Republic of the Philippines

Department of Labor and Employment

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
National Capital Region
Quezon City

________ Division

AGELIO S. TOLENTINO JR.,

Complainant-appellant,

NLRC LAC No. _______________

versus NLRC RAB No. NCR Case No.

(M) 02-01849-16
Hon. Labor Arbiter Augusto L.
Villanueva

ANGLO EASTERN CREW

MANAGEMENT, ANGLO
EASTERN SHIP MANAGEMENT
LTD., GREGORIO B. SIALSA,
EUSEBIO B. TAN, EMERICO O.
DE GUZMAN, ERNESTO R.
AŇASCO, EMITERIO C.
MANIBOG JR., ALELI ANGELA
G. QUIRINO,

Respondents-appellees.
________________________________

NOTICE WITH
MEMORANDUM OF APPEAL
COMPLAINANT-APPELLANT AGELIO S. TOLENTINO JR., by
counsel, and to this Honorable Commission, most respectfully submits
this Notice with Memorandum of Appeal, and avers as follows:

Timeliness of the Appeal

On February 26, 2018 the Honorable Arbiter Augusto L.
Villanueva rendered a Decision in the above-entitled case, the
dispositive portion of which states as follows:
 2

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is

hereby rendered, the instant complaint against the
respondents is HEREBY dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.”
A copy of the afore-stated Decision, which is attached and made
an integral part hereof as Annex “A”, was received by the
Complainant-Appellant only on March 26, 2018. Thus, the last day to
file the instant Notice with Memorandum of Appeal shall be on April 5,
2018.
Specifically, Complainant-Appellant is appealing the portion of
the said Decision with regard to the fact that the Honorable Labor
Arbiter committed serious errors in the findings of fact and law which,
if not corrected by this Honorable Commission, would cause grave and
irreparable prejudice and injury to the Complainant-Appellant.
Complainant-Appellant, in appealing the said Decision hereby:
a) Pays the required appeal fee covered by OR No. __________
dated April 5, 2018 in the amount of Five Hundred Twenty
Pesos (P520.00); and
b) Attaches herewith his Memorandum of Appeal which
expounds on the errors committed by the Labor Arbiter a quo.
The Case
The present case is an action for money claims under the POEA
Standard Employment Contract, including total disability benefits,
illness allowance, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s
fees, filed by Complainant Agelio S. Tolentino Jr. against the
Respondents.
The Parties
1. Complainant-Appellant Agelio S. Tolentino Jr., is a Filipino,
married, and residing at Blk. 6E Lt 10, GMA Village, Poblacion 5,
General Mariano Alvarez, Cavite, 4117 who may be served with the
notices, orders, resolutions and other processes of this Honorable
Office through the undersigned counsel’s address herein below
indicated.
2. Respondent-Appellee Anglo - Eastern Crew
Management, is a domestic corporation licensed to do business in the
Philippines whose principal address is at GF, 2F & 3F, Bloomingdale
Building 205, Salcedo St., Legaspi Village, Makati City, NCR, 1200
where it may be served with the notices, orders, resolutions and other
processes of the Honorable Office.
3. Respondent-Appellee Anglo Eastern Ship Management
Ltd. is the foreign principal in this case.
4. Respondents-Appellees Gregorio B. Sialsa, Eusebio B.
Tan, Emerico O. De Guzman, Ernesto R. Aňasco, Emiterio C.
 3

Manibog Jr., Aleli Angela G. Quirino are the President/Owner/Board

of Directors of Respondent Anglo-Eastern Crew Management hence
their inclusion as respondents.
Statement of Relevant Facts and Proceedings
5. Complainant-Appellant is a Seafarer. On August 11, 2015,
Complainant-Appellant as employee, and respondent Anglo Eastern
Ship Management Ltd., as principal employer through Respondent-
Appellee manning agency Anglo Eastern Crew Management Inc.,
entered into a POEA-approved Standard Employment Contract (SEC),
mutually stipulating and agreeing on the material terms and conditions
of Complainant-Appellee’s employment, to work on board the vessel
“CMB ADRIEN”, for the position of OILER for a period of 9 (1 +/-)
months with a monthly basic salary of $581.00 U.S. Dollars and a total
of (US$1089.00)1 a month including guaranteed overtime and vacation
leave pay. Being a seafarer by profession for years, Complainant-
Appellant has diligently performed all his duties and responsibilities.
6. On November 9, 2015, the Complainant-Appellant left the
Philippines to join his vessel of assignment, “CMB ADRIEN”. His work
as oiler was uneventful until June 6, 2016. According to his statement2
during his assigned watch on June 6, 2016 while in the performance
of his duties and during the term of the contract while on board
the vessel “CMB ADRIEN” at about 10:00 p.m., he had a verbal
encounter with 2nd Engineer Gapo at the alleyway of the deck. In order
to avoid further altercations, Captain Rogelio S. Rodrigazo sent the
Complainant-Appellant to the engine room accompanied by A/B
Castillo. 2nd Engineer Gapo then followed Complainant-Appellant to
the engine room. In order to avoid further confrontation, Complainant-
Appellant left the engine room but on his way out he accidentally hit
his arm on the doorjamb of the engine room.
7. He was checked by Dr. Matias Famolaro who provided
medical assistance to the crew. In his report dated June 6, 2016 Dr.
Famolaro said that Complainant-Appellant had severe trauma on his
right arm, and experienced severe pain, and also had difficulty moving.
He should have been operated on. He instead decided to travel to his
country to continue treatment in the Philippines.
8. Upon his arrival in the Philippines on June 15, 2016, the
Complainant-Appellant immediately reported to the office of
respondents and requested to undergo further medical examination to
determine the damage caused to his arm because of his accident that
he sustained while on board CMB ADRIEN.

1 Copy of the POEA SEC attached and made an integral part hereof as Annex “B”.
2 Statement of Complainant attached and made an integral part hereof as Annex “C”
 4

9. However, the Respondent-Appellee refused to help

Complainant-Appellant with the medical expenses that he would
require for his operation. Complainant-Appellant was forced to spend
for his own operation. On August 16, 2016 he was admitted at the Sta.
Ana Hospital located in New Panaderos, Manila. In the attached
medical abstract3, it showed he was admitted for five (5) days, and
there was a fracture on his forearm, and he had to be operated on
including bone grating and plating.
10. For failure of the Respondents-Appellees to assist him, the
Complainant-Appellant was thus constrained to seek the assistance of
the undersigned counsel in order to secure the payment of his disability
benefits, sickness allowance, medical expenses and other just claims
and benefits. Despite the letters4 sent to respondents asking for
conferences to discuss the Complainant-Appellant’s condition as well
as copies of Complainant-Appellant’s medical records, there was no
favorable response from the Respondents-Appellees.
11. After the complaint was filed before this Honorable Office,
the initial mandatory conference hearings were conducted. Due to
failure to arrive at amicable settlement, the Honorable Labor Arbiter
terminated the preliminary mandatory conference and set the filing of
the parties’ respective Position Papers and Replies.
12. On February 26, 2018 the Honorable Arbiter Augusto L.
Villanueva rendered a Decision in the above-entitled case, the
dispositive portion of which states as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered, the instant complaint against the
respondents is HEREBY dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.”
13. Hence this Appeal.
Issues
A. Whether or not the Honorable Labor Arbiter a quo
committed grave abuse of discretion and serious
error in the findings of fact and of law when he ruled
that Complainant-Appellant is not entitled to the to
the full disability benefits due to the accident he
suffered while on board the vessel “CMB ADRIEN”.
B. Whether or not the Honorable Labor Arbiter a quo
committed grave abuse of discretion and serious
error in the findings of fact and of law when he ruled

3 Attached is the clinical abstract marked as Annex “D”.

4 Attached is the letter sent to respondents requesting for a conference as Annex “E”.
 5

that Complainant-Appellant is not entitled to moral

and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees.

Arguments and Discussions

A. The Honorable Labor Arbiter a
quo committed grave abuse of
discretion and serious error in
the findings of fact and of law
when he ruled that the
complainant-appellant is not
entitled to the full disability
benefits for the accident he
suffered while on board the
vessel “CMB ADRIEN”.

There is no viable evidence to

show that Complainant-
Appellant intentionally
injured himself.

1. The Respondents attempt to deprive complainant the

latter’s disability benefits by arguing that the injury suffered was self-
inflicted. Complainant begs to disagree. Such justification is misplaced
under the facts and law of the case at hand.
2. Respondents exaggerated the June 7, 2016 incident by
concocting malicious imputations to herein complainant that the latter
continued to engage Mr. Gapo, who allegedly remained calm and still,
into a fight despite the Master pacifying the complainant. They
misleadingly added that complainant pointed fingers and started
aggressive commotion towards Mr. Gapo.
3. The Captain erroneously noted in his signed statement that
the Complainant narrated that the latter purposely injured himself.
The captain wrongfully alleged that “THAT DUE TO HIS OUTRAGE
HE SWING HIS RIGHT ARM HITTING THE EDGE OF THE DOOR OF
THE ENGINE WORKSHOP.”
4. There is no truth on the respondents’ misleading depiction
of herein complainant as the troublemaker. From the time he embarked
on the vessel, he has diligently performed all his duties and
responsibilities as OILER. Furthermore, he has properly conducted
himself with utmost respect and obedience to all his superiors and his
colleagues. Our norms of social justice demand that we credit
employees with the presumption of good faith in the performance of
their duties.5

5
Maneja vs. NLRC, 290 SCRA 603.
 6

5. Contrary to the Captain’s unsubstantiated claim, the

Complainant herein did not intentionally swing his right arm at the door
that caused injury to himself. The truth of the matter is that the
Complainant did not instigate any arguments or any fights. It was Mr.
Gapo who started the heated argument due to his unprofessional
behavior toward herein complainant. Although there was a verbal
exchange between herein Complainant and Mr. Gapo, the
complainant strongly denies that he was attempting to punch or hit Mr.
Gapo. In order to avoid further confrontation, he opted to leave the
engine room by stepping or moving backward. Complainant was
actually the one who was backing / moving away from Mr. Gapo in
order to peacefully address the situation.
6. In the process of backing, he did not notice the doorjamb
of the engine room. He accidentally hit the doorjamb of the engine
room causing his injury.
7. It is unfortunate that the statement made by the captain
was crafted in a manner different from how complainant narrated said
incident. It did not reflect the actual situation but was drafted that
placed complainant in a bad light.
8. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and
is not equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and
speculation likewise cannot be given credence.6
9. It is also important to consider that there was no evidence
presented aside from the Captain’s bare allegation that the
Complainant injured himself on purpose.
- The Complainant -
appellant’s illness is
presumed “work
connected.”
________________________________

14. Respondents-appellees misleadingly argued that

complainant-appellant’s illness cannot be considered work-related
since this not among those illnesses enumerated in Section 32-A of
the POEA Standard Contract as compensable occupational diseases.
They erroneously stress that the complainant-appellant is the one who
must show by concrete evidence that said illnesses are work-related.
15. There is no argument that the Complainant-appellant’s
illness is not specifically mentioned in the enumeration in Section 32-
A as compensable occupational diseases. However, the Complainant-
appellant is relieved of the burden to show the causation of their right

6
Manalabe vs. Cabie, A.M. No. P-05-1984, July 6, 2007, 526 SCRA 582, 589
 7

over the disability benefits is based on another provision of the said

contract, to wit:

“Section 20. Compensation and Benefits

B. Compensation and Benefits for Injury or Illness -
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer
suffers work-related injury of illness during the term of his
contract are as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Those illness not listed in Section 32 of the
Contract are disputably presumed as work-related.”
(Underscoring supplied)
16. In view of the above-stated provision, the burden of proof
to show that the arduous nature of the Complainant-appellant’s
employment neither caused the illness nor contributed to its
aggravation shifts to the respondents. Moreover, as noted in Rule 131,
Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court, presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence.

16.1 A disputable presumption has been defined as

specie of evidence that may be accepted and acted on
where there is no other evidence to uphold the contention
for which it stands, or one which may be overcome by other
evidence.[1]

16.2 Consequently, once the basic or jurisdictional

facts are prima facie established, the statutory
presumptions come into operation and work into play in
favor of the claimant. The burden rests on the employer to
overcome them with the degree of contrary proof required
by law and the employee is relieved of the burden to show
causation.[2]Likewise, it must be stressed that the function
of a presumption is to dispense with the need for proof. The
burden to overthrow the presumption and to disconnect, by
substantial evidence the injury or sickness from the
employment, is laid by the statute at the door of the
employer.[3] While disputable, these presumptions can be
overcome only by clear and preponderant evidence.[4]

[1]
People vs. de Guzman, 229 SCRA 795.
[2]
Bohol Land Transportation Co. vs. De Madanguit, 70 Phil 685; Felarca vs. Bookman, Inc. 127 SCRA 275; Batangas
Trans. Co. vs. Riviera, 99 Phil 1056; Villaviaje vs. Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corp, 132 SCRA 622.
[3]
Magalona vs. WWC & NASSCO, 21 SCRA 1199
[4]
Trinidad vs. IAC 204 SCRA 524
 8

16.3 This presumption of compensability for cancer

in said provision of the POEA standard employment
contract is strengthened by the decisions of the Supreme
Court in several cases.[5] Moreover, the Labor Code is
clear that it does not only confine compensable diseases
to those enumerated therein as occupational. It also
contemplates illnesses caused by employment where the
risks of contracting the same are increased by the working
conditions thereof. The Supreme Court stressed that
uncertainty as to whether or not the disease was caused or
the risk of contracting the same was increased by the
decedent's working conditions cannot eliminate the
probability that the ailment was work-connected.[6]
17. In ruling in favor of the seafarer, the Supreme Court
consistently held that Section 20B (4) of the POEA contract clearly
established a “disputable presumption” in favor of the
compensability of an illness suffered by a seafarer during the term of
his employment contract. This disputable presumption works in favor
of the seafarer pursuant to the mandate under Executive Order
247/1987, under which the POEA contract was created "to secure the
best terms and conditions of employment of Filipino contract workers
and ensure compliance therewith" and "to protect the well-being of
Filipino workers overseas". The Supreme Court stressed that unless
contrary evidence is presented by the seafarer's employers, this
disputable presumption stands.

18. Under the beneficent provisions of the Contract, it is

enough that the work has contributed, even in a small degree, to the
development of the disease.[7] Strict proof of causation is not
required.[8]
18.1 The Supreme Court applied a liberal
interpretation in a case of Mercado, Jr. vs. Employees
Compensation Commission [12]wherein it noted that the
requirement that the disease was caused or aggravated by
the employment or work applies only to an illness where
the cause can be determined or proved. Where cause is
unknown or cannot be ascertained, it added that no duty to
prove the link exists. The Supreme Court thus said:
Where however, the causes of an ailment
are unknown to and or undetermined even

[5]
Milano vs. ECC, 142 SCRA 52; Raro vs. ECC, 172 SCRA 845, 849; Panotes vs. ECC, 138 SCRA 595; Abadiano vs.
GSIS, 111 SCRA 509; Isabel Lopez Eliseo vs. WCC, et al., 84 SCRA 188; Mercado, Jr. vs. ECC, 139 SCRA 270; Mora vs.
ECC, 156 SCRA 16; Avendaño vs. ECC, 97 SCRA 464, 468; Cayco, et al. vs. ECC, 99 SCRA 268, 270–271; Ajero vs.
ECC., 101 SCRA 868, 871–872; Mandapat v. ECC, 191 Phil. 47, 50–51; De Leon vs. ECC, 67 SCRA 342, 345
[6]
Nemaria vs. ECC, 155 SCRA 166
[7]
OSM Shipping Phils. Inc vs. Antonia Dela Cruz G.R. No. 159146 January 28, 2005
[8]
Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. vs. NLRC, 353 SCRA 47.
[12]
139 SCRA 270
 9

by medical science, the requirement of

proof of any casual link between the ailment
and the working conditions should be
liberalized so that those who have less in
life will have more in law. . .
. . . The point is that it is grossly inequitable to
require as a condition for an award of
compensation that the claimant demonstrate
that his ailment — the cause or origin of which
is unknown to and undetermined even by
medical science — was, in fact caused or the
risk of contracting the same enhanced by his
working conditions. Plainly, the condition would
be an impossible one, especially considering
that said claimant is most probably not even
conversant with the intricacies of medical
science and the claimant invariably bereft of
the material resources to employ medical
experts to demonstrate the connection
between the cause and the disease.
Considering the liberal character of
employment compensation schemes, the
impossible condition should be deemed as not
having been intended and/or imposed.
Thus, the requirement that the disease
was caused or aggravated by the
employment or work applies only to an
illness where the cause can be determined
or proved. Where cause is unknown or
cannot be ascertained, no duty to prove the
link exists. For certainly, the law cannot
demand an impossibility” (underscoring
supplied).

18.2 It is indeed safe to conclude that the nature of

employment of the late Complainant-appellant contributed
to his illnesses, and therefore, it is but just that
complainant-appellant be duly compensated for it. It cannot
be denied that there was a reasonable connection between
the Complainant-appellant’s job and his illnesses. While on
board the respondents-appellees’ vessels for years, he
was exposed to harsh sea weather, chemical irritants,
dusts, etc., all of which invariably contributed to his illness.
 10

- Providing expenses for

medication is an admission
of the compensability of
the Complainant-
appellant’s illnesses.
_____________________________

19. This Honorable Office should consider in rejecting

respondents-appellees’ misleading argument that complainant’s
illness is not work-related the fact that respondents-appellees paid the
complainant-appellant’s sickness allowance for a period of 120 days
and shouldered the medical expenses of complainant-appellant. As
respondents-appellees are willing to spend further for the medication
of the Complainant-appellant, this is an admission of the
compensability of his illness. In fact, they have commenced the
medication process.
20. As noted in complainant-appellant’s Position Paper, he
received sickness allowance from April 19, 2014 to August 5, 2014.
Complainant-appellant also went to the doctor several times to have
himself checked up. The results indicated that he was suffering from
Type II Diabetes7 and is unfit for sea duty. He also had blurred vision
after the incident on board the ship, thus was required by the
ophthalmologist to get a new pair of glasses8.

21. This Honorable Office should further consider the wisdom

of the ruling of the Supreme Court in the recent case of Heirs of Jessie
David vs. OSG Shipmanagement Manila, Inc. and/or Michaelmar
Shipping Services9 that utilized the “disputable presumptions”
principle in connection with disability benefits claims.
22. Although the said case mentioned only sickness
allowance, said ruling is equally applicable in the instant case wherein
the private respondents have commenced spending for the petitioner’s
medication. Section 20(A)(3) of the POEA contract enumerates the
three classes of benefits the seafarers are entitled to if the illness or
injury is considered as work connected:
(a) sickness allowance not to exceed one
hundred twenty (120) days of his basic salary.
(b) medical expenses until such time he is
declared fit or the degree of his disability has been
established by the company-designated physician.

7
Results attached as Annex A to the Complainant’s Position Paper
8
Proof of purchase of glasses attached as Annex B to the Complainant’s Position Paper
9
G.R. No. 197205, September 26, 2012
 11

(c) compensation in accordance with the

schedule of benefits governed by the rates and the
rules of compensation.
23. The Supreme Court stressed in the Heirs of Jessie David
vs. OSG case that there is implied admission of the compensability of
the seafarer’s illness when the company paid the seafarer sickness
allowance. The Court emphasized that this may be considered as
recognition that the illness was work related because under the POEA
contract, sickness allowance is payable only when a seafarer suffers a
work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract. As such,
an illness recognized as work related at the start cannot evolve into an
illness unconnected to employment.
23.1 As the sickness allowance is a composite
element of the three classes of benefits, then the payment
of medical expenses should likewise be considered as
recognition that the illness was work related.
23.2 Since the word “work-related” phrase preceded
the three sets of disability benefits (sickness allowance,
medical expenses and compensation), thus the payment
of any one of them makes the illness compensable using
the ejusdem generic interpretation principle. The principle
in statutory construction of ejusdem generic should be
applied, i.e., "where general words follow an enumeration
of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed in
their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to
persons or things of the same kind or class as those
specifically mentioned"10.
The Supreme Court has ruled
that diabetes mellitus is
compensable.
24. The Honorable Office should note that the Supreme Court
ruled that disability or death due to “diabetes mellitus” is
compensable. In Barcenas vs. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission11 the Supreme Court held that:
“The succinct exposition in Flores vs. Workmen's
Compensation Commission12, where the Court,
confronted with a comparable situation, ruled that diabetes

10
United Residents of Dominican Hill, Inc. vs. Commission on Settlement of Land Problems, 352 SCRA 782; PNOC Shipping
and Transport Corporation vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 107518, 297 SCRA 402, 422; Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd. vs. Register of
Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58
11
158 SCRA 314
12
G.R. No. L-43540, March 14, 1979, 89 SCRA 89
 12

mellitus was compensable under the Workmen's

Compensation Act, bears repeating:

From the foregoing contentions, the

determinative issue in this petition for review
which We consider as a Special Civil Action for
Certiorari, in Order to expedite its resolution, is
whether petitioner's illnesses, i.e., diabetes
mellitus, with asthmatic bronchitis, pneumonitis
and hypertension are compensable under the
Workmen's Compensation Law, which, in turn
may be resolved through a determination of
whether or not said illnesses have been the
direct cause of or were aggravated by his
employment with respondent Development
Bank of the Philippines.

This case is not one of first impression. In the very

recent case of Sevilla vs. Workmen's Compensation
Commission, et al., the First Division of this Court
speaking thru Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma, ruled in favor
of compensability of diabetes mellitus quoting the oft cited
case of Abana vs. Quisumbing. This Court held:

While there is that possibility that factors

other than the employment of the claimant
may also have contributed to the
aggravation of his illness, this is not a
drawback to its compensability. For, under
the law, it is not required that the
employment be the sole factor in the
growth, development or acceleration of
claimant's illness to entitle him to the
benefits provided for. It is enough that his
employment had contributed, even in a
small degree, to the development of the
disease. It has been repeatedly held that
under the Workmen's Compensation Law, it is
not necessary for a claimant to carry the
burden of proof to establish his case to the
point of demonstration. It is sufficient to show
that the hypothesis on which he bases his claim
is probable.

The Court further emphasized that the

exact medical cause of the illness of an
employee is not significant, for, granted for
argument's sake, that the evidence of the
 13

claimant is insufficient to show a causal link

between the nature of his employment and his
ailment, under the provisions of Section 44 of
the Workmen's Compensation Act, as
amended, it is to be presumed that the
claimant's illnesses which supervened at the
time of his employment, either arose out of, or
was at least aggravated by, said employment,
and that with this legal presumption, the burden
of proof shifts to the employer, and the
employee is relieved of the burden to show
causation. [Emphasis supplied.] “

25. The foregoing finds even more significance in view of the

fact that Respondents-appellees’ acquiescence to hire the
Complainant-appellant, despite the latter being diagnosed of Diabetes
Mellitus. As such, Respondents-appellees assumed the risk of liability
when they took in the Complainant-appellant, with his medical
infirmities.

- The seafarer’s working

environment aggravated
his illnesses.
________________________________
26. In various cases, the Supreme Court acknowledged the
fact that the working condition on board the vessel can aggravate the
seafarer’s medical condition, regardless if the illness is listed or not as
occupational diseases. The seafarer’s constant exposure to hazards
such as chemicals and the varying temperature, coupled by stressful
tasks in his employment caused the aggravation of a seafarer’s
medical condition.

27. Although the word “aggravate” does not appear in the

definition of work-related illnesses under the POEA-standard
employment contract, the Supreme Court nevertheless interpreted
such phrase “work-connected” to include the so-called “aggravation
theory”. This theory of “aggravation” was utilized by the Supreme Court
in the 2013 case of Magsaysay vs. Laurel 13 wherein it ruled that the
Court finds a reasonable work connection between condition at work
and the development of the medical condition. The seafarer’s constant
exposure to hazards such as chemicals and the varying temperature,
like the heat in the kitchen of the vessel and the coldness outside,

13
March 20, 2013 GR 195518
 14

coupled by stressful tasks in his employment caused, or at least

aggravated, his illness.
22. Moreover, the Supreme Court, expounded their
“aggravation principle” in the case of Remigio vs. NLRC14citing More
Maritime Agencies Inc., et al vs. NLRC 15 ruled that:
“Compensability of an ailment does not depend on
whether the injury or disease was pre-existing at the time
of the employment but rather if the disease or injury is work
related or aggravated his condition. It is indeed safe to
presume that, at the very least, the arduous nature of
his employment had contributed to the aggravation of
the injury, if indeed it was pre-existing at the time of his
employment. Therefore, it is but just that he be duly
compensated for it. “The court noted in the above case that
seafarer's job required him to enter a manhole accessible
only in a crouching position and carry a 20-liter canister to
collect carbon, mud, and oil deposited inside the cylinders
of the ship's air trunk, found that his chronic low back pain,
which indicated a slipped disc, was work-related.
23. There is no denial that the complainant-appellant’s illness,
which is aggravated by his work environment, is compensable in view
of the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Villaviaje vs. Marinduque
Mining and Industrial Corp. 16 that:
“As early as Batangas Transportation Co. vs. Vda.
De Rivera (99 Phil 1056) in 1956 and Bohol Land
Transportation Co. vs. De Madanguit (70 Phil 685)
to Felarca vs. Bookman, Inc. (127 SCRA 275) in
1984, this court has consistently ruled that “It is to be
presumed, as mandated by Section 44 of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act, that the employee’s
illness which supervened during his employment,
either arose out or at least aggravated by
said employment and with this legal presumption,
the burden of proof shifts to the employer and the
employee is relieved of the burden to show
causation.”
24. In the case of Seagull Shipmanagement and Transport,
Inc. vs. NLRC17, the Supreme Court awarded benefits to the heirs of
the seafarer therein who worked as a radioman on board a vessel; and

