Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
COURT OF APPEALS
FACT :
The SEC Hearing Panel then issued an Omnibus Order directing this time
the creation of the Mancom and likewise granted an earlier Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration filed by creditor banks which sought to annotate the
suspension order on the titles of the properties of the private respondent
corporations. This directive expressly stated that the same was without
prejudice to the resolution of petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss. Aggrieved,
petitioner immediately took recourse to the Court of Appeals by filing
therewith a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. It
imputed grave abuse of 26 discretion on the part of the SEC Hearing Panel
in precipitately issuing the suspension order and in prematurely directing
the creation of the Mancom prior to the scheduled hearing of its Motion to
Dismiss. Petitioner lamented that these actions of the panel deprived it of
due process by effectively rendering moot and academic its Motion to dismiss
which allegedly presented a prejudicial question to the propriety of creating a
Mancom. Meanwhile, members of the so-called steering committee of the
consortium filed with the appellate court an Urgent Motion for Intervention
and a Consolidated Intervention and Counter-Motion for Contempt and for
the Imposition of Disciplinary Measures Against Petitioner’s Counsel
claiming that they were not impleaded at all by petitioner in its petition
before the appellate court when in fact they had actual, material, direct and
legal interest in the outcome of said case as owners of at least eighty-five
percent (85%) of private respondents’ obligations.
ISSUE:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that what determines the nature of an action,
as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations of
the complaint, or a petition as in this case, and the character of the relief
sought. that the petitioner’s reasoning that the Yutingcos and the corporate
entities making up the EYCO Group, on the basis of the footnote that the
former were filing the petition because they bound themselves as surety to
the corporate obligations, should be considered as mere individuals who
should file their petition for suspension of payments with the regular courts
pursuant to Section 2 of the Insolvency Law. The doctrine of piercing the veil
of corporate fiction heavily relied upon by petitioner is entirely misplaced, as
said doctrine only applies when such corporate fiction is used to defeat
public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime.
TIMES TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC. VS. SANTOS SOTELO, ET AL.
G.R.NO. 163786
FACTS:
ISSUE: Whether or not piercing the corporate veil in this case was proper.
RULING:
Yes. We have held that piercing the corporate veil is warranted only in cases
when the separate legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify
wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, such that in the case of two
corporations, the law will regard the corporations as merged into one. It may
be allowed only if the following elements concur: (1) control—not mere stock
control, but complete domination—not only of finances, but of policy and
business practice in respect to the transaction attacked; (2) such control
must have been used to commit a fraud or a wrong to perpetuate the
violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or a dishonest andan
unjust act in contravention of a legal right; and (3) the said control and
breach of duty musthave proximately caused the injury or unjust loss
complained of.
FACTS:
During the date of the pre-trial conference, counsel for petitioner bank
appeared, presenting a special power of attorney executed by Citibank officer
Florencia Tarriela in favor of petitioner bank’s counsel, J.P. Garcia and
Associates, to represent and bind petitioner bank at the pre-trial conference
of the case at bar. Inspite of this special power of attorney, counsel for
private respondents orally moved to declare petitioner bank as in default on
the ground that the special power of attorney was not executed by the Board
of Directors of Citibank.
RULING:
No. Just as a natural person may authorize another to do certain acts in his
behalf, so may the board of directors of a corporation validly delegate some
of its functions to individual officers or agents appointed by it.
FACTS:
On July 20, 1998, private respondent filed before the Labor Arbiter a petition
for regularization of employment against the petitioner. On August 1, 1998,
however, she was dismissed from employment. Respondent converted her
petition for regularization into a complaint for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter
Madjayran H. Ajan rendered a decision on July 13, 1999, dismissing the
complaint against the petitioner. Private respondent appealed before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The NLRC reversed the ruling
of the Labor Arbiter and held that: (1) MANRED is a labor-only contractor,
and (2) private respondent was illegally dismissed. Petitioner subsequently
appealed before the Court of Appeals but dismissed the petition on the
ground of non-compliance with the rule on certification against forum
shopping taking into account that the aforesaid certification was subscribed
and verified by the Personnel Director of petitioner corporation without
attaching thereto his authority to do so for and in behalf of petitioner
corporation per board resolution or special power of attorney executed by the
latter. The petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration which was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
No. Petitioner’s contention that the filing of a motion for reconsideration with
an appended certificate of non forum-shopping suffices to cure the defect in
the pleading is absolutely specious. It negates the very purpose for which the
certification against forum shopping is required: to inform the Court of the
pendency of any other case which may present similar issues and involve
similar parties as the one before it. The requirement applies to both natural
and juridical persons. Well-settled is the rule that the certificate of non-
forum shopping is a mandatory requirement. Substantial compliance applies
only with respect to the contents of the certificate but not as to its presence
in the pleading wherein it is required
INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT
G.R.No. L- 67626
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether Remo Jr. should be held personally liable together with Akron
Transport International, Inc.
