JAPANESE IMPERIALISM

Questions:
1. Analyze Japan’s policy towards Korea and Manchuria. What was its impact? (2005)
2. What were the causes of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05? What were its consequences? (2006)
3. Discuss the nature of Japan’s Twenty One Demands on China. How did they influence Japanese politics?
(2007)
4. How did the dispute over Korean Influence determine Sino-Japanese relations from the 1870s to 1910?
(2008)
5. Short Notes:
a. Russo-Japanese War
b. Manchurian Crisis (2009)
6. Short Notes:
a. Anglo-Japanese Alliance (2010)
7. What were the consequences of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95? (2011)

Following the collapse of the Tokugawa Shogunate in 1868, the new Meiji government in Japan embarked upon
a process of modernization and reconstruction. The Meiji revolution not only transformed the domestic space of
Japan but also transformed the relationship between Japan and the world. By the end of the 19th century Japan
had shifted from a relatively marginal position to a dominant place in Asia. Till this time, Japan had been
relatively isolated from the rest of the world and had followed a policy of ‘closed country’ (sakoku). The pattern
of Japan’s relations with the world needs to be understood in the context of Western imperialism in Asia in
particular, which generated a sense of crisis.

In the middle of the 19th century Japan was incorporated into the Treaty Port system, which the European
imperialist powers, led by Britain, had devised to regulate their access to the trade of China on advantageous
terms, reducing China and other Asian countries to what has been described as a ‘semi-colonial’ status. The
Japanese reacted vigorously to this situation and respond in two ways in their quest for a more respectable
position in the international order.

The first was internal reconstruction. The 1868 Restoration brought to power a group of leaders determined to
make Japan “rich and strong” (Fukoku Kyohei), a goal that was perceived as necessary for survival in the context
of European imperialism in Asia. Within a generation they dismantled feudalism, substituting it with an
emperor-centric bureaucratic state, created a modern army and navy and took the first major steps towards
industrial development and acquired a colonial empire. Fukoku Kyohei was the paramount objective of the state
and all other demands were either suppressed or neglected. Above all, loyalty to the nation and the Emperor
and obedience to the Meiji political structure were stressed. The second means of strengthening their position of
course was the extension of control and influence over their weaker neighbours. This was what eventually led to
imperialism.

Nationalism was the defining feature of the Meiji period in Japan. In fact EH Norman sees modern Japanese
nationalism as ‘reactive nationalism’, a consciousness of nation and of the urgent necessity to build a modern
state generated at all levels of Japanese society by fear of western physical domination or cultural colonization.
Japan’s drive for empire had domestic roots and ramifications. The nation building projects undertaken by the
Meiji regime inspired a new patriotism among the masses of Japanese people. This bolstered what Andrew
Gordon sees as the ‘assertive external agenda’ of the government. It is interesting that just like Japanese
economic development, the development of nationalism and patriotism in Japan was also state-directed
and state-controlled.

It is in this context that we can understand the gradual emergence of a distinctive Japanese identity or a
‘Japanese-ness’. The threat of Western imperialism also created and reinforced an ‘Asian Consciousness’. This

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stream of thought broadly argued that the only way Japan could defend itself from Western interference was to
unite with Asian countries, which were part of a common cultural tradition. This alliance meant that Japan must
help to modernize and develop these countries. Such an ideology could be used very easily as a part of the
militaristic program of the state.

Theories on Japanese Imperialism

The reasons for Japanese imperialism can be explained in various ways. Some have attributed it to the
persistence of feudal militaristic values, while others have seen political and nationalist factors. In order to
understand this issue we need to look into the various theories of imperialism and analyze them in the Japanese
context.

Many scholars have examined the nature of imperialism. In 1902 J. Hobson argued that countries such as
Britain had excess manufacturing capacity and surplus capital, which could not be invested in the country.
Therefore they were forced to seek new areas for investment. Lenin too argued that imperialism was a product
of monopoly capitalism, in which capitalists sought colonies or spheres of influence that would serve as
politically protected markets. In 1953 Gallagher and Robinson in their article “The Imperialism of Free Trade”
elaborated this argument and identified an intermediate stage between mercantilist imperialism and the one
identified by Hobson. This was the imperialism of Free Trade where the security to trade was of the greatest
importance the imperialist country was willing to limit its formal empire. In this case protectorates and spheres
of influence could be established such as in China and Latin America. It was during this period that the greatest
expansion of the empire took place.

Scholars have also looked at non-economic factors to explain imperialism. John Schumpeter has also argued that
capitalism was a rational economic system and therefore, expansion had nothing to do with capitalism, but
rather represented pre-capitalist forces. Carlton Hayes has argued that nations expand because they desire to
increase their national prestige.

