SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (TRUSTEES / ADOPTION)
1. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. PEREZ
Art. 445. Whatever is built, planted or sown on
the land of another and the improvements or
repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of
the land, subject to the provision of the
following articles.
FACTS: Petitioner Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) is a government financial
institution and the official depository of the
Philippines. Respondents were officers of
Asian Construction and Development
Corporation (ACDC), a corporation engaged
in the construction business. On several
occasions, respondents executed in favour of
Landbank trust receipts to secure the purchase
of construction materials that they will need in
their construction projects. When the trust
receipts matured, ACDC failed to return to
LBP the proceeds of the construction projects
or the construction materials subject of the
trust receipts. After several demands went
unheeded, LBP filed a complaint for Estafa or
violation of Art. 315, par 1(b) of the RPC, in
relation to PD 115, against the respondent
officers of ACDC.
ISSUE: WON the disputed transaction is a
trust receipt or a loan?
RULING: TRUST RECEIPT
There are two (2) obligations in a trust receipt
transaction : (1) covered by the provision that
refers to money under the obligation to deliver
it (entregarla) to the owner of the merchandise
sold. (2) covered by the provision referring to
merchandise received under the obligation to
return it (devolvera) to the owner.
Thus, under the Trust Receipts Law, intent to
defraud is presumed when (1) the entrustee
fails to turn over the proceeds of the sale of
goods covered by the trust receipt to the
entruster, or (2) when the entrustee fails to
return the goods under trust, if they are not
disposed of in accordance with the terms of
the trust receipts.
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In all trust receipts transactions, both
obligations on the part of the trustee exist in
the alternative the return of the proceeds of
the sale or the return or recovery of the goods,
whether raw, or processed. When both parties
enter into an agreement knowing that the
return of the goods subject of the trust receipts
is not possible even without any fault on the
part of the trustee, it is not a trust receipt
transaction penalized under Section 13 of P.D.
115; the only obligation actually agreed upon
by the parties would be the return of the
proceeds of the sale transaction. This
transaction becomes a mere loan, where the
borrower is obligated to pay the bank the
amount spent for the purchase of the goods.
Article 1371 of the Civil Code provides that in
order to judge the intention of the contracting
parties, their contemporaneous and
subsequent acts shall be principally
considered. Under this provision, we can
examine the contemporaneous actions of the
parties rather than rely purely on the trust
receipts that they signed in order to
understand the transaction through their
intent.
We note in this regard that at the onset of
these transactions, LBP knew that ACDC was
in the construction business and that the
materials that it sought to buy under the
letters of credit were to be used for the
following projects: the Metro Rail Transit
Project and the Clark Centennial Exposition
Project. LBP had in fact authorized the
delivery of the materials on the construction
sites for these projects, as seen in the letters of
credit it attached to its complaint. Clearly, they
were aware of the fact that there was no way
they could recover the buildings or
constructions for which the materials, its
demand letter dated May 4, 1999 sought the
payment of the balance but failed to ask, as an
alternative, for the return of the construction
materials or the buildings where these
materials had been used.
The fact that LBP had knowingly authorized
the delivery of construction materials to a
construction site of two government projects,
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (TRUSTEES / ADOPTION)
as well as unspecified construction materials.
As a government financial institution, LBP
should have been aware that the materials
were to be used for the construction of an
immovable property, the ownership of
whatever was constructed with those
materials would presumably belong to the
owner of the land, under Article 445 of the
Civil Code.
Even if we consider the vague possibility that
the materials, consisting of cement, bolts and
reinforcing steel bars, would be used for the
construction of a movable property, the
ownership of these properties would still
pertain to the government and not remain
with the bank as they would be classified as
property of the public domain, as defined by
the Civil Code.
In contrast with the present situation, it is
fundamental in a trust receipt transaction that
the person who advanced payment for the
merchandise becomes the absolute owner of
said merchandise and continues as owner
until he or she is paid in full, or if the goods
had already been sold, the proceeds should be
turned over to him or her.
2. CASTRO vs GREGORIO
FACTS: This is a petition for review on
Certiorari assailing the decision of the CA
which denied the petition for annulment of
judgment filed by petitioners. The petition
before the appellate court sought to annul the
judgment of the trial court that granted Rs’
decree of adoption.
Atty. Castro was allegedly married to Rosario
Castro (Petitioner). Unfortunately, they
separated later on due to their
incompatibilities and Jose’s alleged
homosexual tendencies. Their marriage bore
two daughters: Rose Marie, who succumbed
to death after nine days from birth due to
congenital heart disease, and Joanne Benedicta
Charissima Castro (Petitioner).
On August 2000, A petition for adoption of
Jose Maria Jed Gregorio (Jed) and Ana Maria
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Regina Gregorio (Regina) was instituted by
Atty. Jose Castro. Atty. Castro alleged that Jed
and Regina were his illegitimate children with
Lilibeth Gregorio (Rosario’s housekeeper).
After a Home Study Report conducted by the
Social Welfare Officer of the TC, the petition
was granted.
A disbarment complaint was filed against
Atty. Castro by Rosario. She alleged that Jose
had been remiss in providing support to his
daughter Joanne for the past 36 year; that she
single-handedly raised and provided financial
support to Joanne while Jose had been
showering gifts to his driver and allege lover,
Larry, and even went to the extent of adopting
Larry’s two children, Jed and Regina, without
her and Joanne knowledge and consent. Atty.
Castro denied the allegation that he had
remiss his fatherly duties to Joanne. He
alleged that he always offered help but it was
often declined. He also alleged that Jed and
Regina were his illegitimate children that’s
why he adopted them. Later on Atty. Castro
died.
Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for
annulment of judgment seeking to annul the
decision of the TC approving Jed and Regina’s
adoption.
Petitioner allege that Rosario’s consent was
not obtained and the document purporting as
Rosario’s affidavit of consent was fraudulent.
P also allege that Jed and Regina’s birth
certificates shows disparity. One set shows
that the father to is Jose, while another set of
NSO certificates shows the father to be Larry.
P further alleged that Jed and Regina are not
actually Jose’s illegitimate children but the
legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who
were married at the time of their birth. CA
denied the petition.
CA held that while no notice was given by the
TC to Rosario and Joanne of the adoption, it
ruled that there is “no explicit provision in the
rules that spouses and legitimate child of the
adopter. . . should be personally notified of the
hearing.”
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (TRUSTEES / ADOPTION)
CA also ruled that the alleged fraudulent
information contained in the different sets of
birth certificates required the determination of
the identities of the persons stated therein and
was, therefore, beyond the scope of the action
for annulment of judgment. The alleged fraud
could not be classified as extrinsic fraud,
which is required in an action for annulment
of judgment.
ISSUES:
1. Whether extrinsic fraud exist in the
instant case?
2. Whether consent of the spouse and
legitimate children 10 years or over of
the adopter is required?
RULING: The grant of adoption over R
should be annulled as the trial court did not
validly acquire jurisdiction over the
proceedings, and the favorable decision was
obtained through extrinsic fraud.
When fraud is employed by a party precisely
to prevent the participation of any other
interested party, as in this case, then the fraud
is extrinsic, regardless of whether the fraud
was committed through the use of forged
documents or perjured testimony during the
trial.
Jose’s actions prevented Rosario and Joanne
from having a reasonable opportunity to
contest the adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne
been allowed to participate, the trial court
would have hesitated to grant Jose’s petition
since he failed to fulfill the necessary
requirements under the law. There can be no
other conclusion than that because of Jose’s
acts, the trial court granted the decree of
adoption under fraudulent circumstances.
RA 8552 requires that the adoption by the
father of a child born out of wedlock obtain
not only the consent of his wife but also the
consent of his legitimate children. (Art. III, Sec.
7, RA 8552)
As a rule, the husband and wife must file a
joint petition for adoption. The law, however,
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provides for several exceptions to the general
rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to
adopt his or her own children born out of
wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not
necessary. But, the spouse seeking to adopt
must first obtain the consent of his or her
spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal
separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario
remained legally married despite their de facto
separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed
and Regina, Rosario must first signify her
consent to the adoption. Since her consent was
not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of
the adopter’s children if they are 10 years old
or older (ART. III, Sec. 9, RA 8552).
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’
consent was required by Republic Act No.
8552. Personal service of summons should
have been effected on the spouse and all
legitimate children to ensure that their
substantive rights are protected. It is not
enough to rely on constructive notice as in this
case. Surreptitious use of procedural
technicalities cannot be privileged over
substantive statutory rights.
Since the trial court failed to personally serve
notice on Rosario and Joanne of the
proceedings, it never validly acquired
jurisdiction.
3. CANG vs CA
FACTS: Petitioner Herbert and his wife, Anna
Marie Clavano, begot three children. The
family was living harmoniously in Cebu until
the Anna Marie learned of an alleged extra
marital affair of her husband with one Wilma
Soco, a family friend. Anna Marie filed for a
legal separation case against Herbert. The
court granted petition and ordered Herbert to
give monthly financial support to the children.
Thereafter, Herbert left for the USA. He filed a
divorce against Anna Marie. The US court
awarded the custody of the children to Anna
Marie and ordered Herbert to send monthly
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (TRUSTEES / ADOPTION)
support. He then remarried thereby acquiring
US citizenship. Not long after, he divorced
anew.
