PEOPLE vs. JUMAWAN31 SCRA 825G.R. No.

L-28060, February 27, 1970

Teehankee, J.
FACTS: This case refers to the trial Court’s judgment on June 5, 1967, it was shown that theaccused
collected amounts from customers of the business firms, namely; MontelDiscount Center, the Iloilo
Enterprises and the Piamonte, Bros. for being an agent oncommission basis. The said collections were
returned to the firms, but on oneinstance, he refused to turn over the collections for July and August
1965 to the Mon-tel Discount Center. He also rejected the demand letter of the company for
thepayment of Fifty Five (Php55.00) pesos. The accused contended that he did not return the money
because Mr. ManuelPiamonte, his real original principal, has not paid and refuses to pay him
hiscommission, on account of business losses. He further alleged that he should havebeen paid by the
complainant the amount of P1.50 per day as his earnedcommissions. Supposedly, the amount he
withheld which constitutes his accruedcommissions is equivalent to or more than what he should
receive from Mr. Piamonteas payment considering that he was able to turn over the full amount of
Php65.00 tohim. Thus, the City Court of San Carlos City (Negros Occidental) in its judgment find
theaccused-appellant guilty of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RevisedPenal Code, for
having retained in his possession even after demand, his lastcollections in the amount of P55.00, due
to non-payment of his accrued commissionsin the larger amount of P65.00 earned on previous
collections actually turned over, aswell as non-payment of his expense allowance of P1.50 per day, the
trial court basedits verdict solely on its rejection of appellant’s defense that he had such right of
retention under Articles 1912 to 1914 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:Whether or not the accused should be held liable for estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code?

HELD:Appellant contended that there was an error when the trial Court made no ruling onhis lack of
criminal intent and the absence of damage or prejudice to his principal.Likewise, it was not even
established that there was a damage or prejudice as anessential element of estafa. Appellant’s
principal could not claim any such damage orprejudice, for appellant had retained and set off merely
in part what was justly andlong due to him, with a balance still owing to him.All these factors, the
absence of criminal intent on appellant’s part and lack of damage or prejudice caused to the principal,
besides the appellant’s proven goodfaith, entitle appellant to a verdict of acquittal.ACCORDINGLY, the
judgment appealed from was set aside; the trial Court’s convictionof Tomas Jumawan was reversed
and he was acquitted of the crime of estafa, withcosts de oficio.

People vs. Tomotorgo (April 30, 1985)

Post under case digests, Criminal Law at Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: Plaintiff was the husband of the victim – Magdalena de los Santos. Magdalena had been
persistently asking her husband to sell their conjugal home in Camarines Sur in order for them to
transfer to the house of her husband’s in-laws. Plaintiff didn’t want to abandon their house because
the improvements that he made to the land since this is where he farms. Said lot had a lot of plants
and was very far from his in-laws place.

Upon returning home from his farm one day, he found his wife and three-month old baby already
gone. He went out to look for them and caught up with them 200 meters from their house. He saw his
wife with their kid and a bundle of clothes. Plaintiff begged for his wife to surrender and when she
refused, they got into a scurry when the plaintiff tried to take their child from his wife. The wife
aroused the ire of the plaintiff when she threw their child onto the grassy portion of the trail. Plaintiff
picked up a wood and began hitting his wife. She fell to the ground and complained of severe chest
pains. Realizing what he had done, he brought her home but she died despite plaintiff’s effort to
alleviate her pain.

Plaintiff brought the piece of wood and reported the incident to the baranggay captain who brought
him to the police. He was charged with parricide and pleaded not guilty. Upon realizing the gravity of
his offense, he changed his plea to guilty. The court found him guilty of parricide but with three
mitigating circumstances – voluntary surrender, plea of guilty and that he acted upon an impulse so
powerful as naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation.

He was given the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant claims that the court handed him the wrong
punishment. Appellant claims that article 49 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the proper
applicable penalty when the crime committed is different from what was intended. If the penalty
prescribed for the felony committed is higher than the offense which the accused wanted to commit,
the penalty corresponding to the later shall be imposed as the maximum period. Appellant avers that
the penalty for the felony committed by him – parricide – was higher than that which he intended to
commit – physical injuries.

Issue: Whether the court imposed the wrong penalty

Held: The judgment is affirmed but the court would recommend that executive clemency be extended
to the accused

Article 4 of the RPC states that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act be different from that which he intended and that accused is liable
for all the consequences of his felonious act.

Article 49 of the RPC does not apply to cases where more serious consequences not intended by the
offender result from his felonious act because under Article 4. Par. 1 of the same code, he is liable for
all the direct and natural consequences of his unlawful act. His lack of intention to commit a grave
wrong is at best mitigating.

People vs Francisco AbarcaG.R. No. 74433September 14, 1987Facts:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte, sentencingthe accused-
appellant Francisco Abarca to death for the complex crime of murder withdouble frustrated
murder.The case was elevated to this Court in view of the death sentence imposed. With theapproval
of the new Constitution, abolishing the penalty of death and commuting allexisting death sentences to
life imprisonment, we required the accused-appellant toinform us whether or not he wished to pursue
the case as an appealed case. In compliancetherewith, he filed a statement informing us that he
wished to continue with the case byway of an appeal.On 15 July 1984 in Tacloban City, the accused,
Francisco Abarca with deliberate intentto kill and with evident premeditation, and with treachery,
armed with an unlicensedfirearm (armalite), M-16 rifle, shot several times Khingsley Paul Koh on the
different parts of his body inflicting upon gunshot wounds which caused his instantaneous deathand
as a consequence of which also caused gunshot wounds to Lina Amparado andArnold Amparado on
the different parts of their bodies which have caused the death of said spouses.
Issue:
W/O accused-appellant is liable for the crime of complex crime of murder with doublefrustrated
murder?
Held:
The case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was not committingmurder when he
discharged his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not murder.
We cannot therefore hold the appellant liablefor frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by the
Amparados.For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we therefore impose uponthe
accused-appellant arresto mayor (in its medium and maximum periods) in itsmaximum period, arresto
to being the graver penalty (than destierro).The decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. The
accused-appellant is sentenced tofour months and 21 days to six months of arresto mayor. The period
within which he has been in confinement shall be credited in the service of these penalties. He is
furthermoreordered to indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00 as and for
hospitalization expense and the sum of P1,500.00 as and for Arnold Amparado's loss of earning
capacity. No special pronouncement as to costs

People vs Francisco AbarcaG.R. No. 74433September 14, 1987Facts:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte, sentencingthe accused-
appellant Francisco Abarca to death for the complex crime of murder withdouble frustrated
murder.The case was elevated to this Court in view of the death sentence imposed. With theapproval
of the new Constitution, abolishing the penalty of death and commuting allexisting death sentences to
life imprisonment, we required the accused-appellant toinform us whether or not he wished to pursue
the case as an appealed case. In compliancetherewith, he filed a statement informing us that he
wished to continue with the case byway of an appeal.On 15 July 1984 in Tacloban City, the accused,
Francisco Abarca with deliberate intentto kill and with evident premeditation, and with treachery,
armed with an unlicensedfirearm (armalite), M-16 rifle, shot several times Khingsley Paul Koh on the
different parts of his body inflicting upon gunshot wounds which caused his instantaneous deathand
as a consequence of which also caused gunshot wounds to Lina Amparado andArnold Amparado on
the different parts of their bodies which have caused the death of said spouses.
Issue:
W/O accused-appellant is liable for the crime of complex crime of murder with doublefrustrated
murder?
Held:
The case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was not committingmurder when he
discharged his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not murder.
We cannot therefore hold the appellant liablefor frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by the
Amparados.For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we therefore impose uponthe
accused-appellant arresto mayor (in its medium and maximum periods) in itsmaximum period, arresto
to being the graver penalty (than destierro).The decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. The
accused-appellant is sentenced tofour months and 21 days to six months of arresto mayor. The period
within which he has been in confinement shall be credited in the service of these penalties. He is
furthermoreordered to indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00 as and for
hospitalization expense and the sum of P1,500.00 as and for Arnold Amparado's loss of earning
capacity. No special pronouncement as to costs

People vs. Cabalhin

(1994)Cabalhin was convicted by the RTC of parricide, homicide, and frustrated homicide
for,respectively, killing his wife, killing his wife’s paramour, and almost killing the paramour’smother
who survived. C. claims that he caught his wife and her paramour in the act of sexualintercourse while
in the paramour’s house (he claims he saw her with her legs apart and theman on top of her), then
stabbed the both of them and then stabbed the paramour’s motherwhen she tried to stop him. On
appeal, C. claims that the exceptional circumstances of Article247 should apply to him. The RTC,
however, greatly considered the testimony of the prosectionwitness, the barangay tanod who testified
that when he saw the wife and the paramour on thatday, all bloodied, the wife was fully dressed while
the paramour was wearing khaki pants andno shirt.