The specific case of Japanese expansion has been examined by O. Tanin and E. Yohan who argued that Japan
first expanded her territories after 1894 because of the samurai desire to establish control on the Chinese
mainland and fight ‘white imperialism’. Till the Russo-Japanese war, Japan was attempting ‘primitive capitalist
accumulation’ to increase her economic power and her expansion was not the product of ‘finance capitalism’.
After the war Japan became more of a capitalist society but the social basis of her expansionist policies was the
alliance of the military with the rising bourgeoisie. However, the persistence of feudal relations, particularly in
agriculture, acted as a constraint on the domestic economy, forcing industry to seek markets outside. Japanese
imperialism was thus primarily concerned with trade and raw materials rather than with the export of
capital.

The Japanese Marxist historian, Inoue Kiyoshi has stressed that the Meiji government was ‘absolutist’ and
therefore, an alliance of the bureaucracy, the landowners and the rising bourgeoisie exercised control over the
masses by using the Emperor System ideology. This structure of domination within the country was responsible
for extending the domination outside. The Russo-Japanese war marked a turning point when Japan entered a
modern capitalist stage. From that point Japan emerged as a partner of the other imperialist powers. Japanese
expansionist policies were supported by the military and the business houses or zaibatsu often benefited from
this.

Akira Iriye argues that economic and military compulsions were inextricably linked in the early phase of
Japanese imperialism. After World War I Japanese industry began to compete with Western firms and
economic reasons became important factors in Japan’s expansion. However, it was only in 1929-30, with the
disruption in trade and economy, that Japan rejected the idea of cooperating with the Western powers and
began to fear that it would be excluded from markets and sources of raw materials. This fear pushed Japan to
build a Co-prosperity Sphere that inevitably led her to war. The Co-prosperity Sphere was studied by FC Jones
and he argued that its formation was caused as much by imperialist policies as by the desire for Asian solidarity.

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Marius Jansen has argued that in the 19th century imperialism was a norm and the Japanese accepted the
Darwinist idea that a constant struggle for survival was an inevitable process and Japan must strive to expand
her borders to ensure her survival. John K. Maki has suggested that war was the natural expression of an
aggressive people organized in a military state.

Hyman Kublin sees the increased aggression in terms of Japanese concern for defence. In his opinion, before
1895 Japan’s best means of defence seemed to lie in limited expansion coupled with a strong military
establishment. After 1895 it appeared to depend upon entry into the ranks of world powers.

Andrew Gordon has identified the actors and forces behind Japanese expansionism in terms of three
developments. Firstly, indigenous intellectual traditions rejected both Sino-centric and Western models of
international relations. They claimed a special place for Japan as a divine realm that ‘constitutes the head and
shoulders of the world and controls all nations.” The new rulers of Meiji Japan drew on such attitudes as they
looked to secure Japan’s position in Asia. Secondly, the Meiji rulers accepted a geopolitical logic that led
inexorably towards either empire or subordination, with no middle ground possible. They decided that Japan
had no choice but to secure its independence by emulating the imperialists. Thus, Yamagata Aritomo developed
the strategic vision of zones of sovereignty ringed by zones of advantage. Thirdly, influential Japanese also
developed substantial overseas business interests, especially in Korea. The leading Japanese businessmen active
in Korea were also politically influential figures in Japan. Military and economic domination were two sides of a
single coin. All of Japan’s elites saw Korea and Asia as a frontier for Japan’s expanding power and prestige. The
move to empire was thus “over-determined” i.e. it was propelled by connected logic of military power,
competitive geopolitics, expanding trade and investment, as well as nativist ideals of Japanese supremacy.

Therefore, Japanese motives for imperial expansion cannot be seen simply in terms of their quest for prestige.
Imperialism was probably also prompted by other factors such as the need to redirect the suppressed energies of
the discontented Samurai class, as well as the avoidance of class conflicts within the country. The Japanese
government tried to divert attention outwards and tried to foster a new kind of nationalism, which would also
act as a binding force. Concern for security in the face of increased western encroachments in Asia also gave
urgency to Japanese expansion. Finally we can also see the roots of Japan’s imperial policy in the context of
rapid modernization in Meiji Japan, which necessitated a search for sources of raw materials and markets
outside Japan.

Nature of Japanese Imperialism

Japanese colonial policy had points of similarity as well as differences with European colonial ideas. Japan did
not start with a fully articulated view of what approach should be adopted for its colonies. These views in fact,
developed over time. One assumption that they shared with European views was that different people had
different capabilities and these were inherent qualities. European powers controlled very different cultural
regions and hence such views developed to justify their rule. The Japanese too saw their colonization process as
a mission in which they would civilize their neighbours who were not developed. This view was widely accepted
by intellectuals and administrators like Nitobe Inazo and Goto Shimpei.

Japan itself had only narrowly escaped colonial subjugation in the 19th century and had been saved from that
largely due to the pull of other Asian opportunities on aggressive western energies. Also, the limited political,
military, and economic resources of the developing government did not allow an assertion of Japanese national
power in distant lands. To maximize its strength, therefore the effort to assert its presence in Asia would have
to begin with the domination over neighbouring areas close to home.