In 1987, respondents Clavano, Anna Marie’s
brother and sister-in-law, filed for an adoption
case in Cebu. It annexed an affidavit of
consent of the eldest child, Keith (14 y/o), and
of the mother Anna Marie. According to the
latter, the father had already abandoned the
kids and since she will be leaving for the US to
work, the care and custody of the children will
be best left to the Clavanos. Also, the couple
has helped her in giving the children’s needs
all these years. Besides, the father reneged on
his obligation to send money as ordered by the
two courts above.
Upon learning of the petition for adoption,
petitioner immediately returned to the
Philippines and filed an opposition thereto,
alleging that, although private respondents
Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were
financially capable of supporting the children
while his finances were too meager compared
to theirs, he could not in conscience, allow
anybody to strip him of his parental authority
over his beloved children.
Pending the adoption case, the adoption court
awarded custody of the children to Herbert as
their mother already left thereby relinquishing
custody over the children.
The petition for adoption was granted. The
trial court ratiocinated that the father
abandoned the children and thus his consent
to the adoption was not anymore necessary.
On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto. Thus, this
present controversy at bench.
ISSUE: Is the consent of the father necessary
in the adoption of the three children?
RULING: Yes. The consent is necessary.
Reversed and set aside.
Art. 188 (NCC). The written consent of the
following to the adoption shall be necessary:
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(1) The person to be adopted, if ten
years of age or over;
(2) The parents by nature of the
child, the legal guardian, or the
proper government
instrumentality;
(3) The legitimate and adopted
children, ten years of age or
over, of the adopting parent or
parents;
(4) The illegitimate children, ten
years of age or over, of the
adopting parents, if living with
said parent and the latters
spouse, if any; and
(5) The spouse, if any, of the person
adopting or to be adopted.
(Underscoring supplied)
Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that
notwithstanding the amendments to the law,
the written consent of the natural parent to the
adoption has remained a requisite for its
validity. Notably, such requirement is also
embodied in Rule 99 of the Rules of Court as
follows:
SEC. 3. Consent to adoption. There shall be filed
with the petition a written consent to the
adoption signed by the child, if fourteen years
of age or over and not incompetent, and by the
childs spouse, if any, and by each of its known
living parents who is not insane or hopelessly
intemperate or has not abandoned the child, or
if there are no such parents by the general
guardian or guardian ad litem of the child, or if
the child is in the custody of an orphan
asylum, childrens home, or benevolent society
or person, by the proper officer or officers of
such asylum, home, or society, or by such
persons; but if the child is illegitimate and has
not been recognized, the consent of its father
to the adoption shall not be required.
(Underscoring supplied)
As clearly inferred from the foregoing
provisions of law, the written consent of the
natural parent is indispensable for the validity
of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the
requirement of written consent can be
dispensed with if the parent has abandoned
the child or that such parent is insane or
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (TRUSTEES / ADOPTION)
hopelessly intemperate. The court may acquire
jurisdiction over the case even without the
written consent of the parents or one of the
parents provided that the petition for adoption
alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption
from compliance therewith. This is in
consonance with the liberality with which this
Court treats the procedural aspect of adoption.
In this case, Herbert substantially proved that
he did not abandon his children. There were
numerous exchanges of letters between them
over the years, he sent things and personal
stuff to them, and in turn, the children
expressed their love for their father. He also
provided receipts for bank deposits made in
favor of the children. Although Herbert did
not fully comply with the orders of the legal
separation court and divorce court to give
financial assistance, it is not enough to strip
him of parental authority. The policy of the
law is not to take the children away from their
parents but for the best interest of the child.
Since the father has shown that he did not
abandon his children and they retain
emotional attachments to each other, his
authority over his biological children should
not be disturbed.
4. VDA DE JACOB vs CA
FACTS: Plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein]
claimed to be the surviving spouse of
deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was
appointed Special Administratix for the
various estates of the deceased by virtue of
a reconstructed Marriage Contract between
herself and the deceased.
Defendant-appellee on the other hand,
claimed to be the legally-adopted son of
Alfredo. In support of his claim, he presented
an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by then
Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines
Sur, granting the petition for adoption filed by
deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil.
ISSUE: WON Thea decree of adoption is
sufficient to admit the same?
RULING: No. The burden of proof in
establishing adoption is upon the person
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claiming such relationship. This Respondent
Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence
presented by petitioner shows that the alleged
adoption is a sham.
5. REPUBLIC vs CA
FACTS: The petition below was filed on
September 2, 1988 by private respondents
spouses Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P.
Caranto for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon,
then fifteen years old, who had been living
with private respondent Jaime B. Caranto
since he was seven years old. When private
respondents were married on January 19,
1986, the minor Midael C. Mazon stayed with
them under their care and custody. Private
respondents prayed that judgement be
rendered:
a) Declaring the child Michael C.
Mazon the child of petitioners for all
intents and purposes;
b) Dissolving the authority vested in
the natural parents of the child; and
c) That the surname of the child be
legally changed to that of the
petitioners and that the first name
which was mistakenly registered as
MIDAEL be corrected to MICHAEL.
The RTC set the case for hearing on September
21, 1988, giving notice thereof by publication
in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Province of Cavite and by service of the order
upon the Department of Social Welfare and
Development and the Office of the Solicitor
General.
The Solicitor General opposed the petition
insofar as it sought the correction of the name
of the child from Midael to Michael. He
argued that although the correction sought
concerned only a clerical and innocuous error,
it could not be granted because the petition
was basically for adoption, not the correction
of an entry in the civil registry under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court.
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (TRUSTEES / ADOPTION)
ISSUES:
1. WON publication in adoption and
change of name should be made to
give jurisdiction to the court?
2. WON the Civil Registrar should be
impleaded in the adoption case?
RULING: The local civil registrar is thus
required to be made a party to the proceeding.
He is an indispensable party, without whom
no final determination of the case can be had.
As he was not impleaded in this case much
less given notice of the proceeding, the
decision of the trial court, insofar as it granted
the prayer for the correction of entry, is void.
The absence of-an indispensable party in a
case renders ineffectual all the proceedings
subsequent to the filing of the complaint
including the judgment. Nor was notice of the
petition for correction of entry published as
required by Rule 108, 4 which reads: 4. Notice
and publication. - Upon filing of the petition,
the court shall, by an order, fix the time and
place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
persons named in the petition. The court shall
also cause the order to be published once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the
province. While there was notice given by
publication in this case, it was notice of the
petition for adoption made in compliance with
Rule 99, 4. In that notice only the prayer for
adoption of the minor was stated. Nothing
was, mentioned that in addition the correction
of his name in the civil registry was also being
sought. The local civil registrar -was thus
deprived of notice and, consequently, of the
opportunity to be heard. The necessary
consequence of the failure to implead the civil
registrar as an indispensable party and to give
notice by publication of the petition for
correction of entry was to render the
proceeding of the trial court, so far as the
correction of entry was concerned, null and
void for lack of jurisdiction both as to party
and as to the subject matter.
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6. REYES vs MAURICIO
FACTS: Eugenio Reyes (Eugenio) was the
registered owner of a parcel of land located at
Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan). Said title came from
and cancelled TCT No. T-62290 registered in
the name of Eufracia and Susana Reyes,
siblings of Eugenio. The subject property was
adjudicated to Eugenio by virtue of an
extrajudicial settlement among the heirs
following the death of his parents.
The controversy stemmed from a complaint
filed before the DARAB of Malolos, Bulacan
by respondents Librada F. Mauricio (Librada),
now deceased, and her alleged daughter
Leonida F. Mauricio (Leonida) for annulment
of contract denominated as Kasunduan and
between Librada and Eugenio as parties.
Respondents also prayed for maintenance of
their peaceful possession with damages.
Respondents alleged that they are the legal
heirs of the late Godofredo Mauricio
(Godofredo), who was the lawful and
registered tenant of Eugenio through his
predecessors-in-interest to the subject land;
that , Godofredo had been working on the
subject land and introduced improvements
consisting of fruit-bearing trees, seasonal
crops, a residential house and other
permanent improvements; that through fraud,
deceit, strategy and other unlawful means,
Eugenio caused the preparation of a document
denominated as Kasunduan to eject
respondents from the subject property, and
had the same notarized by Notary Public Ma.
Sarah G. Nicolas in Pasig, Metro Manila; that
Librada never appeared before the Notary
Public; that Librada was illiterate and the
contents of the Kasunduan were not read nor
explained to her; that Eugenio took undue
advantage of the weakness, age, illiteracy,
ignorance, indigence and other handicaps of
Librada in the execution of the Kasunduan
rendering it void for lack of consent; and that
Eugenio had been employing all illegal means
to eject respondents from the subject property.
Respondents prayed for the declaration of
nullity of the Kasunduan and for an order for
Eugenio to maintain and place them in
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (TRUSTEES / ADOPTION)
peaceful possession and cultivation of the
subject property. Respondents likewise
demanded payment of damages.
Eugenio averred that no tenancy relationship
existed between him and respondents. He
clarified that Godofredo’s occupation of the
subject premises was based on the former’s
mere tolerance and accommodation. Eugenio
denied signing a tenancy agreement, nor
authorizing any person to sign such an
agreement. He maintained that Librada,
accompanied by a relative, voluntarily affixed
her signature to the Kasunduan and that she
was fully aware of the contents of the
document.
Provincial Adjudicator- concluded that
Godofredo was the tenant of Eugenio, and
Librada, being the surviving spouse, should be
maintained in peaceful possession of the
subject land.
