SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr.
|2018-2019|
III. TRANSPORTATION OF PASSENGERS
Cases
Nocum vs Laguna Tayabas
Appellee Herminio Nocun who
was a passenger in appellant's
Bus No. 120 then making a trip
within the barrio of Dita,
Municipality of Bay, Laguna,
was injured as a consequence of
the explosion of firecrackers,
contained in a box, loaded in
said bus and declared to its
conductor as containing clothes
and miscellaneous items by a
co-passenger. The findings of
fact of the trial court are not
assailed. The appeal is purely on
legal questions.
Mecenas vs IAC
On April 1980, the MT
"Tacloban City," a barge-type
oil tanker owned by the
Philippine National Oil
Company (PNOC) and
operated by the PNOC
Shipping and Transport
Corporation (PNOC
Shipping), having unloaded
its cargo of petroleum
products, left Amlan, Negros
Occidental, and headed
towards Bataan. At about
1:00 o'clock in the afternoon
of that same day, the M/V
"Don Juan," an interisland
vessel, owned and operated
by the Negros Navigation
Co., Inc. (Negros Navigation)
Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk.
Doctrine
I. Extraordinary Diligence
Issue: Whether or not appellant failed to exercise due diligence.
No.
Article 1733 is not as unbending as His Honor has held, for it reasonably qualifies the
extraordinary diligence required of common carriers for the safety of the passengers
transported by them to be "according to all the circumstances of each case." In fact, Article
1755 repeats this same qualification: "A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances."
Fairness demands that in measuring a common carrier's duty towards its passengers,
allowance must be given to the reliance that should be reposed on the sense of responsibility
of all the passengers in regard to their common safety. It is to be presumed that a passenger
will not take with him anything dangerous to the lives and limbs of his co-passengers, not
to speak of his own.
Not to be lightly considered must be the right to privacy to which each passenger is entitled.
He cannot be subjected to any unusual search, when he protests the innocuousness of his
baggage and nothing appears to indicate the contrary, as in the case at bar. In other words,
inquiry may be verbally made as to the nature of a passenger's baggage when such is not
outwardly perceptible, but beyond this, constitutional boundaries are already in danger of
being transgressed.
Withal, what must be importantly considered here is not so much the infringement of the
fundamental sacred rights of the particular passenger herein involved, but the constant
threat any contrary ruling would pose on the right of privacy of all passengers of all common
carriers, considering how easily the duty to inspect can be made an excuse for mischief and
abuse. Of course, when there are sufficient indications that the representations of the
passenger regarding the nature of his baggage may not be true, in the interest of the common
safety of all, the assistance of the police authorities may be solicited, not necessarily to force
the passenger to open his baggage, but to conduct the needed investigation consistent with
the rules of propriety and, above all, the constitutional rights of the passenger.
Issue: Whether or not Negros Navigation and Capt. Santisteban were grossly negligent.
Yes.
Captain was playing mahjong.
The behaviour of the captain of the "Don Juan" in tills instance-playing mahjong "before
and up to the time of collision constitutes behaviour that is simply unacceptable on the part
of the master of a vessel to whose hands the lives and welfare of at least seven hundred fifty
(750) passengers had been entrusted. Whether or not Capt. Santisteban was "off-duty" or
"on-duty" at or around the time of actual collision is quite immaterial; there is, both
realistically speaking and in contemplation of law, no such thing as "off-duty" hours for the
master of a vessel at sea that is a common carrier upon whom the law imposes the duty of
extraordinary diligence.
Don Juan was overloaded.
The report of the Philippine Coast Guard (Exhibit "10") stated that the "Don Juan" had been
"officially cleared with 878 passengers on board when she sailed from the port of Manila
on April 22, 1980 at about 1:00 p.m." This head-count of the passengers "did not include
the 126 crew members, children below three (3) years old and two (2) half-paying
AGDV

left Manila bound for
Bacolod with seven hundred
fifty (750) passengers listed
in its manifest, and a
complete set of officers and
crew members.
On the evening of that same
day, 22 April 1980, at about
10:30 o'clock, the "Tacloban
City" and the "Don Juan"
collided at the Talbas Strait
near Maestra de Ocampo
Island in the vicinity of the
island of Mindoro. When the
collision occurred, the sea
was calm, the weather fair
and visibility good. As a
result of this collision, the
M/V "Don Juan" sank and
hundreds of its passengers
perished. Among the ill-fated
passengers were the parents
of petitioners, the spouses
Perfecto Mecenas and Sofia
Mecenas, whose bodies were
never found despite intensive
search by petitioners.
Negros Navigation vs CA
In April of 1980, private
respondent Ramon Miranda
purchased from the Negros
Navigation Co., Inc. four
special cabin tickets for his
wife, daughter, son and niece
who were going to Bacolod
City to attend a family
reunion. The tickets were for
M/V Don Juan, leaving
Manila at 1:00 p.m. on April
22, 1980.
At about 10:30 in the evening
of April 22, 1980, the Don
Juan collided off the Tablas
Strait in Mindoro, with the
M/T Tacloban City, an oil
tanker owned by the
Philippine National Oil
Company (PNOC) and the
PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation
(PNOC/STC). As a result, the
M/V Don Juan sank. Several
of her passengers perished in
the sea tragedy. The bodies of
some of the victims were
Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk.
SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr. |2018-2019|
passengers" which had been counted as one adult passenger. 17 Thus, the total number of
persons on board the "Don Juan" on that ill-starred night of 22 April 1 980 was 1,004, or
140 persons more than the maximum lumber that could be safely carried by the "Don Juan,"
per its own Certificate of Inspection.
The grossness of the negligence of the "Don Juan" is underscored when one considers
the foregoing circumstances in the context of the following facts:
Firstly, the "Don Juan" was more than twice as fast as the "Tacloban City." The "Don
Juan's" top speed was 17 knots; while that of the "Tacloban City" was 6.3. knots.
Secondly, the "Don Juan" carried the full complement of officers and crew members
specified for a passenger vessel of her class.
Thirdly, the "Don Juan" was equipped with radar which was functioning that night.
Fourthly, the "Don Juan's" officer on-watch had sighted the "Tacloban City" on his radar
screen while the latter was still four (4) nautical miles away. Visual confirmation of radar
contact was established by the "Don Juan" while the "Tacloban City" was still 2.7 miles
away.
In the total set of circumstances which existed in the instant case, the "Don Juan," had it
taken seriously its duty of extraordinary diligence, could have easily avoided the collision
with the "Tacloban City," Indeed, the "Don Juan" might well have avoided the collision
even if it had exercised ordinary diligence merely.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of gross neglect.
Yes.
Stare decisis et non quieta movere.
In finding petitioner guilty of negligence and in failing to exercise the extraordinary
diligence required of it in the carriage of passengers, both the trial court and the appellate
court relied on the findings of this Court in Mecenas v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
which case was brought for the death of other passengers.
Adherence to the Mecenas case is dictated by this Courts policy of maintaining stability in
jurisprudence in accordance with the legal maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere
(Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled.) Where, as in this case,
the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by parties similarly
situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare
decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.
In Woulfe v. Associated Realties Corporation, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held
that where substantially similar cases to the pending case were presented and applicable
principles declared in prior decisions, the court was bound by the principle of stare decisis.
Similarly, in State ex rel. Tollinger v. Gill, it was held that under the doctrine of stare
decisis a ruling is final even as to parties who are strangers to the original proceeding and
not bound by the judgment under the res judicata doctrine. The Philadelphia court expressed
itself in this wise:
Stare decisis simply declares that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one
case should be applied to those which follow, if the facts are substantially the same, even
though the parties may be different.
AGDV
 SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr. |2018-2019|

found and brought to shore, Thus, in J. M. Tuason v. Mariano, supra, this Court relied on its rulings in other cases
but the four members of involving different parties in sustaining the validity of a land title on the principle of stare
private respondents families decisis et non quieta movere.
were never found.

Korean Airlines vs CA
In 1980, Juanito C. Lapuz, an
automotive electrician, was
contracted for employment in
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, for a
period of one year through
Pan Pacific Overseas
Recruiting Services, Inc.
Lapuz was supposed to leave
on November 8, 1980, via
Korean Airlines. Initially, he
was "wait-listed," which
meant that he could only be
accommodated if any of the
confirmed passengers failed
to show up at the airport
before departure. When two
of such passengers did not
appear, Lapuz and another
person by the name of Perico
were given the two unclaimed
seats.
According to Lapuz, he was
allowed to check in with one
suitcase and one shoulder bag
at the check-in counter of
KAL. He passed through the
customs and immigration
sections for routine check-up
and was cleared for departure
as Passenger No. 157 of KAL
Flight No. KE 903. However,
when he was at the third or
fourth rung of the stairs, a
KAL officer pointed to him
and shouted "Down! Down!"
He was thus barred from
taking the flight. When he
later asked for another
booking, his ticket was
canceled by KAL.
Consequently, he was unable
to report for his work in Saudi
Arabia within the stipulated
2-week period and so lost his
employment.
Issue: Whether or not KAL committed a breach of carriage when it prevented Lapuz from
boarding the aircraft.
Yes.
The status of Lapuz as standby passenger was changed to that of a confirmed passenger
when his name was entered in the passenger manifest of KAL for its Flight No. KE 903.
His clearance through immigration and customs clearly shows that he had indeed been
confirmed as a passenger of KAL in that flight. KAL thus committed a breach of the
contract of carriage between them when it failed to bring Lapuz to his destination.
This Court has held that a contract to transport passengers is different in kind and degree
from any other contractual relation. 3 The business of the carrier is mainly with the traveling
public. It invites people to avail themselves of the comforts and advantages it offers. The
contract of air carriage generates a relation attended with a public duty. Passengers have the
right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious
language, indignities and abuses from such employees. 4 So it is that any discourteous
conduct on the part of these employees toward a passenger gives the latter an action for
damages against the carrier.
The breach of contract was aggravated in this case when, instead of courteously informing
Lapuz of his being a "wait-listed" passenger, a KAL officer rudely shouted "Down! Down!"
while pointing at him, thus causing him embarrassment and public humiliation.
KAL argues that "the evidence of confirmation of a chance passenger status is not through
the entry of the name of a chance passenger in the passenger manifest nor the clearance
from the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, because they are merely means of
facilitating the boarding of a chance passenger in case his status is confirmed." We are not
persuaded.
The evidence presented by Lapuz shows that he had indeed checked in at the departure
counter, passed through customs and immigration, boarded the shuttle bus and proceeded
to the ramp of KAL's aircraft. In fact, his baggage had already been loaded in KAL's aircraft,
to be flown with him to Jeddah. The contract of carriage between him and KAL had already
been perfected when he was summarily and insolently prevented from boarding the aircraft.

KAL, on the other hand,

alleged that on November 8,
1980, Pan Pacific Recruiting
Services Inc. coordinated
with KAL for the departure of
30 contract workers, of whom
only 21 were confirmed and 9
were wait-listed passengers.

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV

 SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr. |2018-2019|

The agent of Pan Pacific,

Jimmie Joseph, after being
informed that there was a
possibility of having one or
two seats becoming available,
gave priority to Perico, who
was one of the supervisors of
the hiring company in Saudi
Arabia. The other seat was
won through lottery by
Lapuz. However, only one
seat became available and so,
pursuant to the earlier
agreement that Perico was to
be given priority, he alone
was allowed to board.

PAL vs CA GR. No. 120262 Issues: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of bad faith.

On October 23, 1988, private Yes.

respondent Pantejo, then City
Fiscal of Surigao City,
boarded a PAL plane in
Manila and disembarked in
Cebu City where he was
supposed to take his
connecting flight to Surigao
City. However, due to
typhoon Osang, the
connecting flight to Surigao
City was cancelled.
To accommodate the needs of
its stranded passengers, PAL
initially gave out cash
assistance of P100.00 and, the
next day, P200.00, for their
expected stay of two days in
Cebu. Respondent Pantejo
requested instead that he be
billeted in a hotel at PALs
expense because he did
nothave cash with him at that
time, but PAL refused. Thus,
respondent Pantejo was
forced to seek and accept the
generosity of a co-passenger,
an engineer named Andoni
Dumlao, and he shared a room
with the latter at Sky View
Hotel with the promise to pay
his share of the expenses upon
reaching Surigao.
“It must be emphasized that a contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and
degree from any other contractual relation, and this is because of the relation which an air
carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites
people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage,
therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the
carriers employees naturally could give ground for an action for damages.”
Assuming arguendo that the airline passengers have no vested right to these amenities in
case a flight is cancelled due to force majeure, what makes petitioner liable for damages in
this particular case and under the facts obtaining herein is its blatant refusal to accord the
so-called amenities equally to all its stranded passengers who were bound for Surigao City.
No compelling or justifying reason was advanced for such discriminatory and prejudicial
conduct.
More importantly, it has been sufficiently established that it is petitioners standard company
policy, whenever a flight has been cancelled, to extend to its hapless passengers cash
assistance or to provide them accommodations in hotels with which it has existing tie-ups.
In fact, petitioners Mactan Airport Manager for departure services, Oscar Jereza, admitted
that PAL has an existing arrangement with hotels to accommodate stranded passengers, and
that the hotel bills of Ernesto Gonzales were reimbursed obviously pursuant to that policy.
Also, two witnesses presented by respondent, Teresita Azarcon and Nerie Bol, testified that
sometime in November, 1988, when their flight from Cebu to Surigao was cancelled, they
were billeted at Rajah Hotel for two nights and three days at the expense of PAL. This was
never denied by PAL.
Further, Ernesto Gonzales, the aforementioned co-passenger of respondent on that fateful
flight, testified that based on his previous experience hotel accommodations were extended
by PAL to its stranded passengers either in Magellan or Rajah Hotels, or even in Cebu Plaza.
Thus, we view as impressed with dubiety PALs present attempt to represent such emergency
assistance as being merely ex gratia and not ex debito.

