TRINIDAD GAMBOA-ROCES, Complainant vs. JUDGE RANHEL A.

PEREZ, Presiding Judge,

Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Enrique Magalona-Manapla, Negros Occidental, Respondent
A.M. No. MTJ-16-1887
January 9, 2017

Facts:

The case is about an administrative complaint filed by Trinidad Gamboa-Roces (complainant) charging
Judge Ranhel A. Perez (Judge Perez), Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, E.B. Magalona
Manapla, Negros Occidental (MCTC), with gross ignorance of the law for his failure to render judgment
on the consolidated ejectment cases, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 451-M and 452-M, within the
reglementary period as prescribed by law.

In her complaint, denominated as Petition, dated November 17, 2015, complainant claimed that she was
one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case Nos. 451-M and 452-M for unlawful detainer and damages. After the
mediation proceedings and the Judicial Dispute Resolution proceedings failed in Civil Case No. 451-M, it
was referred back to the MCTC for trial and was set for preliminary conference. As a new judge was soon
to be assigned in the MCTC, the preliminary conference was reset to January 10, 2014, by Judge Evelyn
D. Arsenio, the then acting Presiding Judge.

Complainant stated that when Judge Perez was appointed and assumed office, her counsel filed two (2)
separate motions for his inhibition in the two cases on the ground that she was previously involved in a
legal confrontation with Judge Perez himself when he was representing his parents. Her motions, however,
were denied in separate orders. Thereafter, Civil Case Nos. 451- M and 452-M were consolidated in the
Order, dated March 11, 2014. After the preliminary conference for the two cases was held, the parties were
then required to file their respective position papers. Thereafter, Judge Perez issued the Order, dated
November 21, 2014, submitting the cases for resolution. With this, complainant claimed that despite the
lapse of more than ten (10) months, Judge Perez failed to decide the cases in violation of the 30-day
reglementary period within which to decide an ejectment case.

Judge Perez on the other hand, admitted that Civil Case Nos. 451-M and 452-M were decided beyond the
prescribed 30-day period and offered his deepest apologies, explaining that the delay was inadvertent and
not intended to prejudice the plaintiffs. He explained that he was able to finish the final draft of his decision
on December 1, 2014, but in his desire to have "a perfect decision," he did not immediately forward the
draft to his Clerk of Court as he would still polish its decision. He, however, got distracted with other issues
and matters in the office.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) through its Report, dated September 7, 2016, recommended
that the complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and that "Judge Perez be found
GUILTY of undue delay in rendering a decision or order and be admonished to be more mindful in the
performance of his duties particularly in the prompt disposition of cases pending and/or submitted for
decision/resolution before his court.

Issue:

Whether or not the Respondent as the Presiding Judge is guilty of undue delay of rendering a decision
within the reglementary period as prescribed by law.

Ruling:

Yes, the Respondent as the Presiding Judge is guilty of undue delay of rendering a decision within the
reglementary period as prescribed by law..The Supreme Court cited Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution which requires the lower courts to decide or resolve cases or matters for decision or final
resolution within three (3) months from date of submission. In complaints for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer as in this case, Section 10 of the Rules on Summary Procedure specifically requires that the
complaint be resolved within thirty (30) days from receipt of the last affidavits and position papers. Without
any order of extension granted by this Court, failure to decide even a single case within the required period
constitutes gross inefficiency. Moreover, Sections 2 and 5 of Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
enjoin the judges to devote their professional activity to judicial duties and to perform them, including the
delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness. This obligation to render

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decision promptly is further emphasized in Administrative Circular No. 3-99 which reminds all judges to
meticulously observe the periods prescribed by the Constitution for deciding cases because failure to
comply with the prescribed period transgresses the parties' constitutional right to speedy disposition of their
cases.

The Court has always reminded the judges to attend promptly to the business of the court and to decide
cases within the required periods for the honor and integrity of the Judiciary is measured not only by the
fairness and correctness of the decisions rendered, but also by the efficiency with which disputes are
resolved. Any delay in the disposition of cases erodes the public's faith and confidence in the Judiciary.
Thus, judges should give full dedication to their primary and fundamental task of administering justice
efficiently, in order to restore and maintain the people's confidence in the courts.