The regional dimensions of the empire created their own singularities. Japan’s colonial empire extended over
people who shared cultural and racial affinities and this was particularly so with Taiwan and Korea. Thus there
grew a view that these regions would be assimilated (doka) into the home country, Japan. This view saw these
countries as sharing a common cultural heritage specifically composed of Confucian values. Ideas related to this

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were often vague and ambiguous and could be used to justify a range of positions. Japanese policy tried to
‘Japanize’ the people and forced them to learn Japanese and live and dress like Japanese. The liberal face of
Japanese colonial policy was represented by Hara Takeshi who as Prime Minister advocated assimilation
through education and spread of civil liberties. However in the 1930s this very gradual assimilation was
transformed into a strict policy that sought to regiment the people under Japanese authority.

The late entry of Japan in the race for colonies meant that it encountered unique difficulties and opportunities in
establishing its rule. Most of the objects of Japan’s imperial ambitions were controlled by other nations or were
in their spheres of influence. Thus, Japan was obliged to gain these territories from other powers by force. In
each case, the successful outcome for Japan was determined by two factors. The first was its proximity to the
theatre of combat. The second was the availability of military and police power to secure Japanese rule after the
occupation of the territory.

The circumscribed location and dimensions of the empire were also the result of Japan’s overriding concern for
security. Indeed, no colonial empire of modern times was as clearly shaped by strategic considerations as Japan.
With the exception of Taiwan, each of Japan’s colonies was obtained after a deliberate decision at the highest
levels that the territory would meet the strategic interests of Japan. For this reason, Marius Jansen points out
that Japanese imperialism was reactive, in the sense that Japan’s expansion on the continent was largely
undertaken to guarantee the nation’s strategic frontiers. As early as the 1880s Japan’s strategic concerns were
perceived in concentric circles radiating from the home islands: the ‘cordon of sovereignty’ encompassing
territory vital to the nation’s survival and under formal occupation and the ‘cordon of advantage’, which was
an outer limit of informal Japanese dominion, seen as necessary to protect and guarantee the inner line.
Yamagata Aritomo perceived the role of Korea as a buffer ‘zone of advantage’ protecting Japan’s home-island
‘zone of sovereignty’.

Japanese imperialism was also characterized by a level of idealism. The political and social reformism of the
Meiji liberals found an outlet for on the Asian continent and fired some Meiji activists with dreams of
transforming ‘corrupted’ and ‘decaying’ Asian civilizations through reform, a vision which they sought to realize
through their own efforts. More influential were matters of pride and prestige, which involved the nation as a
whole. Starting late in the race for colonies, Edward Chen has pointed out, that Japan viewed its victory over
China in 1894-95 and its consequent acquisition of Taiwan as the shortest route to a place in the sun.

The origins of Japanese imperialism cannot be seen in mono-causal terms. William Rockwood has noted that,
“The quest for empire in East Asia was impelled by no single motive, except that most Japanese were
indoctrinated in varying degrees with a mystical faith in the Imperial destiny. It drew support from various
interest groups and for different reasons. Its momentum and direction reflected a political struggle at home as
well as the resistance it met abroad.”

The military that had seemed to be losing its importance in the 1920s also reasserted itself. In this it was helped
by the prevalence of feudal attitudes as well as the fact that the military could function without a check by the
Diet. The social turmoil caused by industrialization, particularly in the rural areas was also crucial in generating
discontent and a desire for a ‘Showa Restoration’. These desires enabled the young officers and patriotic societies
to extend and deepen their influence to push Japan towards expansion and war.

Japanese imperialism was inspired, justified and moulded by ideologies, which have been described as ‘ultra-
nationalistic’ and ‘fascist’. Common to these ideas was a belief that Japan needed to defend her traditions and
culture together with the countries of Asia, in particular the East Asian countries. Various political societies at
different times propagated such ideas. For example, the supporters of Saigo Takamori formed the Genyosha
(Dark Green Society), which advocated an expansionist policy. The Kokuryukai (Black Dragon Society) formed in
1901 propagated liberation of Asian countries under Japanese leadership. Other societies included the Koku
Suikai (Japanese National Essence Society) formed in 1919 and the Kokuhonsha (National Foundation Society)

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formed in 1924. One of the main objectives of these societies was to save Japan from socialism. Yozonsha was
another society that espoused military expansion abroad and military takeover at home.

The Korean Question

In 1871, Japan signed the Treaty of Amity with China, according to which both countries agreed to unite their
efforts against the west. This was extremely significant because Japan, which had hitherto been treated as a
tributary state by China, was now given equality of status. Conflict soon arose over the issue of control over
Ryukyu Islands. The Ryukyu Islands had been conquered by the Satsuma clan in the 17th century. In 1872, upon
the abolition of the Han system, these islands were incorporated into the prefecture of Okinawa, when the King
of Ryukyu was taken to Tokyo. China protested and demanded the intervention of the USA, but the latter
refused. Eventually, as a compromise, Japan offered the southernmost group of these islands in return for the
extension of the Most Favoured Nation Status to Japan. In 1881 China proposed that both the countries
relinquish their claims to the Ryukyu Islands. No agreement could be reached however, and Sino-Japanese
relations were never cordial after this. In this manner, Japan acquired absolute control over Ryukyu Islands
without any hostilities and armed conflict.