DARAB - Mauricio’s are former tenants of
Spouses Reyes. It found that when Spouses
Reyes died, siblings Eufracia, Susana and
Eugenio, among others inherited the subject
property. Under the law, they were
subrogated to the rights and substituted to the
"obligations" of their late parents as the
agricultural lessors over the farmholding
tenanted by respondents
CA - It sustained the factual findings of the
DARAB with respect to the tenancy relation
between Godofredo and Spouses Reyes and
the nullity of the Kasunduan.
As an incidental issue, Leonida’s legal
standing as a party was also assailed by
Eugenio.1avvphi1 Eugenio submitted that the
complaint was rendered moot with the death
of Librada, Godofredo’s sole compulsory heir.
Eugenio contended that Leonida is a mere
ward of Godofredo and Librada, thus, not a
legal heir.
ISSUE: Whether or not Eugenio cannot
collaterally attack the status of Leonida in the
instant petition
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HELD: No.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested
by way of defense or as a collateral issue in
another action for a different purpose. The
necessity of an independent action directly
impugning the legitimacy is more clearly
expressed in the Mexican code (article 335)
which provides: "The contest of the legitimacy
of a child by the husband or his heirs must be
made by proper complaint before the
competent court; any contest made in any
other way is void." This principle applies
under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171
of the code confirm this view, because they
refer to "the action to impugn the legitimacy."
This action can be brought only by the
husband or his heirs and within the periods
fixed in the present articles.
In Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan
City, Negros Occidental, the Court stated that
legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only
in a direct action seasonably filed by the
proper party, and not through collateral
attack.
The same rule is applied to adoption such that
it cannot also be made subject to a collateral
attack. In Reyes v. Sotero,this Court reiterated
that adoption cannot be assailed collaterally in
a proceeding for the settlement of a decedent’s
estate. Furthermore, in Austria v. Reyes, the
Court declared that the legality of the
adoption by the testatrix can be assailed only
in a separate action brought for that purpose
and cannot be subject to collateral attack.
7. IN THE MATTER OF STEPHANIE
NATHY ASTORGA-GARCIA
FACTS: Honorato Catindig filed a petition to
adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie
Nathy Astorga Garcia. He prayed that the
child's middle name Astorga be changed to
Garcia, her mother's surname, and that her
surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his
surname.
Before the adoption, the child had been using
her natural mother's middle name and
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (TRUSTEES / ADOPTION)
surname. The petitioner wanted to change the
child's name such that the child would keep
her natural mother's surname as her middle
name and the petitioner's surname as her
surname. The trial court denied the
petitioner's request as there was no law that
allowed an adopted child to use the surname
of the child's biological mother as the child's
middle name.
The petitioner appealed the decision arguing
that while there is no law providing that an
adopted child can use the natural mother's
surname as a middle name, there is no law
prohibiting it either. It is also customary for
every Filipino to have the surname of the
mother as a middle name and the use in this
instance is customary, not opposed by any
interested party or prohibited by any laws.
The petitioner argued that adoption is for the
benefit and best interest of the adopted child,
hence the child's right to bear a proper name
should not be violated. In addition, permitting
the child to use her mother's surname as her
middle name avoids the stigma of her
illegitimacy.
ISSUE: Whether or not an illegitimate child
may use the surname of her mother as her
middle name when she is subsequently
adopted by her natural father.
RULING: The Court held that there is no law
expressly prohibiting the child to use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle
name and what is not prohibited by law, is
allowed. It is customary for every Filipino to
have a middle name, which is ordinarily the
surname of the mother. While not set out in
law this custom has been recognized during
the lawmaking process. In fact, the Family
Law Committees had agreed that the initial or
surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father.
The Court also said that it is necessary to
preserve and maintain the child’s relationship
with her natural mother because under the
law, she remains an intestate heir of the
mother. The underlying intent of adoption law
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is in favour of the child and the effects of
adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a
legitimate child of the adopter for all intents
and purposes under the law. Being a
legitimate child by virtue of her adoption by
the petitioner, it follows that the child is
entitled to all the rights provided by law to a
legitimate child without discrimination of any
kind, including the right to bear the surname
of her father and her mother.
Adoption law should be interpreted and
construed liberally to carry out the beneficial
purposes of adoption with the interests and
welfare of the adopted child being the primary
and paramount consideration.
8. IN RE: ADOPTION OF MICHELLE
AND MICHAEL LIM
FACTS: Monina Limmarried Primo Lim
(Lim) on June 1974.
They were childless. Minor children, whose
parents were unknown, were entrusted to
them by a certain Lucia Ayuban.
Petitioner and Lim registered the children to
make it appear that they were the children’s
parents. The children2 were named Michelle
P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim
(Michael).