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV


On October 25, 1988 when
the flight for Surigao was
resumed, respondent Pantejo
came to know that the hotel
expenses of his co-
passengers, one
Superintendent Ernesto
Gonzales and a certain Mrs.
Gloria Rocha, an auditor of
the Philippine National Bank,
were reimbursed by PAL.
Calalas vs CA
On August 23, 1989, private
respondent Eliza Jujeurche
G. Sunga, then a college
freshman at the Siliman
University, took a passenger
jeepney owned and operated
by petitioner Vicente Calalas.
As the jeepney was filled to
capacity of about 24
passengers, she was given an
"extension seat," a wooden
stool at the back of the door
at the rear end of the vehicle.
On the way to Poblacion
Sibulan, Negros Occidental,
the jeepney stopped to let a
passenger off. Sunga gave
way to the outgoing
passenger. Just as she was
doing so, an Isuzu truck
bumped the left rear portion
of the jeepney. As a result,
she was injured. She
sustained a fracture of her
tibia. Her confinement in the
hospital lasted from August
23 to September 7, 1989. Her
attending physician, certified
she would remain on a cast
for a period of three months
and would have to ambulate
in crutches during said
period.
Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk.
SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr. |2018-2019|
Issue: Whether or not petitioner failed to exercise due diligence.
Yes.
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at
once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he had to observe extraordinary
diligence in the care of his passengers.
First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion
being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the
middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. This is a violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as
amended, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code.
Second, it is undisputed that petitioners driver took in more passengers than the allowed
seating capacity of the jeepney, a violation of 32(a) of the same law.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that
to which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to
overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga,
but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers. Calrky
We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioners contention that Sungas taking an
"extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the
injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely
because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded
ferry. This is also true of petitioners contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was
improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of
parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway.
Note:
The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions
involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person
where there is no relation between him and another par ty. In such a case, the obligation is
created by law itself.
AGDV

Pilapil vs CA
Petitioner Jose Pilapil, a
paying passenger, boarded
respondent-defendant's bus
bearing at San Nicolas, Iriga
City on 16 September 1971 at
about 6:00 P.M. While said
bus was in due course
negotiating the distance
between Iriga City and Naga
City, upon reaching the
vicinity of the cemetery of
the Municipality of Baao,
Camarines Sur, on the way to
Naga City, an unidentified
man, a bystander along said
national highway, hurled a
stone at the left side of the
bus, which hit petitioner
above his left eye. Private
respondent's personnel lost
no time in bringing the
petitioner to the provincial
hospital in Naga City where
he was confined and treated.
Considering that the sight of
his left eye was impaired,
petitioner was taken to Dr.
Malabanan of Iriga City
where he was treated for
another week. Since there
was no improvement in his
left eye's vision, petitioner
went to V. Luna Hospital,
Quezon City where he was
treated by Dr. Capulong.
Despite the treatment
accorded to him by Dr.
Capulong, petitioner lost
partially his left eye's vision
and sustained a permanent
scar above the left eye.
Fortune Express vs CA
On November 22, 1989, three
armed Maranaos who
pretended to be passengers,
seized a bus of petitioner at
Linamon, Lanao del Norte
while on its way to Iligan
City. Among the passengers
of the bus was Atty. Caorong.
The leader of the Maranaos,
identified as one Bashier
Mananggolo, ordered the
driver, Godofredo Cabatuan,
to stop the bus on the side of
Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk.
SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr. |2018-2019|
Issues: Whether it is the duty of the common carrier to insure passenger against all risks.
Whether or not respondent is presumed to be negligent in this case.
No.
While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe
transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does
not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.
Article 1755 of the Civil Code qualifies the duty of extraordinary care, vigilance and
precaution in the carriage of passengers by common carriers to only such as human care
and foresight can provide. What constitutes compliance with said duty is adjudged with due
regard to all the circumstances.
Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in creating a presumption of fault or negligence on the part
of the common carrier when its passenger is injured, merely relieves the latter, for the time
being, from introducing evidence to fasten the negligence on the former, because the
presumption stands in the place of evidence. Being a mere presumption, however, the same
is rebuttable by proof that the common carrier had exercised extraordinary diligence as
required by law in the performance of its contractual obligation, or that the injury suffered
by the passenger was solely due to a fortuitous event.
No.
First, the presumption of fault or negligence against the carrier is only a disputable
presumption. Where, as in the instant case, the injury sustained by the petitioner was in no
way due to any defect in the means of transport or in the method of transporting or to the
negligent or willful acts of private respondent's employees, and therefore involving no issue
of negligence in its duty to provide safe and suitable cars as well as competent employees,
with the injury arising wholly from causes created by strangers over which the carrier had
no control or even knowledge or could not have prevented, the presumption is rebutted and
the carrier is not and ought not to be held liable. To rule otherwise would make the common
carrier the insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.
Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on
account of the wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common
carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could
have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
Clearly under the above provision, a tort committed by a stranger which causes injury to a
passenger does not accord the latter a cause of action against the carrier. The negligence for
which a common carrier is held responsible is the negligent omission by the carrier's
employees to prevent the tort from being committed when the same could have been
foreseen and prevented by them.
Issues: Whether or not petitioner committed a breach on the contract of carriage.
Whether or not the case of Pilapil vs CA is applicable.
Whether or not the seizure of the bus was caused by force majuere.
Yes.
Art. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is responsible for injuries
suffered by a passenger on account of wilfull acts of other passengers, if the employees of
the common carrier could have prevented the act through the exercise of the diligence of a
good father of a family. In the present case, it is clear that because of the negligence of
petitioner's employees, the seizure of the bus by Mananggolo and his men was made
possible.
Despite warning by the Philippine Constabulary at Cagayan de Oro that the Maranaos were
planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its buses and the assurance
AGDV

the highway. Mananggolo
then shot Cabatuan on the
arm, which caused him to
slump on the steering wheel.
The one of the companions of
Mananggolo started pouring
gasoline inside the bus.
Mananggolo then ordered the
passenger to get off the bus.
The passengers, including
Atty. Caorong, stepped out of
the bus and went behind the
bushes.
However, Atty. Caorong
returned to the bus to retrieve
something from the overhead
rack. at that time, one of the
armed men was pouring
gasoline on the head of the
driver. Cabatuan, who had
meantime regained
consciousness, heard Atty.
Caorong pleading with the
armed men to spare the
driver. During this exchange
between Atty. Caorong and
the assailants, Cabatuan
climbed out of the left
window of the bus and
crawled to the canal on the
opposite side of the highway.
He heard shots from inside
the bus. Atty. Caorong was
hit. Then the bus was set on
fire. Some of the passengers
were able to pull Atty.
Caorong out of the burning
bus and rush him to the
hospital, but he died.
Philippine Rabbit vs IAC
On December 24, 1966,
Catalina Pascua, Caridad
Pascua, Adelaida Estomo, et
al. boarded the jeepney
driven by Tranquilino
Manalo at Dau, Mabalacat,
Pampanga bound for Carmen,
Rosales, Pangasinan to spend
Christmas at their respective
homes. Their contract with
Manalo was for them to pay
P24.00 for the trip. After a
brief stopover at Moncada,
Tarlac for refreshment, the
jeepney proceeded towards
Carmen, Rosales,
Pangasinan.
Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk.
SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr. |2018-2019|
of petitioner's operation manager, Diosdado Bravo, that the necessary precautions would
be taken, petitioner did nothing to protect the safety of its passengers.
Had petitioner and its employees been vigilant they would not have failed to see that the
malefactors had a large quantity of gasoline with them. Under the circumstances, simple
precautionary measures to protect the safety of passengers, such as frisking passengers and
inspecting their baggages, preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors,
before allowing them on board could have been employed without violating the passenger's
constitutional rights. As this Court amended in Gacal v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., 6 a
common carrier can be held liable for failing to prevent a hijacking by frisking passengers
and inspecting their baggages.
No.
It is clear that the cases of Pilapil and De Guzman do not apply to the prensent case. Art.
1755 of the Civil Code provides that "a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers as
far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with due regard for all the circumstances."
Thus, we held in Pilapil and De Guzman that the respondents therein were not negligent in
failing to take special precautions against threats to the safety of passengers which could
not be foreseen, such as tortious or criminal acts of third persons. In the present case, this
factor of unforeseeability (the second requisite for an event to be considered force majeure)
is lacking. As already stated, despite the report of PC agent Generalao that the Maranaos
were planning to burn some of petitioner's buses and the assurance of petitioner's operation
manager (Diosdado Bravo) that the necessary precautions would be taken, nothing was
really done by petitioner to protect the safety of passengers.
No.
The seizure of the bus of the petitioner was foreseeable and, therefore, was not a fortuitous
event which would exempt petitioner from liabilty.
Note:
Atty. Caorong was not guilty of contributory negligence. The armed men actually allowed
Atty. Caorong to retrieve something from the bus. What apparently angered them was his
attempt to help the driver of the bus by pleading for his life. He was playing the role of the
good Samaritan. Certainly, this act cannot considered an act of negligence, let alone
recklessness.
A. Last Clear Chance Doctrine
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance applies.
No.
We reiterate that "[t]he principle about "the last clear" chance, would call for application in
a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where
a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations.
For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on
the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence." This was Our ruling in
Anuran, et al. v. Buño et al. Thus, the respondent court erred in applying said doctrine.
Note:
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
“The doctrine of last clear chance provides that where both parties are negligent but the
negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or where it
is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the
incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed
to do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom. Stated differently, the rule
is that the antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of damages caused
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by the supervening negligence of the latter, who had the last fair chance to prevent the
Upon reaching barrio impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.”
Sinayoan, San Manuel, (Greenstar Express vs Universal Robina Corp, not cited in this case.)
Tarlac, the right rear wheel of
the jeepney was detached, so
it was running in an
unbalanced position. Manalo
stepped on the brake, as a
result of which, the jeepney
which was then running on
the eastern lane (its right of
way) made a U-turn, invading
and eventually stopping on
the western lane of the road in
such a manner that the
jeepney's front faced the
south (from where it came).
The jeepney practically
occupied and blocked the
greater portion of the western
lane.

Almost at the time when the

jeepney made a sudden U-
turn and encroached on the
western lane of the highway
as claimed by Rabbit and
delos Reyes, or after stopping
for a couple of minutes as
claimed by Mangune,
Carreon and Manalo, the
Phillippine Rabbit bus
bumped from behind the right
rear portion of the jeepney.
Three passengers of the
jeepney (Catalina Pascua,
Erlinda Meriales and
Adelaida Estomo) died while
the other jeepney passengers
sustained physical injuries.
What could have been a
festive Christmas turned out
to be tragic.

Bustmante vs CA. Issue: Whether or not respondent court correctly applied the doctrine of Last Clear Chance.

On April 20, 1983, a collision No.

occurred between a gravel
and sand truck, and a Mazda
passenger bus along the
national road at Calibuyo,
Tanza, Cavite. The front left
side portion (barandilla) of
the body of the truck
sideswiped the left side wall
of the passenger bus, ripping
off the said wall from the
driver's seat to the last rear
seat.
The respondent court adopted the doctrine of "last clear chance." The doctrine, stated
broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the
negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable
care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff
notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. In other words, the doctrine of last clear chance
means that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril, and
an injury results, the injured person is entitled to recovery. As the doctrine is usually stated,
a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident,
notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the
opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.
The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent
plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing himself in peril, if

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV


Due to the impact, several
passengers of the bus were
thrown out and died as a
result of the injuries they
sustained.
Immediately before the
collision, the cargo truck and
the passenger bus were
approaching each other,
coming from the opposite
directions of the highway.
While the truck was still
about 30 meters away,
Susulin, the bus driver, saw
the front wheels of the
vehicle wiggling. He also
observed that the truck was
heading towards his lane. Not
minding this circumstance
due to his belief that the
driver of the truck was merely
joking, Susulin shifted from
fourth to third gear in order to
give more power and speed to
the bus, which was ascending
the inclined part of the road,
in order to overtake or pass a
Kubota hand tractor being
pushed by a person along the
shoulder of the highway.
While the bus was in the
process of overtaking or
passing the hand tractor and
the truck was approaching the
bus, the two vehicles
sideswiped each other at each
other's left side. After the
impact, the truck skidded
towards the other side of the
road and landed on a nearby
residential lot, hitting a
coconut tree and felling it."
Lara vs Valencia
The deceased was an
inspector of the Bureau of
Forestry stationed in Davao
The defendant is engaged in
the business of exporting logs
from his lumber concession
in Cotabato. Lara went to said
concession upon instructions
of his chief to classify the
logs of defendant which were
about to be loaded on a ship.
The work Lara of lasted for
six days during which he
Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk.
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he, aware of the plaintiffs peril, or according to some authorities, should have been aware
of it in the reasonable exercise of due case, had in fact an opportunity later than that of the
plaintiff to avoid an accident.
In the recent case of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et
al. (G.R. Nos. 66102-04, August 30, 1990), the Court citing the landmark decision held in
the case of Anuran, et al. v. Buno, et al. (123 Phil. 1073) ruled that the principle of "last
clear chance" applies "in a suit between the owners and drivers of colliding vehicles. It does
not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its
contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the
jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of
negligence."
Furthermore, "as between defendants: The doctrine cannot be extended into the field of
joint tortfeasors as a test of whether only one of them should be held liable to the injured
person by reason of his discovery of the latter's peril, and it cannot be invoked as between
defendants concurrently negligent. As against third persons, a negligent actor cannot defend
by pleading that another had negligently failed to take action which could have avoided the
injury."
All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the respondent Court committed an
error of law in applying the doctrine of last clear chance as between the defendants, since
the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a
suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the
colliding vehicles. Therefore, the respondent court erred in absolving the owner and driver
of the cargo truck from liability.
B. Accomodation Passenger
Issues: Whether or not respondent is required to exercise extraordinary diligence.
Whether or not respondent failed to exercise ordinary diligence.
No.
As accommodation passengers or invited guests, defendant as owner and driver of the pick-
up owes to them merely the duty to exercise reasonable care so that they may be transported
safely to their destination. Thus, "The rule is established by the weight of authority that the
owner or operator of an automobile owes the duty to an invited guest to exercise reasonable
care in its operation, and not unreasonably to expose him to danger and injury by increasing
the hazard of travel.
This rule, as frequently stated by the courts, is that an owner of an automobile owes a guest
the duty to exercise ordinary or reasonable care to avoid injuring him. Since one riding in
an automobile is no less a guest because he asked for the privilege of doing so, the same
obligation of care is imposed upon the driver as in the case of one expressly invited to
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contracted malaria fever. In
the morning of January 9,
1954, Lara who then in a
hurry to return to Davao
asked defendant if he could
take him in his pick-up as
there was then no other
means of transportation, to
which defendant agreed. The
pick-up left Parang bound for
Davao taking along six
passengers, including Lara.
Upon reaching barrio
Catidtuan, Lara accidentally
fell from the pick-up and as a
result he suffered serious
injuries. Valencia stopped the
pick-up to see what happened
to Lara. He sought the help of
the residents of that place and
applied water to Lara but to
no avail. They brought Lara
to the nearest place where
they could find a doctor and
not having found any they
took him to St. Joseph's
Clinic of Kidapawan. But
when Lara arrived he was
already dead.
Necessito vs Paras
On January 28, 1964,
Severina Garces and her one-
year old son, Precillano
Necesito, carrying
vegetables, boarded the bus
of Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines at Agno, Pangasinan.
The passenger truck, driven
by Francisco Bandonell, then
proceeded on its regular run
from Agno to Manila. After
passing Mangatarem,
Pangasinan truck entered a
wooden bridge, but the front
wheels swerved to the right;
the driver lost control, and
after wrecking the bridge's
wooden rails, the truck fell on
its right side into a creek
where water was breast deep.
The mother, Severina Garces,
was drowned; the son,
Precillano Necesito, was
injured, suffering abrasions
and fracture of the left femur.
He was brought to the
Provincial Hospital at
Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk.
SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr. |2018-2019|
ride"Defendant, therefore, is only required to observe ordinary care, and is not in duty
bound to exercise extraordinary diligence as required of a common carrier by our law.
No.
There is nothing to indicate that defendant has acted with negligence or without taking the
precaution that an ordinary prudent man would have taken under similar circumstances. It
should be noted that defendant was not in duty bound to take the deceased in his own pick-
up to Davao because from Parang to Cotabato there was a line of transportation that
regularly makes trips for the public, and if defendant agreed to take the deceased in his own
car, it was only to accommodate him considering his feverish condition and his request that
he be so accommodated.
It should also be noted that the passengers who rode in the pick-up of defendant took their
respective seats therein at their own choice and not upon indication of defendant with the
particularity that defendant invited the deceased to sit with him in the front seat but which
invitation the deceased declined. The reason for this can only be attributed to his desire to
be at the back so that he could sit on a bag and travel in a reclining position because such
was more convenient for him due to his feverish condition. All the circumstances therefore
clearly indicate that defendant had done what a reasonable prudent man would have done
under the circumstances.
There is every reason to believe that the unfortunate happening was only due to an
unforeseen accident by the fact that at the time the deceased was half asleep and must have
fallen from the pick-up when it ran into some stones causing it to jerk considering that the
road was then bumpy, rough and full of stones.
C. Not An Insurer Against All Risks
Issue: Whether or not the carrier is liable for the manufacturing defect of the steering
knuckle, and whether the evidence discloses that in regard thereto the carrier exercised the
diligence required by law.
No.
It is clear that the carrier is not an insurer of the passengers' safety. His liability rests upon
negligence, his failure to exercise the "utmost" degree of diligence that the law requires,
and by Art. 1756, in case of a passenger's death or injury the carrier bears the burden of
satisfying the court that he has duly discharged the duty of prudence required.
In American law, the rule on the liability of carriers for defects of equipment is thus
expressed: "The preponderance of authority is in favor of the doctrine that a passenger is
entitled to recover damages from a carrier for an injury resulting from a defect in an
appliance purchased from a manufacturer, whenever it appears that the defect would have
been discovered by the carrier if it had exercised the degree of care which under the
circumstances was incumbent upon it, with regard to inspection and application of the
necessary tests.
For the purposes of this doctrine, the manufacturer is considered as being in law the agent
or servant of the carrier, as far as regards the work of constructing the appliance. According
to this theory, the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability"
The rationale of the carrier's liability is the fact that the passenger has neither choice nor
control over the carrier in the selection and use of the equipment and appliances in use by
the carrier.
In the case now before us, the record is to the effect that the only test applied to the steering
knuckle in question was a purely visual inspection every thirty days, to see if any cracks
developed. It nowhere appears that either the manufacturer or the carrier at any time tested
AGDV

Dagupan, where the fracture
was set but with fragments
one centimeter out of line.
The money, wrist watch and
cargo of vegetables were lost.
Japan Airlines vs CA
On June 13, 1991, private
respondent Jose Miranda
boarded JAL flight No. JL
001 in San Francisco,
California bound for Manila.
Likewise, on the same day
private respondents Enrique
Agana et al. left Los Angeles,
California for Manila via JAL
flight No. JL 061. As an
incentive for travelling on the
said airline, both flights were
to make an overnight
stopover at Narita, Japan, at
the airlines' expense.
Upon arrival at Narita, Japan
on June 14, 1991, private
respondents were billeted at
Hotel Nikko Narita for the
night. The next day, private
respondents went to the
airport to take their flight to
Manila. However, due to the
Mt. Pinatubo eruption,
unrelenting ashfall blanketed
NAIA rendering it
inaccessible to airline traffic.
Hence, private respondents'
trip to Manila was cancelled
indefinitely.
To accommodate the needs of
its stranded passengers, JAL
rebooked all the Manila-
bound passengers on flight
No. 741 due to depart on June
16, 1991 and also paid for the
hotel expenses for their
unexpected overnight stay.
On June 16, 1991, much to
the dismay of the private
respondents, their long
Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk.
SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr. |2018-2019|
the steering knuckle to ascertain whether its strength was up to standard, or that it had no
hidden flaws would impair that strength. And yet the carrier must have been aware of the
critical importance of the knuckle's resistance; that its failure or breakage would result in
loss of balance and steering control of the bus, with disastrous effects upon the passengers.
No argument is required to establish that a visual inspection could not directly determine
whether the resistance of this critically important part was not impaired. We are satisfied
that the periodical visual inspection of the steering knuckle as practiced by the carrier's
agents did not measure up to the required legal standard of "utmost diligence of very
cautious persons" — "as far as human care and foresight can provide.”
Issue: Whether JAL, as a common carrier has the obligation to shoulder the hotel and meal
expenses of its stranded passengers until they have reached their final destination, even if
the delay were caused by "force majeure."
No.
We have consistently ruled that a contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind,
and degree from any other contractual relation. It is safe to conclude that it is a relationship
imbued with public interest. Failure on the part of the common carrier to live up to the
exacting standards of care and diligence renders it liable for any damages that may be
sustained by its passengers. However, this is not to say that common carriers are absolutely
responsible for all injuries or damages even if the same were caused by a fortuitous event.
To rule otherwise would render the defense of "force majeure," as an exception from any
liability, illusory and ineffective.
Accordingly, there is no question that when a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because
of "force majeure," the general rule is that he cannot be held liable for damages for non-
performance. Corollarily, when JAL was prevented from resuming its flight to Manila due
to the effects of Mt. Pinatubo eruption, whatever losses or damages in the form of hotel and
meal expenses the stranded passengers incurred, cannot be charged to JAL. Yet it is
undeniable that JAL assumed the hotel expenses of respondents for their unexpected
overnight stay on June 15, 1991.
Admittedly, to be stranded for almost a week in a foreign land was an exasperating
experience for the private respondents, but their predicament was not due to the fault or
negligence of JAL but the closure of NAIA to international flights. Indeed, to hold JAL, in
the absence of bad faith or negligence, liable for the amenities of its stranded passengers by
reason of a fortuitous event is too much of a burden to assume.
Furthermore, it has been held that airline passengers must take such risks incident to the
mode of travel. In this regard, adverse weather conditions or extreme climatic changes are
some of the perils involved in air travel, the consequences of which the passenger must
assume or expect. After all, common carriers are not the insurer of all risks.
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anticipated flight to Manila

was again cancelled due to
NAIA's indefinite closure. At
this point, JAL informed the
private respondents that it
would no longer defray their
hotel and accommodation
expense during their stay in
Narita.

Since NAIA was only

reopened to airline traffic on
June 22, 1991, private
respondents were forced to
pay for their
accommodations and meal
expenses from their personal
funds from June 16 to June
21, 1991.

Yobido vs CA Issue: Whether or not petitioner should be liable despite the principle that a common carrier
is not an insurer of all risks.
On April 26, 1988, spouses
Tito and Leny Tumboy and Yes.
their minor children named
Ardee and Jasmin, boarded at
Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur, a As a rule, when a passenger boards a common carrier, he takes the risks incidental to the
Yobido Liner bus bound for mode of travel he has taken. After all, a carrier is not an insurer of the safety of its passengers
Davao City. Along Picop and is not bound absolutely and at all events to carry them safely and without injury.
Road in Km. 17, Sta. Maria, However, when a passenger is injured or dies while travelling, the law presumes that the
Agusan del Sur, the left front common carrier is negligent. Thus, the Civil Code provides:
tire of the bus exploded. The
bus fell into a ravine around Art. 1756. In case of death or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have
three (3) feet from the road been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
and struck a tree. The diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.
incident resulted in the death
of 28-year-old Tito Tumboy Article 1755 provides that (a) common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far
and physical injuries to other as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
passengers. persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. Accordingly, in culpa contractual, once
a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
On November 21, 1988, a negligently. This disputable presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier
complaint for breach of had observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the
contract of carriage, damages Civil Code or that the death or injury of the passenger was due to a fortuitous event.
and attorneys fees was filed Consequently, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part
by Leny and her children of the carrier to hold it responsible for damages sought by the passenger.
against Alberta Yobido, the
owner of the bus, and
Cresencio Yobido, its driver,
before the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City. When
the defendants therein filed
their answer to the complaint,
they raised the affirmative
defense of caso fortuito.

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV


Jesus Vds. De Nueca vs MRC Issue: Whether or not Nueca was a passenger.
At 3 p.m. on Dec. 22, 1958,
Fermin Nueca brought 7
sacks of palay to Manila
Railroad Co. (MRC) at its
station in Barrio del
Rosario, Camarines Sur, to
be shipped to the
municipality of Libmanan of
the same province. He paid
P 0.70 as freight charge and
was issued Way Bill No.
56515. The cargo was
loaded on the freight wagon
of Train 537. Passengers
boarded the train and
shunting operations started
to hook a wagon thereto.
Before the train reached the
turnoff switch, its passenger
coach fell on its side some
40 m from the station. The
wagon pinned Nueca, killing
him instantly.
Dangwa vs CA
On May 13, 1985, private
respondents filed a complaint
for damages against
petitioners for the death of
Pedrito Cudiamat as a result
of a vehicular accident which
occurred on March 25, 1985
at Marivic, Sapid, Mankayan,
Benguet. Among others, it
was alleged that on said date,
while petitioner Theodore M.
Lardizabal was driving a
passenger bus belonging to
petitioner corporation in a
reckless and imprudent
manner and without due
regard to traffic rules and
regulations and safety to
persons and property, it ran
over its passenger, Pedrito
Cudiamat. However, instead
of bringing Pedrito
immediately to the nearest
hospital, the said driver, in
utter bad faith and without
regard to the welfare of the
victim, first brought his other
passengers and cargo to their
respective destinations before
banging said victim to the
Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk.
SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr. |2018-2019|
2. Duration of Responsibility
No.
A passenger is one who travels in a public conveyance by virtue of a contract,
express or implied, with the carrier as to the payment of the fare, or that which is
accepted as an equivalent. The relation of passenger and carrier commences when one
puts himself in the care of the carrier, or directly under its control, with the bona
fide intention of becoming a passenger, and is accepted as such by the carrier – as
where he makes a contract for trasportation and presents himself at the proper place
and in a proper manner to be transported.
Even disregarding the matter of tickets, and assuming Nueca intended to be a
passenger, he was never accepted as such by MRC as he did not present himself at
the proper place and in a proper manner to be transported.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was negligent.
Yes.
Evidently, the incident took place due to the gross negligence of the appellee-driver in
prematurely stepping on the accelerator and in not waiting for the passenger to first secure
his seat especially so when we take into account that the platform of the bus was at the time
slippery and wet because of a drizzle.
The foregoing testimonies show that the place of the accident and the place where one of
the passengers alighted were both between Bunkhouses 53 and 54, hence the finding of the
Court of Appeals that the bus was at full stop when the victim boarded the same is correct.
They further confirm the conclusion that the victim fell from the platform of the bus when
it suddenly accelerated forward and was run over by the rear right tires of the vehicle, as
shown by the physical evidence on where he was thereafter found in relation to the bus
when it stopped. Under such circumstances, it cannot be said that the deceased was guilty
of negligence.
The contention of petitioners that the driver and the conductor had no knowledge that the
victim would ride on the bus, since the latter had supposedly not manifested his intention
to board the same, does not merit consideration. When the bus is not in motion there is no
necessity for a person who wants to ride the same to signal his intention to board. A public
utility bus, once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders.
It is the duty of common carriers of passengers, including common carriers by railroad
train, streetcar, or motorbus, to stop their conveyances a reasonable length of time in order
to afford passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they are liable for injuries
suffered by boarding passengers resulting from the sudden starting up or jerking of their
conveyances while they are doing so.
Further, even assuming that the bus was moving, the act of the victim in boarding the same
cannot be considered negligent under the circumstances. As clearly explained in the
testimony of the aforestated witness for petitioners, Virginia Abalos, th bus had "just
AGDV

Lepanto Hospital where he
expired.
On the other hand, petitioners
alleged that they had
observed and continued to
observe the extraordinary
diligence required in the
operation of the
transportation company and
the supervision of the
employees.
La Mallorca vs CA
On December 20, 1953,
plaintiffs, husband and wife,
together with their minor
daughters, namely, Milagros,
13 years old, Raquel, about
4½ years old, and Fe, over 2
years old, boarded a bus
owned and operated by the
defendant, at San Fernando,
Pampanga, bound for Anao,
Pampanga.
The bus reached Anao
whereat it stopped to allow
the passengers including
plaintiif and his family to get
off. Mariano Beltran, then
carrying some of their
baggages, was the first to get
down the bus, followed by
his wife and his children.
Afterwards, he returned to
the bus to get his other
bayong, which he had left
behind, but in so doing, his
daughter Raquel followed
him, unnoticed by her father.
While said Mariano Beltran
was on the running board of
the bus waiting for the
conductor to hand him his
bayong which he left under
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SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr. |2018-2019|
started" and "was still in slow motion" at the point where the victim had boarded and was
on its platform.
It is not negligence per se, or as a matter of law, for one attempt to board a train or streetcar
which is moving slowly. The fact that passengers board and alight from slowly moving
vehicle is a matter of common experience both the driver and conductor in this case could
not have been unaware of such an ordinary practice.
The victim herein, by stepping and standing on the platform of the bus, is already
considered a passenger and is entitled all the rights and protection pertaining to such a
contractual relation. Hence, it has been held that the duty which the carrier passengers owes
to its patrons extends to persons boarding cars as well as to those alighting therefrom.
Moreover, the circumstances under which the driver and the conductor failed to bring the
gravely injured victim immediately to the hospital for medical treatment is a patent and
incontrovertible proof of their negligence. It defies understanding and can even be
stigmatized as callous indifference. The evidence shows that after the accident the bus could
have forthwith turned at Bunk 56 and thence to the hospital, but its driver instead opted to
first proceed to Bunk 70 to allow a passenger to alight and to deliver a refrigerator, despite
the serious condition of the victim.
Issue: Whether or not private respondent Mariano Beltran and family were still considered
passengers after alighting the bus owned by petitioner.
Yes.
It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at
the moment the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the
carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable
time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. And, what is a reasonable
time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances.
Thus, a person who, after alighting from a train, walks along the station platform is
considered still a passenger. So also, where a passenger has alighted at his destination and
is proceeding by the usual way to leave the company's premises, but before actually doing
so is halted by the report that his brother, a fellow passenger, has been shot, and he in good
faith and without intent of engaging in the difficulty, returns to relieve his brother, he is
deemed reasonably and necessarily delayed and thus continues to be a passenger entitled
as such to the protection of the railroad and company and its agents.
In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was not
unloaded when they alighted from the bus. Raquel, the child that she was, must have
followed the father. However, although the father was still on the running board of the bus
awaiting for the conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so that
even he (the father) had to jump down from the moving vehicle. It was at this instance that
the child, who must be near the bus, was run over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot
be claimed that the carrier's agent had exercised the "utmost diligence" of a "very cautions
person" required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a common carrier in
the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its passengers. In the first place, the driver,
although stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put off the engine.
Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the signal to go
and while the latter was still unloading part of the baggages of the passengers Mariano
Beltran and family. The presence of said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and
AGDV

one of its seats near the door,
the bus, suddenly started
moving forward, evidently to
resume its trip,
notwithstanding the fact that
the conductor has not given
the driver the customary
signal to start. Then the bus
stopped.
Sensing that the bus was
again in motion, Mariano
Beltran immediately jumped
from the running board
without getting his bayong
from the conductor. At that
time, he saw people
beginning to gather around
the body of a child lying
prostrate on the ground, her
skull crushed, and without
life. The child was none other
than his daughter Raquel,
who was run over by the bus.
Aboitiz vs CA
On May 11, 1975, Anacleto
Viana boarded the vessel
M/V Antonia, owned by
defendant, at the port at San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro,
bound for Manila, having
purchased a ticket. On May
12, 1975, said vessel arrived
at Pier 4, North Harbor,
Manila, and the passengers
therein disembarked, a a reasonable cause as will justify the presence of the victim on or near the petitioner's vessel.
gangplank having been
provided connecting the side
of the vessel to the pier.
Instead of using said
gangplank Anacleto Viana
disembarked on the third
deck which was on the level
with the pier. After said
vessel had landed, the
Pioneer Stevedoring
Corporation took over the
exclusive control of the
cargoes loaded on said vessel
pursuant to the Memorandum
of Agreement dated July 26,
1975 (Exh. '2') between the
third party defendant Pioneer
Stevedoring Corporation and
defendant Aboitiz Shipping
Corporation.
The crane owned by the third
party defendant and operated
Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk.
SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr. |2018-2019|
they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the
protection under their contract of carriage.
Note:
But even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated, herein
petitioner can be held liable for the negligence of its driver, as ruled by the Court of Appeals,
pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Issue: Whether or not Anacleto Viana was still a passenger of petitioner when the accident
happened.
Yes.
That reasonableness of time should be made to depend on the attending circumstances of
the case, such as the kind of common carrier, the nature of its business, the customs of the
place, and so forth, and therefore precludes a consideration of the time element per se
without taking into account such other factors. It is thus of no moment whether in the cited
case of La Mallorca there was no appreciable interregnum for the passenger therein to leave
the carrier's premises whereas in the case at bar, an interval of one (1) hour had elapsed
before the victim met the accident. The primary factor to be considered is the existence of
We believe there exists such a justifiable cause.
It is of common knowledge that, by the very nature of petitioner's business as a shipper, the
passengers of vessels are allotted a longer period of time to disembark from the ship than
other common carriers such as a passenger bus. With respect to the bulk of cargoes and the
number of passengers it can load, such vessels are capable of accommodating a bigger
volume of both as compared to the capacity of a regular commuter bus. Consequently, a
ship passenger will need at least an hour as is the usual practice, to disembark from the
vessel and claim his baggage whereas a bus passenger can easily get off the bus and retrieve
his luggage in a very short period of time.
Verily, petitioner cannot categorically claim, through the bare expedient of comparing the
period of time entailed in getting the passenger's cargoes, that the ruling in La Mallorca is
inapplicable to the case at bar. On the contrary, if we are to apply the doctrine enunciated
therein to the instant petition, we cannot in reason doubt that the victim Anacleto Viana was
still a passenger at the time of the incident. When the accident occurred, the victim was in
the act of unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from petitioner's vessel.
As earlier stated, a carrier is duty bound not only to bring its passengers safely to their
destination but also to afford them a reasonable time to claim their baggage.
It is not definitely shown that one (1) hour prior to the incident, the victim had already
disembarked from the vessel. Petitioner failed to prove this. What is clear to us is that at the
time the victim was taking his cargoes, the vessel had already docked an hour earlier. In
AGDV
 SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr. |2018-2019|

by its crane operator Alejo consonance with common shipping procedure as to the minimum time of one (1) hour
Figueroa was placed allowed for the passengers to disembark, it may be presumed that the victim had just gotten
alongside the vessel and one off the vessel when he went to retrieve his baggage.
(1) hour after the passengers
of said vessel had Yet, even if he had already disembarked an hour earlier, his presence in petitioner's
disembarked, it started premises was not without cause. The victim had to claim his baggage which was possible
operation by unloading the only one (1) hour after the vessel arrived since it was admittedly standard procedure in the
cargoes from said vessel. case of petitioner's vessels that the unloading operations shall start only after that time.
While the crane was being Consequently, under the foregoing circumstances, the victim Anacleto Viana is still deemed
operated, Anacleto Viana a passenger of said carrier at the time of his tragic death.
who had already disembarked
from said vessel obviously
remembering that some of his
cargoes were still loaded in
the vessel, went back to the
vessel, and it was while he
was pointing to the crew of
the said vessel to the place
where his cargoes were
loaded that the crane hit him,
pinning him between the side
of the vessel and the crane.
He was thereafter brought to
the hospital where he later
expired three (3) days
thereafter.

Mallari vs CA
On 14 October 1987, the
passenger jeepney driven by
petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr.
collided with the delivery van
of respondent Bulletin
Publishing Corp. along the
National Highway in
Barangay San Pablo, Bataan.
Petitioner Mallari Jr. testified
that he went to the left lane of
the highway and overtook a
Fiera which had stopped on
the right lane. Before he
passed by the Fiera, he saw
the van of respondent
BULLETIN coming from the
opposite direction. It was
driven by one Felix Angeles.
The sketch of the accident
showed that the collision
occurred after Mallari Jr.
overtook the Fiera while
negotiating a curve in the
highway. The points of
collision were the left rear
portion of the passenger
jeepney and the left front side
of the delivery van of
BULLETIN. The impact
caused the jeepney to turn
around and fall on its left side
resulting in injuries to its
Issue: Whether or not the death of Reyes was due to the failure of petitioner to exercise due
diligence.
Yes.
The rule is settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking
another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and
not to proceed if he cannot do so in safety. When a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding
a curve, there is special necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver
does not have the right to drive on the left hand side relying upon having time to turn to the
right if a car approaching from the opposite direction comes into view.
In the instant case, by his own admission, petitioner Mallari Jr. already saw that the
BULLETIN delivery van was coming from the opposite direction and failing to consider
the speed thereof since it was still dark at 5:00 o'clock in the morning mindlessly occupied
the left lane and overtook two (2) vehicles in front of it at a curve in the highway. Clearly,
the proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of Israel Reyes, a passenger of
the jeepney, was the sole negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney, petitioner
Alfredo Mallari Jr., who recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a lane where
overtaking was not allowed by traffic rules. Under Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there
is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation. As found by the
appellate court, petitioners failed to present satisfactory evidence to overcome this legal
presumption.

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 SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr. |2018-2019|

passengers one of whom was

Israel Reyes who eventually
died due to the gravity of his
injuries.

LRTA et al. vs Navidad Issue: Whether or not LRTA should be held liable for Nicanor’s death.

On 14 October 1993, about Yes.

half an hour past seven
o’clock in the evening,
Nicanor Navidad, then drunk,
entered the EDSA LRT
station after purchasing a
"token.” While Navidad was
standing on the platform near
the LRT tracks, Junelito
Escartin, the security guard
assigned to the area
approached Navidad. A
misunderstanding or an
altercation between the two
apparently ensued that led to
a fist fight. No evidence,
however, was adduced to
indicate how the fight started
or who, between the two,
delivered the first blow or
how Navidad later fell on the
LRT tracks. At the exact
moment that Navidad fell, an
LRT train, operated by
petitioner Rodolfo Roman,
was coming in. Navidad was
struck by the moving train,
and he was killed
instantaneously.
The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier
to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but
for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance
to the contract of carriage.
The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers
(a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or
(b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common
carrier’s employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped
the act or omission.
In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent,
and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the
fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier
to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure. In the absence of
satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which petitioners,
according to the appellate court, have failed to show, the presumption would be that it has
been at fault, an exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved.
The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to
indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to
exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its
commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own
employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake
the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the
contract of carriage.

On 08 December 1994, the

widow of Nicanor, herein
respondent Marjorie
Navidad, along with her
children, filed a complaint for
damages against Junelito
Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the
LRTA, the Metro Transit
Organization, Inc. (Metro
Transit), and Prudent for the
death of her husband. LRTA
and Roman filed a
counterclaim against

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV


Navidad and a cross-claim
against Escartin and Prudent.
Prudent, in its answer, denied
liability and averred that it
had exercised due diligence
in the selection and
supervision of its security
guards.
Pestao vs CA
It appears from the records
that at around 2:00 oclock
[o]n the afternoon of August
9, 1986, Ananias Sumayang
was riding a motorcycle
along the national highway in
Ilihan, Tabagon, Cebu.
Riding with him was his
friend Manuel Romagos. As
they came upon a junction
where the highway connected
with the road leading to
Tabagon, they were hit by a
passenger bus driven by
[Petitioner] Gregorio Pestao
and owned by [Petitioner]
Metro Cebu Autobus
Corporation (Metro Cebu, for
brevity), which had tried to
overtake them, sending the
motorcycle and its
passengers hurtling upon the
pavement. Both Ananias
Sumayang and Manuel
Romagos were rushed to the
hospital in Sogod, where
Sumayang was pronounced
dead on arrival. Romagos
was transferred to the Cebu
Doctors Hospital, but he
succumbed to his injuries the
day after.
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SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr. |2018-2019|
3. Presumption of Negligence
Issue: Whether or not petitioner successfully overcome the presumption of negligence.
No.
Eyewitness Ignacio Neis Neis testified that as the two vehicles approached the junction, the
victim raised his left arm to signal that he was turning left to Tabagon, but that the latter
and his companion were thrown off the motorcycle after it was bumped by the overspeeding
bus.
These contentions have already been passed upon by the trial and the appellate courts. We
find no cogent reason to reverse or modify their factual findings. The CA agreed with the
trial court that the vehicular collision was caused by Pestaos negligence when he attempted
to overtake the motorcycle. As a professional driver operating a public transport bus, he
should have anticipated that overtaking at a junction was a perilous maneuver and should
thus have exercised extreme caution.
Factual findings of the CA affirming those of the trial court are conclusive and binding on
this Court. Petitioners failed to demonstrate that this case falls under any of the recognized
exceptions to this rule. Indeed, the issue of negligence is basically factual and, in quasi-
delicts, crucial in the award of damages.
Petitioners aver that the CA was wrong in attributing the accident to a faulty speedometer
and in implying that the accident could have been avoided had this instrument been properly
functioning.
This contention has no factual basis. Under Articles 2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code,
owners and managers are responsible for damages caused by their employees. When an
injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or an employee, the master or employer is
presumed to be negligent either in the selection or in the supervision of that employee. This
presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised
the care and the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision
of its employee.
The CA said that allowing Pestao to ply his route with a defective speedometer showed
laxity on the part of Metro Cebu in the operation of its business and in the supervision of
its employees. The negligence alluded to here is in its supervision over its driver, not in that
which directly caused the accident. The fact that Pestao was able to use a bus with a faulty
speedometer shows that Metro Cebu was remiss in the supervision of its employees and in
the proper care of its vehicles. It had thus failed to conduct its business with the diligence
required by law.
AGDV

Ludo vs CA
Petitioner Ludo & Luym
Corporation is a domestic
corporation engaged in copra
processing with plant and
business offices in Cebu City.
Private Respondent Gabisan
Shipping Lines was the
registered owner and
operator of the motor vessel
MV Miguela, while the other
private respondent, Anselmo
Olasiman, was its captain.
Petitioner owns and operates
a private wharf used by
vessels for loading and
unloading of copra and other
processed products. Among
its wharfs facilities are fender
pile clusters for docking and
mooring.
On May 21, 1990, at around
1:30 P.M., while MV
Miguela was docking at
petitioners wharf, it rammed
and destroyed a fender pile
cluster. Petitioner demanded
damages from private
respondents. The latter
refused. Hence, petitioner
filed a complaint for damages
before the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu.
Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk.
SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr. |2018-2019|
Issue: Whether or not private respondent failed to overcome presumption of negligence.
Yes.
Our review of the records constrains us to conclude that indeed MV Miguela rammed and
damaged petitioners fender pile cluster. Naval and Espina witnessed the incident, saw the
impact and heard cracking sounds thereafter. The trial court found them credible. We
respect this observation of the trial court, for in the appreciation of testimonial evidence and
attribution of values to the declaration of witnesses, it is the trial judge who had the chance
to observe the witnesses and was in a position to determine if the witnesses are telling the
truth or not. Further, private respondents witnesses, Olasiman and Gabisan, acknowledged
that Naval was at the pier waving a handkerchief to direct them to their berthing place.
Res Ipsa Loquitor Doctrine applies.
In our view, all the requisites for recourse to this doctrine exist. First, MV Miguela was
under the exclusive control of its officers and crew. Petitioner did not have direct evidence
on what transpired within as the officers and crew maneuvered the vessel to its berthing
place. We note the Court of Appeals finding that Naval and Espina were not knowledgeable
on the vessels maneuverings, and could not testify on the negligence of the officers and
crew. Second, aside from the testimony that MV Miguela rammed the cluster pile, private
respondent did not show persuasively other possible causes of the damage.
Applying now the above, there exists a presumption of negligence against private
respondents which we opine the latter failed to overcome. Additionally, petitioner presented
tangible proof that demonstrated private respondents negligence. As testified by Capt.
Olasiman, from command of slow ahead to stop engine, the vessel will still travel 100
meters before it finally stops. However, he ordered stop engine when the vessel was only
50 meters from the pier. Further, he testified that before the vessel is put to slow astern, the
engine has to be restarted. However, Olasiman can not estimate how long it takes before
the engine goes to slow astern after the engine is restarted. From these declarations, the
conclusion is that it was already too late when the captain ordered reverse. By then, the
vessel was only 4 meters from the pier, and thus rammed it.
Respondent companys negligence consists in allowing incompetent crew to man its vessel.
As shown also by petitioner, both Captain Olasiman and Chief Mate Gabisan did not have
a formal training in marine navigation. The former was a mere elementary graduate while
the latter is a high school graduate. Their experience in navigation was only as a watchman
and a quartermaster, respectively.
Note:
Res Ipsa Loquitor:
“Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if
those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.”
(Batiquin vs CA)
The doctrine recognizes that parties may establish prima facie negligence without direct
proof and allows the principle to substitute for specific proof of negligence. This is invoked
when under the circumstances, direct evidence is absent and not readily available.
AGDV
 SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr. |2018-2019|

Philippine Rabbit vs IAC Issue: Whether or not petitioner is negligent.

No.

On the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause
of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence, the respondent court said (p. 49,
Rollo):

. . . the jeepney had already executed a complete turnabout and at the time of impact was
already facing the western side of the road. Thus the jeepney assumed a new frontal position
vis a vis, the bus, and the bus assumed a new role of defensive driving. The spirit behind
the presumption of guilt on one who bumps the rear end of another vehicle is for the driver
following a vehicle to be at all times prepared of a pending accident should the driver in
front suddenly come to a full stop, or change its course either through change of mind of
the front driver, mechanical trouble, or to avoid an accident. The rear vehicle is given the
responsibility of avoiding a collision with the front vehicle for it is the rear vehicle who has
full control of the situation as it is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of it.

The above discussion would have been correct were it not for the undisputed fact that the
U-turn made by the jeepney was abrupt (Exhibit "K," Pascua). The jeepney, which was then
traveling on the eastern shoulder, making a straight, skid mark of approximately 35 meters,
crossed the eastern lane at a sharp angle, making a skid mark of approximately 15 meters
from the eastern shoulder to the point of impact (Exhibit "K" Pascua). Hence, delos Reyes
could not have anticipated the sudden U-turn executed by Manalo. The respondent court
did not realize that the presumption was rebutted by this piece of evidence.

With regard to the substantial factor test, it was the opinion of the respondent court that (p.
52, Rollo):

. . . It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actor's conduct is a substantial
factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should
have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent
him from being liable (Restatement, Torts, 2d). Here, We find defendant bus running at a
fast speed when the accident occurred and did not even make the slightest effort to avoid
the accident, . . . . The bus driver's conduct is thus a substantial factor in bringing about
harm to the passengers of the jeepney, not only because he was driving fast and did not
even attempt to avoid the mishap but also because it was the bus which was the physical
force which brought about the injury and death to the passengers of the jeepney.

The speed of the bus was calculated by respondent court as follows (pp. 54-55, Rollo):

According to the record of the case, the bus departed from Laoag, Ilocos Norte, at 4:00
o'clock A.M. and the accident took place at approximately around 12:30 P.M., after
travelling roughly for 8 hours and 30 minutes. Deduct from this the actual stopover time of
two Hours (computed from the testimony of the driver that he made three 40-minute stop-
overs), We will have an actual travelling time of 6 hours and 30 minutes.

Under the circumstances, We calculate that the Laoag-Tarlac route (365 kms.) driving at an
average of 56 km. per hour would take 6 hours and 30 minutes. Therefore, the average
speed of the bus, give and take 10 minutes, from the point of impact on the highway with
excellent visibility factor would be 80 to 90 kms. per hour, as this is the place where buses
would make up for lost time in traversing busy city streets.

Still, We are not convinced. It cannot be said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed when
the accident occurred because the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour, assuming such
calculation to be correct, is yet within the speed limit allowed in highways. We cannot even
fault delos Reyes for not having avoided the collision. As aforestated, the jeepney left a
skid mark of about 45 meters, measured from the time its right rear wheel was detached up
to the point of collision. Delos Reyes must have noticed the perilous condition of the
jeepney from the time its right rear wheel was detached or some 90 meters away,
considering that the road was straight and points 200 meters north and south of the point of

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Juntilla vs Fontanar
The facts established after
trial show that the plaintiff
was a passenger of the public
utility jeepney bearing plate
No. PUJ-71-7 on the course
of the trip from Danao City to
Cebu City. The jeepney was
driven by defendant Berfol
Camoro. It was registered
under the franchise of
defendant Clemente Fontanar
but was actually owned by
defendant Fernando Banzon.
When the jeepney reached
Mandaue City, the right rear
tire exploded causing the
vehicle to turn turtle. In the
process, the plaintiff who was
sitting at the front seat was
thrown out of the vehicle.
Upon landing on the ground,
the plaintiff momentarily lost
consciousness. When he
came to his senses, he found
that he had a lacerated wound
on his right palm. Aside from
this, he suffered injuries on
his left arm, right thigh and
on his back. (Exh. "D").
Because of his shock and
injuries, he went back to
Danao City but on the way,
he discovered that his
"Omega" wrist watch was
lost. Upon his arrival in
Danao City, he immediately
entered the Danao City
Hospital to attend to his
injuries, and also requested
his father-in-law to proceed
immediately to the place of
the accident and look for the
watch. In spite of the efforts
Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk.
SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr. |2018-2019|
collision, visible and unobstructed. Delos Reyes admitted that he was running more or less
50 kilometers per hour at the time of the accident. Using this speed, delos Reyes covered
the distance of 45 meters in 3.24 seconds. If We adopt the speed of 80 kilometers per hour,
delos Reyes would have covered that distance in only 2.025 seconds. Verily, he had little
time to react to the situation. To require delos Reyes to avoid the collision is to ask too
much from him. Aside from the time element involved, there were no options available to
him.
Issue: Whether or not respondent was negligent.
Yes.
In the case at bar, there are specific acts of negligence on the part of the respondents. The
records show that the passenger jeepney turned turtle and jumped into a ditch immediately
after its right rear tire exploded. The evidence shows that the passenger jeepney was running
at a very fast speed before the accident. We agree with the observation of the petitioner that
a public utility jeep running at a regular and safe speed will not jump into a ditch when its
right rear tire blows up. There is also evidence to show that the passenger jeepney was
overloaded at the time of the accident. The petitioner stated that there were three (3)
passengers in the front seat and fourteen (14) passengers in the rear.
While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still good because the grooves of the tire
were still visible, this fact alone does not make the explosion of the tire a fortuitous event.
No evidence was presented to show that the accident was due to adverse road conditions or
that precautions were taken by the jeepney driver to compensate for any conditions liable
to cause accidents. The sudden blowing-up, therefore, could have been caused by too much
air pressure injected into the tire coupled by the fact that the jeepney was overloaded and
speeding at the time of the accident.
In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not
independent of the human will.
Note:
In a legal sense and, consequently, also in relation to contracts, a caso fortuito presents the
following essential characteristics:
(1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor
to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will.
(2) It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can
be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid.
(3) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner. And
(4) the obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury
resulting to the creditor.
(Lasam vs Smith)
AGDV

of his father-in-law, the wrist
watch, which he bought for P
852.70 (Exh. "B") could no
longer be found.
Bayasen vs CA
The records show that the
petitioner was charged in
December 1963 by the
Provincial Fiscal of Mountain
Province of the crime of
Homicide Thru Reckless
Imprudence.
On the morning of August 15,
1963, Saturnino Bayasen, the
Rural Health Physician in
Sagada, Mountain Province,
went to barrio Ambasing to
visit a patient. Two nurses
from the Saint Theodore's
Hospital in Sagada, viz.,
Elena Awichen and Dolores
Balcita, rode with him in the
jeep assigned for the use of
the Rural Health Unit as they
had requested for a ride to
Ambasing. Later, at
Ambasing, the girls, who
wanted to gather flowers,
again asked if they could ride
with him up to a certain place
on the way to barrio Suyo
which he intended to visit
anyway. Dr. Bayasen again
allowed them to ride, Elena
sitting herself between him
and Dolores. On the way, at
barrio Langtiw, the jeep went
over a precipice About 8 feet
below the road, it was
blocked by a pine tree. The
three were thrown out of the
jeep. Elena was found lying
in a creek further below.
Among other injuries, she
suffered a skull fracture
which caused her death.
Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk.
SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr. |2018-2019|
Issue: Whether or not petitioner Bayasen was not negligent and therefore entitled to
acquittal.
Yes.
It is clear from the last part of the Testimony of the witness, Dolores Balcita, that there was
no conversation between the passengers in the jeep that could have distracted the attention
of the accused while driving the jeep. As to the condition of the jeep itself, the same witness
testified that she "did not notice anything wrong" with it from the time they drove from
Sagada to Ambasing, and from there to the place where the jeep fell off the road. Regarding
the road, she said that it was fair enough to drive on, but that it was moist or wet, and the
weather was fair, too. As to whether the accused-petitioner was under the influence of liquor
at the time of the accident, she testified that he was not. the light of the testimony of Dolores
Balcita, the eyewitness of the accident presented by the prosecution, there is absolutely no
evidence on record to show that the accused was negligent in driving his jeep.
The petitioner testified that before reaching the portion of the road where the jeep fell he
noticed that the rear wheel skidded, while driving from 8 to 10 kilometers per hour; that as
a precautionary measure, he directed the jeep towards the side of the mountain, along the
side of the mountain, but not touching the mountain; that while doing so, the late Elena
Awichen suddenly held the steering wheel and he felt that her foot stepped on his right foot
which was pressed then on the accelerator; and that immediately after, the jeep suddenly
swerved to the right and went off.
Furthermore , the statement of Dolores Balcita that the accused was driving at moderate
speed and not "an unreasonable ,speed' is bolstered by the testimony, of Pablo Lizardo. then
mayor of Sagada, Mountain Province, who found the jeep at second gear when he examined
it not long after the incident. Such fact shows that the accused-petitioner could not have
been driving the jeep at a fast rate of speed.
It is obvious that the proximate cause of the tragedy was the skidding of the rear wheels of
the jeep and not the "unreasonable speed" of the petitioner because there is no evidence on
record to prove or support the finding that the petitioner was driving a at "an unreasonable
speed".
It is a well known physical tact that cars may skid on greasy or slippery roads, as in the
instant case, without fault on account of the manner of handling the car. Skidding means
partial or complete loss of control of the car under circumstances not necessarily
implying negligence. It may occur without fault.
No negligence as a matter of law can, therefore, be charged to the petitioner. In fact, the
moment he felt that the rear wheels of the jeep skidded, he promptly drove it to the left hand
side of the road, parallel to the slope of the mountain, because as he said, he wanted to play
safe and avoid the embankment.
AGDV
 SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr. |2018-2019|

Under the particular circumstances of the instant case, the petitioner- driver who skidded
could not be regarded as negligent, the skidding being an unforeseen event, so that the
petitioner had a valid excuse for his departure from his regular course. The negligence of
the petitioner not having been sufficiently established, his guilt of the crime charged has
not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He is, therefore, entitled to acquittal.