The Korean question brought China and Japan into direct conflict. Japan had great commercial, political and
strategic interests in Korea. Japan believed that since it was the first Asian country to modernize, it had a moral
responsibility to guide its less developed neighbours. According to Marius Jansen, the Japanese rationale
behind this was both internal and external. It was external in that Western imperialism threatened to deprive
Asia of all self-determination, and Japan of any economic or political lebensraum. They were also internal in
terms of a conviction that Japan’s synthesis of the East and the West was the surest path of modernization.

Korea paid tribute to both China and Japan but was closer to China and hostile to Meiji Japan. Korea was
perceived as a part of the larger Chinese domain, the Chung Kuo. In 1872, Japan attempted to enhance trade
relations with Korea but was rebuffed. Samurai groups led by Saigo Takamori demanded an immediate
expedition to Korea to uphold the honour of Japan. But the opposing faction in the government, led by Iwakura
chose internal reconstruction over external aggression at this point of time. This eventually led to the
resignation of Saigo Takamori, the 1879 Satsuma rebellion and the expedition to Formosa (Taiwan) in 1874-75.
The Korean issue however remained unresolved even though Japan was able to establish its control over
Formosa (Taiwan).

In 1876, Korea agreed to diplomatic negotiation with Japan on the advice of China, and the Treaty of Kanghwa
was signed. It has been suggested that China encouraged these negotiations due to her fear of Japan, since she
was aware of Japan’s aggressive designs in Korea and wished to avoid any conflict in that period. The Treaty of
Kanghwa opened three ports for Japanese trade – Pusan, Inson, and Wonsan – and declared Korea to be an
‘independent state’. Following the murder of some Japanese citizens in Korea, another treaty was signed in
August 1882, which authorized the stationing of Japanese troops in Korea. Japanese traders used this position to
economic advantage and expanded exports to Korea. They also began to import rice and soybeans from Korea.
Japan was the destination for about 90 percent of exports from Korea during the 1970s.

Also, in this period, two distinct factions began to emerge at the Korean court. The first was the minority,
progressive faction, which was pro-foreign and pro-Japan. The second was the conservative, pro-China faction,
which wished to continue the old style of relations. In the 1880s, the Japanese government began attempts to
try and forge a close political relationship to Korea, which would supercede Korea’s ties to China. In 1881 Japan
also sent military advisors to the Korean court to help modernize the Korean army. In 1882, anti-foreign
opponents of the king killed several of the Japanese military advisors and took power in a coup. The Japanese
responded by forcing the new government to offer an indemnity and accept Japanese troops stationed in Seoul
to protect Japanese diplomats there.

In 1884, the Seoul uprising took place when the Independence Party attempted a coup, supported by the
Japanese delegation. This liberal Japanese faction included Fukuzawa Yukichi. The rebel forces assassinated

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conservative ministers and seized the Korean king, but two thousand Chinese troops intervened to put down the
coup. Crowds of Koreans angry at the Japanese role behind the uprising joined the counterattack. Yuan Shih-Kai
was the Chinese resident in Korea at this time.

Both China and Japan at this point of time wanted to avoid war and decided to negotiate. While Japan wished to
focus on its internal economic development, China too was preoccupied with the ongoing Sino-French war over
Annam. The Tientsin Convention also known as the Li-Ito Convention was held in 1885. Both countries agreed
to withdraw troops from Korea and to stop training the Korean army. They also agreed not to send troops back
to Korea without informing each other, in the form of a written notification. James McClain suggests that the
Convention did not bring lasting stability because from Japan’s perspective, Korea’s domestic policies remained
impossibly chaotic.

In this period, however it seems that the clauses of the Li-Ito Convention were violated time and again, while
the Chinese under Yuan Shih Kai tried to reestablish control at the Korean court. However, the Japanese did not
react aggressively as they chose to focus their attention elsewhere. Through the 1880s and 1890s the Japanese
government funded a substantial buildup of the navy as well as the army under the leadership of Yamagata. In
addition to these internal developments, Japanese attention was also diverted from Korea due to their
overwhelming desire to break free of the unequal treaty system and rights of extraterritoriality. Also, the USA
was playing an important supportive role for Japan and Japan did not wish to antagonize the USA by an
unnecessary military conflict in the region. Hence, while the period between the Tientsin Convention and the
clash of 1894, was one of relative peace and calm, tensions between the two countries continued to escalate.

In 1894, King Kojong asked China for military assistance to quell the domestic unrest caused due to armed
insurgency by the anti-government and anti-foreign Tonghak Movement. Some 3000 Chinese troops
disembarked near Seoul in June. In the view of Japanese leaders China had clearly violated the Tientsin
Convention by dispatching forces without informing Tokyo, and the prospect of a weak Korea once again allied
closely with a disintegrating China, resurrected the specter of Russian or British intervention in affairs on the
peninsula. Japan officially declared war on China on 1st August 1894. Japanese forces overwhelmed the Chinese
defenders at Pyongyang on 16th September and won a decisive naval battle the following day against Chinese
warships near the mouth of the Yalu river, seized Port Arthur on 21st November and on 12th February 1895
destroyed the Chinese fleet at Weihaiwei. The war eventually ended in complete Japanese victory by April 1895.

The Treaty of Shimonoseki signed on 17th April 1895 marked the end of the First Sino-Japanese war. Japan
demanded the affirmation of “the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea”; cession of the
Manchurian province of Liaoning as well as Taiwan and the nearby Pescadore Islands; the opening of four new
treaty ports; the granting of commercial privileges that included the right to navigate the upper reaches of the
Yangtze river and to import machinery and operate manufacturing establishments in Chinese treaty ports.
Japanese also got railroad building rights in Southern Manchuria. The Southern Manchurian Railway did
become the foundation of an expanding Japanese presence in Manchuria, but in a tripartite intervention in 1895
the Russians worked with French and German diplomats and forced Japan to return the Liaodung peninsula.

The war indemnity amounted to nearly 500 million yen. Ito Hirobumi eventually agreed to reduce the
indemnity by one-third and to confine Japanese territorial claims in Manchuria to the Liaotung peninsula. The
port of Weihaiwei was to be occupied till the indemnity was paid in full. This extraordinary indemnity
amounted to about four and a half times Japan’s annual national budget of the year before the war. Japan’s
overseas trade expanded sharply before and after the Sino-Japanese war. From 1880 to 1913 both imports and
exports increased eightfold in volume, roughly doubling every decade.

The decade before this conflict was however significant for Japan as well because her economic and military
modernization had greatly enhanced her confidence. Japan was now looking at Korea as an outlet for her surplus
population and as a source of food supply. 90% of Japanese foreign trade was with Korea. Following the creation
of a Chinese naval base at Port Arthur by Yuan Shih Kai and the rejection of the naval budget by the Diet, a

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section of Japanese bureaucrats and militarists became keen to have a foreign war which would create feelings of
nationalism and facilitate a united home front.

The events of 1894-95 made Japan the world’s first non-Western imperial power. It introduced Japan to the
modern world affairs. Japan acquired the beginnings of a colonial empire after defeating China in this war and
came out with vastly increased prestige and as the model modernizer of the non-western world. At home too the
war inspired a huge outpouring of nationalist pride. At this time Japan also witnessed the rise of militarism, a
decline in demands for constitutional reforms and further strengthening of the power of the ruling oligarchy.
Under Yamagata Aritomo conscious attempts were made to set up the department of Army and the department
of Navy. The Sino-Japanese war was also accompanied by the emergence of the zaibatsu as a strong force in
Japan.

Parallel to this successful drive for empire of the 1890s, the Japanese government also achieved its long-sought
goal of treaty revision. In July 1894 Japan and Britain signed a new treaty that stipulated a full end to
extraterritoriality. The other powers soon followed suit and signed similar treaties. WG Beasley writes that
with the Sino-Japanese war, Japan became an active participant in the affairs of East Asia. As a result
her concern was now less with defence than with the need to protect her interests overseas. This
entailed a complete rethinking of her relations with the Powers, especially Russia and Great Britain.

The Sino-Japanese war however did not remove the all of Japan’s problems. Relations with Russia soured,
especially after Russia acquired Liaotung peninsula under a 25-year lease, and the rights to build the Chinese
Eastern Railway Track linking Vladivostok to the Trans-Siberian Line. This was important for Russia as it gave
her access to ice-free ports. Meanwhile Britain also took over Weihaiwei in order to secure British interests in
China. Germany acquired special rights in Shantung, and France got control over Yunnan, Kwantung and
Kwangsi as exclusive spheres of influence. In the face of this competition, Japan was perturbed and in 1910
formally annexed Korea. In 1905, Ito Hirobumi, the Resident General of Korea, had negotiated the Korean-
Japanese Convention, which turned Korea into a Japanese protectorate. He engineered the abdication of Kojong
in July 1907, and disbanded the Korean army in August, creating widespread discontent and violence. On 22nd
August 1910, the Treaty of Annexation was signed, which renamed Korea Chosen, made it into a colony of
Japan, and placed total authority over civil and military matters in the Governor-General of Korea.

Anglo-Japanese Alliance
In 1900-1901 Japan sent ten thousand troops to China to suppress the Boxer rebellion. The Boxers were
suppressed and Japan joined the subsequent peace conference as an equal to the other powers. After this the
Japanese began to grow closer to the British. According to Morinosuke Kajima, two courses were open to
Japan to make her position in Korea and Manchuria invulnerable. She could either reach a compromise with
Russia, or seek British cooperation to control Russian expansionism. It was only after Japan realized the futility
of compromising with Russia that the Britain and Japan began to seriously consider an alliance.