Held: Decision affirmed. Guilty of parricide, homicide and frustrated homicide. The principalquestion is
whether or not appellant killed his wife and her paramour in the act of committingthe sexual act or
immediately thereafter. Findings of fact of the trial courts are given greatweight on appeal, and the
Court finds that there is no reversible error committed by the trialcourt in appreciating the barangay
tanod’s testimony. Under Article 247, the killing of the wifeby the husband (or vice versa) is justified if
the husband kills her while engaged in sexualintercourse with another man or immediately thereafter.
Clearly, in the present case, C. failedto prove that he killed them while in the act or immediately after.
He cannot invoke Article247; hence he is guilty of parricide for killing his wife, homicide for killing her
paramour, andfrustrated homicide for the paramour’s mother.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CAMILO FERRER and ROMEO REYES, accused-
appellants.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In resolving this case, this Court finds occasion to differentiate between a state witness and a
prosecution witness. It also reiterates some well-settled doctrines in appreciating the generic
aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and cruelty.
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated May 15, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Isabela,
Branch 23, finding appellants Camilo Ferrer and Romeo Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder for the fatal assault upon Florante Agtang and imposing on each of them the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and the joint and several payment to the heirs of the victim of the amount of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, plus costs.
Originally charged in the Information filed before the then Court of First Instance of Isabela on
February 18, 1977 were Tomas Agnir or Agner and appellants Ferrer alias Milo and Reyes alias Romy.
The Information alleged as follows:
“That on or about the 27th day of April, 1976, in the municipality of Quirino, province of Isabela,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, together with Juan
Galasi, who is already dead, and four (4) John Does, whose real identities are still unknown, armed with
three (3) firearms, boloes and pointed knives, conspiring and confederating together and all helping
one another, with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill, suddenly and unexpectedly and without giving him chance to defend
himself, assault, attack and stab with sharppointed knives one Florante Agtang, inflicting upon the
latter multiple stab wounds on the different parts of his body which directly caused him instantaneous
death due to acute hemorrhage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”[2]
Arraigned on July 22, 1977 in the Ilocano dialect which they speak and understand, the three accused
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.[3]
The Facts
The facts of the case as summarized[4] by the trial court are as follows:
“The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, including one of the accused Tomas Agner who was
subsequently discharged as a state witness (p. 160, records).
The defense presented the two accused, Camilo Ferrer and Romeo Reyes, Merlita Cajalne, wife of
accused Romeo Reyes, and the parents of Camilo Ferrer, Pedro Ferrer and Quintina Francisco.
From the combined testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, it appears that in the evening of April
27, 1976, Florante Agtang, Apolonio Villanueva and Oscar Viernes, three young men from Dolores,
Quirino, Isabela, went together to barangay Vintar of the same municipality and a neighboring barrio,
to visit ladies of their court - Florante Agtang to the house of one Ester Galasi and Oscar Viernes to the
house of one Leticia Gambalan. Apolonio Villanueva preferred to go with Oscar Viernes and stayed in
the house of Leticia after they conducted Agtang to the house of Ester.
At about 10:00 o’clock that same evening, Florante Agtang dropped by the house of Leticia where his
companions were and bade the duo for all of them to go home. They all went together homebound
when upon reaching the outskirts of barangay Vintar, after they had just passed an Independent
Church not far from the house of Leticia, they heard a whistle and two men emerged from nowhere
and warned them not to run away. The trio stopped and identified themselves. The two unidentified
persons approached and frisked them for hidden weapons with one of the two pointing a long firearm
at them. Apolonio and Oscar were found to be carrying knives while Florante was divested of a
homemade-gun known as “paltik.” Proceeding further as they were ordered to follow, they came upon
a place near a cornfield where four (4) more persons emerged, one of whom was identified as the
accused Tomas Agner. Apolonio was able to flee as he was frightened by their captors that they
would use the knife confiscated from his possession to kill them. Running as fast as he could, he was
shot at but they missed him. Infuriated because of Apolonio’s escape, they started beating Florante
and Oscar before they reached a river bank. They were ferried across the river and upon reaching the
Magsaysay-Quirino boundary near the proposed railroad, the two were again ordered to remove their
clothes with which they used to tie them. After they were tied a certain Doming hit Florante with a
butt of the gun felling him to the ground as a result. Florante lying fallen, Camilo Ferrer and Romeo
Reyes took turns in stabbing their hapless victim. They waylaid Florante and the group left him where
he was slain, including Oscar Viernes who was released but was forewarned not to reveal what
happened to anyone.
The following morning, the incident was reported by Oscar Viernes despite the warning to the
barangay captain of Dolores who in turn reported the same to the police authorities of Quirino,
Isabela. Acting on said report the police found the dead body at the place pointed to by Oscar where
they were maltreated. The body bore multiple stab wounds. Brought to their house the body of
Florante was autopsied by Dr. Luis R. Tamayo, Municipal Health Officer of Roxas, isabela. The findings
of Dr. Tamayo confirmed the presence of several stab wounds and the cause of death was attributed
to acute hemorrhage resulting from said injuries.”
The star witness for the prosecution was Tomas Agnir (or Agner) who, upon motion of the fiscal, was
discharged from the Information by the trial court in order that he could be a state witness. He
testified thus:
Agner was the brother-in-law of Juan Galasi, the latter’s sister being the former’s wife. He and Galasi
co-owned a boat which Agner himself used in ferrying people across the river.[5] In the evening of
April 27, 1976, Galasi, Romeo Reyes, Camilo Ferrer and a certain Domingo or Ding went to his house
and asked him to take them across the river. They warned him that should he refuse to obey them,
they would kill him.[6]
Acceding to the group’s demand, Agner went westward with them to the river. Along the way, they
met Oscar Viernes, Florante Agtang (Actang or Florendo Agtang[7]) and Apolonio Villanueva. Reyes,
Domingo and Ferrer searched the bodies of the three. They got two knives from each of Villanueva
and Viernes and a paltic firearm from Agtang. Near the banana plants, as all of them had resumed
walking to the river, three other persons who were strangers to Agner, joined them. Suddenly,
Villanueva ran away. Domingo shot at but missed Villanueva. Consequently; Domingo, Ferrer and
Reyes tied Agtang and Viernes with what looked like a plastic rope. All of them went to the river
where Agner ferried them across.
They went northward to the proposed railroad. There, Agner was segregated from the group at a
distance of around four (4) meters. From that distance, Agner watched as Domingo struck Agtang’s
mouth with a gun butt, causing him to fall to the ground while Ferrer and Reyes stabbed the victim
several times as he lay helpless. All these happened in the presence of Galasi. Domingo then ordered
Viernes to go home. Agner himself was told by the three unidentified persons to go home with
instructions not to reveal to anyone what had happened otherwise, he too would be killed.
According to Agner, Agtang was assaulted by the group because Galasi, whose daughter was to be
married to Agtang, did not want the marriage to take place as he preferred someone from Magsaysay
to be his daughter’s groom. Domingo was from Aggad, Magsaysay, Isabela.[8]
Villanueva, who was 21 years old when the incident happened, corroborated Agner’ s story. He
testified that, at around 7:00 o’clock in the evening of April 27, 1976, he, together with Viernes and
Agtang, left their place in Dolores, Quirino, Isabela for Vintar (Bintar), another barrio in Quirino.
Negotiating the distance between the two barrios on foot, he and his companions arrived in Vintar at
around 9:00 o’clock that night. They proceeded to the Galasi residence where Agtang visited Ester
Galasi. Then Villanueva accompanied Viernes while the latter visited Leticia Gambalan. After around
two hours, Agtang fetched them and the three of them proceeded home.
Along the way, someone whistled at them. When they came to a halt, two persons approached and
told them not to run. The three young men were told to follow them northward. When they reached a
banana plantation, the two persons, who turned out to be Reyes and Ferrer, whistled and four other
persons came out from hiding. These four men asked the three young men to follow them to the
fields. Of these four men, Villanueva recognized only Agner whom he used to see in Vintar.
When they reached the fields, one of them, whom Villanueva identified later as Ferrer, approached him
and asked for his small bolo (imuco), saying that they would use the bolo in killing him. Frightened,
Villanueva fled into the tobacco field and hid there the whole night. In the morning, he went home
and checked on his companions. He found Viernes but learned that Agtang’s dead body had been
found on the other side of the Mallig River.[9]
Twenty-one-year-old Agtang sustained seven (7) stab wounds on the left chest, right chest,
epigastrium and abdomen. These wounds injured the lungs, heart and stomach and produced
massive hemorrhage. He had four (4) puncture wounds on the right iliac region and two (2) other stab
wounds on the right and left axilla which injured the lungs and also produced extensive hemorrhage.
[10]
Based on the sworn statements executed by Villanueva and Viernes on May 4, 1976,[11] Sgt. Doroteo
Villegas filed a complaint for murder against Agner and five (5) John Does before the Municipal Court
of Quirino.[12] It was from Agner, who executed a sworn statement on June 19, 1976,[13] that Sgt.
Villegas learned the identities of Reyes and Ferrer.[14] Accordingly, Sgt. Villegas filed an amended
complaint naming therein as accused, aside from Agner and Galasi, “Romy Reyes, Milo Perel (sic),
Doming Doe, John Doe (sic), Peter Doe and Bernard Doe.”[15] On August 6, 1976, the Municipal Court
of Quirino[16] ordered the issuance of warrants for the arrest of all the accused but dismissed the case
as regards Galasi who had died.[17] After due investigation, the aforequoted Information was filed.
The Defense: Denial and Alibi
In their defense, appellants interposed denial and alibi, swearing that they were both at home when
the crime was committed. Merlita Cajalne, the wife of Reyes, testified that April 27, 1976 was their
wedding anniversary, having been married on April 27, 1971. After taking their supper with their five
children at 6:00 o’clock that night, they went to bed. She woke up at 6:00 o’clock the following
morning and found her husband still asleep. She was sure that her husband did not leave home
during the night because she got up six (6) times that night to answer the call of nature.[18]
Appellant Reyes testified that he did not even go out of his home in Aga, Delfin Albano, Isabela that
fateful day, much less that evening. He denied having been to Vintar. He was able to go to Quirino
only when he was arrested. The police of Quirino took him from the municipal jail of Delfin Albano.
They rode a jeep from Delfin Albano up to Santiago from where they walked to Quirino. According to
Reyes, Agner implicated him in the murder case because he had not paid Agner for services rendered
in planting and harvesting his (Reyes’) palay.[19]
For his part, appellant Ferrer, who used to farm the land of Antonio Gambalan in Aga, Magsaysay (now
Delfin Albano), testified that he could not have gone to Vintar on April 27, 1976 because his sister,
Margarita, was lying in state at their home. She had died at dusk of April 26, 1976 after she failed to
deliver the child she was carrying.[20]
Pedro Ferrer, appellant’s father, testified that he and his son Camilo, had gone to bed at the same time
in the evening of “a certain day in April, 1976” when they served coffee to some visitors who attended
the wake of his dead daughter, Margarita. On cross-examination, however, Pedro Ferrer declared that
on that day, they were celebrating the death anniversary of their grandmother.[21]
Appellant Ferrer’s 70-year-old mother, Quintina Francisco, could not remember the date of the death
of her daughter Margarita. However, she insisted that on April 27, 1976, her son Camilo was in their
house. On cross-examination, she declared that her daughter Margarita died in the early evening of
April 27, 1976.[22]
As stated above, the trial court held appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder. It found that of the two qualifying circumstances alleged in the information, namely, evident
premeditation and treachery, only the latter was duly proven. Evident premeditation had no factual
basis whereas treachery was sufficiently established by the fact that Agtang was struck with the butt of
a gun and stabbed repeatedly, that he sustained twelve (12) wounds (should be thirteen [13] wounds)
while he was tied and therefore in a defenseless position.
Appellants’ notice of appeal was filed by their counsel of record, Atty. Edwin C. Uy.[23] On September
2, 1992, the Court required him to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him
for his failure to file appellants’ brief within the required period of time.[24] He did file a four-page
brief[25] but failed to explain its late filing. Thus, on November 11, 1992, the Court imposed upon
Atty. Uy a fine of P500 or a 5-day imprisonment for his failure to explain why he did not file the brief
within the prescribed 10-day period. The Court also dismissed him as counsel for the appellants and
appointed the Public Attorney’s Office of the Department of Justice as counsel de oficio.[26]
The Solicitor General filed the appellee’s brief[27] upon receipt of the brief filed by Atty. Uy for the
appellants. Since the Public Attorney’s Office filed its own appellants’ brief on May 6, 1993, the
Solicitor General filed a second appellee’s brief to traverse the contentions of the appellants.[28]
In this appeal, appellants allege through the Public Attorney’s Office that the trial court erred in
convicting them of the crime charged notwithstanding the prosecution’s failure to prove their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Appellants assert that they should not have been convicted on the
testimony of their former co-accused which was not materially corroborated and therefore insufficient,
coming as it did from someone who had his own interest to protect.
In so contending, appellants quote[29] the portion of Agner’s testimony wherein he described the
participation of each of the perpetrators of the crime as follows:
“Q. After you were segregated and brought to a distance of more or less 4 meters what happened, if
any?
A. Camilo Ferrer and Romeo Reyes stabbed Florante Agtang.
Q. About Din/Doming, did he do any from the person of Florante Agtang? (sic)
A. Ding struck with the firearm the mouth of Florante Agtang, sir.
Q. Where was Juan Galasi when Agtang was body harmed (sic) by the persons you mentioned?
A. Juan Galasi was with the group of Romeo Reyes, Camilo Ferrer or a certain Doming, sir.”[30]
Citing Barretto vs. Sandiganbayan[31] wherein the Court held that the testimony of a state witness
which is not materially corroborated is not sufficient for conviction, appellants state that “x x x
although state witness Apolonio Villanueva testified that he recognized the Accused-Appellants on the
night of April 27, 1976, his testimony is however ineffective and incredible considering that when he
was confronted with his sworn statement (Exh. ‘C’) taken by Cpl. Doroteo Villegas and subscribed
before the Municipal Mayor of Quirino, he could hardly explain the inconsistency between his
testimony and his sworn statement.”[32]They then quote that portion of Apolonio Villanueva’ s
testimony wherein he was confronted with his sworn statement.
Apolonio Villanueva was a prosecution witness but not a state witness. Under Section 9 of Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court, a state witness is one of two or more persons jointly charged with the commission
of a crime but who is discharged with his consent as such accused so that he may be a witness for the
State. He shall only be discharged after the court has required the prosecution to present evidence
and his sworn statement at a hearing in support of the discharge and the court is satisfied that the
requirements of Section 9 are present.[33]
In this case, Apolonio Villanueva was not an accused. Having been in the company of Agtang when he
was killed, Villanueva was presented by the prosecution as a witness. It was Tomas Agner who was
originally included as an accused in the information, but before the start of the hearing, he was
discharged as an accused upon the motion of the prosecution in order that he could testify for the
state. While the procedure undertaken in discharging him may be questioned because the trial court
ordered his discharge even before the prosecution had started presenting evidence, it is safe to
assume that said court, in the exercise of its sound discretion,[34] considered as basis for his discharge
the sworn statement Agner executed before the police. Moreover, his discharge was effected upon
the motion of the trial fiscal who, being in possession of evidence ahead of the court and even the
defense, was best qualified to determine who among the accused should be discharged to be a state
witness.[35]
Be that as it may, any legal deficiency attending Agner’s discharge from the information may not affect
the admissibility and credibility of his testimony in the absence of proof to the contrary.[36] The trial
court, upon which is vested the task of assigning probative value to the testimony of a witness, affixed
the stamp of credibility upon the testimony of Agner while treating it with “extreme caution.”[37] In
the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight or substance which could have affected the result of the case, the trial court’s
findings on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal.[38]
Although it is true that Apolonio Villanueva failed to witness the actual assault upon Agtang as he fled
before it transpired, Agner’s sole testimony on that fact stands unaffected. The testimony of a single
witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to sustain a conviction even in the absence of
corroboration[39] unless such corroboration is expressly required by law.[40] Truth is established not
by the number of witnesses but by the quality of their testimonies.[41] Agner’s testimony is in fact
materially corroborated by the wounds sustained by Agtang as reflected in the certification[42]
executed by Dr. Luis R. Tamayo who autopsied the corpse, as well as by the testimony of Dr. Tamayo.
The defense attempted to taint Agner’s testimony by imputing to him a motive for testifying against
the appellants. Through appellant Reyes, the defense hinted that Agner had an axe to grind against
Reyes because the latter failed to pay Agner for manual work performed in Reyes’ farm. Like the trial
court,[43] we find such alleged motive altogether too insignificant to impel any person to implicate an
accused in so grave a crime as murder. For appellant Ferrer’ s part, he himself admitted that while
Agner was an acquaintance, their relationship did not extend beyond that.[44] This clearly implies that
Agner had no reason to testify against appellants other than to tell the truth. The trial court’s
assessment of Agner is illuminative:
“x x x While his testimony should be treated with extreme caution because he was originally indicted,
the same must be analyzed carefully for its probative worth. It is well-settled in our jurisprudence that
where the testimony of one of the accused is credible and corroborated by other witness, the same
cannot be totally discarded by the mere fact that said accused was discharged to be utilized as a
government witness (People vs. Cutura, L-12702, 4 SCRA 663). The narration made by Agner in his
affidavit and his testimony in court is corroborated by witness Apolonio Villanueva.’ The latter
identified Tomas Agner as one of the group of his tormentors and this must have led to the solution of
the crime because Tomas Agner when investigated made a clean breast of what happened (Exhibit “A”,
prosecution, p-17, records), to the extent that he named his co-defendants in the commission of the
crime charged. He pointed to the accused Camilo Ferrer and Romeo Reyes who stabbed Florante
Agtang. His identification of the two could not be said to be tainted with doubt because without
hesitation and with spontaneity he fingered the two accused who stabbed mercilessly the deceased
victim. It could not even be pointed out why Agner had to implicate them to (sic) this gory crime. In
short, he had no known motive to drag them into this case. The claim of accused Ferrer that he did
not pay the wages of Agner during the latter’s brief stint in the ricefield of Ferrer as a farm helper must
have motivated him to point him, is too shallow a pretense, if not puerile, to be given even the most
scant consideration. Absent (sic) of any motive on the part of Agner to include accused Reyes is also
worthy of note. No person worth his salt would in conscience point to a person without any known
motive as in the case of other accused, Romeo Reyes.”[45]
With respect to the alleged inconsistencies between the testimony and the sworn statement of
Apolonio Villanueva or between his testimony and the sworn statement of Viernes which, appellants
assert, rendered Villanueva’s credibility doubtful, the Court has time and again held that discrepancies
between sworn statements or affidavits and testimonies made at the witness stand do not necessarily
discredit the witnesses, since ex-parte affidavits are generally incomplete.[46] As a general rule, an
inconsistency between two statements of a witness should be determined, not by resort to individual
words or phrases, but by the whole impression or effect of what has been said or done.[47]
Appellants point out that while Villanueva admitted in his sworn statement that he did not recognize
-”not even one” of - the companions of Agner, on the witness stand, he claimed that he did recognize
appellants although he did not know their names. The Solicitor General correctly points out that the
alleged discrepancy was clarified during the redirect examination of Villanueva when he testified that
he recognized appellants as the ones who first whistled at his group but that he could not recognize
the companions of Agner who emerged from the banana plantation.[48]
In view of the positive identification of appellants as the perpetrators of the crime, their alibi crumbled.
[49] Besides, they had not strictly complied with the requirements of time and place in said defense. It
should have been established that appellants were somewhere else when the crime happened and
that it was physically impossible for them to be at the crime scene at the crucial time.[50] Worth noting
is the fact that the distance between appellants’ respective residences in Aga, Magsaysay (Delfin
Albano), Isabela and Vintar, Quirino, Isabela was established by the defense only through the
manifestation in court of their counsel, Atty. Melanio T. Singson, that there is no road connecting the
two places which he estimated to be 70 to 80 kilometers apart “in a straight line.”[51]
The trial court correctly held that treachery qualified the killing of Agtang and that appellants shall be
held responsible for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. There is treachery because
Agtang, was tied and therefore in a helpless condition before he was killed.[52]
Aggravating Circumstances: Nocturnity, Cruelty
However, the trial court improperly considered nocturnity as a separate aggravating circumstance.
While it correctly stated that nighttime must be deliberately sought in the perpetration of the crime, a
close examination of the records shows no factual support that the appellants indeed deliberately
considered the cover of darkness as an indispensable factor in assaulting Agtang. The prosecution
established no more than the simple fact that the crime was committed at night.
Neither may cruelty be appreciated against the appellants. This aggravating circumstance is present
when the wrong done in the commission of the crime is “deliberately augmented by causing other
wrong not necessary for its commission.”[53] The test in appreciating cruelty as an aggravating
circumstance is “whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the wrong by causing
another wrong not necessary for its commission or inhumanly increased the victim’ suffering or
outraged or scoffed at his person or corpse.”[54] In People vs. Dayug and Bannaisan,[55] the Court
said:
“x x x. There is cruelty when the culprit enjoys and delights in making his victim suffer slowly and
gradually, causing him unnecessary moral and physical pain in the consummation of the criminal act
which he intends to commit. The mere fact of inflicting various successive wounds upon a person in
order to cause his death, no appreciable time intervening between the infliction of one wound and
that of another to show that he had wanted to prolong the suffering of his victim, is not sufficient for
taking this aggravating circumstance into consideration.”
Thus, where the victim suffered twenty-one (21) wounds or injuries, eight (8) of which were fatal, the
Court did not appreciate cruelty as a generic aggravating circumstance in the absence of positive
proof that the wounds were inflicted while the victim was still alive to prolong unnecessarily his
physical suffering.[56] In another case, where the victim sustained thirteen (13) wounds, only one of
which was mortal, this Court similarly did not take into account cruelty as an aggravating circumstance
as there was no showing that appellant deliberately and inhumanly increased the suffering of the
deceased.[57]
In the case at bench, the prosecution failed to prove that the appellants inflicted the thirteen (13)
wounds upon the victim in such a way that he was made to agonize before they rendered any of the
blows which snuffed out his life. By Agner’s account, the appellants and Domingo dealt the victim
successive blows[58] so that he must have died instantaneously, considering that nine (9) of his
wounds were fatal.[59]As a matter of fact, the trial court appreciated cruelty only because it considered
the number of wounds on the victim to be “not necessary to consummate the crime of murder.”[60]
The penalty for the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal
in its maximum period to death. In the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the
imposable penalty is the medium period of said penalty or reclusion perpetua.[61] The appellants must
all bear this penalty in view of the duly proven conspiracy among the perpetrators of the crime. Their
cooperative acts towards the common criminal objective of taking the life of Agtang proved that they
were parties to a conspiracy.[62]
WHEREFORE, the herein appealed Decision convicting appellants Camilo Ferrer and Romeo Reyes of
the crime of murder and imposing on each of them the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the solidary
payment to the heirs of Florante Agtang of civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, is hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-40294 July 11, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TOBIAS RIBADAJO, ROMEO CORPUZ, FEDERICO BASAS, ROSENDO ANOR and RODOLFO
TORRES,defendants-appellants.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The death penalty having been imposed by the then Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal in Criminal
Case No. CCC-VII-1329-Rizal for Murder, the case is now before us for automatic review.
There were originally six (6) accused: Tobias Ribadajo, Romeo Corpuz, Federico Basas, Rosendo Anor,
Rodolfo Torres and Loreto Rivera, all inmates of the New Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa, Rizal One of the
however, Loreto Rivera, died during the pendency of the case.
We find the facts of the case, as narrated in the Decision of the trial Court, home by the evidence thus:
From the evidence on record, it is clear that on November 18, 1971, at about 7:56 o'clock in the
evening, prisoners from brigade 3-C, Muntinlupa, Rizal succeeded in opening the door of their
dormitory by means of a false key (tin can) and attacked the inmates from dormitory 3-a, while the
latter were then getting their food rations from the delivery truck wherein the victim was among them.
Records further show that while the victim Bernardo Cutamora, was getting his ration he was
sandwiched by the accused who rushed towards the door and stabbed the victim simultaneously
whereby the latter sustained multiple stab wounds on the different parts of his body which wounds
caused his death as evidenced by Necropsy Report marked Exhibit 'A'. To gain exit from their brigade,
accused Tobias Ribadajo used a false key (tin can) and immediately the door was opened and his co-
accused rushed towards the place where the prisoners of brigade 3-a were waiting for their ration and
with respective matalas on their hands they stabbed the victim to death. All the assailants confessed
participation in the killing claiming that they did it because they were being mocked by the inmates of
3-a who were members of the OXO there was a time when these inmates threw human waste on their
brigade shouting that 'you Commando members could not do anything', and then they would laugh at
them; that in order to avenge this mockery the accused headed by Tobias Ribadajo called up a
meeting in the afternoon of November 18, 1971, at around 1:00, and they planned to kill any prisoner
from brigade 3-a in the evening and they would do the killing at the time they (inmates from 3-a) were
waiting for their 'rancho'. Soon their plan was consummated and the victim, Bernardo Cutamora was
the unlucky guy overcome by their respective bladed weapons. 1
In an investigation conducted by the Investigation Section of the New Bilibid Prisons on November 20,
1971, all the accused executed statements admitting their participation in the slaying of Bernardo
Cutamora. 2 Consequently, an Information for Murder was filed against them on April 24, 1973 with
the then Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal. The delay in filing was due to the separation from the
service of a principal investigator.
Upon arraignment on July 5, 1973, accused Tobias Ribadajo, Romeo Corpuz, Loreto Rivera (who died
on August 15, 1974, p. 46, Rollo), and Rodolfo Torres, all with the assistance of counsel de officio,
pleaded Guilty, while the other two accused Federico Basas and Rolando Aunor, alias Rolando Amor,
alias Rolando Anor, alias Tagalog, entered pleas of Not Guilty. 3 The Information was amended to
correct the name of Rolando Aunor to Rosendo Anor, alias Negro, alias Tagalog. Thereafter, evidence
was adduced.
At the presentation of evidence for the defense, accused Tobias Ribadajo, Romeo Corpuz, and Rodolfo
Torres withdrew their pleas of Guilty. 4 Accused Corpuz and Ribadajo also denied their participation in
the killing of Bernardo Cutamora, and repudiated their confessions, claiming that they had signed the
same under duress. Accused Federico Basas and Rodolfo Torres admitted having executed their
respective confessions, 5 while accused Rosendo Anor changed his plea of Not Guilty to Guilty of the
lesser offense of Homicide. 6
On November 28, 1974, the Trial Court pronounced a verdict of guilty, as follows:
WHEREFORE, after determining the degree of culpability of all the accused, namely: Tobias Ribadajo,
Romeo Corpuz, Federico Basas, Rosendo Anor and Rodolfo Torres, the Court finds them GUILTY,
beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of Murder, as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as charged in the information, and hereby sentences each one of them to suffer the penalty of
DEATH; to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of P12,000.00, jointly and severally; to pay
moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00 and another P10,000.00, as exemplary damages, jointly
and severally, and to pay their proportionate shares of the costs. 7
Appellants claim infirmity of the Trial Court Decision on the following grounds:
I
The Trial Court erred in admitting as evidence, and in giving weight to the supposed extrajudicial
confession of the accused.
II
The Trial Court erred in finding the presence of the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident
premeditation and recidivism.
III
The Trial Court erred in convicting the accused and in imposing the death penalty.
Appellants submit that their extrajudicial confessions were extracted by force; that they had been
exposed for more or less one day to the heat of the sun and the wetness and coldness of the rain, and
had been subsequently beaten up and placed in a "bartolina "
On their face, however, the individual confessions do not show any suspicious circumstance Casting
doubt on their integrity. On the contrary, they are replete with details only appellants could have
supplied. In those statements, they called their co-accused by their nicknames, not knowing their true
names, like "Lilat" for Basas, "Manok" for Anor and "Bukid" for Torres. The investigators could not have
concocted that on November 18, 1971, at around 1:00 P.M., appellants had planned to kill any prisoner
from Brigade 3-a during the distribution of the "rancho"; that they are members of the Sigue-Sigue
Commando Gang and their leader is accused Ribadajo; that, as planned, on the same date at around
8:00 P.M., Ribadajo using a false key tin can opened the door of their dormitory and an the accused
rushed towards the place where the inmates from Brigade 3-a were waiting for their food; that they
stabbed the victim with their "matalas"; and their motive was to avenge the throwing of human waste
on them by inmates of Brigade 3-a.
What is more, during the presentation of evidence by the defense, they were all admitting their guilt
but for the lesser offense of Homicide, as manifested by their de officio counsel.
Atty. Galvan
Your Honor, inasmuch as I have also conferred with all the accused and that having appointed me as
counsel de oficio before when Fiscal Guerrero was here and after a long conference with the accused,
and if the Fiscal will not object if all the accused will change their former plea of not guilty to that of
guilty, as that was their proposal and they were very insistent, that if the Court will allow them to
withdraw their former plea of not guilty and substitute with a plea of guilty to a lesser of homicide,
your Honor. 8
Despite counsel's appeal for "humanity sake," the prosecution, however, opposed the change of plea
because it had already finished with the presentation of its evidence.
We find no sufficient basis, therefore, to destroy the presumption of voluntariness of appellants'
confessions. The presumption of the law is in favor of the spontaneity and voluntariness of an
extrajudicial confession of an accused in a criminal case, 9 for no sane person would deliberately
confess to the commission of a crime unless prompted to do so by truth and conscience. 10 The
burden of proof is upon the declarant to destroy this presumption. 11 Mere repudiation of confession
by the accused at the trial is not sufficient to disregard his confession. 12 Concrete evidence of
compulsion or duress must be presented to sustain their claim of maltreatment. No such evidence has
been put forward. No report of such maltreatment was made to the prison authorities nor to the Fiscal
who conducted the preliminary investigation. During cross-examination, Corpuz admitted that he was
not maltreated. 13 Ribadajo himself did not protest when he was brought to Exequiel Santos,
Administrative Officer III, Bureau of Prisons, who, in his own words, was "like a father to me." 14
As to appellants' claim that they have not been informed of their right to silence and to counsel during
custodial investigation, suffice it to state that the proscription against the admissibility of confessions
obtained from an accused during the period of custodial interrogation, in violation of procedural
safeguards, applies to confessions obtained after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. 15 No law
gives the accused the right to be so informed before the enactment of the 1973 Constitution, 16 even
if presented after January 17, 1973. 17 That Constitutional guaranty relative to confessions obtained
during custodial investigation does not have any retroactive effect. 18 The Trial Court committed no
reversible error either in finding the existence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery, evident
premeditation and recidivism.
Treachery was present because the attack on the victim was sudden and unexpected. 19 When the
inmates from Brigade 3-a went out to get their food ration appellants immediately rushed out of their
own cell and attacked, with their improvised weapon, the unsuspecting victim. There was a collective
effort on appellants' part, who were all armed, in assaulting the victim who was unarmed, 20 and who
was completely deprived of an opportunity to prepare for the attack or to defend himself, 21 or to
prepare for a fight or retreat. 22 Evident premeditation was also present because the plan to kill any
prisoner from Brigade 3-a was hatched around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of November 18, 1971,
and the plan was consummated at about 8:00 in the evening of the same day. Evident premeditation is
present when murder was contemplated at least one hour prior to its execution. 23 Appellants had
ample time to desist from the execution of the offense but they clung to their determination to
achieve their criminal intent.
The aggravating circumstance of recidivism has to be considered because all the accused at the time
of the commission of the offense, were serving their respective sentences by virtue of a final judgment
for other crimes embraced in the same Title of the Revised Penal Code (Corpuz for Homicide; Ribadajo
for Murder; Basas for Murder; Anor for Murder; and Torres for Homicide).
No error either was committed by the Trial Court in imposing the death penalty. The penalty for
murder isreclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. 24 Considering that appellants
committed the present felony after having been convicted by final judgment and while serving their
respective sentences, they should be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by
law for the new felony. 25 Given this circumstance, Anor's change of plea from Guilty to Not Guilty will
not change his liability besides the fact that it was made after the prosecution had rested its case. 26
The defense contention that appellants should be held guilty only for "Death Caused in a Tumultuous
Affray" and sentenced to prision mayor under Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code, upon the
allegation that the commotion was spontaneous, lacks merit. There was no confusion and tumultuous
quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression between both parties. 27 Appellants rushed out
of their cell with the common purpose of attacking the victim of a rival group, which unity of purpose
indicates appellants' common responsibility for the consequences of their aggression. 28
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is hereby AFFIRMED. However, for lack of the necessary
votes, the penalty to be imposed on all the accused-appellants is reduced to reclusion perpetua. The
indemnity to be paid to the heirs of the deceased is hereby raised to P30,000.00. Proportionate costs
against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
Abad Santos, Feria, Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Alampay, Cruz and Paras, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr.,* J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, CJ., concurring:

I concur in the result, there being sufficient evidence other than the challenged extrajudicial confession
for affirmation of the judgment of conviction. I write this brief concurrence to maintain my dissenting
view in the case of Magtoto vs. Manguera (63 SCRA 4, 27) and subsequent cases that "(T)here is no
room for interpretation and the plain mandate of the Constitution expressly adopting the exclusionary
rule as the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against such confessions
obtained in violation of one's constitutional rights by outlawing their admission and thereby removing
the incentive on the part of state and police officers to disregard such rights (in the same manner that
the exclusionary rule bars admission of illegally seized evidence) should be strictly enforced,' and '(T)he
outlawing of an such confessions is plain, unqualified and without distinction whether the invalid
confession be obtained before or after the effectivity of the Constitution." I take exception to the
statement in the main opinion that no law gives the accused the right to be so informed of his right to
silence and to counsel before the enactment of the 1973 Constitution, which does not have any
retroactive effect. I maintain, as in Magtoto, that such a law was enacted as of June 15, 1954 when
Republic Act 1083, authored by the late Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco, inserted the second paragraph
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code authorizing the right of a detained person to counsel in any
custodial investigation, thus: "In every case the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his
detention and shall be allowed upon his request to communicate and confer at any time with his
attorney or counsel. "
I had expressly joined the vigorous dissent of the late Chief Justice (then Associate Justice) Fred Ruiz
Castro inMagtoto that "the majority of my brethren are of the literal view that the only right granted
by the said paragraph to a detained person was to be informed of the cause of his detention,' and that
a detained person 'must make a request for him to be able to claim the right to communicate and
confer with counsel at any time.' I regard this interpretation as abhorrent because it gravely offends
against the provisions of the 1935 Constitution as well as of the 1973 Constitution that guarantee
equal protection of the laws to every person in the realm. ... An accurate paraphrase of the majority
view may be stated in the following words: 'If this detained wretch asserts his right to counsel, I will
allow him to communicate and confer with a lawyer of his choice. But if he says none because he is
unlettered or uninformed, I am under no moral or legal obligation to help him because, standing
mute, he has no right to counsel.' The absurdity so implicit in these words strikes terror in me at the
same time that it saddens me, for it not only denies the poor and the unschooled the equal protection
of the laws but also inflicts a horrendous indignity on them solely because of their poverty, ignorance
or illiteracy. The cogent remark of the late Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco, truly a man of wisdom and
experience, when Republic Act 1083 as a bill was under discussion in the Senate, that a detained
person in every custodial interrogation should, under the proposed amendment, be informed
beforehand of his right to counsel, was therefore not a mere wisp of wind, but was indeed a warning
most pregnant with meaning. "
It seems clear that the second paragraph of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as inserted by
Republic Act 1083 makes it the duty on the part of any police or military officer to inform the person
detained of his right to counsel at the start of any custodial interrogation and that this duty was made
a statutory one as early as 1954 upon the enactment of the aforesaid Act.

Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, CJ., concurring:
I concur in the result, there being sufficient evidence other than the challenged extrajudicial confession
for affirmation of the judgment of conviction. I write this brief concurrence to maintain my dissenting
view in the case of Magtoto vs. Manguera (63 SCRA 4, 27) and subsequent cases that "(T)here is no
room for interpretation and the plain mandate of the Constitution expressly adopting the exclusionary
rule as the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against such confessions
obtained in violation of one's constitutional rights by outlawing their admission and thereby removing
the incentive on the part of state and police officers to disregard such rights (in the same manner that
the exclusionary rule bars admission of illegally seized evidence) should be strictly enforced,' and '(T)he
outlawing of an such confessions is plain, unqualified and without distinction whether the invalid
confession be obtained before or after the effectivity of the Constitution." I take exception to the
statement in the main opinion that no law gives the accused the right to be so informed of his right to
silence and to counsel before the enactment of the 1973 Constitution, which does not have any
retroactive effect. I maintain, as in Magtoto, that such a law was enacted as of June 15, 1954 when
Republic Act 1083, authored by the late Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco, inserted the second paragraph
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code authorizing the right of a detained person to counsel in any
custodial investigation, thus: "In every case the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his
detention and shall be allowed upon his request to communicate and confer at any time with his
attorney or counsel. "
I had expressly joined the vigorous dissent of the late Chief Justice (then Associate Justice) Fred Ruiz
Castro inMagtoto that "the majority of my brethren are of the literal view that the only right granted
by the said paragraph to a detained person was to be informed of the cause of his detention,' and that
a detained person 'must make a request for him to be able to claim the right to communicate and
confer with counsel at any time.' I regard this interpretation as abhorrent because it gravely offends
against the provisions of the 1935 Constitution as well as of the 1973 Constitution that guarantee
equal protection of the laws to every person in the realm. ... An accurate paraphrase of the majority
view may be stated in the following words: 'If this detained wretch asserts his right to counsel, I will
allow him to communicate and confer with a lawyer of his choice. But if he says none because he is
unlettered or uninformed, I am under no moral or legal obligation to help him because, standing
mute, he has no right to counsel.' The absurdity so implicit in these words strikes terror in me at the
same time that it saddens me, for it not only denies the poor and the unschooled the equal protection
of the laws but also inflicts a horrendous indignity on them solely because of their poverty, ignorance
or illiteracy. The cogent remark of the late Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco, truly a man of wisdom and
experience, when Republic Act 1083 as a bill was under discussion in the Senate, that a detained
person in every custodial interrogation should, under the proposed amendment, be informed
beforehand of his right to counsel, was therefore not a mere wisp of wind, but was indeed a warning
most pregnant with meaning. "
It seems clear that the second paragraph of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as inserted by
Republic Act 1083 makes it the duty on the part of any police or military officer to inform the person
detained of his right to counsel at the start of any custodial interrogation and that this duty was made
a statutory one as early as 1954 upon the enactment of the aforesaid Act.