RULING:
No, the environmental facts of this case show that there is no cogent basis to
pierce the corporate veil of Akron and hold petitioner personally liable. While
it is true that in December, 1977 petitioner was still a member of the board
of directors of Akron and that he participated in the adoption of a resolution
authorizing the purchase of 13 trucks for the use in the brokerage business
of Akron to be paid out of a loan to be secured from a lending institution, it
does not appear that said resolution was intended to defraud anyone. The
word "WE' in the said promissory note must refer to the corporation which
Coprada represented in the execution of the note and not its stockholders or
directors. Petitioner did not sign the said promissory note so he cannot be
personally bound thereby. It is his inherent right as a stockholder 5 to
dispose of his shares of stock anytime he desires.
Rural Bank of Lipa City, Inc. vs. Court of appeals
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not Pepsi still had juridical personality to pursue its case against
Reburiano after a shortening of its corporate existence.
RULING:
Yes. Petitioners are in error in contending that "a dissolved and non-existing
corporation could no longer be represented by a lawyer and that a lawyer
could not appear as counsel for a non-existing judicial person.” 453 The only
reason for their refusal to execute the same is that there is no existing
corporation to which they are indebted. Such argument is untenable. The
law specifically allows a trustee to manage the affairs of the corporation in
liquidation. Consequently, any supervening fact, such as the dissolution of
the corporation, repeal of a law, or any other fact of similar nature would not
serve as an effective bar to the enforcement of such right. As clearly stated in
Section 122 of the Corporation Code: Section122: Corporate Liquidation. —
Every Corporation whose charter expires by its own limitation or is annulled
by forfeiture or otherwise, or whose corporate existence for other purposes is
terminated in any other manner, shall nevertheless be continued as a body
corporate for three (3) years after the time when it would have been so
dissolved, for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits by or against it
and enabling it to settle and close its affairs, to dispose of and convey its
property and to distribute its assets, but not for the purpose of continuing
the business for which it was established. At any time during said three (3)
years, said corporation is authorized the empowered to convey all of its
property to trustees for the benefit of stockholders, members, creditors, and
other persons in interest. From and after any such conveyance by the
corporation of its property in trust for the benefit of its stockholders,
members, creditors and others in interests, all interests which the
corporation had in the property in terminates, the legal interest vests in the
trustees, and the beneficial interest in the stockholders, members, creditors
or other persons in interest. Petitioners argue that while private respondent
Pepsi Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines, Inc. undertook a voluntary
dissolution on July 3, 1983 and the process of liquidation for three (3) years
thereafter, there is no showing that a trustee or receiver was ever appointed.
They contend that Section 122 of the Corporation Code does not authorize a
corporation, after the three-year liquidation period, to continue actions
instituted by it within said period of three years. Here, the change in the
status of private respondent took place in 1983, when it was dissolved,
during the pendency of its case in the trial court. The change occurred prior
to the rendition of judgment by the trial court. Rules of fair play, justice, and
due process dictate that parties cannot raise for the first time on appeal
issues which they could have raised but never did during the trial and even
on appeal from the decision of the trial court
MARUBENI CORPORATION VS. LIRAG, 362 SCRA 620 (2001)
G.R.NO. 130998
FACTS:
ISSUE:
In this appeal, petitioners raise the following issues: (1) whether or not there
was a consultancy agreement between petitioners and respondent; and
corollary to this, (2) whether or not respondent is entitled to receive a
commission if there was, in fact, a consultancy agreement
RULING: