Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
107964-66, (1999)
FACTS:
● Jan. 9, 1992: 3 criminal informations for violation of Sec. 4 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960, as amended, in relation to Sec. 34 of RA No. 265 were
filed against private respondent Imelda Marcos before RTC Pasig (Br. 158-
Pasig)
○ Informations amended prior to arraignment
● Private respondent pleaded not guilty
● After arraignment, Panel of Prosecutors from DOJ and SolGen filed separate
motions for consolidation of 3 informations pending before Br. 158-Pasig
and 21 other cases pending in RTC Manila (Br. 26-Manila)
○ SolGen alleged:
■ Indictable acts under 3 informations form part of and is related to
the transaction complained of in criminal cases in Manila
■ Pasig and Manila cases relate to series of transactions devised
by Pres. Marcos and wife to hide their ill-gotten wealth
○ Br. 158-Pasig: granted motion provided no objection from RTC Manila
judge
○ Br. 26-Manila: 3 informations were re-raffled and re-assigned instead to
Br. 52-Manila presided by Judge Nitafan
■ Re-numbered criminal cases: 92 107942-44
● July 20, 1992: Without private respondent taking any action or filing any motion
to quash informations, respondent judge issued 2 orders
○ 1st order: Show cause why Crim Case 92-107942 should not be
dismissed on the ground that it violates ex post facto law
■ "[O]fficial publications reveals that CB Circular 960 is dated 21
October 1983 and that said regulatory issuance was imperfectly
published in the January 30, 1984 issue of the Official Gazette."
■ Date of violation in the information was prior to the date and
complete publication of the Circular charged to have been
violated, the information in this case appears peremptorily
dismissible
○ 2nd order: Show cause why Crim Cases 92-107943-44 should not be
dismissed on the ground that right to double jeopardy was violated
■ 3 cases pending before Br. 26-Manila constitute one continuous
crime
■ To separately prosecute private respondent for a series of
transaction would endow it with the "functional ability of a worm
multiplication or amoeba reproduction"
■ Imelda would be unduly vexed with multiple jeopardy
● Prosecution complied with twin show cause orders accompanied by motion to
inhibit respondent judge
● August 6, 1992: Respondent judge issued an order denying motion for
consolidation of Pasig and Manila cases
○ Consolidation of cases under Rule 31 of Civpro has no counterpart in
Crimpro
○ Judge Nitafan stated that he is "more studious and discreet, if not more
systematic and methodical," than the prosecution "in the handling of
ISSUES/HELD:
1. (Main Issue) W/N accused can still file MTQ? NO, MTQ must be filed at any
time before entering a plea or arraignment.
● GR: No MTQ can be entertained by court after entering a plea or after
arraignment
○ Shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash
● EXC: In the following circumstance (grounds) mentioned in Sec. 8 Rule 117,
which adopts omnibus motion rule
○ Grounds: no offense charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense
charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and jeopardy
● In the present case, private respondent pleaded to the charges without
filing any motion to quash
○ Waived and abandoned her right to avail of any legal ground which
she may have properly and timely invoke to challenge the complaint or
information pursuant to Sec. 8 of Rule 117
■ Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. — The
failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash
before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because
he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in
his motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion
to quash
2. (Main Issue) W/N a judge can motu proprio initiate the dismissal and
subsequently dismissed a criminal information or complaint without any motion
to that effect being filed by the accused based on the alleged violation of the
latter's right against ex post facto law and double jeopardy? NO, right to file MTQ
belongs to accused (Sec. 1 of Rule 117).
● Nothing in the rules authorizes court or judge to motu proprio initiate MTQ if no
such motion was filed by the accused
○ Accused is in the best position to know what ground/s he will base his
objection to the information
○ If judge initiates MTQ, he is pre-judging the case of prosecution and
takes side with accused
3. (Not IMPT) W/N the grounds of ex post facto law and double jeopardy are
applicable? NO.
● Ex Post Facto Law
○ Every law carries with it the presumption of constitutionality until
otherwise declared by this court
○ To rule that CB Circular is an ex post facto law is to say that it is
unconstitutional
■ Neither private respondent nor SolGen challenges it
■ Cannot pass upon constitutionality unless law directly assailed
● Double Jeopardy1
1 Requisites: (a) the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second, (b) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated, and (c) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first 20 or the second offense
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or
is a frustration thereof
2 Attaches when: (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea
has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused
FACTS:
● Petitioners Rodolfo G. Valencia, Pedrito Reyes, Remedios Marasigan, Bayani
Anastacio, Rumulado Bawasanta, Jose Enriquez, Nelson Gabutero, Jose
Genilo, Jr., Jose Leynes and Alfonso Umali were charged with Violation of
Section 3(e) in relation to Section 3(g) of RA. 3019. Information filed with SB
reads.
● XXX accused xxx, all members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental
Mindoro, and Alfonso V. Umali, Jr., then Provincial Administrator, all of whom
are public officials of the provincial government of Oriental Mindoro, while in the
performance of their official and/or administrative functions, and acting in
evident bad faith and manifest partiality, conspiring and confederating with
private accused Engr. Alfredo M. Atienza, and mutually helping one another, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give said accused Alfredo M.