.R. No. L-50884 March 30, 1988 –CASE OF COMPLEX CRIME

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.FILOMENO SALUFRANIA, defendant-appellant.
FACTS: On 7 May 1976, Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman was charged before the CFI of Camarines
Norte,with the complex crime of parricide with intentional abortion. It was alleged that on the 3rd day
of December, 1974, the accused Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman did then and there, willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence on his wife, MARCIANA ABUYO-SALUFRANIA
by then and there boxing and stranging her, causing upon her injuries which resulted in her
instantaneous death; and by the same criminal act committed on the person of the wife of the
accused, who was at the time 8 months pregnant, the accused caused the death of the unborn
child,committing both crimes of PARRICIDE and INTENTIONAL ABORTION as defined and punished
under Art. 246 and Art. 256, paragraph I, of the Revised Penal Code.
At the trial court, Dr. Juan L. Dyquiangco Jr., Pedro Salufrania testified that,he was called upon by the
Municipal Judge of Talisay to examine the corpse of Marciana Abuyo-Salufrania that was exhumed
from its grave in which the cause of death was cardiac arrest.

Dr. Dyquiangco testified that after conducting the post mortem examination, he issued a certification
thereof (Exhibit "A"); that he issued a death certificate (Exhibit "B") for the deceased Marciano Abuyo-
Salufrania, bearing the date of 5 December 1974, made on the basis of the information relayed by a
certain Leonila Loma to his nurse before the burial, without mentioning the cause of death; that the
cause of death, as cardiac arrest, was indicated on said death certificate only after the post mortem
examination on 11 December 1974. The lower court allowed the son of the accused, Pedro Salufrania,
The lower court stated that, by reason of interest and relationship, before Pedro Salufrania was allowed
to testify against his father-accused Filomeno Salufrania, after careful examination by the prosecuting
officer and the defense counsel under the careful supervision of the court a quo, to determine
whether, at his age of 13 years old, he was already capable of receiving correct impressions of facts
and of relating them truly and, also, whether he was compelled and/or threatened by anybody to
testify against his father-accused.He stated that his father Filomeno Salufrania and his mother
Marciana Abuyo quarrelled at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of 3 December 1974, he saw his father
box his pregnant mother on the stomach and, once fallen on the floor, his father strangled her to
death; that he saw blood ooze from the eyes and nose of his mother and that she died right on the
spot where she fell. His brother,Eduardo Abuyo and had refused and still refused to live with his
father-accused, because the latter has threatened to kill him and his other brothers and sister should
he reveal the true cause of his mother's death.The brother in law and sister of the deceased
victim,Narciso Abuyo also declared that after the burial of Marciana Abuyo, the three (3) children of his
deceased sisterrefused to go home with their father Filomeno Salufrania; that when asked why, his
nephew Alex Salufraña told him that the real cause of death of their mother was not stomach ailment
and headache, rather, she was boxed on the stomach and strangled to death by their father; that
immediately after learning of the true cause of death of his sister, he brought the matter to the
attention of the police authorities .

The CFI found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, of the complex crime of Parricide with Intentional
Abortion, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Marciano Abuyo in the sum of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs. "For unselfish, valuable and
exemplary service rendered by counsel de oficio, Atty. Marciano C. Dating, Jr., a compensation of
P500.00 is hereby recommended for him subject to the availability of fund. Since the accused was
sentenced to death, this becomes an automatic review before the Supreme Court.