The spouses reared and cared for the children
as if they were their own but on November
1998, Lim died.
On 27 December 2000, petitioner married
Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the
children by availing of the amnesty given
under Republic Act No. 85526 (RA 8552) to
those individuals who simulated the birth of a
child.
At the time of the filing of the petitions for
adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and
already married, while Michael was 18 years
and seven months old.
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (TRUSTEES / ADOPTION)
RTC RULING: Trial court dismissed the
petitions.
The trial court ruled that since petitioner had
remarried, petitioner should have filed the
petition jointly with her new husband. The
trial court ruled that joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is mandatory citing
Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article
185 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner, who has
remarried, can singly adopt.
RULING: NO.
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions
for adoption were filed, petitioner had already
remarried. She filed the petitions by herself,
without being joined by her husband Olario.
We have no other recourse but to affirm the
trial court’s decision denying the petitions for
adoption.
Sec.7, Art III of RA 8552 reads:
“Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except
in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the
legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt
his/her own illegitimate son/daughter:
Provided, however, That the other
spouse has signified his/her consent
thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally
separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly
adopt, or one spouse adopts the
illegitimate son/daughter of the other,
joint parental authority shall be
exercised by the spouses.”
The use of the word "shall" in the above-
quoted provision means that joint adoption by
the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is
in consonance with the concept of joint
40
parental authority over the child which is the
ideal situation.
The law is clear. There is no room for
ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the
time the petitions for adoption were filed,
must jointly adopt.
Since the petitions for adoption were filed
only by petitioner herself, without joining her
husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in
denying the petitions for adoption on this
ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the
three exceptions enumerated in Section 7.
First, the children to be adopted are not the
legitimate children of petitioner or of her
husband Olario. Second, the children are not
the illegitimate children of petitioner. And
third, petitioner and Olario are not legally
separated from each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the
adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent
does not suffice. There are certain
requirements that Olario must comply being
an American citizen.
Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to
affirm the trial court’s decision favoring
adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear
and it cannot be modified without violating
the proscription against judicial legislation.
9. NERY vs SAMPANA
FACTS: Melody Nery (Nery) engage in the
services of Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana
(Sampana) for the annulment of her marriage
and for her adoption by an alien adopter. The
petition for annulment was granted. As for the
adoption, Sampana asked Nery if she had an
aunt, whom they could represent as the wife
of her alien adopter. Thereafter, Nery paid
Sampana in installment and did not ask for
receipts since she trusted Sampana.
Nery alleged that Sampana sent a text message
informing her that he already filed the petition
for adoption and it was already published.
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (TRUSTEES / ADOPTION)
Furthermore, Samapana informed Nery that
they needed to rehearse before the hearing.
When Nery asked why she did not receive
notices from the court, Sampana claimed that
her presence was no longer necessary because
the hearing was only jurisdictional. Nery
inquired about the status of the petition for
adoption and discovered that there was no
such petition filed in the court.
Sampana argued that Nery’s allegations were
self-serving and unsubstantiated. However, he
admitted receiving "one package fee" from
Nery for both cases of annulment of marriage
and adoption. He alleged that Nery insisted
on being adopted despite the factors that
affects the adoption. Thus, he suggested that
"if the [alien] adopter would be married to a
close relative of, the adoption could be
possible." he, required Nery to submit the
documents, including the marriage contracts
and the certification of the alien’s qualification
to adopt from the Japanese Embassy. Nery
furnished the blurred marriage contract, but
not the certification. He alleged that he
prepared the petition for adoption but did not
file it because he was still waiting for the
certification.
Sampana denied that he misled Nery as to the
filing of the petition for adoption. Sampana
claimed that Nery could have mistaken the
proceeding for the annulment case with the
petition for adoption, and that the annulment
case could have overshadowed the adoption
case. In any case, Sampana committed to
refund the amount Nery paid him, after
deducting his legal services and actual
expenses.
IBP found Sampana guilty of malpractice for
making Nery believed that he filed the petition
for adoption and for failing to file the petition
despite receiving his legal fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not Nery can be legally
adopted.
RULING: NO. In the present case, Sampana
admitted that despite receiving this fee, he
unjustifiably failed to file the petition for
41
adoption and fell short of his duty of due
diligence and candor to his client. Sampana’s
proffered excuse of waiting for the
certification before filing the petition for
adoption is disingenuous and flimsy.
In his position paper, he suggested to Nery
that if the alien adopter would be married to
her close relative, the intended adoption could
be possible. Under the Domestic Adoption Act
provision, which Sampana suggested, the
alien adopter can jointly adopt a relative
within the fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity of his/her Filipino spouse, and the
certification of the alien’s qualification to
adopt is waived.