14
487 SCRA 190
15
307 SCRA 189
16
132 SCRA 622
17
388 Phil. 906
 15

who, after ten months from his latest deployment, suffered from bouts
of coughing and shortness of breath, necessitating open heart surgery.
The Supreme Court found in said case that the seafarer's work
exposed him to different climates and unpredictable weather, which
could trigger a heart attack or heart failure. The court likewise ruled in
said case that the seafarer had served the contract for a significantly
long amount of time, and that his employment had contributed, even to
a small degree, to the development and exacerbation of his disease.
25. The exact cause of the ailment suffered by a claimant is
not significant, and the possibility that factors other than the
employment, such as advancing age, may have caused or contributed
to the development of the ailment, is not a drawback; for what is
material and decisive is that the employment contributed even in a
small degree in aggravating the ailment.18 It has been repeatedly held
by the Supreme Court that once an illness is shown to have
supervened in the course of employment, there arises a rebuttable
presumption in law that illness arose out of, or at least was
aggravated by, such employment.19
26. The Court ruled that “where the cause of the illness of the
claimant or of the death of the deceased is not definitely determinable,
the medical report of findings presented by the employer does not or
cannot constitute substantial evidence to prevail over the presumption
of compensability and aggravation and thus defeat the compensability
of the claim."20
27. As the employee’s illnesses were the "precipitating factors
that triggered” the medical condition which were "attributable to his
employment"21 consequently complainant-appellant's claim to
compensation must be upheld.
28. The above-cited cases utilizes “the aggravation rule” which
provides that, where an employment injury worsens or combines with
a preexisting impairment to produce a disability greater than that which
would have resulted from the employment injury alone, the entire
resulting disability is compensable. In short an employer is liable under
the aggravation rule when an employment injury creates, worsens, or
combines with a preexisting condition to create a new and greater
disability. An employer is liable for employment conditions that cause
an injury or aggravate or accelerate a pre-existing condition under the

18
Calvero vs. E.C.C., 117 SCRA 452; Balatero vs. ECC, 95 SCRA 608, 614.
19
Pillsburg Mindanao Flour Milling Co., Inc. vs. Murillo, 81 SCRA 306; Lorenzo vs. WCC, 81 SCRA 434; Trinidad vs. WCC,
81 SCRA 668; Vda. de Torres vs. Warner Barnes & Co., Inc., 81 SCRA 682; Martillo vs. Republic, 83 SCRA 519; Delana
vs. WCC, 83 SCRA 528; Eliseo vs. WCC, 84 SCRA 188; Abordo vs. WCC, 84 SCRA 385; Lamco vs. WCC, 84 SCRA 401;
and Parisan vs. WCC, 84 SCRA 713; Nisda vs. Sea Serve Maritime Agency, G.R. No. 179177, 23 July 2009.
20
Lao vs. ECC 97 SCRA 780, 791
21
Mondejar vs. WCC, 77 SCRA 301.
 16

aggravation rule, which dictates that the employer takes the employee
as he finds him.22
29. The degree of proof required to validate work connection is
merely substantial evidence, that is, such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and not direct
causal relation. It is enough that the hypothesis on which the
workmen's claim is based is probable.23 Probability, not the ultimate
degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation proceedings.24
The complainant-appellant’s
illness is compensable due to
Stress.
________________________________

30. In addition, the compensability of the seafarer’s medical

conditions is proper in view of the Supreme Court’s acknowledgment
that the working condition on board the vessel can aggravate the
seafarer’s medical condition as any kind of work or labor produces
stress and strain normally resulting in wear and tear of the human
body.25

31. A study properly identified “stress” as one of the factors that

caused the seafarer’s illness, stress and climate changes likewise
permeate his working environment as with that of any other seafarer.
These factors confirm the existence of a reasonable connection
between the nature of the seafarer's work and the onset of his illness.
26

32. The Supreme Court further noted that chronic stress can
cause a lot of different problems, and if not managed, it can ultimately
lead to a medical condition. xxx. There is no question that stress is a
culprit in many disorders.27
33. In the case of GSIS vs. Cuntapay28 the Supreme Court
explained:
"Medical researchers are n[o]t sure exactly how
stress increases the risk of heart disease. Stress itself
might be a risk factor, or it could be that high levels of stress
make other risk factors (such as high cholesterol or high
blood pressure) worse. For example, if you are under

22
http://definitions.uslegal.com/a/aggravation-rule/
23
Castor-Garupa vs. ECC, G.R. No. 158268, April 12, 2006 and GSIS vs. Valenciano, April 10, 2006.
24
Government Service Insurance System vs. Cuanang, 430 SCRA 639, 646, citing Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc.
vs. NLRC, 353 SCRA 47, 53.
25
Ranises vs. ECC, 504 Phil. 340, 345; GSIS vs. Villareal, 520 SCRA 741, 746.
26
Maersk Filipinas Crewing Inc vs. Mesina, 697 SCRA 601.
27
Magsaysay vs. Laurel, March 20, 2013, G.R. 195518
28
G.R. 168862 April 13, 2008
 17

stress, your blood pressure goes up, you may overeat, you
may exercise less and you may be more likely to smoke.”
34. In a study made by research associates at the Centre for
Occupational and Health Psychology at Cardiff University, Rachel
McNamara, Alison Collins and Victoria Matthews in coordination with
the Seafarers International Research Centre, they noted that the
seafarer’s illness is caused by the stress on board the vessel. They
said:
“Seafaring is a dangerous occupation because it
includes a number of workplace dangers in combination,
something rare in other industries. Seafarers are exposed
to extreme weather conditions: rough seas and storms
result in the rolling and pitching of the ship, leading to an
unstable environment that makes physical work difficult.
Increasingly, shipping regulators, owners and trade
unions alike are becoming aware that such conditions,
along with ship type, minimal manning, rapid turnaround,
short sea passages and traffic conditions, may find
seafarers working long hours without sufficient rest. These
factors will undoubtedly result in fatigue, which has
potentially disastrous consequences both for the individual
in terms of reduced performance and poor health (for
example, ulcers, hypertension and hearing loss as a result
of excessively noisy machinery and vibration).29