The defense had for witnesses Geronimo Villan, Juanito Bragais, Angeles Liling Balce and the accused
Filomeno Salufrania.Geronimo Villan testified that he was a neighbor of Filomeno Sulfrania whio tried
to help him administer a native treatment around 6am in the morning of December 4, 1974, but she
died around 7am. Witness Juanita Bragais testified that he was fetched by Felipe Salufrania, another
son of Filomeno Salufrania Marciana Abuyo was already dead so he just helped Filomeno Salufrania in
transferring the body of his wife to the house of the latter's brother-in—law.Angeles Liling Balce, who
claimed to be a former resident she arrived in the house of Filomeno Salufrania at about 6:00 o'clock
in the morning Marciana still in a coma lying on the lap of her husband who informed her that
Marciana was suffering from an old stomach ailment. The accused admitted that he was that lawful
husband of the deceased Marciana Abuyo; that he sent r Juanito Bragais but the latter was not able to
cure his wife, that there was no quarrel between him and his wife that preceded the latter's death, and
that during the lifetime of the deceased, they loved each other; that after her burial, his son Pedro
Salufrania was taken by his brother-in-law Narciso Abuyo and since then, he was not able to talk to his
son until during the trial; and that at the time of death of his wife, aside from the members of his
family, Geronimo Villan Francisco Repuya and Liling Angeles Balce were also present.Appellant alleges
that the trial court failed to determine the competence of Pedro Salufrania before he was allowed to
testify. He also questions the competence of Dr. Dyquiangco as an expert witness, and alleges that the
findings of Dr. Dyquiangco and the testimony of Pedro Salufrania do not tally. But this contention is
without merit. The Court notes, first of all, that appellant did not even bother to discuss his defense in
order to refute the massive evidence against him. This is tantamount to an admission that he could not
adequately support his version of Marciana Abuyo's death.Lastly, appellant alleges that, assuming he
indeed killed his wife, there is no evidence to show that he had the intention to cause an abortion. In
this contention, appellant is correct. He should not be held guilty of the complex crime of Parricide
with Intentional Abortion but of the complex crime of Parricide with UnintentionalAbortion. The
elements of Unintentional Abortion are as follows:
1. That there is a pregnant woman. 2. That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without
intending an abortion. 3. That the violence is intentionally exerted. 4. That as a result of the violence
the foetus dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled therefrom.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in its ruling of complex crime with parricide and intentional
abortion?

HELD: According to the Supreme Court,

“Trial judges are in the best position to ascertain the truth and detect falsehoods in the testimony of
witnesses. This Court will normally not disturb the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses, in view of its advantage in observing first hand their demeanor in giving their testimony.
Such rule applies in the present case.
The Solicitor General's brief makes it appear that appellant intended to cause an abortion because he
boxed his pregnant wife on the stomach which caused her to fall and then strangled her. We find that
appellant's intent to cause an abortion has not been sufficiently established. Mere boxing on the
stomach, taken together with the immediate strangling of the victim in a fight, is not sufficient proof to
show an intent to cause an abortion. In fact, appellant must have merely intended to kill the victim but
not necessarily to cause an abortion. The evidence on record, therefore, establishes beyond reasonable
doubt that accused Filomeno Salufrania committed and should be held liable for the complex crime of
parricide with unintentional abortion. The abortion, in this case, was caused by the same violence that
caused the death of Marciana Abuyo, such violence being voluntarily exerted by the herein accused
upon his victim. It has also been clearly established (a) that Marciana Abuyo was seven (7) to eight (8)
months pregnant when she was killed; (b) that violence was voluntarily exerted upon her by her
husband accused; and (c) that, as a result of said violence, Marciana Abuyo died together with the
foetus in her womb. In this afternoon, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code states that the accused
should be punished with the penalty corresponding to the more serious came of parricide, to be
imposed in its maximum period which is death. However, by reason of the 1987 Constitution which has
abolished the death penalty, appellant should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. “

In the present case, the Supreme Court modified, the judgment appealed from was AFFIRMED.
Accused-appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The indemnity of
P12,000. 00 awarded to the heirs of the deceased Marciana Abuyo is increased to P30,000.00 in line
with the recent decisions of the Court. With costs.

People vs. Mangalino 182 SCRA 329 (February 15, 1990)Facts:

Semion Mangalino inserted his finger and later on forcibly introducedhis sexual organ into
Marichelle’s, six yr old, undeveloped genitalia. Physicalexam in NBI concluded that bruises on
Marichelle’s vagina: caused by a hardobject like an erected penis and an indication of an unsuccessful
penetration.
They discounted the probability of an accident since there was no contusionon the labia. Semion
denied the charges and argued that bruises may beself-inflicted. She was constantly running and
might have bumped her pelvisagainst a chair which explained the absence of contusions on the labia.
Ruling:
He is guilty of statutory rape. For rape to be committed, fullpenetration is not required. It is enough
that there is proof of entrance of themale organ within the labia or pudendum of the female organ.
Even theslightest penetration is sufficient to consummate the crime of rape. Accordingto the NBI
report, rape could have been perpetrated. Dr. Garcia certified theexistence of indications of recent
genital trauma. Vestibular mucosa was darkred and normally, it was supposed to be pinkish. The
forcible attempt of anerected penis caused the 3.5 cm contusion prior to the hymen. The penile-
vaginal contact without penetration was due to 1 cm diameter opening of Marichelle’s hymen. The
victim being young, the penetration could only go asdeep as the labia. Offender and victim being
neighbors explain the absenceof visible signs of physical injuries. The reason why Marichelle did not
crywas that she did not feel any pain during the attempted sexual intercourse.
Doctrine:
The victim being young, the penetration could only go as deep asthe labia. For rape to be committed,
full penetration is not required. It isenough that there is proof of entrance of the male organ within the
labia or the pudendum of the female organ

People vs. Atento 196 SCRA 357 (April 26, 1991)Facts:

Glenda Aringo, a sixteen year old developmentally-challenged person, claimed that Cesar Atento, her
neighbor, raped her 5x. from April 1986.

She said shewas raped 4 more times. It was at this time that she felt tickled and described
the act as “masarap”. She could not anymore conceal her condition becauseshe was already 5 months
pregnant.
Ruling:
Glenda has the intellectualcapacity of a 9 and 12 yr old and is within a mentally defective level. Her
judgment unsound and her capacity for higher perceptual processes isunsatisfactory. Although it is not
clear the Cesar employed force, he is stillguilty under Paragraph 2 (when the woman is deprived of
reason or isotherwise unconscious) because Glenda is deprived of reason by beingmentally deficient.
He is also liable under par. 3 (when the victim is under 12)because she has the mentality of a girl less
than 12 yrs old at the time shewas raped. The absence of will determines the existence of the rape.
Suchlack of will may exist not only when the victim is unconscious or totallydeprived of reason, but
also when she is suffering some mental deficiencyimpairing her reason or free will. The deprivation of
reason need not becomplete. Mental deficiency or abnormality is sufficient.
Doctrine:
Paragraph 3 does not only refer to chronological age but also tomental age.Note: SC might have been
confused. Par 2 refers to a situation wherein thewoman is drugged or drunk, etc

People vs. Campuhan 329 SCRA 270 (March 30, 2000)Facts:

Corazon Pamintuan heard her 4 yr old daughter, Crysthel, cry andshe rushed to the bedroom where
she saw Primo Campuhan kneeling beforeCrysthel whose jogging pants were already removed while
his short pantswere already down to his knees. According to Corazon, Primo was forcing hispenis into
Crysthel’s vagina. According to the physical exam, there was noevident sign of extra-genital physical
injury. Her hymen was intact and her orifice was only .05 in diameter.
Ruling:
Mere touching of the externalgenitalia by the penis is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. But the
actof touching should be understood as inherently part of the entry of the penisinto the labias and not
the mere touching alone of the mons pubis or thepudendum. There must be sufficient and convincing
proof that the penisindeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merelystroked the
external surface thereof, for the accused to be convicted of consummated rape. Absent any showing of
the slightest penetration of thefemale organ, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of
lasciviousness.Primo’s kneeling position rendered an unbridled observation impossible.Prosecution
was not able to prove that any inter-genital contact wasachieved. All the elements for attempted rape
are present; hence, theaccused should be punished only for it.
Doctrine:
Mere touching does not mean stroking. There must be intent topenetrate

the act as “masarap”. She could not anymore conceal her condition becauseshe was already 5 months
pregnant.
Ruling:
Glenda has the intellectualcapacity of a 9 and 12 yr old and is within a mentally defective level. Her
judgment unsound and her capacity for higher perceptual processes isunsatisfactory. Although it is not
clear the Cesar employed force, he is stillguilty under Paragraph 2 (when the woman is deprived of
reason or isotherwise unconscious) because Glenda is deprived of reason by beingmentally deficient.
He is also liable under par. 3 (when the victim is under 12)because she has the mentality of a girl less
than 12 yrs old at the time shewas raped. The absence of will determines the existence of the rape.
Suchlack of will may exist not only when the victim is unconscious or totallydeprived of reason, but
also when she is suffering some mental deficiencyimpairing her reason or free will. The deprivation of
reason need not becomplete. Mental deficiency or abnormality is sufficient.
Doctrine:
Paragraph 3 does not only refer to chronological age but also tomental age.Note: SC might have been
confused. Par 2 refers to a situation wherein thewoman is drugged or drunk, etc.
People vs. Campuhan 329 SCRA 270 (March 30, 2000)Facts:
Corazon Pamintuan heard her 4 yr old daughter, Crysthel, cry andshe rushed to the bedroom where
she saw Primo Campuhan kneeling beforeCrysthel whose jogging pants were already removed while
his short pantswere already down to his knees. According to Corazon, Primo was forcing hispenis into
Crysthel’s vagina. According to the physical exam, there was noevident sign of extra-genital physical
injury. Her hymen was intact and her orifice was only .05 in diameter.
Ruling:
Mere touching of the externalgenitalia by the penis is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. But the
actof touching should be understood as inherently part of the entry of the penisinto the labias and not
the mere touching alone of the mons pubis or thepudendum. There must be sufficient and convincing
proof that the penisindeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merelystroked the
external surface thereof, for the accused to be convicted of consummated rape. Absent any showing of
the slightest penetration of thefemale organ, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of
lasciviousness.Primo’s kneeling position rendered an unbridled observation impossible.Prosecution
was not able to prove that any inter-genital contact wasachieved. All the elements for attempted rape
are present; hence, theaccused should be punished only for it.
Doctrine:
Mere touching does not mean stroking. There must be intent topenetrate.
People vs. Gallo 315 SCRA 461 (September 29, 1999)Facts
: In 1998, an RTC decision found Romeo Gallo guilty of the crime of qualified rape with the penalty of
death. In 1999- Gallo filed a Motion to Re-Open the Case seeking modification of the death sentence
to reclusionperpetua in line with the new court rulings on the attendant circumstances inSec 11 of RA
7659. According to People vs. Garcia: the additional attendantcircumstances introduced in RA 7659
should be considered as specialqualifying circumstances distinctly applicable to the crime of rape and
if notpleaded as such, could only be appreciated as generic aggravatingcircumstances. The
information filed against Gallo does not allege hisrelationship with the victim Marites Gallo (his
daughter), thus it CANNOT beconsidered as a qualifying circumstance.
Ruling
: Judicial decisions applyingor interpreting the law or the constitution form part of the legal system of
theland and so the doctrine forms part of the penal statutes and therefore maybe applied retroactively
being favorable to the accused who is not a habitualcriminal, notwithstanding that final sentence has
already been pronouncedagainst him. The doctrine of People vs. Garcia may be retroactively appliedas
it is favorable to him. The case is reopened and the judgment is modifiedfrom death to reclusion
perpetua.
Doctrine:
Special qualifying circumstances have to be alleged in theinformation for it to be appreciated.

