenryto createa bravenew worldwithout boundaries(Rhein-
gold 1993;Der Spiegel 1997). Several authors have also pointed to the formation of
electroniccommunities,the potentialfor resistancethroughinformationexchange
in these communities,and the constructionof a neutralspace in which gender,na-
tionality,class,and race do not matter-a thoroughlyandrogynousworld in which
physicalappearancemattersnot. In short,technologyis the solution to a host of so-
cial problems.-
The disadvantagesof cyberspaceare no less known: the class bias at its heart
(who can affordto be on the Net, and who has access?);its urban and FirstWorld

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 "WAR OF INK AND INTERNET" IN CHIAPAS 293

bent; its masculine and white nature; its predisposition toward the English lan-
guage;its isolating nature (community is achievedonly with a very individualized
and lonely interactionwith a machine); the information overloadand trivialityof
images; and the Internet'sinherent visual bias (Brook and Boal 1995).Although
there are potentials for resistanceand connections to some impressiveprojects,cy-
berspacereflectsall of the power relationspresent in the so-called realworld. As a
tool for equalizationand democratization,as cyberspaceis sometimes heralded,by
itself it is thoroughly inadequate:The initial investment,in terms of skills,money,
and infrastructure,is high, so forthe foreseeablefuturelargesegmentsof the world's
population will be cut off from any supposedbenefits (Warfand Grimes1997).Nev-
ertheless,cyberspaceis anotherterritory.Itsveryexistencechangeshuman relations
inside and outside the Internetthrough the flow of information,whether people
worldwide are directlyconnected or not.
Ratherthan reflecton any innate "natureof the Internet"it is betterto conceive
of it as a contradictoryspace.Castingthe Internetand cyberspaceas inherentlygood
or evil is specious;let us recollectthat technology mirrorsthe class relationsinher-
ent in the largersociety (Henwood 1995;Cleaver1996).Cyberspaceis a site of strug-
gle, ratherthan a straightforwardtool of liberation or domination;there is reason
behind the Marxianwarningagainstcommodity fetishism.Socialrelationsarecon-
structedwithin cyberspaceand around it.
Social space-and the Internetis no exception-is continuallyproduced,repro-
duced, and contested.The production of space takesplace not only through some
dominant institutions, like the state or capital, but also on a microlevel through
everydaylife (de Certeau1984;Braudel1985).At everypoint in time, spacereflectsan
antagonism of structure and individual. Web sites-some dominant, some resis-
tant-can contain materialsfrom governments,human-rightsorganizations,mili-
tia groups, or simply self-indulgentnonsense.
The Internetis a spaceof flows,but in no way separatefrom other social spaces.
Its space finds an analogy in nature in the form of a rhizome, a subterraneanstem
lacking a definite beginning or end that continues to grow in all directions, con-
stantlybuilding new connectionswhile old ones die. It is differentfrom the arbores-
cent structureof the tree,which sets down roots and developsa stem and branches
(Deleuze and Guattari1987, 3-25, 5o6-507). Becauseof this similarity,the Internet
has often been described as a rhizome (Escobar1994;Wark 1994;Cleaver1996).
Spacein this case is not geometricalbut relational,composed of flows.A new flow,
binarydatain the Internet,dissolvesold territorieswhile constructingnew ones, re-
territorializingits space in a differentconfiguration.The Internet createsno new
space lacking boundaries or hindrances,but ratherits own new configurationsof
territories.It contains sites with differentaccess speeds, private-accessprivileges,
differentdomains, or even securitycodes that breakup the supposed homogeneity
of the space.
This notion of a space of flows has become part of geographicalresearch,in the
arenaof criticalgeopolitics. Geographerswho turn to this model of spacedealwith

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294 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW

flows,with their influenceon geopoliticalspace (Slater1992; Luke1994; O'Tuathail

and Luke1994; Adams 1996), and with the production of scale (Herod 1991;Smith
1992; Staeheli1994; Mitchell 1997). In this sense, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari
haveprovideda powerfulmetaphorfor rethinkinggeopolitics,the politicalspacein
which the Zapatistasare located. Territories(states) are no longer the building
blocks of internationalrelations;rather,they arequestionedand constantlyrestruc-
tured.Statesand nations areproducedby a varietyof convergingflows of capital,of
goods, of migrants,and of information.They are, following Deleuze and Guattari
(1987), assemblagesthat aretryingto impose their deterritorializationsand reterri-
torializations.At the same time, molecularflowsof capitalarealso reterritorializing
the geopoliticallandscape.
Molecularflowsarefluid,disseminatingand congregating,and nonhierarchical.
Theyareopposed to the molar(a geopoliticalstate,for example)that is alwaystrying
to subsumethe molecular.The molarwill impose its own rhythm,contain molecu-
lar flowswithin territoriesand quantities,and subordinatethem to the molarorder.
This molar order is arborescentand hierarchical(roots-stem-branches)and per-
petuates itself by proliferatingbinary divisions (the stem into branches) (Deleuze
and Guattari 1987, 3-25; Guattari and Negri 1990,141). "Molecular refers to the com-
plex of relationswhich are developedeitherin a socializingor antagonisticmanner
among the pluralityof social subjects.Molarrefersto the reductionof this complex
of multifariousrelationshipto a relationshipof dual opposition"(Negri 1989, 95).
Molecularflows includethe flow of money,the flow of bodies as migration,and the
flow of information,which at any time can resultin molar oppositions.
The Internetis destabilizingto conventionalterritorializationand state control
of information.Littlewonder that states,througha varietyof means,try to contain
the Internet,regulatingthe rhythm,intensity,and type of informationofferedand
forcingthe molecularrhizomeinto a molar order.The increasingattemptsat terri-
torialization,with pitched battles over file encryption, child-pornographylegisla-
tion, the applicationof U.S.law in cyberspace(itself a questionableenterpriseand a
patentattemptto nationalizecyberspace),the selectiveshutdownby serviceprovid-
ersand statesof bulletinboards,the controlof accessto software-downloadsites,os-
tensibly to protect propertyrights-trying to regulateor shut down the common,
but illegal, practiceof pirating software-are individualbut pervasiveattempts to
territorializethe cyberspacerhizome (Cleaver1996).
Unbounded,the social and politicalmovementsof cyberspacehaveimpactsand
strategiesdifferentfrom traditionalclass movements:They are molecular,defying
the molar opposition of class.The two Marxianclassesare derivedfrom capitalism
and work on an arborescentlogic. Socialmovementsarethe resultof complex pro-
cesses and multiple proliferations.There is a morphologicalresemblancebetween
socialmovementswith theirhorizontalorganizationsand the structureof the Inter-
net (Cleaver1996).
In Chiapasflows of informationaredestabilizing,used to amplifyor containthe
effects of the uprising. Other flows of information-about financialperformance

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 WAR OF INK AND INTERNET IN CHIAPAS 295

and threatsto capital-also travelacrossboundaries,destabilizingthe statenot from

below,as the Zapatistashavedone, but with the weight of media disapprovaland ac-
tions of internationalcapital.This createsfeedbackin otherunits, as the so-calledte-
quila effectdemonstrates-a term used by the U.S.media to designatethe successive
stock-marketcrashesin manyLatinAmericancountriesin the wakeof the Mexican
financialcrisis. This feedbackthrough cyberspacehas been used by the Zapatistas
and their supportersin the Chiapasconflict.

MOLAR OPPOSITIONS IN CHIAPAS

After a few days of fighting the better-equippedMexican army,the Zapatistasre-

treatedfrom the Chiapastowns they had occupied and returnedto the Lacandon
rain forest,pursuedby the Mexicanarmy.Twelvedaysinto the conflict and after145
officiallycounted deaths (mostly membersof the EZLN), the governmentdeclareda
cease-fire.2The uprisingwas swiftlytransformedfrom a shooting war into a war of
wordsin the ensuingnegotiations.The cease-firetook the Zapatistasby surprise,be-
causethey had plannedfor a prolongedand largerconflict.One partof the EZLN was
to stayin the jungle to protectthe Zapatistacore area,while anotherechelon was to
march in a suicide action toward Mexico City to divert the war from the Chiapas
communities and projectit into Mexico'scenter,creatingan event of such magni-
tude that it had to be noticed and acknowledgedby the world'smedia (LeBot 1997,
214-220). With the cease-fire,any projectionof the war to the outside had to come
not througha self-squanderingof the Zapatistaarmybut by circulatingthe uprising
in differentmedia.The uprisingof Indiansagainstthe establishmentgainedinstant
national and internationalattention, creatinga networkof electronicsupport that
was far differentfrom the generalinsurrectionfor which the Zapatistashad hoped
(Elorriaga1997).
The Zapatistademands are not couched not in the traditionalMarxist-Maoist
languageof CentralAmericanguerrillauprisingsof the 1970Sand 198os; they are a
mixture,part specific demandsrooted in local conditions that precipitatedthe up-
rising and part broadercalls for changeat the nationallevel (Cleaver1994).Promi-
nent in the initial list were demands for "housing,land, health care,work, bread,
education, information, culture, independence, democracy, justice, liberty and
peace"(Rosen1996,2). Fromthe beginningthe Zapatistaswereconvincedthat these
issues would be resolved at the national, not the regional, level (Harvey 1996).
Prominentamong the declarationspublishedon the firstdaywas"AWomen'sRevo-
lutionary Law,"a list of demandsfor women'srights-equality of participation,the
rightto education,and reproductivefreedom-basic demandsfor an armyof which
one-third of the troops are women.3In this first stage,the increasinglyprominent
Zapatistaspokesman,SubcomandanteMarcos,madehis debutwith communiques
mixing analysisand poetry that would rapidlyincreasein volume and popularity.
Observerscame to dub this a "postmodernrevolution,"perhapsthe firstrevolution
of the twenty-first century (Burbach1994). Although the specific strategies and
techniques used are new, this uprising is one of a long series of peasant revolts in

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296 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW

Mexico that havebeen precipitatedby local issues (Collierand LoweryQuaratiello

1994).
At firstthe Internetwas used mainlyby academicsto provideinformationabout
the conflict and backgroundon the Zapatistas,until then a relativelyunknown
force.As conflict persisteda structuredeveloped,with e-mail listservsand bulletin
boardsspringingup, accompaniedby actions such as write-in and fax campaignsto
Mexicanconsulatesand the U.S.governmenturginga nonmilitaryresolutionof the
conflict. Efforts drew on Central American solidarity groups and anti-NAFTAorgan-
izing (Cleaver1996).Asidefrom providinginformation,the initialcyber-Zapatistas
and the internationaldimension they addedto the conflict did not yet enterinto the
strategies:The immediate territorialmilitary conflict was top priority.However,
molecularescapesof informationthroughthe Internetraisedthe internationalvisi-
bility of the conflict, which made it more difficultfor the Mexicangovernmentto
suppressinformation about its counterinsurgencyactions and helped preventan
quickand bloody resolution.The Internet'sinfluencewould growas scalebecame a
centralissue.
ENLARGING THE TERRAIN OF STRUGGLE

After long rounds of negotiations, against a backgroundrumble of low-intensity

warfare,the Zapatistasrejectedthe firstgovernmentproposalin July1994and called
the Convenci6n Nacional Democratica (National Democratic Convention). The
convention, held in Zapatistaterritoryin August 1994,was attendedby numerous
national and internationalparticipantsfrom various social movements. After the
Mexicanpresidentialelections in the same month, won as usualby the Institutional
RevolutionaryParty,Mexico'sruling party of sixty years,the situation decayed.
Tensionintensifiedwhen the Mexicaneconomy crashedin December1994.By
the following Februarythe governmentof PresidentErnestoZedillo Ponce de Le6n
issued arrestwarrantsfor Zapatistaleaders, sending the federal army to occupy
Zapatista-heldterritory.This resultedin a stream of protests around Mexico, the
biggestof which, in MexicoCity,was attendedby 750,000 supporters.The Zapatista
leadershipwent uncaught, and, with the concatenation of national and interna-
tional protests,the governmentorderedits troops to stop, having driven the EZLN
forcesdeep into the Lacandonjunglewith theirbacksto the Guatemalanborder.Ne-
gotiations resumedin the summer of 1995amid a tense climate.In January1996the
Zapatistassigned the firstagreementwith the federalgovernment,which dealtwith
indigenous rights,and pleaded for the formation of a national political organiza-
tion, the FrenteZapatistade la LiberacionNacional (FZLN).
As much as the militaryphase was about conqueringterritory,the negotiations
wereaboutthe scaleof the issuesunderdiscussion.Forthe Zapatistas,nationalsupport
from social movementsand indigenousgroupswas necessaryevidenceto provethe
largernational relevanceof their demands,while internationalsupport was a life-
supportsystemof protectionfrom militaryannihilation.Zapatistasupportersmain-
taineda constantfusilladeto increaserecognitionof theircauseatnationalandinterna-

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 WAR OF INK AND INTERNET IN CHIAPAS 297

tionallevels,whilethe Mexicangovernmenttriedforcontainmentat localand regional

scalesso it could negotiatea solutionfor Chiapasalone.The Zapatistasand theiradvi-
sors duringthe negotiationscoinedthe Spanishtermachicar(to makesmaller)to de-
scribethe constantgovernmentattemptsto minimizedemandsandto keepthe conflict
peripheralto Mexicanterritoryand safelyon the fringeof Mexicanpolitics.
After i January 1994, when the Zapatistas took San Cristobal de las Casas, they
sought to enlargetheirspaceof support,firstto a nationallevel and then to the inter-
nationallevel. Rejectingthe governmentproposal,Zapatistaleadersreachedout to
national civil society as a protective umbrella through the National Democratic
Convention. Marcos, the Zapatistaspokesman,built into his statements declara-
tions of faith in Mexicancivil society and its abilityto protectthe Zapatistas(Elorri-
aga 1997;EZLN 1997;Le Bot 1997,239-262). After the active promotion of civil society
with the construction of the FZLN, the scalewas againwidened by the Zapatistasto
include internationalparticipation,culminatingin the IntergalacticEncounterfor
Humanity and against Neoliberalism in August 1996 (Elorriaga 1997). This interna-
tional encounter,precededby continentalencountersin Europe,America,and Asia,
brought togetheractiviststo providea common front against"neoliberalism," pro-
moted as an enemy of humanity.The presumptuoustitle of the intergalacticen-
counter speaksto Zapatistaambitions about worldwidecoalition building,an idea
officiallyproposed by Durito,a bug with Don Quixote-like ambitions from the La-
candon rain forest who plays the role of commonsense interlocutorto the often-
confusedguerrillacommanderin the writingsof SubcomandanteMarcos.Theseof-
ten poetic and picaresquewritingshavehelped to coalescea diversenetworkof fol-
lowers and have guaranteedongoing internationalvisibility.
The scale of demandsbecame the centerof dispute duringthe negotiationsbe-
tween the Mexicangovernmentand the EZLN. Eventhough not producedon-site by
the Zapatistasin Chiapas,internationalsupport over the Internet became an in-
creasingcomponent of the struggle.The Zapatistasknew what they had, as Subco-
mandante Marcosacknowledgedlater:

Therearepeople that haveput us on the Internet,and the zapatismo4 has occupied a

spaceof whichnobodyhadthought.TheMexicanpoliticalsystemhasgaineditsin-
ternationalprestigein the mediathanksto its informationalcontrol,its control
overtheproductionof news,controlovernewsanchors, andalsothanksto its con-
troloverjournaliststhroughcorruption,threats,andassassinations.
Thisis a coun-
trywherejournalistsarealsoassassinated
witha certainfrequency.
Thefactthatthis
typeof newshassneakedoutthrougha channelthatis uncontrollable,efficient,and
fastis a verytoughblow.TheproblemthatanguishesGurriasis thathe hasto fight
an imagehe cannotcontrolfromMexico,becausethe informationis simultane-
ously everywhere.(Le Bot 1997,349;my translation)

The molar conflict in Chiapaswas spawningits own rhizomes,reachingfromZapa-

tistaterritoryto socialorganizationsthroughoutMexico,and throughcyberspaceto
other channels around the world.

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298 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW

ZAPATISTAS IN CYBERSPACE

Fromthe beginningthe Chiapasconflictattractednationaland internationalatten-

tion. The Mexicanindependentpress,pushing its limits underthe regime of Presi-
dent Carlos Salinas de Gortari, jumped on coverage of the 1994 revolt, despite
government suppressionattempts.Mexicantelevision networks,which are domi-
natedby stateinterests,providedlimited coverageof the eventsin Chiapas,but print
media providedmuch broadanalysis,often sympatheticto the EZLN.Especiallyim-
portantwas the MexicoCitydailynewspaperLaJornada,which publishedcontinu-
ing reportsand opinions on Chiapas,includingtextsof EZLNcommuniques,andwas
repaidwith a doublingof its circulationwithin threeweeks (Schmidt1996, 28). Op-
position both to the land-tenurechangesof 1992 andthe neoliberalpoliciesof the Sa-
linas regime had found a point of coalescence.6Internationally,the captureof San
Cristobalde LasCasas,long a populartouristdestination,and a happybut probably
nonaccidentalcoincidencewith the implementationof NAFTA,immediatelyrallied
progressivesin many countries to the Zapatistaaxis. The causes of an indigenous
movement,women'srights,anti-NAFTA sentiment,and rhetoricagainstneoliberal-
ism, matchedby amazingrestrainton the partof the EZLNin termsof violent retribu-
tion, provideda set of powerfulrallyingpoints. The charmof the EZLNwas difficult
to resist,especiallyata moment thatcoincidedwith the end of realexistingsocialism,
proclamationsof the end of history,and progressivesin almost all countries who
weredisorientedand looking for a causecelebre.Opposition to NAFTA had spawned
electronic communities and lubricated cross-borderdiscussion. These incipient
structures,though bounced hardby passageof NAFTA in October1993, still existed
and immediatelymobilizedin favorof the Zapatistas(Carr1996; Cleaver1996). The
NAFTAconnection provideda crucialsymbolic link, and little did it matterthat the
date of the uprisingwas chosen more becauseof an anticipatedlackof resistanceby
local police and armythanksto an equallytraditionalNew Year'sDayhangoverthan
because of NAFTA'S symbolic significance (Autonomedia 1994, 144). The words
"NAFTA is a death sentence for the Indians"were circulatedwidely.

This amount of internationalattentionis widelycreditedwith forcingthe Mexi-

can governmentto stop the shooting warand to protectthe Zapatistasfrom annihi-
lation (Cleaver1996). Actions were monitored from multiple sides; this "reverse
panopticon"made it easierfor establishedorganizationsin and outside Mexico to
put pressureon the Mexicangovernment (O'Tuathail1994). Appearancewas cru-
cial.When the armydiscoveredZapatistacamps in 1993, the informationwas sup-
pressedbecauseNAFTA,a hallmarkof the Salinasregime'spolicy,was underacerbic
debatein the U.S.Congress,and anyimmoderationshown towardexistingguerrilla
armieswas fearedcertainto immediatelyconjureexploitablestereotypesof Third
World chaos (Ross 1995a, 27). And the well-executed Zapatistauprising on New
Year'sDay 1994 createdan event that was impossibleto ignore,preciselybecause of
the attention focused on Mexico with the inaugurationof NAFTA.
The charismaticleaderof the Zapatistas,SubcomandanteMarcos,firstappeared
in SanCrist6baland,afterthe initialseriesof televisioninterviews,drewthe focus of

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 WAR OF INK AND INTERNET IN CHIAPAS 299

D _ s Netsape: ZRPRTISTRSIN CYBERSPRCE,A Guide to RnaIlsis &1Information M I

E.akkFor.ard Ho| I Reload Images IOpen Print

P Find | tcp
Location: Ihttp:// www.eco.utexas.edu /Homepages /facully /cleaver /zapsinyber.html

An Accion Zapatista Report:

The intemational circulaLtionthrough the Net of the strugles of the Zapatistas in Chiapas, Mexico has become one of the most
successful examples of the use of computer communications by grassroots social movements. That circulation has not only
brought support to the Zapatistas from throughout Mexico and the rest of the World. but it has sparked a world wide discussion
of the meaning and implications of the Zapatista r-ebellionfor many other confrontations with contemporary capitalist
economic and political policies.

The indigenous character of the Zapatista r-ebellion has also provoked new awareness, respect and study of the much broader
phenomenon of indigenous revival and strugle in this period.-

The Zapatista analysis of neoliberalism- (the Latin Amnericanterm for pro-market, pro-business and anti-worker/peasant
policies) has led to discussions and analyses of the similarities with Thatcherism in England, EU-Maastricht policies in Europe,
1IMFadjustment programs in Africa and Asia, Reagan-Bush-Clinton supply-side policies in the US and so on. The enonmous
response to the 1996 Zapatista call for a series of continental and intercontinental Encounters led to an historic gathering in

iW/I.r hittp://nwww.eco.utexas.edu/c i-bin/imagemap/faculty/Cteaver/zapsheaderimage.map?103,123 ?[~

a listing of currentWebsites, conferences,news-

FIG. i-Screen shot of "Zapatistasin Cyberspace'"
groups,books, photographs,and archivalmaterials.Source:[http://www.eco.utexas.edu/Homepages
/faculty/Gleaver/zapsincyber.html].

media attention. At first timidly, then more and more boldly drawing on a vast
knowledge of literatureand popular culture, Marcos managed to guide the self-
representationof the Zapatistas.His knowledge of global culturehelped make the
uprisingpalatable,and the leaderof an indigenous rebellionbecame a media cause
c6lbre, interviewedby a variety of media like VanityFair, 60 Minutes, and Time
magazine(G6'mezPefia1995). His casualsavvyappealedto a broadaudience,and his
knowledgeof literatureand writing style projectedthe image of an urbaneintellec-
tual, so focus shifted from the peasant uprising and its roots to the persona of the
writing and fighting revolutionary."Myjob is to makewar and write letters"(Ross
1995b, 7) became the inscription of man with ample ammunition that would not fit
the gun he was carrying(G6mez Pefia1995). Soon this image pervadedcyberspace,
with no lessappealtherethan forthe cosmopolitanreadersof VanityFair(Figurei).
Marcos, the mestizo spokesperson for an indigenous movement, provided
many of the signifiers that legitimized and knit together a wide coalition of sup-
porters outside Chiapas.His diversestyles,humor, self-criticism,referencesto lit-
eratureand indigenous culture,and access to other social movements had little to

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300 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW

do with the direct causes for the uprising in Chiapas. But those were the traits
picked up and swiftly circulatedthrough e-mail and Websites acrossnational and
ideologicalboundaries.A refusalto be definedaccordingto traditionalideological
boundary lines appealedto a much wider audiencethan any ideological tract ever
could. The Zapatistas,conscious of this fact,declined any formalmanifestoas long
as possible, callingthemselveshumorously a desmadre(a slightlyvulgarterm indi-
cating total disorganization)when pressedfor a definition of their politics (Le Bot
1997, 302).
The Internetprovideda wealthof information,often an overload.A concern of
some readerswas the reliabilityof the information,for all that was presented-eye-
witness accountsand scholarlybackgroundanalysis-appearedundifferentiated,as
just anothere-mail message.Therewas, in otherwords,no legitimizingfilter;all in-
formation came in the same typeface,and readershad to sort out the information
themselves.What the Net did was fill in the lack of coverageby mainstreamnews
media. Within a few days of the uprising there were appealsby human-rightsor-
ganizations for letters of protest to the U.S. and Mexican governments,for dona-
tions, and for volunteersas human-rightsobservers.Human-rightscaravanswere
launched from the U.S. to Chiapas,in coordination with Mexican organizations
(Cleaver1996).
Special e-mail discussion lists devoted wholly to events in Chiapassprangup,
with hosts in Mexico City,in Austin,Texas,and at the Universityof California,Los
Angeles.Interrelated,they often cross-postedinformation.Thatthis was not neces-
sarilybadwas shown twice,once duringthe Mexicanpresidentialelection in August
1994,when the listservat the UniversidadNacionalAut6nomade Mexico,Mexico's
flagshipuniversity,experiencedproblemsand was unable to transmitinformation
for two days(Cleaver1996).The problemwas quicklysolvedby reroutingcommuni-
cation, provingthat a rhizome is difficultto control.In addition,severalWebpages
wereconstructed,with up-to-dateand extensivebackgroundinformation,pictures,
and links to other sites,such as the pagesof newspaperslikeLaJornadaand Zapnet's
interactive, multimedia project (Figure 2).'
So far,the culminationof this efforthasbeen the attemptto createan Interconti-
nental Network of AlternativeCommunication, in which groups that are loosely
connectedby theirconcernabout Chiapasand the largerworld politics of neoliber-
alism can exchange information and coordinate strategies.An effect of coalition
building is the disappearanceof an initialevent,the indigenousuprisingin Chiapas,
behind broaderissuesof neoliberalism,an umbrellaactivelypromotedby the Zapa-
tistas themselves (EZLN 1997; Marcos 1997).
Internationally,the centralizedeffortby a guerrillaarmyhas been transformed
into a decentralizedaction,with a goal of redirectingeventsin Chiapastowardpeace
and an increasedself-determinationfor indigenous people. The international"Za-
patistas"resemblethe organizationalform of the communities in Chiapas(Collier
and Lowery Quaratiello 1994,152-154). The rhizomatically allied communities in
Chiapasgaveriseto a an armythat provokeda molar confrontation(guerrilla-gov-

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 ccWAR OF INK AND INTERNET ))IN CHIAPAS 301

El ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Netscape:
ZRPNETI PROPOGANOR _________ I;........
Bak riw,vw Reload Homne Search Guide o~q Print Security Stop

Location~: htp:/' ctau oeuzapatistas/info.html

FIG.2-Screen shot of "TheRevolutionWill Be Digitized,"an interactive,multimediaWebsite and

CD-ROm by Zapnetin collaborationwith artists,writers,and activistsat various locations involved in
the Zapatistaeffort. Source:[http://www.actlab.utexas.edu/--zapatistas/info.html].

ermient), that led again to a rhizomaticform of organizationwhen it was takenup

by supportersthrough the Internet.
WHERE ARE THE CYBER-ZAPATISTAS?
The information on the Internetemanatednot from a centralsite under Zapatista
command in Mexico but from multiple sites throughout the world. The majority
were in the United States,followedby Italyand Mexico (Acci6nZapatistade Austin
1997). Internetaccessis quitehigh in the UnitedStates,whereasMexicanInternetac-
cess is limited and mostly in Mexico City.The Zapatistacause drew an incredibly
high level of supportfrom Italy,whereprominentpoliticians,tradeunions, and po-
litical partiescollected money and participatedin support actions.
The Chiapasuprisingwas not a Netwar,in which two molar armiesconfronted
each other,but an action by more-or-lesscoordinatedsupportersin differentplaces
with differentagendas(churches,human-rightsgroups,leftistpoliticalgroups) that
have converged around the issue of the Zapatistauprising. Cyber-Zapatistasare
thereforeeverywhere-but they are not controlledby the Zapatistasin Chiapas.

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302 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW

Thereis, therefore,no justificationfor the hype that has surroundedthe role of

the Internetin the uprising,leadingto the image of the Zapatistasdirectlycommu-
nicating with the world (Robberson1995)and using the Internetand a "portable
laptop computerto issue ordersto other EZLN units via a modem"(U.S.Army,cited
in Swett1995).Giventhe extremepoverty in the core areaof the Zapatistauprising,
which includesa generalabsenceof roads,electricity,telephones,and communica-
tions in general,it is extremelyunlikelythat EZLNunits in the jungle would find a
telephone to plug into their modem, wholly aside from the necessityof Internetac-
cessprovidersand the dangerof interference.Eventhe implicationof suchaccessis a
developed-worldcelebrationof technology.No evidence of a direct EZLNpresence
on the Web exists. The Internetsimply serves supporterswho coordinateactions,
disperseinformation,andrelayEZLN communiques.
Use of the Internet(imagined or real) by guerrillasfit right into the lauding of
the Internetin 1994 andbecamethe focus of articlesin popularmagazines(Robber-
son 1995;Watson1995).The uprising,with a number of underlyingcausesand the
continuing pain and sufferingit caused in the region,was transformedinto a self-
congratulatorytechnology fetishization,where the focus of articles on use of the
Internet was not an analysis of the Zapatistasbut a promotion of the Internet
through the underlyingmessage,"Evenindigenous guerrillerosare using the Inter-
net, shouldn'tyou?"

IN CHIAPAS
CYBER-ZAPATISTAS
The pro-ZapatistaInternet mobilization efforts were successful information rhi-
zomes becausethey producedflows that foreshortenedthe options availableto the
Mexican government and boosted Zapatistaefforts, rather than providing any
specificaction throughthe Internetitself.The Internet,a child of the military,effec-
tivelycounteredstate-orientedmilitaryoperations.Zapatistacause-promotionfed
into preexistinge-mail lists concernedwith indigenousrights,discussiongroupson
CentralAmerica,anti-NAFTA networks,and visions in nongovernmentalorganiza-
tions of peasantself-determinationstruggles.All providedoutlets for the Zapatista
messages (Cleaver1996).
Informationredistributedon the Internetenhanced the reach of reportspub-
lished in traditionalmedia. One case is the AndersonValleyAdvertiser,a small,pro-
gressivenewspaperpublished in northern California,whose in-depth reports on
Chiapasgainednationalcirculationthroughthe Internet(Cleaver1996).Muchcele-
brated,for example,was a memorandum from the ChaseManhattanBankurging
the Mexicangovernmentto deal peremptorilywith the Zapatistas.The memoran-
dum was circulatedrapidlyon the Internet,leading to protestsand an embarrass-
ment of the Mexicangovernmentas a toady of internationalcapital(Cleaver1996).
FaxprotestcampaignsagainstMexicanconsulatesweresupplementedby directac-
tion, including concerted demonstrations in February1997in front of thirty-six
consulatesin the United Statesin supportof constitutionalreformsin Mexico (Bel-
linghausen1997).

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 WAR OF INK AND INTERNET" IN CHIAPAS 303

In Europe,mediaattackson local outposts of the Mexicanstatewereextendedto

involve political parties and governments.Italian parliamentariansproduced in-
quiries and signed letters,later published in Mexican newspapers,requiringa just
and peacefulsolution to the conflict.The Mexicangovernmenttried to publicizeits
efforts for a peaceful solution, an attempt that backfiredwhen constitutional re-
forms were rejectedat the end of 1996,breedingfurtherconsternationin European
governing circles (Bellinghausen 1997).
Mediaattackson the governmentwere reinforcedby direct contactswith Chia-
pas. Peacecaravansand peace camps were organizedby human-rightsand church
organizations.Aid caravanscollectedmoney and materialsin the United Statesand
deliveredthem to communities in the zone of conflict in Chiapas.Aid caravanspro-
vided additionaleye-witnessreportsof the area'slow-intensitywar.Repostedon the
Internet,the accountsralliedsupportfor the communities.Permanentpeace camps
were establishedby a varietyof organizations,which put internationalobserversin
the conflictarea,both to providefor directsupportand visibilityand to decreasethe
possibility of violent retributionby governmenttroops.
Another return flow came from people who attendedthe two conferencesor-
ganizedby the Zapatistas.The internationalconferencein 1996,in the rapidorgani-
zation of which the Internetplayeda greatrole,had about 3,ooo attendeesfrom five
continents and forty-two countries (Acci6n Zapatistade Austin 1997).Prominent
intellectualsand media stars made their way into Chiapasto meet with Zapatista
leaders.Notable among them were Danielle Mitterand,widow of the late French
president,an Italianparliamentarycommission,and the Americanfilm directorOl-
iverStone.They gaveadditionalcredenceto the Zapatistacause and kept the upris-
ing a media event.
Visibility changed the war in Chiapas. One shift was the institution of low-
intensity warfarein Chiapasby government troops. In truth, this type of conflict
might betterbe called "low-visibilitywarfare,"for crueltyto its victims is undimin-
ished. Whateverthe name, it is a strategythat eliminates iconic moments, such as
confrontationsbetween soldiersand civilians,the brutaloccupation of sites, or the
burning of houses,8and shiftsaction to the destructionof watersuppliesand grain-
storagefacilities,the confiscation of medical stockpiles,and the cutting off of elec-
tricity, which lack dramatic quality.But the effects of the strategy make survival
more and more difficult (Pineda 1996). The rationale is to pressurethe populace
while evading the creationof images that can be circulatedin image-drivenmedia
like the Internet.
Although repressionin Chiapasgrewmore severe,outside Chiapasthe govern-
ment was losing the battlefor public opinion. The rhizomaticstructureof the Inter-
net made it all but impossible to control the flow of informationand organization.
Mexico attemptedto constructWebsitesadvancinggovernmentinformation,as for
example from its consulate in New YorkCity,but this information simply failed to
circulatein the sameway as Zapatistainformationdid. The nonhierarchicalorgani-
zation of the discussion lists and newsgroupson the Internetmade it impossibleto

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304 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW

spin and forcethe circulationof officialinformationas it used to be with domestic

media in the past.
The constitution of an internationalnetworkthroughthe Internetenabledvar-
ied actions and returnflows to Chiapasand constant protestsand symbolic attacks
on manifestationsof the Mexicangovernmentaroundthe world.Manyof these ac-
tions were coordinatedwith other media, but with its reachand speed the Internet
producedtimely action. Its role lay not only in passing on informationbut also in
enlargingeffectsoutside its narrowtechnologicalspace,which is what madeit a suc-
cessful broadcastplatform.
LIMITATION AND LIBERATION

Chiapashas shown that the Internetcan have an impact on the lives of people who
arenot directlyconnectedwith eachother.A rhizomaticstructure,with its deterrito-
rializingand reterritorializingeffects,the Interneteasilyescapeseffortsat hierarchi-
cal control. Redefiningtraditionalnotions of scale, it can add a new dimension to
local struggles,reconfiguringthe space of politics. But the Internetis a social space,
and thereforea site of strugglethat is as much imbuedwith antagonismsas anyother
socialspaceand thatoffersjustas manypossibilitiesfor dominationas forliberation.
The potentialsof the Net arerealizedin articulationwith otherspacesand flows-the
flow of money, goods, and bodies, for example-rather than in a strugglethat con-
structs itself solely through some cyberreality.It is a conduit, not a conscience.
The Internetenabledthe Zapatistasto sustaina struggleover scale by challeng-
ing the containment efforts of the Mexican government.It provided an environ-
ment in which multiple national and international actors sympathetic to the
Zapatistascould be drawn into the conflict, pressuringthe Mexican government
and influencingits actions-not directlybut becauseof what the governmentfeared
would happen.
The price for the Zapatistaswas that direct issues leading to the uprising were
displaced,firstby the idolizationof SubcomandanteMarcosand then by a widening
of political concernsinto an intercontinentalcontest againstneoliberalism.Such is
the controversyinherent in the formulation of the "Warof Ink and Internet,"as it
was called by the Mexican secretaryof foreign affairs(Aponte 1995).On the one
hand,the circulationof imagesand messagesleadsto solidarityactions and a strug-
gle for representationin cyberspace.Butwar in cyberspaceis differentfrom the war
in Chiapas.In Chiapas,people are daily hurt by the conflict, through lack of re-
sources and mistreatment,resultingin injuryand death. Displacewar into cyber-
space, and these details retreat.Leftby itself, cyberspaceconnects people in only a
limited way and provides only an illusion of participation.
A wholesalecelebrationof the Internetas tool of liberationis to my mind unwar-
ranted.True,it is a newly constructedspacewith novel potential to connect groups
and individualsand to spreada new rhizomeof socialrelationswithout connections
to other movements,but all progressivetalk on the Internetremainsa virtualrevo-
lution. Laudingthis new space as in itself liberatoryis an exercisein fetishization,

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 WAR OF INK AND INTERNET IN CHIAPAS 305

neglecting the need to connect to other flows and transformsocial relationsthem-

selves.This happenedin the case of the Chiapasuprising:The effectproducedmust
be measurednot in the number of times "Chiapas"appearson Web sites or discus-
sion listsbut in the multiple effectsproducedoutside cyberspace.Wherecyberspace
meets other flows of realityis where its potential lies.

NOTES

1. This idea that advancedtechnologywill finallyusher in a period of peace and modernityis not
confined to the United States.In Mexico,the same attitudeabout the Internetis peddled,with calls for
everyschool to be connected to the Net in orderto makethe country more competitive.The very real
obstaclesto education in ruralareas,such as the lack of school buildings,teachers,and books, areig-
nored.
2. The realnumberof deathsis unknown. Estimatesby the CatholicChurchand various civil or-
ganizations range up to 1,ooo, including a large number of victims among the civilian population
(Schmidt 1996, 22).
3. An excellentcollection of Zapatistacommuniques and interviewscan be found in ;Zapatistas!
Documents of the New Mexican Revolution (Autonomedia 1994) and at the Zapatista homepage,
[http://www.EZLN.org] .
4. Zapatismo is the ideology of the Zapatistas,which, ironically,consists of the absence of a
defined ideology.
5. Jose Angel GurriaTrevinlo,Mexico'ssecretaryof foreign affairs.
6. The reform of Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution in 1992essentiallyended land reform
and removedprotection from communal landholdings,therebyopening up the possibility of the de-
struction of the land base of many peasant communities.
7. A list of ZapatistaWeb sites can be found at [http://www.eco.utexas.edu/Homepages/faculty
/Cleaver/zapsincyber.html]. Other relevantWebsites include:the Zapatistahomepage, [http://www
.EZLN.org];La Jornada,[http://serpiente.dgsca.unam.mx/jornada/index.html]; the Index of Chia-
pas 95, [http://www.eco.utexas.edu:8o/Homepages/Faculty/Cleaver/chiapas9s.html]; the homepage
of the Intercontinental Encounter, [http://planet.com.mx/-chiapas/] or [http://www.utexas.edu
/ftp/student/nave/encuentros.html];the National Commission for Democracyin Mexicohomepage,
[http://www.igc.apc.org/ncdm/];and multimediainformation on the Zapatistas,[http://www.actlab
.utexas.edu/-zapatistas/rev.html].
8. This type of warfarefinally made headlines around the world on 22 December 1997,when
paramilitaryforces brutallymurderedforty-fiveIndians, mostly women and children,in the village
of Acteal,Chiapas.Stateofficialshad ignoredwarningsabout the imminent massacre.RedCrossand
internationalobserversdiscoveredthe paramilitarytroops and their helpersin the local and statepo-
lice forcesas theywere tryingto hide the bodies. Imagesof the corpsesresultedin a nationaland inter-
national wave of protests, as well as in the resignation of the governor of Chiapas and the
imprisonment of a number of lower officials.It also spawned a largerdebate on the strategyof low-
intensity warfare,for it was revealedthat the creationof paramilitaryforceshad been part of an over-
all military strategy to debilitate the Zapatistasthrough systematic attacks against the population
(Marin 1998).The attorneygeneral,however,maintainedthat it was an instanceof a dispute between
communities.

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