At the time of the Boxer rebellion, Ito Hirobumi was in power in Japan and he had followed a pro-Russia policy.
In June 1901, however Ito’s cabinet fell and Ito was replaced by Katsura Taro, a follower of Yamagata Aritomo,
who favoured a British alliance. The cooperative ties of the two countries were formalized with an alliance in
1902. By this agreement Britain recognized Japan’s special interests in Korea, and in turn Japan recognized
Britain’s special interests in China. This alliance was also accompanied by a naval agreement. The Anglo-
Japanese alliance of 1902 was the first time a ‘white’ western power accorded equal status to a ‘non-white’
country. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was supported by many groups at home. An important role was played by
societies such as Kokumin Domei Kai (People’s Alliance Society), militarists and liberals, officials in the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, the Gento and the Emperor.

The immediate impact of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was the security it provided to Japan against Russia.
Russia temporarily withdrew its troops from Manchuria. Japan could now take an aggressive stand against

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Russia since now the fear of a Triple Intervention was gone, because they now had Britain as an ally. This forms
the immediate background to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05.

The Russo-Japanese War (1904-05)

While Russia had withdrawn its troops from Manchuria, the issue was unsolved and Russia continued to covet
Korea. Over the next several years, Japanese leaders sought to solidify their hegemony in Korea. One option
favoured by Ito Hirobumi was a diplomatic deal with the Russians, according to which Japan would grant them
primacy in Manchuria if they would retreat in Korea. Russia however clarified that Korea’s independence would
be preserved and no Korean ports be used for strategic purposes. This was unacceptable to Japan as they wanted
complete control over Korea.

Japan realized that in the context of their recent military and economic development, a declaration of war was
the most feasible option. By February 1904 popular pressure too eventually led the Japanese government to
decide to secure its position in Korea and Manchuria by force. It declared war on Russia, leading to the Russo-
Japanese war (1904-05). Military results were initially mixed. Japan won a string of land battles as it advanced
towards Korea. The army also prevailed in a siege of Port Arthur and in May 1905 the Russian fleet off the
coast of Korea was defeated. Yet the Japanese forces could not rout the Russians completely, and their own
material and human losses were high. The Russians too now wanted to stop fighting especially since they feared
that a continued war would incite revolutionary movements back home.

Japan asked the US President Theodore Roosevelt to mediate a settlement and after many negotiations, Japan
signed the Treaty of Portsmouth with Russia on 5th September 1905. Russia agreed to recognize Japan’s
preponderant interests in Korea and not oppose any measures that Japan might take there. Additional
provisions granted Japan the Russian leasehold over the Liaotung peninsula, the Tsar’s railroad and mining
rights in southern Manchuria, and sovereignty over the southern half of Sakhalin. By the Taft-Katsura
Agreement, the USA also accepted Japan’s paramount interest in Korea and Japan agreed to accept American
suzerainty over the Philippines. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was also revised in 1905, indicating a renewal of
friendship. By 1905 therefore we see that both USA and Britain recognized and supported Japanese claims in
Korea.

Public opinion at home was however disappointed as the material gains were nowhere near what they had been
at the end of the Sino-Japanese war. Riots broke out in Tokyo and soon after, martial law was also declared in
Tokyo. Nonetheless Japan’s position in Taiwan and Korea was now secure from international challenge and
Korea had been shifted from a ‘zone of advantage’ to a ‘zone of sovereignty’. At the same time, Japan’s position
in Manchuria was also strengthened.

Japanese Imperialism in the period of the First World War

According to J.K. Fairbank, Japan’s foreign policy from the Taiwan expedition of 1874 to the annexation of
Korea in 1910 had been consistent; the objectives were security, autonomy and big power status. A second brief
period in the history of Japanese imperialism was from the First World War to 1922. During this period,
notions of ultra-nationalism and Pan-Asian liberation had a significant impact upon Japanese imperialism. In the
1910s and 1920s, the mainstream parties fervently supported empire abroad and sought equality with the
Western imperialist powers. The outbreak of World War I gave the Japanese government a golden opportunity
to extend its power in Asia. The Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 led Japan quickly to join the war on the British
side in August 1914. By the year’s end Japanese troops had taken control of German possessions including
railways and a military base in China’s Shandong peninsula and several Pacific Islands.

Japan’s Twenty One Demands to China

On 18th January 1915, the Japanese Prime Minister presented the young Chinese government led by Yuan Shih
Kai with five sets of specific demands (twenty-one in all). These demands were contained in five groups. Group I
related to the disposition of German economic rights in Shantung. Group II was aimed at strengthening Japan’s
position in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. Group III was intended to secure mining and railway

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concessions in Central China. Group IV was designed to prevent China from ceding or leasing to any third
power any territory along the Chinese coast. Group V termed as ‘wishes’ was drawn up to cover miscellaneous
items like the employment of Japanese advisers by the Chinese government. The fifth group was especially
offensive to the Chinese. The Chinese reacted with outrage and Yuan Shih Kai sought international support.
When the British and the Americans too objected to the more radical demands, the Japanese agreed to withdraw
the claims put forth in Group V. Yuan accepted the other demands.

When the United States entered the war in 1917 it became Japan’s ally. The two governments signed the Ishii-
Lansing Agreement by which both agreed to recognize each other’s colonial possessions in Asia.

In the peace negotiations at Versailles in 1919 Japan participated as one of the victorious allies. Japanese control
over Shantung was confirmed. However, the principle of racial equality that they had demanded was not
included as a clause. These decisions undermined the idealistic claims of the Western powers that principles of
equality and self-determination should anchor the post war international order. They fuelled strong Japanese
anger at the hypocrisy of the Western governments. The Treaty of Versailles and Japanese intervention in
Siberia marked a rocky start to post war cooperative imperialism. The Washington Conference (November
1921-February 1922) protected a stable colonial order in the hands of the victors of the First World War,
including Japan.

In the late 1920s the conflict between the civilian and military wings of the Japanese government for supremacy
had become quite serious. The militarists advocated the Positive China Policy i.e. expansion into and control
over the Chinese mainland. The government had, however changed over to a foreign policy of internationalism,
called Shidehara Diplomacy and was following what came to be known as the Soft China Policy. It was the new
external influences after 1929 – the Great Depression, the rise of Chinese nationalism and the rise to power of
Hitler and Mussolini – that brought about a change in policy.

According to Yanaga, Japan’s attitude and policy were determined by political, economic, military, ideological
and psychological factors. Firstly, Japan was facing an economic crisis due to demographic expansion, rising
unemployment and decline of traditional economy. Secondly, socialist and democratic movements were
threatening the supremacy of the military, and Pan-Asianism seemed to be the perfect answer to them.

The Manchurian Crisis

Manchuria was the most obvious area of focus for Japanese imperialism because of its strategic location, fertile
agricultural economy, ice-free ports and harbours, and rich natural resources, especially minerals. Its fertile
plains were also seen as a friendly destination for emigrant farmers, which would relieve the population
pressures and agrarian poverty at home. It was also a testing ground for the army’s notion of a totalitarian,
regimented socio-economic order.

Following the Sino-Japanese conflict of 1894-95, Japan had received a number of privileges in Manchuria as
well. In 1905, US President Roosevelt declared that Manchuria should be returned to the Chinese and converted
to a neutral zone. After the Russo-Japanese war, Japan however decided to pursue exclusive interests in
Manchuria and pressurized China into granting her economic benefits there. The prevalent view in Japan, which
was favoured by militarists at this time, was to bring about complete control of Manchuria, ignoring the
protests being made by Britain and USA. It was around this time that the relationship between Japan and China
worsened.

In July 1910, in order to counter western intervention, Russia and Japan, by a secret agreement divided
Manchuria into a northern Russian sphere of influence and a Japanese southern sphere of influence. The
instability in China after the 1911 Revolution, made the western powers ambiguous about any intervention, and
this further emboldened Japan.

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Through the 1920s groups of young officers were becoming increasingly frustrated with Japan’s foreign and
domestic policies. The cooperative diplomacy being pursued by the political parties came to be perceived as
weakness. They began to fear the Chinese Nationalist Party’s challenge to Japanese hegemony in Manchuria
and North China and responded with acts of rebellion. The Kwantung Army in Manchuria became one hotbed
of such agitation and the leaders of the Kwantung Army decided to take bold action in Manchuria. On 18th
September 1931, Colonel Ishiwara Kanji’s forces blew up some track of the Southern Manchurian railway and
announced it as the work of Chinese military forces. This is also known as the Mukden Incident. The Kwantung
Army used this as a pretext for a runaway attack on Chinese regional armies in the area. Within less than 48
hours, the whole of Manchuria was captured. Japanese frontiers now extended up to Russia and Japan had
acquired territory three times its own size.

Whether military leadership in Tokyo knew of the planning of these actions, and if so, whether it approved
them, remains controversial to this day. Whatever its prior knowledge, the Tokyo government responded
weakly. PM Inukai Tsuyoshi resisted military pressure to annex Manchuria as a formal colony but allowed the
Kwantung Army to install friendly Chinese leaders in a puppet regime, known as the Manchukuo, founded in
March 1932. It was nominally an independent nation. However in practice Japan retained full control of the
conquered territory. The last emperor of China’s Qing dynasty, Puyi was declared the Manchurian emperor.
Andrew Gordon opines that this decision to create an independent puppet state reflected the ideology
of Pan-Asian liberation and anti-(West) imperialism.

China appealed to the League of Nations and the Lytton Commission appointed by the League clearly rejected
Japan’s claim that military intervention in Manchuria was a proper and necessary act of self-defense. The
League accepted the Lytton Report censuring Japan by the vote of 42 to 1. On 27th March 1933, Japan withdrew
from the League of Nations, while the military began to make simultaneous preparations for an onslaught in
northern China. Many Japanese historians regard the Manchurian Crisis of 1931-32 as the start of what
they call the Fifteen Year War – essentially the start of World War II in Asia. The failure of the League
of Nations in controlling Japanese imperialism not only egged on Japan, but also encouraged radical
Western powers in their aggressive policies.