People vs. Berana 311 SCRA 664 (July 29, 1999)Facts:

Early morning, 14 yr old Maria Elena Jarcia was awakened by her bro-in-law, Raul Berana. He pointed a
“buntot page” (long with someprotruding parts and with long and pointed tip) at her neck and warned
her not to make any noise or else she will be killed. She was made to lie downand Berana raised her
duster and removed her shorts and underwear. Hemashed her breasts and laid on top of her. He
inserted his penis to her vagina and she felt much pain. He kissed her and made several push andpull
movements and then, Maria Elena felt something liquid in her organ.After this, Berana sat down and
told Maria Elena not to tell anyone. He thendid it again. Accused claims he was seduced by Elena.
Ruling:
Physicalresistance need not be established in rape cases when intimidation isexercised upon her and
she submits herself against her will to the rapist’slust because of fear for life and personal safety.
Relationship qualifies thecrime from reclusion perpetua to death under RA 7659. To
effectivelyprosecute Berana for the crime of rape committed by a relative by affinitywithin the 3rd civil
degree, it must be established that:1.he is legally married to Elena’s sister 2.Elena and Berana’s wife are
full or half-bloodsiblingsProsecution established relationship by the testimonies of Elena(saying that
he knows Berana because he is the husband of my sister) andher mother (saying that he knows Berana
because he is the husband of her daughter, Rosa Jarcia). It based its conviction on Berana’s letter
addressingElena’s parents as “mama at papa” and his use of the phrase “any inyongmanugang, Raul”.
Since relationship qualifies the crime of rape, there mustbe clearer proof of relationship and in this
case, it was not adequatelysubstantiated. Evidence presented is not sufficient to dispel doubts about
thetrue relationship. Although he claims that Elena initiated the act, he never mentioned this on his
letters and instead, unceasingly asks for forgiveness,admitting categorically the offense charged.
Doctrine:
Relationship must be proven for it to be appreciated as a specialqualifying circumstance.

Notes: The letters may show remorse for a completely different thing (like“I’m sorry I gave in to the
seduction”) and not an apology for rape

REPUBLIC ACT No. 9262 (Anti VAWC)

AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN,PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE
MEASURES FOR VICTIMS,PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSESWhat
constitutes
violence against women and children
?
1.
causing
physical harm
2.
threatening
to cause
physical harm
3.
attempting
to cause
physical harm
4.
placing them in
fear of imminent physical harm
5.
attempting to compel or compelling them to
engage in conductwhich they have a right to desist from or desist from conductwhich they have a
right to engage in
or
attempting to restrict or restricting their freedom of movement or conduct
by force or threat of force or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or intimidation directed
against the woman or child which includes:
a.
threatening to
deprive or actually depriving them of custody
to his/her family
b.
depriving or threatening to deprive them of financialsupport
or deliberately providing
insufficient financialsupport
c.
depriving or threatening to
deprive them of a legal right
d.
preventing the woman
in engaging in any legitimateprofession, etc or controlling the victim’s own money or properties, or
solely controlling the conjugal or commonmoney or properties
6.
inflicting or threatening to inflict
physical harm on oneself for thepurposes of controlling the woman
7.
causing or attempting to cause them to
engage in any sexualactivity which does not constitute rape
, by force or threat of force,physical harm, or through intimidation directed at them or
her/hisimmediate family
8.
engaging in
purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct,personally or through another, that alarms or
causessubstantial emotional or psychological distress
to the woman or child. This includes:
a.
stalking
them in public or private places
b.
peering in the window or lingering outside
the residence
c.
entering or remaining in their dwelling
or on their property
against her/his will
d.
destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets
of the woman or her child
e.
engaging in
any form of harassment or violence
9.
causing
mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to them, including repeated verbal abuse
andemotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody
of minor children of access to the woman’s child/childrenWhat
relationships
are
included
?
1.
married
relationship
2.
dating
relationship – the parties live as husband and wife without thebenefit of marriage OR are romantically
involved over time and on acontinuing basis during the course of the relationship. A
casualacquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in abusiness or social context is
NOT a dating relationship
3.
sexual
relations – single sexual act which may or may not result inthe bearing of a common childWhat is a
protection order
?It is an order issued for the
purpose of preventing further acts of violenceagainst a woman or her child and granting other
necessary relief
. Therelief granted under a protection order serve the purpose of
safeguardingthe victim from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the victim’sdaily life, and
facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim toindependently regain control of her life.Who can
file
a petition for a protection order?

1.
the
offended party
2.
parents or guardian
of the offended party
3.
ascendants, descendants or collateral relatives within the 4
th
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity
4.
officers or social workers
of the DSWD or social workers of LGUs
5.
police officers
, preferably those in charge of women and children’sdesks
6.Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad
7.
lawyer, counselor, therapist or healthcare provider
of thepetitioner
8.
at least 2 concerned responsible citizens
of the city or municipality
who has personal knowledge
of the offensecommitted
Where can you file
for a protection order?RTC, MTC, MCTC with territorial jurisdiction or in a family court if available inthe
area.Note: The protection order takes the shape of a penalty and violates theconstitutional right of
presumption of innocence. It presumes the perpetrator is guilty even before he is heard

OLIVAREZ VS CA

FACTS:
Isidro Olivares was charged with violation of RA 7610 for touching the breast and kissing the lips of
Cristina Elitiong, a 16-year old high school student employed by the former in making sampaguita
garlands during weekends. The trial court found him guilty; affirmed by the CA. Petitioner now alleges
that his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated for
failure to allege in the information the essential elements of the offense for which he is being charged.
Issue: WON Olivares can be charged with violation of RA 7610.
Held:
Yes.
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of R.A. 7610 are as follows:

1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.

2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
The first element obtains in this case. It was established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner
kissed Cristina and touched her breasts with lewd designs as inferred from the nature of the acts
themselves and the environmental circumstances. The second element, i.e., that the act is performed
with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, is likewise present.
Thus, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges in lascivious conduct
under the coercion or influence of any adult. In this case, Cristina was sexually abused because she
was coerced or intimidated by petitioner to indulge in a lascivious conduct. Furthermore, it is
inconsequential that the sexual abuse occurred only once. As expressly provided in Section 3 (b) of
R.A. 7610, the abuse may be habitual or not. It must be observed that Article III of R.A. 7610 is
captioned as “Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse” because Congress really intended to cover a
situation where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated into lascivious conduct, not
necessarily for money or profit. The law covers not only child prostitution but also other forms of
sexual abuse.
As to the contention that the minority of Cristina was not properly alleged in the information, the SC
ruled that: Petitioner was furnished a copy of the Complaint which was mentioned in the information,
hence he was adequately informed of the age of the complainant.

G.R. No. 147913 January 31, 2007

CLEMENT JOHN FERDINAND M. NAVARRETE,

Petitioner,vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.This petition for review on certiorari
1
assails the decision
2
and resolution
3
of the Court of Appeals (CA)which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to convict
petitioner of acts of lasciviousness.BBB, five years old, went to petitioner¶s house to watch television,
which was something she oftendid.
9
BBB testified that it was on this occasion that petitioner sexually abused her, "placed his penis[in her]
vagina" twice, poked her vagina with a "stick with cotton"
11
and boxed her on the right side of her eye.
12
Then, petitioner brought her to the comfort room and pointed a knife to her throat.
13
Afterwards, she and petitioner watched a pornographic movie
14
together.
15
AAA, BBB¶s mother, testified that around 10:30 p.m., BBB went out of petitioner¶s house.
Whiletrembling and crying, BBB embraced her mother and told her that "
KuyaFerdiesinundot ako.
"
16
Petitioner denied the accusation against him and claimed that AAA merely concocted the
chargeagainst him. He alleged that she had ill feelings against the Navarrete¶s due to the separation
of her (AAA¶s) son from the Philippine Postal Corporation and their refusal to allow her to place a
"jumper"on their electrical connection.
18
The RTC absolved petitioner of statutory rape however, it convicted petitioner for acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in relation to Section 5(b), ArticleIII of
RA 7610.On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.Issue: WON petitioner cannot be
convicted of acts of lasciviousness, a crime not specifically allegedin the information.Decision:
Petitioner was found guilty of violating Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of
RA 7610:Sec. 5.Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. ² Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicateor
group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited
inprostitution and other sexual abuse.The penalty of
reclusion temporal
in its medium period to
reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed uponthe following:xxxxxxxxx(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct with a child exploited inprostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided,
That when the victim is under twelve (12)years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under
Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, [or] the [RPC], for rape
or lascivious conduct as the case

G.R. No. 147913 January 31, 2007

CLEMENT JOHN FERDINAND M. NAVARRETE,

Petitioner,vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.This petition for review on certiorari
1
assails the decision
2
and resolution
3
of the Court of Appeals (CA)which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to convict
petitioner of acts of lasciviousness.BBB, five years old, went to petitioner¶s house to watch television,
which was something she oftendid.
9
BBB testified that it was on this occasion that petitioner sexually abused her, "placed his penis[in her]
vagina" twice, poked her vagina with a "stick with cotton"
11
and boxed her on the right side of her eye.
12
Then, petitioner brought her to the comfort room and pointed a knife to her throat.
13
Afterwards, she and petitioner watched a pornographic movie
14
together.
15
AAA, BBB¶s mother, testified that around 10:30 p.m., BBB went out of petitioner¶s house.
Whiletrembling and crying, BBB embraced her mother and told her that "
KuyaFerdiesinundot ako.
"
16
Petitioner denied the accusation against him and claimed that AAA merely concocted the
chargeagainst him. He alleged that she had ill feelings against the Navarrete¶s due to the separation
of her (AAA¶s) son from the Philippine Postal Corporation and their refusal to allow her to place a
"jumper"on their electrical connection.
18
The RTC absolved petitioner of statutory rape however, it convicted petitioner for acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in relation to Section 5(b), ArticleIII of
RA 7610.On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue: WON petitioner cannot be convicted of acts of lasciviousness, a crime not specifically allegedin
the information.