The explanation given by Judge Perez of his being inexperienced as a newly appointed judge was too flimsy.
The excuses only show his lack of diligence in discharging administrative responsibilities and professional
competence in court management wherein a judge is expected to keep his own listing of cases and to note
therein the status of each case so that they may be acted upon accordingly and without delay and must adopt
a system of record management and organize his docket in order to monitor the flow of cases for a prompt
and effective dispatch of business.

A.M. No. 17-11-06-CA

RE: ANONYMOUS LETTERCOMPLAINT (with Attached Pictures) AGAINST ASSOCIATE

JUSTICE NORMANDIE B. PIZARRO, COURT OF APPEALS,

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

This administrative matter arose from an anonymous letter-complaint1 charging Associate Justice
Normandie B. Pizarro (Justice Pizarro) of the Court of Appeals (CA) of habitually gambling in casinos,
"selling" decisions, and immorally engaging in an illicit relationship. The subject letter-complaint was
initially filed with the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) on 20 September 2017. The matter was
referred by the Ombudsman to this Court on 24 October 2017.2

The anonymous letter-complaint accused Justice Pizarro of being a gambling addict who would allegedly
lose millions of pesos in the casinos daily, and insinuated that Justice Pizarro resorted to "selling" his
cases in order to support his gambling addiction.

The anonymous complainant further accused Justice Pizarro of having an illicit relationship, claiming that
Justice Pizarro bought his mistress a house and lot in Antipolo City, a condominium unit in Manila, and
brand new vehicles such as Toyota Vios and Ford Everest worth millions of pesos. Lastly, the anonymous
complainant alleged that Justice Pizarro, together with his mistress and her whole family, made several
travels abroad to shop and to gamble in casinos.

Attached to the anonymous letter-complaint are four (4) sheets of photographs3 showing Justice Pizarro
sitting at the casino tables allegedly at the Midori Hotel and Casino in Clark, Pampanga.

On 21November2017, the Court issued a Resolution4 noting the 27 September 2017 Letter of the
Ombudsman referring the anonymous letter-complaint; and requiring Justice Pizarro to file his comment
on the anonymous letter-complaint.

On 8 December 2017, Justice Pizarro filed his comment5 wherein he admitted to his indiscretion. He
stated that he was indeed the person appearing on the subject photographs sitting at a casino table. He
explained that the photographs were taken when he was accompanying a balikbayan friend; and that they
only played a little in a parlor game fashion without big stakes and without their identities introduced or
made known. Justice Pizarro averred that the photographs may have been taken by people with ulterior
motives considering his plan for early retirement.

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He further confessed that sometime in 2009 he also played at the casino in what he termed, again, a parlor
game concept. He maintained, however, that such was an indiscretion committed by a dying man because,
prior to this, he had learned that he had terminal cancer.

He also found as cruel, baseless, and highly unfair the accusation that he is the "most corrupt justice in the
Philippines" noting that no administrative case had been filed against him for the past seven (7) years; that
his first administrative case, which this Court resolved in his favor, actually involved his former driver in
Ilocos Sur who forged his signature to make it appear that the driver was employed in the judiciary; and
that all of the few administrative cases filed against him did not involve corruption; and that he was
absolved in all.

Justice Pizarro likewise categorically denied having a mistress. He characterized such accusations as
cowardly acts of his detractors, who even furnished· copies of the anonymous complaint to the presiding
justice of the appellate court and the leader of a major religious group, with the intent of destroying his
character.

ISSUE

The sole issue before the Court is whether Justice Pizarro is guilty of the accusations against him for
which he may be held administratively liable.

THE COURT’S RULING

Under the Rules of Court, administrative complaints against judges of regular courts and special courts as
we11 as justices of the CA and the Sandigan,bayan may be instituted: (1) by the Supreme Court motu
proprio; (2) upon a verified complaint, supported by affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge
of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations; or (3) upon an
anonymous complaint, supported by public records of indubitable integrity.