Cervantes vs CA
On March 27, 1989, the
private respondent,
Philippines Air Lines, Inc.
(PAL), issued to the herein
petitioner, Nicholas
Cervantes (Cervantes), a
round trip plane ticket for
Manila-Honolulu-Los
Angeles-Honolulu-Manila,
which ticket expressly
provided an expiry of date of
one year from issuance, i.e.,
until March 27, 1990. The
issuance of the said plane
ticket was in compliance with
a Compromise Agreement
entered into between the
contending parties in two
previous suits, docketed as
Civil Case Nos. 3392 and
3451 before the Regional
Trial Court in Surigao City.
Issue: Whether or not the PAL agents in Los Angeles and San Francisco were negligent in
confirming and thereby changing the compromise agreement.
Yes, but only simple negligence.
In awarding moral damages for breach of contract of carriage, the breach must be wanton
and deliberately injurious or the one responsible acted fraudulently or with malice or bad
faith. Petitioner knew there was a strong possibility that he could not use the subject ticket,
so much so that he bought a back-up ticket to ensure his departure. Should there be a finding
of bad faith, we are of the opinion that it should be on the petitioner. What the employees
of PAL did was one of simple negligence. No injury resulted on the part of petitioner
because he had a back-up ticket should PAL refuse to accommodate him with the use of
subject ticket.
Note:
The ticket constitute the contract between the parties. It is axiomatic that when the terms
are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, contracts are to
be interpreted according to their literal meaning.
(Lufthansa vs CA)

On March 23, 1990, four days

before the expiry date of
subject ticket, the petitioner
used it. Upon his arrival in
Los Angeles on the same day,
he immediately booked his
Los Angeles-Manila return
ticket with the PAL office,
and it was confirmed for the
April 2, 1990 flight.

Upon learning that the same

PAL plane would make a
stop-over in San Francisco,
and considering that he would
be there on April 2, 1990,
petitioner made arrangements
with PAL for him to board the
flight in San Francisco

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV

 SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr. |2018-2019|

instead of boarding in Los

Angeles.

On April 2, 1990, when the

petitioner checked in at the
PAL counter in San
Francisco, he was not
allowed to board. The PAL
personnel concerned marked
the following notation on his
ticket: TICKET NOT
ACCEPTED DUE
EXPIRATION OF
VALIDITY.

Calalas vs CA Issue: Whether or not petitioner was negligent.

Yes.

In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at
once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he had to observe extraordinary
diligence in the care of his passengers.

First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion
being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the
middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. This is a violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as
amended, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code.

Second, it is undisputed that petitioners driver took in more passengers than the allowed
seating capacity of the jeepney, a violation of 32(a) of the same law.

The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that
to which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to
overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga,
but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers. Calrky

We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioners contention that Sungas taking an
"extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the
injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely
because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded
ferry. This is also true of petitioners contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was
improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of
parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway.

Note:
The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions
involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person
where there is no relation between him and another par ty. In such a case, the obligation is
created by law itself.

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV


Gillaco vs Manila Railroad
That at about 7:30 a.m., on
the morning of April 1, 1946,
Lieut. Tomas Gillaco,
husband of the plaintiff, was
a passenger in the early
morning train of the Manila
Railroad Company from
Calamba, Laguna to Manila;
That when the train reached
the Paco Railroad station,
Emilio Devesa, a train guard
of the Manila Railroad
Company assigned in the
Manila-San Fernando, La
Union Line, happened to be
in said station waiting for the
same train which would take
him to Tutuban Station,
where he was going to report
for duty;
That Emilio Devesa had a
long standing personal
grudge against Tomas
Gillaco, same dating back
during the Japanese
occupation;
That because of this personal
grudge, Devesa shot Gillaco
with the carbine furnished to
him by the Manila Railroad
Company for his use as such
train guard, upon seeing him
inside the train coach;
That Tomas Gillaco died as a
result of the would which he
sustained from the shot fired
by Devesa.
It is also undisputed that
Devesa was convicted with
homicide by final judgment
of the Court of Appeals.
Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk.
SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr. |2018-2019|
A. Nefligence or Intentional Assault by Carrier’s Employee
Issue: Whether or not Manila Railroad should be liable for the death cause by its employee.
No.
Art. 1105 (Old Civil Code):
"No one shall be liable for events which could not be foreseen or which, even if foreseen,
were inevitable, with the exception of the cases in which the law expressly provides
otherwise and those in which the obligation itself imposes such liability."
The act of guard Devesa in shooting passenger Gillaco (because of a personal grudge
nurtured against the latter since the Japanese occupation) was entirely unforeseeable by the
Manila Railroad Co. The latter had no means to ascertain or anticipate that the two would
meet, nor could it reasonably foresee every personal rancor that might exist between each
one of its many employees and any one of the thousands of eventual passengers riding in
its trains. The shooting in question was therefore "caso fortuito" within the definition of
article 105 of the old Civil Code, being both unforeseeable and inevitable under the given
circumstances; and pursuant to established doctrine, the resulting breach of appellant's
contract of safe carriage with the late Tomas Gillaco was excused thereby.
No doubt that a common carrier is held to a very high degree of care and diligence in the
protection of its passengers; but, considering the vast and complex activities of modern rail
transportation, to require of appellant that it should guard against all possible
misunderstanding between each and every one of its employees and every passenger that
might chance to ride in its conveyances at any time, strikes us as demanding diligence
beyond what human care and foresight can provide.
Another very important consideration that must be borne in mind is that, when the crime
took place, the guard Devesa had no duties to discharge in connection with the
transportation of the deceased from Calamba to Manila. The stipulation of facts is clear
that when Devesa shot and killed Gillaco, Devesa was assigned to guard the Manila-San
Fernando (La Union) trains, and he was at Paco Station awaiting transportation to
Tutuban, the starting point of the train that he was engaged to guard. In fact, his tour of
duty was to start at 9:00 a.m., two hours after the commission of the crime. Devesa was
therefore under no obligation to safeguard the passenger of the Calamba-Manila train,
where the deceased was riding; and the killing of Gillaco was not done in line of duty.
The position of Devesa at the time was that of another would be passenger, a stranger
also awaiting transportation, and not that of an employee assigned to discharge any of the
duties that the Railroad had assumed by its contract with the deceased. As a result,
Devesa's assault cannot be deemed in law a breach of Gillaco's contract of transportation
by a servant or employee of the carrier.
AGDV

Maranan vs Perez
Rogelio Corachea, on
October 18, 1960, was a
passenger in a taxicab owned
and operated by Pascual
Perez when he was stabbed
and killed by the driver,
Simeon Valenzuela.
Valenzuela was prosecuted
for homicide in the Court of
First Instance of Batangas.
Found guilty, he was
sentenced to suffer
imprisonment and to
indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of
P6,000. Appeal from said
conviction was taken to the
Court of Appeals.
On December 6 1961, while
appeal was pending in the
Court of Appeals, Antonia
Maranan, Rogelio's mother,
filed an action in the Court of
First Instance of Batangas to
recover damages from Perez
and Valenzuela for the death
of her son. Defendants
asserted that the deceased
was killed in self-defense,
since he first assaulted the
driver by stabbing him from
behind. Defendant Perez
further claimed that the death
was a caso fortuito for which
the carrier was not liable.
Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk.
SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr. |2018-2019|
Issue: Whether or not respondent should be liable for Coraecha’s death.
Yes.
Unlike the Gillaco case, the killing of the passenger here took place in the course of duty
of the guilty employee and when the employee was acting within the scope of his duties.
Moreover, the Gillaco case was decided under the provisions of the Civil Code of 1889
which, unlike the present Civil Code, did not impose upon common carriers absolute
liability for the safety of passengers against wilful assaults or negligent acts committed by
their employees. The death of the passenger in the Gillaco case was truly a fortuitous event
which exempted the carrier from liability. It is true that Art. 1105 of the old Civil Code on
fortuitous events has been substantially reproduced in Art. 1174 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines but both articles clearly remove from their exempting effect the case where the
law expressly provides for liability in spite of the occurrence of force majeure. And herein
significantly lies the statutory difference between the old and present Civil Codes, in the
backdrop of the factual situation before Us, which further accounts for a different result in
the Gillaco case. Unlike the old Civil Code, the new Civil Code of the Philippines expressly
makes the common carrier liable for intentional assaults committed by its employees upon
its passengers, by the wording of Art. 1759 which categorically states that:
Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have
acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common
carriers.
The Civil Code provisions on the subject of Common Carriers1 are new and were taken
from Anglo-American Law. There, the basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on
passengers committed by its drivers rests either on
(1) the doctrine of respondeat superior or
(2) the principle that it is the carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger safely.
Under the first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when the act of the
employee is within the scope of his authority and duty. It is not sufficient that the act be
within the course of employment only.
Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it is enough that
the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty. It is no defense for the carrier
that the act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's orders. The
carrier's liability here is absolute in the sense that it practically secures the passengers from
assaults committed by its own employees.
As can be gleaned from Art. 1759, the Civil Code of the Philippines evidently follows the
rule based on the second view. At least three very cogent reasons underlie this rule. As
explained in Texas Midland R.R. v. Monroe, 110 Tex. 97, 216 S.W. 388, 389-390, and
Haver v. Central Railroad Co., 43 LRA 84, 85:
(1) the special undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its passenger that full
measure of protection afforded by the exercise of the high degree of care prescribed by the
law, inter alia from violence and insults at the hands of strangers and other passengers, but
above all, from the acts of the carrier's own servants charged with the passenger's safety;
(2) said liability of the carrier for the servant's violation of duty to passengers, is the result
of the formers confiding in the servant's hands the performance of his contract to safely
transport the passenger, delegating therewith the duty of protecting the passenger with the
utmost care prescribed by law; and
(3) as between the carrier and the passenger, the former must bear the risk of wrongful acts
or negligence of the carrier's employees against passengers, since it, and not the passengers,
has power to select and remove them.
Accordingly, it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and similar
employees with due regard not only to their technical competence and physical ability,
but also, no less important, to their total personality, including their patterns of
behavior, moral fibers, and social attitude.
AGDV
 SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr. |2018-2019|

B. Passenger’s Duty to Observe Diligence to Avoid Injury; Contributory Negligence

Issue: Whether or not there was contributory negligence on the part of the deceased.
PNR vs CA
Yes.
The facts show that on
September 10, 1972, at about
9:00 o'clock in the evening,
Winifredo Tupang, husband
of plaintiff Rosario Tupang,
boarded 'Train No. 516 of
The appellate court found, the petitioner does not deny, that the train boarded by the
appellant at Libmanan,
deceased Winifredo Tupang was so over-crowded that he and many other passengers had
Camarines Sur, as a paying
no choice but to sit on the open platforms between the coaches of the train. It is likewise
passenger bound for Manila.
undisputed that the train did not even slow down when it approached the Iyam Bridge which
Due to some mechanical
was under repair at the time, Neither did the train stop, despite the alarm raised by other
defect, the train stopped at
passengers that a person had fallen off the train at lyam Bridge.
Sipocot, Camarines Sur, for
repairs, taking some two
The petitioner has the obligation to transport its passengers to their destinations and to
hours before the train could
observe extraordinary diligence in doing so. Death or any injury suffered by any of its
resume its trip to Manila.
passengers gives rise to the presumption that it was negligent in the performance of its
Unfortunately, upon passing
obligation under the contract of carriage. Thus, as correctly ruled by the respondent court,
Iyam Bridge at Lucena,
the petitioner failed to overthrow such presumption of negligence with clear and convincing
Quezon, Winifredo Tupang
evidence.
fell off the train resulting in
his death.The train did not
But while petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by law, it appears
stop despite the alarm raised
that the deceased was chargeable with contributory negligence. Since he opted to sit on the
by the other passengers that
open platform between the coaches of the train, he should have held tightly and tenaciously
somebody fell from the train.
on the upright metal bar found at the side of said platform to avoid falling off from the
Instead, the train conductor
speeding train. Such contributory negligence, while not exempting the PNR from liability,
Perfecto Abrazado, called the
nevertheless justified the deletion of the amount adjudicated as moral damages. By the same
station agent at Candelaria,
token, the award of exemplary damages must be set aside. Exemplary damages may be
Quezon, and requested for
allowed only in cases where the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
verification of the
oppressive or malevolent manner. There being no evidence of fraud, malice or bad faith on
information. Police
the part of petitioner, the grant of exemplary damages should be discarded.
authorities of Lucena City
were dispatched to the Iyam
Bridge where they found the
lifeless body of Winifredo
Tupang.

As shown by the autopsy

report, Winifredo Tupang
died of cardio-respiratory
failure due to massive
cerebral hemorrhage due to
traumatic injury [Exhibits B
and C, Folder of
Exhibits],Tupang was later
buried in the public cemetery
of Lucena City by the local
police authorities.

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV

 SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr. |2018-2019|

Isaac vs Al Ammen Trans Issue: Whether or not petitioner Isaac is guilty of contributory negligence.

A. L. Ammen Transportation Yes.

Co., Inc., hereinafter referred
to as defendant, is a A circumstances which miliates against the stand of appellant is the fact borne out by the
corporation engaged in the evidence that when he boarded the bus in question, he seated himself on the left side thereof
business of transporting resting his left arm on the window sill but with his left elbow outside the window, this being
passengers by land for his position in the bus when the collision took place. It is for this reason that the collision
compensation in the Bicol resulted in the severance of said left arm from the body of appellant thus doing him a great
provinces and one of the lines damage. It is therefore apparent that appellant is guilty of contributory negligence. Had he
it operates is the one not placed his left arm on the window sill with a portion thereof protruding outside, perhaps
connecting Legaspi City, the injury would have been avoided as is the case with the other passenger. It is to be noted
Albay with Naga City, that appellant was the only victim of the collision.
Camarines Sur. One of the
buses which defendant was It is true that such contributory negligence cannot relieve appellee of its liability but will
operating is Bus No. 31. On only entitle it to a reduction of the amount of damage caused (Article 1762, new Civil
May 31, 1951, plaintiff Cesar Code), but this is a circumstance which further militates against the position taken by
Isaac boarded said bus as a appellant in this case.
passenger paying the required
fare from Ligao, Albay bound It is the prevailing rule that it is negligence per se for a passenger on a railroad voluntarily
for Pili, Camarines Sur, but or inadvertently to protrude his arm, hand, elbow, or any other part of his body through the
before reaching his window of a moving car beyond the outer edge of the window or outer surface of the car,
destination, the bus collided so as to come in contact with objects or obstacles near the track, and that no recovery can
with a motor vehicle of the be had for an injury which but for such negligence would not have been sustained. (10 C.
pick-up type coming from the J. 1139)
opposite direction, as a result
of which plaintiff's left arm Plaintiff, (passenger) while riding on an interurban car, to flick the ashes, from his cigar,
was completely severed and thrust his hand over the guard rail a sufficient distance beyond the side line of the car to
the severed portion fell inside bring it in contact with the trunk of a tree standing beside the track; the force of the blow
the bus. Plaintiff was rushed breaking his wrist. Held, that he was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
to a hospital in Iriga, (Malakia vs. Rhode Island Co., 89 A., 337.)
Camarines Sur where he was
given blood transfusion to
save his life. After four days,
he was transferred to another
hospital in Tabaco, Albay,
where he under went
treatment for three months.
He was moved later to the
Orthopedic Hospital where
he was operated on and
stayed there for another two
months. For these services, he
incurred expenses amounting
to P623.40, excluding
medical fees which were paid
by defendant.