Clearly, there was no proof that the adoption
may be granted for under the Rules on
Adoption A.M no. 2-06-02 SC under Sec 5
(Domestic Adoption) and Sec 29 (Inter-country
Adoption), petitioner does not in any of those
that are enumerated by the law. The law
provides the following:
SEC. 29. Who may be adopted. –
Only a child legally available for
domestic adoption may be the subject
of Inter-country adoption.
SEC. 5. Who may be adopted. – The
following may be adopted: (1) Any
person below eighteen (18) years of
age who has been voluntarily
committed to the Department under
Articles 154, 155 and 156 of P.D. No.
603 or judicially declared available for
adoption; (2) The legitimate child of
one spouse, by the other spouse; (3)
An illegitimate child, by a qualified
adopter to raise the status of the
former to that of legitimacy; (4) A
person of legal age regardless of civil
status, if, prior to the adoption, said
person has been consistently
considered and treated by the
adopters as their own child since
minority; (5) A child whose adoption
has been previously rescinded; (6) A
child whose biological or adoptive
parents have died: Provided, That no
proceedings shall be initiated within
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (TRUSTEES / ADOPTION)
six (6) months from the time of death
of said parents. (7) A child not
otherwise disqualified by law or these
rules. (DOMESTIC ADOPTION)
Likewise as stated in Sec 4 of the same
rule, it states that:
SEC. 4. Who may adopt. – The
following may adopt: (2) Any alien
possessing the same qualifications as
above-stated for Filipino nationals:
Provided, That his country has
diplomatic RELATIONS with the
Republic of the Philippines, that he
has been living in the Philippines for
at least three (3) continuous years
prior to the filing of the petition for
adoption and maintains such
residence until the adoption decree is
entered, that he has been certified by
his diplomatic or consular office or
any appropriate government agency
to have the legal capacity to adopt in
his country, and that his government
allows the adoptee to enter his
country as his adopted child.
Provided, further, That the
requirements on residency and
certification of the alien’s qualification
to adopt in his country may be waived
for the following: Xxx xxx xx (iii) one
who is married to a Filipino citizen
and seeks to adopt jointly with his
spouse a relative within the fourth
(4th) degree of consanguinity or
affinity of the Filipino spouse.
Since there was no valid proof or
evidence to justify the adoption
proceedings, the petition for adoption
should be dismissed.
10. CASTRO vs GREGORIO
FACTS: Atty. Castro was allegedly married to
Rosario Castro (Petitioner). Unfortunately,
they separated later on due to their
incompatibilities and Jose’s alleged
homosexual tendencies. Their marriage bore
two daughters: Rose Marie, who succumbed
42
to death after nine days from birth due to
congenital heart disease, and Joanne Benedicta
Charissima Castro (Petitioner).
On August 2000, a petition for adoption of
Jose Maria Jed Gregorio (Jed) and Ana Maria
Regina Gregorio (Regina) was instituted by
Atty. Jose Castro. Atty. Castro alleged that Jed
and Regina were his illegitimate children with
Lilibeth Gregorio (Rosario’s housekeeper).
After a Home Study Report conducted by the
Social Welfare Officer of the TC, the petition
was granted.
Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for
annulment of judgment seeking to annul the
decision of the TC approving Jed and Regina’s
adoption.
Petitioner allege that Rosario’s consent was
not obtained and the document purporting as
Rosario’s affidavit of consent was fraudulent.
P also allege that Jed and Regina’s birth
certificates shows disparity. One set shows
that the father to is Jose, while another set of
NSO certificates shows the father to be Larry.
P further alleged that Jed and Regina are not
actually Jose’s illegitimate children but the
legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who
were married at the time of their birth. CA
denied the petition.
CA held that while no notice was given by the
TC to Rosario and Joanne of the adoption, it
ruled that there is “no explicit provision in the
rules that spouses and legitimate child of the
adopter should be personally notified of the
hearing.
CA also ruled that the alleged fraudulent
information contained in the different sets of
birth certificates required the determination of
the identities of the persons stated therein and
was, therefore, beyond the scope of the action
for annulment of judgment. The alleged fraud
could not be classified as extrinsic fraud,
which is required in an action for annulment
of judgment.
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (TRUSTEES / ADOPTION)
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the adoption is valid.
2. Whether consent of the spouse and
legitimate children 10 years or over of
the adopter is required?
RULING:
1. The grant of adoption over R should
be annulled as the trial court did not
validly acquire jurisdiction over the
proceedings, and the favorable
decision was obtained through
extrinsic fraud.
When fraud is employed by a party
precisely to prevent the participation
of any other interested party, as in this
case, then the fraud is extrinsic,
regardless of whether the fraud was
committed through the use of forged
documents or perjured testimony
during the trial.
Jose’s actions prevented Rosario and
Joanne from having a reasonable
opportunity to contest the adoption.
Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed
to participate, the trial court would
have hesitated to grant Jose’s petition
since he failed to fulfill the necessary
requirements under the law. There can
be no other conclusion than that
because of Jose’s acts, the trial court
granted the decree of adoption under
fraudulent circumstances.
2. RA 8552 requires that the adoption by
the father of a child born out of
wedlock obtain not only the consent of
his wife but also the consent of his
legitimate children.(Art.III, Sec.7, RA
8552)
As a rule, the husband and wife must
file a joint petition for adoption. The
law, however, provides for several
exceptions to the general rule, as in a
situation where a spouse seeks to
adopt his or her own children born
out of wedlock. In this instance, joint
43
adoption is not necessary. But, the
spouse seeking to adopt must first
obtain the consent of his or her
spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal
separation or annulment, Jose and
Rosario remained legally married
despite their de facto separation. For
Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and
Regina, Rosario must first signify her
consent to the adoption. Since her
consent was not obtained, Jose was
ineligible to adopt.
The law also requires the written
consent of the adopter’s children if
they are 10 years old or older (ART.III,
Sec.9, RA 8552).
For the adoption to be valid,
petitioners’ consent was required by
Republic Act No. 8552. Personal
service of summons should have been
effected on the spouse and all
legitimate children to ensure that their
substantive rights are protected. It is
not enough to rely on constructive
notice as in this case. Surreptitious use
of procedural technicalities cannot be
privileged over substantive statutory
rights.
Since the trial court failed to
personally serve notice on Rosario and
Joanne of the proceedings, it never
validly acquired jurisdiction.
11. BARTOLOME vs SSS
NATURE OF THE CASE:
This Appeal, filed under Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court, seeks to annul the March 17, 2010
Decisionof the Employees Compensation
Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. SL-18483-
0218-10, entitled Bernardina P. Bartolome v.
Social Security System (SSS) [Scanmar
Maritime Services, Inc.}, declaring that
petitioner is not a beneficiary of the deceased
employee under Presidential Decree No. (PD)
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (TRUSTEES / ADOPTION)
442, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines, as amended by PD 626.
FACTS: John Colcolis a legally adopted child
of Cornelio Colcol( Great Grandfather ).
Cornelio died when John was only Four (4)
years of age.
When John was already independent, he was
employed as an electrician (Seaman) of
Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was
enrolled under the government’s Employees’
Compensation Program (ECP). He died due to
an accident while on board the vessel Maersk
Danville while it was in Brazil. John was, at
the time of his death, childless and unmarried(
Single ). Thus, petitioner Bernardina P.
Bartolome, John’s biological mother and,
allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a
claim for death benefits.
SSS denied the claim on the ground
that Bernardina was no longer considered as
the parent of John since the latter was legally
adopted by Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is
Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary
beneficiary, not petitioner.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the death of the
adopter during the adoptee’s minority
results to the restoration of the
parental authority to the biological
parents of the latter.
2. Whether or not Bernardina is
considered as a legal beneficiary of
John.
RULING:
FIRST ISSUE: Yes.
The Court ruled that John’s minority at the
time of his adopter’s death is a significant
factor in the case at bar. Under such
circumstance, parental authority should be
deemed to have reverted in favor of the
biological parents. Otherwise, taking into
account our consistent ruling that adoption is
44
a personal relationship and that there are no
collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who
was then left to care for the minor adopted
child if the adopter passed away?
The Court also applied by analogy, insofar as
the restoration of custody is concerned, the
provisions of law on rescission of adoption
wherein if said petition is granted, the parental
authority of the adoptee’s biological parents
shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor
or incapacitated.
The manner herein of terminating the
adopter’s parental authority, unlike the
grounds for rescission, justifies the retention of
vested rights and obligations between the
adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent
restoration of parental authority in favor of the
biological parents, simultaneously, ensures
that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left
to fend for himself at such a tender age.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the
biological parents retain their rights of
succession to the estate of their child who was
the subject of adoption. While the benefits
arising from the death of an SSS covered
employee do not form part of the estate of the
adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal
or intestate succession at least reveals the
policy on the rights of the biological parents
and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to
receive benefits from the adopted. In the same
way that certain rights still attach by virtue of
the blood relation, so too should certain
obligations, which, the Court ruled, include
the exercise of parental authority, in the event
of the untimely passing of their minor
offspring’s adoptive parent.
SECOND ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption of
John, without more, does not deprive
petitioner of the right to receive the benefits
stemming from John’s death as a dependent
parent, given Cornelio’s untimely demise
during John’s minority. Since the parent by
adoption already died, then the death benefits
under the Employees’ Compensation Program
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (TRUSTEES / ADOPTION)

shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John’s

sole remaining beneficiary.

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