Atienza unwarranted benefit, privilege and advantage by entering into a grossly
disadvantageous contract of loan, whereby the provincial funds of Oriental
Mindoro in the sum of P2,500,000.00 was given to Alfredo M. Atienza to finance
the cost of repair, operation and maintenance of his vessel, thereby causing the
provincial government of Oriental Mindoro damage and undue injury.
● Petitioners filed a "Motion Seeking an Order to Allow Accused to File with the
Ombudsman Motion for Reconsideration/Reinvestigation and to Defer Issuance
of Warrant of Arrest” followed by a "Motion to Quash" filed by petitioner Valencia
on April 14, 1997. 3
● SB granted motion for reinvestigation and directed the OSP to conduct
reinvestigation
● Office of the Special Prosecutor/Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution wherein
Ombudsman and Prosecution Bureau Director Victorio U. Tabanguil approved
the recommendation of Special Prosecution Officer II Manuel A. Corpuz that the
motion for reinvestigation be denied but that the complaint as against
Emmanuel B. Buenaventura, Violeta A. Daquis and Damte A. Manzo be
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. However, Deputy Special Prosecutor
Robert E. Kallos and Special Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo recommended
the dismissal of the complaint against all accused on the ground that their
liability is civil in nature.
● prosecution filed an Amended Information. 6
● Petitioners filed with SB Motion for Leave to File MR of Joint Resolution. Denied
● petitioners learned that in the administrative case against them docketed as
OMB-ADM-1-96-0316, which involved the same subject matter as the criminal
case, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint against them after finding that
the contract of loan was entered into in pursuance of the police power of the
local chief executive. Invoking this Resolution, petitioners filed with the
Sandiganbayan MR of the Order dated June 23, 1999 and/or Motion to Resolve
Motion to Quash Information. SB denied the Motion.
● petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
● Save where the Rules expressly permit the investigation of facts alleged in a
motion to quash, the general rule is that in the hearing of such motion only such
facts as are alleged in the information, and those admitted by the prosecutor,
should be taken into account in the resolution thereof. Matters of defense can
not be produced during the hearing of such motions, except where the rules
expressly permit, such as extinction of criminal liability, prescription and former
jeopardy. Otherwise put, facts which constitute the defense of the accused
against the charge under the information must be proved by them during trial.
Such facts or circumstances do not constitute proper grounds for a motion to
quash the information on the ground that the material averments do not
constitute the offense.
● GR: a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations of the information do
not constitute the offense charged, or any offense for that matter, should be
resolved on the basis alone of said allegations whose truth and veracity are
hypothetically admitted. The information need only state the ultimate facts; the
reasons therefor could be proved during the trial
● The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion to quash under
this particular ground is whether or not the facts asseverated, if hypothetically
admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined in the law.
In this examination, matters aliunde are not considered.
BUUUT: inquiry into facts outside the information may be allowed where the
prosecution does not object to the presentation thereof. For a case to fall under the
exception, it is essential that there be no objection from the prosecution. Thus, the
above rule does not apply where the prosecution objected to the presentation of
extraneous facts and even opposed the motion to quash
The elements of the crime of violation of Section 3 (e) are the following:
1. The accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official
functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable
negligence; and
3. His action has caused undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
has given any party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his functions. 29
● All the above elements are averred in information. It sufficiently alleges that
petitioners are public officials discharging official or administrative functions
who, in evident bad faith and with manifest partiality, entered into a grossly
disadvantageous contract on behalf of the government with a private person
which gives the latter unwarranted benefit and advantage.
● Petitioners invoke the earlier Resolution of the Ombudsman which
recommended the dismissal of the case against them. There, the Graft
Investigation Officer opined that the contract of loan extended by petitioners to
Engr. Alfredo M. Atienza for the repair, maintenance and operation of the latter's
motor vessel was necessary for the transportation needs of the inhabitants of
the Province of Oriental Mindoro, which had just suffered three successive
typhoons. The loan of provincial funds was supposedly extended by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro under Section 468 of R.A. 7160
(The Local Government Code of 1991), pursuant to the General Welfare
provision embodied in Section 16 thereof,
● However, the Resolution must be established as their defense during the trial. It
was not even offered and admitted as evidence by the Sandiganbayan. It was
merely attached to petitioners' "Supplemental Pleading in Support of Motion to
Quash Information." Furthermore, the Resolution does not bear the approval of
the Ombudsman.
● The fact that Special Prosecutor and Deputy Special Prosecutor recommended
the dismissal of case against petitioners is of no moment, especially since they
also signed the Comment filed before this Court wherein they extensively
argued against the instant petition. The continuing objection and opposition of
the prosecution to petitioners' motion to quash the Information removes this
case from the exception to the above-cited rule that in the determination of
whether the facts alleged constitute an offense, only the allegations in the
Information, whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted, should be
considered.
● Petitioners argue that the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the administrative
case against them based on the same subject matter should operate to dismiss
the criminal case because the quantum of proof in criminal cases is proof
beyond reasonable doubt, while that in administrative cases is only substantial
FACTS:
● Serafin Saballegue was charged with violation of Section 22 (a) in relation to
Sections 19 (b) and 28 (e) of RA No. 8282, or the Social Security Act.
● Serafin is a proprietor of Saballegue Printing Press. The Information charged
him of unlawfully refusing and failing to remit the premiums due for his
employee to the SSS in the amount of Php 6,533.00, representing SSS and EC
premiums for the period from January 1990 to December 1999 and the 3%
penalty per month for late remittance in the amount of Php 11,143.28.00
computed as of 15 March 2000, despite lawful demands.
● The Information contains a certification signed by State Prosecutor Romulo
Tolentino.
● The case was raffled to RTC of Naga City, presided by Judge Zeida Garfin.
● Serafin was then arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charge, and the case
was set for pre-trial.
● Three days thereafter, Serafin filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
Information was filed without the prior written authority or approval of the city
prosecutor as required under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
● The RTC granted the motion, notwithstanding defendant’s plead to the
Information, on the basis of Rule 112, Section 4, which says:
● No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating
prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.
● The RTC cited that the Information will readily show that it has not complied
with this rule as it has not been approved by the City Prosecutor. Further, the
RTC ruled that questions of want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings. For the RTC, the filing of a valid information goes into the
matter of jurisdiction of the court.
● For Prosecutor Tolentino, he argued that him being duly designated to assist
the City Prosecutor in the investigation and prosecution of all SSS cases by the
Regional State Prosecutor as alter ego of the Secretary of Justice in Region V,
then that authority may be given to other than the City Prosecutor. Further,
Prosecutor Tolentino appended a notation which states that the City/ Provincial
Prosecutor is inhibiting from this case and the Special Prosecution Team on
SSS cases in Region V is authorized to dispose of the case without the
City/Provincial Prosecutor in view of the request for inhibition of the SSS
Regional Manager as granted by the Regional State Prosecutor.
● However, the RTC found that the said notation was not shown in the
Information. That, at most, the authority of the special prosecutor is only for the
conduct of preliminary investigations and the prosecution of cases after they
are filed.
● In his Motion for Reconsideration, Prosecutor Tolentino showed as proof of his
authority to file the Information the Letters of Commendation from Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño and Secretary Hernando Perez.
● The RTC denied the MR on the ground of lack of notice of hearing to the other
party.
ISSUES/ HELD:
(2) Whether prior written authority and approval of the city or provincial
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor is necessary in filing the Information at bar?
YES.
● Under Rule 117, Section 3: The accused may move to quash the complaint or
Information on any of the following grounds:
xxx
(d) that the officer who filed the Information had no authority to do so;
xxx
● The case of Villa is authority for the principle that lack of authority on the part of
the filing officer prevents the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law while jurisdiction over
the case is invested by the act of plaintiff and attaches upon the filing of the
complaint or information. Hence, while a court may have jurisdiction over the
subject matter, like a violation of the SSS Law, it does not acquire jurisdiction
over the case itself until its jurisdiction is invoked with the filing of the
information.
● In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, et al., the SC held that the information having
been filed by an unauthorized party (the PCGG), the information was fatally
FACTS:
● Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner)
was charged before the MeTC Branch 7, with two separate offenses:
○ (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal
Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L.
Ponce (respondent Ponce); and
○ (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce's
husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce's vehicle.
● Petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was
meted out the penalty of public censure.
● Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal
Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same
offense of reckless imprudence.
○ The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two
cases
● After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to
the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 157, in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803).
○ Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on
17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question.
○ Without acting on petitioner's motion, the MeTC proceeded with the
arraignment and, because of petitioner's absence, cancelled his bail and
ordered his arrest.
○ Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner's
motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until
after his arrest.
● Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the
RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner's loss of standing to
maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.
● Ruling of RTC:
○ RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on
petitioner's forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising
from the MeTC's order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. Did the petitioner forfeit his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the
MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366? NO
● The RTC's dismissal of petitioner's special civil action for certiorari to review a
pre-arraignment ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process
Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under
procedural rules and jurisprudence.
● The mischief in the RTC's treatment of petitioner's non-appearance at his
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing
2. Does Petitioner's Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 bar his prosecution
in Criminal Case No. 82366? YES (MAIN)
● Reckless imprudence is a single crime, its consequences on persons and
property are material only to determine the penalty
○ Prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent
prosecution for the same Quasi-Offense
● The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were
prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses.
○ these nine paragraphs in Art 365 are collapsible into four sub-groupings
relating to
■ (1) the penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of "imprudence"
and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2);
■ (2) a modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses
(paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9);
■ (3) a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph
5); and
■ (4) the definition of "reckless imprudence" and "simple
imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8).
○ Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the mental attitude or condition
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight,
the imprudencia punible, " unlike willful offenses which punish the
intentional criminal act . These structural and conceptual features of
quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional crimes under
the first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
● Reason for the ruling:
○ The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof.
○ As the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect
one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence)
remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions
● History of Ruling
○ There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken
line of authority. Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El Pueblo de
Filipinas v. Estipona, decided by the pre-war colonial Court in November
1940, allowed the subsequent prosecution of an accused for reckless
FACTS:
● The accused was charged with unlawfully selling two (2) heat-sealed plastic
sachets of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu). Accused was also in
possesion (with intent to sell) one (1) heat-sealed plastic sachet of
methamphetamine hydrochloride. The accused pleaded not guilty to the crimes
chard.
● The evidence established that sometime in July 2010, PSI Llamas of the Sual
Police Station, Pangasinan, started conducting a surveillance of the alleged
illegal drug-selling activities of the accused-appellant. A buy-bust operation was
conducted on the appellant who agreed to deliver the drugs in front of Las
Brisas Subdivision. PO3 Rimando was the designated poseur-buyer.
○ The appellant was described as a woman of about 4 to 5 feet tall and
between 45 to 50 years old.
○ The appellant was arrested after the police officers waited for 5 minutes
at the side of the highway beside the subdivision which was about 150
meters away from their station.
○ Two marked P1000.00 bills were used as the marked money.
○ When the appellant was arrested by PO3 Rimando and PO2 Aficial, a
routine body search was conducted on the appellant by Rimando. The
marked money and another small plastic sachet she was holding in her
left hand were recovered from her.
● The appellant was then brought to the Sual Police Station.
○ The two plastic sachets were marked as “BJB-1” and “BJB-2”. The other
plastic sachet recovered was marked as “BJB-3”.
○ Rimando prepared and signed a confiscation receipt in the presence of
the barangay kagawad, a DOJ Prosecutor, and an ABS-CBN reported.
PO2 Viray took pictures of the seized items, marked money, and the act
of signing the confiscation receipt. The items were brought to the PNP
Crime Laboratory in Lingayen.
■ The laboratory results conducted by PSI Malojo yielded positive
for shabu and having a weight of 0.08 grams, 0.07 grams, and
0.05 grams, respectively. She identified these items in Court.
● Appellant’s defense:
○ She said that she was grilling barbecue with a certain Mina at a video
bar in front of Jamaica Sual Subdivision. She alleged that after a while,
Mina’s boyfriend, PSI Llamas, arrived and talked to her. When Llamas
left, Mina asked her to deliver a letter to a certain Renee who owed her
money. Mina called on a tricycle driver who would bring her to Renee.
When she met Renee, she handed the letter and Renee gave her a
sealed envelope. She gave the same to Mina who was drinking beer
with Llamas. She asked permission to go home, but Mina told her to grill
more barbecues. She insisted but Llamas placed his right arm around
her neck and called someone on his cellphone. A police car arrived and
brought her to the police station where she was forced to say something
about shabu that she knew nothing about.
○ Llamas denied knowing Mina and all the incidents that transpired.
● The RTC found the appellant guilty.
● The CA affirmed the decision.
● The procedure of handling the seized items, as stated in the facts, sufficiently
complied with the chain of custody rule required by RA 9165.
● The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
also refer to minor details which did not relate to the crimes charged. The
inconsistencies were with regard to the composition of the buy-bust team, in the
identity/description of the accused-appellant, and in the markings on the seized
items. These are collateral matters that are not essential elements of the crime
charged.
○ As regards the source of the information on the description of accused-
appellant which enabled the poseur-buyer to identify her, the same is a
trivial matter. Whether the information came from PSI Llamas or a
confidential informant, the fact remains that a crime was committed in
the presence of the police officers who were members of the buy-
bust team and who had the duty to immediately arrest her after the
consummation of the transaction. The fact also remains that the
description about the seller matched accused-appellant.
○ As regards the alleged discrepancies in the markings of the seized
items, the same were clearly typographical errors. The transcript of PSI
Malojo’s testimony showed that she identified the markings of the plastic
sachets as “BJB-1”, “NJN-2”, and “BJB-3”. However she later on
clarified that she was actually referring to “BJB-1”, “BJB-2”, and “BJB-3”.
○ As regards the confiscation report bearing the date Aug. 5, 2010 when
the buy-bust happened on Aug. 6, this was cured by the testimony of
Kagawad Gulen that on Aug. 6, 2010, he was called to witness the items
confiscated and was asked to sit beside Rimando when the latter was
preparing the report.
3. Did the RTC err in convicting the appellant under an Information that
charged two offenses? NO. (MAIN ISSUE)
FACTS:
● This is a consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under R45 assailing the
Decision on June 13, 2014 and Resolution dated October 16, 2014 of the CA
reversing the Decision of the RTC in denying the MTQ filed by Villapando.
● Villapando is the assignee of Enhanced Electronics and Communications
Services, Inc. of Condominium Unit No. 2821 and parking slot at the Legazpi
Place in Makati City. Petitioners John Labsky P. Maximo (Maximo) and Robert
M. Panganiban (Panganiban) are Directors of ASB Realty Corporation (now, St.
Francis Square Realty Corp.), the developer of the said condominium unit.
● On November 23, 2010, Villapando filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Makati City, a complaint against Maximo and Panganiban and other
directors/officers of ASB Realty Corp. (ASB) for Violation of Sections 17, 20
and 25 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957, otherwise known as the
Subdivision and Condominium Buyer's Protective Decree.
○ Villapando alleged in his complaint that there was failure on the part of
Maximo and Panganiban and the other officers of ASB to comply with
PD No. 957 relative to the registration of contracts to sell and deeds of
sale (Sec. 17), time of completion (Sec. 20) and issuance of title (Sec.
25) with respect to the aforementioned condominium unit.
● The complaint was dismissed by the OCP-Makati in its Resolution on the
ground that prior to the estimated date of completion of the condominium unit,
ASB encountered liquidity problems and instituted a petition for rehabilitation
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) which showed good faith
on the part of ASB.
● Maximo instituted a Complaint for Perjury, Incriminating Innocent Person and
Unjust Vexation against Villapando. The complaint was assigned to Assistant
City Prosecutor (ACP) Evangeline Viudez-Canobas.
● Panganiban also led a Complaint for Perjury and Unjust Vexation against
Villapando. The complaint was assigned to ACP Benjamin S. Vermug, Jr.
○ The common allegation in the complaints of Maximo and
Panganiban was that Villapando committed perjury when the latter
alleged in the complaint he filed against them that they were
officers and directors of ASB at the time the Deed of Sale was
executed between ASB and Enhanced Electronics on February 28,
1997. They claimed that they were not even employees of ASB in
1997 as they were both minors at that time.
● ACP Canobas issued a Resolution (Canobas Resolution) on August 3, 2011
finding probable cause against Villapando for the crime of perjury but dismissed
the complaints for unjust vexation and incriminating innocent person.
● Accordingly, on August 15, 2011, an Information for Perjury was filed against
Villapando before Branch 67 of the METC, Makati City. The Information was
signed by ACP Canobas and sworn to before ACP Benjamin S. Vermug, Jr.
● Meanwhile, on August 31, 2011, Villapando filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of the Canobas Resolution before the OCP-Makati alleging
that the Information was filed without the prior written authority of the City
Prosecutor. He also stated that violations of Sections 17, 20 and 25 are
committed not at the time of the execution of the contract to sell but after the
execution of the contract, and that there is no allegation in his complaint-
ISSUE/HELD:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE RESPONDENT DID
NOT COMMIT FORUM SHOPPING DESPITE HIS FILING OF A PETITION FOR
REVIEW BEFORE THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE INVOLVING THE SAME
PARTIES, FACTS, ISSUES AND RELIEFS – NO
● The filing of an appeal with the DOJ as well as the ling of the petition with the
CA would not constitute forum shopping for the reason that the finding of the
DOJ would not be binding upon the courts. In other words, even if the DOJ
recommends dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner, such resolution
would merely be advisory, and not binding upon the courts. The DOJ ruling on
the petition for review would not constitute as res judicata on the case at bar,
neither can it conflict with resolution of the court on the propriety of dismissing
the case.
● Forum shopping is the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has
been rendered in one forum, of seeking another and possibly favorable opinion
in another forum other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari.
There can also be forum shopping when a party institutes two or more suits in
different courts, either simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the courts
to rule on the same and related causes and/or to grant the same or
substantially the same reliefs on the supposition that one or the other court
would make a favorable disposition or increase a party's chances of obtaining a
favorable decision or action.
● The issue here is the lack of the certification of the City prosecutor because the
information only bears the certification of the ASSISTANT CITY
PROSECUTOR. So the core issue is the validity of the amended information.
● Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states
that the filing of a complaint or information requires a prior written authority or
approval of the named officers therein before a complaint or information may be
filed before the courts:
● Section 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. — If the
investigating prosecutor nds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he
shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify under oath
in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized
● In the case at bar, Villapando is charged in the Amended Information which was
signed by the ACP.
● Maximo and Panganiban argued that the CA erred in holding that the
information did not comply with the rules because the information already bears
the certification because it was the City Prosecutor who authorized the filing of
the ORIGINAL INFORMATION in court. According to them, there is. A
presumption that prior written authority of the CP was obtained in the filing of
the information.
● In the cases of People v. Garfin, Turingan v. Garfin, and Tolentino v.Paqueo,
this Court had already rejected similarly-worded certifications uniformly holding
FACTS:
● Jessie B. Castillo was elected mayor of the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite in the
May 1998 elections.
● On September 19, 2000, an Information was filed against Castillo charging him
with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019, in relation to the
alleged illegal operation of the Villa Esperanza dumpsite located in Molino,
Bacoor, Cavite.
○ According to the Information, Castillo, while in the performance of his
official functions as Mayor of Bacoor, gave unwarranted benefits to his
co-accused Melencio and Emerenciano Arciaga by allowing the latter to
operate the Villa Esperanza dumpsite without the requisite
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) and permit from the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB).
● An administrative complaint for Simple Misconduct had previously been filed
against Castillo also in relation to the illegal operation of the dumpsite.
○ The Office of the Ombudsman found Castillo guilty of the administrative
charge and imposed the penalty of 1 month and 1 day suspension.
○ On appeal, the CA set aside the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman and ordered the dismissal of the administrative complaint
against Castillo, as to wit:
Xxx [Castillo] did not violate the DENR notice which was
issued way back in 1998 yet, or before his actual
assumption of office. Quite the contrary, while already a
mayor, [Castillo], upon being informed of the notice,
immediately took steps in resolving the municipality's aged-
long garbage problem. True, the solution was a long-term
one, but the end results were just the same, i.e., what was
once a mountainous pile of trash covering a 2-hectare
piece of property has been remarkably reduced and what
was left was a considerable area used as a segregation
and transfer station of garbage prior to their eventual
dumping at the San Mateo landfill.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. [MAIN ISSUE] Was the outright quashal of the Information proper? NO
● The Sandiganbayan allowed the quashal of the Information due to the
prosecution's failure to (1) allege, with precision, the exact amount of benefits
granted by Castillo to the Arciagas and (2) specify, quantify and prove "to the
point of moral certainty" the undue injury caused to the people of Molino.
● Even assuming for the sake of argument that the Information was defective on
the ground that the facts charged therein do not constitute an offense, outright
quashal of the Information is not the proper course of action.
● Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court gives clear guidance on this matter. It
provides -
Sec. 4. Amendment of complaint or information. - If the motion to
quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information
which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an
amendment be made.
FACTS:
● Pursuant to the instructions of then Director of the Bureau of
Corrections, Dionisio R. Santiago, on June 30, 2003, a random drug test
was conducted in the National Bilibid Prison (NBP) wherein the urine
samples of thirty-eight (38) inmates were collected and subjected to
drug testing by the Chief Medical Technologist and Assistant Medical
Technologist of the Alpha Polytechnic Laboratory in Quezon City, and
out of that number, twenty-one (21) urine samples tested positive.
● That on or about June 30, 2003, in the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without having been authorized by law, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously use or in any manner
introduced into the physiological system of his body, Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, otherwise known as "shabu," a dangerous drug in
violation of the aforecited law.
xxxx
xxxx
9. Assuming for the sake of argument, but not admitting, that the
accused were apprehended or arrested for using a dangerous drug or
for violating the provisions of RA 9165 which led to the June 30, 2003
screen test, or that the accused are subject to mandatory or random
drug testing, the drug test would be invalid absent a showing that the
same was conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after the
apprehension or arrest of the offender through a confirmatory test within
fifteen (15) days receipt of the result in accordance with the provisions
of Section 38, Article II of RA 9165 x x x.
xxxx
10. In the case, the accused were not informed of the results of the
screening test, thus depriving them of the right to challenge the same
through a confirmatory drug test within the required fifteen (15)-day
period after receipt of the positive result.
● The CA, in its Decision dated May 29, 2008, affirmed the trial court's
Order,
● The RTC judge went beyond her authority when she dismissed the
cases based on lack of probable cause and not on the ground raised by
respondents
● Considering that the RTC has already found probable cause, it should
have denied the motion to quash and allowed the prosecution to present
its evidence and wait for a demurrer to evidence to be filed by
respondents, if they opt to, or allowed the prosecution to amend the
Information and in the meantime suspend the proceedings until the
amendment of the Information without dismissing the case.
FACTS:
● Petitioner claims:
○ (IMPT) OMB gravely abused its discretion in recommending the filing
of 24 informations against him for violation of Sec. 7 of Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act
■ Cannot revive the cases previously dismissed by SB in its
Feb. 10, 2004 Resolution
○ Defense of prescription may be raised for the first time on appeal
■ May dismiss criminal cases before SB and RTC
○ No necessity of presentation of evidence before the court a quo
● OMB argues:
○ Dismissal of criminal cases does not mean petitioner was exempt
from criminal prosecution
○ New informations may be filed by OMB
■ Find probable cause in the conduct of its preliminary
investigation (PI)
○ Filing of the complaint with PCGG in 1987 and information with SB in
1989 interrupted the prescriptive period
○ Absence of petitioner from Philippines from 1986-2000 interrupted
period based on Art. 91 of RPC
● PCGG avers:
○ 1987 Constitution and Ombudsman Act of 1989, the OMB need not wait
for a new complaint with a new docket number for it conduct PI on the
alleged offenses
○ The issue as to whether prescription should begin to run when the
offender is absent from the Philippines;
■ RPC: negative (does not run)
■ RA 3019 and RA 33263: silent
ISSUES/HELD:
3 Act To Establish Periods of Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal
Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin To Run
(Only IMPT part in this issue) Preliminary issue: whether this Court may validly take
cognizance of and resolve the issue considering that as we have said in the assailed
Decision, "this case has never progressed beyond the filing of the informations against
the petitioner" and that "it is only prudent that evidence be gathered through trial on the
merits to determine whether the offense charged has already prescribed." YES.
● Rule 117 of ROC
○ Accused may, at any time before he enters his plea, move to quash the
complaint and information on the ground that the criminal action or
liability has been extinguished
■ Ground includes defense of prescription (Art. 89 of RPC
enumerates this as one of the grounds that extinguishes criminal
liability)
■ Even if there is yet to be a trial on the merits of a criminal case,
the accused can very well invoke prescription
4 (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to
run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted
5 SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and
if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings
are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting jeopardy
FACTS:
● Beñares was accused of estafa arising from 2 contracts of sale executed in
1976 where he sold two lands to respondent.
● After respondent fully paid and after deed of absolute sale was issued,
petitioner mortgaged lands to the BPI.
● When respondent demanded delivery, petitioner failed to comply
● Respondent filed estafa case
● After prosecution presented last witness, it was given 15 days to formally offer
its evidence but prosecution did not make any formal offer
● petitioner filed motion praying prosecution's submission of formal offer be
deemed waived and case be dismissed for lack of evidence.
● Despite receipt of notice, respondent and counsel failed to attend hearing on
motion
MeTC’s 1st order: gave prosecution another 15 days to formally offer evidence which
petitioner opposed.
February 27, 2002: MeTC issued Order granting motion to dismiss for failure of
prosecution to prosecute case. Failed to make formal offer of evidence despite the 15
day extension.
○ Order for extension dated jan 28, 2002
○ Notice received on Feb 7, 2002
Respondent filed MR for dismissal and prayed for admission of Formal Offer of
Documentary Exhibits
● claims she had difficulty securing documents from the court which were marked
during trial.
● Petitioner opposed the motion invoking his right against double jeopardy.
METC: granted and set aside previous order dismissing case and reinstated case i
● Formal Offer admitted and accused is given 15 days from receipt of Order to
filed Comment or Opposition
● MR denied, thus, petition for certiorarti with RTC.
Petition for certiorari with CA. Claims no failure to prosecute and no double
jeopardy.
LAST ELEMENT: there was yet no conviction, nor an acquittal on the ground that
petitioner's guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, but the dismissal of
the case was based on failure to prosecute.
GR: A dismissal with express consent or upon motion of the accused does not
result in double jeopardy, except in two instances,
EXCEPTION
Also cannot rely on doctrine that when judge dismisses case for failure to prosecute,
termination amounts to an acquittal as the prosecution will fail to prove the case
when the time therefor comes.
1. Here, testimonial evidence were presented against petitioner. Even without
documentary evidence, his guilt or innocence may be proven.
2. petitioner appears to have admitted the genuineness and due execution of
respondent's documentary evidence, thus the prosecution need not even
present documents in view of admission. prosecution has enough evidence
left for the trial court's determination of his guilt.
FACTS:
● The crime involved here arose from three separate but related contracts
between the PNP and the Beltra Industries for the purchase and delivery of
Caliber .45 Thompson Brand Pistols.
● The first contract covered a total amount of P52M, the second covered P29M,
the third covered P23M. The purchase orders were signed by Director General
Nazareno and Director Nartatez, while the corresponding checks were signed
by Director Custodio (collectively, the accused).
● There were allegations of irregularity or overpricing surrounding the
procurement. This then lead President Ramos to form a tri-agency investigating
committee composed of lawyers from the PNP Inspector General’s office, the
National Police Commission, and the Office of the President. This committee
found, however, no overpricing nor any collusion on the part of the police
officers.
● The Commission on Audit for its part formed a special audit team, which found
that the contracts were overpriced by at least P45M.
● The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed an Information against the accused
for a violation of Section 3 (g) of RA 3019.
● For the prosecution, the members of the special audit team testified and
compared the purchases of pistols by the PNP with those made by the AFP.
● For the defense, the contracts entered into by the AFP cannot be a basis of
comparison because the AFP made the purchases under a foreign military
assistance program extended by the U.S. pursuant to defense treaties. Thus,
for the PNP, they had to directly purchase the pistols from commercial sales
which was 2 to 3 times more expensive than purchases from the foreign military
assistance program. The defense also presented members of the tri-agency
committee.
● The Sandiganbayan acquitted the accused. It concluded that the AFP prices did
not offer sufficient basis for comparison to be able to establish firmly the alleged
overpricing in the purchase of the subject firearms by the PNP. The
Sandiganbayan based this conclusion on the testimonies of the respondents’
witnesses whose competence on the matters they testified on was never
questioned or disputed by the prosecution.
● The Sandiganbayan further observed that the audit team followed a flawed
procedure in reaching its overpricing conclusion. The audit team merely relied
on the AFP Supply Issuance and did not conduct any actual canvass of the gun
prices. Thus, to the Sandiganbayan, the comparison made between the PNP
price and the AFP quoted cost was substantially deficient under the prevailing
rules that indispensably required an actual canvass done on different and
identified suppliers to show exactly the variances in the prices of similar articles
to firm up, for evidentiary purposes and to a reliable degree of certainty, a
finding of overpricing. The requirement of actual canvass, according to the
Sandiganbayan, was settled law as applied by this Court in Arriola v.