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV


Bachelor Express vs CA
On August 1, 1980, Bus No.
800 owned by Bachelor
Express, Inc. and driven by
Cresencio Rivera was the
situs of a stampede which
resulted in the death of
passengers Ornominio Beter
and Narcisa Rautraut.
The evidence shows that the
bus came from Davao City on
its way to Cagayan de Oro
City passing Butuan City;
that while at Tabon-Tabon,
Butuan City, the bus picked
up a passenger; that about
fifteen (15) minutes later, a
passenger at the rear portion
suddenly stabbed a PC soldier
which caused commotion and
panic among the passengers;
that when the bus stopped,
passengers Ornominio Beter
and Narcisa Rautraut were
found lying down the road,
the former already dead as a
result of head injuries and the
latter also suffering from
severe injuries which caused
her death later. The passenger
assailant alighted from the
bus and ran toward the bushes
but was killed by the police.
Thereafter, the heirs of
Ornominio Beter and Narcisa
Rautraut, private respondents
herein (Ricardo Beter and
Sergia Beter are the parents
of Ornominio while Teofilo
Rautraut and Zoetera [should
be Zotera] Rautraut are the
parents of Narcisa) filed a
complaint for "sum of
money" against Bachelor
Express, Inc. its alleged
owner Samson Yasay and the
driver Rivera.
Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk.
SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr. |2018-2019|
C. Injury to Passenger Due to Acts of Co- Passenger or Stranger
Issues: Whether or not the running amuck of the pasdenger was the proximate cause of the
death of Beter and Rautraut.
Whether or not such will totally exempt petitioner from liability.
Yes.
The running amuck of the passenger was the proximate cause of the incident as it triggered
off a commotion and panic among the passengers such that the passengers started running
to the sole exit shoving each other resulting in the falling off the bus by passengers Beter
and Rautraut causing them fatal injuries. The sudden act of the passenger who stabbed
another passenger in the bus is within the context of force majeure.
No.
However, in order that a common carrier may be absolved from liability in case of force
majeure, it is not enough that the accident was caused by force majeure. The common
carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the injuries resulting from such
accident.
In the light of the foregoing, the negligence of the common carrier, through its employees,
consisted of the lack of extraordinary diligence required of common carriers, in exercising
vigilance and utmost care of the safety of its passengers, exemplified by the driver's belated
stop and the reckless opening of the doors of the bus while the same was travelling at an
appreciably fast speed.
At the same time, the common carrier itself acknowledged, through its administrative
officer, Benjamin Granada, that the bus was commissioned to travel and take on passengers
and the public at large, while equipped with only a solitary door for a bus its size and loading
capacity, in contravention of rules and regulations provided for under the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code (RA 4136 as amended.)
Considering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals-the bus driver did not immediately
stop the bus at the height of the commotion; the bus was speeding from a full stop; the
victims fell from the bus door when it was opened or gave way while the bus was still
running; the conductor panicked and blew his whistle after people had already fallen off
the bus; and the bus was not properly equipped with doors in accordance with law-it is clear
that the petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of fault and negligence found
in the law governing common carriers.
The petitioners' argument that the petitioners "are not insurers of their passengers" deserves
no merit in view of the failure of the petitioners to prove that the deaths of the two
passengers were exclusively due to force majeure and not to the failure of the petitioners to
observe extraordinary diligence in transporting safely the passengers to their destinations
as warranted by law.
Note:
Escriche defines caso fortuito as an unexpected event or act of God which could neither be
foreseen nor resisted, such as floods, torrents, shipwrecks, conflagrations, lightning,
compulsion, insurrections, destruction of buildings by unforeseen accidents and other
occurrences of a similar nature.
A caso fortuito presents the following essential characteristics:
(1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor
to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will.
(2) It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can
be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid.
(3) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner. And
AGDV
 SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr. |2018-2019|

(4) the obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury
resulting to the creditor.

Fortune Express vs CA Issue: Whether or not petitioner is relieved from liability on account of force majuere.

No.
The seizure of the bus of the petitioner was foreseeable and, therefore, was not a fortuitous
event which would exempt petitioner from liabilty.

Art. 1174 of the Civil Code defines a fortuitous even as an occurrence which could not be
foreseen or which though foreseen, is inevitable.

In Yobido v. Court of Appeals, we held that to be considered as force majeure, it is

necessary that:
(1) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the human will;
(2) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable;
(3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the
obligation in a normal manner; and
(4) the obligor must be free of participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor.
The absence of any of the requisites mentioned above would prevent the obligor from being
excused from liability.

Thus, in Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the common carrier was liable for
its failure to take the necessary precautions against an approaching typhoon, of which it
was warned, resulting in the loss of the lives of several passengers. The event was
foreseeable, and, thus, the second requisite mentioned above was not fulfilled. This ruling
applies by analogy to the present case. Despite the report of PC agent Generalao that the
Maranaos were going to attack its buses, petitioner took no steps to safeguard the lives and
properties of its passengers. The seizure of the bus of the petitioner was foreseeable and,
therefore, was not a fortuitous event which would exempt petitioner from liability.

Petitioner invokes the ruling in Pilapil v. Court of Appeals and De Guzman v. Court of
Appeals in support of its contention that the seizure of its bus by the assailants constitutes
force majeure. In Pilapil v. Court of Appeals, it was held that a common carrier is not liable
for failing to install window grills on its buses to protect passengers from injuries caused
by rocks hurled at the bus by lawless elements. On the other hand, in De Guzman v. Court
of Appeals, it was ruled that a common carrier is not responsible for goods lost as a result
of a robbery which is attended by grave or irresistible threat, violence, or force.

It is clear that the cases of Pilapil and De Guzman do not apply to the present case. Art.
1755 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers as
far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
person, with due regard for all the circumstances. Thus, we held in Pilapil and De Guzman
that the respondents therein were not negligent in failing to take special precautions against
threats to the safety of passengers which could not be foreseen, such as tortious or criminal
acts of third persons. In the present case, this factor of unforeseeablility (the second
requisite for an event to be considered force majeure) is lacking. As already stated, despite
the report of PC agent Generalao that the Maranaos were planning to burn some of

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV

 SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr. |2018-2019|

petitioners buses and the assurance of petitioners operations manager (Diosdado Bravo)
that the necessary precautions would be taken, nothing was really done by petitioner to
protect the safety of passengers.

Manila Railroad vs Issue: Whether or not petitioner should be relieved from liability on the ground that Abello
Ballesteros was not its employee.

Private respondents here, No.

plaintiffs below, were
passengers on petitioner's In rejecting petitioner's contention that the negligence of Marcial Nocum could not be
bus, the driver of which was imputed to it and relieved it from liability, the trial court found that Dionisio Abello "was
Jose Anastacio. In likewise reckless when he was driving the bus at the rate of from 40 to 50 kilometers per
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, hour on a bumpy road at the moment of the collision."
Anastacio stopped the bus
and got off to replace a Another defense put up by petitioner is that since Abello was not its employee it should not
defective spark plug. While be held responsible for his acts. This defense was correctly overruled by the trial court,
he was thus engaged, one considering the provisions of Article 1763 of the Civil Code and section 48 (b) of the Motor
Dionisio Abello, an auditor Vehicle Law, which respectively provide as follows:
assigned to defendant
company by the General Art. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account
Auditing Office, took the of the wilfull acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's
wheel and told the driver to employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have
sit somewhere else. With prevented or stopped the act or omission.
Abello driving, the bus
proceeded on its way, from Sec. 48(b). No professional chauffeur shall permit any unlicensed person to drive the motor
time to time stopping to pick vehicle under his control, or permit a person, sitting beside him or in any other part of the
up passengers. Anastacio car, to interfere with him in the operation of the motor vehicle, by allowing said person to
tried twice to take the wheel take hold of the steering wheel, or in any other manner take part in the manipulation or
back but Abello would not control of the car.
relinquish it. Then, in the
language of the trial court,
"while the bus was
negotiating between Km.
posts 328 and 329 (in Isabela)
a freight truck ... driven by
Marcial Nocum ... bound for
Manila, was also negotiating
the same place; when these
two vehicles were about to
meet at the bend of the road
Marcial Nocum, in trying to
evade several holes on the
right lane, where his truck
was running, swerved his
truck towards the middle part
of the road and in so doing,
the left front fender and left
side of the freight truck
smashed the left side of the

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV


bus resulting in extensive
damages to the body of the
bus and injuries to seventeen
of its passengers, ... including
the plaintiffs herein."
Smith Bell vs Borja
It appears that on September
23, 1987, Smith Bell [herein
petitioner] filed a written
request with the Bureau of
Customs for the attendance of
the latters inspection team on
vessel M/T King Family
which was due to arrive at the
port of Manila on September
24, 1987.
Said vessel contained 750
metric tons of alkyl benzene
and methyl methacrylate
monomer.
On the same day, Supervising
Customs Inspector Manuel
Ma. D. Nalgan instructed
[Respondent Catalino Borja]
to board said vessel and
perform his duties as
inspector upon the vessels
arrival until its departure. At
that time, [Borja] was a
customs inspector of the
Bureau of Customs receiving
a salary of P31,188.25 per
annum.
"At about 11 oclock in the
morning on September 24,
1987, while M/T King
Family was unloading
chemicals unto two (2) barges
[--] ITTC 101 and CLC-1002
[--] owned by [Respondent]
ITTC, a sudden explosion
occurred setting the vessels
afire. Upon hearing the
explosion, [Borja], who was
at that time inside the cabin
preparing reports, ran outside
Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk.
SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr. |2018-2019|
Issue: Whether or not the explosion should be attributed to ITTC.
No.
We are not persuaded. Both the RTC and the CA ruled that the fire and the explosion had
originated from petitioners vessel. Said the trial court:
The attempts of [Petitioner] Smith Bell to shift the blame on x x x ITTC were all for naught.
First, the testimony of its alleged eyewitness was stricken off the record for his failure to
appear for cross-examination (p. 361, Record). Second, the documents offered to prove that
the fire originated from barge ITTC-101 were all denied admission by the [c]ourt for being,
in effect, hearsay (pp. 335 and 362). x x x Thus, there is nothing in the record to support
[petitioners] contention that the fire and explosion originated from barge ITTC-101.
We find no cogent reason to overturn these factual findings. Nothing is more settled in
jurisprudence than that this Court is bound by the factual findings of the Court of Appeals
when these are supported by substantial evidence and are not under any of the exceptions
in Fuentes v. Court of Appeals; more so, when such findings affirm those of the trial court.
Verily, this Court reviews only issues of law.
Negligence is conduct that creates undue risk of harm to another. It is the failure to observe
that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby
that other person suffers injury. Petitioners vessel was carrying chemical cargo -- alkyl
benzene and methyl methacrylate monomer. While knowing that their vessel was carrying
dangerous inflammable chemicals, its officers and crew failed to take all the necessary
precautions to prevent an accident. Petitioner was, therefore, negligent.
The three elements of quasi delict are: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant, and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages inflicted on the plaintiff. All these elements
were established in this case. Knowing fully well that it was carrying dangerous chemicals,
petitioner was negligent in not taking all the necessary precautions in transporting the cargo.
As a result of the fire and the explosion during the unloading of the chemicals from
petitioners vessel, Respondent Borja suffered the following damage: and injuries: (1)
chemical burns of the face and arms; (2) inhalation of fumes from burning chemicals; (3)
exposure to the elements [while] floating in sea water for about three (3) hours; (4)
homonymous hemianopsia or blurring of the right eye [which was of] possible toxic origin;
and (5) [c]erebral infract with neo-vascularization, left occipital region with right sided
headache and the blurring of vision of right eye.[17]
Hence, the owner or the person in possession and control of a vessel and the vessel are
liable for all natural and proximate damage caused to persons and property by reason of
negligent management or navigation. Report (Exh. 10) dated October 21, 1987 submitted
by the Admiral Surveyors and Adjusters, Inc., showed that no part of M/T King Family
AGDV
 SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr. |2018-2019|

to check what happened. sustained any sharp or violent damage that would otherwise be observed if indeed an
Again, another explosion was explosion had occurred on it. On the other hand, the fact that the vessel sustained cracks on
heard. its shell plating was noted in two Survey Reports from Greutzman Divers Underwater
Specialist, dated October 6, 1987 (Exh. 11), and during the underwater inspection on the
Seeing the fire and fearing for sunken barge ITTC-101.
his life, [Borja] hurriedly
jumped over board to save
himself. However, the
[water] [was] likewise on fire
due mainly to the spilled
chemicals. Despite the
tremendous heat, [Borja]
swam his way for one (1)
hour until he was rescued by
the people living in the
squatters area and sent to San
Juan De Dios Hospital.

After weeks of intensive care

at the hospital, his attending
physician diagnosed [Borja]
to be permanently disabled
due to the incident. [Borja]
made demands against Smith
Bell and ITTC for the
damages caused by the
explosion. However, both
denied liabilities and
attributed to each other
negligence.
4. Limited Liability and Defenses

Issue: Whether or not petitioner should be exempt from liability because of force majuere.
Yobido vs CA
No.

In view of the foregoing, petitioners' contention that they should be exempt from liability
because the tire blowout was no more than a fortuitous event that could not have been
foreseen, must fail. A fortuitous event is possessed of the following characteristics:
(a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the debtor to
comply with his obligations, must be independent of human will;
(b) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can
be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid;
(c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner; and
(d) the obliger must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting
to the creditor.