Decision: Petitioner was found guilty of violating Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b),
Article III of RA 7610:Sec. 5.Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. ² Children, whether male or
female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any
adult, syndicateor group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be
children exploited inprostitution and other sexual abuse.The penalty of
reclusion temporal
in its medium period to
reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed uponthe following:xxxxxxxxx(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct with a child exploited inprostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided,
That when the victim is under twelve (12)years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under
Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, [or] the [RPC], for rape
or lascivious conduct as the case may be. Provided..
G.R. No. 186469 June 13, 2012
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOVER MATIAS y DELA FUENTE, Accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This resolves the appeal from the August 19, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 02781 filed by appellant Jover Matias y Dela Fuente which affirmed his conviction for the
crime of "rape" under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act (RA) No. 7610.2
The Factual Antecedents
Appellant Jover Matias y Dela Fuente and private complainant AAA3 were neighbors at Sto. Niño St.,
Barangay San Antonio, Quezon City. In the evening of June 6, 2004, AAA, a minor, having been born
on April 23, 1991, was on her way to the vegetable stall ("gulayan") of a certain "Manuela" to buy
something when, all of a sudden, appellant pulled her towards a house that was under construction.
There, he forced her to lie on a bamboo bed ("papag"), removed her shorts and underwear, and
inserted first, his finger, and then his penis into her vagina. Appellant threatened to kill her if she
should report the incident to anyone.
When AAA arrived home, she narrated to her mother and aunt what appellant did to her.1âwphi1
Together, they proceeded to the barangay to report the incident and, thereafter, to the Baler District
Police Station to file a complaint. A physical examination was conducted by Police Chief Inspector
Pierre Paul Figeroa Carpio upon AAA, who was found to have "[d]eep-healed lacerations at 3 and 7
o’clock positions" and was in a non-virgin state physically at the time of examination. Subsequently,
appellant was charged with rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in an Amended
Information4 dated July 16, 2004.
In defense, appellant claimed that in the evening of the incident, he and his uncle, Romeo Matias, were
doing construction work at the house of his aunt, also located at Sto. Nino St., Barangay San Antonio,
Quezon City. He was therefore surprised when two policemen arrested him at around 6:30 in the
evening of even date and detained him at the Baler Police Station.
The RTC Ruling
In its April 19, 2007 Decision,5 the RTC convicted appellant for "rape" under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA
7610 and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The RTC likewise directed him to pay AAA the
amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P30,000 as moral damages.
In convicting appellant, the RTC gave full credence to AAA's testimony, which was straightforward and
positive. On the other hand, it found appellant’s defenses of denial and alibi as weak, taking into
consideration that his aunt's house where he was allegedly doing construction work was just a few
meters away from the vegetable stall, clearly making it possible for him to be at the locus criminis at
the time of the incident.
The CA Ruling
In its assailed Decision,6 the CA affirmed the RTC Decision in toto, finding no compelling reason to
depart from its findings and conclusions. The appellate court held that if the RTC found AAA's
testimony to be credible, logical and consistent, then it should be given great respect, as the RTC had
the ability to observe firsthand the demeanor and deportment of the witnesses on stand.
Moreover, for appellant's alibi to prosper, he should be able to show that he was a great distance away
from the place of the incident and that it was impossible for him to be there or within its immediate
vicinity at the time of the commission of the crime. The CA ruled that it is highly unlikely for a young
girl to fabricate a story that would destroy her reputation and her family’s life and endure the
discomforts of trial.
Issue Before The Court
The sole issue to be resolved in this appeal is whether the CA committed reversible error in affirming in
toto the Decision of the RTC, which convicted appellant of "rape" under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA
7610.
The Court's Ruling
Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 provides:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
the following:
(a) x x x
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; xxx7
In the case of People v. Pangilinan,8 which affirmed the doctrines enunciated in the cases of People v.
Dahilig9and People v. Abay,10 the Court explained:
Under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353, if the victim of sexual abuse is below
12 years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for statutory rape under
Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code and penalized with reclusion perpetua. On the other
hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under
Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code.
However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because his right against
double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single
criminal act. Likewise, rape cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Under
Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code (on complex crimes), a felony under the Revised Penal Code
(such as rape) cannot be complexed with an offense penalized by a special law.
In this case, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, convicted appellant for "rape" under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of
RA 7610 and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, upon a finding that AAA was a minor below 12
years old at the time of the commission of the offense on June 6, 2004. However, a punctilious scrutiny
of the records shows that AAA was born on April 23, 1991, which would make her 13 years old at the
time of the commission of the offense on June 6, 2004. Thus, appellant can be prosecuted and
convicted either under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 for sexual abuse, or under Article 266-A of the
RPC, except for rape under paragraph 1(d).11 It bears pointing out that the penalties under these two
laws differ: the penalty for sexual abuse under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 is reclusion temporal
medium to reclusion perpetua, while rape under Article 266-A of the RPC is penalized withreclusion
perpetua.
On this score, it is worth noting that in its April 19, 2007 Decision,12 the RTC concluded that AAA was
the "victim of sexual abuse labeled 'rape',"13 considering the established fact that there was sexual
intercourse between him and AAA. Thus, appellant's conviction was clearly under Sec. 5 (b), Article III
of RA 7610 or sexual abuse and not for rape under Article 266-A of the RPC.
In the light of all the foregoing, there is a need to modify the penalty imposed upon appellant.1âwphi1
Following the pronouncement in the case of Malto v. People14 for sexual abuse, and in the absence of
any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the Court finds it appropriate to impose the penalty of
reclusion temporal in its maximum period, which has the range of 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20
years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,15 therefore, the maximum term of the indeterminate
penalty shall be that which could be properly imposed under the law, which is 17 years, 4 months and
1 day to 20 years ofreclusion temporal, while the minimum term shall be within the range next lower in
degree, which is prision mayorin its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period, or a
period ranging from 8 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months. Similarly, the award of moral
damages is increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00, pursuant to the Malto case.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The August 19, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02781 finding appellant Jover Matias y Dela Fuente guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS as to penalty and the amount of damages awarded. Appellant is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of 12 years of prision mayoras minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as maximum, and ordered to pay the private complainant the amount of P50,000.00 as moral
damages. The rest of the assailed Decision stands.
People vs. Ladjaalam
G.R. Nos. 136149-51. September 19, 2000
Appellee: People of the Philippines
Appellant: Walpan Ladjaalam alias “Warpan”
Ponente: J. Panganiban
FACTS:
Four Informations were filed against appellant Walpan Ladjaalam in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Zamboanga City (Branch 16), three of which he was found guilty, to wit: 1) maintaining a drug den in
violation of Section 15-A, Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972); 2) illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended by
Republic Act. No. 8294; and 3) direct assault with multiple attempted homicide. The following
information was provided by the prosecution:
1) In the afternoon of September 24, 1997, more than thirty (30) policemen proceeded to the house of
appellant and his wife to serve the search warrant when they were met by a volley of gunfire coming
from the second floor of the said house. They saw that it was the appellant who fired the M14 rifle
towards them.
2) After gaining entrance, two of the police officers proceeded to the second floor where they earlier
saw appellant firing the rifle. As he noticed their presence, the appellant jumped from the window to
the roof of a neighboring house. He was subsequently arrested at the back of his house after a brief
chase.
3) Several firearms and ammunitions were recovered from appellant’s house. Also found was a pencil
case with fifty (50) folded aluminum foils inside, each containing methamphetamine hydrochloride.
4) A paraffin test was conducted and the casts taken both hands of the appellant yielded positive for
gunpowder nitrates.
5) Records show that appellant had not filed any application for license to possess firearm and
ammunition, nor has he been given authority to carry firearms.
ISSUE:
Whether or not such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
HELD:
No. Section 1 of RA 8294 substantially provides that any person who shall unlawfully possess any
firearm or ammunition shall be penalized, “unless no other crime was committed”. Furthermore, if
homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Since the crime committed was direct
assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating
circumstance.

Criminal Law; Special Penal Laws: CELINO v. CA, G.R. No. 170562 June 29, 2007
Brief Facts:
Two separate Information were filed against the petitioner, Angel Celino: one for violation of the
Comelec gun ban; the other, for Illegal Possession of Firearm under R.A. 8294. After pleading not guilty
to the former, he filed a Motion to Quash on the latter contending that he “cannot be prosecuted for
illegal possession of firearms x x x if he was also charged of having committed another crime of [sic]
violating the Comelec gun ban under the same set of facts xx x.”

Issue:
Whether the mere filing of an information for gun ban violation against him necessarily bars his
prosecution for illegal possession of firearm because of the provision of the law that "Provided,
however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested."

Ruling:
Ruling against the petitioner, the High Court explained that he can be convicted of illegal
possession of firearms, provided no other crime was committed by the person arrested. The word
“committed” taken in its ordinary sense, and in light of the Constitutional presumption of
innocence,necessarily implies a prior determination of guilt by final conviction resulting from
successful prosecution or voluntary admission.
Citing the case of People v. Valdez (1999), the Supreme Court ruled that “all pending cases
involving illegal possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted and tried if no other crimes
expressly indicated in Republic Act No. 8294 are involved x x x.”
In sum, when the other offense involved is one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294, any
information for illegal possession of firearm should be quashed because the illegal possession of
firearm would have to be tried together with such other offense, either considered as an aggravating
circumstance in murder or homicide, or absorbed as an element of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or
attemptedcoup d’etat. Conversely, when the other offense involved is not one of those enumerated
under R.A. 8294, then the separate case for illegal possession of firearm should continue to be
prosecuted.