35. Seafarers are often faced with time pressure and hectic
activity during their voyage. The International Labour Organization
(ILO, 2006) determined the maximum working times of sea farers to be
14 hours per day. In seafaring, this time span is often considerably
exceeded, especially on ships with frequent port clearances. This
study reveals that the long working days, heat in work places,
separation from their family, time pressure / hectic activities, and
insufficient qualifications of subordinate crew members are the most
important stressors on board. The seafarers with higher stress due to
heat in shipboard operations had shorter job duration at sea. The
stressors of heat and noise show that physical stressors on ships
currently are still very important in spite of the increasing
mechanization in seafaring. Extremely high number of working hours
over a lengthier period of time combined with a lack of sleep can elicit
chronic fatigue, health problems and safety risks on the vessels. 30
36. Most seafarers are exposed to ongoing elevated stress
levels something which has a negative impact on physical and mental

29
http://www.sirc.cf.ac.uk/uploads/publications/Review%20Fatigue%20Offshore%20Shipping.
30
“A STUDY ON THE FACTORS INFLUENCING THE SEAFARERS’ STRESS by J. Rengamani and Dr. M Sakthivel
Murugan published in Dec. 2012, AMET International Journal of Management,
(http://www.ametjournal.com/attachment/ametjournal-4/Dev-Article-6-Rengamani.pdf
 18

health not to mention that it can lower work performance. Of course

depending on the duties that have been assigned to someone there
might be variations of stress levels due to the type and nature of the
work. One of the major sources of stress is the overlap between home
and work. Stress is usually produced when the people have to cope
with demands which exceed their ability to meet them. Stress can be
caused by work-related factors or it may have to do with the private
lives of the seafarer (being away from home etc.). According to the
study, the factors presented below more or less affect the seafarers’
health:31
1. Watch patterns
2. Work overload, which can also lead to Chronic
Responsibility Syndrome
3. Tasks that are made unnecessarily difficult
mainly because of the work environment (noise,
vibration, confined space etc.) that the seafarer
has to face onboard
4. Health worries about contact with dangerous
cargos and materials
5. Adverse weather
6. Employment worries about changes to the
industry
7. Social isolation and loneliness mainly attributed
to the difficult communication between crews of
mixed cultures
8. Loss of contact with friends and family
9. Home leave worries
37. The Supreme Court reiterated this principle in its ruling in
the Heirs of the Late R/O Reynaldo Aniban vs. NLRC32 that a ship
radio operator, who was healthy when he boarded his vessel, died of
myocardial infarction three months later. It ruled that his disease is
compensable on the ground that any kind of work or labor produces
stress and strain normally resulting in wear and tear of the human
body.
38. The Supreme Court, in affirming the Court of Appeals
decision in the case of Oriental Shipmgt. Co., Inc. vs. Bastol 33
emphasized that what makes the job more difficult, aside from
exposure to fluctuating temperatures caused by variant weather
changes, the job obviously entails laborious manual tasks conducted
in a moving ship, which makes for increased work-related stress. All
these factors may have exacerbated seafarer’s heart condition.
31
http://officerofthewatch.com/2012/04/22/seafarers-health-lifestyle/)31
32
282 SCRA 377
33
G.R. 168269 January 29, 2010
 19

Prolonged and continued exposure to the same could probably risk the
seafarer to another attack.
39. This principle was explicitly explained by the Supreme
Court when it ruled that “it is sufficient to say that an injury is received
34

in the course of the employment when it comes while the workman is

performing the duty in which he is employed. It arises out of the
employment when there is apparent to the rational mind upon
consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between
the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and
the resulting injury. Under this test, if the injury can be seen to have
followed as a natural incident of the work and to have been
contemplated by a reasonable person familiar with the whole situation
as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the
employment, then it arises "out of" the employment. Thus, with the
laborer constantly being exposed to the elements of nature and
considering the great physical strain which he had to bear, a stroke or
cerebro vascular accident may fairly be expected. The physical effort
and the periodic urgency involved in the duties of a stevedore may
cause a great increase in blood pressure, straining the vascular system
of the body. Occurring repeatedly and over a long period of time, a
stroke is validly foreseeable. Even a single heavy load, at a single point
in time, may cause the same cerebro vascular accident to a laborer
who has neither tools nor machines to aid him in his tasks bearing the
onus of making a living with only his body and raw physical strength. It
is to be expected that after working continuously as such for more than
thirty (30) years, expending his natural energies, the same would take
a toll on the worker wearing him away to finally succumb to illness or
injury. Thus, the fact of causality of the deceased employee's illness or
accident by his employment is demonstrated. The conclusion of
compensability is inevitable.”
- The Certificate of Fitness
to work, signed by the
Complainant-appellant
must be set aside.
__________________________
40. The respondents-appellees erroneously argued that
complainant-appellant’s Certificate of Fitness to Work is binding.
40.1 It is a well-known nefarious industry practice
that before manning agencies give an injured seafarer the
disability and other benefits due them, these agencies,
insulate themselves from litigation and to deny the hapless

34
Vda de Pongan vs. WCC, May 27, 1985, GR. No. 42419
 20

seafarer the proper compensation due them, often times

require the seafarer claimant to sign a waiver / quitclaim,
or in this instance, a certificate of fitness to work, as a
precondition to releasing funds to a seafarer, often in the
guise of “financial assistance” or “common courtesy”, AS
IN THIS CASE. Unfortunately for this complainant, his dire
financial condition forced him to sign said document
without properly being appraised of its legal
consequences.
41. Complainant-appellant merely signed the documents in
order to procure his sickness allowance. The signed documents were
merely a predesignated scheme to evade payment of disability
benefits.35
42. Thus, Complainant-appellant had no intention to relinquish
his rights, nor was he duly assisted by counsel nor aided by a
competent third person when he signed the said documents.
43. The certificate of fitness to work executed by complainant-
appellant cannot prevail in the instant case as complainant-appellant,
being a seafarer and untrained in the medical arts, is not in possession
of sufficient knowledge to expertly asses his true and correct health
status. For while a person can assess his general health, he cannot do
so with respect to his medical condition which undoubtedly require a
trained man learned in the medical arts, to properly diagnose and treat.
It could not be said that a layman possess the requisite level of
knowledge and expertise which took years of learning and experience
for a trained cardiologist to acquire. Therefore, respondent-appellees’
act of preying upon the ignorance of the complainant-appellant must
not be countenanced by this Honorable Office.
44. Further, given the circumstances surrounding the
execution of the certificate of fitness by the complainant-appellant, the
signed certificate of fitness to work is akin to a waiver or quitclaim. It
has been categorically declared by the Honorable Supreme Court in
Marcos vs. NLRC36, that quitclaims are frowned upon for being against
public policy, to wit:
“Under prevailing jurisprudence, the fact that an employee
has signed a satisfaction receipt for his claims does not
necessarily result in the waiver thereof. The law does not
consider as valid any agreement whereby a worker agrees
35
INTER-ORIENT MARITIME, INCORPORATED and/or TANKOIL CARRIERS, LIMITED,
CRISTINA CANDAVA, G.R. No. 201251 June 26, 2013
[11] Mercury Drug vs. Dayao, 202 Phil 424
[12] Cariño vs. ACCFA, L-19808, Sept. 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 183; Philippine
Sugar Institute vs. CIR, L-13475, Sept. 29, 1960, 109 Phil. 452; Mercury
Drug Co. vs. CIR, L-23357, April 30, 1974, 56 SCRA 694, 704.
[13] L-19808, Sept. 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 183
[14] 366 Phil. 646, 653-654 (1999).
[15] Varorient Shipping Co. vs. Flores October 6, 2010 161934
[16] RECEIPT AND QUITCLAIM
36
G.R. No. 111744 September 8, 1995
 21

to receive less compensation than what he is entitled to

recover. A deed of release or quitclaim cannot bar an
employee from demanding benefits to which he is legally
entitled.
We have heretofore explained that the reason why
quitclaims commonly frowned upon as contrary to public
policy, and why they are held to be ineffective to bar claims
for the full measure of the workers' legal rights, is the fact
that the employer and the employee obviously do not stand
on the same footing. The employer drove the employee to
the wall. The latter must have harsh necessities of life. He
thus found himself in no position to resist money proffered.
His, then, is a case of adherence, not of choice. One thing
sure, however, is that petitioners did not relent on their
claim. They pressed it. They are deemed not have waived
any of their rights. Renuntiatio non praesumitur.
Along this line, we have more trenchantly declared that
quitclaims and/or complete releases executed by the
employees do not estop them from pursuing their claims
arising from unfair labor practices of the employer. The
basic reason for this is that such quitclaims and/or
complete releases are against public policy and, therefore,
null and void. The acceptance of termination does not
divest a laborer of the right to prosecute his employer for
unfair labor practice acts.”
45. Further, the Honorable Supreme Court, in Periquet vs.
NLRC,37 this Court set the guidelines and the current doctrinal policy
regarding quitclaims and waivers, as follows:
“While rights may be waived, the same must not be
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good
customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law.

‘Article 6 of the Civil Code renders a quitclaim

agreement void ab initio where the quitclaim obligates the
workers concerned to forego their benefits while at the
same time exempting the employer from any liability that it
may choose to reject. This runs counter to Art. 22 of the
Civil Code which provides that no one shall be unjustly
enriched at the expense of another.’”
46. Moreover, it must be stressed that the POEA SEC
recognizes the right of seafarers to seek a second opinion to contest
the certification issued by the company doctor, in this case, the “fit to

37
248 SCRA 146, 152-153, September 8, 1995, per Regalado, J
 22

work” certification. To insist that the seafarer is barred from seeking

opinion is tantamount to a violation of the POEA SEC’s terms and
conditions.
47. From the foregoing, it is clear that this Honorable Office
must not take against complainant-appellant his signed certificate of
fitness, as complainant-appellant was made to sign the same in
violation of public policy.
I. Complainant - appellant is
entitled to Total Disability
Benefits.
__________________________

48. The employment of seafarers, including claims for disability

benefits, are governed by the contracts they sign every time they are
hired or rehired; and as long as the stipulations therein are not contrary
to law, morals, public order or public policy, they have the force of law
between the parties.38

49. It is elementary in contract laws that a contract entered into

by the parties, is deemed to include provisions of positive law which
regulate such contract. Thus, in the case of Asia World Recruitment,
Inc. vs. NLRC39, the Honorable Supreme Court held, to wit:

Although a contract is the law between the parties,

the provisions of positive law which regulate such contracts
are deemed included and shall limit and govern the
relations between the parties.
50. As carved out by the Honorable Supreme Court in the case
of Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. vs. NLRC,40 recovery of disability
and death benefits after finding that there was a reasonable connection
between the seafarer's job and his medical condition is compensable.

51. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a worker

brings with him possible infirmities in the course of his employment and
while the employer is not the insurer of the health of the employees,
he takes them as he finds them and assumes the risk of liability.41

52. Accordingly, the Complainant-appellant is entitled to

receive the disability benefits provided under his collective
agreement42 amounting to Ninety Three Thousand One Hundred Fifty
Four US Dollars (US$93,154.00).

38
Coastal Safeway Marine Services, Inc. vs. Delgado, G.R. No. 168210, June 17, 2008.
39
313 SCRA 1.
40
376 Phil. 738
41
Inter-Orient Maritime, Inc., et al. vs. Candava, G.R. No. 201251, June 26, 2013.
42
CBA attached as Annex C to the Complainant’s Position Paper
 23

53. Regarding the issue of compensability, it has been the

Supreme Court's consistent ruling that in disability compensation, "it is
not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to
work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity."43
Permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn
wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature that [he] was
trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a
person of [his] mentality and attainment could do. Disability need not
render the seafarer absolutely helpless or feeble to be compensable;
it is enough that it incapacitates to perform his customary work.44
54. Respondents-appellees cannot deny the fact that a
seafarer suffering from any of medical conditions, as in Complainant-
appellant’s case, will be considered more of a liability than an asset if
he is allowed to go on board the vessel. He would no longer be able to
perform strenuous activities such as the rigorous duties of a seafarer
as he already got dizzy and experienced a mild stroke while on board
Respondent-appellees vessel.

55. The present case is no different. Here, it is clear that the

Complainant-appellant suffered a mild stroke and is suffering from
diabetes due to the stress and fatigue that he suffered during his stint
on-board Respondent’s vessel and within effectivity of his POEA
Contract. In fact, he was medically repatriated due to said illness.

56. The foregoing finds even more significance in view of the

fact that Respondents-appellees’ acquiescence to hire the
Complainant-appellant, despite the latter being diagnosed of Diabetes
Mellitus. As such, Respondents-appellees assumed the risk of liability
when they took in the Complainant-appellant, with his medical
infirmities.
57. Undeniably, the Complainant-appellant suffered from total
permanent disability because he was no longer employed as a
seafarer, a profession he had been engaged in for years prior to his
medical repatriation. In the case of Seagull Maritime Corp., et al. vs.
Jaycee Dee, et al.45 where the seafarer’s left foot was injured, the
Supreme Court ruled that the seafarer’s disability was permanent and
total as no profit-minded employer would hire the seafarer even if the
injury was confined to his left foot:
“Besides, we have consistently ruled that disability is
intimately related to one’s earning capacity. The test to
determine its gravity is the impairment or loss of one’s
capacity to earn and not its mere medical significance.
43
Valenzona vs. Fair Shipping Corporation, 659 SCRA 642, 652-653, Quitoriano vs. Jebsens Maritime, Inc., 610 SCRA
529, 536; Lloreta vs. PTC, 607 SCRA 796, 804, Philimare, Inc./Marlow Navigation Company, Ltd. vs. Suganob, 579 Phil.
706, 715; Austria vs. Court of Appeals, 387 SCRA 216, 221.
44
Seagull Maritime Corporation vs. Dee, 520 SCRA 109.
45
520 SCRA 109.
 24

Permanent total disability means disablement of an

employee to earn wages in the same kind of work or work
of a similar nature that he was trained for or accustomed to
perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality
and attainment can do. It does not mean state of absolute
helplessness but inability to do substantially all material
acts necessary to the prosecution of a gainful occupation
without serious discomfort or pain and without material
injury or danger to life.20 In disability compensation, it is not
the injury per se which is compensated but the incapacity
to work.
Although private respondent’s injury was undeniably
confined to his left foot only, we cannot close our eyes, as
respondents would like us to, to the inescapable impact of
private respondent’s injury on his capacity to work as a
seaman. In their desire to escape liability from private
respondent’s rightful claim, respondents denigrated the
fact that even if private respondent insists on continuing to
work as a seaman, no profit-minded employer will hire him.
His injury erased all these possibilities.”
58. It is well-settled in labor law that disability refers to the loss
or impairment of earning capacity.46 Permanent total disability
means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of
work, or work of similar nature that [he] was trained for or accustomed
to perform, or any kind of work which a person of [his] mentality and
attainment could do.
59. Subparagraph no. 6, paragraph B “Compensation and
Benefits for Injury” of Section 20 contained in the POEA Standard
Employment Contract provides:
“In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer
caused by either injury or illness the seafarer shall be compensated in
accordance with the schedule of benefits arising from an illness or
disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation
applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted”.
II. Respondents - appellees
are solidarily liable to pay
Complainant-appellant
moral and exemplary
damages, as well as
attorney’s fees.
________________________________

46 ]
Philimare Inc. vs. Suganob, G.R. No. 168753 (July 9, 2008); Austria vs. Court of Appeals (387 SCRA 216, 221)
 25

60. Complainant-appellant suffers and continues to suffer

tremendous pain and tribulation due to his illness. Coupled with
Respondents-appellees’ indifference to his cause, Complainant-
appellant suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation and social
humiliation experienced on account of the Respondents-appellees’
unfounded attempt to abscond from their liability and paint them as
financially motivated litigants.
61. Respondents-appellees’ indifference to Complainant-
appellant’s plight is simply intolerable. Respondents-appellees’ act of
unduly withholding the disability benefits due to the Complainant-
appellant is tainted with bad faith. Clearly, such acts of bad faith must
not be countenanced by this Honorable Office. Under the foregoing,
Complainant-appellant thus becomes entitled to payment of moral
damages in the amount of at least One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00).
62. Moral damages may be awarded to compensate one for
diverse injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings and social humiliation.47
63. Similarly, Respondents-appellees should be made to pay
he Complainant-appellant exemplary damages in the amount of at
least One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) to set an example
for public good and to avoid the repetition of a similar offense.
Respondents-appellees wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive and
malevolent manner in treating Complainant-appellant cannot be
tolerated. Thus, Respondents-appellees should be made to pay
complainant exemplary damages.
64. As stated above, Complainant-appellant exhausted all
opportunity to avoid litigating the present case and attempted in good
faith to reach an amicable arrangement with Respondents-appellees.
However, Respondents-appellees ignored Complainant-appellant’s
efforts of reaching out to them and only gave him attention when the
instant case was already filed. Accordingly, Respondents-appellees
must be directed to pay attorney’s fees in this case.

47Guita vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 60409, November 11, 1985, 139 SCRA 576 cited in Suario vs. Bank of the
Philippine Islands, et al., G.R. No. 50459, August 25, 1989; R & B Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, et al., G.R. No. 64515, June 22, 1984,129 SCRA 736.
 26

Prayer
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Complainant-appellant
Hermito Roel C. Valorozo, prays that the Decision of the Honorable
Labor Arbiter dated February 13, 2018 be REVERSED and anew one
be issued DIRECTING Respondents-appellees to pay Complainant-
appellant the following:
1. Total permanent disability benefits provided
under his Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) amounting to Ninety Three Thousand
Fifty Four US Dollars (US$93,154.00);
2. Moral damages in the amount of at least One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00); and
3. Exemplary damages in the amount of at least
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00)
4. Attorney’s fees equivalent to at least 10% of the
total monetary award.
Other reliefs and remedies as this Honorable Commission may
deem just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.
Makati City for Quezon City, March 1, 2018.

SAPALO VELEZ BUNDANG & BULILAN

Counsel for the Complainant-Appellant
11th Floor, Security Bank Centre
6776 Ayala Avenue, Makati City 1200
Email Address: info@sapalovelez.com
Tel. (632) 891 1316; Fax (632) 8911198

By:

DENNIS R. GORECHO
Attorney’s Roll No. 44352
PTR No. 6619050; Makati City; 01-04-2018
IBP No. 020996; PPLM; 01-04-2018
MCLE Compliance No. V-0016897; Pasig
City; 03-16-2016

IGNACIO A. SAPALO
Attorney’s Roll No. 58497
PTR No. 6619055; Makati-01-04-2018
IBP LRN No. 010114; 06-29-2011; PPLM
MCLE Compliance V No. 0007748; 3-28-2012
 27

Served to:

DEL ROSARIO & DEL ROSARIO

Counsel for Respondents-appellees
14th Floor, DelRosarioLaw Centre
21st Drive cor. 20th Drive
Bonifacio Global City
1630 Taguig City

EXPLANATION ON MODE OF SERVICE and/or FILING

I declare that on March 1, 2018, I served and/or filed copies of
Notice with Memorandum of Appeal by registered mail under Registry
Receipts Nos. _________________ in the manner prescribed by the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 13, §7 because personal mode is
impractical and expensive in view of distance or time constraints.

IGNACIO A. SAPALO