The reasons for Japanese expansion in Manchuria were many. Yanaga believes that the purpose was not simply
to enhance Japanese status vis-à-vis the western powers. There were many political-economic, military,
psychological, and ideological reasons behind it too. Militarists in Japan saw expansion in Manchuria as the only
way to bring Japan out of her financial crisis. In ideological terms, established groups such as the militarists and
zaibatsu spoke of notions of Pan-Asianism to counter the growing strength of democratic and socialist
movements in Japan.

Following the Manchurian episode, Japan acquired nearly 1 million square miles of territory. This victory
represented the final triumph of the totalitarian, ultra-nationalist, military wing in Japan, and the Party system
was ended. China was ousted from Manchuria.

The Second Sino-Japanese Conflict (1937)

Northern China was still an attractive prospect for the Japanese. Economically, geographically and strategically,
it was seen as useful. The expanding arms industry in Japan was also in need of raw materials that north China
could provide, especially since normal channels of trade were disrupted following the Manchurian crisis. By the
mid 1930s the influence of the Military Academy faction was declining and the Elite War College faction was
coming into prominence. The latter favoured an alliance between the militarists and the zaibatsu for economic
reconstruction. These groups were also promised cooperation for economic ventures in China. This further
encouraged the militarist wing.

The Second Sino-Japanese war began on 7th July 1937 with a clash on the Marco Polo Bridge. Following this
incident the Japanese cabinet authorized the decision to launch a major offensive. They wanted to control the
iron and coal resources in North China. They also believed that Chiang Kai Shek’s Nationalist government

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would always remain a threat to Japan’s control of Manchuria and North China and they hoped to replace it
with a friendly government. In 1937, Japanese forces extended their control south from Beijing. They occupied
the Shandong peninsula, Shanghai, Nanjing and a large portion of the Yellow River. By early 1938 Japan
announced a call for a war to ‘annihilate’ the Nationalist regime. When Japanese troops entered Nanjing in
December, horrific mass murders took place where tens of thousands of people were killed. The scope of the
Nanjing Massacre remains controversial, with figures ranging from forty thousand to three hundred thousand
murders.

The military situation reached a stalemate in the autumn of 1938. The Japanese troops were barely able to
defend the cities and railway lines in the occupied areas and had little control over the countryside and were
under constant threat of guerilla attack. The Nationalist government eventually retreated to the far west where
it was protected by mountains and sheer distance. This was coupled with tensions with the Soviet Union in
Nomonhan in 1939. In March 1940 Japan created and recognized a new Chinese government to administer
these regions more effectively.

Japan entered the Second World War as an ally of the fascist Germany and Italy. Its imperialist designs were
sought to be legitimized by the idea of Pan-Asianism. Japan, by virtue of being the first Asian country to
modernize considered itself to be the leader of all other Asian nations. Japan advocated the notion of the Greater
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. By the time of the Second World War, Japan’s formal empire included Taiwan,
Korea, Sakhalin, the Kwantung territory and the Pacific Islands. Japan had captured most of the Southeast Asia
and reached up to Burma when it was defeated. Japan’s surrender on 14th August 1945 and the occupation of the
country by Allied forces till 1952 gave a deathblow to Japanese imperialism, from which it never recovered.

Thus, in less than eighty years, Japan emerged, from a semi-feudal state as a modernized, industrialized, and
imperial power in its own right. Imperialism became an integral part of Japanese policy because of Japan’s
preoccupation with its defence and sovereignty. As early as 1890, Prime Minister Yamagata had outlined
Japan’s foreign policy objectives as to “preserve our independence and enhance our national position. To this
end, Japan must be prepared to defend both a ‘line of sovereignty’ and a ‘line of advantage’”. Outside the
government, popular support for imperialist policies can also be seen in the activities of the various political
societies mentioned earlier.

Japanese imperialism was similar to western imperialism because both served the national interest of their
respective countries by subjugating the interests of other countries. However, the main difference was that
Japanese imperialism was directed against people with whom they shared cultural and racial affinities such as
Taiwan and Korea. Also, capital investment was not the causative force behind Japanese imperialism as was the
case of Britain. Expansion against other Asian peoples was rationalized by the doctrines of Social Darwinism, by
notions of the superiority of Japan’s unique national polity, and by the idea of a Japanese national mission to
bring progress and modernity to its backward neighbours. One view wanted to assimilate these regions into the
home country because it saw them as sharing a common cultural heritage. Japan’s development had been widely
seen as the triumph of the East over the West, but eventually Japan also followed the same policy of exploiting
these nations that it considered inferior, just as the West had.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ø Marlene J. Mayo – The Emergence of Imperial Japan
Ø James L. McClain – Japan: A Modern History
Ø Andrew Gordon - A Modern History of Japan, From Tokugawa Times to the Present
Ø Morinosuke Kajima – The Emergence of Japan as a World Power 1895 – 1925
Ø JK Fairbank – East Asia

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