The rationale for the requirement that complaints against judges and justices of the judiciary must be
accompanied by supporting evidence is to protect magistrates from the filing of t1imsy and virtually
unsubstantiated charges against them. This is consistent with the rule that in administrative proceedings,
the complainants bear the burden of proving the allegations in their complaints by substantial evidence. If
they fail to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which their claims are based, the respondents are
not obliged to prove their exception or defense.

In this case, the anonymous complaint accused Justice Pizarro of selling favorable decisions, having a
mistress, and habitually playing in casinos; and essentially charging him of dishonesty and violations of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law, immorality, and unbecoming conduct. These accusations,
however, with the only exception of gambling in casinos, are not supported by any evidence or by any
public record of indubitable integrity. Thus, the bare allegations of corruption and immorality do not
deserve any consideration. For this reason, the charges of corruption and immorality against Justice
Pizarro must be dismissed for lack of merit.

Inasmuch as the Court would want to cleanse the Judiciary of its erring and undesirable members and
personnel, such policy could only be implemented with the strict observance of due process, such that
substantial evidence is required to prove the charges against a member of the Judiciary. The Court is duty
bound to protect its ranks or any member or personnel of the Judiciary from baseless or unreasonable
charges.

Indeed, while the law and justice abhor all forms of abuse committed by public officers and employees
whose sworn duty is to discharge their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity, competence,
accountability, and loyalty, the Court must protect them against unsubstantiated charges that tend to
adversely affect, rather than encourage, the effective performance of their duties and functions.

As regards the accusation of habitually playing in casinos, it is clear that the anonymous complaint was
not supported by public records of indubitable integrity as required by the rules. Nevertheless, it is equally
undisputed, as in fact it was admitted, that Justice Pizarro was the same person playing in a casino in
Clark, Pampanga, as shown by the photographs attached to the anonymous complaint. He also admitted
that he played in a casino sometime in 2009. The Court cannot simply ignore this evident and admitted
fact. The issue now is whether Justice Pizarro may be held administratively liable for gambling in casinos.

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Accordingly, the Court finds respondent Justice Pizarro guilty of conduct unbecoming of a member of the
judiciary. Considering, however, that this is the respondent justice's first transgression, and further
bearing in mind his immediate admission of his indiscretion as well as the number of years he has been in
government service, the Court finds the imposition of a fine in the amount of ₱100,000.00 sufficient in
this case.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro GUILTY of
conduct unbecoming of a member of the judiciary, and is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine in the amount
of ₱100,000,00.

Atty. Tamondong vs. Judge Pasal

FACTS: The heirs of Enrique Abada filed a case for Quieting of Title, Recovery of Possession, Annulment
of Transfer Certificate of Title, and Annulment of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale, before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities. Atty. Tamondong, counsel for the adverse party, filed an Omnibus Motion
for the dismissal of the complaint based on the following grounds: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the person
of Henmar; (b) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and/or improper venue; and (c) prescription
and/or laches. In an Order dated March 26, 2013, the MTCC denied the motion to dismis. Tamondong filed
a Motion for Reconsideration but it was also denied by the MTCC in an Order dated July 4, 2013.
Tamondong filed Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Preliminary Injunction but the same were denied.
Tamondong filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Resolution, and Abada's heirs filed their
Opposition/Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration. In an Order dated February 24, 2014, Judge Pasal
deemed the Motion for Reconsideration of Tamondong as already submitted for resolution. However, even
after more than six months, Judge Pasal had yet to resolve the said Motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge failed to observe his duties with competence and diligence.
HELD: Yes. As a frontline official of the Judiciary, Judge Pasal should act with efficiency and probity at
all times. Judge Pasal's unexplained delay in resolving the Motion for Reconsideration is inexcusable,
unwarranted, and unreasonable. Judge Pasal failed to heed the consistent reminder of the Court for judges
to decide cases promptly and expeditiously under the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice
denied. Every judge should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and observant in
the performance of his functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of the
people in the Judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it into disrepute. Judge Pasal's failure to resolve the
Motion for Reconsideration within the 30-day reglementary period is not excusable and warrants the
imposition of administrative sanctions upon him.
Decision-making is primordial among the many duties of judges. The speedy disposition of cases is the
primary aim of the Judiciary, for only thereby may the ends of justice not be compromised and the Judiciary
may be true to its commitment of ensuring to all persons the right to a speedy, impartial, and public trial.
To pursue this aim, the Court, through the Rules of Court and other issuances, has fixed reglementary
periods for acting on cases and matters.

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RAPSING v. OCA
ROGER RAPSING, Complainant, vs. THE OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, JUDGE
CARIDAD M. WALSE, LUTERO] and CELESTINA D. ROTA, respondents.
A.M. No. MTJ-17-1894 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 11-2355-MTJ]
April 04, 2017

FACTS:

In the February 22, 2011 Amended Affidavit-Complaint, Roger Rapsing (Rapsing) accused Presiding Judge
Caridad M. Walse-Lutero (Judge Walse-Lutero) of Branch 34, Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City of
undue delay in resolving two (2) motions filed by his counsel in Civil Case No. 06-35758, entitled Roger
Rapsing v. Spouses Eddie and Luzviminda Rapsing, for Ejectment.

The motions were: (1) Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Admission dated August 15, 2008 and filed
on August 20, 2008; and (2) Motion to Inhibit dated July 24, 2008 and filed on July 25, 2008. The
Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Admission arose from the January 17, 2008 Order of respondent
Judge Walse-Lutero denying complainant's motion to correct the pre-trial order.Complainant moved for
reconsideration but this was denied by the respondent judge in an Order dated July 4, 2008, prompting
complainant to file a Motion to Inhibit on July 25, 2008.

During the hearing of the Motion to Inhibit on August 15, 2008, the matter of the denial of the motion to
correct the pre-trial order was also discussed. Respondent Judge Walse-Lutero informed complainant's
counsel that the proper remedy to remove the supposed admission of his client as contained in the pre-trial
order was to file a withdrawal of admission and not correction of the pre-trial order. Consequently, it was
agreed upon that the resolution of the motion to inhibit shall be held in abeyance pending the filing of the
proper motion. The Motion to Withdraw Admission was subsequently filed on August 20, 2008, and was
deemed submitted for resolution in the Order dated September 12, 2008. Considering that the motion had
remained unresolved for a considerable length of time, complainant argued that respondent Judge Walse-
Lutero should be held liable for undue delay. In First Indorsement dated April 8, 2011, Court Administrator
Jose Midas P. Marquez referred the complaint to Judge Walse-Lutero for comment.

On April 18, 2012, the Office of the Court Administrator received respondent Judge Walse-Lutero's
Comment. Judge Walse-Lutero denied delaying the resolution of the motions. She explained that the Branch
Clerk of Court failed to return the record of the case to her for the resolution of the motions. Respondent
averred that she discovered the unresolved motions only in March 2011, when her staff, upon coming from
the Supreme Court, informed her of the present administrative complaint.

Respondent added that Ms. Shernalyn Mallari-Carian (Carian), the Docket Clerk-in-Charge, reasoned her
being new in her post when queried for failure to refer the record of Civil Case No. 06-35758 to respondent
Judge Walse-Lutero. Carian averred that the former Clerk-in-Charge turned over all the records of the civil
cases to the Branch Clerk of Court Ms. Celestina Rota (Rota). Carian pointed out that complainant had been
following up the case with Rota. For her part, Rota admitted that "even with the intermittent follow-up of
the herein parties in this case, [she] failed to refer the case to [respondent Judge Walse-Lutero] for resolution
of the pending incident due to the volume of civil cases also for decision."

Judge Walse-Lutero further affirmed that "[u]pon receipt of the record, [she] discovered that it was badly
damaged by rain water that leaked through [the court's] ceiling." When she asked Rota why the latter did

5
not inform her about the damage or ask the parties to replace the drenched documents, Rota merely shrugged
and said, "[K]aya nga judge." Nonetheless, Judge Walse-Lutero alleged that after the record was
reconstituted, she promptly resolved all pending incidents and rendered her decision in the subject case.

Respondent Judge Walse-Lutero revealed that with the 3,800 cases she inherited from the previous
presiding judges, as well as the 80 to 130 cases that were raffled to her branch on a monthly basis, "it [was]
impossible for [her] to monitor each and every case before [the] court." Therefore, she "had to rely on
[Rota] to inform [her] of cases that require[d] prompt action."Unfortunately, Rota had been greatly remiss
in the performance of her duties. For instance, when respondent Judge Walse-Lutero took over, she
discovered that almost 200 cases with pending motions or submitted for decision were bundled with
archived ones. Respondent Judge Walse-Lutero consistently gave "unsatisfactory" ratings to Rota and once
raised the issue of her incompetence before then Court Administrator Jose P. Perez. Respondent Judge
Walse-Lutero was advised by the Office of the Administrative Services of the Office of the Court
Administrator to direct Rota "to explain why she should not be dropped from the service." Respondent
Judge Walse-Lutero did as instructed and Rota had the audacity to reply: "Ibalato mo na sa akin itong rating
judge." Respondent Judge Walse-Lutero has since submitted several memoranda to the Office of the Court
Administrator requesting to drop Rota from the rolls.

Considering Judge Walse-Lutero's explanation, particularly her averments regarding Rota's neglect, this
Court resolved to furnish Rota with copies of the Affidavit-Complaint and of the Comment of Judge Walse-
Lutero dated April 16, 2012. This Court equally decided to require her to explain "why she should not be
administratively held liable for gross neglect of duty."
On February 29, 2016, the Office of the Court Administrator received Rota's comment.
Rota attributed her "neglect/omission/lapse" to the high caseload of the court, particularly in criminal cases.
She added that the number of court personnel in her branch was not proportionate to the court's caseload.
Rota also explained that the case record got wet during the Typhoon Ondoy through a leak in the roof. She
allegedly apologized for it, and rectified the damage by working on Saturdays.
Finally, on the high volume of cases, Rota explained that while both civil and criminal cases were equally
important, the court gave priority to criminal cases especially those involving detention prisoners.

The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Memorandum dated August 5, 2016, recommended the
dismissal of the case against Judge Walse-Lutero, with a reminder for her "to be more meticulous and
zealous in organizing and supervising the work of her subordinates."

ISSUE:

Whether or not Presiding Judge Caridad M. Walse-Lutero and Branch Clerk of Court Celestina D. Rota are
administratively held liable for gross neglect of duty?

HELD:

We find Judge Walse-Lutero liable for neglecting her duty to resolve motions expeditiously. On the other
hand, we agree with the findings of the Office of the Court Administrator that Rota is guilty of gross neglect

6
of duty. This Court resolves to re-docket the present administrative case as a regular administrative matter
against Presiding Judge Caridad M. Walse-Lutero and Branch Clerk of Court Celestina D. Rota.

Presiding Judge Caridad M. Walse-Lutero is ADMONISHED for her undue delay in resolving the motions
in Civil Case No. 06-35758.

Branch Clerk of Court Celestina D. Rota is found GUILTY of gross neglect of duty and is hereby
DISMISSED from service. All her benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any, are declared FORFEITED,
with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
government-owned and controlled corporations and financial institutions.
Re: Anonymous Letter Complaint Vs. Judge Divina T. Samson, etc., Compostela Valley, and Utility
Worker Francisco M. Roque, Jr., etc.
A.M. No. MTJ-16-1870
June 6, 2017

FACTS:

Respondent Roque was convicted for the said crime by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagum City,
Branch 1, Davao del Norte on June 1, 2005. He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate with six months
and twenty days of prision correccional, as maximum penalty, including all the accessory penalties provided
by law. Respondent Roque immediately applied for probation, which was granted by the RTC on July 25,
2005. Upon the motion of Probation and Parole Officer II, respondent Roque was discharged from his
probation July 18, 2008. Respondent Roque applied for the position of Utility Worker I in the court of
respondent Judge Samson. However, in his Personal Data Sheet dated June 12, 2008, respondent did not
disclosed the fact that he had been formally charged and convicted of an offense.

On July 11, 2013, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received an anonymous letter-complaint
charging respondent Judge Divina T. Samson with misconduct for hiring co-respondent Francisco M.
Roque, Jr. as Utility Worker I in her court despite knowing that respondent Roque was convicted for illegal
possession of explosives, as she was the public prosecutor who handled the case, and for knowingly abetting
the concealment of such fact, which led to Roque's appointment in the Judiciary. The complaint also
charged respondent Roque with dishonesty and falsification for the untruthful entries he made in his
Personal Data Sheet, particularly
that he had not been formally charged and convicted of an offense.

On February 15, 2016, the OCA found respondents guilty. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not respondent Roque is liable for dishonesty and falsification for failing to disclose in his
Personal Data Sheet that he was charged of a criminal offense and convicted of the crime charged.

(2) Whether or not respondent Judge Samson is liable for violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct for her
complicity in the appointment of respondent Roque to the judiciary despite knowing that he was not yet
discharged from probation when he applied for the position of utility worker I in her court.

HELD:

I.

Yes. Respondent Roque is liable for dishonesty and falsification for failing to disclose in his Personal Data
Sheet that he was charged of a criminal offense and convicted of the crime charged.

Under Section 17 of the Probation Law, the confidentiality of records of a probationer refers to the
investigation report and supervision history of a probationer taken under the said law, which records shall

7
not be disclosed to anyone other than the Probation Administration or the court concerned. However, the
Probation Administration and the court concerned have the discretion to allow disclosure of the confidential
records to specific persons and the government office/agency stated in the Probation Law. The
confidentiality of the said records is different from respondent Roque' s obligation to answer truthfully the
questions in his Personal Data Sheet, as the accomplishment of the Personal Data Sheet is a requirement
under the Civil Service Rules and Regulations in connection with employment in the government. The
Personal Data Sheet is the repository of all information about any government employee and official
regarding his personal background, qualification, and eligibility. Respondent Roque, therefore, had the
obligation to reveal the fact that he had been formally charged and convicted of a criminal offense to enable
the Selection and Promotion Board for Lower Courts to correctly determine his qualification for the position
applied for. The Office of the Court Administrator aptly stated that by respondent Roque' s false statement
in his Personal Data Sheet making it appear that he had a spotless record, he gained unwarranted advantage
over other qualified individuals, especially that he was also recommended by respondent Judge Samson for
the position.

The falsification in respondent Roque' s Personal Data Sheet is a dishonest act related to his employment.
Dishonesty is the concealment or distortion of truth, which shows lack of integrity or a disposition to
defraud, cheat, deceive or betray and an intention to violate the truth.

II.

Yes. Respondent Judge Samson is liable for violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct for her complicity in
the appointment of respondent Roque to the judiciary despite knowing that he was not yet discharged from
probation when he applied for the position of utility worker I in her court.

Respondent Judge Samson, she contends that respondent Roque applied for the position of Utility Worker
in her court after his discharge from probation, but the records show that respondent Roque accomplished
his Personal Data Sheet on June 12, 2008 or more than a month before he was discharged from probation
on July 18, 2008. When respondent Roque• applied for the position of Utility Worker I in her court,
respondent Judge Samson knew that he was not yet discharged from probation and yet she recommended
respondent Roque for the position in a recommendation letter dated June 3, 2008, which forms part of the
employment record of respondent Roque in the Court. As the Presiding Judge of the Court, respondent
Judge Samson should have been circumspect and waited for the final discharge of respondent Roque before
she entertained his application and gave him her favorable recommendation, as it is only upon the final
discharge of respondent Roque from probation that his case is deemed terminated and all his civil rights
lost or suspended are restored. Her act violates Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, thus:

CANON 2 - A JUDGE SHOULD A VOID IMPROPRIETY AND

APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES

Rule 2.01 --A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary. xx xx
Rule 2.03 - A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or
judgment. The prestige of
judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit
others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.

Hence, the OCA decision is hereby affirmed but modifies the recommended penalties to be imposed.

A.C. No. 11256, March 07, 2017

FLORDELIZA A. MADRIA, Complainant, v. ATTY. CARLOS P. RIVERA, Respondent.

Facts:

In November 2002, complainant Flordeliza A. Madria consulted the respondent in his law office in
Tuguegarao City, Cagayan to inquire about the process of annulling her marriage with her husband, Juan
C. Madria.

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The respondent told her that she had a strong case, and guaranteed that he could obtain for her the decree
of annulment. He told her, too, that his legal services would cost P25,000.00.

After paying his legal services, respondent advised her to just wait for the resolution of her complaint, and
assured her that she did not need to appear in court. He explained that all the court notices and processes
would be sent to his office, and that he would regularly apprise her of the developments.

In the latter part of April 2003, the respondent informed the complainant that her petition had been
granted. The complainant, throughher daughter Vanessa, received from the respondent a copy of the
certificate of finality dated September 26, 2003 signed by one Jacinto C. Danao of the RTC (Branch 4).

Believing that the documents were authentic, the complainant used the purported decision and certificate
of finality in applying for the renewal of her passport.However, she became the object of an investigation
by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) because her former partner, Andrew Dowson Grainge, had
filed a complaint charging that she had fabricated the decision for the annulment of her marriage. Only
then did she learn that the decision and the certificate of finality given by the respondent did not exist in
the court records,

Respondent averred that petitioner had prevailed upon him to simulate the court decision to the effect that
her marriage had been annulled, and to fabricate the certificate of finality; that she had assured him that
such simulated documents would be kept strictly confidential.

IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala concluded that the respondent had violated his Lawyer's
Oath; and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for a period of two years.

The IBP Board of Governors modified the recommendation of suspension from the practice of law for
two years to disbarment.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Atty. Rivera is guilty of the charges.

Held: YES.

Respondent`s deliberate falsification of the court decision and the certificate of finality of the decision
reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part, and made a mockery of the administration of justice
in this country. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar.

The respondent directly contravened the letter and spirit of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1, and Rule 15.07,
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Surely, too, he could not have soon forgotten his express undertaking under his Lawyer's Oath to "do no
falsehood, nor consent to its commission."17 Indeed, the ethics of the Legal Profession rightly enjoined
every lawyer like him to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course
of his practice of law. Members of the Bar are expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility as the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly
fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith.

Also, Canon 15 and Rule 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility required the
respondent be true to the complainant as his client. By choosing to ignore his fiduciary responsibility for
the sake of getting her money, he committed a further violation of his Lawyer's Oath by which he swore

9
not to "delay any man's cause for money or malice," and to "conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to
the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients."
He compounded this violation by taking advantage of his legal knowledge to promote his own selfish
motives, thereby disregarding his responsibility under Canon 17.

The moral standards of the Legal Profession expected the respondent to act with the highest degree of
professionalism, decency, and nobility in the course of their practice of law.

It is true that the power to disbar is always exercised with great caution and only for the most imperative
reasons or in cases of clear misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court and member of the bar. The test is whether the conduct shows the lawyer to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, and whether the conduct renders the
lawyer unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court.

Virgilio J. Mapalad, Jr., Complainant, v. Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez, Respondent

A.C. No. 10911, 6 June 2017

Facts:
Complainant filed a disbarment case against the respondent for presenting falsified Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Number without indicating the date of issue. The respondent used
the said falsified MCLE Number in several legal pleadings against the complainant.

Upon inquiry with the MCLE Office, a certification was issued stating the respondent has yet complied
his MCLE requirements. The complainant filed his complaint against the respondent at the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for act of deliberately and unlawfully misleading the courts, parties and counsels
concerned into believing that he had complied with the MCLE requirements when in truth he had not, is a
serious malpractice and grave misconduct. The complainant, thus, prayed for the IBP to recommend
respondent’s disbarment.

The respondent was given the chance to comment on the complaint twice but the respondent didn’t
provide any response.

Both the complainant and the respondent were called for a hearing by the IBP-CBD – both parties
attend. The IBP-CBD then directed both parties to submit position papers. Only the complainant
complied. The IBP-CBD recommend the respondent be disbarred and his name stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys. The IBP-BOG adopted and approved the IBP-CBD’s report.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent be administratively disciplined based on allegations in the complaint?

Held:
The Supreme Court find the respondent guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath; Rule 1.01, Canon 1;
Rule 10.01, Canon 10; Canon 17; Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The Supreme Court disbarred the respondent and his name was ordered stricken off from the Roll of
Attorneys.

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