Commission on Audit.
● The People filed a petition under Rule 45 to assail the acquittal of the accused.
● the respondents object to the petition mainly because the review sought
violates their constitutional right against double jeopardy. They assert that the
petition is essentially an appeal from a judgment of acquittal or a review of
alleged errors in judgment that throws the case wide open, placing the
ISSUE/HELD:
Whether the acquittal of the accused can be assailed through Rule 45? NO.
● Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which implements this particular
constitutional right, reads:
○ SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an
accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or
other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall
be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.
● Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a first
jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly
terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A
first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent
court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e)
when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.
● A judgment of acquittal is final and is no longer reviewable. It is also
immediately executory and the State may not seek its review without placing
the accused in double jeopardy.
● The absolute and inflexible rule is that the State is proscribed from
appealing the judgment of acquittal through either a regular appeal under
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, or an appeal by certiorari on pure questions
of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules.
● An instance when the State can challenge a judgment of acquittal is pursuant to
the exercise of our judicial power "to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government," as implemented through
the extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In such
instance, however, no review of facts and law on the merits, in the manner done
in an appeal, actually takes place; the focus of the review is on whether the
judgment is per se void on jurisdictional grounds, i.e., whether the verdict was
rendered by a court that had no jurisdiction; or where the court has appropriate
jurisdiction, whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
● Applying all these principles, the present Rule 45 petition must necessarily fail.
Even under our most liberal reading, we cannot treat the petition as a Rule 65
petition, as it raises no jurisdictional error that can invalidate a verdict of
acquittal.
FACTS:
● On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against
petitioner committed as follows:
○ on or about the 18th day of March 2002,
○ in the Municipality of Mayantoc, Province of Tarlac, Philippines
○ the said accused (SSGT. JOSE M. PACOY) with intent to kill, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot his commanding officer
2Lt. Frederick Esquita with his armalite rifle hitting and sustaining upon
2Lt. Frederick Esquita multiple gunshot wounds on his body which
caused his instantaneous death.
○ With the aggravating circumstance of killing, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita in
disregard of his rank.
● On September 12, 2002, upon arraignment, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel
de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide
● on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued
another Order
○ directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the Information to
Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance
● Prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word "Homicide" and
instead wrote the word "Murder" in the caption and in the opening paragraph of
the Information.
○ accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that of the original
Information for Homicide, with the correction of the spelling of the
victim's name from "Escuita" to "Escueta”
● On October 8, 2002, the date scheduled for pre-trial conference and trial,
petitioner was to be re-arraigned for the crime of Murder.
○ Counsel for petitioner objected on the ground that the latter would be
placed in double jeopardy, considering that his Homicide case had been
terminated without his express consent, resulting in the dismissal of the
case.
○ As petitioner refused to enter his plea on the amended information for
Murder, the public respondent entered for him a plea of not guilty
● Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with Motion to Suspend Proceedings Pending
the Resolution of the Instant Motion on the ground of double jeopardy
○ Denied: Information for Homicide was merely corrected/or amended
before trial commenced and did not terminate the same;
○ Filed MR: GRANTED
■ In granting the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent judge
found that a close scrutiny of Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code shows that "disregard of rank" is merely a generic
mitigating circumstance which should not elevate the
classification of the crime of homicide to murder.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. Was the amendment of Information after petitioner pleaded not guilty to the
charge in the Information for Homicide proper? YES
2. Was the petitioner placed in double jeopardy by the change of the charge
from Homicide to Murder; and subsequently, from Murder back to Homicide? NO
● double jeopardy when the following requisites are present:
○ (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second;
■ jeopardy attaches only:
■ (a) after a valid indictment;
■ (b) before a competent court;
■ (c) after arraignment;
■ (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and
■ (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
○ (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and
○ (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.
● It is the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal or termination of
the case that bars further prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to
commit the same or the frustration thereof; or prosecution for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the
former complaint or information.
● Dismissal of the first case contemplated by Section 7 presupposes a definite or
unconditional dismissal which terminates the case. And for the dismissal to be a
bar under the jeopardy clause, it must have the effect of acquittal.
● The respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 was for the trial
prosecutor to correct and amend the Information but not to dismiss the same
upon the filing of a new Information charging the proper offense as
contemplated under the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court:
○ If it appears at anytime before judgment that a mistake has been made
in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original
complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the
proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the
accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require
the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
○ Section 14 does not apply to a second information, which involves the
same offense or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the first information
● The informations against the private respondent as one of the accused in two
cases for homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Oriental Mindoro,
Branch 43, read:
● Accused Ureta and Banang jumped bail during trial and were tried in absentia.
ISSUES/HELD:
6 Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
7 Sec. 7. – Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for
the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which
necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following
instances:
(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission
constituting the former charge;
(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a plea was
entered in the former complaint or information; or
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor and of the
offended party except as provided in section 1 (f) of Rule 116.
In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or in part the judgment, he
shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction for the graver offense.
8 Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law.