As Article 1174 provides, no person shall be responsible for a fortuitous event which could
not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. In other words, there must be
an entire exclusion of human agency from the cause of injury or loss.

Under the circumstances of this case, the explosion of the new tire may not be considered
a fortuitous event. There are human factors involved in the situation. The fact that the tire
was new did not imply that it was entirely free from manufacturing defects or that it was
properly mounted on the vehicle. Neither may the fact that the tire bought and used in the
vehicle is of a brand name noted for quality, resulting in the conclusion that it could not
explode within five days' use. Be that as it may, it is settled that an accident caused either
by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver is not a caso fortuito
that would exempt the carrier from liability for damages.

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV

 SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr. |2018-2019|

Moreover, a common carrier may not be absolved from liability in case of force majeure or
fortuitous event alone. The common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in
causing the death or injury resulting from an accident. This Court has had occasion to state:

While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still good because the grooves of the tire
were still visible, this fact alone does not make the explosion of the tire a fortuitous event.
No evidence was presented to show that the accident was due to adverse road conditions or
that precautions were taken by the jeepney driver to compensate for any conditions liable
to cause accidents. The sudden blowing-up, therefore, could have been caused by too much
air pressure injected into the tire coupled by the fact that the jeepney was overloaded and
speeding at the time of the accident.

It is interesting to note that petitioners proved through the bus conductor, Salce, that the bus
was running at "60-50" kilometers per hour only or within the prescribed lawful speed limit.
However, they failed to rebut the testimony of Leny Tumboy that the bus was running so
fast that she cautioned the driver to slow down. These contradictory facts must, therefore,
be resolved in favor of liability in view of the presumption of negligence of the carrier in
the law. Coupled with this is the established condition of the road — rough, winding and
wet due to the rain. It was incumbent upon the defense to establish that it took precautionary
measures considering partially dangerous condition of the road. As stated above, proof that
the tire was new and of good quality is not sufficient proof that it was not negligent.
Petitioners should have shown that it undertook extraordinary diligence in the care of its
carrier, such as conducting daily routinary check-ups of the vehicle's parts.

Bayasen vs CA Issue: Whether or not petitioner should not belianle since the cause of the accident was the
skidding of the vehicle.

Yes.

It is obvious that the proximate cause of the tragedy was the skidding of the rear wheels of
the jeep and not the "unreasonable speed" of the petitioner because there is no evidence on
record to prove or support the finding that the petitioner was driving a at "an unreasonable
speed".

It is a well known physical tact that cars may skid on greasy or slippery roads, as in the
instant case, without fault on account of the manner of handling the car. Skidding means
partial or complete loss of control of the car under circumstances not necessarily
implying negligence. It may occur without fault.

No negligence as a matter of law can, therefore, be charged to the petitioner. In fact, the
moment he felt that the rear wheels of the jeep skidded, he promptly drove it to the left hand
side of the road, parallel to the slope of the mountain, because as he said, he wanted to play
safe and avoid the embankment.

Under the particular circumstances of the instant case, the petitioner- driver who skidded
could not be regarded as negligent, the skidding being an unforeseen event, so that the
petitioner had a valid excuse for his departure from his regular course. The negligence of
the petitioner not having been sufficiently established, his guilt of the crime charged has
not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He is, therefore, entitled to acquittal.

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV


Gatchalian vs Delim
At noon time on 11 July
1973, petitioner Reynalda
Gatchalian boarded, as a
paying passenger,
respondent's "Thames" mini
bus at a point in San Eugenio,
Aringay, La Union, bound for
Bauang, of the same
province. On the way, while
the bus was running along the
highway in Barrio Payocpoc,
Bauang, Union, "a snapping
sound" was suddenly heard at
one part of the bus and,
shortly thereafter, the vehicle
bumped a cement flower pot
on the side of the road, went
off the road, turned turtle and
fell into a ditch. Several
passengers, including
petitioner Gatchalian, were
injured. They were promptly
taken to Bethany Hospital at
San Fernando, La Union, for
medical treatment. Upon
medical examination,
petitioner was found to have
sustained physical injuries on
the leg, arm and forehead,
specifically described as
follows: lacerated wound,
forehead; abrasion, elbow,
left; abrasion, knee, left;
abrasion, lateral surface, leg,
left.
On 14 July 1973, while
injured. passengers were
confined in the hospital, Mrs.
Adela Delim, wife of
respondent, visited them and
later paid for their
hospitalization and medical
expenses. She also gave
petitioner P12.00 with which
to pay her transportation
expense in going home from
the hospital. However, before
Mrs. Delim left, she had the
injured passengers, including
petitioner, sign an already
prepared Joint Affidavit
which stated, among other
things:
“That we are no longer
interested to file a complaint,
criminal or civil against the
said driver and owner of the
Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk.
SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr. |2018-2019|
Issue: Whether or not respondent can escape liability because of the waiver allegedly made
by petitioner.
No.
A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be couched in clear and
unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or
benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not casually be attributed to a person
when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right
vested in such person.
The degree of explicitness which this Court has required in purported waivers is illustrated
in Yepes and Susaya v. Samar Express Transit (supra), where the Court in reading and
rejecting a purported waiver said:
. . . It appears that before their transfer to the Leyte Provincial Hospital, appellees were
asked to sign as, in fact, they signed the document Exhibit I wherein they stated that "in
consideration of the expenses which said operator has incurred in properly giving us the
proper medical treatment, we hereby manifest our desire to waive any and all claims against
the operator of the Samar Express Transit."
xxx xxx xxx
Even a cursory examination of the document mentioned above will readily show that
appellees did not actually waive their right to claim damages from appellant for the latter's
failure to comply with their contract of carriage. All that said document proves is that they
expressed a "desire" to make the waiver — which obviously is not the same as making an
actual waiver of their right. A waiver of the kind invoked by appellant must be clear and
unequivocal (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of July 8, 1887) — which is not the
case of the one relied upon in this appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
If we apply the standard used in Yepes and Susaya, we would have to conclude that the
terms of the Joint Affidavit in the instant case cannot be regarded as a waiver cast in "clear
and unequivocal" terms.
Moreover, the circumstances under which the Joint Affidavit was signed by petitioner
Gatchalian need to be considered. Petitioner testified that she was still reeling from the
effects of the vehicular accident, having been in the hospital for only three days, when the
purported waiver in the form of the Joint Affidavit was presented to her for signing; that
while reading the same, she experienced dizziness but that, seeing the other passengers who
had also suffered injuries sign the document, she too signed without bothering to read the
Joint Affidavit in its entirety. Considering these circumstances there appears substantial
doubt whether petitioner understood fully the import of the Joint Affidavit (prepared by or
at the instance of private respondent) she signed and whether she actually intended thereby
to waive any right of action against private respondent.
Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries
sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise
extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such purported waiver most strictly against
the common carrier. For a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be contrary to law,
morals, public policy or good customs. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to
claim damages by an injured passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in
this case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence
exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to render that standard
unenforceable. We believe such a purported waiver is offensive to public policy.
AGDV
 SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr. |2018-2019|

said Thames, because it was

an accident and the said
driver and owner of the said
Thames have gone to the
extent of helping us to be
treated upon our injuries.”

Fortune Express vs CA Issue: Whether or not petitioner is relieved from liability on account of force majuere.

No.
The seizure of the bus of the petitioner was foreseeable and, therefore, was not a fortuitous
event which would exempt petitioner from liabilty.

Art. 1174 of the Civil Code defines a fortuitous even as an occurrence which could not be
foreseen or which though foreseen, is inevitable.

In Yobido v. Court of Appeals, we held that to be considered as force majeure, it is

necessary that:
(1) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the human will;
(2) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable;
(3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the
obligation in a normal manner; and
(4) the obligor must be free of participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor.
The absence of any of the requisites mentioned above would prevent the obligor from being
excused from liability.

Thus, in Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the common carrier was liable for
its failure to take the necessary precautions against an approaching typhoon, of which it
was warned, resulting in the loss of the lives of several passengers. The event was
foreseeable, and, thus, the second requisite mentioned above was not fulfilled. This ruling
applies by analogy to the present case. Despite the report of PC agent Generalao that the
Maranaos were going to attack its buses, petitioner took no steps to safeguard the lives and
properties of its passengers. The seizure of the bus of the petitioner was foreseeable and,
therefore, was not a fortuitous event which would exempt petitioner from liability.

Petitioner invokes the ruling in Pilapil v. Court of Appeals and De Guzman v. Court of
Appeals in support of its contention that the seizure of its bus by the assailants constitutes
force majeure. In Pilapil v. Court of Appeals, it was held that a common carrier is not liable
for failing to install window grills on its buses to protect passengers from injuries caused
by rocks hurled at the bus by lawless elements. On the other hand, in De Guzman v. Court
of Appeals, it was ruled that a common carrier is not responsible for goods lost as a result
of a robbery which is attended by grave or irresistible threat, violence, or force.

It is clear that the cases of Pilapil and De Guzman do not apply to the present case. Art.
1755 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers as
far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
person, with due regard for all the circumstances. Thus, we held in Pilapil and De Guzman
that the respondents therein were not negligent in failing to take special precautions against
threats to the safety of passengers which could not be foreseen, such as tortious or criminal
acts of third persons. In the present case, this factor of unforeseeablility (the second
requisite for an event to be considered force majeure) is lacking. As already stated, despite
the report of PC agent Generalao that the Maranaos were planning to burn some of

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV


Singson vs CA
On 24 May 1988 CARLOS
SINGSON and his cousin
Crescentino Tiongson bought
from Cathay Pacific Airways,
Ltd. (CATHAY), at its Metro
Manila ticket outlet two (2)
open-dated, identically
routed, round trip plane
tickets for the purpose of
spending their vacation in the
United States. Each ticket
consisted of six (6) flight
coupons corresponding to
this itinerary: flight coupon
no. 1 - Manila to Hongkong;
flight coupon no. 2 -
Hongkong to San Francisco;
flight coupon no. 3 - San
Francisco to Los Angeles;
flight coupon no. 4 - Los
Angeles back to San
Francisco; flight coupon no. 5
- San Francisco to Hongkong;
and, finally, flight coupon no.
6 - Hongkong to Manila. The
procedure was that at the start
of each leg of the trip a flight
coupon corresponding to the
particular sector of the travel
would be removed from the
ticket booklet so that at the
end of the trip no more
coupon would be left in the
ticket booklet.
On 6 June 1988 CARLOS
SINGSON and Crescentino
Tiongson left Manila on
board CATHAYs Flight No.
902. They arrived safely in
Los Angeles and after staying
there for about three (3)
weeks they decided to return
Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk.
SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr. |2018-2019|
petitioners buses and the assurance of petitioners operations manager (Diosdado Bravo)
that the necessary precautions would be taken, nothing was really done by petitioner to
protect the safety of passengers.
Issue: Whether or not Cathay Pacific should be held liable because of the negligence of its
agent?
Yes.
CATHAY undoubtedly committed a breach of contract when it refused to confirm
petitioner's flight reservation back to the Philippines on account of his missing flight
coupon. Its contention that there was no contract of carriage that was breached because
petitioner's ticket was open-dated is untenable. To begin with, the round trip ticket issued
by the carrier to the passenger was in itself a complete written contract by and between the
carrier and the passenger. It has all the elements of a complete written contract, to wit:
(a) the consent of the contracting parties manifested by the fact that the passenger agreed
to be transported by the carrier to and from Los Angeles via San Francisco and Hongkong
back to the Philippines, and the carrier's acceptance to bring him to his destination and then
back home;
(b) cause or consideration, which was the fare paid by the passenger as stated in his ticket;
and,
(c) object, which was the transportation of the passenger from the place of departure to the
place of destination and back, which are also stated in his ticket.6 In fact, the contract of
carriage in the instant case was already partially executed as the carrier complied with its
obligation to transport the passenger to his destination, i.e., Los Angeles.
Only the performance of the other half of the contract — which was to transport the
passenger back to the Philippines — was left to be done. Moreover, Timothy Remedios,
CATHAY's reservation and ticketing agent, unequivocally testified that petitioner indeed
had reservations booked for travel —
Clearly therefore petitioner was not a mere "chance passenger with no superior right to be
boarded on a specific flight," as erroneously claimed by CATHAY and sustained by the
appellate court.
Interestingly, it appears that CATHAY was responsible for the loss of the ticket. One of
two (2) things may be surmised from the circumstances of this case: first, US Air
(CATHAY's agent) had mistakenly detached the San Francisco-Hongkong flight coupon
thinking that it was the San Francisco-Los Angeles portion; or, second, petitioner's booklet
of tickets did not from issuance include a San Francisco-Hongkong flight coupon.
In either case, the loss of the coupon was attributed to the negligence of CATHAY's agents
and was the proximate cause of the non-confirmation of petitioner's return flight on 1 July
1988. It virtually prevented petitioner from demanding the fulfillment of the carrier's
obligations under the contract.
Had CATHAY's agents been diligent in double checking the coupons they were supposed
to detach from the passengers' tickets, there would have been no reason for CATHAY not
AGDV
 SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr. |2018-2019|

to the Philippines. On 30 June to confirm petitioner's booking as exemplified in the case of his cousin and flight
1988 they arranged for their companion Tiongson whose ticket booklet was found to be in order. Hence, to hold that
return flight at CATHAYs no contractual breach was committed by CATHAY and totally absolve it from any
Los Angeles Office and chose liability would in effect put a premium on the negligence of its agent, contrary to the
1 July 1988, a Friday, for policy of the law requiring common carriers to exercise extraordinary diligence.
their departure. While
Tiongson easily got a
booking for the flight,
SINGSON was not as lucky.
It was discovered that his
ticket booklet did not have
flight coupon no. 5
corresponding to the San
Francisco-Hongkong leg of
the trip. Instead, what was in
his ticket was flight coupon
no. 3 - San Francisco to Los
Angeles - which was
supposed to have been used
and removed from the ticket
booklet. It was not until 6
July 1988 that CATHAY was
finally able to arrange for his
return flight to Manila.

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV